FunctionsofEgalitarianisminYugoslavSociety

FunctionsofEgalitarianisminYugoslavSociety

byIvanBernik

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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:4/1989,pages:425432,onwww.ceeol.com.

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FUNCTIONS OF EGALITARIANISM IN YUGOSLAV SOCIETY

Ivan Bernik

I Research of egalitarianism and its role in Yugoslav society has been strongly influenced by the statement that egalitarianism is one of the dominant norms in Yugoslav society. J. upanov proposed this at the beginning of the Seventies, and generalizing from some empirical findings, he concluded that egalitarianism (defined as a preference for equal distribution of earnings without taking into account ones position in the social division of labour) was accepted by the great majority of the Yugoslav population. The subsequent surveys have mostly tried in line with upanovs analysis to establish precisely which parts of the population are the most egalitarian. But the general results of these surveys have been somewhat surprising; they have not confirmed unanimously the statement about the popularity of egalitarianism in Yugoslav society. A survey, conducted in Serbia (Popovi and coll., 1977), shows that (only) 42 percent of the population are in favour of egalitarianism and that 29 percent are nonegalitarian (the rest being classified as mixed type). It has also been established by the survey that egalitarianism is widely accepted in low, economically deprived strata and it decreases, or better still, nonegalitarianism increases in parallel with the position of a stratum in the social hierarchy (Popovi and coll., 1977: 332). Recent studies, conducted by the same author in Belgrade and by I. iber in Croatia, have shown that the presence of egalitarian attitudes in the population has not changed significantly (Popovi and coll., 1987: 176, 367; iber, 1987: 140). Annual public opinion polls in Slovenia have shown a high rate of stability in egalitarian value orientation over a period of time; about 60 percent of the respondents were in favour of egalitarianism in the Seventies and at the beginning of the Eighties. Detailed analysis of the Slovene data has lead to findings similar to those established in Serbia, i.e., egalitarianism has been accepted mostly by those belonging to the lower social strata (Klinar, 1980: 51, 54). Similar conclusions have also been made in some surveys of attitudes towards economic inequality and social development (Rus, 1971: 36; To, 1974). It is true that egalitarianism as a social value prevails among the majority of the Yugoslav population, but it should be kept in mind that there exists another set of values, which are clearly nonegalitarian. Yugoslav society is far from being homogeneous as far as distribution ideology is concerned; there exist speaking in general terms at least two different and even conflicting distributive ideologies. This division among two value orientations is in line with interest differences, which are based on different positions of social strata in the system of economic
Praxis International 9:4 January 1990 0260-8448

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inequality. The egalitarian set of values is obviously related to the interest in improving the relative position in the distribution of earnings, while nonegalitarianism stems from the interest in the preservation and strengthening of a relatively favourable economic status. The results of analyses of attitudes towards social inequality in some other socialist countries are not much different than the Yugoslav ones. Studies conducted in Poland have also established a high presence of egalitarianism in Polish society (Nowak, 1969; Koralewicz-Zebik, 1984; Slomczynski and Krause, 1986: 21). Summing up results of attitudes towards inequality in earnings in Poland and her neighbors A. Matejko stresses: Egalitarian postulates are positively stronger among manual workers than among the relatively privileged strata of Party and state officials, managers, specialists and intellectuals. (Matejko, 1974: 21; see also Lane, 1971: 105). To put it differently and in line with Yugoslav findings distributive ideology of higher social strata is predominantly nonegalitarian. Findings about the two opposed distributive ideologies have inevitably led to the question of their relative social importance. Quantitative prevalence of egalitarian values does not necessarily imply their social domination. The fact that nonegalitarianism prevails among higher social strata, which also have access to power resources, suggests that its social influence is much higher than its quantitative representation in the society would indicate. It can be assumed on that basis that in a confrontation of both ideologies the latter would prevail as socially dominant. The domination of nonegalitarian ideology is, of course, not just symbolic; it represents a basis for the practical regulation of processes of distribution of economic goods as well as a basis for the legitimation of social inequalities. II The conclusions proposed above could be countered by the objection that in socialist countries the official or proclaimed ideology has always been in favour of egalitarianism. This assertion implies, on the one hand, that social influence of spontaneous nonegalitarian ideology of higher social strata is curbed by the proclaimed dominant ideology and that, on the other hand, the social role of the distributive ideology of lower strata is enhanced by it. Before accepting those farreaching conclusions, the question should be answered whether the overt socialist distributive ideology is egalitarian indeed. If in need of any systematic analyses of different aspects of official distributive ideology in Yugoslav society, we can rely only on some general observations and conclusions about the official dominant ideology in socialist countries. As a classic source S. Ossowskis analysis of the doctrine of non-egalitarian classlessness can be consulted (Ossowski, 1963: 100-118). He argues that the Soviet version of the doctrine does not deny the existence of unequal distribution of earnings, but that it even stresses its desirability and its positive social functions. At the same time the doctrine also stresses that economic privileges and discrimination have . . . nothing in common with class divisions (Ossowski, 1963: 113). It is not hard to see that the content of the doctrine of nonegalitarian classlessness is close to Marxs principle of distributing economic rewards according to work, a principle which holders

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of political power often refer to when trying to justify and legitimize existing inequalities. Later analyses of the overt dominant distributive ideology in socialist countries have confirmed Ossowskis views and shown that nonegalitarianism has remained its core element (see Wesolowski, 1979: 123-4; Zaslavsky, 1982: 87). If we agree that the conclusions mentioned above do hold true also for Yugoslav society and some Yugoslav studies speak firmly in favour of them (see Peujli, 1971: 227; Popovi and all., 1977; Mrki, 1981) then the contention that the social influence of the spontaneous nonegalitarian attitudes of higher social strata is curbed in Yugoslav society by an egalitarian official distributive ideology necessarily comes into question. These data suggest just the opposite, i.e. the existence of the congruence between the overt dominant ideology and values of higher strata concerning distribution of economic rewards. The congruence implies mutual reinforcement of both ideologies the interests and attitudes of higher social strata are backed by the overt dominant ideology and the latter is in turn upheld by the most powerful social strata. The congruence leads at least at first sight to the petrification of the gap between the distributive ideologies of economically privileged and deprived parts of the population and makes (the meritocratic version of ) nonegalitarianism an effective dominant ideology. But at the same time this gap should be considered an important source of possible tensions in Yugoslav society and as a possible source of delegitimation of political power. III The preceding discussion makes it possible to formulate the question about the functions of egalitarianism in a more precise way. It is obvious that the question cannot be dealt with without taking into account a complex picture of distributive ideologies; that is, functions of egalitarianism in the Yugoslav social system can be comprehended only by highlighting the contradictory relations to dominant distributive ideology (both overt and spontaneous). In trying to elucidate the social consequences of interplay in opposing distributive ideologies, we should return for a moment to J. upanovs explanation of the social functions of egalitarianism in Yugoslav society. He has argued that the question of the social functions of egalitarianism, as one of the dominant norms in Yugoslav society, could be approached only by taking into account its relation to some other social values. According to upanov, egalitarianism does not operate on its own, but as the central axis of a broader complex, which represents a cluster of cognitive perspectives, ethical principles, social norms and collective attitudes (upanov, 1970: 21). That complex, named by upanov the egalitarian syndrome, consists of besides egalitarianism a cognitive perspective of limited goods, redistributive ethics, norms of egalitarian distribution, fear of private (individual) initiative, antiprofessionalism, intellectual leveling-down and anti-intellectualism. The egalitarian syndrome has, according to upanov, contradictory social effects; on the one hand it hinders the development of Yugoslav society towards being an industrial society by preventing it from efficiently using human resources, but on the other hand it indicates a broad value consensus, which undoubtedly helps to maintain the integration of Yugoslav society. In Yugoslav sociology there has been apart from empirical studies of (non)-

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egalitarian attitudes mentioned in the previous pages no systematic analyses of the theoretical consistency and empirical validity of the concept of the egalitarian syndrome; nevertheless we can base our discussion on some comments and observations. From our point of view the seminal contribution to the understanding of the concept has been the idea emphasizing that the concept of the egalitarian syndrome lumps together two (qualitatively) different ideological complexes (Makarovi, 1984: 310). This idea suggests that egalitarian ideology (attitudes, norms and perspectives) is clearly distinct from those components of the syndrome, which are directed against social differentiation (heterogeneity) and autonomy of individuals and social collectivities. To put it more precisely the egalitarian syndrome is composed of two ideological complexes an egalitarian and an authoritarian one. This analytical decomposition of the egalitarian syndrome opens some new questions and thus helps in explaining some contradictions and problems mentioned earlier. The key question emerging from this decomposition is why and how two different ideological complexes are related to each other. The question is complicated by the fact that at least hypothetically the social bearers of each ideological complex are different social strata. Empirical evidence presented on previous pages shows that egalitarianism is accepted by the majority of the Yugoslav population from lower social strata only. In the absence of any comprehensive study of the spontaneous ideology of holders of political power in Yugoslav society (every such study will be complicated by the fact that the overt dominant political ideology and spontaneous ideology of the political elite do not necessarily correspond in all respects as stressed by M. Markus, 1982: 88) we can only state as an hypothesis that the authoritarian ideological complex pertains to them. It can be argued as in the case of egalitarian ideology that authoritarianism is strongly related to the interests of the political elite; on the one hand, it regulates its political actions and, on the other, it helps in legitimizing its political power and political order in general. Before tackling some aspects of the question of how the congruence between the egalitarian and authoritarian ideological complex is (or can be) established and reproduced, it should be stressed that our analysis will be as already indicated mostly hypothetical. It tries to be a critical synthesis of discussions on that topic and (at least) a basis for possible further research. We will start our analysis with a thesis, that the quest for legitimacy of political power (which is otherwise common to all social systems) is especially pronounced in social systems where political power wields broad prerogatives and where the institutional separation of a political sphere from other social subsystems is low. The legitimacy of political power is in that case of vital importance for the reproduction of the whole social system. Analyses of processes of legitimation in socialist societies stress the complexity of these processes but, at the same time, they also point out that the desired results are often uncertain and unstable (Rigby and Fehr, 1982; Pakulski, 1986). The pronounced quest for legitimacy of political power does not necessarily abolish the possibility of at least temporary withdrawal of voluntary mass support for the political authorities. The symbiosis of egalitarian and authoritarian ideological complexes in the egalitarian syndrome can be explained in the context of the attempts on the part

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of the political elite to win and maintain its legitimacy. It does not mean, of course, that processes of legitimation of political power in the Yugoslav society are identical to processes of creating the egalitarian syndrome. It should be kept in mind that our analysis as the assertion about complexity of legitimation processes suggests can tackle only one aspect of legitimacy building. We shall discuss our case as more or less independently from other ideological, political and economic processes of legitimation, but more thorough analysis should include its interconnections with other processes. When speaking about the complexity of processes of legitimation it should also be noted that different parts of the subordinated population play different roles. Some analyses of legitimation of power in socialist society in general (Triska and Gati, 1981) and in Yugoslav society in particular (Denitch, 1976; upanov, 1983) have shown that attempts of the political elite to win voluntary mass support are directed primarily at the industrial workers. In other words, the industrial workers are seen by the political elite as the group with the highest delegitimizing potential and are treated as a strategic part of the subordinated population. Among different interpretations of Webers concept of legitimacy, from our point of view, analytically the most promising is one which stresses that in the centre of the legitimation process are the promises (actual or implied) that a given order of political domination will contribute to the well-being (political, religious, economic, material or psychic) of the underlying population (Bensman, 1979: 31). This interpretation suggests that a certain reciprocity constitutes the core of legitimation processes. As such, they transform when successful unilateral power relations into a relatively stable system of authority. The notion of reciprocity can be directly employed in explaining the emergence and continuation of the (somewhat uneasy) symbiosis between the egalitarian and authoritarian ideological complex in Yugoslav society. In attempts to win voluntary support from a subordinated population (especially from industrial workers) the political elite has to take into account at least some of its attitudes, values and expectations, among other considerations. The fact that egalitarianism is in the core of the spontaneous ideology of industrial workers implies a necessity on the part of the political elite to observe demands and expectations stemming from this ideology. It leads to the situation where the egalitarian ideology is effectively recognised as a part of a dominant ideology. It means, on the one hand, that egalitarianism can influence certain decisions concerning distribution of economic goods and at least in some respects shape the system of economic inequalities, but, on the other hand, it is protected by and thus controlled by holders of political power. The patronage over the popular ideology has some far-reaching consequences. By taking care of the distributive ideology of lower strata, the political elite gets in turn not only acceptance of its actions in the sphere of distribution of economic goods but also compliance with regulative actions in general. These attitudes of the subordinated population imply at least implicit acceptance of egalitarian ideology. It can be said following arguments from Lipsets (1969) analysis of working class authoritarianism that egalitarianism in the economic sphere . . . requires authoritarianism in the political sphere, i.e. a specific redistributive role of the state, coalescence of the Party and the state, centralization of political power (upanov, 1970: 42).

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But from the point of view of our analysis it should be added that the link between egalitarianism and authoritarianism is not natural and spontaneous but organised on the part of the political elite. The egalitarian syndrome can be seen as a specific result of endeavours of the political elite to gain legitimacy, or at least some forms of conditional voluntary compliance, from the majority of the subordinated population. To put it in other terms, an egalitarian syndrome is a result of organised consensus (Zaslavsky, 1982), organised on the part of the political elite. As already indicated, there is no systematic and comprehensive empirical evidence which could confirm or disprove our hypotheses, but it is worth mentioning some findings (apart from the already mentioned results of research into egalitarianism) which indicate that continuation of the present research endeavours can lead to more systematic understanding of the structure of the dominant ideological complex in Yugoslav society and its social functions. The research (already mentioned in previous pages) conducted in Serbia has found out that statism (defined as an ideological orientation close to our authoritarianism) is most widespread among farmers and other manual strata (Popovi and coll., 1977; 390). Two recent studies from Croatia have led to similar results. J. upanovs study of political attitudes of young workers has confirmed the hypothesis of strong ideological ties between political elite (in the role of patrons) and workers (as clients). It has led him to the conclusion that there exists a firm ultra-leftist core of workers, whose authoritarian orientation corresponds with authoritarianism, which is characteristic of the state-Party complex (upanov, 1986: 1165). The other study produced results similar to those of the Serbian research; according to it statism (as an ideological orientation) is mostly accepted by social strata which perform manual and routine labour (Hodi, 1986: 69; Katunari, 1987: 606). But the same study has discovered (without explanation) that less skilled workers are more in favour of liberal values (which have been defined as opposite to authoritarian ones) than higher social strata. IV The proposed analytical scheme suggests some hypothetical conclusions concerning the regulation of the distribution of economic goods and indicates some contradictions of the mode of legitimation of political power in Yugoslav society. As far as regulation of distributive processes is concerned, we have pointed out that in normal circumstances the role of spontaneous distributive ideology of higher social strata (which is congruent with the overt dominant ideology) should have been the basis of the distributive policy. But the search by the political elite for its own legitimacy leads to the enhancement of social influence in egalitarian ideology. It amounts to the fact that the actual regulation of the distribution of earnings (and economic rewards in general) is based on compromises between both ideologies. It explains why economic inequalities and especially inequalities in wages and salaries are relatively small and stable (see Davis and Scase, 1985: 100). The main aim of political regulation of distributive processes is to ensure a basis for legitimacy of political power or at least to curb delegitimation tendencies. Winning or retaining legitimacy of political power also implies as M. Hirszowicz

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(1980: 119) points out the legitimacy of the elites economic privileges. The need of the political elite to win popular support thus leads to the fact that in Yugoslav society distributive policy has always been a means for the implementing of a broad ideological programme concerning societal organization and directions of social development (Mrki, 1981: 24). But the attempts by the political elite to uphold its legitimacy (among others) by taking a paternalistic stance towards egalitarianism inevitably produce contradictory results. This means that as already pointed out expectations and demands stemming from egalitarian ideology are given official recognition. With some simplification a specific mutual legitimation can be spoken about: the interaction between egalitarianism and authoritarianism does not represent a source of legitimation of political power only, but it also grants a certain legitimacy to the egalitarian expectations and demands of the masses. That fact is clearly expressed in the feelings of a significant proportion of the Yugoslav population (as pointed out in the first part of this paper) that the existing income inequalities are unjust. Those feelings are more or less independent of fluctuations in the actual distribution of incomes. On that ground it can be argued that the narrow basis of legitimacy of economic inequalities (which implies persistent demands on the part of the deprived population to improve both its absolute and relative economic status) is an inevitable side-effect of the mode of legitimation of political power in Yugoslav society. This side-effect has been quite easy to control in times of relative economic prosperity, but is getting increasingly uncontrollable in periods of economic decline. Decrease in the absolute, and probably even in the relative, economic status of large proportions of the population strengthens the feelings of distributive injustice and resentment, and leads at least in the long run to the withdrawal of voluntary compliance with the political authorities. Expressed in more dramatic terms, economic crisis implies the possibility of the collapse of an ideological alliance between masses (especially workers) and holders of political power, manifested through the egalitarian syndrome. The consequences of the breakdown of an important aspect of social consensus are not difficult to foresee. When speaking about the possibility of economic decline and its consequences for reproducing the unity between egalitarianism and authoritarianism, we should recall J. upanovs thesis that the egalitarian syndrome is an important factor preventing the transformation of the Yugoslav society into an economically dynamic and efficient one. Our analysis speaks at least implicitly in favour of his proposition. The fact that an ideological block of egalitarianism and authoritarianism is one of the important generators of structural economic crisis, reveals another aspect of the contradictions in the present mode of legitimation of political power. The contradictions form a kind of vicious circle the egalitarian syndrome is an important source of integration and stability for Yugoslav society, but at the same time, it amounts to economic stagnation in the long run, which in turn undermines the integration of society and opens possibilities for many hidden social tensions and conflicts to become manifest. A possible response to disintegrate tendencies is (as pointed out by J. upanov (1982: 2061-3)) in the fundamentalist revival of unity between egalitarianism and authoritarianism; but those attempts can only have short term effects. Long term regulation of these contradictions demands radical changes in the mode of legitimation of political power in Yugoslav society.

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