SIBAL vs VALDEZ Facts: May 11, 1923: Vitaliano Mamawal (deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac) levied an attachment

on 8 parcels of land owned by P July 30, 1923: Macondray & Co. Inc bought the 8 parcels of land at an auction Sept. 24, 1923: P paid Macondray & Co. Inc P2,000 for the redemption price of said parcels of land without specifying the particular parcels April 29, 1924: Vitaliano Mamawal (deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac) attached the personal property of P among which included the sugar cane in the 7 parcels of land May 9&10, 1924: Sheriff sold it to R at a public auction who paid P1,550 for the land and P600 for the sugar cane April 29, 1924: Sheriff also attached the real property (included 1 parcels of land and a house and camarin situated on one of the parcels) of P including all his rights, interest and participation thereof June 25, 1924: 8(1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11) of the 11 parcels, including house and camarin(7) were bought by R at the auction for P12,200 3 parcels (2, 12, 13) were released from the attachment by virtue of claims presented by Agustin Cuyugan and Domiciano Tizon June 25, 1924: Macondray & Co. sold and conveyed to R for P2,579.97 all of its rights over the 8 parcels of land acquired by it in a public auction o R became the absolute owner of the 8 parcels of land

Ungathered products and growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property and subject to execution o Is thus not subject to redemption A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed. The thing sold, must be specific and identified. They must be owned at the time by the vendor. * pending crops which have potential existence may be the valid subject matter of sale, and may be dealt with separately from the land on which they grow

Issue: Ruling: Art 334(2), CC: Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered, and trees before they are cut down, are likewise immovable, and are considered as part of the land to which they are attached. Where the crops belonging to the owner of the plantation, they form part of the immovable, and where it is seized, the fruits gathered or produced inure to the benefit of the seizing creditor WON sugar cane is personal or real property.

MANANZALA vs CA, ARANEZ Facts: P is the owner of a parcel of land and possessed it ever since 1995 by virtue if a conditional sale made in her favor by NHA 1960: PHHC/NHA awarded the subject land to Nestor and Elisea Mercado who took possession of the land So P contested the award so PHHC later cancelled the award to Mercado spouses Dec. 14, 1984: P paid in full the price of the land under the deed of conditional sale so on Jan. 14, 1985 NHA executed a deed of sale in her favor and the next day she had a TCT under her name Jan. 31, 1985: R brought an action for specific performance against P to enforce a deed of sale covering the same lot o P and R had an agreement on March 22, 1960 o Contract stated that title to the land shall be transferred to R within 30 days after full payment of the purchase price by P to PHHC o Deed was notarized by Atty. Lopez, who was counsel of P P denied the sale o Deed was a forgery and that her signature was secured through fraud o Deed of sale was void because was made before the actual award of the land to her and that it was made in violation of the prohibition in the rules and regulations of the PHHC against the subsequent disposition of the land within one year of the issuance of the title

* the sale of a lot by a seller who is yet to acquire full ownership from the government agency is valid since it involves the sale of a future thing, but really it was a sale subject to the condition that seller will acquire the property.

Issue: Ruling: The signature of P on the deed was genuine The sale to R was not in violation of any rule of the PHHC There was a meeting of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the signature of P on the deed of sale which the NBI found to be genuine o Notarization gave rise to the presumption of its regularity P can validly sell the land even before the actual award to her WON P must transfer ownership of the land to R.

Melliza vs. CITY OF ILOILO, UP, CA Facts: P owned 3 parcels of land Lots 2, 5, 1214 Nov. 27, 1931: P donated Lot 1214 to the Municipality of Iloilo, to serve as site for the municipal hall But was revoked by the parties for the reason that the area donated was found inadequate to meet the requirements of the development plan of the municipality, the so called Arellano Plan Lot 1214 were divided by Certeza Surveying Co into Lots 1214-A and 1214-B and later subdivided to 1204-B-1 (1214-B), 1214-B-2 (1214-C), 1214-B-3 (1214D) Jan. 14, 1938: P sold her remaining interest in Lot 1214to Villanueva who later transferred it to Pio Sian Melliza o At the back of the annotated certificate of Pio Sian Melliza was that some of the lots were to belong to the Municipality of Iloilo Aug. 24, 1949: the City of Iloilo (succeeded Municipality of Iloilo) donated the city hall site to UP Lots 1214-B, 1214-C, 1214-D 1952: UP enclosed the site donated with a wire fence o P then asked for payments of the value of the lot 1214-B Dec. 10, 1955: P filed an action for recovery of the lot 1214-B

P was also aware of the terms already * the requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. * the requirement was deemed fulfilled since it specifically referred to such portions of the lots required by the Arellano plan, which had long been in existence and it specifically provided for the land areas needed for the city hall site. Therefore, at the time of the perfection of the contract, the exact area of the land needed, which was the subject matter of the sale, could be determined by simply referring to the Arellano plan, without the parties needing to draw-up a new contract, nor even to clarify matters or explain their intentions.

Issue: -

WON the conveyance by Juliana Melliza to Iloilo municipality included the portion of Lot 1214 now known as Lot 1214-B.

Ruling: Intention of the parties: to provide Iloilo municipality with lots sufficient in are for the construction of the city, with its avenue and parks o Was revoked for inadequacy of area The instrument describes 4 parcels of land by their lot numbers and area, the lots object of the sale, by stating that said lots are the ones needed for the construction of the city hall site, avenues and parks. o Sufficient basis for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a new and further agreement of the parties

ASUNCION, CRISTINA, ROSARIO ATILANO vs. LADISLAO, GREGORIO ATILANO Facts: 1916: Eulogio Atilano I purchased from Gerardo Villanueva a lot 1920: subdivided the lots into 5 parts: 535-A, 535-B, 535-C, 535-D, 535-E May 18, 1920: for the sum of P150 he executed a deed of sale for lot 535-E in favor of Eulogio Atilano II The 3 other portions, 353-B, 353-C, 353-D were then sold to other persons Had lot 535-A remain for himself Upon his death land was passed on to Ladislao Atilano Dec. 6, 1952: Eulogio Atilano II upon the death of his wife obtained a TCT under his name and childrens as co-owners of the land July 16, 1959: so to end co-ownership, they had it resurveyed so that it be subdivided o Discovered that the land they were occupying was lot 535-A and not 535-E Jan. 25, 1960: heirs of Eulogio Atilano II had offered to surrender to R the possession of 535-A and demand in return the possession of 535-E but R refused to accept

o Mistake does not invalidate contract Remedy: reformation of the instrument o Available when, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident. Deed of sale in 1920 cannot be reformed o Retained possession of their respective properties to the real intention of the parties to the sale o They must execute mutual deed of conveyance * the object of the sale was actually lot 535-A, although the deed of sale referred to lot 535-E, because there was only a mistake in designating the particular lot to be sold in the instrument, which mistake was deemed pro forma and did not vitiate the consent of the parties or affect the validity and binding effect of the sale. * when one seeks to sell or buy a real property, one sells or buys the property as he sees it in its actual setting and by its physical metes and bounds, and not by the mere lot number assigned to it in the certificate of title. *It was clear that when the brothers entered into a contract, they were referring to lot 535-A because even before that, the purchasing brother had been occupying said lot as his residence.

Issue: Ruling: 535-A was already in possession of R, who had constructed residence therein, even before the sale in his favor and even before the subdivision of the entire lot 535 The 2 brothers continued in possession of the respective portions for the rest of their lives, obviously ignorant of the initial mistake in the designation of the 1920 sale until 1959, when the mistake was discovered for the first time. Real intention of the parties to the sale: the specific portion where R was then already residing, where he constructed his house at the end of the war, and where his heirs continued to reside thereafter: namely 535-A; and that its designation as lot 535-E in the deed of sale was a simple mistake in the drafting of the document. WON there was really a mistake in the designation of lots in the instrument.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, CABAL vs. IAC, SORIANO Facts: -

GAITE vs. FONACIER, KRAKOWER, LARAP MINES & SMELTING INC., VIVAS, DANTE, ESCANDOR, TY Facts: -

Issue: -

Ps incidental function is the buying of palay grains from qualified farmers. Aug. 23, 1979: R offered to sell palay grains to NFA through Cabal (Provincial Manager of NFA) o R submitted the documents required by the NFA for pre-qualifying as a seller Aug. 24, 1979: R delivered 630 cavans of palay. These were not rebagged, reclassified and weighed. So when he demanded payment, he was informed that his payment was held in abeyance since R was still investigating an information that he was not a bona fide farmer and that the palay delivered was not his harvest. Aug. 28, 1979: P wrote R to withdraw palay delivered stating that NFA cannot legally accept the said delivery on the basis of the subsequent certification of the BAEX technician that he is not a bona fide farmer. Instead of withdrawing it, he demanded payment so he filed a complaint for specific performance and collection of money with damages on Nov. 2, 1979 An agreement was made between the parties and the palays were later withdrawn from the warehouse. WON there was a contract of sale.

Ruling: Sale as a contract one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent Contract meeting of the minds between 2 persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. R offered to sell palay produced in his farmland and when P accepted there was already a meeting of the minds o Even if there was no meeting of the minds as to the quality it does not affect the perfection of the contract * Specific quantity of the subject matter is not important when it is still possible to determine the quantity without the need of a new contract between the parties, and therefore complies with the requisite of being determinable.

R was the owner of 11 iron lode mineral claims known as the Dawahan Group Sept. 29, 1952: by a Deed of Assignment R appointed P as his attorney -in-fact into a contract with any individual or juridical person for the exploration and development of the mining claims on a royalty basis of not less than P0.50 per ton of ore that might be extracted therefrom March 19, 1954: P executed a general assignment conveying the development and exploration of said mining claims unto Larap Iron Mines owned by P on the same royalty basis P then embarked upon the development and exploitation of the mining claims in question and extracted an estimate of approximately 24,000 metric tons of iron ore R then revoked the authority granted to P to exploit and develop the mining claims Dec. 8, 1954: executed Revocation of Power of Attorney and Contract where P transferred to R, for the consideration of P20,000 + 10% of the royalties R would receive from the mining claims o P transferred to R all his rights and interest over the 24, 000 tons of iron ore in consideration of P75,000 which P10,000 was paid upon the signing Dec. 8, 1954: P65, 000 balance was to be paid upon the first delivery of iron ores and also executed a surety bond

Issue: -

WON R still have the right to insist that P should wait for the sale or shipment of the ore before receiving payment.

Ruling: * when parties to a sale covering a specific mass had not made any provisions in their contract for the measuring or weighing of the subject matter sold, and that the price agreed upon was not based on such measurement, then *t+he subject matter of the sale is, therefore, a determinate object, the mass, and not the actual number of units or tons contained therein, so that all that [is] required of the seller Gaite was to deliver in good faith to his buyer all of the ore found in the mass, notwithstanding that the quantity delivered is less than the amount estimated.

ALCANTARA-DAUS vs HERMOSO, DE LEON Facts: Issue: -

HEIRS OF SEVERINA SAN MIGUEL vs. CA, DOMINADOR, GUILLERMO, PACIENCA, ENRICO, AUGUSTO, ANTONIO, RODOLFO, CONRADO, LUCITA SAN MIGUEL Facts: P had a lot with an area of 632 sq. m., more or less Without Ps knowledge, Dominador subdivided the land into 3 lots o 1312 108 sq. m. o 1313 Lot 1 299 sq. m. o 1313 Lot 2 225 sq. m. Sept. 25, 1974, Dominador, et al. filed a petition with CFI to issue title over 1313 Lots 1 & 2 in their names July 19, 1977: LRC issued it under their names Aug. 22, 1978: P filed a petition for the review of the decision that the land registration proceeding were fraudulently concealed Dec. 27, 1982: declared OCT as null and void July 13, 1987: TCT issued under Severina and heirs Feb. 15, 1990: court issued a writ of possession issued in favor of P to be implemented but was returned unsatisfied Nov. 17, 1991: court issued a writ of demolition in favor of P but was returned unsatisfied Aug. 6, 1993: P decided not to pursue with the writs issued and entered into a compromise agreement with R o Conditions: P were to sell the subject lots to R for P1.5M with the TCT conditioned upon the purchase of another lot which had an additional P300,000 sum o So executed the sale designated as kasulatan sa bilihan ng lupa Nov. 16, 1993: R prayed that P deliver the owners copy of the certificate of title to them P opposed since R did not get to pay P300,000. If they pay then that is the time certificate be given. R admitted the non-payment since P have not presented any proof of ownership over the untitled parcel of land rd Parcel of land was now under the name of a 3 party, Emiliano Eugenio

R owned a parcel of land which he inherited from his father by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition 1960: R engaged the services of Atty. Juan to take care of the documents of the properties of his parents The Atty let them sign voluminous documents After the death of the Atty some documents were discovered that it has been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Rs brothers and sisters Rs signature made to Rodolfo de Leon was forged Rodolfo de Leon then sold the land to P R now asked to annul the document but P refuses

WON the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Rodolfo de Leon over the land in question was perfected and binding upon the parties.

Ruling: Rodolfo de Leon was not the owner of the land delivered to P Rs signature was also forged on the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim A contract of sale is consensual. It is perfected by mere consent, upon a meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment. At this stage, the seller's ownership of the thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the contract of sale. The contract, however, creates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. * In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the seller's non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract. Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties, its consummation by delivery is yet another matter. It is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold.

Issue: -

WON R may be compelled to pay the P300,000 as agreed in the kasunduan, despite Ps lack of evidence over the parcel of land.

Ruling:

in contracts of sale, the vendor need not possess title to the thing sold at the perfection of the contract. However, the vendor must possess title and must be able to transfer title at the time of delivery. In a contract of sale, title only passes to the vendee upon full payment of the stipulated consideration, or upon delivery of the thing sold. Severina's heirs are not in a position to transfer title. Without passing on the question of who actually owned the land covered by LRC Psu-1312, we note that there is no proof of ownership in favor of Severina's heirs. o In fact, it is a certain Emiliano Eugenio, who holds a tax declaration over the said land in his name. Though tax declarations do not prove ownership of the property of the declaring, tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. o Severina's heirs have nothing to counter this document. to insist that Dominador, et al. pay the price under such circumstances would result in Severina's heirs' unjust enrichment the non-payment of the P300,000 is not a valid justification for refusal to deliver the certificate of title * Although the seller must be the owner of the thing in order to transfer ownership to the buyer, he need not be the owner thereof at the time of perfection; it is sufficient that he be the owner at the time of the delivery

CONCHITA NOOL, ALMOJERA vs. CA, ANACLETO NOOL, NEBRE Facts: 1 hectare of land was owned by Victorino Nool 3.0880 hectares of land was owned by Francisco Nool P alleges that they are the owners of the 2 parcels of land which they bought from Victorino and Francisco Nool (Conchitas older brother) o P was in dire need of money so they obtained a loan from DBP and they used the lands to secure the mortgage o Since they failed to pay the mortage it was later foreclosed o DBP had 1-year redemption period which was from March 16, 1982March 15, 1983 but was never exercised o Since was not repurchased it was under DBPs name on May 23, 1983 o P then contacted Anacleto Nool to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP which he did on April 1, 1985 so both lands were under his name as of Fen. 8, 1988 Agreement 1: price P100,000. Conchita paid P30,000 and upon the payment of P14,000 she was to regain possession but never paid Agreement 2: R agreed to return to P the lands at any time until P has the necessary amount

Issues: Ruling: It is clear that the sellers no longer had any title to the parcels of land at the time of sale. Since Exhibit D, the alleged contract of repurchase, was dependent on the validity of Exhibit C, it is itself void. A void contract cannot give rise to a valid one. * It is likewise clear that the sellers can no longer deliver the object of the sale to the buyers, as the buyers themselves have already acquired title and delivery thereof from the rightful owner, the DBP. Thus, such contract may be deemed to be inoperative and may thus fall, by analogy, under item no. 5 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code: Those which contemplate an impossible service. Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof *object of the sale+ at the time it is delivered. Here, delivery of ownership is no longer possible. It has become impossible. WON Conchita can repurchase the land from Anacleto.

Exhibit D presupposes that petitioners could repurchase the property that they "sold" to private respondents. As petitioners "sold" nothing, it follows that they can also "repurchase" nothing. Nothing sold, nothing to repurchase. In this light, the contract of repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void. One "repurchases" only what one has previously sold. In other words, the right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. Undisputedly, private respondents acquired title to the property from DBP, and not from petitioners. * Nool to hold the contract of sale void, in order to render the attached right to repurchase also void. The Court found it inequitable for the sellers to exercise the right to repurchase, when they had not complied with their obligation to transfer ownership over the subject matter of the sale, and that the buyer was the one that eventually bought the property from the foreclosing bank.

ALFONSO, CRESENTE, REYNELDA, DEMETRIO, ELUITERIA, EULALIO, WARLITO QUIJADA (heirs of the late Trinidad Quijada) vs. CA, MONDEJAR, GOLORAN, ASIS, RAS, ABISO, BAUTISTA, MACASERO, MAGUINSAY Facts: Pedro Corvera had 2 parcels of land was inherited by Trinidad Quijada and siblings Upon her death was inherited by P Trinidad Quijada and siblings executed a conditional deed of sale in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon o Condition: parcel of land shall be used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed high school in Talacogon Despite the donation Trinidad remained possession of the land July 29, 1962: verbally sold 1 parcel of land to Mondejar without the benefit of a written deed of sale and evidenced only by receipts 1980: P filed a complaint for forcible entry against R but was dismissed 1987: since the condition in the donation never materialized, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Talacogon enacted a resolution reverting the 2 parcels to the donors R also already sold some parcels of land to Baustista, Guden, Ernesto and Rodolfo Goloran July 5, 1988:P filed a case against R

Issue: Ruling: -

WON sale made by Trinidad to Mondejar was valid.

Sale made by Trinidad Quijada to respondent Mondejar was valid as the former retained an inchoate interest on the lots by virtue of the automatic reversion clause in the deed of donation. When the Municipality's acceptance of the donation was made known to the donor, the former became the new owner of the donated property donation being a mode of acquiring and transmitting ownership notwithstanding the condition imposed by the donee. The donation is perfected once the acceptance by the donee is made known to the donor. o Accordingly, ownership is immediately transferred to the latter and that ownership will only revert to the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.

that resolutory condition is the construction of the school at the time of the sales made in 1962 towards 1968, the alleged seller (Trinidad) could not have sold the lots since she had earlier transferred ownership thereof by virtue of the deed of donation Since no period was imposed by the donor on when the donee must comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. o Such period, however, became irrelevant herein when the doneeMunicipality manifested through a resolution that it cannot comply with the condition of building a school and the same was made known to the donor. o Only then when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor's knowledge that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation. * the sale of a land previously donated by the seller to a LGU under a resolutory condition, was a valid sale even though at the time of the sale, ownership in the property was still with the local government * When the resolutory condition did occur which effectively reverted ownership back to the seller under Art. 1434 the sellers title passes by operation of law to the buyer. * Art. 1434 applies not only the sale of goods, but also to other kinds of property, including real property

CAVITE DEVELOPMENT BANK (CDB), FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. CYRUS LIM, LOLITA CHAN LIM, CA Facts: -

June 15, 1983: Rodolfo Guansing obtained a P90,000 loan from CDB in which he mortgaged a parcel of land He later defaulted in his payment so CDB foreclosed the mortgage March 15, 1984: foreclosure sale was made, CDB was the highest bidder March 2, 1987: Guansing failed to redeem so had the property under CDBs name June 16, 1988: R, assisted by a broker named Remedios Gatpandan, offered to purchase the property from CDB Had a written Offer to Purchase signed by R and broker with the conditions: o 10% option money o Balance payable in cash o Property should be cleared of illegal tenants Property was worth P300,000 June 17, 1988: R then paid P30,000 as option money and was issued a receipt Later found out that the title under Guansings was cancelled by court on March 23, 1984 since it was discovered that Rodolfo fraudulently secured the title from Perfecto (father of Rodolfo) Aug. 29, 1989: R filed an action for specific performance and damages against P since she considered a serious misrepresentation by CDB and FEBTC on their ability to sell the subject property

Issue: -

WON there was contract of sale perfected between P and R.

Ruling: P30,000 although denominated in the offer to purchase as option money it is actually in the nature of a down payment when considered with the other terms of the offer An option contract is separate from and preparatory to a contract of sale which, if perfected, does not result in the perfection or consummation of the sale. Only when the option is exercised may a sale be perfected. Parties entered into a contract of sale, partially consummated as to the payment of the price A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. It is, therefore, not required that, at the perfection stage, the seller be the owner of the thing sold or even that such subject matter of the sale exists at that point in time. Under Art. 1434 of the Civil Code, when a person sells or alienates a thing

which, at that time, was not his, but later acquires title thereto; such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. sale by CDB to Lim of the property mortgaged in 1983 by Rodolfo Guansing must, therefore, be deemed a nullity for CDB did not have a valid title to the said property CDB never acquired a valid title to the property because the foreclosure sale, by virtue of which the property had been awarded to CDB as highest bidder, is likewise void since the mortgagor was not the owner of the property foreclosed. * A foreclosure sale, though essentially a "forced sale," is still a sale in accordance with Art. 1458 of the Civil Code, under which the mortgagor in default, the forced seller, becomes obliged to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the highest bidder who, in turn, is obliged to pay therefore the bid price in money or its equivalent. Being a sale, the rule that the seller must be the owner of the thing sold also applies in a foreclosure sale. o * Mortgagor or pledgor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged, in anticipation of a possible foreclosure sale should the mortgagor default in the payment of the loan. Exception to the rule that mortgagor is not the owner of mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract is still valid: o Doctrine of the mortgagee in good faith P are not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of mortgagors title but they cannot be excused from the duty of exercising the due diligence required of banking institutions