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Guthrie To write a history of Greek philosophy is to describe the formative period of our own thought Even the modern

ern natural philosopher who studies the records of the earliest European thinkers may find that he has more in common with them than he expected. Para ninguna ciencia resulta esencial estudiar su historia. Aun ms, podramos estudiar filosofa sin referirnos a la historia, o slo hacerlo con los ms grandes. Pero el contemplar como se gesta el pensamiento permite comprenderlo con mayor profundidad y encontrar lo que de verdad tengan por contar. With the Greeks we stand at the beginning of rational thought in Europe. It follows that we shall not only be concerned with reasoned explanation or scientific observation, but shall be watching the emergence of these activities from the mists of a pre-scientific age. This emergence is not sudden, but slow and gradual This is not a condemnation of myth as false in itself. It's stories and images may be, at an early stage of civilization, the only available means (and an effective one) of expressing profound and universal truths. Later, a mature religious thinker like Plato may choose it deliberately, and as the culmination of a reasoned argument, to communicate experiences and beliefs, the reality and cogency of which is a matter of conviction outrunning logical proof. This is genuine myth, and its validity and importance are undoubted. The danger begins when men believe they have left all that behind and are relying on a scientific method based solely on a combination of observation and logical inference. The unconscious retention of inherited and irrational modes of thought, cloaked in the vocabulary of reason, then becomes an obstacle, rather than an aid, to the pursuit of truth. What may we call the conception of Greek philosophy? It occurred when the conviction began to take shape in men's minds that the apparent chaos of events must conceal an underlying order, and that this order is the product of impersonal forces. For religious faith there is substituted the faith that was and remains the basis of scientific thought with all its triumphs and all its limitations: that is, the faith that the visible world conceals a rational and intelligible order, that the causes of the natural world are to be sought within its boundaries, and that autonomous human reason is our sole and sufficient instrument for the search.

Popper The simplicity and boldness of their questions is part of it, but more important still is the critical attitude which, as I shall try to show, was first developed in the Ionian School. The questions which the Pre-Socratics tried to answer were primarily cosmological questions, but they also dealt with questions of the theory of knowledge. It is my belief that philosophy must return to cosmology and to a simple theory of knowledge.

There is at least one philosophical problem in which all thinking men are interested: the problem of under- standing the world in which we live, including ourselves They bear upon the development of the problem of change, as I call it, and only to the extent to which they are needed for an understanding of the Pre-Socratic approach to the problem of knowledge Our Western science-and there seems to be no other-did not start with collecting observations of oranges, but with bold theories about the world Traditional empiricist epistemology, and the traditional historiography of science, are still deeply influenced by the Baconian myth according to which science starts from observation and then slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories. That the facts are very different can be learned from studying the early Pre-Socratics. Here we find fascinating ideas, some of which are strange and Once we realize that all scientific statements are hypotheses, or guesses, or conjectures, and that the vast majority of these conjectures (including Bacon's own) have turned out to be false, the Baconian myth becomes irrelevant Ejemplo de Tales y la Tierra suspendida en el agua y la de Anaximandro en la mitad de todo, sin partir de una directa observacin en ambos casos Certainly not by observation but by reasoning, Anaximander arrived at his theory by way of criticising Thales' theory What prevented Anaximander from arriving at the theory that the earth was a globe rather than a drum? There can be little doubt about the answer to this question: it was observational experience Philosophy is speculative: everybody knows this. And as everybody knows, science begins only when the speculative method is replaced by the observational method, and when deduction is replaced by induction. This reply, of course, amounts to the thesis that scientific theories should be defined by reference to their origin-their origin in observations, or in so-called ' inductive procedures'. Yet I believe that few, if any, physical theories would fall under this definition. And I do not see at all why the question of origin should be important. What is important about a theory is its explanatory power, and whether it stands up to criticism and to tests. But are not Anaximander's theories false, and therefore non-scientific? They are false, I admit, but so are many theories, based upon countless experiments, which were held by modern science until recently, and to which nobody would deny the character of scientific theories, even though they are false. I believe that the Milesians, like their oriental predecessors who took the world for a tent, envisaged the world as a kind of house, the home of all creatures-our home. Thus there was no need to ask what it was for. But there was a real need to inquire into its architecture What was the secret of the ancients? I suggest that it was a tradition-the tradition of critical discussion

Schools, especially primitive schools, have all, it appears, a characteristic structure and function. Far from being places of critical discussion, they make it their task to impart a definite doctrine, and to preserve it, pure and unchanged. Thales was the first teacher who said to his pupils: 'This is how I see things- how I believe that things are. Try to improve upon my teaching It thus leads, almost by necessity, to the realization that our attempts to see, and to find, the truth, are not final, but open to improvement; that our knowledge, our doctrine, is conjectural; that it consists of guesses, of hypotheses, rather than of final and certain truths; and that criticism and critical discussion are our only means of getting nearer to the truth. It thus leads to the tradition of bold conjectures and of free criticism, the tradition which created the rational or scientific attitude, and with it our Western civilization, the only civilization which is based upon science. The rationalist tradition, the tradition of critical discussion, represents the only practicable way of expanding our knowledge -conjectural or hypothetical knowledge, of course the significance of observations and experiments depends entirely upon the question whether or not they may be used to criticize theories

Kirk The truth is, though, that no sensible person thinks it absolutely ' better' to examine knowledge of an orange than to examine knowledge of the world as a whole; but he may think it more helpful to concentrate at first on deliberately limited acts of perception, as a useful stage on the way to assessing knowledge in its wider aspect, as exercised on our total environment. Popper's own attitude to scientific methodology, which was formed, as he writes in the 1958 preface to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, in reaction against the attempts of the Vienna circle to base all philosophical and scientific truth upon verification by experience Philosophy of the traditional type had assumed that philosophical truths were metaphysical in content and could be apprehended by intuition. But what if scientific method should prove to be almost the reverse of what had generally been assumed, proceeding not inductively fromn observation and experiment to theories, but from theories to the validation, or possible falsifi- cation, provided by experimental tests? Then logical positivism would lose a powerful support for its claim to epistemological impregnability. What scien- tists produce are theories which may work for the time being and allow further progress, but which may subsequently have to be discarded because of the discovery of one new apparent fact with which they do not accord At the same time, though, in making ' falsifiability ', or the lack of it, the criterion of whether or not a theory is to be regarded as ' scientific ', he implicitly accepts that epistemology is somehow ultimately based, as the positivists required

Popper disguises the fact that science ulti- mately does start from observation-and thus, though he him- self denies this, that it is in part inductive, even if not so rigidly inductive as is often suggested Naturally, most attempts to extend scientific knowledge start immediately from an idea or intuition, which is then tested ' scientifically ' and accordingly approved, modified, or rejected. But the idea or intuition which acted as the starting-point of any such particular process is itself the culmination of a previous process or series of processes which must have been 'inductive' in some valid sense because it must ultimately have been based on an indefinite number of particular observations What Popper has done, then, in his description of the process of scientific discovery, is to ignore the essential preliminary stage of making observations, of building up a complex structure of experience out of which, by some kind of inductive process, come intuitions or universal theories. Scientific discovery does not differ in this respect from any other kind of theorizing, whether 'true' or 'untrue' in effect. Popper concentrates solely on the second stage, when such an intuition is brought into the open, tested in the laboratory, and, if not contradicted, promoted to the status of a ' corrobor- ated ' scientific theory representing a growth of knowledge. How does Popper attempt to answer this extremely -obvious objection to his theory of scientific discovery? o He claims that how men arrive at theories cannot be deter- mined, because the process is not entirely a rational one o He asserts that the whole question of the origins of a scientific theory is from this point of view unimportant If we accept the premise that scienice starts from intuitions, and suppress the rest, it may seem legiti- mate to accept that general conclusion. Yet such a conclusion promotes the misleading assumption that all scientific state- ments, if 'corroborated' by tests, possess the same degree of 'truth Near-Eastern- mythology and its influence on Greek cosmogony. The creation-myths of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian river-cultures had envisaged the world as built on a raft on the primeval water or as thrusting up from beneath its surface. Yet is is highly probable that his theory was so based-or at the lowest evaluation perfectlypossible. Would it not have been better for Popper to inform his audience and readers of this possibility? They would then have been able to see more clearly that Thales's 'intuition' may well have been ultimately based, after all, on a very specific experience: not that of Thales himself, but of the influential river-peoples with whom the widely-diffused account long ago originated

Lloyd The historical question concerning the charac- teristics and methods of Greek natural philosophy. It is this latter question that I wish to take up here.' In particular I wish to broaden

the field of the discussion to take the whole of early Greek speculative thought (and not merely the work of the philosophers) into account. the general problem of the relation between, and the relative importance of, conjecture and observation in early Greek science, bearing in mind the differing views that have been expressed by Popper and Kirk on the Presocratics, Popper maintaining that the best of the Presocratics' ideas have nothing to do with observation, and Kirk on the other hand insisting on the part played by observation (and common- sense) in their theories First several of the theses concerning the origins of Greek science that Popper has developed (with some, at least, of which Kirk too is in agree- ment) must surely be accepted. The first is that Greek science begins with global questions, not with detailed, specific ones, let alone with collections of observations. It begins with such problems as how things began and what they are made of. And of course the question of origins, particularly, had always been a favourite subject of myths, so that the Milesian philosophers' theories of the beginnings of things may be seen as rational- istic answers to a question that had already been posed, and answered, in mythical terms in, for example, Hesiod's Theogony Secondly the role of rational criticism and debate in the early stages of Greek science is amply demonstrated by an impressive body of evidence But what is especially striking and noteworthy is that even though there is no fully articulated doctrine of 'scientific method' until Aristotle, we find prelimin- ary sketches, if no more, of various notions of how the investigation of natural phenomena should be conducted in several earlier writers, and here the evidence from the medical theorists is particularly valuable The dogmatic nature of much Presocratic speculation is a feature that had struck the writer of On Ancient Medicine, who explicitly rejected the use of arbitrary postulates such as 'the hot' and 'the cold'. It is clear to us that he too made certain quite arbitrary assumptions in his own patho- logical doctrines, for instance. But this does not diminish the importance of the fact that he attempted to distinguish the methods proper to medicine from those of cosmology Generalisation appears equally hazardous on the question of the relation between theoryconstruction and empirical research in antiquity, as here too the situation varies from one branch of science to another, depending on the subject-matter investigated and the means available to investigate it These few examples already show (I suggest) that there are variations in the relationship between problem-appreciation, theory-construction and programmes of empirical research in different contexts in ancient science. In particular we can distinguish between programmes of empirical research (if we may call them that) that were fairly clearly undertaken with a view to providing data that would confirm or refute a particular theory, and those programmes that reflect not a desire to test a theory, so much as a de- sire to exploit a new scientific technique, such as dissection. Thus when the method of dissection was used systematically, this revealed problems that had not been dreamed of previously, and here it seems to me to make more sense to talk of the observations (not the problems themselves) as the starting-point of scientific progress. But whether or not that is accepted, I may end by observing that even a rapid survey such as this serves to indicate some of the quite striking differences to be found

in early Greek science both in the conception of 'the inquiry into nature' and in its practice, and that so far as the historical issues arising out of the controversy between Popper and Kirk are concerned, what are needed are more, and more detailed, case-studies of specific scientific problems in antiquity, to throw further light on the intricate questions of the methods, and methodo- logical assumptions, of early Greek scientists. Most Varios presocrticos criticaron los mitos anteriores Jenfanes: Homero y Hesodo atribuyeron a los dioses los vergonzoso y reprocable entre los hombres: robo, adulterio y engaos entre ellos" (Dk 21 B 11) Herclito: "Homero y Arquloco, en vez de ser cantados por los rapsodas, deberan ser golpeados y arrojados fuera de la competencia potica" (DK 22 B 42) Tolkien To many, Fantasy, this sub-creative art which plays strange tricks with the world and all that is in it, combining nouns and redistributing adjectives, has seemed suspect, if not illegitimate. To some it has seemed at least a childish folly, a thing only for peoples or for persons in their youth. As for its legitimacy I will say no more than to quote a brief passage from a letter I once wrote to a man who described myth and fairy-story as lies; though to do him justice he was kind enough and confused enough to call fairy-story-making Breathing a lie through Silver. Fantasy is a natural human activity. It certainly does not destroy or even insult Reason; and it does not either blunt the appetite for, nor obscure the perception of, scientific verity. On the contrary. The keener and the clearer is the reason, the better fantasy will it make. If men were ever in a state in which they did not want to know or could not perceive truth (facts or evidence), then Fantasy would languish until they were cured. If they ever get into that state (it would not seem at all impossible), Fantasy will perish, and become Morbid Delusion. For creative Fantasy is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the world as it appears under the sun; on a recognition of fact, but not a slavery to it. So upon logic was founded the nonsense that displays itself in the tales and rhymes of Lewis Carroll. If men really could not distinguish between frogs and men, fairy-stories about frog-kings would not have arisen. Fantasy can, of course, be carried to excess. It can be ill done. It can be put to evil uses. It may even delude the minds out of which it came. But of what human thing in this fallen world is that not true? Men have conceived not only of elves, but they have imagined gods, and worshipped them, even worshipped those most deformed by their authors' own evil. But they have made false gods out of other materials: their notions, their banners, their monies; even their sciences and their social and economic theories have demanded human sacrifice. Abusus non tollit usum. Fantasy remains a human right: we make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker.

We do not, or need not, despair of drawing because all lines must be either curved or straight, nor of painting because there are only three primary colours. We may indeed be older now, in so far as we are heirs in enjoyment or in practice of many generations of ancestors in the arts. In this inheritance of wealth there may be a danger of boredom or of anxiety to be original, and that may lead to a distaste for fine drawing, delicate pattern, and pretty colours, or else to mere manipulation and over-elaboration of old material, clever and heartless. But the true road of escape from such weariness is not to be found in the wilfully awkward, clumsy, or misshapen, not in making all things dark or unremittingly violent; nor in the mixing of colours on through subtlety to drabness, and the fantastical complication of shapes to the point of silliness and on towards delirium. Before we reach such states we need recovery. We should look at green again, and be startled anew (but not blinded) by blue and yellow and red. We should meet the centaur and the dragon, and then perhaps suddenly behold, like the ancient shepherds, sheep, and dogs, and horses and wolves. This recovery fairy-stories help us to make. In that sense only a taste for them may make us, or keep us, childish. Recovery (which includes return and renewal of health) is a re-gainingregaining of a clear view. I do not say seeing things as they are and involve myself with the philosophers, though I might venture to say seeing things as we are (or were) meant to see themas things apart from ourselves. We need, in any case, to clean our windows; so that the things seen clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness or familiarityfrom possessiveness. Of all faces those of our familiares are the ones both most difficult to play fantastic tricks with, and most difficult really to see with fresh attention, perceiving their likeness and unlikeness: that they are faces, and yet unique faces. This triteness is really the penalty of appropriation: the things that are trite, or (in a bad sense) familiar, are the things that we have appropriated, legally or mentally. We say we know them. They have become like the things which once attracted us by their glitter, or their colour, or their shape, and we laid hands on them, and then locked them in our hoard, acquired them, and acquiring ceased to look at them.

The fantastic elements in verse and prose of other kinds, even when only decorative or occasional, help in this release. But not so thoroughly as a fairy-story, a thing built on or about Fantasy, of which Fantasy is the core. Fantasy is made out of the Primary World, but a good craftsman loves his material, and has a knowledge and feeling for clay, stone and wood which only the art of making can give. By the forging of Gram cold iron was revealed; by the making of Pegasus horses were ennobled; in the Trees of the Sun and Moon root and stock, flower and fruit are manifested in glory. And actually fairy-stories deal largely, or (the better ones) mainly, with simple or fundamental things, untouched by Fantasy, but these simplicities are made all the more luminous by their setting. For the story-maker who allows himself to be free with Nature can be her lover not her slave. It was in fairy-stories that I first divined the potency of the words, and the wonder of the things, such as stone, and wood, and iron; tree and grass; house and fire; bread and wine.

I have claimed that Escape is one of the main functions of fairy-stories, and since I do not disapprove of them, it is plain that I do not accept the tone of scorn or pity with which Escape is now so often used: a tone for which the uses of the word outside literary criticism give no warrant at all. In what the misusers are fond of calling Real Life, Escape is evidently as a rule very practical, and may even be heroic. In real life it is difficult to blame it, unless it fails; in criticism it would seem to be the worse the better it succeeds. Evidently we are faced by a misuse of words, and also by a confusion of thought. Why should a man be scorned if, finding himself in prison, he tries to get out and go home? Or if, when he cannot do so, he thinks and talks about other topics than jailers and prison-walls? The world outside has not become less real because the prisoner cannot see it. In using escape in this way the critics have chosen the wrong word, and, what is more, they are confusing, not always by sincere error, the Escape of the Prisoner with the Flight of the Deserter. Electric lamps have come to stay, they say. Long ago Chesterton truly remarked that, as soon as he heard that anything had come to stay, he knew that it would be very soon replaced indeed regarded as pitiably obsolete and shabby. The march of Science, its tempo quickened by the needs of war, goes inexorably on ... making some things obsolete, and foreshadowing new developments in the utilization of electricity: an advertisement. This says the same thing only more menacingly. The electric street-lamp may indeed be ignored, simply because it is so insignificant and transient. Fairy-stories, at any rate, have many more permanent and fundamental things to talk about. Lightning, for example. The escapist is not so subservient to the whims of evanescent fashion as these opponents. He does not make things (which it may be quite rational to regard as bad) his masters or his gods by worshipping them as inevitable, even inexorable. It is indeed an age of improved means to deteriorated ends. It is part of the essential malady of such days producing the desire to escape, not indeed from life, but from our present time and self-made misery that we are acutely conscious both of the ugliness of our works, and of their evil. So that to us evil and ugliness seem indissolubly allied. We find it difficult to conceive of evil and beauty together. The fear of the beautiful fay that ran through the elder ages almost eludes our grasp. Even more alarming: goodness is itself bereft of its proper beauty. In Faerie one can indeed conceive of an ogre who possesses a castle hideous as a nightmare (for the evil of the ogre wills it so), but one cannot conceive of a house built with a good purposean inn, a hostel for travellers, the hall of a virtuous and noble kingthat is yet sickeningly ugly. At the present day it would be rash to hope to see one that was notunless it was built before our time. But there are also other and more profound escapisms that have always appeared in fairytale and legend. There are other things more grim and terrible to fly from than the noise, stench, ruthlessness, and extravagance of the internal-combustion engine. There are hunger, thirst, poverty, pain, sorrow, injustice, death. And even when men are not facing hard things such as these, there are ancient limitations from which fairy-stories offer a sort of escape, and old ambitions and desires (touching the very roots of fantasy) to which they offer a kind of satisfaction and consolation