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Marxism,PostMarxismandtheImplosionofCommunism
Marxism,PostMarxismandtheImplosionofCommunism
bySvetozarStojanovi
Source:
PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:3+4/1990,pages:205212,onwww.ceeol.com.
ISM, POST-MARXISM AND
PLOSION OF COMMUNISMt
Svetozar Stojanovic
1. From Marxism 0 Post-Marxism
As a reaction t the official "Marxism-Leninism", critical Marxism,
especially in Easter Europe, passed through two stages in the fifties, sixties
and seventies. The first was so called Authentic Marxism and the second
Revisionist Marxis .
In rejecting "Ma xist-Leninist" ideology critical Marxists at first moved
"back to authentic arx". Their basic idea was that "Marxism-Leninism" is
an essential distorti n and not a creative development of the original thought
of Karl Marx. True in returning to "real Marx" some in the spirit of a naive
hermeneutic expect d to find a fully homogenous thought. The others knew,
however, that their return to Marx had to be selective and critical from the
very beginning, si ce his opus is full of important tensions and even
contradictions.
It was this insight hat logically led to Revisionist Marxism: 1 significant and
even crucial ideas 0 classical Marxism were subjected to revision. From this
fragmentation of arxism there was, however, only one step to its radical
revision when even the basic modus of theorizing was put in question.
But how much ca one change Marx's mode of theory construction and still
remain a Marxist 0 any sort? In other words, radical Marxist revisionism
tends sooner or I ter to be transformed into Post-Marxism, whether
consciously or only de facto.
2
It goes without s ying that I have in mind the immanent evolution of a
tradition and that c nsequently considerable Marxist legacy and influence is
still present within ost-Marxism. Naturally, it is a theoretical and political
orientation that d aws upon multiple traditions, especially the liberal-
democratic one, an not just upon revisionist Marxism.
In my opinion, th turning point in the transition from revisionist Marxism
to Post-Marxism is t e rejection of Marx's fundamental canon that in the new
society the dichoto y between state and civil society has to be overcome. It is
Post-Marxism and ot any kind of Marxism that claims that this dichotomy,
on the contrary, 0 ght to be preserved and that progressive structural
transformation of xisting communist systems is unthinkable without the
renewal of the sph re of civil society independent from the state.
This break with t e Marxist tradition is rendered quite radical once the
painful conclusion s reached that civil society is not feasible and viable
without strong capi alist components, involving market in all its dimensions
(goods, services, ca ital and labour) and pluralism of ownership forms.
Praxis International 10: 3/4 ctober 1990 & January 1991 0260-8448 $2.00
206 Praxis International
There is a crucial lesson to be learnt from the fact that both most
productive and most humane countries are capitalist ones but with a social-
democratic face. It is imperative for leftists now to study in detail all the
arrangements and achievements of this mix of capitalism, democracy and
socialism.
In addition to political and ownership pluralism, a project of good society
that I call social-eco-democracy must also involve a combination of opposite
principles of social organization. Enterprise has to be a profit-making
institution and not a basic unit of social policy of the state. Roughly speaking,
the basis of economy has to be market, whereas the state has to a great degree
to function according to the opposite principles of solidarism and ecologism.
I do not have in mind some kind of "transition" between capitalism and
Marx's communism, but a society in its own right with a mixed type of
ownership, civil society, and entire organization.
Let us, however, for the moment return to the Marxists' criticism of the
ruling communism in the name of Marx's communism. In my view, it used to
have subversive character, especially in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakia. Because: (1) it successfully questioned the system's Marxist
legitimacy, and (2) it challenged the ideological monopoly of the ruling class
on public discourse, thereby creating some free space not only for critical
Marxism but also for some non-Marxist intellectual orientations. The bitter
reaction of officials and the persecution of Marxist critics showed that
pointing to the gap between "Marxist-Leninist" systems and Marx's
communism did indeed irritate some sore spots.
In addition to these two progressive functions, however, such criticism had
from the beginning a latent conservative function. But how could the idea
of the withering away of the state, for instance, even inadvertently contribute
to the preservation of a social order, the essence of which is a structural
control of one group over the state and, through it, over all key areas and
means of social life?
A realistic, and hence politically relevant program would have under those
conditions focused on reducing (liberalization), and in the long run
eliminating this control (democratization). The program of withering away
of the state, on the contrary, is an excellent example of how a utopia can
indirectly contribute to preserving domination over people by drawing their
attention away from real problems and realistic ways to resolve them, i.e.
from trying to create a civil society independent from the state and transform
the monopolizied into a legal and pluralistic state.
Symptomatically, the effectiveness of the Marxist critique of ruling
communism was increasingly waning as real prospects were increasing for
considerable liberalization of the system: decentralization of government,
some reliance on market and private property (in small businesses),
establishing pockets of independent civil society, etc. Those critics of real
communism who continued relying on Marx's utopia in such a political
context were threatened with the deadly danger of becoming directly
conservative and even reactionary.
Unfortunately, it did not require any effort to use Marx's critique of
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Praxis International 207
bourgeois political economy against the above-mentioned measures and
changes. It is not hard to guess what Marx would say about them since he
characterized even the principle of distribution according to work as
bourgeois (even though market would be abolished).
I believe that Post-Marxists should introduce a fundamental distinction in
classical Marxism between the principles of radical humanism, on the one
hand, and the idea of communist social organization, on the other.
These principles as is well-known are: praxis, de-alienation, de-reification,
meeting authentic human needs, freedom of each and every individual as a
precondition for freedom of all. Marx expected them to be fully realized in a
new classless and stateless society, where private ownership of forces of
production and the market economy were to be completely abolished, and
the distribution of social product was, in the first phase, to be carried out in
accordance with the work invested, and later in accordance with needs.
However, life has proven Marx's idea of communism without market, state
and law to be incompatible with the feasible and viable programs of good
society.
In my opinion, though, this is not to say that Marx's radical humanistic
principles need have the same fate. Provided they are separated from
communist utopia and understood only as ultimate regulative-critical ideals,
and not as constitutitive-operative principles as well, they can, naturally
combined with numerous mediations, be useful in evaluating existing
societies and projects of the good society.
2. Decadence of Communist ideology
In my view ideology is a set of ideas which social groups at the expense of
truth use to justify what they do and discredit their opponents. Among such
ideas it is ideals that play an especially important role, so important indeed
that we need a separate name for this dimension of ideology - thus my term
idealogy.3
Bourgeois liberalism and democracy, for instance, before becoming reality
had been a grand ideal-Iogy. Communism as well entered historical stage as a
great ideal-Iogy.
This ideal-logical communist phase I have been calling "socialist realism"
borrowing the phrase from the official soviet ideology but at the same time
extending its meaning to cover the whole communist ideology and not only
that in arts and culture. In order to justify their monopoly of power officials
used to characterize it as "dictatorship of the proletariat" during the "transi-
tion period" toward a "communist future" (stateless and classless society). All
their problems, mistakes and crises were explained away as allegedly "un-
avoidable" and "understandable" on the path to this future state. It was only
their alleged "tendency" to move in this direction that was really to be counted.
This utopian stage lasted roughly until 1968, the turning point being the
Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The reformist program of the
Czechoslovak communists condensed in the formula of "socialism with a
human face" had to be countered in ideology as well, and not only (by tanks)
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in practice. For this purpose the syntagm of "real socialism" was invented. It
was this slogan that meant to suggest that communist reformers were
arbitrarily imagining some alternative socialism whereas in practice the only
feasible socialism was the one already existing in the communist countries. In
my view this was the second major stage in the history of the official
communist ideology.
"Real socialism" as a reply to the project of "socialism with a human face"
was indeed quite cynical since it was imposed by force. In addition to its
cynicism the proclamation of "real socialism", according to analysts and
critics, was tautological as well: reality was supposed to be vindicated
primarily by the fact that it was reality. The third characteristic of the
communist ideology was conservatism that typically took "reality" as the
standard of evaluation.
"Real socialism" represents a minimal, borderline case of ideology.
Having entered this stage communist ideal-Iogy was transformed into a real-
logy. The result was poverty of ideology, since the system became incapable
of effectively relying on its own foundational ideals but instead had to invoke
the fact that it exists.
Naturally, there was no sharp demarcation line between this and the
preceding ideological phase: people were still expected on occasion to use the
language of "socialist realism" but without necessarily believing in it - hence
ever greater hypocrisy.
The official ideology of the CPSU, of course, did not want to suggest that
the Soviet Union was simply one of the countries of "real socialism". There
had to exist an international ("internationalist"!) hierarchy of "real
socialisms" headed by the SUas a country of "developed socialism" as well. By
implication the other communist countries belonged to "undeveloped
socialism" that had yet to catch up with the level of the Soviet Union.
However, if the Soviet Union had already achieved"developed socialism"
why was it not passing to the stage of communism without classes and state, as
envisioned in the Marxist-Leninist scheme? Here is yet another immanent
difficulty of the ideology of "developed socialism": how come the Soviet
Union, itself a model of "developed socialism", still had to catch up with
developed capitalism?
But the main blow to ideologies is dealt by life and not by logical
difficulties. As soon as the main ideological reference point became "reality"
rather than the utopian future, official communist policy was unavoidably
judged by its practical performance, so that nobody was willing any longer to
forgive its faults in the name of the alleged communist future. In other words,
communist reality was looking increasingly bad, especially in comparison to
the rich and democratic capitalist West ("comparative crisis" of communism).
Gorbachev's response to what he sawfirst as "stagnation" and then "crisis"
was "perestroika of socialism". In my opinion, this is the third and last stage
of communist ideology (in Europe). However, Gorbachev has recently
radicalized his policy so much that we are dealing now not only with
"perestroika" of communism but with post-communism as well.
Naturally, he is unwilling to say so publicly because he does not want to
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alienate moderate conservatives, or at least wants to neutralize them.
"Perestroika" is ideology (distorted picture) exactly because it has to conceal
something important. Unlike "perestroika" as an intrasystemic change,
Gorbachev's call to "new thinking" logically speaking does not set any such
limits.
To this point we have distinguished three phases of communist ideology:
"socialist realism," "real socialism" and "perestroika of socialism". Of
course, the trajectory of communist ideology can be viewed from other
angles as well. Based on its relationship to truth (which connects very well to
its described attitude toward "reality") three following phases can be
depicted.
The initial stage of ideologies is usually characterized by a mixture of truths
and untruths, which should be called distorted consciousness. The next phase
is false consciousness, consisting only of untruths, that adherents, however,
still believe to be truths. The terminal stage in ideological decay should be
termed mendacious consciousness, when nobody believes in the ideological
claims. It goes without saying that communist ideologues used to consciously
lie earlier as well, but this was not their dominant tendency.
It is against this background of false and especially of mendacious
consciousness that Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost" and its attraction is to be
understood. In the atmosphere of openness everybody is given the
opportunity to see and publicly talk about the reality of "real socialism" and
of its past.
3. Negative dialetic of communist statism
For almost three decades I have been trying to elaborate a theory of
communist statism that is based on structural control of a group (statist ruling
class) over the state (thus the name "statism") and through it over the
economy and other areas of social life.
Comn1unist statism belongs to the family of socio-political formations
where political power is primary and the economic secondary. In capitalism
as a socio-economic formation, on the contrary, political domination is
derivative whereas the economic is original. The statist class cannot
dominate society without directly ruling it through the state (ruling-dominant
class). On the other hand, the capitalist class is capable of dominating
without ruling the state (non-ruling dominant class).
It seems now that the most developed part of the world is being
transformed into a socio-informational society, in which as the very name
indicates, the basic source of domination is control of information.
What was the basis of the hopes of communist reformers during several
decades before the sudden collapse of the East European communism in
1989? They had relied on the structural room for intrasystemic changes that
lay between total, supercentralized and detailed control of communists
(totalitarianism, for which Stalinism is a perfect example) and the minimum
of their selective-strategic control.
One of the main queries to be pondered is: what are the structural reasons
210 Praxis International
for the incapacity of the ruling class to consolidate minimal selective-strategic
domination? Communist conservatives have always believed that if the
control came to be eroded seriously it would be virtually impossible to stop
the process leading to its complete elimination. They have understood the
structural vulnerability of communism much better than communist
reformers. However, this leads us straight to the negative dialectic of the
system. Such a dialectic has been at work since communism's coming to
power. However, its latent internal contradictions have only recently
become quite actual and produced results completely opposite to those
intended by the system's architects.
(1) The statist ruling class had an important but at the same time
misleading advantage over the bourgeoisie: unlike the latter, it did not have
to struggle for the influence on the state apparatus since it was overlapping
with and leading it. From the very beginning it was, however, a potential
weakness as well. Namely, if statists are denied their direct grip on the state,
their rule in other areas as well will also be lost. There is no reserve power
position for them to fall back upon. As already stated, in order to dominate,
the statist class has to rule the state directly.
First structural defense line of this class is at the same time its last one.
Hence its incapacity to consolidate selective-strategic control. Capitalist
power structure, on the other hand, is incomparably more flexible and has a
depth defense.
(2) I have written elsewhere that the statist power is structurally
transparent whereas capitalist power is structurally concealed. It is in statism
that everybody knows that political ruling is the main source and center of
social power. It is also widely known where exactly this power is concentrated.
The structural mixture of transparency and concentration of power, unlike its
dispersal and concealment in capitalism, has finally proven very vulnerable.
The visible center of power, rendering mass mobilization and control
effective for a long time, has been transformed into a singular target of almost
all critique, pressure and attack.
(3) Politocracy, as the hard core of the ruling class, consists of professional
politicians who naturally have vested interest in their careers. Consequently,
if under pressures a monopolistic politics is being transformed into
democratic-competitive one, career politicians will try to play by new rules,
leave communist parties, join or even form new parties, support radical
reforms, etc. What else is left them if their self-cooptation is being replaced by
democratic elections?
(4) Pressures from below have widened and deepened divisions within the
ruling class and party. They consist of various strata: politocracy,
technocracy, officials of the administrative, military, police and propaganda
apparatus, etc. Since these groups have somewhat different interests various
reformist and anti-reformist coalitions within the ruling class and party, as
well as between some of its parts and external groups have been coming into
being.
(5) To claim that the communist party rules is both true and misleading.
There is no denial that the statist class has been organized as a political party.
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It is exactly this party organization that until recently had brought about
several great advantages to the class. First: it was through the party that as a
rule about ten percent of the population were directly organized, mobilized
and controlled. Second: it was the CP that served as the central "transmission
belt" in the system of "transmission belts". The ideological claim that other
organizations and institutions were "transmission belts" of the CP covered up
the fact that the CP itself was in the same instrumental position vis-a-vis the
"party within the party" or the ruling class. Third: it was in this way that class
character of the party and the state was disguised.
On the other hand, from the very beginning there has been a latent tension
and even contradiction between the ruling class and the CP. In recent times the
structural advantage of the ruling class being organized as and disguised in the
CP has in actuality turned into a systemic source of trouble for the class.
Namely, the previously powerless party base has begun alienating itself from
the party hierarchy, and using their organizations as legal and legitimate
channels of pressure upon it to allow for or at least not to hinder radical social
changes.
After all, the CP has always been more homogenous in ideology than in
practice. As the only real party in those countries it used to attract millions of
people, but with different and even opposite interests and views. During
deep crises they have tended to disintegrate, practically along the whole
political spectrum. Recently they have disintegrated completely. Some of the
leaders and many members of the new parties from the left to the right are ex-
communists. This is yet another indication that in those countries (except in
former East Germany) the de facto outcome for some time to come will not be
simple and full negation of communism but rather post-communism.
4. Victorious "capitalist encirclement"
Various ideological devices were invented to disguise, rationalize and
compensate for the inferiority of communist statism vis-a-vis democratic
capitalism. Until recently it had tried to function basically in isolation from
the outside capitalist world and global market-place.
The history of communism in power began as a "war communism" without
market and money. When it led to economic disaster Lenin made a turn-
about and introduced NEP with a partial rehabilitation of market and private
property. Stalin put a terroristic end to NEP, initiating as it were, a super-war
communism with its anti-market, totally command economy. After World
War 11 he divided the world market ideologically into capitalist and socialist
ones in order to compensate for the autarchy and inferiority of the
latter.
Finally, it was Gorbachev who came to the conclusion that there is really
only one world market and that communist countries have to integrate in it
even at the price of systemic transformations, i.e. of their own marketization.
Global market economy is in my view a victorious form of the "bourgeois en-
circlement" of communist statism. As a factor of overdetermination the world
capitalist "economic base" has been putting an irresistible pressure upon the
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communist "superstructure" to adjust to the needs of further technological
development.
Elsewhere I have reformulated Marx's insight into the prevalence of
"economic base" in history in the following way: When the "superstructure"
of human societies comes into conflict with their "economic base" they tend
in the long run to change the former rather than to prevent increase in the
productivity of the latter. True, before the advent of capitalism there had
been societies and even whole civilizations whose rigid "superstructure" had
completely blocked economic development. However, the price for it was
usually very high indeed: they were overrun by technologically more
advanced enemies. In other words, Marx made a mistake in overgeneralizing
his insight about the supremacy of "economic base" and in understanding it
too deterministically. The more one goes back in history and the more one
takes local perspective, the less right is Marx with his "economic base"
model. And conversely, history since the ascent of capitalism and gradual
creation of global market "economic base" has been increasingly supportive
of Marx in this regard.
His economic paradigm is unable to explain the origin and functioning of
communist statism as a socio-political formation. On the other hand, Marx
can be helpful in explaining the final outcome of the competition and conflict
between two dominant social formations in the contemporary world.
Structural pressures ofcapitalismas a socio-economicformationwould greatly
contributed to the implosion of communist statism in Europe.
NOTES
t This manuscript will also appear in the volume Crisis and Reconstruction: The State and
Civil Society in Africa and Eastern Europe, edited by Prosser Gifford, University Press of
America, 1992.
1. My first two books (in the projected tetralogy dealing with Marxism and communism):
Between Ideals and Reality, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973 (original 1969) and In
Search of Democracy in Socialism, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981 (original 1978) were
written in this manner.
2. See my third book (in the Perestroika: From Marxism and Bolshevism to
Gorbachev, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1988 (original 1987).
3. See my definitions of "ideology" and '''ideal-Iogy'' in ch. 4 op. cit.