Natural Kinds in Physiology Mark B. Couch Philosophy Department Seton Hall University So. Orange, NJ USA 07079 couchmar@shu.

edu (973) 761-9000 x5183

Abstract: Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that it be established that the structures belong to different kinds while the functional kinds are the same. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds in physiology are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing physiologists think about the matter. I will consider several examples in which the practice of researchers conflicts with the standard account of these issues. Examining these examples helps us to avoid spurious accounts of how natural kinds are individuated in physiology.

1. Introduction The notion of multiple realization has played a significant role in discussions about how to understand the nature of the sciences. On the standard account presented by Putnam (1967) and Fodor (1974), the existence of multiple realization is said to imply that certain higherlevel natural kinds cannot be identified with lower-level natural kinds. This, in turn, is said to have important implications for our understanding of how the sciences are related to one another. But the picture suggested by this account has come in for several forms of criticism. Among other concerns there are claimed to be problems with the traditional arguments that have been offered for multiple realization (Kim 1992, Bechtel and Mundale 1999, Shapiro 2000, Couch 2004, Polger 2004). This paper will continue this general line of criticism by suggesting that we still have not properly understood the problems that exist

with the standard account. I will examine this issue by considering how the account fares in relation to our understanding of natural kinds in physiology. There are several issues involved in understanding this topic and there is no hope of addressing them all at once. There are two clarifications that it will be helpful to make about the issues we will be examining. The first point concerns the kinds of arguments for multiple realization that have been offered in the literature. Some arguments depend on conceiving of logically possible situations where a functional kind is realized by different kinds of structures, and other arguments depend on an appeal to certain empirical considerations. Though I think that both arguments have their place my interest in this paper will only be with the empirical arguments that have been offered. My concern is with the sciences as they are actually practiced, and I believe that this can be understood best by focusing on particular examples. The second point concerns the examples that we will be focusing on. Though the notion of multiple realization has been supported by different examples it is common to find discussions focusing on the psychological examples that were originally presented by Putnam and others. But these examples raise a number of difficulties concerning how mental kinds are individuated in psychology that make them difficult to work with. In order to avoid this problem, I have chosen to focus instead on the example of visual systems (i.e., eyes) from comparative physiology. Researchers in comparative physiology have an excellent understanding of the properties of the eyes that different species have. Given the empirical nature of the arguments we will be considering this will enable us to make our discussion more precise.

These clarifications made, let us examine some of the different examples of multiple realization that have been presented. Each of the examples that we will be considering depends on differences in the eyes of various species.

2. The Closely Related Species Argument We can start with the argument that concerns the differences that exist across different species that are closely related to one another (Putnam 1967, Horgan 1993). Because of the differences that are thought to exist there is said to be little chance of finding similar mechanisms in the eyes. These examples have received a lot of attention in the literature, but, in the present case, it is not clear that they are well supported by the evidence. The examples usually turn on characterizing the structures involved at the wrong levels of description to emphasize the presence of differences in the structures. Consider as an example of closely related species the eyes of humans and chimpanzees (examples throughout are taken from Wolken 1995). Both eyes are vertebrate systems that form images by means of an optical system and retina. The suggestion is that in structures like these there are differences present in the structures even though they realize the same functional kind of light reception. However, the fact that the structures have differences at some level does not show that the differences are related to the structural kinds that are relevant to consider. As has been noted recently, in identifying the structural kinds it is important that we be sure that we have identified the structures that serve to explain the performance of the function, and not merely any features of the structures (Bechtel and Mundale 1999, Shapiro 2004). There are different levels of description at

which the structures can be characterized, and the appropriate level of description will be determined by the function that is in question. In the present case I believe that the problem is with the description of the structures as containing different kinds of components as one another. When we examine the structures we find that they, in fact, exhibit significant structural similarities. Both eyes contain a similar lens, cornea, retinal layers, visual pigments, and outer shell. And these are the major functional systems within the eye, and not merely its trivial components. The importance of these similarities for explaining how the structures function is recognized by researchers as well. In discussing the similarities in the two kinds of systems, the researchers Suomi and Immelmann go as far as to claim that the structures are essentially identical in these different species (Suomi and Immelmann 1983, 205). There may be differences that can be identified at a certain level of description in the structures, but this does not prevent researchers from identifying the significant similarities that exist. The reason this is accepted by researchers has to do with the close phylogenetic relationship between the structures. With homologous structures like these, researchers believe that closely related species will often have structures that are similar in their composition and organization (see Lange 2000, 248; Crawford, et. al 1990, 24). This claim cannot be made about every structure that might be considered, of course, since we expect there to be exceptions that occur. But it is accepted by researchers that there will often be significant similarities in structures like these that have an explanatory role in underwriting generalizations in physiology.

3. The Distantly Related Species Argument The proponent of the standard account at this point might look for another example to support their view that multiple realization occurs in some structures. Maybe what is needed is to focus on differences across more distantly related species that represent analogies, instead of homologies. There are different examples that well need to consider here, and, to do this, we can start with the human and fly eyes. When we examine the eyes it is apparent that the structures differ from one another in a number of ways. The human eye is a refracting type imaging eye that contains a cornea, lens, and retina with an optical system that can be adjusted for different distances. But the flys eye is quite different than this. The eye consists of a collection of ommatidia organized into a honeycomb that cannot be adjusted, and there are invertebrate rhabdomers (not rods and cones) in the receptors. Given the differences this would seem to provide an example of different kinds of structures that serve the same function of light reception. But these examples are problematic in how they should be interpreted. I argued before that in closely related species there are significant similarities in the structures when they are characterized at the appropriate level of description. What we need to consider now, though, is a related issue concerning the functional kinds in question. In making a claim about multiple realization it needs to be shown that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures in the species since only then is there a problem that needs to be dealt with. What I want to suggest at this point is that the standard account often helps itself to the assumption that the structures perform the same kind of function without providing any justification for this claim. While this may be plausible in some cases, there

are examples where we have reason to be more cautious. I think that this occurs when we look at the differences that occur in the examples we are considering. There is a lot of folk taxonomy that goes on among philosophers in classifying physiological structures in different species as belonging to the same functional kind. Consider how this relates to the example we described. The human and fly eyes differ in several ways in the components they have. They differ in their optical systems, receptor systems, visual pigments, etc. But the differences that occur are not only found within the structures since there are related differences that occur in the functions the structures perform. For example, we know that (1) the differences in the visual pigments lead the eyes to respond to different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum; the fly can detect ultraviolet light whereas we cannot. (2) The rhabdomeric structure of the flys receptors enables the organism to perceive the plane of polarized light whereas we cannot. (3) The structure of the flys optical system is fixed and it has no means for accommodation while the human system can accommodate for various distances. And (4) the flys eye is such that it provides for cruder images while the human eye is designed to provide images of higher resolution. These kinds of differences in the functions of the structures are important for understanding the behavior of the species that researchers are interested in. The claim that the eyes perform the same kind of function does not reflect the various differences that exist between the structures. This point is common among researchers in the science of vision as well. As Cook explains, an inventory of the animal world quickly reveals a bewildering assortment of evolved visual systems that allow for the detection and use of information from light. And it is important to recognize that each species . . . possesses a

distinctive combination of sensory equipment and perceptual capacities that are tuned to the particular demands of its niche (italics added; 1998, 332). His point is that the visual capacities of the human system are not the same but only superficially similar to the capacities of the flys system. The diversity in the functions of the eyes is recognized by researchers who do comparative work, and who are sensitive to the differences in the species. If the previous example does not seem to work, then maybe we need to consider some other structures from species that are less distantly related than this. This brings us to our last example that we will discuss. Consider as an example the differences that exist between the human and pigeon eyes. The two kinds of eyes are vertebrate structures that have numerous features in common. They are both imaging eyes that contain a cornea, adjustable optical system, retinal layers, and outer shell. But the eyes are structured in somewhat different ways. The pigeon eye is more flattened in shape that the human eye and it contains a structure in the retina called the pecten which is thought to aid in visual acuity (Wolken 1995, 127). Furthermore, the pigeon retina is different from the human system because in addition to rods and cones there are pigmented oil globules that have independently evolved to assist in the birds color vision capacities. As Wolken explains, the oil globules function as cut-off filters of light . . . making cones less sensitive to light transmitted in the ultraviolet to red wavelengths (128). The oil droplets are thought to serve as light filters in processing the information about light in the environment. In this case, there is little doubt that the structures that mediate color vision are different in the two systems, and yet they are capable of performing similar kinds of visual tasks. I would

suggest that this represents a plausible example where the function of image-forming color vision is realized in different ways across the species that has support from the practice of researchers.

4. Implications There are two implications to discuss in relation to the standard account that follow from the examples. First, we should recognize that the physiological generalizations that are supported by the last example are restricted in their application to particular species. The generalizations that apply in this case will be restricted to humans and pigeons (and maybe others), but not all species (e.g., not all species have image-forming color vision). This means that we can accept in this case that there is a set of generalizations that can be used by researchers to explain a range of facts about the structures involved. But this should not be taken as indicating that we can expect to find completely general theories that apply to whatever species we might be interested in. This is a problem for the standard account insofar as its proponents have claimed that functionalists are committed to finding universal laws that range across a wide group of different species (Putnam 1967, Horgan 1993). What the example suggests is that there is a role for claims about multiple realization to play in physiology that is worth considering, but that we need to be clear about where plausible examples are likely to be found (and see that the examples will be more limited). We should also recognize that the kinds of generalizations that will find empirical support will be determined by the properties of the systems in question and the particular species that are under investigation.

Second, a common problem with discussions about multiple realization is that we are presented with an example to consider, and then told that the same considerations apply in other cases. The same considerations that apply in the case of computers, say, can be seen at work in psychology. But there are sometimes important differences in the examples described that need to be considered separately. I believe that this is the case in the present discussion. With the examples we described there are issues about how kinds are individuated in comparative physiology that are different from other cases that are relevant to consider. Comparative physiologists have specific ways of thinking about how kinds are individuated across different species, and these are important for a proper understanding of the examples. So one of the virtues of considering the example of eyes is that it enables us to focus on these issues in a manner that has been neglected by the standard account. I want to suggest that biological classification has a more important role to play in understanding the similarities and differences among species than has been recognized. The proponents of the standard account have for too long been discussing the properties of different species by relying on folk intuitions and in the absence of a proper comparative framework.References

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