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GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND VOLUNTARY ABITRATION Extent of power of Voluntary Arbitrator G.R. No. 140960 January 20, 2003 LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FERDINAND SAORNIDO as voluntary arbitrator and LUDO EMPLOYEES UNION (LEU) representing 214 of its officers and members, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 6, 1999 and its Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 44341. The relevant facts as substantially recited by the Court of Appeals in its decision are as follows: Petitioner LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION (LUDO for brevity) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil, corn starch, glucose and related products. It operates a manufacturing plant located at Tupas Street, Cebu City and a wharf where raw materials and finished products are shipped out. In the course of its business operations, LUDO engaged the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services (CLAS) for the loading and unloading of its finished products at the wharf. Accordingly, several arrastre workers were deployed by CLAS to perform the services needed by LUDO. These arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different dates, as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO every time the latter needed additional manpower services. Said employees thereafter joined respondent union, the LUDO Employees Union (LEU), which acted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. On April 13, 1992, respondent union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with LUDO which provides certain benefits to the employees, the amount of which vary according to the length of service rendered by the availing employee. Thereafter, the union requested LUDO to include in its members period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre services to LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higher benefits. LUDO failed to act on the request. Thus, the matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The parties accordingly executed a submission agreement raising the sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers for resolution by the Voluntary Arbitrator. In its decision dated April 18, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that: (1) the respondent employees were engaged in activities necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner, and (2) CLAS is a labor-only contractor of petitioner.2 It disposed of the case thus: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Voluntary Arbitrator finds the claims of the complainants meritorious and so hold that: a. the 214 complainants, as listed in the Annex A, shall be considered regular employees of the respondents six (6) months from the first day of service at CLAS; b. the said complainants, being entitled to the CBA benefits during the regular employment, are awarded a) sick leave, b) vacation leave & c) annual wage and salary increases during such period in the amount of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND SIXTY ONE CENTAVOS (P5,707,261.61) as computed in "Annex A"; c. the respondents shall pay attorneys fees of ten (10) percent of the total award; d. an interest of twelve (12) percent per annum or one (1) percent per month shall be imposed to the award from the date of promulgation until fully paid if only to speed up the payment of these long over due CBA benefits deprived of the complaining workers. Accordingly, all separation and/or retirement benefits shall be construed from the date of regularization aforementioned subject only to the appropriate government laws and other social legislation. SO ORDERED.3 In due time, LUDO filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator, thus: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by respondent voluntary arbitrator, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.4 Hence this petition. Before us, petitioner raises the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT BENEFITS CONSISTING OF SALARY INCREASES, VACATION LEAVE AND SICK LEAVE BENEFITS FOR THE YEARS 1977 TO 1987 ARE ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED THEIR CASE IN JANUARY 1995; II WHETHER OR NOT A VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CAN AWARD BENEFITS NOT CLAIMED IN THE SUBMISSION AGREEMENT.5 Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely erred when it upheld the award of benefits which were beyond the terms of submission agreement. Petitioner asserts that the arbitrator must confine its adjudication to those issues submitted by the parties for arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers. Hence, the award of benefits by the arbitrator was done in excess of jurisdiction.6 Respondents, for their part, aver that the three-year prescriptive period is reckoned only from the time the obligor declares his refusal to comply with his obligation in clear and unequivocal terms. In this case, respondents maintain that LUDO merely promised to review the company records in response to respondents demand for adjustment in the date of their regularization without making a categorical statement of refusal. 7 On the matter of the benefits, respondents argue that the arbitrator is empowered to award the assailed benefits because notwithstanding the sole issue of the date of regularization, standard companion issues on reliefs and remedies are deemed incorporated. Otherwise, the whole arbitration process would be rendered purely academic and the law creating it inutile.8 The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters is clearly defined and specifically delineated in the Labor Code. The pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, read: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. --- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases: 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; xxx Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under

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the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks." In construing the above provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC, 9 that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly include money claims in one form or another .10 Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC,11 compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party (emphasis supplied)." 12 While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws. Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes.13 The succinct reasoning enunciated by the CA in support of its holding, that the Voluntary Arbitrator in a labor controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitral awards, deserves our concurrence, thus: In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly stated and limited in the submission agreement. However, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the power to make a final settlement. Thus, assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator to decide whether an employee was discharged for just cause, the arbitrator in this instance can reasonable assume that his powers extended beyond giving a yes-orno answer and included the power to reinstate him with or without back pay. In one case, the Supreme Court stressed that "xxx the Voluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. The Arbitrator, as already indicated, viewed his authority as embracing not merely the determination of the abstract question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted but also, in the affirmative case, the amount thereof. By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement mentioned only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another action for payment of such benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor.14 As regards petitioners contention that the money claim in this case is barred by prescription, we hold that this contention is without merit. So is petitioners stance that the benefits claimed by the respondents, i.e., sick leave, vacation leave and 13th-month pay, had already prescribed, considering the three-year period for the institution of monetary claims.15 Such determination is a question of fact which must be ascertained based on the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented by the parties before the Voluntary Arbitrator. In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator found that prescription has not as yet set in to bar the respondents claims for the monetary benefits awarded to them. Basic is the rule that findings of fact of administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.16 Here, the Voluntary Arbitrator received the evidence of the parties first-hand. No compelling reason has been shown for us to diverge from the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, especially since the appellate court affirmed his findings, that it took some time for respondent employees to ventilate their claims because of the repeated assurances made by the petitioner that it would review the company records and determine there from the validity of the claims, without expressing a categorical denial of their claims. As elucidated by the Voluntary Arbitrator: The respondents had raised prescription as defense. The controlling law, as ruled by the High Court, is: "The cause of action accrues until the party obligated refuses xxx to comply with his duty. Being warded off by promises, the workers not having decided to assert [their] right[s], [their] causes of action had not accrued" (Citation omitted.) Since the parties had continued their negotiations even after the matter was raised before the Grievance Procedure and the voluntary arbitration, the respondents had not refused to comply with their duty. They just wanted the complainants to present some proofs. The complainants cause of action had not therefore accrued yet. Besides, in the earlier voluntary arbitration case aforementioned involving exactly the same issue and employees similarly situated as the complainants, the same defense was raised and dismissed by Honorable Thelma Jordan, Voluntary Arbitrator. In fact, the respondents promised to correct their length of service and grant them the back CBA benefits if the complainants can prove they are entitled rendered the former in estoppel, barring them from raising the defense of laches or prescription. To hold otherwise amounts to rewarding the respondents for their duplicitous representation and abet them in a dishonest scheme against their workers.17 Indeed, as the Court of Appeals concluded, under the equitable principle of estoppel, it will be the height of injustice if we will brush aside the employees claims on a mere technicality, especially when it is petitioners own action that prevented them from interposing the claims within the prescribed period. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44341 and the resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Art. 262-A Motion for Reconsideration required THIRD DIVISION ALBERT TENG, doing business under the firm name ALBERT TENG FISH TRADING, and EMILIA TENGCHUA, Petitioners, G.R. No. 169704 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ.

versus

Promulgated: November 17, 2010

ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC, EDDIE D. NIPA, ORLANDO P. LAYESE, HERNAN Y. BADILLES and ROGER S. PAHAGAC, Respondents.

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x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION BRION, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners Albert Teng Fish Trading, its owner Albert Teng, and its manager Emilia Teng-Chua, to reverse and set aside the September 21, 2004 decision and the September 1, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals ( CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78783. The CA reversed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA), National Conciliation and Mediation Board ( NCMB), Region IX, Zamboanga City, and declared that there exists an employer-employee relationship between Teng and respondents Hernan Badilles, Orlando Layese, Eddie Nipa, Alfredo Pahagac, and Roger Pahagac (collectively, respondent workers). It also found that Teng illegally dismissed the respondent workers from their employment. BACKGROUND FACTS Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and, for this purpose, owns boats ( basnig), equipment, and other fishing paraphernalia. As owner of the business, Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint venture agreements with master fishermen (maestros) who are skilled and are experts in deep sea fishing; they take charge of the management of each fishing venture, including the hiring of the members of its complement. He avers that the maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of the fish caught in every fishing voyage. On February 20, 2003, the respondent workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading, Teng, and Chua before the NCMB, Region Branch No. IX, Zamboanga City. The respondent workers alleged that Teng hired them, without any written employment contract, to serve as his eyes and ears aboard the fishing boats; to classify the fish caught by baera; to report to Teng via radio communication the classes and volume of each catch; to receive instructions from him as to where and when to unload the catch; to prepare the list of the provisions requested by the maestro and the mechanic for his approval; and, to procure the items as approved by him. They also claimed that they received regular monthly salaries, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus, and incentives in the form of shares in the total volume of fish caught. They asserted that sometime in September 2002, Teng expressed his doubts on the correct volume of fish caught in every fishing voyage. In December 2002, Teng informed them that their services had been terminated. In his defense, Teng maintained that he did not have any hand in hiring the respondent workers; the maestros, rather than he, invited them to join the venture. According to him, his role was clearly limited to the provision of the necessary capital, tools and equipment, consisting of basnig, gears, fuel, food, and other supplies. The VA rendered a decision in Tengs favor and declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers. The dispositive portion of the VAs May 30, 2003 decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit. It follows also, that all other claims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit. The respondent workers received the VAs decision on June 12, 2003. They filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated June 27, 2003 and which they received on July 8, 2003. The VA reasoned out that Section 6, Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the VAs order or decision. The order states: Under Executive Order No. 126, as amended by Executive Order No. 251, and in order to implement Article 260-262 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, inter alia: An award or the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrators becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the award or decision by the parties (Sec. 6, Rule VII). Moreover, the above-mentioned guidelines do not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the order or decision of voluntary arbitrators. On July 21, 2003, the respondent-workers elevated the case to the CA. In its decision of September 21, 2004, the CA reversed the VAs decision after finding sufficient evidence showing the existence of employer-employee relationship: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The questioned decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated May 30, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by ordering private respondent to pay separation pay with backwages and other monetary benefits. For this purpose, the case is REMANDED to the Voluntary Arbitrator for the computation of petitioners backwages and other monetary benefits. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teng moved to reconsider the CAs decision, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of September 1, 2005. He, thereafter, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that: a. b. the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration; and no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers.

Teng contends that the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provision allowing this recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code. He cites the 1989 Procedural Guidelines, which, as the VA declared, does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration. He claims that after the lapse of 10 days from its receipt, the VAs decision becomes final and executory unless an appeal is taken. He argues that when the respondent workers received the VAs decision on June 12, 2003, they had 10 days, or until June 22, 2003, to file an appeal. As the respondent workers opted instead to move for reconsideration, the 10-day period to appeal continued to run; thus, the VAs decision had already become final and executory by the time they assailed it before the CA on July 21, 2003. Teng further insists that the VA was correct in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and the respondent workers. What he entered into was a joint venture agreement with the maestros, where Tengs role was only to provide basnig, gears, nets, and other tools and equipment for every fishing voyage. THE COURTS RULING We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

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Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration. On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code which was originally worded as: Art. 263 x x x Voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be final, unappealable, and executory. As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states: Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award or decision x x x shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word unappealable from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law, and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent. We recognized the intent of the change of phraseology in Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang, where we ruled that: It is true that the present rule [Art. 262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period. In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force UnionPTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., we likewise ruled that the VAs decision may still be reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 days from receipt thereof. The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision. We further cited the 1989 Procedural Guidelines which implemented Article 262-A, viz: [U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day period. These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision within the 10-day period. Tengs allegation that the VAs decision had become final and executory by the time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thus fails. We consequently rule that the respondent workers seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the VAs judgment, and the VA erred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration is allowed. The Court notes that despite our interpretation that Article 262A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision, a contrary provision can be found in Section 7, Rule XIX of the Department of Labors Department Order ( DO) No. 40, series of 2003: Rule XIX Section 7. Finality of Award/Decision. The decision, order, resolution or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration. Presumably on the basis of DO 40-03, the 1989 Procedural Guidelines was revised in 2005 ( 2005 Procedural Guidelines), whose pertinent provisions provide that: Rule VII DECISIONS Section 6. Finality of Decisions. The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the decision by the parties. Section 7. Motions for Reconsideration. The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is not subject of a Motion for Reconsideration. We are surprised that neither the VA nor Teng cited DO 40-03 and the 2005 Procedural Guidelines as authorities for their cause, considering that these were the governing rules while the case was pending and these directly and fully supported their theory. Had they done so, their reliance on the provisions would have nevertheless been unavailing for reasons we shall now discuss. In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature. By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VAs decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule. The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by congressional intent. By disallowing reconsideration of the VAs decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. There exists an employer-employee relationship between Teng and the respondent workers. We agree with the CAs finding that sufficient evidence exists indicating the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Teng and the respondent workers.

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While Teng alleged that it was the maestros who hired the respondent workers, it was his company that issued to the respondent workers identification cards ( IDs) bearing their names as employees and Tengs signature as the employer. Generally, in a business establishment, IDs are issued to identify the holder as a bona fide employee of the issuing entity. For the 13 years that the respondent workers worked for Teng, they received wages on a regular basis, in addition to their shares in the fish caught. The worksheet showed that the respondent workers received uniform amounts within a given year, which amounts annually increased until the termination of their employment in 2002. Tengs claim that the amounts received by the respondent workers are mere commissions is incredulous, as it would mean that the fish caught throughout the year is uniform and increases in number each year. More importantly, the element of control which we have ruled in a number of cases to be a strong indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship is present in this case. Teng not only owned the tools and equipment, he directed how the respondent workers were to perform their job as checkers; they, in fact, acted as Tengs eyes and ears in every fishing expedition. Teng cannot hide behind his argument that the respondent workers were hired by the maestros. To consider the respondent workers as employees of the maestros would mean that Teng committed impermissible labor-only contracting. As a policy, the Labor Code prohibits labor-only contracting: ART. 106. Contractor or Subcontractor x x x The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor. xxxx There is labor-only contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. Section 5 of the DO No. 18-02, which implements Article 106 of the Labor Code, provides: Section 5. Prohibition against laboronly contracting. Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present: (i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or (ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee. In the present case, the maestros did not have any substantial capital or investment. Teng admitted that he solely provided the capital and equipment, while the maestros supplied the workers. The power of control over the respondent workers was lodged not with the maestros but with Teng. As checkers, the respondent workers main tasks were to count and classify the fish caught and report them to Teng. They performed tasks that were necessary and desirable in Tengs fishing business. Taken together, these incidents confirm the existence of a labor-only contracting which is prohibited in our jurisdiction, as it is considered to be the employers attempt to evade obligations afforded by law to employees. Accordingly, we hold that employer-employee ties exist between Teng and the respondent workers. A finding that the maestros are labor-only contractors is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship exists between Teng and the respondent workers. As regular employees, the respondent workers are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. The dismissal of an employee, which the employer must validate, has a twofold requirement: one is substantive, the other is procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a just or an authorized cause, as provided by law; the rudimentary requirements of due process the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself must be observed as well. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause; failure to show this, as in the present case, would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. The respondent workers allegation that Teng summarily dismissed them on suspicion that they were not reporting to him the correct volume of the fish caught in each fishing voyage was never denied by Teng. Unsubstantiated suspicion is not a just cause to terminate ones employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code. To allow an employer to dismiss an employee based on mere allegations and generalities would place the employee at the mercy of his employer, and would emasculate the right to security of tenure. For his failure to comply with the Labor Codes substantive requirement on termination of employment, we declare that Teng illegally dismissed the respondent workers. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the September 21, 2004 decision and the September 1, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78783. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 149050 March 25, 2009 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT - NUWHRAINAPL, Petitioner, vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN and HYATT REGENCY MANILA, Respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 assailing the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60959. The Resolution2 dated 16 November 2000 dismissed outright petitioners special civil action for certiorari therein on the ground that it was a wrong remedy while the Resolution 3 dated 10 July 2001 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The following factual antecedents are matters of record. In 1995 and 1996, Mario Dacles and Teodoro Valencia respectively assumed their duties as glass cleaners at Hyatt Regency Manila (respondent Hyatt), pursuant to the cleaning service contract 4 executed between respondent Hyatt and City Service Corporation (CSC).51awphi1 Meanwhile, in April 1998, respondent Hyatt hired Amelia Dalmacio and Renato Dazo on a casual basis as florist/sales clerk and helper/driver, respectively. After their contracts expired on 30 August 1998, Dalmacio and Dazo continued reporting for work. On 16 September 1998, Dalamcio and Dazo signed another employment contract with respondent Hyatt.6 During the Labor Management Committee Meeting (LMC), petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL (petitioner union), a legitimate labor organization composed of the

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rank-and-file employees of respondent Hyatt, questioned the status as non-regular employees of Dacles, Valencia, Dalmacio and Dazo (Dacles, et al.).7 On 19 April 1999, petitioner union and respondent Hyatt agreed to submit the matter for resolution through the grievance machinery as provided for in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Petitioner union claimed that Dacles, et al. were regular employees on account of the nature of their functions as well as the length of their service. On the other hand, respondent Hotel maintained that Dalmacio and Dazo were mere project employees whose employments were co-terminus with the existence of the flower shop outlet and that Dacles and Valencia were employees of CSC, an independent contractor. On 16 September 1999, respondent Hyatt dismissed Dacles and Valencia and disallowed them from reporting to work on the ground that the service contract between respondent Hyatt and CSC had been terminated. Petitioner union and respondent Hyatt were unable to settle the dispute through the grievance procedure and, thus, agreed to elevate the issue for voluntary arbitration. The parties selected Dean Froilan Bacungan as voluntary arbitrator. After the exchange of responsive pleadings, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On 11 January 2000, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Voluntary Arbitrator rules that: 1. Mario Dacles and Teodoro Valencia are not employees of the Hotel. They are employees of the City Service Corporation. 2. As employees of the Hotel, Amelia Dalmacio and Renato Dazo can not be legally terminated on September 17, 1999 and November 16, 1999 respectively, but they may be legally terminated anytime the Hotel closes down the Flower Shop wherein Dalmacio and Dazo work, or earlier for cause provided by law. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner union moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated 10 July 2000. On 08 September 2000, petitioner union elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In the assailed Resolution dated 16 November 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, to wit: Contrary to Secs. 1, 4 and 6, in relation to Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner resorted to the instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of a petition for review; its payment of the docket fees is short by P10.00; and the petition is not accompanied by a certified true copy of the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated January 11, 2000. If the action were to be treated as a petition for review, then it was filed out of time. On July 20, 2000, petitioner received the resolution dated July 10, 2000 denying its motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision. Consequently, it had until July 25, 2000, or fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration, within which to file a petition for review (Sec. 4, Rule 43). However, the petition was only filed on September 8, 2000, or forty-five days beyond the reglementary period. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.9 Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that the voluntary arbitrators decision was rendered under Title VII-A of the Labor Code and, therefore, is not covered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as provided in Section 2 thereof. On 10 July 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.10 Hence, the instant petition, attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IS AN APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.11 Petitioner union argues that the proper remedy to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not an appeal via a petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner unions theory is based on the following ratiocinations: first, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is similar to the decisions rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Secretary of Labor and Employment, which become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice, in that the Labor Code expressly disallows an appeal from their judgment or final order; second, Section 2 of Rule 43, which exempts judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code from an appeal via Rule 43, should apply with equal force to decisions of labor voluntary arbitrators. The petition lacks merit. The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees ,12 where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlines in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.13 Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals ,14 and Nippon Paint Employees Union v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling. In Alcantara, the Court held that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in Luzon Development Bank still stands. The Court explained, thus: The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but, nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit x x x16 On some occasions, rules of procedure may be relaxed and on that basis the Court of Appeals could have treated the petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 43. However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals , the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 43. It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is a cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.17 In any event, the voluntary arbitrator did not commit any reversible error in ruling that Dacles and Valencia were employees of CSC, an independent contractor, whose services may be terminated upon the expiration of the contract for cleaning services between CSC and respondent Hyatt. There is no dispute that Dacles and Valencia performed services at respondent Hyatt pursuant to the said contract. The Court affirms the ruling of the voluntary arbitrator that Dacles and Valencia cannot be considered as employees of respondent Hyatt in the absence of evidence to prove that CSC had been engaged in labor-only contracting. The Court also affirms the voluntary arbitrators findings that Dalmacio and Dazo were project employees, whose employment may be terminated only upon the closure of the flower shop. Said findings are in accord with the conditions of the employment contracts between respondent Hyatt and the two employees. Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of

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discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.18 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the resolutions dated 16 November 2000 and 10 July 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60959 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents. ROMERO, J.: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1 The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government. Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. 2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision. In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. 3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes. On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases: . . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employeremployee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. xxx xxx xxx It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. 4 The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," 5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." 6 Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator. Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, 7 in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it. In Volkschel Labor Union, et al . v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10 Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of

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this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. xxx xxx xxx Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasijudicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision. An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. 13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. 14 An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate, 15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, 16 and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state. 17 The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 191, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities 18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.
19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS (Art. 263-266) Requirements of Strike G.R. No. 101858 August 21, 1992 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), TINIG AT LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA BLTBCONAFLU and its reinstated one hundred ninety (190) members, namely, BIENVENIDO PAGKATUTUHAN, GIL A. ALANO, ANGELITO CALISIHAN, CARLOS CORTEZ, RUSTICO PANTOJA, RICO M. SERDAN, NESTOR GARCIA, DANILO SAN AGUSTIN, MARLON TIZON, MANUEL LUBUGUIN, EDGARDO AVENIDA, LEONARDO ROLDAN, HILARION QUINTAIN, BASILIO BITUIN, LEONARDO PINEDA, GREGORIO CABRERA, ALFREDO ARROYO, NOLITO BESAS, CRISOSTOMO DE LUNAS, MARTINIO ORTEGA, ENRIQUITO CIPRIANO, PEDRO BUGAY, NOLASCO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO GAA, VIRGILIO AVENANTE, DANTE AURE, FELIPE ANDALEON, REYNALDO CANETE, GREGORIO DELOS REYES, ZOSIMO P. ROZEL, RUBEN ROZEL, TOMAS ESTEVA, JACINTO LANDICHO, OSCAR DELOS REYES, ROBERTO PESCASIO, MANUEL PEREJA, FELIX P. SALIBA, LEOGARIO SALAZAR, EDUARDO DELA CUESTA, REYNALDO CATANGAY, CELSO PENANA, ROGELIO SAVIDO, EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, RODRIGO LORENZANA, LORETO UMALI, LEONIDES MENDOZA, JOSE ALINA, MANOLITO F. CAPIANGAO, RAMON ALCANTARA, GREGORIO M. BREGONIA, ENRICO P. DIASANTA, FORTUNATO GAITE, NESTOR R.

HOMOROK, JR., NESTOR LIM, SONIA MARALIT, NATALIA M. MARAMOT, FERNANDO A. MARAHAN, AURORA S. MARIANO, CEFIRINO M. ROYO, DANILO M. SAMBOJON, DIONISIO APURADO, AUGELIO PASUMBA, DEMOCRITO SISPEREZ, CARLITO R. ZUGUIRE, MARIANO UMALI, NEMESIO T. RUMOLO, PEDRO MONTERO, JAIME MALLA, ROMEO C. EBORA, LEOPOLDO REGALO, MARIO C. GRINDALO, BASILIO ADAJAR, GREGORIO P. CESAR, PEDRO DYPIANGCO, ARTURO B. DE LUNA, YOLANDA MONTICER, ARMANDO P. CODERA, CARLITO C. LUBUGUIN, ILUMINADO A. MEDINA, RAMON V. EM, JR., JAIME N. BENEDICTO P. BLASTIQUE, CESARE VILLANUEVA, EDWIN CARASCO, CRISANTO T. VALENTE, LUIS S. DELEMA, CARLOS D. DELGADO, PEDRO B. PERENA, JR., AMANCIO C. CLARETE, ALFREDO E. AREJA, RUFINO G. ALINSUNURIN, TELESFORO URI, ARNEL ASOY, RODRIGO A. AVARADO, PABLITO BELLERAS, ROMEO M. HUTALIA, JOSE M. MAGPANTAY, ERNESTO C. MASCULINO, DANILO O. PARDILLA, ROMEO C. QUINDARA, ROMEO R. RAZA, RODOLFO S. SANTILLAN, DANILO C. VISITACION, ROGELIO B. YAMBAO, AIDEN P. MANUPIL, BUENAVENTURA ARGENTE, ROGELIO M. DELICA, NARCISO M. RAMIREZ, ROGELIO A. TAN, CARLOS T. CHUA, NONILON A. GUTIERREZ, PEDRO E. LOBO, WILFREDO G. LEGUA, FELICIANO G. GONZALES, ORLANDO H. VERGARA, CARLOS A. BORDON, HOSPICIO D. BRIONES, MARTIN DALISAY, ISIDRO C. MACATANGAY, FLORENCIO E. MALAPIT, MIGUEL SANCHEZ, RENATO A. VILLENA, CARLIE M. DELICIA, REYNALDO B. ABANADOR, CELESTINO A. DALISAY, REYNALDO E. ACAB, RONELO U. ALINEA, REYNALDO T. ALVISO, JESUS V. CATAPIA, NOLETO R. DE CHAVEZ, INOCENCIO S. EGAMINO, DOMINADOR ILAO, CRISOSTOMO E. MAGADIA, RODOLFO B. MARALIT, ISIDRO PACIA, EFRENIO R. PALMA, PROSPERO B. PENA, ARMANDO V. PON, NICOLAS M. RECEDE, DOMINGO SECRETARIO, CRISANTO V. ULAC, REYNALDO V. FERMIN, MARCELINO N. NOSES, MARIO C. SUAREZ, ROGELIO W. BURON, MARIO D. ZOMBILLA, JACINTO B. ORANTE, SANECITO Q. DE LUNA, JACINTO S. GRIMALDO, DANTE LADERA, FELIX S. LADINES, NOEL S. MARQUEZ, JUANCHO S. ALMORAS, DANILO S. RICO, TIMOTEO J. QUINCENA, MELECIO F. LLAMELO, NICOLAS C. ASEJA, DOMINGO J. EVANGELISTA, ROLANDO P. REYES, RENATO ABILLA, DONATO ALCANTARA, ELADIO Q. MANALO, OLYMPIO C. PERENA, ARMANDO C. SAAVEDRA, JOSELITO TROZADA, LAURO M. ZUBRANO, JULIO A. ANTENOR, MANOLO A. ATIENZA, CELESTINO D. ENRIQUEZ, RODANTE C. VICTORIA, EDUARDO, E. ALCANTARA, SANTIAGO ARENDA, LEOPOLDO V. DEL MUNDO, LEOPOLDO REGALO, JAIME MALLA, ELMAR CHUA, RENE A. ANEMIAS, MANUEL MILLAR, JESUS M. FAVIS, SALLY ALMARIO, ARCANGEL F. FAURA, FLORENCIO BUHAY, JUANELIO ALMORES, JAIME FAJELAN, CRISTOBAL M. LUCI, JUANITO CRIMALDO, RAUL I. CONSIGNADO, ISAGANI R. SUNGA, EFREN LINA, and PEPITO ABRATIQUE, respondents. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Corpus for petitioner.

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Villy Cadiz for private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTBCO-NAFLU. Samuel D. Entuna, Napoleon Banzuela, Jr., Noli J. Delos Santos, Alvin M. Exconde, Angel Al. Caluntad, Ildefonso B. Malueda for private respondents. CRUZ, J.: This case arose when on May 23, 1988, private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU), an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or to certify it to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. The petitioner also moved to dismiss the notice of strike on August 3, 1988. Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC on August 29, 1988. 1 A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU on August 29, 1988, and on the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU on August 30, 1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it. On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of TLM-BLTBCoNAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking the premises of BLTBCo's terminals. On September 6, 1988, the NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking employees to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of May 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. 2 On September 15, 1988, the BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work not later than September 18, 1988. It later extended the deadline to September 19, 1988. Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later readmitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work. Among those who failed to comply with the return-to-work order were the respondent individual union members. On July 19, 1991, the NLRC issued a resolution deciding the dispute thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice and union busting filed by the union against BLTBCo for lack of merit; 2. Ordering BLTBCo to fully implement the provisions of the CBA in the matter of uniform and safety shoes; 3. Declaring valid the dismissal of Jose M. Calubayan, Tirso Vinas, Ronelito Torres, Floro T. Isla and Rosauro Aguilar, being grounded on lawful causes: 4. Declaring the strike illegal; 5. Declaring the following officers and members of the union, namely: . . . to have lost their employment status; 6. Ordering the reinstatement of the following union members, namely; . . . to their former position without loss of seniority rights but without backwages. 7. The case of Ladislao Violanda is considered withdrawn. 8. Directing likewise the reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts. 9. Declaring regular the employment of casual employees who have already rendered service of at least one year whether continuous or broken. On September 16, 1991, the NLRC issued the other challenged resolution, viz.: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent BLTBCo and Complainant Pepito Abratique are denied for lack of merit. As a consequence, respondent's prayer for temporary restraining order is likewise denied. As prayed for, respondent is directed to reinstate the union members specifically named in the questioned resolution and all those striking employees who have not committed illegal acts. This order of reinstatement is immediately executory. No further motions for reconsideration shall be allowed. BLTB then filed this special civil action for certiorari, claiming that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in: 1. ordering the reinstatement of the aforenamed 190 individual respondent union members notwithstanding the fact that they knowingly participated in a strike which was illegal from its inception as it was done in complete defiance and/or disobedience to the Assumption Order of August 29, 1988 and the Return-To-Work Order of September 6, 1988; 2. failing to consider that aforenamed individual union members have already abandoned their employment when they defied the Return-ToWork Order of September 6, 1988; 3. limiting the declaration of forfeiture of employment status to mere thirty-six (36) union officers and members of the striking union when BLTBCo was able to initially identify at least (a) one hundred (100) employees who committed illegal/violent acts during and after the strike; and (b) twenty (20)employees who reported back for work and later on abandoned it and resumed their strike activities; 4. not including the recognized union officers Jerry Soriano, Serafin Soriano and Desiderio Comel among the union officers whose employment status have been declared forfeited; and 5. incorporating in its subject Resolution a blanket order reinstating BLTBCo's striking employees who have not committed illegal acts. On motion of the petitioner and upon its posting of a cash bond in the amount of P500,000.00, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on November 6, 1991, against the enforcement of the abovequoted resolutions. 3 Separate comments on the petition were filed by two of the private respondents, Celso Peana and Pepito Abratique, and by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public respondent. A consolidated reply to these comments was later submitted by the petitioner. The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties and finds that the challenged resolutions must be sustained. BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been reinstated because they defied the return-to-work order of September 6, 1988. It invokes against the NLRC its own words in its resolution of July 19, 1991, where it said: A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989: 178 SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. (Union of Filipino Employees (UFE), et al. vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 88710-13, December 19, 1991) That is only half the picture, however. As the NLRC further explained, it was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture of employment status of all those who participated in the strike" because, first of all, there was inadequate service of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the NAFLU.

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Secondly, and more importantly, the resolution declared as follows: Applying the principle of vicarious liability, only the officers of the union deserved to be penalized with the loss of their employment status. The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-file employees merely followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264, paragraph (e), those who participated in the commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminally thereof in court must be penalized. BLTBCo will have to agree with Us that while the general membership of TLM-NAFLU may have joined the strike at its inception, We are convinced that they returned to work on September 19, 1988 or, immediately thereafter. And, We are not swayed that these employees have abandoned their job just because they reported late or, beyond the period required by the Commission and by BLTBCo. The circumstances of time and place of employment and the residences of the employees as well as the lack of individual notice to them are reasons enough to justify their failure to beat the deadline. True it is, that management of BLTBCo caused the publication of the Resolution of the Commission of September 5, 1988 in the Manila Bulletin, We cannot reasonably expect the complainants, who are ordinary workers, to be regular readers of such newspaper. Moreover, the publication of the said resolution was only made once. We accept these factual conclusions as they do not appear to have been reached arbitrarily. The mere fact that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had been sufficiently notified thereof. As the Solicitor General correctly adds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during the period given by the petitioner, which was only five days. The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. 4 This refusal must be clearly established. As we stressed in a recent case, 5 mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. In the case at bar, the affidavit of Eduardo Azucena, BLTBCo operations manager, 6 besides being hearsay, lacks credibility in light of the subsequent acts of the private respondents in complaining about their separation. A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his employment. If his purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike. The petitioner also alleges that the NLRC erred in limiting the forfeiture of employment status to the 36 union officers and members although there were at least 100 employees who committed violent acts and 20 employees who reported back for work and later abandoned it to resume their strike activities. These issues are also factual. The findings thereon of the NLRC are conclusive on us and will not be disturbed as it clearly appears that they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. We agree with the Solicitor General that the mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be given an opportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the alleged ground constitutes a criminal offense, as we held in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Phil., Inc. 7 In that case, we ordered the reinstatement of employees against whom criminal complaints had been filed but not yet proved. The next contention of the petitioner is that Serafin Soriano, Jerry Soriano and Desiderio Comel should also be dismissed with the other union officers and members who participated in the illegal strike. We note, however, that these three have not been impleaded in this petition (unlike the others who have been individually named) and so have not been given an opportunity to defend themselves against the charges of BLTBCo. Absent such an opportunity, we are precluded from making any pronouncement regarding their alleged role in the strike for which their dismissal is sought. The petitioner's last point is that the NLRC should not have issued the blanket directive for the "reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts." The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts." The directive was not really "blanket," as the petitioner would call it, but indeed selective. The NLRC made this clear in the resolution dated September 16, 1991, thus: The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiate the commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation. He who asserts the commission of illegal acts, must prove the same, and it is on the basis of substantiated evidence that this Commission declares the loss of employment status of specific union members who have committed illegal acts. This Commission's order directing the reinstatement of all striking employees against whom no complaint of illegal acts having been committed during the strikes, and who were barred from returning to work and is similarly situated with those who have been directed to be reinstated, should, as a consequence and on the basis of the reasons discussed in the questioned resolution be reinstated. There is no denial of due process in this direction, for respondent has been given the chance to defend its position. Elaborating on the same issue, the Solicitor General astutely observes: The assailed Resolution does not prevent petitioner from continuing with its investigation and come up with evidence against these workers. But they have to be admitted back to their work first. This is clearly a situation where the social justice provisions of our laws and jurisprudence come in aid of labor. Since such investigations might be extended, intentionally or otherwise, the workers are in danger of losing their livelihood. As compared to the management that is in a position to wage an extended legal struggle against labor, the latter cannot do so. This is where the State intervenes to equalize matters between labor and management. The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-towork order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect. Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 19, 1991, and September 16, 1991, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated November 6, 1991, is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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LEGALITY OF STRIKE 1. Statutory Prohibition G.R. No. 124678 July 31, 1997 DELIA BANGALISAN, LUCILIN CABALFIN, EMILIA DE GUZMAN, CORAZON GOMEZ, CORAZON GREGORIO, LOURDES LAREDO, RODOLFO MARIANO, WILFREDO MERCADO, LIGAYA MONTANCES and CORAZON PAGPAGUITAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents. REGALADO, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38316, which affirmed several resolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as its resolution of April 12, 1996 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 1 Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately. Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners Bangalisan, Gregorio, Cabalfin, Mercado, Montances and Pagpaguitan, the Secretary subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for nine months without pay. Petitioner Gomez likewise moved for reconsideration with the DECS and then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The other petitioners also filed individual appeals to the MSPB, but all of their appeals were dismissed for lack of merit. Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their respective cases, petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The appeals of petitioners Cabalfin, Montances and Pagpaguitan were dismissed for having been filed out of time. On motion for reconsideration, however, the CSC decided to rule on the merits of their appeal in the interest of justice. Thereafter, the CSC issued Resolution No. 94-1765 finding Cabalfin guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing on him a penalty of six months suspension without pay. The CSC also issued Resolutions Nos. 94-2806 and 94-2384 affirming the penalty of nine months suspension without pay theretofore imposed on petitioners Montances and Pagpaguitan. With respect to the appeals of the other petitioners, the CSC also found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It, however, modified the penalty of nine months suspension previously meted to them to six months suspension with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages. All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all denied, 2 except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because of his failure to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application for leave therefoer. This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand. 3 Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court but, on August 29, 1995, their petition was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. 4 On October 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 5 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied by respondent court, 6 hence the instant petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions of the CSC (1) that penalized petitioners whose only offense was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances; (2) that penalized petitioner Mariano even after respondent commission found out that the specific basis of the charges that former Secretary Cario filed against him was a falsehood; and (3) that denied petitioners their right to back wages covering the period when they were illegally not allowed to teach. 7 It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. 8 Petitioners contend, however, that they were not on strike but were merely exercising their constitutional right peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. We find such pretension devoid of merit. The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike has been decided by this Court in a resolution, dated December 18, 1990, in the herein cited case of Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al . vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held "that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. 9 The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. 10 Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible . The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances." 11 It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. 12 It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the "mass actions," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. As expounded by this Court in its aforementioned resolution of December 18, 1990, in the Manila Public School Teachers Association case, ante: It is, of course, entirely possible that petitioners and their member-teachers had and have some legitimate grievances. This much may be conceded. After all, and for one thing, even the employees of the Court have found reason to complain about the manner in which the provisions of the salary standardization law on pay adjustments and position classification have been, or are being, implemented. Nonetheless, what needs to be borne in mind, trite though it may be, is that one wrong cannot be righted by

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another, and that redress, for even the most justifiable complaints, should not be sought through proscribed or illegal means. The belief in the righteousness of their cause, no matter how deeply and fervently held, gives the teachers concerned no license to abandon their duties, engage in unlawful activity, defy constituted authority and set a bad example to their students. Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 6 issued by the Civil Service Commission. The resolution of the said issue is not really necessary in the case at bar. The argument of petitioners that the said circular was the basis of` their liability is off tangent. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. 13 The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule. 14 To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. 15 In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector. 16 On the issue of back wages, petitioners' claim is premised on the allegation that their preventive suspension, as well as the immediate execution of the decision dismissing or suspending them, are illegal. These submissions are incorrect. Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that "(t)he proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service." Under the aforesaid provision, it is the nature of the charge against an officer or employee which determines whether he may be placed under preventive suspension. In the instant case, herein petitioners were charged by the Secretary of the DECS with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations, and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), for joining the teachers' mass actions held at Liwasang Bonifacio on September 17 to 21, 1990. Hence, on the basis of the charges against them, it was within the competence of the Secretary to place herein petitioners under preventive suspension. As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Older No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned." Petitioners' claim of denial of due process must also fail. The records of this case clearly show that they were given opportunity to refute the charges against them but they failed to avail themselves of the same. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 17 For as long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met. 18 Having ruled that the preventive suspension of petitioners and the immediate execution of the DECS decision are in accordance with law, the next query is whether or not petitioners may be entitled to back wages. The issue regarding payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already settled in our jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified. 19 With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the Civil Service Commission will show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without official leave, for his participation in the mass actions on September 18, 20 and 21, 1990. It was his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis of his preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service. However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questioned resolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmothe r. Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering such absences. 20 Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is punishable by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which caused his dismissal from the service. 21 However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages must be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against them. The CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner Mariano, they indeed participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their participation in the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their subsequent suspension. The denial of salary to an employee during the period of his suspension, if he should later be found guilty, is proper because he had given ground for his suspension. It does not impair his constitutional rights because the Constitution itself allows suspension for cause as provided by law and the law provides that an employee may be suspended pending an investigation or by way of penalty. 22 Moreover, the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn. Since petitioners did not work during the period for which they are now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the payment of such salaries. 23 It is also noteworthy that in its resolutions, the Civil Service Commission expressly denied petitioners' right to back wages. In the case of Yacia vs. City of Baguio, 24 the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service ordering the dismissal of a government employee on the ground of dishonesty was immediately executed pending appeal, but, on appeal, the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified that penalty to a fine equivalent to six months pay. We ruled that the claim of an employee for back wages, for the period during which he was not allowed to work because of the execution of the decision of the Commissioner, should be denied. The appeal board's modified decision did not exonerate the employee nor did it affect the validity of his dismissal or separation from work pending appeal, as ordered by the Civil Service Commissioner. Such separation from work pending his appeal remained valid and effective until it was set aside and modified with the imposition of the lesser penalty by the appeals board. If the Civil Service Appeals Board had intended to grant him back salaries and to reduce his penalty to six months fine deductible from such unearned back salaries, the board could and should have so expressly stated in its decision. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Mariano shall be given back wages without deduction or qualification from the time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years. SO ORDERED.

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2. Purpose: Economic Strike and U.L.P. Strike Doctrine of ULP strike in good faith with rational reasons G.R. No. L-28607 February 12, 1972 (Not sure if its the right case) SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION, petitioner, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. RESOLUTION FERNANDO, J.:p The decision sought to be reconsidered by respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. upheld the validity of a strike conducted by the Shell Oil Workers' Union and thus reversed an appealed decision from respondent Court of Industrial Relations. 1 It was arrived at unanimously, although there was a concurring opinion by Justice Antonio Barredo, with whom Justices J.B.L. Reyes and Querube Makalintal were in agreement. At that time, Justice Fred Ruiz Castro was on official leave and therefore could not take part. He has now expressed his conformity with the opinion of the Court as rendered. Justice Claudio Teehankee, however, would join the two other Justices in support of the concurring opinion of Justice Barredo. Former Justice Dizon, who concurred in the result, had since then been retired. After a careful study of the extensive motion for reconsideration, this Court, in accordance with the two opinions, is once again unanimous in sustaining the validity of the strike. The concurrence by Justice Barredo was prompted by his differing with the majority of the Court as to the existence of facts in the record which would indicate a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, thus resulting in the strike by petitioner Union. Nonetheless, he was likewise for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations for, as he pointed out: "All these, however do not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner's strike should necessarily be held to be illegal. It is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give but secondary importance to strict technicalities, whether of substantive or remedial law, and to constantly bear in mind the human values involved which are beyond pecuniary estimation. As a general rule, labor's most potent and effective weapon is the strike, and it is but natural that when things appear to be dimming on the negotiation tables, labor should almost instinctively take a striking posture. In other words, the determination of the legality or illegality of a strike, particularly in this enlightened era of progressive thinking on labor-management relations is something that cannot be achieved by mere straight-jacketed legalistic argumentation and rationalization; the process is broader and deeper than that, for to do justice in deciding such an issue, it is imperative that utmost consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of each case, with a view to having the most comprehensive understanding of the motivations of the parties, in the light of human needs, on the part of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and economical conduct of business and industry, on the part of management. In this particular case, for instance, I cannot agree that respondent has violated its collective bargaining agreement with petitioner, but, on the other hand, I am not ready to conclude that for this reason, the strike here in question was consequently illegal. I hold that the two strike votes taken by the members of the petitioning union were both premised on the sincere and honest belief that there was a legal breach of the said agreement." 2 Such an approach was reflected in this portion of the opinion of the Court: "As a matter of fact, this Court has gone even further. It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by the present Chief Justice while still an Associate Justice of this Court: "As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein." " 3 In the light of the above, it is apparent why, notwithstanding the vigorous plea made in the motion for reconsideration, there would be no legal justification for reaching a different conclusion from that arrived at in our decision of May 31, 1971. 1. More specifically, it is urged on this Court by respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. that the failure to abide by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement should not be considered an unfair labor practice. It is much too late in the day for such a contention to be advanced. Such a view runs counter to decisions of this Court that go back to 1967. The ruling was first announced by this Court through Justice Castro in Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations. 4 It was subsequently followed in Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust Company ; 5 Manila Hotel Company v. Pines Hotel Employees Association 6 and Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations. 7 There is no merit either for the argument advanced in the motion for reconsideration that the decision in this case would justify violence and thus negate the rule of law. A more careful reading of what was set forth in our decision should suffice to demonstrate that such misgivings are unjustified. As was set forth therein: "Respondent Court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of the violence that attended it. What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union's economic demands may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That the law recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an objective. For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed." 8 2. There must have been, on the part of respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., a realization that the unanimity displayed by this Court in reaching its conclusion would, from the realistic standpoint, preclude undue optimism. Thus, there was an alternative prayer. Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. seeks to have the twelve officers of the Union denied reinstatement and be given a money award instead, the employee status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Antonio Labrador and Sesinando Romero be terminated for committing serious acts of violence, and the reinstatement of the seventeen security guards be without backpay. While obviously, in the light of the legal doctrines announced, the reinstatement of the twelve officers of the Union who were dismissed merely because they were such, as well as that of the security guards, was a logical and legal consequence of the decision reached, there appears to be merit in its plea that the employee status of the five above-named individuals be terminated. A reappraisal of the evidence would indicate that Nestor Samson did beat driver Arsenio Alejo with such force as to cause him to fall down with his eyes "popping out." As for Jose Rey and Romeo Rosales, they were among those who attacked Marcos Prieto, the Company's Iloilo Installation Manager, resulting in the latter's hospitalization for thirty-two days. The violence exerted by Sesinando Romero and Antonio Labrador, by design and in concert, upon the two helpless victims, Arturo Mallari, the lorry driver, and his helper, Avelino Ruiz, were likewise of such magnitude as to entail the loss of employee status. WHEREFORE, with the modification of our decision of May 31, 1971 in that by this Resolution the employee status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Sesinando Romero and Antonio Labrador is likewise deemed terminated as in the cases of Ricardo Pagsibigan, Daniel Barraquel, Gregorio Bacsa, Conrado Pea, and Ernesto Crisostomo, the same is reiterated in all respects, and the motion for reconsideration of respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. is denied. G.R. No. 37687 March 15, 1982 PEOPLE'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ORGANIZATION (FFW), ERNESTO PAGAYATAN, ANTONIO ERIO, RODRIGO BOADO AND LINO FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, FEDERATION OF TENANTS AND LABORERS ORGANIZATION, and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

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GUERRERO, J.: Petition for review of the decision and en banc resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated April 2, 1973 and October 3, 1973, respectively, promulgated in three (3) consolidated cases. 1 The decision penned by Associate Judge Alberto S. Veloso adopting in full the report of CIR Hearing Examiner Atty. Francisco de los Reyes made the following dispositive portion, thus After a careful review, scrutiny and evaluation of the records of these cases, as well as of every piece of evidence adduced by the parties, pro and con, this court finds the findings of facts and conclusions of law contained in the aforequoted Report to be amply substantiated, and, therefore, adopts the same as its own. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, above- entitled cases should therefore be, as they are hereby ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. This petition limits itself to the controversy in Case No. 4498-ULP filed by People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization against People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation and the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization. On the basis of the Examiner's Report, the following facts appear: On April 30, 1964, the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization, Rizal Chapter, FTLO for short, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with respondent People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation, hereafter referred to as PINCOCO, (Exhibits "2" and "G"). At the time the agreement was consummated, herein individual petitioners, Ernesto Pagayatan, Antonio Erio, Rodrigo Boado and Lino Francisco, who were also the individual complainants in Case No. 4498-ULP, together with those mentioned in Annex "A" of the complaint (List of some forty-five [45] other employees), were employees of PINCOCO and members of FTLO. The relevant portions of the working agreement stipulate: xxx xxx xxx Art. II. Union Security Maintenance Shop. Those who are members in good standing of the Union before the signing of this working agreement, shall continue to be union members in good standing as a prerequisite for continued employment in the company. xxx xxx xxx Any employee covered by this agreement who during its term, should resign from the union or shall be expelled therefrom according to its normal procedures for any of the causes hereafter enumerated, shall upon written notice by the union directorate, be discharged from employment, provided that the causes for expulsion from the Union be any of the following: 1. Working in the interest of any labor organization other than the Union which claims or exercises jurisdiction similar to that claimed or exercised by the Union; 2. Refusal to pay or non-payment of Union dues and Assessment; 3. Disloyalty to the Union; 4. Separation from the Union for cause. xxx xxx xxx Art. VIII. No Strike, No Lockout. For the duration of the Agreement, the COMPANY shall not lockout its employees, nor shall the UNION or any employee stage any strike, picket or other concerted activity other than in protest of unfair labor practice, and the court decision in the case that may be filed in this connection shall determine the propriety of such concerned activity under the Agreement. Violation of this paragraph shall be treated as subject to the same sanctions as a violation of the duty to bargain collectively. A stoppage of work or cessation of operation due to poor sales, lack of raw material, or any other business reason, or to force majeure shall not be deemed a lockout for the purpose of the preceding paragraph. In any case that the COMPANY should stop operations due to any of the foregoing reasons, adequate notice shall be given to the UNION whenever possible. xxx xxx xxx Art. XI. Duration of the Agreement. This agreement shall take effect this day of April, 1964 and shall only be in effect for a period of one (1) year thereafter. Unless written notice of a desire to terminate or modify the same is given by either party to the other at least thirty (30) days before its expiration, this agreement shall be deemed to be renewed for another year. xxx xxx xxx On October 18, 1964, it appears that with the knowledge of PINCOCO, an election of union officers of the Rizal Chapter of FTLO was conducted by virtue of a resolution (Exhibit "2-FFW", t.s.n., pp. 24-31, October 10, 1969) and that individual petitioners were elected as the new officers with Ernesto Pagayatan as chapter president (Exhibits "4-FFW" and "5-FFW"). On January 10, 1965, individual petitioners together with fifty-one (51) other employees executed a Certification (Exhibit "3-FFW") stating that they are members of the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization, but as of the above date, they have changed the name of their union to People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (PICEWO) and have affiliated this new union with the Federation of Free Workers, Ernesto Pagayatan was again made the president of the new union (PICEWO) together with the set of officers elected with him in the last election retaining their respective positions. Further, in the same certification, the union counsel of FTLO, Atty. David Advincula, was disauthorized to represent the signatories. The certification contains no specific reason or cause for the change of union name. On February 10, 1965, the new union was granted a certificate of registration by the Department of Labor (Exhibit " 1FFW "), On March 23, 1965, Ernesto Pagayatan, assuming the capacity of chapter president of FTLO and not as a president of PICEWO, notified in writing respondent PINCOCO of their desire to terminate the working agreement. Later, a set of collective bargaining proposals was sent in the name of PICEWO (Exhibits "e", "10" and " 11 "). PINCOCO replied this wise: xxx xxx xxx That in view of the study effected by the management as to its stand with regard to the said proposals and further submission of the same to our legal counsel for consultation and advice and considering that April 15, 1965 is a legal holiday we cannot serve you, our formal reply within the period specified by existing statute. However, we assure you of our formal reply to your proposal on April 14, 1965 and that management will endeavor to avail of the remedies within the financial capacity of the company and other factors to be considered to meet the terms of your proposal. On April 13, 1965, FTLO passed a resolution expelling petitioners Ernesto Pagayatan, Antonio Erio Rodrigo Boado and Lino Francisco from the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization (FTLO) on grounds of disloyalty and working for the interest of another labor federation (Exhibit "F"). On April 22, 1965, Ernesto Pagayatan, this time as president of PICEWO filed a notice of strike, alleging as cause thereof respondent employer's refusal to bargain. (Exhibit "9-H"). On April 29,1965, prompted by the demand of the majority of the FTLO directorate to enforce the maintenance of membership shop of the working agreement, respondent PINCOCO dismissed Ernesto Pagayatan and his companions from employment (Exhibits "12- FFW "12-A-FFW" to "12-CFFW"). On May 1, 1965, the FTLO and respondent PINCOCO executed a collective bargaining agreement for a period of three (3) years (Exhibits "A-CO" and "D"). Meantime, on April 30, 1965, PICEWO, led by individual petitioners struck. Thereafter, at the behest of the FTLO, respondent PINCOCO posted a notice for the strikers to return to work within a period of five (5) or ten (10) days or else they shall be considered to have abandoned their work. None of the strikers returned and picketing went on for a period of six (6) months. Later, PINCOCO again posted a notice that it had decided to resume operation on March 9, 1966, and between March 7 and 8 of the same year, all employees were advised to signify their ability to work at which time they will be required to submit police clearances and to medical and physical examination by the company physician, otherwise their failure to return within the period shall be considered as abandonment of work. On March 31, 1966 petitioner-union, through its president, signified the intention to return to work beginning April 4, 1966. None of the strikers, however, were allowed to work.

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From the preceding developments, three separate cases were filed with the Court of Industrial Relations. In Case No. 4428-ULP, FTLO indicted herein individual petitioners for unfair labor practice in staging an illegal strike after they were already dismissed from the company. In Case No. 167-INJ, FTLO sought for the issuance of a permanent injunction to stop the alleged illegal strike. In Case No. 4498-ULP, PICEWO sued PINCOCO and FTLO for unfair labor practice, alleging that by illegally dismissing petitioners, the company discriminated against them in regard to hire, tenure and/or other conditions of employment by unlawfully acceding and effecting the request of FTLO without proper investigation thereof, with no just reason but to encourage membership in the FTLO; and that respondent federation, in recommending and insisting on the dismissal of individual petitioners, had interfered in their right to selforganization. (Annex "C", p. 39, Rollo) After the reception of evidence, the Hearing Examiner designated by the Court of Industrial Relations, reported that the petitioners were, beyond doubt, members of the FTLO when the Working Agreement of April 30, 1964 took effect and that the working agreement required in Article II thereof maintenance of membership in the federation as condition for continued employment in the company. Since the specific causes for expulsion from membership have been enumerated, particularly that of working for the interest of another organization and disloyalty to the union, the Hearing Examiner concluded that petitioners' conduct is within the said causes expressed in the agreement. The Report also established that FTLO is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees which entered into a bona fide agreement, putting a limitation of petitioners' right to leave the union and join another. The Examiner found no unfair labor practice committed by either the FTLO or PINCOCO, and that the strike staged by petitioners was not on account of any unfair labor practice, but, rather, done to force recognition. Based on the above findings, respondent court dismissed the three cases. On April 10, 1973, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration; same was denied in the en banc resolution of October 3, 1973. Petitioners now raise the following assignment of errors: a) The respondent court erred in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration and the Memorandum in support of the Motion for Reconsideration were filed out of time; b) The respondent court erred in holding that the strike declared by herein petitioners was intended only to force recognition; c) The respondent court erred in not declaring both respondent Corporation and respondent Federation guilty of committing unfair labor practice; d) The respondent court erred in not declaring as illegal the dismissal from employment of individual petitioners; and e) Respondent court erred in not ordering the return to work of the striking members of petitioner Union with backwages and other fringe benefits from April 30, 1965 until their actual reporting for work. The last day for filing the motion for reconsideration was April 9, 1973 which was a holiday (BATAAN DAY), and the last day for filing the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration, ten days after, was April 19, 1973, also a holiday (MAUNDY THURSDAY). Since petitioners have filed their pleadings on the next respective business days, that is, April 10, 1973, for the motion for reconsideration and April 23 for the arguments in support thereof (April 20 to 22 not being business days), the pleadings were, therefore, filed on time. On this procedural aspect, the resolution of October 3, 1973 has erred. It is the policy of the law to disregard technicalities in procedure so as not to deprive the litigant's pursuit of his substantial rights under the Rules. Under Article 13, last paragraph, of the Civil Code, in computing the period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. And under Rule 28 of the Rules of Court, Section 1, time is computed thus Sec. 1. How to compute time.-In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday. Under the second assignment of error, the question to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners' act of disaffiliating themselves from the mother federation constitutes an act of disloyalty to the union which would warrant their expulsion and consequently their dismissal from the company in pursuance to the union security clause embodied in the CBA. Petitioners contend that no disloyalty is involved since what they did on January 10, 1965 was merely to change, as they did change, the name of Rizal Chapter of the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization FTLO to People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (PICEWO). While We are not convinced with the petitioners' argument that the only act that they have done was to change the name of their union for they have registered the new union and affiliated it with the Federation of Free Workers, We rule that individual petitioners do not merit the dismissals meted by the company. In Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills , 2 We held that the validity of the dismissals pursuant to the security clause of the CBA hinges on the validity of the disaffiliation of the local union from the federation. It was further held in this case that PAFLU (the federation) had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of association free to serve the common interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances warrant such an act. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Esguerra, said: All these questions boil down to the single issue of whether or not the dismissal of the complaining employees, petitioners herein, was justified or not. The resolution of this question hinges on a precise and careful analysis of the Collective Bargaining Agreements. (Exhs. "H" and "l"). In these contracts it appears that PAFLU has been recognized as the sole bargaining agent for all the employees of the Company other than its supervisors and security guards. Moreover it likewise appears that "PAFLU, represented in this Act by its National Treasurer, and duly authorized representative, ... (was) acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union and the employees of the Company, etc." In other words, the PAFLU, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances warrant. This is clearly provided in its Constitution and By-Laws, specifically Article X on Union Affiliation, supra. At this point, relevant is the ruling in an American case. (Harker et al. vs. Mckissock et al., 81A 2d 480, 482). The locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence. The right of the local members to withdraw from the federation and to form a new local depends upon the provisions of the union's constitution, by- laws and charter. In the absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union, a local may sever its relationship with its parent.

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There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by respondent federation that the local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation. Except for the union security clause, the federation claims no other ground in expelling four of the fifty-one who signed the certification. Fifty-one out of sixty employees is equivalent to eighty five percent (85%) of the total working force. This is not a case where one or two members of the old union decided to organize another union in order to topple down the former, but it is a case where majority of the union members decided to reorganize the union and to disaffiliate from the mother federation. There is no merit to the contention of the respondent federation that the act of disaffiliation is disloyalty to the union. The federation and the union are two different entities and it was the federation which actively initiated the dismissal of the individual petitioners. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation to which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation and continued existence to the will of its members. The very essence of self-organization is for the workers to form a group for the effective enhancement and protection of their common interests. The third, fourth and fifth assignment of errors maybe resolved on the same issue which is the legality of the strike and the consequences thereof. Petitioners allege that the strike which was started on April 30, 1965 was staged because of the unfair labor practice of the respondent company in refusing to bargain collectively with PICEWO and in dismissing individual petitioners. The Hearing Officer in his Report which was adopted in full by the Court of Industrial Relations settled the legality of the strike in the following manner: xxx xxx xxx While the reply of respondent PINCOCO to the proposal of the new union evokes ambiguity, the same may not be treated as a refusal to bargain. At the time the letter proposal was sent, the presumed bargaining agent was the FTLO. No showing had been made that the PICEWO, upon its organization was should should have been accorded the status of a majority bargaining representative. The letter reply of PINCOCO, although it seem to cast doubt as to its motivation, should not be held and taken against it as a positive design to discriminate in the absence of any additional or corroborative showing that the new union actually represented the majority of the employees in the unit and that this fact was known to the management. The strike therefore of the PICEWO was not on account of any unfair labor practice acts committed by the respondent PINCOCO. It seem to have been more of a strike to force recognition. xxx xxx xxx We do not agree with the finding of the Hearing Officer that the strike was staged to force recognition. The chain of events which preceded the strike belie this conclusion. On April 5, 1965, Ernesto Pagayatan, the president of PICEWO sent to the management a set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement. The management on April 13, 1965 replied that the formal reply to the proposals cannot be made within the reglementary period because they will submit the said proposals to their legal counsel for further study and instead their reply would be made on April 19, 1965. No reply was made on that date. On April 29, 1965, individual petitioners were dismissed. A strike was staged the next day. One day after the petitioners struck, a new collective bargaining agreement was signed by the respondent company and the FTLO. The respondent company knew that a new union was formed composed of about 85% of the total number of its employees. It was furnished a copy of the certification that the majority of the FTLO members are forming a new union called PICEWO. The set of bargaining proposals were in the name of the new union. While a company cannot be forced to sit down and bargain collectively with the new union since it had no notice of the union's official capacity to act as the bargaining agent, the respondent company cannot deny that it had factual knowledge of the existence of a majority union. It could have asked for further proof that the new union was indeed the certified bargaining agent. It did not. Instead, it dismissed individual petitioners and signed a new CBA the day after the expiration of the old CBA, on the pretext that FTLO was presumed to be the certified bargaining agent. Such pretext does not seem justified nor reasonable in the face of the established fact that a new union enjoyed a majority status within the company. On the belief that the respondent company refused to bargain collectively with PICEWO, individual petitioners together with the other members staged a strike. We have in several cases ruled that a strike may be considered legal when the union believed that the respondent company committed unfair labor acts and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith although subsequently such allegation of unfair labor practices are found out as not true. Thus, in Norton and Harrison Co. and Jackbilt Blocks company Labor Union (NLU) vs. Norton and Harrison, et al ., 3 We held that "the act of the company in dismissing Arcaina done without the required fair hearing, and, therefore, not tenable even under strict legal ground, induced the union and its members to believe that said company was guilty of unfair labor practice although viewed now in retrospect said act would fall short of unfair labor practice. Since the strike of the union was in response to what it was warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practice on the part of the management, said strike following the berrer ruling did not result in the termination of the striking members' status as employees and therefore, they are still entitled to reinstatement without backwages." The Ferrer 4 ruling was also upheld in Shell Oil Workers Union vs. Shell Company of the Phil. Ltd. 5 where We stated that "(i)t is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by the present Chief Justice while still an Associate Justice of this Court: 'As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein. The Ferrer ruling was promulgated in 1966, that in the Shell Oil case in 1971. In 1980, there was the case of Pepito vs. Secretary of Labor, L-49418, Feb. 29, 1980, where petitioner therein was separated for having been implicated in a pilferage case by a coemployee but was later absolved from the charge. The Supreme Court thru Chief Justice Fernando ruled that the cause for his dismissal was proved non-existent or false and thus ordered his reinstatement with three years backwages, without deduction and qualification. We adopt the Pepito ruling and We hold that the petitioners in the case at bar are entitled not only to reinstatement but also to three years backwages without deduction and qualification. This is . justified and proper since the strike was proved and We held the same to be not illegal but was induced in the honest belief that management had committed unfair labor practices and, therefore, the cause of their dismissal from employment was non-existent. It is clear that management gave cause or reason to induce the staging of the strike by improperly refusing to recognize the new union formed by petitioners. It has been twelve (12) years since petitioners were dismissed from their employment and in their destitute and deplorable condition, to them the benign provisions of the New Constitution for the protection of labor, assuring the rights of workers to self- organization, collective bargaining and security of tenure would be useless and meaningless. Labor, being the weaker in economic power and resources than capital, deserve protection that is actually substantial and material. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision under review is hereby SET ASIDE. The respondent company is hereby ordered to reinstate individual petitioners and other striking members within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision, with backwages equivalent, to three (3) years at the rates actually received by them before their dismissal without deduction and qualification. In view of the length of time that this dispute has been pending, this decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation and notice to the parties. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Doctrine of ULP strike in good faith no rational reason G.R. Nos. 86917-18 January 25, 1991 RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents. SARMIENTO, J.:p The only question in this petition for certiorari is whether or not strikers who have been found to have staged an illegal strike may be reinstated to work. The facts are as follows: xxx xxx xxx It appears that to avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal and non-work-related conversations, personal telephone calls and non-work-connected visits by personnel to other departments, the respondent Reliance Surety Insurance Co., Inc. (company for short) on 21 November 1986, thru the manager (Mr. Celso Eleazar) of its underwriting department, effected a change in the seating arrangement of its personnel in said department. Four of those affected namely: Isagani Rubio, Rosalinda Macapagal, Glene Molina, and Severa Cansino protested the transfer of their tables and seats, claiming that the change was without prior notice and was done merely to harass them as union members. When the manager insisted, a heated discussion ensued, during which Rubio and companions were alleged to have hurled unprintable insults (sipsip, balimbing, vacuum, etc.) to the manager and supervisors. Rubio, Macapagal, Molina and Cansino were asked to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for misconduct, insubordination, and gross disrespect. The work atmosphere in the department had allegedly become charged or tense as Rubio continued to refuse to stay at his designated place, and Molina and Macapagal still levelled insults to those who testified against them. Hence, Rubio and companions were placed under preventive suspension on 3 February 1987 and ultimately dismissed after investigation on 3 March 1987. On 6 March 1987, the Reliance Surety & Insurance Employees Union (or union for short) filed in behalf of Rubio, Macapagal, Molina, and Cansino with the NLRC-NRC Branch, Manila, against the respondent company a complaint for illegal dismissal (NLRC- NCR Case No. 00-0300828-87) which it subsequently amended on 7 April 1987 to include the charge of unfair labor practice. The union claims that the company was guilty of unfair labor practice because it, among others, effected transfer and changes in the seating arrangement to pressure or intimidate union members; because it interfered in the union members' exercise of their right to selforganization by forcing them to undertake overtime work even on a non-working Saturday and in times when there were scheduled union meetings to prevent them from attending the same: and because, thru its manager and assistant managers, it caused the resignation and withdrawal of union members from the union. It also appears that on 12 March 1987, or while the complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP was hibernating in the NCR Arbitration Branch, the union filed with the DOLE a notice of strike predicated on unfair labor practices (dismissal of union officers/members, discrimination and coercion on employees) allegedly committed by the company. On 13 March 1987, the company received a copy of the notice of strike and a telegram from the DOLE setting the notice of strike for initial conciliation conference on 17 March 1987 at 2:00 p.m. But even before the initial conference could take place, the union in the morning of 17 March 1987 struck and picketed the company premises by forming human barricades, which effectively obstructed the free ingress to and egress from its premises, more particularly at the lobby of the 8th floor of the building where it has its office, thereby preventing its officials and employees from doing their usual duties. Because of this new development, the company filed on 31 March 1987 with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch, Manila, a petition to declare the strike illegal (NLRC-CR Case No. 00-03001179-87) on the grounds that the 30 or 15 day cooling-off period was blatantly defied; that the legal requirement to furnish the department with the results of the strike vote at least 7 days before the strike was ignored; just as the 24hour period within which BLR or the Regional Office should be furnished with a written notice of the meeting to declare a strike was also not complied with. Charged, together with the union and its members, as individual respondents in the petition to declare the strike illegal were the following officers: Rolando Tugade, president; Joseph Aying, vice-president; Isagani Rubio, treasurer; Ms. Glene Molina and Ms. Rosalinda Macapagal, secretaries; Froilan Garcia and Ms. Luz Monroy, Sgts. at arms: Orlando Calma, auditor; and Manolo Que, pro, who, the company claims, should be divested of their employment status for having knowingly participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts. 1 xxx xxx xxx The Labor Arbiter found the strike to be illegal, a finding the National Labor Relations Commission, on appeal, affirmed. However, the Commission held: xxx xxx xxx However, while we are convinced that the strike is illegal, we are equally convinced that it should not be visited with the consequence so harsh as the supreme penalty of dismissal, where merely reinstating them (strikers) without backwages would suffice in view of the union's belief, in proceeding with strike, that the company was committing unfair labor practice in terminating the services of some of its officers and members, in line with the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ferrer vs. CIR, 17 SCRA 352, to that effect. In justifying the imposition of a penalty lesser than dismissal even in cases involving strikes tainted with illegality, the Supreme Court in the case of Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc., 58 SCRA 120 ruled: It would imply at the very least that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps s may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, as family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those depending on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided. xxx xxx xxx In other words, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find it more in keeping with justice and equity if the striking union officers are reinstated, instead of being dismissed, to their former positions without loss

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of seniority rights but without backwages to serve as penalty for their indiscretion in launching an illegal strike. 2 xxx xxx xxx The Commission then disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, under the premises, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that all the striking officers of the appellant union should be reinstated to their former positions without loss of seniority rights but without backwages except Isagani Rubio, Glene Molina, and Rosalinda Macapagal, whose dismissal due to gross disrespect was found to be justified, and Luz Monroy who, in consideration of the financial assistance of P4,500.00 had withdrawn her appeal and allowed the arbiter's order of dismissal to be binding upon her. The dismissal of Severa Cansino due to gross disrespect is likewise upheld. However, the company is directed to pay said employees, namely Isagani Rubio, Glene Molina, Rosalinda Macapagal and Severa Cansino one month salary each including cost of living allowance and other benefits. 3 The petitioner argues that in so disposing, the Commission is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. There is no dispute that the strike in question was illegal, for failure of the striking personnel to observe legal strike requirements, to wit: (1) as to the fifteen-day notice; (2) as to the two-thirds required vote to strike done by secret ballot; (3) as to submission of the strike vote to the Department of Labor at least seven days prior to the strike. 4 As found likewise by the Commission, in the course of the strike held on April 1, 1987, certain strikers harassed non-striking employees, called company officers names, and committed acts of violence (as a result of which, criminal charges were brought with the fiscal's office.) 5 There is no question, finally, that the strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a change in the seating arrangement in the office of the underwriting department, the petitioner merely exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question, much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. The Court is indeed at a loss how rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify a four-monthlong strike. As to the private respondent's charges of harassment, the Commission found none, and as a general rule, we are bound by its findings of fact. Amid this background, the Court must grant the petition. In staging the strike in question, a strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate them without, indeed, loss of seniority rights, is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction. The private respondents can not find sanctuary in the cases of Ferrer v. Court of Industrial Relations 6 and Almira v. BF Goodrich Philippines, Inc., 7 in which we affirmed reinstatement in spite of an "illegal" strike. In the first place, neither Ferrer nor Almira involved an illegal strike. What was involved in Ferrer was a defective strike, that is, one conducted in violation of the thirty-day "cooling-off' period, but one carried out in good faith "to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices [committed by] Management." 8 What Almira on the other hand declared was that a violent strike alone does not make the action illegal, which would justify the dismissal of strikers. It is therefore clear that we ordered reinstatement in both cases not in spite of the illegality of the strike but on the contrary, because the same was "legal", that is to say, carried out in good faith. We can not apply, either, the ruling in Bacus v. Ople, 9 where we held that the mere finding of illegality attending a strike does not justify the "wholesale" dismissal of strikers who were otherwise impressed with good faith. The Court must not be understood to be abandoning the teachings of either Ferrer, Almira, or Bacus. The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike. We do find, however, not a semblance of good faith here, but rather, plain arrogance, pride, and cynicism of certain workers. With respect to the private respondent, Isagani Rubio, what militates against his readmission to the firm is the fact that he had accepted the sum of P2,448.80 "in full satisfaction of the . . . Decision" (of the Labor Arbiter). He can not now insist on reinstatement after accepting the legality of his dismissal. He can not have his cake and eat it too. As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 76219 May 27, 1991 GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ and GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents. NARVASA, J.:p GTE Directories Corporation (hereafter, simply GTE) is a foreign corporation engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company) telephone directories for Metro Manila and several provinces. The record shows that initially, the practice was for its sales representatives to be given work assignments within specific territories by the so-called "draw method." These sales territories were so plotted or mapped out as to have "an equal number of advertisers as well as . . . revenue. . ." Within these territories, the sales representatives therein assigned were given quotas; i.e., they had to "achieve a certain amount of revenue or advertisements sold, decreased, increased or cancelled within a given period of time." A territory was not fully released to the salesperson for handling at one time, but assigned in increments or partial releases of account. Now, increments were given by the so-called "Grid System," grids (divisions or sections) within each territory usually numbering five (i.e., Grids I to V). Each grid was assigned a fixed closing dated. At such closing date, a salesperson should have achieved a certain amount of the revenue target designated for his grid; otherwise, he loses the forthcoming grid or forfeits the remaining grids not yet received. The Grid System was installed for the following reasons: (1) to give all salespersons an opportunity to contact advertisers within a reasonable period; (2) to assure GTE that it will get its share of advertising budget from clients as early as possible; and (3) to ensure an even flow of work throughout the company. This practice was observed from 1980 until sometime in June, 1984 when GTE realized that competition among media for a share of the advertising revenue had become so keen as to require quick reaction. GTE therefore launched an aggressive campaign to get what it considered to be its rightful share of the advertising budget of its clientele before it could be allocated to other media (newspaper, television, radio, etc.) It adopted a new strategy by which: (1) all its sales representatives were required, as in the past, to achieve specified revenue targets (advertisements sold) within predetermined periods; (2) in cases of cancelled revenue accounts or advertisements, it required all its salespersons to re-establish contact and renew the same within a fixed period; (3) if the cancelled revenue accounts were not renewed within the assigned period, said accounts were declared, for a set period, OPEN TERRITORY to all sales representatives including the one who reported the cancellation; (4) if not renewed during said open territory period, said cancelled accounts were deemed no longer "open territory," and the same could be referred for handling to contractual salespersons and/or outside agencies. A new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was thereafter drawn up. GTE informed all its sales representatives of the new policy in a Memorandum dated October 12, 1984. The new policy was regarded as an improvement over the previous Sales Production Policy, which solely considered quota attainment and handling in the Sales Report for the purpose of evaluating performance. It appears that the new policy did not sit well with the union. It demanded that it be given 15 days "to raise questions or objections to or to seek reconsideration of the sales and administrative practices issued by the Company on June 14, 1984." This, GTE granted, and by letter dated October 26, 1984, the union submitted its proposals for "revisions, corrections and deletions of some policies incorporated in the Sales Administrative Practices issued on June 14, 1984 including the new policies recently promulgated by Management."

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GTE next formulated a new set of "Sales Administrative Practices," pursuant to which it issued on July 9, 1985, a memorandum requiring all Premise Sales Representatives (PSRs) to submit individual reports reflecting target revenues as of deadlines, set at August 2, 1985. This was superseded by another memorandum dated July 16, 1985, revising the previous schedules on the basis of "the consensus reached after several discussions with your DSMs, as well as, most of you," and pointing out that "the amount required on the 1st deadline (P30,000) . . . has been reduced further (to P20,000) having taken into consideration that most of your accounts you have already on hand are with your respective "prep artists"" On August 5, 1985, GTE's Sales Manager sent another Memorandum to "all premise sales personnel." That memorandum observed that most of them had omitted to submit reports regarding "the target of P20,000.00 revenue handled on . . . (the) first Grid deadline of August 2, 1985" notwithstanding that "several consultations/discussions . . . (had) been held with your DSMs, as well as yourselves in different and separate occasions," and "these schedules/targets were drawn up by no less than you, collectively," and notwithstanding that "this has been a practice of several years." It closed with the expressed expectation that the sales reports would be submitted "no later than 2:00 P.M. reflecting P20,000.00 revenue handled, as per memo re: Grid Deadlines dated July 16, 1985." But as before, the sales representatives did not submit the reports. Instead their union, GTE Directories Corporation Employees Union (hereafter, simply the union), sent a letter to the Sales Manager dated August 5, 1985. 1 The letter stated that in fact "only one out of nineteen sales representatives met the P20,000 revenue handled on our first grid deadline of August 2;" that the schedule was not "drawn (up) as a result of an agreement of all concerned" since GTE had failed to get "affirmative responses" from "clustered groups of SRs;" that the union could not "Comprehend how cancelling non-cancelling accounts help production;" and that its members would fail "expectations of cancelling . . . non-cancelling accounts" since it "would result to further reduction of our pay which (they) believe is the purpose of your discriminate and whimsical memo." The following day, on August 6, 1985, the union filed in behalf of the sales representatives, a notice of strike grounded on alleged unfair labor practices of GTE consisting of the following: 1. Refusal to bargain on unjust sales policies particularly on the failure to meet the 75% of the average sales production for two consecutive years; 2. Open territory of accounts; 3. Illegal suspension of Brian Pineda, a union officer; and 4. Non-payment of eight days' suspension pay increase. In due course, the Bureau of Labor Relations undertook to conciliate the dispute. On the same day, August 6, 1985, GTE sent still another memorandum to sixteen (16) of its premise sales representatives, this time through its Director for Marketing & Sales, requiring submission of "individual reports reflecting target revenues as of grid deadlines . . . not later than 4:00 P.M. . . ." 2 No compliance was made. GTE thereupon suspended its sales representatives "without pay effective August 12, 1985 for five (5) working days" and warned them that their failure to submit the requisite reports by August 19, 1985 would merit "more drastic disciplinary actions." Still, no sales representative complied with the requirement to submit the reports ("list of accounts to be cancelled"). So, by memorandum of the Marketing Director dated August 19, 1985, all the sales representatives concerned were suspended anew "effective August 20, 1985 until you submit the . . . (report)." Finally, GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum. By memorandum dated August 23, 1985, individually addressed to its sales representatives, GTE required them, for the last time, to submit the required reports ("list of accounts to be cancelled") within twentyfour (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum; otherwise, they would be terminated "for cause." Again not one sales representatives submitted a report. Instead, on August 29, 1985, the Union President sent an undated letter to GTE (addressed to its Director for Marketing & Sales) acknowledging receipt of the notice of their suspension on August 19, 1985 in view of their "continued refusal to submit the list of accounts to be cancelled," professing surprise at being "served with a contradictory notice, giving us this time 24 hours to submit the required list, without the suspension letter, which we consider as still in force, being first recalled or withdrawn," asking that they be informed which of the two directives should be followed, and reserving their "right to take such action against you personally for your acts of harassment and intimidation which are clearly designed to discourage our legitimate union activities in protesting management's continious (sic) unfair labor practices." Consequently, by separate letters dated August 29, 1985 individually received, GTE terminated the employment of the recalcitrant sales representatives, numbering fourteen, with the undertaking to give them "separation pay, upon proper clearance and submission of company documents, material etc., in . . . (their) possession." Among those dismissed were the union's president and third vice president, and several members of its board of directors. On September 2, 1985, the union declared a strike in which about 60 employees participated. During all this time, conciliation efforts were being exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations, including attempts to prevent the imposition of sanctions by GTE on its employees, and the strike itself. When these proved futile, Acting Labor Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued an Order dated December 6, 1985 assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. The order made the following disposition, to wit: WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at G.T.E. Directories, pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Accordingly, all striking workers including those who were dismissed during the conciliation proceedings, except those who have already resigned, are hereby directed to return to work and the management of G.T.E. Directories to accept all returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the strike notice and without prejudice to the determination of the obligation and rights of the parties or to the final outcome of this dispute. The Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby directed to hear the dispute and submit its recommendations within 15 days upon submission of the case for resolution. All concerned including the military and police authorities are hereby requested to assist in the implementation of this Order." The Acting Secretary opined that the dispute "adversely affects the national interest," because: 1) GTE, a "100% foreign owned" company, had, as publisher of "PLDT's Metro Manila and provincial directories . . . earned a total of P127,038,463 contributing close to P10 million in income tax alone to the Philippine government," and that "major contribution to the national economy . . . (was) being threatened because of the strike;" and 2) "top officers of the union were dismissed during the conciliation process thereby compounding the dispute," Reconsideration of this Order was sought by GTE by motion filed on December 16, 1985, on the ground that 1) "the basis for assumption of jurisdiction is belied by the facts and records of the case and hence, unwarranted;" 2) "national interest is not adversely affected to warrant assumption of jurisdiction by (the) Office of the Minister of Labor and Employment;" and 3) "assumption of jurisdiction by the . . . Minister . . . without prior consultation with the parties violates the company's right to due process of law." GTE however reiterated its previously declared "position that with or without the order now being questioned, it will accept all striking employees back to work except the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who were dismissed for cause prior to the strike." By Resolution of then Labor Minister Blas Ople dated January 20, 1986, GTE's motion for reconsideration was denied. The order noted inter alia that GTE had "accepted back to work all the returning workers except fourteen (14) whom it previously dismissed insisting that they were legally dismissed for violation of company rules and, therefore, are not included and may not be reinstated on the basis of a return-to-work order," and that "they were dismissed for their alleged failure to comply with the reportorial requirement under the Sales and Administrative Practices in effect since 1981 but which for the present is the subject of negotiations between the parties." The Order then 1) adverted to the "general rule (that) promulgations of company policies and regulations are basic management prerogatives

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although the principle of collective bargaining encompasses almost all relations between the employer and its employees which are best threshed out through negotiations, . . . (and that) it is recognized that company policies and regulations are, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, generally binding and valid on the parties until finally revised or amended unilaterally or preferably through negotiations or by competent authorities;" 2) affirmed the "recognized principle of law that company policies and regulations are, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, generally binding (and) valid on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended unilaterally or preferably through negotiations or by competent authorities;" and 3) closed by pointing out that "as a basic principle, the matter of the acceptability of company policies and rules is a proper subject of collective negotiations between the parties or arbitration if necessary." In a clarificatory Order dated January 21, 1986, Minister Ople reiterated the proposition that "promulgations of company policies and regulations are basic management prerogatives," and that "unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law," they are "generally binding and valid on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended unilaterally or preferably, through negotiations or by competent authorities." Adjudication of the dispute on the merits was made on March 31, 1986 by Order of Minister Ople's successor, Augusto Sanchez. The Order 1) pointed out "that the issue central to the labor dispute revolves around compliance with existing company policies, rules and regulations specifically the sales evaluation and production policy which was amended by the October 12, 1984 memorandum and the grid schedule;" 2) declared that because fourteen (14) sales representatives who after reinstatement pursuant to the order of January 20, 1986 had been placed "on forced leave with pay "were actually dismissed for failure to comply with the reporting requirements under the "Sales Administration Practices" which was ( sic) then the subject of negotiations between the parties at the Bureau of Labor Relations," it was only fair that they 'be reinstated . . .with back wages since they were terminated from employment based on a policy . . . still being negotiated to avoid precisely a labor-management dispute from arising" therefrom;" 3) pronounced the union's action relative to the allegedly illegal dismissal of one Brian Pineda to be "barred by extinctive prescription" in accordance with the CBA then in force; and 4) on the foregoing premises adjudicated the dispute as follows: 1. The union and management of G.T.E. Directories Corporation are directed to negotiate and effect a voluntary settlement on the questioned Grid schedule, the Sales Evaluation and Production Policy; 2. Management is ordered to reinstate the fourteen (14) employees with full back wages from the time they were dismissed up to the time that they were on forced leave with pay." Both the Union and GTE moved for reconsideration of the Order. The Union contended that: 1) GTE should have been adjudged guilty of unfair labor practice and other unlawful acts; 2) its strike should have been declared lawful; 3) GTE's so-called "bottom-third" policy, as well as all sales and administrative practices related thereto, should have been held illegal; and 4) GTE should have been commanded: (a) to pay all striking employees their usual salaries, allowances, commission and other emoluments corresponding to the period of their strike; (b) to release to its employees the 8-days pay increase unlawfully withheld from them; (c) to lift the suspension imposed on Brian Pineda and restore to him the pay withheld corresponding to the suspension period; (d) to pay the sales representatives all their lost income corresponding to the period of their suspensions, and dismissal, including commissions that they might have earned corresponding to their one-week forced leave. GTE for its part, argued that the termination of the employment of its fourteen (14) premise sales representatives prior to the strike should have been upheld. It also filed an opposition to the union's motion for reconsideration. The motions were resolved in a "Decision" handed down by Minister Sanchez on June 6, 1986. The Minister stated that he saw no need to change his rulings as regards Pineda's suspension, the question on GTE's sales and administrative policies, and the matter of back wages. However, as regards "the other issues raised by the union," the Minister agreed "with the company that these were not adequately threshed out in the earlier proceedings . . . (for) (w)hile it is true that the union had already presented evidence to support its contention, the company should be given the opportunity to present its own evidence." Accordingly, he directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to hear said "other issues raised by the union and to submit its findings and recommendations thereon within 20 days from submission of the case for decision." Again GTE moved for reconsideration; again it was rebuffed. The Labor Minister denied its motion by Order dated October 1, 1986. In that order, the Minister, among other things 1) invoked Section 6, Rule XIII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, pertinently reading as follows: During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation proceedings called by the Bureau or the Regional Office. and pointed out that "in dismissing 14 salesmen . . . for alleged violations of the reportorial requirements of its sales policies which was then the subject of conciliation proceedings between them, (GTE) acted evidently in bad faith; hence the status quo prior to their dismissal must be restored . . . (and) their reinstatement with backwages is in order up to the time they were on forced leave. . . ;" 2) declared that because he had "ordered the parties to negotiate and effect a voluntary settlement of the questioned Grid Schedule, the Sales Evaluation and Productions Policy, it would be unripe and premature for us to rule on the legality or illegality on the company's sales policies at this instance;" 3) opted, however, to himself resolve "the so-called 'other issues"' which he had earlier directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to first hear and resolve (in the Decision of June 6, 1986, supra), i.e., GTE's liability for unfair labor practice, the legality of the strike and the strikers' right to be paid their wages while on strike, his ruling thereon being as follows: While the company, in merely implementing its challenged sales policies did not ipso facto commit an unfair labor practice, it did so when it in mala fide dismissed the fourteen salesmen, all union members, while conciliation proceedings were being conducted on disputes on its very same policies, especially at that time when a strike notice was filed on the complaint of the union alleging that said sales policies are being used to bust the union; thus precipitating a lawful strike on the part of the latter. A strike is legal if it was provoked by the employer's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the union, by the discrimination employed by it with regard to the hire and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of employees due to union activities as well as the company's refusal to bargain collectively in good faith (Cromwell Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Cromwell Employees and Laborers Union, 19 SCRA 398). The same rule applies if employer was guilty of bad faith delay in reinstating them to their position (RCPI vs. Phil. Communications Electronics & Electricity Workers Federation, 58 SCRA 762). While as a rule strikers are not entitled to backpay for the strike period (J.P. Heilbronn Co. vs. NLU, 92 Phil. 575) strikers may be properly awarded backwages where the strike was precipitated by union busting activities of the employer (Davao Free Workers, Front, et al. vs, CIR, 60 SCRA 408), as in the case at bar. . . . The Minister accordingly annulled and set aside his order for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct hearings on said issues since he had already resolved them, and affirmed his Order of March 31, 1986"directing Union and Management to negotiate a voluntary settlement on the company sales policies and reinstating the fourteen employees with full backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the time they were on forced leave with pay" "but with the modification that management . . . (was) directed to give the

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striking workers strike duration pay for the whole period of the strike less earnings." GTE thereupon instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying for invalidation, because rendered with grave abuse of discretion, of the Labor Minister's orders 1) commanding "reinstatement of the fourteen dismissed employees, and 2) "finding . . . (it) guilty of unfair labor practice and directing (it) to pay strike duration pay to striking workers." It seems to the Court that upon the undisputed facts on record, GTE had cause to dismiss the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who had repeatedly and deliberately, not to say defiantly, refused to comply with its directive for submission of individual reports on specified matters. The record shows that GTE addressed no less than (six) written official communications to said premise sales representatives embodying this requirement, to wit: 1) Memorandum of July 9, 1985 pursuant to GTE's "Sales Administrative Practices" superseded by a memorandum dated July 16, 198 requiring submission of individual reports by August 2, 1985; 2) Memorandum of August 5, 1985, requiring submission of the reports by 2:00 P.M.; 3) Memorandum of August 6, 1985, for submission of requisite reports not later than 4:00 P.M. of that day, with a warning of "appropriate disciplinary action;" 4) Letter of August 9, 1985 imposing suspension without pay for five (5) working days and extending the period for submission of reports to August 19, 1985; 5) Letter of August 19, 1985 suspending the sales representatives until their submission of the required reports; 6) Letter dated August 28, 1985 giving the sales representatives "a last chance to comply with . . . (the) directive within 24 hours from receipt . . .;" with warning that failure to comply would result in termination of employment. The only response of the sales representatives to these formal directives were: 1) a letter by their Union to GTE's Sales Manager dated August 5, 1985 in which the requirement was criticized as not being the "result of an agreement of all concerned," and as incomprehensible, "discriminate and whimsical;" 2) a strike notice filed with the Ministry of Labor on August 6, 1985; and 3) an undated letter sent to GTE's Director for Marketing & Sales on August 29, 1985, drawing attention to what it deemed contradictory directives, and reserving the right to take action against the manager for "acts of harassment and intimidation . . . clearly designed to discourage our legitimate union activities in protesting management's continuous unfair labor practices." The basic question then is whether or not the effectivity of an employer's regulations and policies is dependent upon the acceptance and consent of the employees thereby sought to be bound; or otherwise stated, whether or not the union's objections to, or request for reconsideration of those regulations or policies automatically suspend enforcement thereof and excuse the employees' refusal to comply with the same. This Court has already had occasion to rule upon a similar issue. The issue was raised in a 1989 case, G.R. No. 53515, San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) v. Ople. 3 In that case, the facts were briefly as follows: In September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme known as the "Complementary distribution system" (CDS) whereby its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers through San Miguel's sales offices. The labor union (herein petitioner) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the Ministry of Labor, with a notice of strike on the ground that the CDS was contrary to the existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company. It was alleged that the new marketing scheme violates . . . (a provision) of the collective bargaining agreement because the introduction of the CDS would reduce the takehome pay of the salesmen and their truck helpers for the company would be unfairly competing with them." The Labor Minister found nothing to suggest that the employer's unilateral action of inaugurating a new sales scheme "was designed to discourage union organization or diminish its influence;" that on the contrary, it was "part of its overall plan to improve efficiency and economy and at the same time gain profit to the highest;" that the union's "conjecture that the new plan will sow dissatisfaction from its rank is already a prejudgment of the plan's viability and effectiveness, . . . like saying that the plan will not work out to the workers' (benefit) and therefore management must adopt a new system of marketing." The Minister accordingly dismissed the strike notice, although he ordered a slight revision of the CDS which the employer evidently found acceptable. This Court approved of the Minister's findings, and declared correct his holding that the CDS was "a valid exercise of management prerogatives," 4 viz.: Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. . . . (NLU vs. Insular La Yebana Co., 2 SCRA 924; Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 21 SCRA 226, 235.) (Perfecto V. Hernandez, Labor Relations Law, 1985 ed., p. 44.) (Emphasis ours.) The Court then closed its decision with the following pronouncements: 5 Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise means designed towards that goal. In Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713, We ruled: . . . Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them (LVN, Pictures Workers vs. LVN, 35 SCRA 147; Phil. American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garments Workers, 26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). . . . In the case at bar, it must thus be conceded that its adoption of a new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was within its management prerogative to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the manner, procedure and processes by which particular work activities should be done. There were, to be sure, objections presented by the union, i.e., that the schedule had not been "drawn (up) as a result of an agreement of all concerned," that the new policy was incomprehensible, discriminatory and whimsical, and "would result to further reduction" of the sales representatives' compensation. There was, too, the union's accusation that GTE had committed unfair labor practices, such as 1. Refusal to bargain on unjust sales policies particularly on the failure to meet the 75% of the average sales production for two consecutive years; 2. Open territory of accounts; 3. Illegal suspension of Brian Pineda, a union officer; and 4. Non-payment of eight days' suspension pay increase.

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This Court fails to see, however, how these objections and accusations justify the deliberate and obdurate refusal of the sales representatives to obey the management's simple requirement for submission by all Premise Sales Representatives (PSRs) of individual reports or memoranda requiring reflecting target revenues which is all that GTE basically required and which it addressed to the employees concerned no less than six (6) times. The Court fails to see how the existence of objections made by the union justify the studied disregard, or wilful disobedience by the sales representatives of direct orders of their superior officers to submit reports. Surely, compliance with their superiors' directives could not have foreclosed their demands for the revocation or revision of the new sales policies or rules; there was nothing to prevent them from submitting the requisite reports with the reservation to seek such revocation or revision. To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or order laid down by management, on the pleaded theory that the rule or order is unreasonable, illegal, or otherwise irregular for one reason or another, would be disastrous to the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his employees to preserve and maintain in the working establishment and without which no meaningful operation and progress is possible. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules, defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced. This is not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or orders they regard as unjust or illegal. They may object thereto, ask to negotiate thereon, bring proceedings for redress against the employer before the Ministry of Labor. But until and Unless the rules or orders are declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. It is impermissible to reverse the process: suspend enforcement of the orders or rules until their legality or propriety shall have been subject of negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration. These propositions were in fact adverted to in relation to the dispute in question by then Minister Blas Ople in his Order dated January 21, 1986, to the effect among others, that "promulgations of company policies and regulations are basic management prerogatives" and that it is a "recognized principle of law that company policies and regulations are, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, generally binding (and) valid on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended unilaterally or preferably through negotiations or by competent authorities." Minister Sanchez however found GTE to have "acted evidently in bad faith" in firing its 14 salespersons "for alleged violations of the reportorial requirements of its sales policies which was then the subject of conciliation proceedings between them;" 6 and that "(w)hile the company, in merely implementing its challenged sales policies did not ipso facto commit an unfair labor practice, it did so when it in mala fide dismissed the fourteen salesmen, all union members, while conciliation proceedings were being conducted on disputes on its very same policies, especially at that time when a strike notice was filed on the complaint of the union alleging that said sales policies are being used to bust the union; thus precipitating a lawful strike on the part of the latter." No other facts appear on record relevant to the issue of GTE's dismissal of the 14 sales representatives. There is no proof on record to demonstrate any underhanded motive on the part of GTE in formulating and imposing the sales policies in question, or requiring the submission of reports in line therewith. What, in fine, appears to be the Minister's thesis is that an employer has the prerogative to lay down basic policies and rules applicable to its employees, but may not exact compliance therewith, much less impose sanctions on employees shown to have violated them, the moment the propriety or feasibility of those policies and rules, or their motivation, is challenged by the employees and the latter file a strike notice with the Labor Department which is the situation in the case at bar. When the strike notice was filed by the union, the chain of events which culminated in the termination of the 14 sales persons' employment was already taking place, the series of defiant refusals by said sales representatives to comply with GTE's requirement to submit individual reports was already in progress. At that time, no less than three (3) of the ultimate six (6) direct orders of the employer for the submission of the reports had already been disobeyed. The filing of the strike notice, and the commencement of conciliation activities by the Bureau of Labor Relations did not operate to make GTE's orders illegal or unenforceable so as to excuse continued non-compliance therewith. It does not follow that just because the employees or their union are unable to realize or appreciate the desirability of their employers' policies or rules, the latter were laid down to oppress the former and subvert legitimate union activities. Indeed, the overt, direct, deliberate and continued defiance and disregard by the employees of the authority of their employer left the latter with no alternative except to impose sanctions. The sanction of suspension having proved futile, termination of employment was the only option left to the employer. To repeat, it would be dangerous doctrine indeed to allow employees to refuse to comply with rules and regulations, policies and procedures laid down by their employer by the simple expedient of formally challenging their reasonableness or the motives which inspired them, or filing a strike notice with the Department of Labor and Employment, or, what amounts to the same thing, to give the employees the power to suspend compliance with company rules or policies by requesting that they be first subject of collective bargaining, It would be well nigh impossible under these circumstances for any employer to maintain discipline in its establishment. This is, of course, intolerable. For common sense teaches, as Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto once had occasion to stress 7 that: Success of industries and public services is the foundation upon which just wages may be paid. There cannot be success without efficiency. There cannot be efficiency without discipline. Consequently, when employees and laborers violate the rules of discipline they jeopardize not only the interest of the employer but also their own. In violating the rules of discipline they aim at killing the hen that lays the golden eggs. Laborers who trample down the rules set for an efficient service are, in effect, parties to a conspiracy, not only against capital but also against labor. The high interest of society and of the individuals demand that we should require everybody to do his duty. That demand is addressed not only to employer but also to employees. Minister Sanchez decided the dispute in the exercise of the jurisdiction assumed by his predecessor in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, 8 providing in part as follows: (g) When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . . Even that assumption of jurisdiction is open to question. The production and publication of telephone directories, which is the principal activity of GTE, can scarcely be described as an industry affecting the national interest. GTE is a publishing firm chiefly dependent on the marketing and sale of advertising space for its not inconsiderable revenues. Its services, while of value, cannot be deemed to be in the same category of such essential activities as "the generation or distribution of energy" or those undertaken by "banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries." It cannot be regarded as playing as vital a role in communication as other mass media. The small number of employees involved in the dispute, the employer's payment of "P10 million in income tax alone to the Philippine government," and the fact that the "top officers of the union were dismissed during the conciliation process," obviously do not suffice to make the dispute in the case at bar one "adversely affecting the national interest." WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and as prayed for, the Order dated October 1, 1986 of the public respondent is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. May 30, 1950 G.R. No. L-2660 LUZON MARINE DEPARTMENT UNION, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, JUAN L. LANTING and MODESTO CASTILLO, Judges of Court of Industrial Relations, LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., UNION DE OBREROS ESTIVADORES DE FILIPINAS, and UNIVERSAL MARINE UNION, respondents.

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Lorenzo M. Taada and Simeon M. Gopengco for petitioner. Arsenio I. Martinez for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. , J.: This petition for certiorari to review a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations raises the question of the legality of a strike declared by the petitioner during the pendency of its petition for the settlement of an industrial dispute before the Court of Industrial Relations. The facts out of which the question arose are briefly as follows: On June 17, 1948, the petitioner, which is a duly registered labor union, presented to the respondent Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. a petition containing twelve demands, among which was that it be granted full recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop and check-off. On June 21, 1948, said petitioner initiated the present proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations by filing a petition therein, praying that the respondent company be directed to comply immediately with all the demands embodied in the aforesaid petition. The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (U.O.E.F.) a labor organization claiming some 75,000 members, divided into units of committees, one of which is the Universal Marine Union, intervened on behalf of the latter for the reason that the demand of the petitioner for recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop, etc., would violate an agreement entered into between the respondent company and the said U.O.E.F. in the early part of 1947, whereby the said company recognized the U.O.E.F. as the labor organization of the workers rendering services to the Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc., with full right for collective bargaining, and that no person or persons must be hired by the company unless he or they are bona fide members of the Union. The intervenor U.O.E.F. moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the petitioner did not count with more than thirty members employed by the respondent company. The petition for dismissal was duly heard and the parties adduced evidence on the question of jurisdiction on July 7, 10 and 12, 1948. On July 19, 1948, Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the court had jurisdiction over the case. Before receipt of notice of said order, 65 alleged members of the petitioner failed to report for work on the morning of July 19, 1948, without previously notifying the respondent of the cause of their absence. The foreman of the Towing Department of the respondent request the U.O.E.F. to furnish men who could take the places of the absent ones, and that request was promptly complied. It was only at 8:15 a. m. on July 21, 1948, that the general manager of the respondent company received by mail a notice from the petitioner that the said 65 men struck on July 19, 1948, at 6 a. m. On July 20, 1948, the petitioner filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a petition alleging that all members of petitioner, numbering more than 300, went on strike at 6 a. m. on July 19 due to the refusal of the respondent company to grant their demands or to negotiate with them and the challenge flung to them that there are not more than thirty members of the petitioning union employed by the respondent company, and praying for the issuance of a restraining order to prevent the respondent from employing strike breakers. The respondent company and the intervenor U. O. E. F. filed their respective oppositions to that petition. On August 16, 1948, Associate Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order directing the strikers to return to work immediately and the respondent company to reinstate them in the positions they were occupying before the strike. The intervenor and the respondent company immediately filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, and the court sitting in banc, with the dissent of Judge Bautista, set said order aside on the ground that the strike was unjustified and illegal. The opinion of the Court, penned by Associate Judge Lanting and concurred in by Presiding Judge Roldan and Associate Judge Castillo, held: Although section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides that, pending award or decision by the Court of Industrial Relations, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court, and although the Court had not enjoined the petitioner not to strike, it does not necessarily follow that the strike was legal and justified. In the case of Rex Taxicab Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations (70 Phil. 621), wherein this Supreme Court held that the employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations, it was also held that in cases not falling within the prohibition, the legality or illegality of a strike depends, first, upon the for which it is maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on. And in the case of Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union (71 Phil. 124), the Supreme Court further held that the right of the employees, tenants or laborers to be continued in the service under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose carries with it the corresponding obligation on their part not to strike or walk out of their employment, or to return to it if they have already done so. Conformably to these principles the Supreme Court, in the case of National Labor Union, Inc. vs. Philippine Match Company, (70 Phil. 300), declared illegal and unjustified a strike motivated by an unreasonable demand of the labor union for the dismissal of a factory foreman. In that case the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moran, held that although Commonwealth Act No. 103 recognizes, in a negative way, the laborers right to strike, it also creates all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided, because a strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character and general in its disturbing effects upon the social order and the public interests; that as the strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of a remedy peculiarly their own, and outside of the statute, and, as such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice; and that when the petitioners declared a strike even before the outcome of the investigation by the company of their complaint against the factory foreman was announced, and without previously having resorted to any of the pacific means provided by law, they acted unreasonably, and the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their behavior. Their cessation from their employment as a result of such an unjustified strike is one of such consequences which they must take by the choice of a remedy of their own, outside of the statute. The Court of Industrial Relations found from the testimony of Ciriaco C. Sarmiento, president of the petitioning union, that his men went on strike because the opposite party claims or asserts that we have no members inside the company, and because the members of the union were becoming impatient to wait for the decision of the court, and they are in suspense they are doubting. From this, the Court concluded, that the purpose of the strike was to influence the decision and to compel the Court to decide the question promptly. According to the Court, it was an unwarranted interference with the ordinary processes of law and cannot be tolerated because it tends to destroy the confidence of the public in the machinery instituted by the Government for the orderly solution of industrial disputes. Applying the rulings laid down by this Court in the case above stated, the Court of Industrial Relations declared the strike in question illegal. Counsel for the petitioner insist before this Court that the strike in question was called for a lawful purpose. They contend that the evidence clearly shows that the members of the petitioning union struck in order to show the company and the U.O.E.F. that they had more than thirty members, and due to the threats of Alejo Villanueva, who threatened to dismiss the laborers from the company. Thus, according to the petitioner, the strike was motivated (1) by the desire or the strikers to show the company and the U.O.E.F. that they were more than thirty in number, and (2) by the threat of Alejo Villanueva to dismiss them from the company. In our opinion, neither of these motives nor both of them justified such a drastic measure as a strike, which necessarily entails pernicious consequences not only to the company but also to the laborers themselves and the public. It was of no avail to the petitioner to strike to show to the company and the intervenor U.O.E.F. that the petitioner had more than thirty members, because the question of whether or not the petitioner had more than thirty members employed in the service of the company was at that time sub judice, both parties having submitted evidence before the court to prove their respective contentions, and the company had the right to wait for the decision of the court upon the evidence adduced before it. As the lower court correctly observed, the only permissible way to prove an allegation and to influence the decision of the proceedings. The second motive, referring to the alleged threat of dismissal by Alejo Villanueva, is likewise trivial and puerile. Villanueva was not an officer or employee of the respondent company, and the petitioner knew that he had no power or authority to dismiss any of the companys employees. He was merely an officer of the intervenor U.O.E.F. Indeed, we venture to say, that even if the threat had been made by the officer of the respondent company, the petitioner would have not been justified thereby to declare a strike because the petitioner knew that under the law, during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the Court of Industrial Relations, the employer can not lay off, and much less

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dismiss, the petitioning employees without the permission of the Court. Counsel contend that there is no provision of law, decision, ruling or doctrine which provides that a strike called for such a purpose is against the law. We have adverted to the ruling of this Court in Rex Taxicab Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, that in cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or illegality of the strike depends, first, upon the purpose for which it is maintained, and, second upon the means employed in carrying it on. Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust (as in the of the National Labor Union, Inc. vs. Philippine Match Company, supra), or if in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence or cause injuries to persons or damage to property (as in the case of National Labor Union, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations and Manila Gas Corporation, 68 Phil. 732), the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by the court illegal, with the adverse consequences to the strikers. To summarize, the rulings of this Court in the cases hereinabove cited are: (1) The law does not look in favor upon the strikes and lockouts because of their disturbing and pernicious effects upon the social order and the public interests; to prevent or avert them to implement section 6, Article XIV of the Constitution, the law has created several agencies, namely: the Bureau of Labor, the Department of Labor, the Labor-Management Advisory Board, and the Court of Industrial Relations. (See sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103; and Executive Order No. 158, dated July 28, 1948.) (2) The law does not expressly ban strikes except when enjoined against by the court; but if a strike is declared for a trivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, or if it is carried out through unlawful means, the law will not sanction it and the court will declare it illegal, with the adverse consequences to the strikers. (3) If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands, instead of resorting first to the legal processes provided by the law, they do so at their own risk, because the dispute will necessarily reach the court and, if the latter should find that the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer the adverse consequences. The Court of Industrial Relations has merely applied to this case the settled doctrines of this Court as above summarized. We reaffirm those doctrines and must, consequently sustain the resolution complained of. We do not deem it necessary to decide the two collateral issues raised by counsel for petitioner in their memorandum, namely: (1) whether or not the business of the respondent company is coupled with public interest; and (2) whether or not the closed-shop agreement between the respondent company and the U.O.E.F. is valid, legal and binding. These questions do not affect the main issue of the illegality of the strike in question. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. G.R. No. 91980 June 27, 1991 ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division), HON. CARMEN TALUSAN and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents. NARVASA, J.:p The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM) " said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, "working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages." In that "demand," the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA 6727 which reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx (d) . . . Where the application of the increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) having jurisdiction over the workplace. It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide any dispute arising under this Section within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is formally submitted to it for arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of the increase in the wage rates prescribed under this Section. But the Union claims that "demand was ignored: 1 The . . . COMPANY ignored said demand by offering a measly across-the-board wage increase of P7.00 per day, per employee, as against the proposal of the UNION of P25.00 per day, per employee. Later, the UNION reduced its proposal to P15.00 per day, per employee by way of amicable settlement. When the . . . COMPANY rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION the members thereof, on their own accord, refused to render overtime services, most especially at the Beer Bottling Plants at Polo, starting October 16, 1989. In this connection, the workers involved issues a joint notice reading as follows: 2 SAMA-SAMANG PAHAYAG: KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY PAWANG KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY NAGKAISANG NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION. The Union's position (set out in the petition subsequently filed in this Court, infra) was that the workers' refuse "to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16, 1989" as a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired employees. 3 That decision to observe the "eight hours work shift" was implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800 daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant's production line (of San Miguel Corporation [hereafter, simply SMC]) joined by others at statistical quality control and warehouse, all members of . . . IBM . . . " 4 There ensued thereby a change in the work schedule which had been observed by daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e., "ten (10) hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays . . ; (and on) Saturdays, . . eight (8) hours for both shifts" a work schedule which, SMC says, the workers had "welcomed, and encouraged" because the automatic overtime built into the schedule "gave them a steady source of extra-income," and pursuant to which it (SMC) "planned its production targets and budgets. 5 This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. Its claim is that there ensued "from 16 October 1989 to 30 November 1989 alone . . work disruption and lower efficiency . . (resulting in turn, in) lost production of 2,004,105 cases of beer . . ; that (i)n "money terms, SMC lost P174,657,598 in sales and P48,904,311 in revenues . . (and the) Government lost excise tax revenue of P42 million, computed at the rate of P21 per case collectible at the plant. 6 These losses occurred despite such measures taken by SMC as organizing "a third shift composed of regular employees and some contractuals," and appeals "to the Union members, through letters and memoranda and dialogues with their plant delegates and shop stewards," to adhere to the existing work schedule. Thereafter, on October 18, 1989, SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against the Union and its members "to declare the strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment of the union officers and shop stewards. The complaint was docketed as NLRCNCR Case No. 00-10-04917. 7

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Then on December 8, 1989, on the claim that its action in the Arbitration Branch had as yet "yielded no relief," SMC filed another complaint against the Union and members thereof, this time directly with the National labor Relations Commission, "to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for the issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order. 8 Before acting on the application for restraining order, the NLRC's First Division first directed SMC to present evidence in support of the application before a commissioner, Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan. On December 19, 1989, said First Division promulgated a Resolution on the basis of "the allegations of the petitioner (SMC) and the evidence adduced ex parte in support of their petition." The Resolution 1) authorized the issuance of "a Temporary Restraining Order for a period of twenty (20) days . . upon . . a cash or surety bond in the amount of P50,000.00 . . . DIRECTING the respondents to CEASE and DESIST from further committing the acts complained about particularly their not complying with the work schedule established and implemented by the company through the years or at the least since 1984, which schedule appears to have been adhered to by the respondents until October 16, 1989 . . .; 2) set the incident on injunction for hearing before Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan on 27 December 1989 . . . The Labor Arbiter accordingly scheduled the incident for hearing on various dates: December 27 and 29,1989, January 8, 11, 16, and 19, 1990. The first two settings were cancelled on account of the unavailability of the Union's counsel. The hearing on January 8, 1990 was postponed also at the instance of said counsel who declared that the Union refused to recognize the NLRC's jurisdiction. The hearings set on January 11, 16 and 19, 1990 were taken up with the cross-examination of SMC's witness on the basis of his affidavit and supplemental affidavits. The Union thereafter asked the Hearing Officer to schedule other hearings. SMC objected. The Hearing Officer announced she would submit a report to the Commission relative to the extension of the temporary restraining order of December 9, 1989, supra, prayed for by SMC. Here the matter rested until February 14, 1990, when the Union filed the petition which commenced the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar. 9 In its petition, the Union asserted that: 1) the "central issue . . is the application of the Eight-Hour Labor Law . . . ( i.e.) (m)ay an employer force an employee to work everyday beyond eight hours a day? 2) although the work schedule adopted by SMC with built-in automatic overtime, 10 "tremendously increased its production of beer at lesser cost," SMC had been paying its workers "wages far below the productivity per employee," and turning a deaf ear to the Union's demands for wage increases; 3) the NLRC had issued the temporary restraining order of December 19, 1989 "with indecent haste, based on ex parte evidence of SMC and such an order had the effect of "forcing the workers to work beyond eight (8) hours a day, everyday!! 4) the members of the NLRC had no authority to act as Commissioners because their appointments had not been confirmed by the Commission on Appointment; and 5) even assuming the contrary, the NLRC, as an essentially appellate body, had no jurisdiction to act on the plea for injunction in the first instance. The petition thus prayed: 1) for judgment (a) annulling the Resolution of December 19, 1990; (b) declaring mandatory the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of National Labor Relations Commissioners; and (c) ordering the removal "from the 201 files of employees any and all memoranda or disciplinary action issued/imposed to the latter by reason of their refusal to render overtime work;" and 2) pending such judgment restraining(a) the NLR Commissioners "from discharging their power and authority under R.A. 6715 prior to their re-appointment and/or confirmation;" as well as (b) Arbiter Talusan and the Commission from acting on the matter or rendering a decision or issuing a permanent injunction therein, or otherwise implementing said Resolution of December 19, 1989. In traverse of the petition, SMC filed a pleading entitled "Comment with Motion to Admit Comment as Counter-Petition," in which it contended that: 1) the workers' abandonment of the regular work schedule and their deliberate and wilful reduction of the Polo plant's production efficiency is a slowdown, which is an illegal and unprotected concerted activity; 2) against such a slowdown, the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in the first instance; 3) indeed, the NLRC has "the positive legal duty and statutory obligation to enjoin the slowdown complained of and to compel the parties to arbitrate . ., (and) to effectuate the important national policy of peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration;" accordingly, said NLRC "had no legal choice but to issue injunction to enforce the reciprocal no lockout-no slowdown and mandatory arbitration agreement of the parties;" and 4) the NLRC "gravely abused its discretion when it refused to decide the application for injunction within the twenty day period of its temporary restraining order, in violation of its own rules and the repeated decisions of this . . . Court. It is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, thereby causing financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity. It is, SMC argues, contrary to the law and to the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Union. The argument is correct and will be sustained. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, . . (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor. It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The provision 11 states that . . . the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through

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the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration. In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or Wage Order. xxx xxx xxx The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or abitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment 12 pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. 13 Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout." Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the latter's demurring to the accuracy of the quotation, 14 also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by arbitration. The provisions are as follows: Section 1. Any and all disputes, disagreements and controversies of any kind between the COMPANY and the UNION and/or the workers involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employeremployee relations arising during the effectivity of this Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the procedure set out in this Article. No dispute, disagreement or controversy which may be submitted to the grievance procedure in Article IX shall be presented for arbitration unless all the steps of the grievance procedure are exhausted (Article V Arbitration). Section 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the terms of this agreement (Article VI). The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of wage distortions, or for that matter; any other issue "involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations." The partial strike or concerted refusal by the Union members to follow the five-year-old work schedule which they had therefore been observing, resorted to as a means of coercing correction of "wage distortions," was therefore forbidden by law and contract and, on this account, illegal. Awareness by the Union of the proscribed character of its members' collective activities, is clearly connoted by its attempt to justify those activities as a means of protesting and obtaining redress against said members working overtime every day from Monday to Friday (on an average of 12 hours), and every Saturday (on 8 hour shifts), 15 rather than as a measure to bring about rectification of the wage distortions caused by RA 6727 which was the real cause of its differences with SMC. By concealing the real cause of their dispute with management (alleged failure of correction of wage distortion), and trying to make it appear that the controversy involved application of the eight-hour labor law, they obviously hoped to remove their case from the operation of the rules implementing RA 6727 that " Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout." The stratagem cannot succeed. In the first place, that it was indeed the wage distortion issue that principally motivated the Union's partial or limited strike is clear from the facts, The work schedule (with "built-in overtime") had not been forced upon the workers; it had been agreed upon between SMC and its workers at the Polo Plant and indeed, had been religiously followed with mutually beneficial results for the past five (5) years. Hence, it could not be considered a matter of such great prejudice to the workers as to give rise to a controversy between them and management. Furthermore, the workers never asked, nor were there ever any negotiations at their instance, for a change in that work schedule prior to the strike. What really bothered them, and was in fact the subject of talks between their representatives and management, was the "wage distortion" question, a fact made even more apparent by the joint notice circulated by them prior to the strike, i.e., that they would adopt the eight-hour work shift in the meantime pending correction by management of the wage distortion (IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION). In the second place, even if there were no such legal prohibition, and even assuming the controversy really did not involve the wage distortions caused by RA 6727, the concerted activity in question would still be illicit because contrary to the workers' explicit contractual commitment "that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of . . . (their collective bargaining) agreement. 16 What has just been said makes unnecessary resolution of SMC's argument that the workers' concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force for the last several years, is a slowdown, an inherently illegal activity essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract, or statute or rule. The Court is in substantial agreement with the petitioner's concept of a slowdown as a "strike on the installment plan;" as a wilfull reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their demands. 17 The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees "continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them," they at the same time "select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do other work;" in other words, they "work on their own terms. 18 But whether or not the workers' activity in question their concerted adoption of a different work schedule than that prescribed by management and adhered to for several years constitutes a slowdown need not, as already stated, be gone into. Suffice it to say that activity is contrary to the law, RA 6727, and the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Union's claim that the restraining order is void because issued by Commissioners whose appointments had not been duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments should be as it is hereby given short shift, for, as the Solicitor General points out, it is an admitted fact that the members of the respondent Commission were actually appointed by the President of the Philippines on November 18, 1989; there is no evidence whatever in support of the Union's bare allegation that the appointments of said members had not been confirmed; and the familiar presumption of regularity in appointment and in performance of official duty exists in their favor. 19 Also untenable is the Union's other argument that the respondent NLRC Division had no jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order or otherwise grant the preliminary injunction prayed for by SMC

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and that, even assuming the contrary, the restraining order had been improperly issued. The Court finds that the respondent Commission had acted entirely in accord with applicable provisions of the Labor Code. Article 254 of the Code provides that "No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 . . ." Article 264 lists down specific "prohibited activities" which may be forbidden or stopped by a restraining order or injunction. Article 218 inter alia enumerates the powers of the National Labor Relations Commission and lays down the conditions under which a restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue, and the procedure to be followed in issuing the same. Among the powers expressly conferred on the Commission by Article 218 is the power to "enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party . . ." As a rule such restraining orders or injunctions do not issue ex parte, but only after compliance with the following requisites, to wit: a) a hearing held "after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property;" b) reception at the hearing of "testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for crossexamination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath," as well as "testimony in opposition thereto, if offered . . .; c) a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect: (1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof; (2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow; (3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; (4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. However, a temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte under the following conditions: a) the complainant "shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable; b) there is "testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice;" c) the "complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission;" and d) the "temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. The reception of evidence "for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission." The record reveals that the Commission exercised the power directly and plainly granted to it by sub-paragraph (e) Article 217 in relation to Article 254 of the Code, and that it faithfully observed the procedure and complied with the conditions for the exercise of that power prescribed in said sub-paragraph (e) It acted on SMC's application for immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order ex parte on the ground that substantial and irreparable injury to its property would transpire before the matter could be heard on notice; it, however, first direct SMC Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan to receive SMC's testimonial evidence in support of the application and thereafter submit her recommendation thereon; it found SMC's evidence adequate and issued the temporary restraining order upon bond. No irregularity may thus be imputed to the respondent Commission in the issuance of that order. In any event, the temporary restraining order had a lifetime of only twenty (20) days and became void ipso facto at the expired ration of that period. In view of the foregoing factual and legal considerations, all irresistibly leading to the basic conclusion that the concerted acts of the members of petitioner Union in question are violative of the law and their formal agreement with the employer, the latter's submittal, in its counter-petition that there was, in the premises, a "legal duty and obligation" on the part of the respondent Commission "to enjoin the unlawful and prohibited acts and omissions of petitioner IBM and the workers complained of, 20 a proposition with which, it must be said, the Office of the Solicitor General concurs, asserting that the "failure of the respondent commission to resolve the application for a writ of injunction is an abuse of discretion especially in the light of the fact that the restraining order it earlier issued had already expired" 21 must perforce be conceded. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the counter-petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the respondent Commission (First Division) with instructions to immediately take such action thereon as is indicated by and is otherwise in accord with, the findings and conclusions herein set forth. Costs against petitioner. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3. Procedural Requirements a. Notice of Strike G.R. No. 168406 July 13, 2009 CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Petitioners -versus BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO and ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, Respondents. RESOLUTION

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CORONA, J.: Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non profit corporation duly formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty. Roberto F. de Leon as its president. Respondents Ronnie Sualog, Joel Calida, Johnny Arinto and Roberto de Guzman, on the other hand, were former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union). The union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired on May 31, 2000. Prior to the expiration of the CBA and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. Sometime in 2000, the union submitted its formal CBA proposal to the companys negotiating panel and repeatedly asked for the start of negotiations. No negotiations, however, took place for various reasons proffered by the company, among them the illness of the chairman of the management panel. In order to compel the company to negotiate, respondents, as officers of the union, filed a request for preventive mediation with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Their strategy, however, failed to bring the management to the negotiating table. The union and management only met on April 5, 2001, but the meeting concluded with a declaration by both parties of a deadlock in their negotiations. On April 6, 2001, the union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to bargain. On April 22, 2001, the company formally responded to the demands of the union when it submitted the first part of its economic counterproposal; the second part was submitted on May 11, 2001. Meanwhile, on May 4, 2001, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the Department of Labor and Employment. In response to the companys counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved proposal, but the company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on May 26, 2001 on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock. On May 31, 2001, the company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service. In a decision dated November 28, 2001, the labor arbiter declared the strike procedurally [infirm] and therefore illegal. The labor arbiter noted that the union failed to attach its written CBA proposal and the companys counter-proposal to the notice of strike and to provide proof of a request for a conference to settle the dispute. Thus, the notice to strike was deemed not to have been filed and the strike illegal. As a consequence, all the officers of the union were deemed terminated from service. However, these employees were entitled to separation pay equivalent to that granted to employees affected by the retrenchment program which the company had earlier launched. Respondents appealed but on September 30, 2002, the NLRC in a decision affirmed the labor arbiter. The NLRC did not see fit to pass upon the issues raised by respondents because, by the time they appealed on December 20, 2001, they had either resigned from the company or were no longer part of the union because of the election of new set of officers. Respondents motion for reconsideration was consequently denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari. On May 31, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, holding that the labor arbiter and the NLRC took a selective view of the attendant facts of the case and in negating thereby the effects of the notice of strike the union filed. What was more, the NLRCs reasoning was flawed because a worker ordered dismissed under a tribunals decision has every right to question his or her dismissal. The labor arbiters ruling was likewise wrong because it was based on a flimsy technicality that conveniently booted out the union officers from the company. Thus, the CA set aside the rulings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter as far as respondents Sualog, Calida, De Guzman and Arinto were concerned and ordered petitioners to pay them full backwages and benefits from the time of their dismissal up to the finality of its decision, plus separation pay computed at one month salary per year of service from the time they were hired up to the finality of its decision. On the other hand, the CA dismissed the petition as far as Laureano Fegalquin, Bautista and Precentacion were concerned. Petitioners then sought redress from this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari hoisting the issue of whether or not the strike staged by respondents on May 26, 2001 was legal. We rule in the affirmative. It is undisputed that the notice of strike was filed by the union without attaching the counter-proposal of the company. This, according to petitioners and the labor arbiter, made the ensuing strike of respondents illegal because the notice of strike of the union was defective. The contention is untenable. Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states: In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably. Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board. (emphasis supplied) In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed. The Implementing Rules use the words as far as practicable. In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to produce the companys counterproposal which it did not have. One cannot give what one does not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the impossible. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his declaration that respondents, as union officers, automatically severed their employment with the company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first place, there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of the strike

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should not be automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment. The law is clear: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. (emphasis supplied) Note that the verb participates is preceded by the adverb knowingly. This reflects the intent of the legislature to require knowledge as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike. The provision is worded in such a way as to make it very difficult for employers to circumvent the law by arbitrarily dismissing employees in the guise of exercising management prerogative. This is but one aspect of the States constitutional and statutory mandate to protect the rights of employees to self-organization. Nowhere in the ruling of the labor arbiter can we find any discussion of how respondents, as union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the strike was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 103560 July 6, 1995 GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC. (INPORT), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fifth Division) ADELO EBUNA, EMMANUEL VALMORIDA, RODOLFO PEREZ, ROGER ZAGADO, MARCOS GANZAN, AND REY VALLE, (WILFREDO DAHAN, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, WILFREDO AMPER, RICARDO ABA, YOLITO AMBUS, FIDEL CALIO, VICENTE CAHATOL, SOTECO CUENCA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO FAJARDO, ROLANDO JAMILA, RICARDO LAURETO, RUDY LAURETO, QUIRICO LEJANIO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE LAURETE, JESUSTUDY OMISOL, ZOSIMO OMISOL, PEDRO SUAREZ, SATURNINO SISIBAN and MANUEL YANEZ), respondents. G.R. No. 103599 July 6, 1995 ADELO EBUNA, WILFREDO DAHAN, RICARDO LAURETO, REY VALLE, VICENTE CAHATOL, MARCOS GANZAN, RODOLFO PEREZ, ROEL SAA, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, MANUEL YANEZ, WILFREDO AMPER, QUIRECO LEJANO, EMMANUEL VALMORIA, ROLANDO JAMILLA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO FAJARDO, PEDRO SUAREZ, ELPIDIO ESTROGA, RUBEN PAJO, JESUSTODY OMISOL, RICARDO ABA, FIDEL CALIO, SATURNINO SESYBAN, RUDY LAURETO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE LAURENTE, ROGER ZAGADO, SOTECO CUENCA, FIDEL ESLIT, ZOSIMO OMISOL, ANGEL BERNIDO, and MICHAEL YAGOTYOT, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, and GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC. (INPORT), respondents. ROMERO, J.: Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike? This is the core issue to be decided in these two petitions. Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) filed a petition for certiorari against the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) assailing the latter's decision in "Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Adelo Ebuna, et al." (NLRC RAB X Case No. 5-0405-85) with twenty-seven private respondents (G.R. No. 103599). 1 This petition has been consolidated with G.R. No. 103599 where the petitioners are the private respondents in instant case and the private respondent is INPORT. For the sake of clarity, INPORT shall be denominated in the case at bench as the petitioner and the employees as private respondents. Instant case arose from the following facts: Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port. On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga") with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. On May 7, 1985, the National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest. 2 Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before the remaining strikers could be accepted back to work. Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of the union officers and members and without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew their notice of strike and returned to work. The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any objection, the Labor Arbiter, in his decision dated July 23, 1985, granted their prayer to be excluded as respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover, petitioner's complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who did not return to work and continued with the strike. For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike staged by petitioner's workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW). As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been "duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5 The dispositive portion of the decision reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered that the strike undertaken by the officers and majority union members of Macajalar Labor Union-FFW is ILLEGAL contrary to Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended. Our conclusion on the employment status of the illegal strikers is subject to our discussion above. 6 Both petitioner and private respondents filed motions for reconsideration, which public respondent NLRC treated as appeals. 7 On January 14, 1991, the NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter's decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with modification in accordance with the foregoing resolution. Complainant INPORT is hereby ordered, in lieu of reinstatement, to pay respondents the equivalent of twelve (12) months salaries each as separation pay. Complainant is further ordered to pay respondents two (2) years backwages based on their last salaries, without qualification or deduction. The appeal of complainant INPORT is Dismissed for lack of merit. 9

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Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution on December 12, 1991. 10 The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months' salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of "equitable relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given. The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 14, 1991 is Modified reducing the award for separation pay to six (6) months each in favor of respondents, inclusive of lawful benefits as well as those granted under the CBA, if any, based on the latest salary of respondents, as and by way of financial assistance while the award for backwages is Deleted and Set Aside. In lieu thereof, respondents are granted compensation for their sudden loss of employment in the sum of P1,000.00 each. The motion of respondents to implead PPA as third-party respondent is Noted. Except for this modification the rest of the decision sought to be reconsidered shall stand. 11 In the instant petitions for certiorari, petitioner alleges that public respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding private respondents separation pay and backwages despite the declaration that the strike was illegal. On the other hand, private respondents, in their petition, assail the reduction of separation pay and deletion of backwages by the NLRC as constituting grave abuse of discretion. They also allege that the Resolution of January 14, 1991 could not be reconsidered after the unreasonable length of time of eleven months. Before proceeding with the principal issues raised by the parties, it is necessary to clarify public respondent's statements concerning the strike staged by INPORT's employees. In its resolution dated January 14, 1991, the NLRC held that the facts prevailing in the case at bench require a relaxation of the rule that the formal requisites for a declaration of a strike are mandatory. Furthermore, what the employees engaged in was more of a spontaneous protest action than a strike. 12 Nevertheless, the Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision which declared the strike illegal. A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. 15 Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute. The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16 The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT. Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements. As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, 17 the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory. 18 Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia: (i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . . without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. (Emphasis ours) In explaining the above provision, we said: In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement' during the cooling-off period. . . . xxx xxx xxx The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 19 From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of the law. The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike. In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the "screening" required by the company. 21 The question to be resolved now is what these remaining strikers, considering the circumstances of the case, are entitled to receive under the law, if any. Are they entitled, as they claim, to reinstatement or separation pay and backwages? In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ordered INPORT to reinstate/accept the remaining workers as well as to accept the remaining union officers after the latter sought reconsideration from INPORT. 22 The NLRC on January 14, 1991, modified the above decision by ordering INPORT to pay private respondents the equivalent of twelve months in salary as separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and two years' backwages. 23 On reconsideration, public respondent modified its original award and reduced the separation pay to six months, deleted the award for backwages and instead awarded P1,000.00 as compensation for their sudden loss of employment. 24 Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages when he is unjustly dismissed. 25 Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. Reinstatement and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee. 26 Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not possible, due, for instance, to strained relations between employer and employee. It is also given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law. 27 Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. 28 It is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job.
29

Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled to separation pay. 30 Wellsettled is it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed

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for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. 31 Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal. 32 It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions and jurisprudence that there must generally be unjust or illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement and backwages may be granted. And in cases where reinstatement is not possible or when dismissal is due to valid causes, separation pay may be granted. Private respondents contend that they were terminated for failure to submit to the controversial "screening" requirement. Public respondent Commission took the opposite view and held: As the evidence on record will show, respondents were not actually terminated from the service. They were merely made to submit to a screening committee as a prerequisite for readmission to work. While this condition was found not wholly justified, the fact remains that respondents who are resistant to such procedure are partly responsible for the delay in their readmission back to work. Thus, We find justifiable basis in further modifying our resolution of January 14, 1991 in accordance with the equities of the case. We shall therefore recall the award for backwages for lack of factual and legal basis. The award for separation pay shall likewise (be) reasonably reduced. Normally, severance benefit is granted as an alternative remedy to reinstatement. And since there is no dismissal to speak of, there is no basis for awarding reinstatement as a legal remedy. In lieu thereof, We shall grant herein respondents separation pay as and by way of financial assistance in the nature of an "equitable relief". 33 We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed when INPORT refused to accept them back to work after the former refused to submit to the "screening" process. Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which makes a distinction, we differentiate between the union members and the union officers among private respondents in granting the reliefs prayed for. Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal. However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate. No backwages will be awarded to private respondentunion members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award. The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment. 34 Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35 Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law. The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief. However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and academic and cannot be effected in view of a manifestation filed by INPORT dated May 15, 1987. 36 In said Manifestation, it attached a Certification by the President of the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) to the effect that the private respondents/remaining strikers have ceased to be members of said union. The MLU-FFW had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT containing a union security clause. Article 1, Section 2(b) of the CBA provides: The corporation shall discharge, dismiss or terminate any employee who may be a member of the Union but loses his good standing with the Union and or corporation, upon proper notice of such fact made by the latter; provided, however, . . . after they shall have received the regular appointment as a condition for his continued employment with the corporation. . . .
37

1987 when they were dismissed from the union, we award them separation pay. We find that to award one month salary for every year of service until 1985, after April of which year they no longer formed part of INPORT's productive work force partly through their own fault, is a fair settlement. Finally, there is no merit in INPORT's statement that a Resolution of the NLRC cannot be modified upon reconsideration after the lapse of an unreasonable period of time. Under the present circumstances, a period of eleven months is not an unreasonable length of time. The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 14, 1991 did not acquire finality in view of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Commission's modified Resolution issued on December 12, 1991 is valid and in accordance with law. In sum, reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible. The NLRC's award of separation pay as "equitable relief" and P1,000.00 as compensation should be deleted, these being incompatible with our findings detailed above. WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 ("Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.") is GRANTED. One month salary for each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers as separation pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599 ("Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.") is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

b. Cooling-off period G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p In issue in this case is the authority of the Secretary of Labor to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them.

Since private respondents (union members) are no longer members of the MLU, they cannot be reinstated. In lieu of reinstatement, which was a proper remedy before May

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The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for various categories of employees in Section 1, Article V entitled "PAY SCALE." Besides the pay increases, the CBA also provided for the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel (f) . . . to undertake the study, review, correction, updating, complete overhaul, re-classification or re-grouping of positions as may be required of the payscale and position classification to evolve updated payscales as soon as possible. (p. 76, Rollo.) and that (iii) . . . the Payscale Panel shall exert all reasonable efforts to complete its studies so as to evolve new updated payscale and position classification by January 01, 1988, (p. 76, Rollo.) As agreed by the parties, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work. By July, 1988, the Job Evaluation Committee of the panel had finished the reconciliation and initial evaluation of positions in all departments within PAL. In November, 1988, the PALEA members of the panel proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum salary entry level for the lowest job classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel members proposed PHP 2,310 and a PHP 200 across-the-board increase for employees who could not avail of the payscale adjustments. The panel conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not accept less than the amount it proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no authority to offer more. PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith. On December 29, 1988, PALEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith. On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run. During the conciliation meeting, the following evolved as the real issues: 1. determination of the minimum entry rate 2. wage adjustment due to payscale study 3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus. (p. 38, Rollo.) On January 6, 1989, Attorney Jesus C. Sebastian, NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB order treating the strike notice as preventive mediation case No. PM-01-007-89. PAL's counsel sought clarification from NCMB'S Sebastian. He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives could not certify the strike vote. On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. The reasons for PAL's petition were, as stated by the Secretary himself: The Philippine Airlines, Inc. is a corporation where the government has substantial equity holding. It is engaged in an industry imbued with national interest. It is the flag carrier of the Republic of the Philippines. Being the sole airline that services domestic routes, a prolonged work stoppage will push back the national economic recovery program of the government and consequently result to enormous damage to the economy of the country. Hundreds of thousands of people directly and indirectly dependent on the continued operations of the firm including the huge work force of the company will likewise be prejudiced. The viability of the firm will also be endangered. These considerations have in the past guided this Office in consistently exercising its powers under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, in handling labor disputes in the Company. The current situation is no exception to this rule. This Office is of the view that the present work stoppage at Philippine Airlines, Inc. will adversely affect the national interest. Thus, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the instant dispute. (pp. 38-39, Rollo.) Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction. Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. On January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, January 21, 1989, and resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the following monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from taking retaliatory action against them: . . . to resolve the impasse between the herein parties, this Office finds the following award just and reasonable: 1. As far as the issue of minimum entry level is concerned, the company is directed to adjust the same to P2,500.00 from its present level effective January 1, 1989. 2. The company is ordered to grant the amount of P3.3 million per month to cover across-theboard increases of covered regular employees subject to the distribution of the union as embodied in their proposed scheme but in no instance should the lowest adjustment be less than P300.00. In line with this, the scheme proposed by the union and submitted to NCMB on January 20,1989 is herein adopted. It is understood, however, that in items 1 and 2 above, the amount which is higher should be granted. 3. A goodwill bonus in the amount of P3,000.00 to be paid in four equal pay period installments beginning February 15 and up to March 31, 1989 is hereby awarded. (p. 39, Rollo.) Declaring the strike valid, the Secretary stated: Except for the fact that the Union's notice of strike was treated as a preventive mediation case (at the instance of NCMB), it should be noted that the Union complied with all the requirements for a valid strike . It observed the cooling-off periods required and submitted the necessary strike vote. If ever there is any ground to discipline the Union officers for noncompliance with the law, it would be based on the "non-filing" of the strike notice, which "nonfiling" was a consequence of the NCMB'S efforts to create the appropriate atmosphere to resolve the dispute by treating the notice of strike as a preventive mediation case. Otherwise put, the strike would have been legal in all respects had not the NCMB, in its good faith effort to settle the dispute, treated the notice of strike as a case for preventive mediation. Under these circumstances, and in the interest of industrial peace and the promotion of the concept of preventive mediation, the parties are directed to desist from committing any retaliatory act as a result of the work stoppage . The UNION, however, is hereby warned that in the future this office will not tolerate such conduct and will apply the full force of the law. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.) The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Secretary denied it in a minute resolution on May 8, 1989 or three months later. In this petition for review, PAL avers that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction: 1. in ruling on the legality of the strike;

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2. in directing PAL to desist from taking retaliatory action against the officers and members of the Union responsible for the illegal strike; and 3. in failing to seasonably exercise his authority to avert the illegal strike and protect the rights and interests of PAL whose business is affected with public interest. Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in the meantine (Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677, 685 [1987]). Indeed, as found by the Labor Secretary in his Order of January 21, 1989, the only issues involved in the dispute were: 1. determination of the minimum entry rate 2. wage adjustment due to payscale study 3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus. The legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution. The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of Labor. Art. 217, par. a, subpar. 5 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural. xxx xxx xxx 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied.) In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. There is merit in PAL's contention that the Labor Secretary erred in declaring the strike valid and in prohibiting PAL from taking retaliatory or disciplinary action against the strikers for the damages suffered by the Airline as a result of the illegal work stoppage. PALEA's strike on January 20, 1989 was illegal for three (3) reasons: 1. It was premature for there was an existing CBA which still had nine (9) months to run, i.e., up to September 30, 1989. The law expressly provides that neither party to a collective bargaining agreement shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. While either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date (known as the "freedom period") it shall nevertheless be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by them (Art. 253, Labor Code). 2. It violated the no-strike provision of the CBA, to wit: The Association agrees that there shall be no strikes, walk outs, stoppage, or slowdown of work, or any other form of interference with any of the operations of the Company during the period between the signing of the Agreement up to September 30, 1989. (Emphasis supplied, p-118, Rollo.) 3. The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive mediation." The effect of that declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to drop the case from the docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared. The Secretary must have thought so too, that is why he failed to act, for a period of seven (7) days, on PAL's petition for him to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The strike which the union mounted, while preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by the petitioner as "an ambush" (p. 2, Rollo). Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action against the union officers who participated in it, and against any union members who committed illegal acts during the strike, Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 264. Prohibited activities.. . . xxx xxx xxx Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied.) The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action. The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL's damages because of his failure to act promptly and use his authority to avert the illegal strike under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Nevertheless, the Secretary's delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible action of the union in declaring the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is primary and exclusive. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated January 21, 1989 and May 8, 1989 of the Secretary of Labor in NCMB NCR Case No. PM-01-007-89 are set aside and nullified insofar as the said orders declare valid the PALEA strike of January 20-21, 1989 and restrain the petitioner from taking appropriate legal action against PALEA's officers who led the illegal strike, and any union members who may have committed illegal acts during said strike. The monetary benefits awarded to the union in the said orders are, however, affirmed. Costs against respondent PALEA. SO ORDERED. c. Strike Vote d. 24-hour Notice [G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005] CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO, ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS STA. BARBARA, JR., respondents.

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DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57500 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The Antecedents[2] Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (the Union, for brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. had been the bone of contention between the Union and the petitioner. The petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike on April 15, 1993. The Union had to contend with another union the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE) which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution on November 18, 1994 granting the appeal. He, likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMCACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to the Court which rendered judgment on February 4, 1997 affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus: 1. Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and 2. Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.[3] The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr. Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the Court.[4] However, in a Letter to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the following grounds: 3) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents as required by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union. 4) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the National Labor Relations Commission.[5] Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations in a Letter dated October 16, 1997 and suggested the date, time and place of the initial meeting. The Union further reiterated its plea in another Letter[6] dated October 28, 1997, to no avail. Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.[7] A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. On November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;[8] the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted. On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes[9] of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.[10] On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on December 1, 1997, the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Union likewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions, not limited to contempt and other penalties, against the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith, to bargain collectively with the Union, to adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guilty of unfair labor practices, and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises.[11] On December 4, 1997, the SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor dispute. The decretal portion of the order reads: WHEREFORE, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreements in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court. SO ORDERED.[12] In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work. For its part, the petitioner filed a petition[13] to declare the strike illegal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97. In its position paper, the petitioner appended the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the property across the hospital which was being used as a parking lot, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Also included were the affidavits of Simon J. Tingzon and Reggie B. Barawid, the petitioners security guards assigned in front of the hospital premises. They attested to the fact that no secret balloting took place at the said parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. of November 10, 1997.[14] The petitioner also appended the affidavit of Henry V. Vera Cruz, who alleged that he was a member of the Union and had discovered that signatures on the Statements of Cash Receipt Over Disbursement submitted by the Union to the DOLE purporting to be his were not his genuine signatures;[15] the affidavits of 17 of its employees, who declared that no formal voting was held by the members of the Union on the said date, were also submitted. The latter employees also declared that they were not members of any union, and yet were asked to sign documents purporting to be a strike vote attendance and unnumbered strike vote ballots on different dates from November 8 to 11, 1997. In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those members who alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997. [16] In the meantime, on September 30, 1998, the Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the cancellation of the respondent Unions certificate of registration. The decision was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on December 29, 1998. In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision on December 23, 1998 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-1208644-97 in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal. The fallo of the decision reads: 1. Declaring as illegal the strike staged by the respondents from November 28, 1997 to December 5, 1997; 2. Declaring respondent Jaime Ibabao, in his capacity as union president, the other union officers, and respondents Ronald Q. Centeno, Michael Eustaquio and Henry Vera Cruz to have lost their employment status with petitioner; and 3. Ordering the above respondents to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) by way of damages.[17] The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike

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vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike. The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered a Decision[18] on June 14, 1999, granting their appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioners petition to declare the strike illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled as follows: We find untenable the Labor Arbiters finding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10, 1997, claiming that this is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that no strike voting took place in the parking lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all because the same was conducted in the parking lot immediately/directly fronting, not across, the hospital building (Annexes 1-J, 1-K to 1-K-6). Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike voting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro forma (Annexes H-2 to H-19).[19] The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that the NCMB decided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which the NCMB agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the strike vote was conducted.[20] The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the said motion on September 30, 1999.[21] The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC on the following allegation: PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, AND CONTRAVENED THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN REVERSING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 23, 1998 (ANNEX E) AND IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE STAGED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM NOVEMBER 28, 1997 TO DECEMBER 5, 1997.[22] On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC. The petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the following ground: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE NLRCS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT STRIKE.[23] The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is merely directory and not mandatory. The use of the word shall in the rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Unions duty to submit the said notice of strike vote. The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared that the respondents complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike. The petitioner insists that, as gleaned from the affidavits of the 17 union members and that of the overseer, and contrary to the joint affidavit of the officers and some union members, no meeting was held and no secret balloting was conducted on November 10, 1997. The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held on the said date by the respondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular inspection of the area where the respondents members allegedly held the voting. The petitioner also points out that it adduced documentary evidence in the form of affidavits executed by 17 members of the respondent union which remained unrebutted. The petitioner also posits that the CA and the NLRC erred in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter; furthermore, there was no need for the respondent union to stage a strike on November 28, 1997 because it had filed an urgent motion with the DOLE for the enforcement and execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118915. The petition is meritorious. We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule. Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law.[24] Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC,[25] the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB: 1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union; 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed. 4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB . The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned. 5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. [26] A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late.[27] The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator,[28] while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.[29] The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto;

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and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of the unions decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union illegal. In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal. Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines[30] and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,[31] no labor organization shall declare a strike unless supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.[32] The union is thus mandated to allege and prove compliance with the requirements of the law. In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were uniform and pro forma. We agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted by the respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. This can be gleaned from the affidavit of Barbacena and the joint affidavit of Tingzon and Barawid, respectively: 1. That I am working as an overseer of a parking lot owned by Mrs. Madelaine Dionisio and located right in front of the Capitol Medical Center, specifically at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City; 2. That on November 10, 1997, during my entire tour of duty from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., no voting or election was conducted in the aforementioned parking space for employees of the Capitol Medical Center and/or their guests, or by any other group for that matter.[33] 1. That I, Simon J. Tingzon, am a security officer of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency (hereinafter referred to as VPSSA), assigned, since July 1997 up to the present, as Security Detachment Commander at Capitol Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as CMC) located at Scout Magbanua corner Panay Avenue, Quezon City; 2. That my (Tingzon) functions as such include over-all in charge of security of all buildings and properties of CMC, and roving in the entire premises including the parking lots of all the buildings of CMC; 3. That I, Reggie B. Barawid, am a security guard of VPSSA, assigned, since June 1997 up to the present, as security guard at CMC; 4. That my (Barawid) functions as such include access control of all persons coming in and out of CMCs buildings and properties. I also sometimes guard the parking areas of CMC; 5. That on November 10, 1997, both of us were on duty at CMC from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with me (Barawid) assigned at the main door of the CMCs Main Building along Scout Magbanua St.; 6. That on said date, during our entire tour of duty, there was no voting or election conducted in any of the four parking spaces for CMC personnel and guests.[34] The allegations in the foregoing affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The respondents failed to prove the existence of a parking lot in front of the hospital other than the parking lot across from it. Indeed, 17 of those who purportedly voted in a secret voting executed their separate affidavits that no secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997, and that even if they were not members of the respondent Union, were asked to vote and to sign attendance papers. The respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence that the said affiants were coerced into executing the said affidavits. The bare fact that some portions of the said affidavits are similarly worded does not constitute substantial evidence that the petitioner forced, intimidated or coerced the affiants to execute the same. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and NLRC are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED. e.) Strike Vote Report G.R. No. 119467 February 1, 2000 SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA MOLDEX PRODUCTS, INC., ALEGRIA AQUINO AND 62 OTHERS AS APPEARING IN ANNEX "A", petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER EDGARDO MADRIAGA, MOLDEX PRODUCTS, INC. AND MR. JACINTO UY, respondents. PURISIMA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Resolution,1 dated November 29, 1994, and Resolution, dated January 30, 1995, of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 6622-94. The facts that matter are as follows: In the earlier part of 1993, petitioners and private respondents negotiated for the renewal of their Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). Due to some economic differences, the negotiations ended in a deadlock. On April 2, 1993, petitioners filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ("NCMB"). The series of conferences proved unavailing. On April 24, 1993, petitioner Union conducted a strike vote among its members, and the results of the voting were thereafter conveyed to the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization ("ANGLO") for submission to the NCMB, but for some unknown reason, the same was not made. On May 5, 1993, petitioners went on strike without the report of the strike vote submitted to the NCMB. On June 17, 1993, private respondents filed a "Petition to Declare Strike Illegal and Authorize Dismissal of the Officers and Other Employees for Illegal Acts"2 with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"). The petition alleged that the petitioners barricaded the three gates of private respondent (Moldex) and committed acts of violence, threats and coercion. Docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-04019-93, the petition was raffled to Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga ("LA Madriaga"). A Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") was later issued. After efforts to reach an amicable settlement failed, trial on the merits was conducted, with the private respondents presenting their own witnesses and evidence. Petitioners did not present any witness but instead, relied on their Memorandum, contending that the private respondents' pieces of evidence are inadmissible, for being hearsay, and that the pictures presented were neither identified nor authenticated by the photographer or an eyewitness.1wphi1.nt On March 7, 1994, Labor Arbiter Madriaga came out with a Decision,3 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the strike staged by respondents is hereby declared illegal for the aforementioned reasons, as a result of which the union officers, to wit: Peter Nudalo David Pastor Alejandro Cabatingan Cipriano Selerio President Vice-President Secretary Auditor

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Wilfredo Uy Jose Matining Clemente Ramos Rico Subion Maximino Villaverde Generoso Calalo Peter Lito Semillano Stephen Landong Henry Calero Nestor Obado Igmedio Espesor Eduardo Pastoril Ronaldo Nerbiol Nestor Samantilla Arceslo Barcelona Celso Rodriguez Treasurer P.R.O. Chairman of the Board Member of the Board Member of the Board Member of the Board Member of the Board Member of the Board Shop Steward Shop Steward Shop Steward Shop Steward Shop Steward Shop Steward Shop Steward Shop Steward petitioner, no evidence is there to support its claim that the individual respondents were sent notices. Considering the impact of a declaration of illegality of strike, the forfeiture of employment, extra caution must be taken by the Labor Arbiter in this regard. As it appears that respondents are insistent in their posture that a strike vote had been conducted and and [sic] the same is in the custody of the federation, We are inclined to the view that, in keeping with the principles of fair play and equity, respondents be extended a final opportunity to produce the strike vote and the results thereof in evidence before the Labor Arbiter of origin. This, to Us, is the equitable measure to take under the circumstances. Pending resolution, complainant-appellee filed a Motion to Delete Names. Let the same incident be remand [ sic] for appropriate action. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby vacated and set aside, and the case remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. Petitioners presented a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution on the grounds that a full-blown trial was already conducted and that a remand will only delay the case, but the NLRC denied the same. Forthwith, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition, anchored on the grounds that: THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RESOLVING TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE ARBITER OF ORIGIN AS THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RESOLVING TO REMAND THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF FACTUAL MATTERS. The Solicitor General, for his part, raised the additional issue of: WHETHER OR NOT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY PETITIONERS WAS ILLEGAL. After a studied review of the attendant facts and study of the applicable law in the case, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to the labor arbiter of origin for further reception of evidence. Reception of evidence would be a futile exercise considering that the facts are already clear and complete, and would not alter the outcome of the case. It has been shown that the results of the strike-vote were never forwarded to the NCMB, as admitted by petitioners themselves and as attested to by a Certification of Non-Submission of Strike Vote issued by the NCMB.5 There is thus no need for additional evidence on the matter, as it would not change the fact that the results of the strike-vote were not submitted to the NCMB. Without the submission of the results of the strike-vote, the strike was illegal, pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code, which reads: Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. xxx xxx xxx Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in a illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. Neither is there any need to remand the case to determine whether petitioners were sent notices or copies of the petition and whether the service of a copy of private respondent's (Moldex) formal offer of evidence with the federation, ANGLO, instead of petitioners' counsel, was valid. In their Memorandum (paragraph 31), petitioners deny ever making such a claim. And if ever they made such claim, they are now waiving such irregularity, dispensing with the need of resolving the same. It is therefore established that the result of the strike-vote was not submitted to the NCMB making the strike staged by petitioners illegal, in accordance with Article 264 of the Labor Code. The requirements of procedural due process had been complied with. Petitioners and private respondents were allowed to present their witnesses and evidence. Private respondents presented their witnesses, while petitioners did not, opting instead to file a Memorandum, challenging the admissibility of private respondents' pieces of evidence. So long as a party is given an opportunity to be heard and to submit his evidence, the requirements of procedural due process are complied with.6 Anent the Solicitor General's stance that the strike conducted by petitioners was illegal, the records of the case and the proceedings before Labor Arbiter Madriaga confirm the same. Aside from not submitting the result of the strike-vote to the NCMB, petitioners also committed acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation during the strike. As found by Labor Arbiter Madriaga: But even going into the merits of the case, petitioner has established by substantial evidence on record that respondents totally blocked free ingress to and egress from petitioner's premises and committed illegal acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation in the course of their strike.

and individual respondents who committed prohibited acts in the course of the strike, to wit: A. Mararac, W. Guzman, R. Corpuz, N. Flores, E. Rambaoa, O. Martinez, J. Casim, S. Bergonia, L. Aquino, M. Munoz, M. Legaspi, A. Ebrado, E. Caballero, J. Aguilar, B. Blace, P. Candado, C. Burato, V. dela Pena, L. Gaurino, J. Pacaldo, L. Daleon, G. Francisco, E. Blace, M. Jacobo, L. Dumaguin, J. Lumaban, F. Mendoza, R. Canones, R. Dumlao, J. Siccuan, L. Dumlao, L. Mararac, A. Labitan, D. Laguit, C. Villaviza, E. Viray, W. Dimailig, R. Ang, B. Llanos, F. Basilan, M. Tugadi, L. Villanueva and J. Mansion are hereby declared to have validly forfeited their employment status. The rest of the striking workers, including those who were identified in petitioner's affidavits and/or photographs, but were not formally impleaded as party respondents are hereby ordered reinstated without backwages. Respondents are hereby ordered to remove all obstructions barring free ingress to and egress from company premises. SO ORDERED. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, in its Resolution 4 promulgated on November 22, 1994, held: We remand. From our perusal of the records, it has dawned on Us that both parties were not able, for reasons and/or causes known only to them, to submit crucial evidence in support of their respective contentions. On the part of the

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The affidavits of the witnesses of respondents which they offered during trial are as follows: Edwin Bayan averred in his Affidavit that on June 11, 1993 he saw A. Mararac holding a Molotov; that W. Guzman, R. Corpuz, N. Flores, D. Rombaoa, O. Martinez and J. Casim threw stones at company vehicles containing employees who wanted to report for work; and that on June 11 and June 14, 1993 the following employees formed a human barricade which prevented employees who wished to work from entering the premises, to wit: S. Bergonia, L. Aquino, M. Munoz, R. Corpuz, one Mararac, N. Flores, M. Legaspi, J. Matining, A. Ebrado, E. Caballero, R. Subion, J. Aguilar, I. Espesor, B. Blace, P. Candado, C. Burato, V. dela Pea, P. Nudalo, L. Gaurino, L. Dumlao, J. Pacaldo, L. Daleon, one Francisco, D. Pastor, E. Blace, O. Martinez, M. Jacobo, L. Dumaguin, J. Lumaban, F. Mendoza, R. Canones, H. Calero, M. Villaverde, R. Dumlao, J. Siccuan, E. Rombaoa, L. Mararac, S. Landong, W. Guzman, A. Mararac; S. Bergonia, C. Rodriguez, A. Labitan, J. Casim, N. Obado, D. Laguit and C. Villaviza. Mr. Libio B. Cruz, Jr. in his sworn affidavit alleged that on June 15, 1993, Emmanuel Viray, Cristito Burato, Pascual Capangpangan and Maximino Villaverde threw stones at the Injection and Films & Sheets Building breaking the window panes and resulting in the filing of criminal cases before the Prosecutor's Office at Valenzuela; and that Engineering Supervisor Fidel Santiago was threatened by Peter Nudalo, Francisco Basilan, David Pastor and Leonardo Gaurino resulting in the filing of a criminal complaint for Grave Threats before the Prosecutor's Office at Valenzuela. Guillermo Tadeo Banag averred in his affidavit that he was coerced by Union President Pedro Nudalo to stop working and that Jaime Mansion switched off the circuit breaker to render company machines inoperable. Oliver Salamera and Juancho Sacro alleged in their Joint Affidavit on May 5, 1993 that Union Officers Nudalo, Landong, Ramos, Semillano, Subion and Cabatingan coerced them to stop working, barricaded the gates and prohibited them from returning to work. Nicolas Bauto and Joselito Custodio in their Joint Affidavit alleged that they were threatened with bodily harm by union officers and members forcing them to leave the plant for fear of bodily harm. The sworn allegations of the foregoing affidavits who all took the witness stands were corroborated by the photographs submitted by petitioner in evidence and which were not rebutted by respondents, to wit: Exhibit "1" is a blow-up photograph showing wooden planks and tent obstructing the company gate and Maysan Road leading to the company premises. Exhibits "2" and "3" show that hollow blocks were stacked and tents built across the gate. Exhibits "4" to "9" show security guards dismantling obstructions built by respondents across the company gates, pursuant to the TRO issued by the Commission in the Injunction case filed by petitioner. Exhibits "10" to "16" show a human blockade barring a bus carrying other employees who wanted to report for work from entering company premises. In picture No. 21 of Exhibit "11" and pictures 26 to 29 of Exhibits "12" to "15", those strikers who prevented the bus from carrying workers who wanted to report for work were identified in the Formal Offer of Evidence as Jerry Lumaban, Celso Rodriguez, Bernard Llanos, Cristito Burato, Jerry Aguilar, Rico Subion, Rufino Ang, Pete Lito Semillano, Sonny Bergonia, Jaime Mansion, Edwin Almonte, Margarito Legaspi, Reynaldo Corpuz, Wilfredo Dimailig, David Pastor, Clemente Ramos, Leonardo Gaurino, Leonardo Villanueva, Edmund Arcena, Stephen Landong, Willy Guzman, Maximino Villaverde, Generoso Calalo, Igmedio Espesor, Diomar Serafica, John Nero Pacaldo, Joselito Munoz, Cristopher Lias and Antonio Awalay. Exhibit "17" shows two strikers about to throw stones, identified in the Formal Offer of Evidence as Stephen Landong and Jimmy Casim. Exhibit "18" shows a flat tire of the bus caused by strikers, and Exhibits "19", "20" and "21" show the broken windows of the bus which was barred by strikers from entering company premises. Exhibits "22" to "30" showed that the strikers used a human blockade, wooden posts and threw big stones and rocks to bar a bus from entering the company premises. Picture No. 14 of Exhibit "22", picture No. 5 of Exhibit "23" reveal that the strikers who prevented a bus carrying employees who wanted to report for work on June 14, 1993 are Stephen Landong, Emerson Rombada, George Francisco, Nicasio Flores, Julieto Albania, Arnel John Santos, Willy Guzman, Elvira Caballero, Alfredo Viernes, Elecito Blanco, Vicleo dela Pea, Cesario Villaviza, Leonardo Villanueva, Loreto Mararac, Celestino del Rosario, Alegria Aquino and Leonardo de Leon. Exhibits "31" to "34" show that the strikers used big stones, rocks, wooden materials and GI sheets along Maysan Road leading to the company gates which made the road impassable. All the foregoing evidence undoubtedly prove that indeed respondents blocked free ingress to and egress from the company premises by way of physical obstructions, human blockades, acts of violence, coercion, threats and intimidation.7 It bears stressing that factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.8 After going over the records on hand, the Court discerns no ground for disturbing the above-quoted findings of Labor Arbiter Madriaga as the same are basically supported by substantial evidence and his conclusion accords with law. With respect to petitioners' allegation that the testimonies of the private respondents' witnesses were hearsay and that the pictures presented during trial were not authenticated or identified, the same is without merit. Technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.9 The application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice.10 In fine, the Court holds that there is no need to remand this case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings, as the facts are clear and complete on the basis of which a decision can be made. Furthermore, the decision of Labor Arbiter Madriaga is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions, dated November 29, 1994 and January 30, 1995, respectively, of the Second Division of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 662294 are SET ASIDE; and the strike staged by petitioners declared ILLEGAL, with the FORFEITURE of the employment status of the petitioners, Peter Nudalo, David Pastor, Alejandro Cabatingan, Cipriano Seleria, Wilfredo Uy, Jose Matinig, Clemente Ramos, Rico Subion, Maximino Villaverde, Generoso Calalo, Peter Lito Samillano, Stephen Landong, Henry Calero, Nestort Obado, Igmedio Espesor, Eduardo Pastoril, Ronaldo Nerbiol, Nestor Samantilla, Arceslo Barcelona, Celso Rodriguez, A. Mararao W. Guzman, R. Corpus, L. Aquino, M. Munoz, M. Legaspi, A. Ebrao, E. Caballero, J. Aguilar, B. Blace, P. Candado, C. Burato, V. dela Pena, L. Gaurino, J., Pacaldo, L. Daleon, G. Francisco, E. Blace, M. Jacob, L. Dumaguin, J. Lumaban, F. Mendoza, R. Cannes, R. Dumlao, J. Siccuan, L. Dumlao, L. Mararac, A. Latitan, D. Laguit, C. Villaviza, E. Viray, W. Dimailig, R. Ang, B. Llanos, F. Basilan, M. Tugadi and L. Villanueva UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt G.R. No. L-59743 May 31 1982 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner, vs. ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents. PLANA, J: This is a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the decision dated February 20, 1982 of Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) with station at the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A, Bacolod City, which, among others, declared illegal the ongoing strike of the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) at the Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC), and to restrain the implementation thereof. I. FACTS 1. NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file employees (about 1200 of more than 2000 personnel) and has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining agreement effective

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February 16, 1981 February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII, Sec. 5 of the said CBA Bonuses The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1- months' salary. 2. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. 3. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC and NFSW on November 30,1981. Under paragraph 4 thereof The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. 4. As of November 30, 1981, G.R. No. 51254 (Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Blas Ople and Amado Inciong, Minister and Deputy Minister of Labor, respectively, and Marcopper Employees Labor Union, Petition for certiorari and Prohibition) was still pending in the Supreme Court. The Petition had been dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the vote of seven Justices. 1 A motion for reconsideration thereafter filed was denied in a resolution dated December 15, 1981, with only five Justices voting for denial. (3 dissented; 2 reserved their votes: 4 did not take part.) On December 18, 1981 the decision of June 11, 1981 having become final and executory entry of judgment was made. 5. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused. 6. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. 7. One day after the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE. 8. On February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition (R.A.B. Case No. 011082) with the Regional Arbitration Branch VI-A, MOLE, at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote. 9. After the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal. The dispositive part of his decision dated February 20, 1982 reads: Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the strike commenced by NFSW on January 28, 1982, illegal, 2. Directing the Central to resume operations immediately upon receipt hereof; 3. Directing the Central to accept back to work all employees appearing in its payroll as of January 28, 1982 except those covered by the February 1, 1982 memorandum on preventive suspension but without prejudice to the said employees' instituting appropriate actions before this Ministry relative to whatever causes of action they may have obtained proceeding from said memorandum; 4. Directing the Central to pay effective from the date of resumption of operations the salaries of those to be placed on preventive suspension as per February 1, 1982 memorandum during their period of preventive suspension; and 5. Directing, in view of the finding that the subject strike is illegal, NFSW, its officers, members, as well as sympathizers to immediately desist from committing acts that may impair or impede the milling operations of the Central The law enforcement authorities are hereby requested to assist in the peaceful enforcement and implementation of this Decision. SO ORDERED. 10. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental were threatening to immediately enforce the February 20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the petitioner, and praying that WHEREFORE, on the foregoing considerations, it is prayed of the Honorable Court that on the Petition for Preliminary Injunction, an order, after hearing, issue: 1. Restraining implementation or enforcement of the Decision of February 20, 1982; 2. Enjoining respondents to refrain from the threatened acts violative of the rights of strikers and peaceful picketers; 3. Requiring maintenance of the status quo as of February 20, 1982, until further orders of the Court; and on the Main Petition, judgment be rendered after hearing. 1. Declaring the Decision of February 2O, l982 null and void; 2. Making the preliminary injunction permanent; 3. Awarding such other relief as may be just in the premises. 11. Hearing was held, after which the parties submitted their memoranda. No restraining order was issued. II ISSUES The parties have raised a number of issues, including some procedural points. However, considering their relative importance and the impact of their resolution on ongoing labor disputes in a number of industry sectors, we have decided in the interest of expediency and dispatch to brush aside non-substantial items and reduce the remaining issues to but two fundamental ones: 1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code. 2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay. (See petitioner's memorandum of April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2, 1982, pp. 3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the thrusts and application of PD 851. III. DISCUSSION 1. Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as pertinent, read: Art. 264, Strikes, picketing and lockouts. ... (c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may file a notice of strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen (15) days; ... (d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the voluntary sttlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout. (f) A decision to declae a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots in meetings or referenda. A decision to declae a lockout must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the board of direcotrs of the employer corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. the decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken . The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the coolingoff period herein provided. (Emphasis supplied).

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ART. 265. Prohibited activities. It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or employer to declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.) (a) Language of the law. The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory. When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served, or when as in the instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory. (b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report. In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period . As applied to the CAC-NFSW dispute regarding the 13th month pay, MOLE intervention could have possibly induced CAC to provisionally give the 13th month pay in order to avert great business loss arising from the project strike, without prejudice to the subsequent resolution of the legal dispute by competent authorities; or mediation/conciliation could have convinced NFSW to at least postpone the intended strike so as to avoid great waste and loss to the sugar central, the sugar planters and the sugar workers themselves, if the strike would coincide with the mining season. So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of minority groups within the union. The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. (Answer of public respondents, pp. 17-18.) If the purpose of the required strike notice and strike-vote report are to be achieved, the periods prescribed for their attainment must, as aforesaid, be deemed mandatory., ... when a fair interpretation of the statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way, shows the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when some antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercised, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. So it has been held that, when a statute is founded on public policy [such as the policy to encourage voluntary settlement of disputes without resorting to strikes], those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions. (82 C.J.S. 873-874. Emphasis supplied.) (c) Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right to strike. To quote Justice Jackson in International Union vs. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, at 259 The right to strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to regulation than the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bargaining ... The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike- vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. (d) State policy on amicable settlement of criminal liability . Petitioner contends that since the non-compliance (with PD 851) imputed to CAC is an unfair labor practice which is an offense against the state, the cooling-off period provided in the Labor Code would not apply, as it does not apply to ULP strikes. It is argued that mediation or conciliation in order to settle a criminal offense is not allowed. In the first place, it is at best unclear whether the refusal of CAC to give a 13th month pay to NFSW constitutes a criminal act. Under Sec. 9 of the Rules and regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 Non-payment of the thirteenth-month pay provided by the Decree and these rules shall be treated as money claims cases and shall be processed in accordance with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission. Secondly, the possible dispute settlement, either permanent or temporary, could very well be along legally permissible lines, as indicated in (b) above or assume the form of measures designed to abort the intended strike, rather than compromise criminal liability, if any. Finally, amicable settlement of criminal liability is not inexorably forbidden by law. Such settlement is valid when the law itself clearly authorizes it. In the case of a dispute on the payment of the 13th month pay, we are not prepared to say that its voluntary settlement is not authorized by the terms of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code, which makes it the duty of the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement of labor disputes. (e) NFSW strike is illegal. The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing a strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also failed to file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote, when it should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike." Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the strike staged by petitioner is not in conformity with law. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether the pendency of an arbitration case against CAC on the same issue of payment of 13th month pay [R.A.B No. 51281, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A, NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP) and a number of CAC workers are the complainants, with NFSW as Intervenor seeking the dismissal of the arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rank and file employees] has rendered illegal the above strike under Art. 265 of the Labor Code which provides:

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It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister, or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.) (2) The Second Issue. At bottom, the NFSW strike arose from a dispute on the meaning and application of PD 851, with NFSW claiming entitlement to a 13th month pay on top of bonuses given by CAC to its workers, as against the diametrically opposite stance of CAC. Since the strike was just an offshoot of the said dispute, a simple decision on the legality or illegality of the strike would not spell the end of the NFSW-CAC labor dispute. And considering further that there are other disputes and strikes actual and impending involving the interpretation and application of PD 851, it is important for this Court to definitively resolve the problem: whether under PD 851, CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month's pay. Keenly sensitive to the needs of the workingmen, yet mindful of the mounting production cost that are the woe of capital which provides employment to labor, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 851 on 16 December 1975. Thereunder, "all employers are hereby required to pay salary of not more than all their employees receiving a basic P1,000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th month pay not later than December 24 of every year." Exempted from the obligation however are: Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent ... (Section 2.) The evident intention of the law, as revealed by the law itself, was to grant an additional income in the form of a 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same. Otherwise put, the intention was to grant some relief not to all workers but only to the unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by whatever name called; but it was not envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already paying his employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a binding agreement and, in the latter ease, regardless of the conditional character of the grant (such as making the payment dependent on profit), so long as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a 13th month salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay. This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption: "Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree." (P.D. 851.) The Rules Implementing P.D. 851 issued by MOLE immediately after the adoption of said law reinforce this stand. Under Section 3(e) thereof The term "its equivalent" ... shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference." (Italics supplied.) Having been issued by the agency charged with the implementation of PD 851 as its contemporaneous interpretation of the law, the quoted rule should be accorded great weight. Pragmatic considerations also weigh heavily in favor of crediting both voluntary and contractual bonuses for the purpose of determining liability for the 13th month pay. To require employers (already giving their employees a 13th month salary or its equivalent) to give a second 13th month pay would be unfair and productive of undesirable results. To the employer who had acceded and is already bound to give bonuses to his employees, the additional burden of a 13th month pay would amount to a penalty for his munificence or liberality. The probable reaction of one so circumstance would be to withdraw the bonuses or resist further voluntary grants for fear that if and when a law is passed giving the same benefits, his prior concessions might not be given due credit; and this negative attitude would have an adverse impact on the employees. In the case at bar, the NFSW-CAC collective bargaining agreement provides for the grant to CAC workers of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and amelioration bonus, the aggregate of which is very much more than a worker's monthly pay. When a dispute arose last year as to whether CAC workers receiving the stipulated bonuses would additionally be entitled to a 13th month pay, NFSW and CAC concluded a compromise agreement by which they agree(d) to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. When this agreement was forged on November 30,1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including the distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper employees (in addition to mid- year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices. The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 150437 July 17, 2006 SUKHOTHAI CUISINE and RESTAURANT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR PHILIPPINE LABOR ALLIANCE COUNCIL (PLAC) Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter, EMMANUEL CAYNO, ALEX MARTINEZ, BILLY BACUS, HERMIE RAZ, JOSE LANORIAS, LITO ARCE, LINO SALUBRE, CESAR SANGREO, ROLANDO FABREGAS, JIMMY BALAN, JOVEN LUALHATI, ANTONIO ENEBRAD, JOSE NEIL ARCILLA, REY ARSENAL, ROEL ESANCHA, EDGAR EUGENIO, ALBERT AGBUYA, ROLANDO PUGONG, ARNEL SALVADOR, RICKY DEL PRADO, CLAUDIO PANALIGAN, BERNIE DEL MUNDO, JOHN BATHAN, ROBERTO ECO, JOVEN TALIDONG, LENY LUCENTE, ANALIZA CABLAY, RIGOBERTO TUBAON and MERLY NAZ, respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the Decision1 dated August 8, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63864 which affirmed in toto the Decision dated November 29, 2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution2 dated October 18, 2001 which denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. This case originated from a complaint for illegal strike filed with the NLRC by the petitioner3 against private respondents due to an alleged "wildcat strike" and other concerted action staged in the company premises on June 24, 25 and 26, 1999. The undisputed facts are as follows: Sometime in March 1998, the majority of the employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a union which affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (Union).4 On December 3, 1998, private respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice, and particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. On December 10, 1998, in a

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conciliation conference, the representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. On the following day, or on December 11, 1998, a Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB personnel, and the results of the vote were submitted to the NCMB on December 21, 1998. On January 21, 1999, the petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the strike. On March 24, 1999, during the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the petitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee in February 1999. In view of this termination, private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. In the morning of June 24, 1999, private respondent Jose Lanorias, a union member, was relieved from his post, and his employment as cook, terminated. Subsequently, respondent Billy Bacus, the union vice-president, conferred with Ernesto Garcia and protested Lanorias's dismissal. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a "wildcat strike." On June 25, 1999, a Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest, according to the respondents, was converted into a "sit-down strike." On the next day, or on June 26, 1999, the same was transformed into an "actual strike." On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, seeking to declare the strike illegal, and to declare respondents, who participated in the commission of illegal acts, to have lost their employment status. Having arrived at no amicable settlement, the parties submitted their position papers, together with supporting documents, affidavits of witnesses, and photographs, in compliance with the orders of the Labor Arbiter. On October 12, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared to have staged an illegal strike, and the employment of union officers and all individual respondents are deemed validly terminated in accordance with law. Finally, all individual respondents are hereby directed to immediately remove their picket lines and all physical obstructions that impede ingress and egress to petitioner's premises. SO ORDERED.5 The principal question before the Labor Arbiter was whether the private respondents staged an illegal strike. Ruling in the affirmative, the Labor Arbiter held that the Notice of Strike dated December 3, 1998 as well as the Strike Vote of December 11, 1998 referred to a prior dispute submitted for voluntary arbitration and, hence, they cannot apply to the strike staged about six months later, which commenced on June 24, 1999 and ended on June 26, 1999; that, for these reasons, the Union failed to comply with the mandatory requisites for a lawful strike; that the issuance of memos by the petitioner to instill discipline on erring employees is a lawful exercise of management prerogative and do not amount to acts of unfair labor practice; that, instead of resorting to a strike, private respondents should have availed of the proper legal remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal dismissal with the NLRC; that, the root causes of the controversy are the petition for certification election and petition for cancellation of union registration which were then pending before the Department of Labor as well as the issue on unfair labor practice then pending before the voluntary arbitrator, and, hence, the parties should have awaited the resolution of the cases in the proper fora; and that even if private respondents complied with all the requisites of a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to the commission of prohibited acts, including the obstruction of free ingress and egress of the premises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon non-striking employees. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC which, on November 29, 2000, promulgated its Decision the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 12, 1999 in the above entitled case is hereby vacated and set-aside. Consequently, the complaint of illegal strike is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. All striking workers are hereby ordered to return to work immediately and Sukhothai Restaurant to accept them back to their former or equivalent positions. If the same is no longer possible, Sukhothai Restaurant is ordered to pay them separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service reckoned from their initial date of employment up to the present. SO ORDERED.6 In overruling the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting; that the petitioner violated the Submission Agreement dated December 10, 1998 in that no termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings and, hence, the strike was justified; that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote dated December 3, 1998 and December 11, 1998, respectively, are applicable to the strike of June 24, 25, and 26, 1999 since the same issues of unfair labor practice were involved and that unfair labor practices are continuing offenses; that even if the foregoing Notice of Strike and Strike Vote were not applicable, the Union may take action immediately since the petitioner is guilty of union busting; and that the re-filing of a Notice of Strike on June 25, 1999 cured the defect of non-compliance with the mandatory requirements. After the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner appealed to the CA and raised the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE STRIKE STAGED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS LEGAL; and II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE STRIKE AND COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS WERE PROPERLY AND VALIDLY DECLARED TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS.7 As stated above, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC. Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following grounds: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED THE ISSUES IN THE INSTANT CASE IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY RULING THAT THE WILDCAT STRIKE OF JUNE 24, 1999 IS VALID AND LEGAL DESPITE CLEAR AND INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT: A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUISITES FOR A VALID STRIKE AS PRESCRIBED BY THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE; B. THERE WERE NO STRIKEABLE ISSUES; AND C. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED ILLEGAL AND PROHIBITED ACTS DURING THE STRIKE. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER IN ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHICH FAILURE AMOUNTED TO A DENIAL OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.8 The petition is meritorious. The questions before this Court are whether the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal; and whether private respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. Respondents insist that the filing of the Notice of Strike on December 3, 1998, the Strike Vote of December 11, 1998, the submission of the results of the vote to the NCMB on December 21, 1998, and their observation of the 15-day cooling-off period in case of unfair labor practice as well as the seven-day reporting period of the results of the strike vote, all satisfy the mandatory requirements under Article 2639 of the Labor Code and are applicable to the June 1999 strike. In support of this theory, respondents invoke Article 263(f) in that the decision to strike is valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike vote was taken, thus, there is no need to repeat the process. Furthermore, according to the respondents, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the concerted actions in June 1999, these requirements may nonetheless be dispensed with since the petitioner is guilty of union busting and, hence, the Union can take action immediately. The undisputed fact, however, is that at the time the strike was staged in June 1999, voluntary arbitration between the parties was

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ongoing by virtue of the January 21, 1999 Submission Agreement. The issue to be resolved under those proceedings pertained to the very same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3, 1998: the commission of unfair labor practices, such as acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. Article 264 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 264. Prohibited activities. xxxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. x x x x (emphasis supplied) This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. 10 The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.11 Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes. 12 In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,13 Chief Justice Fernando declared that the principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis, subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation.14 The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. The questions that surround their dismissal, as private respondents so affirm, are connected to the alleged breach of the "guarantee" by the petitioner not to dismiss its employees during the pendency of the arbitration case, the very questions which they also link to the other incidents of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by the petitionerthese matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. On the other hand, if private respondents believed that the disciplinary measures had nothing to do with the issues under arbitration, then they should have availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal15 or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA, if one is available, so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings,16 or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike.17 And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.18 For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal.19 With respect to respondents' averment that assuming arguendo that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the strike in June 1999, the requirements for a valid strike may nonetheless be dispensed with in case of union busting,20 the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the question at length, especially in view of the foregoing declaration that the strike is illegal, as well as the considerations of established doctrine: the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory, 21 and in case of union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with. Article 263(f) in part states: "In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided." This provision should be read with Section 3, Rule XXII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, then applicable at the time of the dispute, the relevant provisions of which state: However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of any union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board. (emphasis supplied) The NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing, and Lockout (January 31, 1992) provide the same wording. The foregoing provision of the implementing rules should also be compared to the provisions of the Labor Code under Article 263(c): (c) x x x However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. The implementing rules clarify Article 263(c) in that the union may strike "immediately" provided that the strike vote is conducted, the results thereof submitted "in every case" at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. In sum, in case of alleged union busting, the three remaining requirements notice, strike vote, and seven-day report period cannot be dispensed with.22 What is more, the strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.23 Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or c) obstruct public thoroughfares. The following acts have been held to be prohibited activities: where the strikers shouted slanderous and scurrilous words against the owners of the vessels;24 where the strikers used unnecessary and obscene language25 or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work,26 and circulated libelous statements against the employer which show actual malice;27 where the protestors used abusive and threatening language towards the patrons of a place of business or against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade customers to withdraw their patronage;28 where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of the workplace 29 and perpetrated acts of violence and coercion to prevent work from being performed;30 and where the strikers shook their fists and threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the workplace.31 Permissible activities of the picketing workers do not include obstruction of access of customers.32 The evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidation and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner;33 waving their arms and shouting at the passersby, "Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai!"[34] and "Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain d'yan!"[35] as well as numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of the establishment;36 preventing the entry of customers; 37 angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion 38 which affected neighboring establishments within the mall;39 openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers 40 and using loud and abusive language, such as "Putang ina niyong lahat!", toward the rest of the management41 as well as their co-workers who refused to go on strike;42 physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises,43 as well as deliberately blocking their movements inside the restaurant,44 at times by sharply bumping into them 45 or through indecent physical contact;46 openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such as "Pag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo!";47 and shouting at the security guard "Granada!" which caused panic among the customers and prompted security to report a possible death threat to management and the security agency.48 In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article 264(a) of the Labor Code: Art. 264. Prohibited Activities (a) x x x xxxx x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly

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participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. xxxx In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.49 this Court explained that the effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary Roel Esancha striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.50 In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.51 Liability for Claudio Panaligan prohibited acts is to be determined on an individual basis: Rank in Respondent Rey Arsenal Private Respondent Union Illegal Acts Knowingly participating in an illegal strike; shouting at the security guard Alex Martinez "Granada!" which caused panic among the customers;52 Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering 53 the restaurant; publicly denouncing the reputation of the establishment; openly threatening non-strikers with Emmanuel Cayno President bodily harm;55 Hermie Raz Knowingly participating in an illegal strike; Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging Jose Lanorias customers from entering the Lito Arce restaurant;56 use of abusive language towards management or non-strikers;Cesar Sangreo deliberately blocking the movements of Rolando Fabregas Vice management or non-strikers inside the 58 Billy Bacus President restaurant; Knowingly participating in an illegal strike; Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering the Analiza Cablay Secretary restaurant;59 Jimmy Balan Knowingly participating in an illegal strike; Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging Joven Lualhati Jose Neil Arcilla Treasurer customers from entering the Antonio Enebrad restaurant;60 publicly denouncing the reputation of the establishment; coercing non-strikers to strike;Edgar Eugenio Cursing and use of abusive language towards management, non-strikers, or customers;63 Albert Agbuya Knowingly participating in an illegal Arnel Salvador strike; intimidating, harassing, Ricky Del Prado preventing, and discouraging Bernie Del Mundo customers from entering the Roberto Eco restaurant;64 Joven Talidong Knowingly participating in an illegal Id.;83 cursing and use of abusive language towards management, nonMember strikers, or customers;84 Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering Member the restaurant;85 Member Id.86 Member Id.87 Member Id.88 Member Id.89 Member Id.90 Id.;91 threatening non-strikers with strike; use of abusive language Leny Lucente Member bodily harm;92 towards management, non-strikers, or 65 Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and customers; intimidating, harassing, discouraging customers from entering preventing, and discouraging the restaurant;93 cursing and use of customers from entering the abusive language towards restaurant;66 deliberately blocking the management, non-strikers, or movements of management or non94 Rigoberto Tubaon Member customers; strikers inside the restaurant;67 Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;95 cursing and use of the restaurant;68 abusive language towards Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and management, non-strikers, or discouraging customers from entering Merly Naz Member customers;96 the restaurant;69 Preventing and discouraging Cursing and use of abusive language customers from entering the towards management, non-strikers, or Lino Salubre Member restaurant;97 customers;70 deliberately blocking the Preventing and discouraging movements of management or noncustomers from entering the strikers inside the restaurant; Rolando Pugong Member restaurant;98 intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and the restaurant;72 discouraging customers from entering John Bathan Member the restaurant;99 Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering Thus, the Labor Arbiter is correct in ruling that the employment of all the restaurant;73 individual private respondents are deemed validly terminated. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision and Resolution Id.74 of the Court of Appeals together with the Decision dated November Id.75 29, 2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission are Id.76 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter 77 Id.; deliberately blocking movements dated October 12, 1999 is REINSTATED. The Court finds the strike of non-strikers inside the restaurant by illegal and, as a consequence thereto, the union officers who sharply bumping into them78 or through participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts, 79 indecent physical contact; cursing namely, Emmanuel Cayno, Billy Bacus, Analiza Cablay, Jose Neil and use of abusive language towards Arcilla, Roel Esancha, and Claudio Panaligan, as well as the union management, non-strikers, or members who participated in the commission of illegal acts during customers;80 the strike, namely, Rey Arsenal, Alex Martinez, Hermie Raz, Jose Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and Lanorias, Lito Arce, Cesar Sangreo, Rolando Fabregas, Jimmy discouraging customers from entering Balan, Joven Lualhati, Antonio Enebrad, Edgar Eugenio, Albert 81 the restaurant; Agbuya, Arnel Salvador, Ricky Del Prado, Bernie Del Mundo, Id.82 Roberto Eco, Joven Talidong, Leny Lucente, Rigoberto Tubaon,

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Merly Naz, Lino Salubre, Rolando Pugong, and John Bathan, all private respondents, are hereby declared to have lost their employment status. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.