Is there anything new about new terrorism?

The concept of Terror as the systematic use of violence to attain socio-political ends was first codified by Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution (Atran, 2003: 1534). However, Terrorism as a phenomenon has been around for millennia (Atran, 2003: 1534)&(Evans, & Newman, 1998: 530). Nevertheless, in recent years some scholars have asserted that we have witnessed the emergence of a new form of Terrorism. According to proponents of this hypothesis, this New Terrorism is distinguished from its predecessor by a new structure (of networks), a new attitude (an apparently increased willingness to inflict mass casualties), and a new kind of personnel, amateurs who often come together in ad hoc or transitory groupings (Laqueur, 1996: 34)&(Tucker, 2001: 1). Drawing on a historiographical survey of the phenomenon of Terrorism this essay will critically analyze the said assertion in the context of recent evolutions in the common perception of Terrorism and conclude that it is not that we have witnessed a new form of Terrorism but rather it is the rhetoric of Terrorism analysis which has changed.

By its very essence the history of terrorism is coextensive with the history of politics and sociality (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Terrorism is a relative concept, ergo for as long as there has been politics and social interaction there has been political and social opposition. Yet before the attacks in the United States on September 11th 2001 the subject of Terrorism did not loom large in academic discussion. Since then, however, extensive debates have emerged on the definition of Terrorism and how it has evolved over time (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1)&(Victoroff, 2005: 9). Defining Terrorism is thus perhaps at the psychosocial crux of the matter. As Noam Chomsky puts forth in his book Manufacturing

Consent, there is an intrinsic bias inherent in all human perceptions and this bias manifests itself most profoundly in the spheres of political analysis. Centering his focus on the United States, Chomsky argues that this dichotomous treatment of worthy and unworthy victims is politically advantageous to policy-makers because focusing on victims of enemy forces shows those enemies to be wicked, while also distracting from and allowing otherwise controversial U.S. lead policies to proceed more easily (Chomsky, 2002: xix-xx).

Despite the claims of those who support the New Terrorism hypothesis it is important to note that the term Terrorism is itself a very recent one that has only been in use since the French Revolution in the late 18th century1. More to the point since that time the parameters of the terms use have repeatedly shifted meaning that conceptualizations of Terrorist groups have tended to focus primarily on modern factions, dismissing antecedent groups that predate this etymology (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Thus, given that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, it is unlikely that any belief in New Terrorism will be generally accepted either (Atran, 2003: 1534). Described by Chomsky as an invidious word, an example of the innate bias of the label Terrorism lies in the current branding of Extremism and Islamic Fundamentalism (Chomsky, 2002: xx)&(Atran, 2003: 1535). As Scott Atran argues, calling the current wave of radical Islam Fundamentalism (in the sense of Traditionalism) is misleading, approaching an oxymoron. Present day radicals whether Shiite (Iran, Hezbollah) or Sunni (Taliban, Al Qaida), are much closer in spirit and action to Europes post 11789-1799 2

Renaissance Counter-Reformation [sic] [than to any new form of New Terrorist ideology. In fact,] this idea has its clearest historical model in the Holy Inquisition2 (Atran, 2003: 1535).

Atrans statement would suggest that the extremist element supposed about New Terrorism is most certainly not new. Equally as David Tucker points out, citing the example of the Gruppi di Azione Partigiana in Italy, the Polish Underground of WWII and the IRA among many others; the assertion that there is something new about the network structure commonly in use by modern Al-Qaeda linked Islamic paramilitaries is somewhat of a fallacy. In fact there is a very long tradition of these kinds of networks (Tucker, 2001: 4). We can find precedents to what is now called the network structure in the leaderless Rosa Luxembourg inspired anarcho-syndicalist movements during the era of the Russian Revolution (Tudor, 2009: 1)&(Torrance, 2009: 1).

By definition all groups are in essence comprised of a network3. Understood in this way, it is clear that a network structure is not so much an alternative to a hierarchy, but is rather a necessary and integral component of it. Indeed networks are frequently critical to the proper functioning of an organization. Thus, despite their ostensibly hierarchical structure a federation of any kind can be regarded as a network. Likewise, the formal structure of Hizballah [sic] [or any other Terrorist organisation] is highly bureaucratic but interactions among members are volatile and do not form rigid lines of control (Tucker, 2This is a broad reference to the Conservativism of the Roman Inquisition, not simply the Spanish
Inquisition 3 The definition of the term network in the Oxford English Dictionary is a group of people who interact together - (http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/network?view=uk)

2001: 9). As such, all Terrorist organizations can be regarded as being fundamentally based on a network structure. In this light the recent emergence in the Middle East of organisations less cellular or hierarchical than those that operated in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as more of a return to a traditional model than the emergence of anything new (Masters, 2008: 397)&(Tucker, 2001: 4).

More to the point, it should not be assumed that adopting a more devolved network structure would be a progressive and entirely beneficial measure to a Terrorist group. As autonomous units, network cells are undoubtedly more adaptable. Yet increased autonomy also renders the network more susceptible to exogenous and endogenous security threats. Diminished centralisation increases discovery and entry opportunities for enemies, in turn threatening the entire networks security. Thus even New network organisations are to some degree likely to be hierarchically structured in a traditionally concentric or centrifugal fashion (Tucker, 2001: 10-11).

Furthermore, a network structure can also impair the integration of strategic and tactical coordination and control (Laqueur, 1996: 25). Diminished control and coordination, in turn, can increase the difficulty of accomplishing complex tasks (Tucker, 2001: 10). Crucially, it can also increase the likelihood that an ill-judged action will undermine constituency support and legitimacy (Tucker, 2001: 10). A primary example of this was the Real-IRA bombing of Omagh town centre in 1998 after which the organisation was forced temporarily to suspend its operations as a result of the loss of support and mass condemnation triggered by widespread popular revulsion at the carnage

(The CAIN Project). Thus it is unlikely that New Terrorist organisations will become anymore delegated or cellular than their predecessors.

Noam Chomsky argues that the idea of New Terrorists apparently greater propensity to commit acts of mass and indiscriminate slaughter is a biased misperception based on the fact that on 9/11 an attack on a rich and powerful country succeeded for the first time on a scale that commentators outside the ranks of Western privilege often responded with a welcome to the club (Chomsky, 2003: 607). Terrorist attacks have been increasing steadily since the Iranian Revolution4, yet it is only as a result of recent rapid technological development and heightened media-awareness that Terrorism has achieved such striking global coverage (Masters, 2008: 406)&(Evans, & Newman, 1998: 530). In turn the increasing resistance of governments and the declining news value of terrorist incidents as they become more commonplace has encouraged further and greater attacks and consequently changed the rhetoric of terrorism analysis (Jenkins, 1982: 18). Yet as David Tucker points out, the premise that New Terrorists somehow have an increased willingness to commit mass indiscriminate attacks to a greater extent than what has previously been seen is a skewed analysis which rests on a very few cases compared to the total number of international terrorist attacks (Tucker, 2001: 6). Organisations driven by extreme ideologies have always resorted to extreme and horrific acts of mass and indiscriminate slaughter. Radical aims could only be pursued by similarly radical methods and their success was due largely to the arbitrary character [of their attacks] and the unpredictability of their choice of victims (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Indeed the 41979 5

mass indiscriminate attacks carried out by the Islamic extremists of today are a form of Terrorism which best hark back to the heyday of totalitarian terrorism in the 1930s and 1940s [When revolutionary movements in Russia, Germany, France, Spain and elsewhere] sought to impose total political control on society (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Much like the current crop of Islamist Terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, many national liberation and separatist movements of the time resorted to grand scale attacks either as the main method of struggle or as a tactic complementing guerrilla warfare (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Terrorism is neither a species of guerrilla warfare nor insurgency although it is often isomorphicly confused with both (Evans, & Newman, 1998: 531). Thus, perhaps it is the case that what we are witnessing is not the dawn of a new kind of terrorism but rather a misunderstanding of a conventional Terrorist group (Evans, & Newman, 1998: 531).

Given that a sustained campaign of asymmetric warfare requires popular assistance, to the extent that terrorists with religious motivations also have political and social agendas, [as well as constituency concerns to do with safe houses, weapons supply and financial backing etc.], they are subject to the same constraints, and are reliant on the same need of constituency support for their methods and aims as paramilitary groups which have exclusively socio-political goals (Evans, & Newman, 1998: 215+531)&(Tucker, 2001: 7). Furthermore, as Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation points out, since 2001 there has been a tendency to exaggerate the dimensions of the threat posed by terrorists and the strategic impact that their violence has actually wrought. By overreacting and falling prey to a sense of acute fear and intimidation, the terrorists

power is disproportionately inflated in ways that are both counterproductive and often completely divorced from reality (Hoffman, 2001: 419). This does not mean however that a religious or political group would never commit a mass-casualty attack, just that such groups have the same reasons not to do so (Laqueur, 1996: 34)&(Tucker, 2001: 7).

Equally, as Hoffman points out, the real issue and a more likely threat may not be posed by the mass and indiscriminate use of violence - such as with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons - but a more concise and strategic use or the threat thereof which, psycho-socially, could still achieve a similar level of impact (Hoffman, 2001: 424). Much like suicide bombers or indeed any form of Terrorist attack, the real advantage of a CBRN attack is as a weapon of psychological warfare. Its primary target being not the immediate victims killed in the attack, but the wider public audience made to witness it (Atran, 2003: 1534). 9/11 demonstrated that terrorists did not require a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) to cause mass casualties (Enders, & Sandler, 2005: 260). The New Terrorism hypotheses may therefore be missing the point. A strategic threat could very easily create a disproportionately large amount of publicity, fear and alarm and therefore prove a more expedient and practicable tactic for terrorists than actually carrying out a large-scale attack (Hoffman, 2001: 424). Either way, given the misleading rhetoric and hyperbole in which the threat of terrorism is frequently couched it is important to note that as serious and potentially catastrophic as a terrorist attack might prove, it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely undermine the national security, much less threaten the survival of a nation (Hoffman, 2001: 426).

A common part of this misestimated hyperbole is the belief amongst proponents of the New Terrorism hypothesis that terrorist missions by volunteers constitute a radical new departure, dangerous because they are almost impossible to prevent. However that is a myth, like many others in which terrorism has always been shrouded (Laqueur, 1996: 26). True some contemporary groups appear more loosely connected or indirectly linked through networks comprised of both professional - i.e., full-time - terrorists and amateurs - supporters, sympathisers, and would-be terrorists who may lack the expertise or experience of their more established counterparts - (Hoffman, 2001: 418). However, as David Tucker puts it, all Terrorists are amateurs when they begin (Tucker, 2001: 4). Amateurism has always been an element of terrorist strategy and amateur militants have since the beginning appeared in all eras and cultural traditions (Laqueur, 1996: 26).

Therefore although Terrorism has increased in volume and severity, modern terrorists still operate within self-imposed constraints with a limited technical repertoire that has changed little over time (Jenkins, 1982: 11). In the aftermath of 9/11 the framing of contemporary terrorist groups began to take on the form of New Terrorism (Masters, 2008: 411). Yet as has been shown, there is nothing new about New Terrorism. The label is a fallacy based on a misperception of a phenomenon which predates the academia propounding the New Terrorism hypothesis. Thus it is not that we have witnessed a new form Terrorism but rather it is the rhetoric of its analysis which has changed.

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Approaches, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 3-42 Waldron, J., 2004, Terrorism and the Uses of Terror, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 1, Terrorism, pp. 5-35

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