RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL 93. 94. Republic Act No.

8493 Speedy Trial Act Estrada v Desierto, March 2, 2001

FACTS: After his fall from the pedestal of power, petitioner Joseph Estrada was confronted with cluster of legal problems. Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigattion of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudical publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal casesviolation of his right to due process. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial? HELD: There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al., we laid down the doctrine that: "We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
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during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.' We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc. and its companion cases, viz: "Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation. xxx The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was xxx a.The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038. b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. c.Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated. Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro,
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et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied) Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner. The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs." News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior. Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court. 94-A Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindano Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et. al. A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011 FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City. Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying
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that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices . The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines5 (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court. The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out "in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed "earnest hope that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits." The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010,10 the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. HELD: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined: (a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting. (b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court. (c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment. (d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities. The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches. If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.
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At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted. (e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court27 applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both. (f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.1avvphi1 (g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. (j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities. (k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology. (l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE 95. Cariaga v Court of Appeals, June 6, 2001

FACTS: Jonathan Cariaga, a DPLC employee was found guilty beyond reasonbale doubt of qualified theft for stealing and, with the aid of his cousin Ricardo Cariaga, selling DPLC electrical wires (company property). The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return was uncertain. The trial court rendered the decision finding that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft. The accused appealed the judgement of conviction to the Court of Appeals which it affirmed. The CA reasoned out that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court during the criminal proceedings against the petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly considered by the trial court. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to cross-examination is admissible in evidence?
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HELD: No. The testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to cross-examination is not admissible in evidence. The affidavits of witnesses who are not presented during the trial and thus, are not subjected to cross-examination are inadmissible because they are hearsay. In Toledo, Jr. vs. People, this Court emphasized that the preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of an accused person to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face. In Tan vs. Court of Appeals , it was ruled that unable to testify or for that matter unavailability, does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses. 96. People v Ong, June 21, 2004

FACTS: The accused William Ong and Ching De Ming alias Roberto Tui were charged with violation of RA No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment, the two accused, who are Chinese nationals, plead not guilty. The records do not show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English languaged. Their trial proceeded. In the course of the trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter. The trial court convicted the appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. Hence this instant case by way of automatic review. The appellants insists on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid arraignment? HELD: No. Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.) The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or dialect known to them. Re: Constitutional Right to Confront the Witnesses In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete . The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. 97. People v Ricardo Bohol, June 28, 2008

FACTS: On August 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the police station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Jessie Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal drug trade in Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. P/Sr. Insp. Nitullano then formed a team of six police operatives to verify the informants tip,
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and, if found positive, to launch then and there a buy-bust entrapment of Bohol. PO2 Ferdinand Estrada was assigned to act as poseur buyer, and he was provided with a marked P100-bill as buy-bust money. Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered the assailed convicting Ricardo Bohol in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-205461 and 02-205462 of violating Sections 11 (3) and 5 Article II, respectively, of Republic Act No. 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Since one of the penalties imposed by the trial court is life imprisonment, the cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review. On June 15, 2005, this Court transferred the cases to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to this Courts decision in People v. Mateo. In a Decision dated September 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification, so that the penalty in Criminal Case No. 02-205461 should be imprisonment for 12 years, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day, as maximum. Bohols Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court. Thus, Bohol filed a notice of appeal. ISSUE: Whether the failure of the prosecution to present the confidential informant as a witness during the trial is a violation of his Consitutional right of meeting the witnesses face to face? HELD: In entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The settled rule is that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is entitled to the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and manner of testifying and thus, is in a better position to assess their credibility. Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the informants presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in court. Hence, we agree that Bohols guilt has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. NOTE: Compare Bohol and Ong Case In Ong case, it appears that from careful reading of the testimony SPO1 Gonzales, the designated poseur-buyer in the team, that he is not a privy to the sale transaction that transpired between the confidential informant and Ong, the alleged pusher.

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESSES 98. People v Chua, April 4, 2001

FACTS: Accused Alicia Chua has appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch V finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, and eight (8) counts of estafa sentencing her to various penalties therefor. In her brief, accused-appellant anchors her defense on the approval of her application for a license to recruit on April 13, 1993, which, according to her, rendered her a genuine holder of authority. She also claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to compulsory process. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was denied of her constitutional right to compulsory process?

HELD: No. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in ones behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained. In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellants motion for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a license until then.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 99. People v Malimit, 264 SCRA 167

FACTS: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court committed the several error, among others in admitting as evidence the wallet and is contents although the circumstances which elade to its production was obtrained in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. HELD: The right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object of evidence. 100. People v Rondero, 320 SCRA 383

FACTS: Delfin Rondero, accused-appellant, was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The trial court dismissed the charge of rape holding that it has not been adequately proven due to the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's private part. Nevertheless, rendered a decision sentencing the accusedappellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of homicide. Hence this instant case. ISSUE: Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some of his hair strands were taken from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Whether hair samples taken from the accused without his consent is a violation of his right against selfincrimination? HELD: No. Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution as a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is inherently coercive in nature. However, to paraphrase Justice Sanchez in the case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, "Compulsion does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." Needless to say, the above-mentioned provisions are an affirmation that "coercion can be mental as well as physical and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-mentioned provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the
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accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. 101. Marcelo v Sandiganbayan, January 26, 1999

FACTS: After being arrested by NBI agents for pilferage of mail matter in the post office, the petitioner and his companions were asked to affix their signatures on the envelops of the letters, which constitutes the corpus delicti. Appealing his conviction of qualified theft by the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner invokes the Beltran v. Samson ruling in arguing that the signing of his name was not a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination. ISSUE: Whether the act of signing constitutes self-incrimination? HELD: No. The use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the useof petitioner's signature in this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelops was merely to autheticate the envelopes as the one seized from him and his co-accused. (QUERY: But does not the signature signify owning to the possession of pilfered materials?) 102. Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Granted. FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzons plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition. ISSUES: Whether the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. HELD: NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.

103.

People v Gallarde, February 17, 2000

FACTS: On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding accusedappellant Radel Gallarde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. ISSUE: Whether the taking of the pictures of the accused without the assistance of counself is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination? HELD: The trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. RATION: The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT 105. 106. Republic Act No. 9745 Anti-Torture Act of 2009 People v Echegaray, February 7, 1997

FACTS: Accused Leo Echagaray was formally charged of raping his 10-year old daughter and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. ISSUE: Whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood. HELD: The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death. 107. People v Mercado, November 29, 2000

FACTS:
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For automatic review by the court is the decision, dated July 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, convicting accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and SPO1 Aurelio Acebron y Adora, of the Philippine National Police of Tanay, Rizal, of kidnapping with murder and sentencing of death penalty. ISSUE: Whether RA 7659 and RA 8177 is unconstitutional? HELD: No. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court's 12-3 per curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray, wherein the following rulings were made: 1. The death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil." 2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy "the element of heinousness" by specifying the circumstances which generally qualify a crime to be punishable by death; 3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application. 4. The Constitution does not require that "a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven" before the death penalty may be prescribed. Congress is authorized under the Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and compelling reasons are present, and the Court would exceed its own authority if it questioned the exercise of such discretion. In the subsequent case of Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, the Court sustained the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177, providing for death by lethal injection against claims that death by lethal injection was cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and that the law violated treaty obligations. Petitioner in that case argued that death by lethal injection constituted cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment because: (1) Republic Act No. 8177 failed to provide for the drugs to be used in administering lethal injection, the dosage for the drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering drug(s) to the convict; (2) Republic Act No. 8177 and its implementing rules did not fix either the date of execution of the convict or the time for notifying him, with the result that such uncertainties cause pain and suffering to the convict, and (3) the possibility of botched executions or mistakes in administering drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel. Rejecting petitioner's contention that death by lethal injection violates the prohibition against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment in Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution, the Court said: "Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that ' [p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.' Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law 'cruel, degrading or inhuman'? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials."[19] "Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an 'alarming upsurge of such crimes,' for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that 'the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.' Indeed, today, even members of the Court who originally dissented from the majority ruling sustaining the validity of Republic Act No. 7659 agree on the imposition of the death penalty without in the least changing their view about the constitutionality of the penalty.
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