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Improvement Boards: Building Capability for Public Service Improvement Through Peer Support
Carol Yapp and Chris Skelcher
Improvement boards offer a new approach to supporting stronger performance by public service organizations, and especially those facing significant issues of change. They involve formalized peer challenge and support by senior politicians and managers from other agencies. The authors document early experiences with improvement boards in local government and draw conclusions for policy and practice. Improvement boards will have the most impact where the organizations leadership already has some understanding of the performance improvement task, and is able to position the board as part of a wider strategy for change.
The question of how to enable the improvement of public service organizations has become particularly significant in recent years. Governments internationally have developed a series of policy initiatives, including the use of market devices, inspection and performance ranking systems, change of organizational leadership, enhanced citizen and user voice, and supervision by central ministries. In parallel, academic research has begun to open up the question of public service performance and its improvement to greater scrutiny. This has led to new insights and theory building, whose consequences have relevance for policymakers, as well as politicians and managers in public organizations. This article presents early evidence of a new approach to supporting the improvement of public service organizations. It involves creating an improvement board to provide peer support to the managerial leadership of the organization undergoing change. The authors show how improvement boards fit into a collectivist strategy for strengthening public organizations. The data is derived from studies of English local government, but the findings have wider relevance across the public service internationally. Lessons are drawn for further academic research and managerial policy and practice. Public service improvement can be understood from a variety of theoretical perspectives (Boyne, 2003), each of which delivers different normative positions on how organizational performance can be improved.
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Traditionally, great weight has been placed on the role of individual leaders. Changes at the top are viewed as an important mechanism, reflecting an individualistic understanding of organizations and their improvement (Barker et al., 2001). This approach is reinforced through the business literature and management conference circuit, where individuals who have led successful changes recount their experiences and seek to motivate others. An alternative perspective recognizes the structural constraints on individual agency (Hannan and Freeman, 1988; Ingraham et al., 2003; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). It sees the potential of leaders to make a difference being contingent, and regards the process of improvement as a more complex phenomenon than the individual personality, competence and charisma of top managers. Nutt (2004), for example, proposes that the levels of internal resources and responsiveness to external client groups are the primary structural features that inhibit organizational transformation. In this situation, change at the top may not be an effective strategy for improvement. Our research into the process of turnaround and improvement by English local authorities led to similar conclusions. We have adopted an institutional perspective that explains change and improvement in terms of particular moments in an organizations performance trajectory, where structural constraints are relaxed or become malleable, and there is the potential for agency by key groups and

Carol Yapp is a lecturer at the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), the University of Birmingham. Chris Skelcher is Professor of Local Government Studies at the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), the University of Birmingham.

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individuals (Jas and Skelcher, 2005a). Drawing on Huff et al. (1992), this perspective identifies significant performance decline as the point at which the interaction of stress and inertia in the organization motivates strategic renewal. The explanation derived from our empirically-based work is that strategic change directed at performance improvement takes place through a combination of three factors: cognition of existing performance; capability to build a collective leadership for change built around a future-oriented narrative; and capacity in terms of managerial systems, resources and staffing to deliver that change (Jas and Skelcher, 2005b). One approach to building collective leadership capability is through the use of improvement boards. These are a form of peer support to the organizations managerial (and potentially political) leadership. They rest on the theory that senior management will benefit from the challenge, advice and support of their peers in other organizations. This function may be undertaken collectively, at meetings of management and the improvement board, or in small groups or on a one-to-one basis. The model has the potential to operate at a variety of levels and in a number of rolesfrom challenge and scrutiny to coaching and individual advice. These features, and the flexibility they offer, distinguish improvement boards from other methods of management performance support, such as consultants, interim managers, and leadership development programmes (Ginsberg and Abrahamson, 1991). Improvement boards are a novel development in public service performance improvement. They arose from experiments in providing peer challenge and support undertaken within the English local government community in the early 2000s. Subsequently, they were adopted as one of the mechanisms for turnaround and improvement of councils identified as poorly performing in the national Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA). Here, they became part of a system of supervision and improvement support. The system includes Government Monitoring Boards (GMBs) through which national government monitors, guides and oversees turnaround and improvement of individual councils, lead officials representing the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) in each council, a package of individuallytailored programmes provided by the Local Government Association and Improvement and Development Agency, relationship managers who provide a link to the Audit Commission
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(the body responsible for assessing council performance), and a number of other mechanisms and processes (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). While most other parts of the system were mandatory on councils, it was at their discretion as to whether they wished to create an improvement board. Research Design Several local authorities had created improvement boards as part of their turnaround strategies in response to the 2002 CPA. We studied the five councils where the improvement boards had become operational and had become part of the improvement process. These councils were identified from our wider research project, which was tracking developments in all 15 councils. Data sources were the interviews undertaken as part of this wider research project, official reports, and eight supplementary interviews with improvement board members in January 2005. The approach to the research and subsequent analysis of the material gained was inductive, with careful attention paid to the views and intended meaning in the narratives of individual participants, though this account is ultimately that of the researchers (Marshall, 1981; Watson, 2001). Establishing Improvement Boards Forming Councils either decided themselves, or were strongly urged by their lead official, to establish an improvement board. There was initial uncertainty about their role and how they would operate, due to a lack of previous experience with this improvement mechanism. Councils felt they were starting with a blank sheet of paper, though a common early perception of the boards role was that they should be a critical friend. The councils appointed the members of their improvement board. Membership profiles varied, although individuals often met more than one requirement. At least one council appointed their board members on the basis of their talent and/or national influence in their field, matched closely to specifics within the councils improvement agenda, for example human resource management, financial systems, customer care, organization development and change. All included people who had local knowledge by being residents or by working in the councils area, but who also had considerable professional expertise. They also all included senior officers and elected members from local authorities categorized as
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good or excellent in the CPA. These elected members were perceived as having particular value in working with their counterparts in the host council, helping to engage them fully in the improvement process, and ensuring consideration of the political dimension of the functioning and remit of local authorities. Representatives of the local business community were present on all boards, and their private sector perspective and practice were also of practical value to the improvement process. Senior officers of partner organizations with whom stronger collaboration was required, for example, the chief executive of the primary care trust often featured. Lead officials were regular attendees at some improvement boards but by invitation and not as full members. On the whole, their attendance was seen as helpful in providing a link with the GMB, and offering a further perspective on progress and external requirements. Choice, Acceptance and Impact At the initial stages of development, improvement board members reported mixed responses from their councils. Proactive positive choice, relationship building, role definition, and turbulence within the organization appeared to be significant factors influencing the extent of a councils acceptance of the improvement boards role and impact. In some cases duplication of the role of other features of the improvement system (for example GMBs) were also early factors. Where there was early acceptance and co-operation by councils with the improvement boards they appeared to have a marked impact on recovery. Some respondents perceived that acceptance and co-operation by the councils was affected by the relationship between peoples responsibility for poor performance, and responsibility for leading the recovery process. Where newly appointed officers and members were leading, the role of the board, and impact and speed of improvement were perceived as easier to achieve. However, this perception was not borne out conclusively by the research. Our research identified three ways in which acceptance of the improvement boards affects impact: Immediate acceptance, significant impact: The greatest level and speed of acceptance, and willingness to work with the board, was achieved in council A. This council felt it owned the process having made a proactive, positive choice to pursue this approach to
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improvement. It was enthusiastically supported by the councils political administration, which also had a clear idea about the boards potential role. There was a recent change of political leadership, and a mix of newly appointed and wellestablished senior officers. Gradual but early acceptance, significant impact: A more gradual but early acceptance of the role, and potential contribution, was achieved in councils B and C. The boards were viewed as necessary in order to meet government requirements and board members perceived a sense of discomfort from the council. In council B, the relationship was consciously built by the chair, and early attention given to defining and differentiating the role of the board. In this council there was a new political administration, compared with that in power at the time of CPA, and a largely new set of senior officers. Relative acceptance, limited impact: In council D, turbulence in the organization resulted in the improvement board not gaining complete acceptance and having only a limited impact. Though the relationship between board and the council was not problematic, other significant relationships were, and negative developments within the council tended to distract from the improvement board process, and ultimately derailed it. Early Development of Improvement Boards Two approaches to the development of improvement boards were identified: active development and role emergence. The former were improvement boards that spent time in the active consideration of their role and how they would operate in practical terms. These became effective most quickly and had the most impact. Those that allowed the role to emerge, or had relatively little discussion about it, were less productive and more duplication of other parts of the improvement system were apparent. Active Role Development Boards perceived as having considerable impact on the improvement process went through a three-stage process before becoming fully operational: Stage 1: Pre-consideration: The preconsideration of the purpose and composition of the board involved the consideration of the opportunities available to the council in terms of the expertise and
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talent of individuals resident in the area. In that sense the role of the board was affected by the opportunities available and allowed for the consideration of the credibility of the board both internally within the council, and externally with monitoring and regulatory agencies. This was a significant feature of one of the case studies where the council has made particularly rapid progress in the improvement process. Stage 2: Agreeing role, activities and style: Most of the improvement boards covered by the research started with this stage. Although clearly there was some pre-consideration in all cases, it was not to the degree described above. Board members were all appointed for their expertise and included residents who could also make a professional contribution. Private sector managers were also a common feature of all boards, and senior officers of significant partners. At this stage there was a significant and deliberate consideration of the purpose and role of the board. Care was also taken not to duplicate activity undertaken elsewhere in the improvement system. The intention was to work collaboratively, emphasising the supportive developmental role, rather than monitoringwhich was considered largely to be the formal role of other individuals or groups, and particularly, the government monitoring boards. Improvement board chairs played a major role in defining the ethos and spirit of the approach. The language of critical friend was used by all in headlining the role of the boards, but played out in significantly different ways of operating so is of little use in characterizing approaches, though it is interesting that people use the term as if it were. Stage 3: Activity and building relationships: Improvement boards that were perceived as having significant impact were characterized by attention to relationships both within the board and with officers and elected members of the council. Relationships were often designed to develop through the process of working together and were formed both one to one (through activities outside of board meeting) and collectively (through meetings to plan, challenge, or generate ideas). All those involved gave a significant time commitment to meetings of the board and activities outside of the formal meetings. Care was taken to engage with elected members of all parties, either before boards became operational, and/or all party leaders were invited to attend board meetings as
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they became operational. Here, transparency of process was deemed to be particularly important. Role Emergence The term role emergence has been chosen to distinguish the approach described above, where there was a very conscious and focused consideration of the role of the improvement board, from approaches where this was absent. Though issues such as role differentiation, and defining the actual practice of being a critical friend were acknowledged, there appears to have been little focused effort on resolving these issues in-depth, and in advance of action. The duplication of activities associated with other improvement processes and systems were more apparent where the role was allowed to emerge rather than actively developed. Activity also centred on formal meetings of the board and there was little work done outside of these meetings. Attendance by board members appeared problematic, though more informal offers of support from those who found it difficult to attend were not taken up. There were no conscious plans, and little opportunity, to build relationships. Activity focused on mentoring relationships and key individuals rather than any broader engagement with the council. However, through working with their experience and feedback, change to activities and approach were made over time. Significant additional turbulence within the organization (formal regulatory enquiry) was also present and was perceived as being a debilitating factor. The Activity and Impact of Improvement Boards Four main categories of improvement board contributions emerged from our research: professional/political intellectual; professional/ political practical; emotional/transactional; and managing external relationships. Professional/Political Intellectual The intention of all of the boards included in the research was to recruit people with professional expertise, and most of the contributions to the recovery process were based on this. Stimulation of ideas and challenge to plans and progress have been described as professional/political intellectual, to distinguish them from the hands-on types of advice described as professional/political practical. It is worth making this distinction as the apparently more successful boards placed a strong emphasis on both, and the less successful
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only on the former. In successful boards, challenging progress and plans to improve were linked to ensuring that a council had thought things through, plans were realistic, or were more ambitious. Helping to refine ideas or stimulate new thinking and offer upto-date alternatives were also described as a valuable feature of the boards contributions. Importantly, expertise was not confined to professional expertise, in terms of business/ service functions. The inclusion of respected, leading elected members from other councils ensured that the process had credibility with local politiciansthey could be engaged in the process, and benefited from the stimulus. Professional/Political Practical Here, professional/political practical is defined as hands-on practical activities based on the professional/political expertise of board members. This took such forms as sharing organizational practicetried and tested systems, or advice based on experience and knowledge, and focused on particular issues and functions that were problematic for a council. Board members worked directly with officers and elected members to explore problems and identify and apply solutions. The practical achievements of board members could also make ambitious change and improvement appear possible, and they were able to demonstrate how this could be done. In this sense improvement boards were a practical vehicle for bringing external perspectives to bear on organizational issues. This could also be described as mentoring where board members worked directly in support of individual officers. In terms of the political function, encouraging, inviting and welcoming elected members into broader local, regional, and national networks was a significant practical step. Emotional/Transactional A strong theme emerging from the research was the degree to which senior managers and politicians involved in the improvement process in a council felt under siege. They felt under siege of constant inspection, criticism, contradictory advice, unsupportive and unhelpful challenge, and constant and sometimes inconsistent demands from regulatory bodies, and those in other formal monitoring roles. Where improvement boards appear to have worked well, their relationship with the council has been very challenging but, importantly, also very supportive. In being supportive, they
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appear to occupy a unique position in the improvement system as it is currently designed. In being advocates, by giving recognition, acknowledging achievements, and encouraging (coupled with practical expert help), they are seen to have helped to build confidence. This is often expressed in terms of motivation and morale. Low morale and motivation are said not only to be a consequence of being labelled as performing badly, but also a consequence of the perceived relentless criticism and lack of acknowledgement of effort and progress that follows. Low morale and motivation at any level of the organization was described as making the improvement process that much more difficult both for the organization as a whole, and for individuals within it. Though often rejected as a valid issue in terms of an organizations ability to perform, emotional/ transactional needs were a strong theme throughout this research. Managing Relationships More or less consciously, boards were used to help manage and develop external and internal relationships. Where they were used consciously for this purpose board members were chosen, at least partly, on the ability to add credibility to the councils improvement efforts both internally and externally. Where this was the case, their credibility rested on the board members being acknowledged experts and achievers, and sometimes nationally recognized as being influential in their field. The boards also engaged other people on an ad hoc basis by inviting input from key organizations, and/or individuals whose support was vital to a particular issue. To this extent they were considered as a new type of community engagement, where highly skilled professional people, who would not normally engage with the council (for example through residents associations), could become involved in ways that added significant value. The boards were therefore symbolic in the way they were constructed, and their methods of operation. On occasion they also acted as independent advocates of the achievements and progress of councils to external regulatory or monitoring groups/agencies. Operating Processes A variety of operating processes were described during the research and these are aligned closely to the contributions of the boards: Preparation and meetings to plan: Planning meetings, which included defining the
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purpose of the board and its style of operating, prioritizing and setting goals and objectives, though of great practical value, also provided vehicles (sometimes unconsciously) to develop a sense of being a team, and building other relationships. Meeting with political groups and management teams also featured at early stages of the process. Gauging commitment was one of the purposes of these early meetings, transparency, and establishing credibility (particularly with elected members) were others. Regular board meetings: The most effective activities took place outside of more formal/ regular meetings of the whole board; however, the meetings had an important channelling role. Meetings of board members only, prior to meeting with the council officers and members, were felt to be important by some board members. An example of the purpose of pre-meetings would be to identify and prioritize issues within performance data, and to explore lines of inquiry. Other internal activity: Activities that occurred between formal meetings were often consciously designed to build the relationship between the improvement board and officers and elected members of the council. Subgroups were a particular feature of successful boardsworking closely with officers to gain further insight into prioritized issues, jointly formulating action plans, and jointly reporting back to the main board informing or changing overall improvement plans. Mentoring was also part of the process in that it occurred naturally during joint working. However, it was also a semideliberate strategy in some cases where board members perceived a particular need for support to individuals in developing personal strategies of action. External activity: External expertise was brought into the organization by board members undertaking activity within councils. However, they also facilitated and/ or hosted visits by officers and councillors to other organizations to see and hear about systems and practices outside of the councils current experience or knowledge and can be termed as field trips. In some cases, elected members were invited and welcomed into networks by board members who were politiciansand encouraged to think of themselves as contributors to knowledge sharing and learning, as well as recipients. This constituted a major and positive change of practice for some councils.
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Committee-style meetings: This style of activity was probably the least effective, and was used predominantly where the boards role emerged rather than being actively planned. This style of meeting was also associated with the duplication of activity in other parts of the improvement system. Behaviours Interviewees tended to comment on the helpful behaviours of improvement board members. There were few references to unhelpful behaviours, and these usually applied to other regulatory and monitoring groups or roles associated with the improvement system. It is this context of close regulatory scrutiny, and how these roles are undertaken, that makes the behaviour of improvement boards very significant. At the very least they can redress the balance of critical scrutiny and support. Helpful Behaviour Behaviours described as helpful were being very challenging but appearing to be on the councils sidegenuinely wanting to help; seeking and promoting a two-way dialogue; promoting a relationship of equals; and empathy. Acknowledgement of achievement and progress, and highlighting what was right and good about a council, were perceived as promoting confidence and self-belief. Sensitivity, and concern for building constructive relationships with elected members and officers, appeared also to be important, for examplenot embarrassing anyone publicly (although not avoiding issues). Key themes throughout were strong, insightful challenge and empathy. BehaviourPersonality or Role? The behaviours listed above were not entirely consistent with roles, and much was made of personality and the turnover of people in key roles. The approach taken by a monitoring board, its individual members, lead officials, and anyone in a role with a significant monitoring remit appeared to differ, and was perceived to be a product of personality, and particularly, not related to the attitude to improvement of the council. More constructive/ helpful behaviour seemed to appear, for example, after a change of lead official. This obviously involved lapses of time, however, when interviewees were asked whether they felt this was a deliberate change in policy and brief for lead officials, respondents were often emphatic in their view that it was not/ unlikely.
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Improvement Boards and Capability for Change Improvement boards provide peer support to assist the building of leadership capability for enhancing performance of public organizations. In this role, they respond to an understanding of performance improvement that recognizes the need to build a collective leadership for change, so that structural constraints can be managed or overcome. This approach is more in tune with the realities of public service organizations than that based on the single, powerful leader. This is because public service organizations are complex entities, frequently being large composites of different functions and professional groups, with multiple accountabilities and exhibiting sometimes intense relationships between managers and elected politicians. Organizations with such features will embed a considerable number of structural constraints to change, making improvement dependent on the ability to construct a coalition within the organization. Where organizations are under pressure to change and close central supervision, as in the case of the councils we studied, peer support that has a primary allegiance to the council offers an important resource. As Mellahi (2005) has pointed out in relation to the business sector, and as our own research shows (Jas and Skelcher, 2005a; Turner and Whiteman, 2005), the senior management and political leadership of organizations facing performance problems can lack not only capability to lead change, but also might not fully understand the internal and external environment of the organization. In this situation, the contribution of supervisory boards and consultants working to external stakeholders such as central ministries will not be received with such readiness as those who are peers and are sided with the organization. The English local government case reported here provides a small-scale example of how improvement boards can be designed and of their potential impact. Although few councils had adopted improvement boards at the time of the research, a number of indicative conclusions can be drawn. The perception of the research participants is that improvement boards can have a very positive impact on the improvement process. Key contributions of successful boards were: professional/political intellectual, professional/ political practical, supporting the development and management of external and internal relationships, and emotional/transactional. It is our view that the two latter contributions are almost unique within the formal improvement
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system. These two elements of activity/ behaviour help managers and politicians to move collectively through the performance trajectory from the initial stages of inertia (and/ or resistance) to strategic renewal, allowing them to become more receptive to intellectual challenge and practical support. The collectivist nature of the activities also builds organizational capability in ways which other developmental mechanisms (for example, programmes of leadership development) may find difficult to match. However, they are not the sole answer and are likely to have the most impact where they are designed by a council leadership that has some cognition of the performance improvement task, and is able to position the improvement board as part of a wider strategy for change. Further research would be required to track specific and measurable impacts on organizational performance, and to isolate these from the effects of the broader improvement system and initiatives. However, there is a consistently positive narrative within this exploratory study of a small-scale innovation that leads us to recommend them to practitioners charged with building organization capability and improving performance. Acknowledgements This article draws on a three-year research study by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister on Learning from the experience of recovery and an ESRC Public Service Programme Research Award: RES-166-25-0200 Responding to evidence of poor performance. The views expressed in the article are the authors own, and do not necessarily reflect those of ODPM or the local authority case studies. The case studies have been anonymized in line with our research protocol. Further papers are available at www.inlogov.bham.ac.uk/research. References
Barker, V. L. III, Patterson, P. W. Jr. and Muller, G. C. (2001), Organizational causes and strategic consequences of the extent of top management team replacement during turnaround attempts. Journal of Management Studies, 38, 2, pp. 237269. Boyne, G. (2003), What is public service improvement? Public Administration, 81, 2, pp. 211227. Ginsberg, A. and Abrahamson, E. (1991), Champions of strategic shifts: the role of internal and external change agents. Journal of Management Studies, 28, 2, pp. 17389 Hannan, M. and Freeman, J. (1988), Structural
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inertia and organizational change. In Cameron, K. et al. (Eds), Readings in Organizational Decline: Frameworks, Research and Prescriptions (Ballinger, Cambridge, MA). Huff, A. O., Huff, A. S. and Thomas, H. (1992), Strategic renewal and the interactions of cumulative stress and inertia. Strategic Management Journal, 13, pp. 5575. Ingraham, P. W., Joyce, P. G. and Donahue, A. K. (2003), Government Performance: Why Management Matters (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore). Jas, P. and Skelcher, C. (2005a), Performance decline and turnaround in public organizations: a theoretical and empirical analysis. British Journal of Management, 16, pp. 195210. Jas, P. and Skelcher, C. (2005b), Envisaging performance futures: how cognition, capability and capacity shape public sector turnarounds. Paper to Ninth International Research Symposium on Public Management, Bocconi

University, Milan. Marshall, J. (1981), Making sense as a personal process. In Reason, P. and Rowan, J. (Eds), Human Inquiry (Wiley & Sons, Chichester). Mellahi, K. and Wilkinson, A. (2004), Organizational failure: a critique of recent research and a proposed integrative framework. International Journal of Management Reviews, 5/6, 1, pp. 2141. Mellahi, K. (2005), The dynamics of boards of directors of failing organizations. Long Range Planning, 38, pp. 261279. Nutt, P. C. (2004), Promoting the transformation of public organizations. Public Performance and Productivity Review, 27, 4, pp. 933. Turner, D. and Whiteman, P. (2005), Learning from the experience of recovery: the turnaround of poorly performing local authorities. Local Government Studies, 31, 5, pp. 627654. Watson, T. J. (2001), In Search of Management (Thomson Learning, London).

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