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A. Uniqueness: China influence is up and US engagement is down recent trips pale in comparison to policy. Martinez 13 (Guillermo I., Columnist, America losing influence throughout Latin
America May 23, 2013, The Sun Sentinel, Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin America . It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who governed in the region. Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to the region, that is no more . The days when John F. Kennedy created the
Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young throughout the western hemisphere have been gone for more than half a century. The time when Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those governments that respected human rights and encouraged that caudillos be ousted is also a historical footnote. True, the world has changed. The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to American foreign policy, more so now that militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis. Latin America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez was elected. The rising price of oil gave Chvez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few. Colombia once depended greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the FARC guerrillas and the drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan Colombia since Juan Manuel Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with the FARC and closer ties to those who govern in Venezuela. Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped

change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with
Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home.

Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China. The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America foreign policy.
The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power. This is no fairy tale.

B. Link: Engagement is zero-sum Chinas power depends on Americas neglect. Kreps 13 (Sarah E. Kreps & Gustavo A. Flores-Macas are Assistant Professors of
Government at Cornell University, No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad, May 17, 2013,
To be sure, China

may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and
Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly

needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears
to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely. A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in which Chinas

trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

C. Impact: 1. Continued engagement key to growth & CCP stability. Farnsworth 12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in
Washington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas. Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, What is China doing in the Americas? Its a good questionand an increasingly important one for
policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, its about goodwill, good business and strategic position.1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because Chinas interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, Chinas footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-

President Jiang Zemins 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded.

Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to Chinas National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the dealsand in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hus first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part

of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacyan average annual rate of 9.8 percent
from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapseBeijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel

its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that Chinas leaders believe they need to support economic growthand thus political stabilityfor the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least
in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.

2. CCP instability leads to nuclear war. Rexing, 5 (San, Staff Epoch Times, The CCPs Last Ditch Gamble: Biological and
Nuclear War, 8-5, news/5-8-5/30975.html)
What, then, is the gist of this wild, last-ditch gamble? To put it in a few words: A

cornered beast is fighting desperately to survive in a battle with humanity. If you dont believe me, read some passages directly from the speeches. 1) We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the US], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a
nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities.

Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nations future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone! 2) In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! Wed rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isnt there a nuclear bondage theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our

Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished. 3) It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, wed have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Partys life has always been above all else!

Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate

to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen

beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCPs nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.


U Generic
China is increasing its engagement with Latin America theyre winning the influence battle now. Ellis 13 (R. Evan is associate professor for Hemispheric Defense Studies, China's
New Backyard: Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag? JUNE 6, 2013, erica) For the past decade, Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing interest in Latin America. But while Beijing's diplomats bulked up on their Spanish and Portuguese, most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United

States still held a dominant position in the minds of its southern neighbors. In April 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on China's influence in the hemisphere and concluded that the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere was much stronger than China's and, moreover, that Beijing's economic engagement in the region did not present a security threat. But that was 2005. In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden

went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left:

Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's

itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to

Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the muchpublicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make

no mistake: China is now a

presence in the region . Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica. Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California, sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders. Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four promarket, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States.
The challenges arising from China's global engagement should not, however, be confused with the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that characterized the Cold War, in which each side actively promoted different, competing concepts for a global order. China does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, yet the

mercantilist way in which it promotes its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international norms that it didn't create, makes it more difficult for the United States to conduct business and pursue policy goals in Latin America and other parts of the world. Consider China's ties with the eight countries that make up the leftist

Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Since 2007, China has loaned $50 billion to Ecuador and Venezuela, the alliance's two largest countries, giving them the financial wherewithal to continue sustaining anti-U.S. policies at home and to advance their cause in the region -- from funding oil alliance Petrocaribe, to setting up teleSUR and Banco del Sur, to sending suitcases of cash to politicians in Argentina. And the willingness of Chinese companies

to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those countries' regimes to nationalize industries and displace undesired Western corporations. China's indifference to those countries' political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to

less democratic practices, from the legal actions taken against the leadership of El Universo and other Ecuadorean media, to forcing RCTV off the air in Venezuela and persecuting Venezuelan opponents from Manuel Rosales (now in exile) to former armed forces head Ral Baduel (now incarcerated). China's no-strings-attached

investments enable the regimes to thumb their noses at Western institutions

and prevailing international norms regarding respect for contracts, freedom of expression, democracy, and human rights.

Chinas influence and engagement increasing now, displacing the US. Costa Rica News, 6/12 (China Rooted in Latin America 2013, China concluded its last Made in China contract signing sweep across the Latin Americas last week. President Xi Jinping, during his visit last week to Mexico, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago came, signed at least two dozen agreements further consolidating territory the hemisphere. With Brazil, Mexico and Chile as its main customers, Costa
Ricas premiering stadium and trade agreement made by the Chinese, 33% of the oil from Ecuador endorsed as part payment of its investment in infrastructure and Colombia flirting to get an agreement free trade, the


influence is increasingly in the daily life in Latin America . Nicaragua is ready to sign with Chinese entrepreneurs in trade for large portion of its territory and its coasts on two oceans to build the second hemisphere canal. A statement from the presidency of Nicaragua confirmed that the National Assembly is drafting a Special Law Initiative for the Development of Infrastructure and Transport Nicaraguan Canal, Free Trade Zones and Infrastructure Associates. According to information provided by the Assembly, the initiative, which aims to start a feasibility study by a company based in Hong Kong, would be approved this week. China has become a strong partner in the region, displacing the United States in several countries. China is the main destination for Brazilian exports andis a vital partner for the economy of Peru. Ecuador
and most recently Costa Rica have become increasingly dependenent on Chinas economic. Colombia sells nearly 10,000 million dollars and buys about 3,500 million, while Mexico sells nearly 10 times what it buys: 56.936 million dollars, compared to 5.721 million dollars, according to figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI ), 2012. The Chinese economys appetite for commodities, especially mining and

agriculture, is the main reason the nation has to deepened trade relations with Latin American countries, with or without agreements. With a trade balance

surplus of 6 billion per year Chinese entrepreneurs have been opened stores in the Colombian capital. Xi Jinping has over 1.3 billion mouths to feed and 950 million people to keep working, according to figures from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. With that many people China has no choice but to seek to

expand trade ties with Latin America.

China influence rising in Latin America. Xiaoxia, 5/6 (Wang, ECONOMIC OBSERVER/Worldcrunch, In America's
Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, May 5, 2013, -mikee Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin

Americas second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion. Some prominent Chinese have condemned

the United States' high-profile Return to Asia strategy, with its intention of containing China's front door. Shouldnt the United States, which put forward the Monroe Doctrine two centuries ago, also question how China is quietly arriving in Americas backyard?

U Mexico
A. Uniqueness: China is stepping up its engagement with Mexico and are on the verge of forming a cooperative and strategic alliance. Shahani, 6/5 (Arjan, Chinese President Xi Jinpings Visit to Mexico, AQ, 2013, Slowly but surely, from a diplomatic standpoint, Mexico is taking steps to reestablish itself as an outspoken, independent and active player, and is engaging emerging and established world powers beyond its neighbor to the North. In April, Pea Nietos participation in the conference of the Boao Forum For Asiaa China-based forum similar to the World Economic Forumand Chinese President Xi Jinpings visit to Mexico this week are a clear example of Mexicos global pivot. President Xis visit, foreshadows a stronger bilateral

commercial and diplomatic relationship. Fox and Caldern did very little to maintain the strategic alliance that the PRI had built with China, and Caldern angered the Chinese government in 2011 when he received the Dalai Lama at the presidential residence. But now, officials from the federal government and

representatives from the private sector involved in President Xis visit are predicting the launch of a strategic, integral and functional alliance between China and Mexico. They are not exaggerating: as agreements reached during the visit show, this is much more than Xi making a courtesy call. Amapola Grijalva, vice president
of the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce, told journalist Daro Celis in a June 3 radio interview that agreements reached between the two delegations will help narrow the commercial balance gap between the countries, will open up a huge market for Mexican exporters, and will allow China to provide financing for important heavy infrastructure projects in the near future. Grijalva estimates that during Peas administration, up to $81 billion coming from China could go into financing new industrial naval port complexes, airports, telecom projects, and railway transportation systems. A

joint declaration signed and issued by Pea Nieto and Xi on June 4 summarizes the amount of work already invested in the renewed Mexico-China relationship. The two leaders signed memorandums of understanding to formally establish cooperation in energy, mining, emerging industries, infrastructure, private sector collaboration, university alliances, trade, banking, and even the oil industry. In addition, it was announced that

sanitary measures have been met to reopen the Chinese market to pork from Mexico, and an agreement was reached to allow all forms of tequila into China. Additionally, to promote tourism in both countries, Pea Nieto and Xi expressed their mutual interest in expanding international flights connecting Mexico and China and in establishing a working relationship between their tourism ministries. In the political arena, Pea Nieto took the opportunity to amend Calderns diplomatic gaffe by ratifying the One China principle. Pea Nieto stated that it is Mexicos position that both Taiwan and the Tibet are part of Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are an internal issue for China. In the statement, both parties declared that given the improvement of diverse mechanisms in the bilateral cooperation, the conditions are such that Mexico-China relations can be elevated to a new level of benefit to both nations. They also established a calendar of working visits from high-level government officials to implement the agreements and scheduled future meetings during upcoming international forums including the UN, APEC and the G20. As President Xis visit shows, the coming

years are certain to bring Mexico and China diplomatically closer and to catalyze economic growth, trade and development in a mutually beneficial waywhile breaking Mexicos trade dependency on the U.S. market.

U Venezuela
A. Uniqueness: The lack of US attention is increasing Chinas influence Venezuela is a key country for their expanding power. Menendez 13 (Fernando is an economist and principal of The Cordoba Group
China is moving in next-door to the U.S. 10 May 2013 When concerns about a rising China are broached they are usually focused around that nations increasing economic, financial and military power in Asia. Another region
undergoing significant political and economic development, once considered the backyards of the United States, is less often cited. Latin America, however, is fast becoming a growing nub on Chinas

radar as a global power. U.S. preoccupation with the Middle East has led arguably to a decline in American power in Latin America and elsewhere. Economically, as Americas influence wanes in the southern hemisphere Chinas has grown. The shift can be seen in levels of loans, foreign direct investment and trade.

Fueling A Commodities Boom In its quest to fuel its growing economy, Chinas demand for commodities has generated a boom for the producer nations. Soybeans from Argentina, copper from Chile and Peru, tin from Bolivia, and oil and iron ore from Brazil have helped fuel these economies for the last decade, especially during the financial meltdown of 2008 when traditional markets were contracting and stagnating. The China Development Bank (CDB) and Sinopec (China Petroleum Company), for example, signed a 2009 agreement with Petrobras, Brazils state-owned oil company, for $10 billion in return for 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years. With the discovery of one of the worlds larg est offshore oilfields, Brazil will surely become a major oil supplier for China. Today China owns stakes in oilfields in Ecuador and has major investments in copper projects in Peru. By some reports China accounts for over $11 billion of Perus $41 billion invested in energy and minerals. China also loaned Venezuela a staggering $40

billion in exchange for oil deliveries to fuel its growing economy. In Michael Forsythe and Henry Sandersons new book, Chinas Superbank, the authors describe how Chen Yuan, the chairman of the CDB, handed Hugo Chvez a 600-page book filled with recommendations for building, running, and managing roads, ports, and railroads. Forsythe and
Sanderson argue that Chinas policy of paying generous amounts of cash for its raw materials and propping up local autocrats gives a whole new meaning to the term too big to fail. As the largest single overseas

investor in Venezuela, China tied the money to contracts with Chinese firms.
China is also fast becoming an alternative source of development funding. Its ability to lend long-term and the large amounts involved makes it an important and different player. In terms of infrastructure development, the China Development Bank has made substantive loans to develop roads, ports, railroads and other infrastructure that will secure it access to continuing flows of raw materials. According to research conducted by the Financial Times, the China Development Bank (CDB) has displaced the World Bank as the worlds largest development bank, lending billions around the world in pursuit of Chinas interests.

China is increasing engagement in Venezuela but its on the brink. Myers 13 (Margaret, Director of the China and Latin America program at the InterAmerican Dialogue. Graduate work at The George Washington University. Studied USChina relations at the Johns Hopkins University. The Future of China-Venezuela Relations, Saturday, March 30, 2013, Inter-American Dialogue, China has became a critical economic partner for Venezuela over the past decade . By means of the "China-Venezuela Joint Fund" and other mechanisms, China's policy banks have offered more in loans to Venezuela

than to any other country. But what is the likelihood of continued high-level, bilateral cooperation in a post-Chvez political environment? Tsinghua Universitys
Matt Ferchen, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Sun Hongbo, and Venezuelan journalist, Andrs Rojas Jimnez, debated the future of China-Venezuela relations at the Inter-American Dialogue on March 22nd. Sun

Hongbo opened with an optimistic view of the China-Venezuela relationship. Economic complementarity,
he suggested,

will ensure

cooperatio n between the two nations for the foreseeable future. With respect to Chinas $40-$50 billion in loans to Venezuela, Sun also foresees little risk, noting that Chinas loan contracts have sufficient precautions built in. According to Matt Ferchen, however, the strength of the ChinaVenezuela strategic partnership will likely be tested in the coming years .
China is unprepared for the possibility of significant political and economic instability in Venezuela, he added, and is fearful of losing its preferred status in a post-Chvez government. Ferchen agreed that economic

complementarity exists between China and Venezuela, and will play a role in future engagement, but suggested that the extent of future cooperation will depend on economic and political developments in Venezuela. Andrs Rojas Jimnez
explained that Chinas loans have done little to strengthen Venezuelas economy. Following the creation of the China Venezuela Joint Fund, oil exports to China jumped from 95,000 bpd in 2007 to 460,000 bpd in 2012. But Venezuelas external debt also increased considerably. In 2012, Chinese loans accounted for 25 percent of Venezuelas total external debt. Venezuela is also increasingly dependent upon oil exports for economic growth; exports of non-traditional goods are at the same levels as a decade ago. PdVSA, furthermore, has consistently fallen short of the eventual 800,000 bpd promised to China. Chinese entities recently criticized Venezuela for delays on certain projects, including some in the Orinoco. Panelists insisted that however relations progress, there is a need for greater transparency and accountability in financing agreements and loan disbursement. All agreed that China and Venezuela will be taking a

closer look at the nature of bilateral relations in the coming months.

U Cuba
A. US engagement in Cuba is down, allowing China to expand. Rowe, 6/15 (David, an attorney in Jamaica and Florida and an adjunct law professor
at the University of Miami, Is it Time For President Obama to Visit the Caribbean? 2013,
DIFFERENT US PRESIDENTS have had different attitudes to the Caribbean, from President Ronald Reagan, who made a high-profile visit to Jamaica (and ordered the invasion of Grenada to) to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, both of whom maintain special relationships with Haiti. But President Barack Obamas attitude to the

Caribbean has been characterized largely by disengagement . The biggest Caribbean issue for Obama seems to have been his repeated pledge to close the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where foreign-born terrorism suspects are currently detained. In April of 2009, Obama traveled to Trinidad and Tobago for the Fifth Summit of the Americas, pointing
to mutual respect between the United States and the Caribbean, and launching the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

The President also spoke about Cuba. Since then, however, US engagement with the Caribbean seems to have lessened as other powers like the United Kingdom and China have stepped up their presence . Four years after the Fifth Summit, US Vice President
Joe Biden arrived in Port of Spain to discuss regional security and energy. But Obama was conspicuous by his absence, particularly in light of the fact that Chinas President, Xi Jinping, actually visited the country just days after Bidens departure. The question is, why hasnt Obama visited the Caribbean on an official basis, other than a stop at an Organization of American States summit? There are a host of issues on which he could focus from Caribbean deportees to Caribbean crime to Caribbean debt and it seems that it is time to act.


L Generic
Chinas overall engagement & influence is growing because the US is absent. The plans economic focus competes with China. Romero & Barrionuevo 9 (Simon & Alexei, Deals Help China Expand Sway in
Latin America, April 16, 2009,
CARACAS, Venezuela As

Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America, China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted access to credit. In

recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazils national oil company $10 billion. The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come. Chinas trade with Latin America has grown quickly this decade,

making it the regions second largest trading partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washingtons influence in the hemisphere. This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis, said David Rothkopf, a former Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. The loans are an example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more active. Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the economic crisis, including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of clout that has suffered losses from the financial crisis. Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected to push Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba. Meanwhile, China is rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to commodities like soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes. One of Chinas new deals in
Latin America, the $10 billion arrangement with Argentina, would allow Argentina reliable access to Chinese currency to help pay for imports from China. It may also help lead the way to Chinas currency to eventually be used as an alternate reserve currency. The deal follows similar ones China has struck with countries like South Korea, Indonesia and Belarus. As the financial crisis began to whipsaw international markets last year, the Federal Reserve made its own currency arrangements with central banks around the world, allocating $30 billion each to Brazil and Mexico. (Brazil has opted not to tap it for now.) But smaller economies in the region, including Argentina, which has been trying to dispel doubts about its ability to meet its international debt payments, were left out of those agreements. Details of the Chinese deal with Argentina are still being ironed out, but an official at Argentinas central bank said it would allow Argentina to avoid usi ng scarce dollars for all its international transactions. The takeover of billions of dollars in private pension funds, among other moves, led Argentines to pull the equivalent of nearly $23 billion, much of it in dollars, out of the country last year. Dante Sica, the lead economist at Abeceb, a consulting firm in Buenos Aires, said the Chinese overtures in

the region were made possible by the lack of attention that the United States showed to Latin America during the entire Bush administration. China is also seizing opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders over which the United States holds some sway, like the Inter-American Development Bank, are pushing up against their limits. Just one of Chinas planned loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is

almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008. Brazil is expected to use the loan for offshore exploration, while agreeing to export as much as 100,000 barrels of oil a day to China, according to the oil company. The Inter-American bank, in which the United States has de facto veto power in some matters, is trying to triple its capital and increase lending to $18 billion this year. But the replenishment involves delicate negotiations among member nations, made all the more difficult after the bank lost almost $1 billion last year. China will also have a role in these talks, having become a member of the bank this year. China has also pushed into Latin

American countries where the United States has negligible influence, like

Venezuela. In February, Chinas vice president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Caracas to meet with President Hugo

Chvez. The two men announced that a Chinese-backed development fund based here would grow to $12 billion from $6 billion, giving Venezuela access to hard currency while agreeing to increase oil shipments to China to one million barrels a day from a level of about 380,000 barrels. Mr. Chvezs government contends the Chinese aid differs from other multilateral loans because it comes without strings attached, like scrutiny of internal finances. But the Chinese fund has generated criticism among his opponents, who view it as an affront to Venezuelas sovereignty. The fund is a swindle to the nation, said Luis Daz, a lawmaker who claims that China locked in low prices for the oil Venezuela is using as repayment. Despite forging ties to Venezuela and extending loans to other nations that have chafed at Washingtons clout, Beijing has bolstered its presence without bombast, perhaps out of an awareness that its relationship with the United States is still of paramount importance. But this deference may not last. This is China playing the long

game, said Gregory Chin, a political scientist at York University in Toronto. If this ultimately translates into political influence, then that is how the game is played.

US non-engagement is fueling Chinas influence, but its reversible. Mack 12 (Congressman Connie Mack, Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise Does
China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere? January 11, 2012, Chinas economic expansion is rapidly filling spaces vacated and ignored by the United States . In the Western Hemisphere, the lack of a coherent U.S. foreign policy has left the door wide open for a variety of actors. China hasnt hesitated. While the U.S. waited five years to pass free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, China has been working with Colombia on developing a coast-to-coast railroad as an alternative to the Panama Canal. While the
U.S. spends four years dithering over the Keystone XL pipeline, a slam-dunk energy project with another hemispheric allyCanada China has made preparations to buy Canadian oil through new pipelines and invested

heavily in national oil companies in Brazil and Venezuela. China has invested in Perus mining, oil, wood, fishing, and tourism sectors. Chinese groups have signed agreements in Brazil and Argentina to develop millions of acres of farmland to boost its food security. Chinas trade with Latin America has grown by double digits annually since 2006, while U.S. direct investment has dropped. China is an economic and political threat and has made significant gainsbut it is not too late. The Barack Obama administrations lack of leadership with regard to Latin America doesnt mean the U.S. must resign itself to a Chinese-centric hemisphere. Despite its economic might and influence, China doesnt enjoy the cultural and logistical connections with Latin America that the U.S. takes for granted. The

peoples of our two regions share values like freedom of speech, democracy and the hope for a safe and secure environment in which our children can prosper. Connections like these, with neighbors near our borders, should give the U.S. an unbeatable advantage. Its time the Obama team puts forth a foreign policy that take s

Latin America seriously or steps aside before its too late.

The plan crowds out Chinese influence market influence is key Johnson 5 (Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, October 24, 2005,
Today, another communist state-the People's Republic of



seeking trade, diplo-matic,

and military ties in Latin America and the Car-ibbean. The region is rich in natural resources and developing markets for manufactured goods and even arms. China does not currently pose a direct

military threat in Latin America and has steadily embraced market concepts, but it represents serious competition that could dilute U.S. influence . Washington could ignore this intrusion or attempt to contain it. Ignoring it leaves a vacuum for China to fill, while trying to contain it runs against America's own free market ideals. Instead, the United States can best look after its hemispheric interests and moderate China's presence by : Consolidating trade relations with Latin America and comprehensive relationships as opposed to narrow-interest diplomacy such as counternarcotics, Minimizing unproductive restrictions on assis-tance to U.S. neighbors, and Pressing harder for democratic and economic reforms, prioritizing support for these pur-poses, and reenergizing public diplomacy. China's Interest in the
removing protectionist U.S. trade barriers, Emphasizing

Americas China is the world's oldest continuous civiliza-tion with more than 3,500 years of written history. Its power has risen and declined, most notably in the mid-1800s, when the ruling Qing Dynasty crumbled, inviting rebellion and foreign interven-tion. At the end of World War II, the Nationalist government, weakened by a decade of war against Japan and wracked by corruption and incompe-tence, fought a civil war against the Chinese Com-munist Party and was defeated. By 1950, communist leaders like Mao Zedong believed their authoritarianism would return China to glory, a belief that expired after 30 million people starved to death in state-induced famines in the early 1960s and another 10 million perished in fanatical ideological campaigns. In December 1978, after several "great leaps" backward, Com-munist Party leader Deng Xiaoping introduced eco-nomic reforms that have steadily transformed the PRC into a remarkable hybrid-a "socialist market economy"-in essence, a communist state that uses market-based pricing principles. Feeding the Dragon. Twenty-five years into this experiment, China has the world's sixth-largest econ-omy, the third-largest defense budget according to some estimates, and the largest national population (1.3 billion people). According to the World Bank, its gross domestic product of $1.6 trillion is growing about 9 percent per year. China needs resources to feed its rapidly expanding economy, but it does not have sufficient oil, natural gas, aluminum, copper, or iron to satisfy its energy and manufacturing needs. Furthermore, it needs trade partners to buy its elec-tronics, apparel, toys, and footwear. While commu-nist China is embracing market concepts, it still has a non-market economy in which a disciplined totalitar-ian party retains full authority (through the central government) over non-state investment, import, export, and financial decisions. China's neighbors are competing for many of the same world markets, as are Europe and the United States. Latin America is a particularly promising prospect. It is relatively unindustrialized and has an abundance of raw materials. Moreover, authoritar-ian leaders and/or corrupt oligarchies control a number of governments. Signing purchase agree-ments with them is much easier than dealing with the panoply of private corporations found in more democratic countries. Challenging the United States. China's main rival for global

preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing Tai-wan's reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was isolated, but now plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere.
Besides status as a nuclear nation, it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds observer status in the Organization of American States. While China has become the second-largest U.S. trade

partner after Canada, it challenges U.S. influence wherever it can. In fact, it will

soon have more attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, "[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere, the Chinese are taking advantage of

failures of half-hearted mar-ket reforms and Washington's unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthusiasm. National Defense University
professor Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations in Latin America while Washington became the world's superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]

L Cuba
Cuba is key to Chinas development strategy theyre stepping up their engagement now. Hearn 9 (Adrian, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim. Chinas Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts, Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009,
China and Cuba: Reordering the Local China

is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more

valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is

a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an external potentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, China has become an important commercial and political partner for Cuba, though as Mao Xianglin of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences notes, Chinese officials are

not interested in replicating the Soviet experience: I think we have to recognize that although bartering with Venezuela and other countriesfor example doctors for oilis of great value to Cuba, it is not enough. There will never be a return to the Soviet model, and nor would this be a good idea. The Soviets essentially gave resources to Cuba for political reasons, but this is not sustainable and it creates a dependency. Using Chinese expertise Cuba could come

to produce electronic goods for sale to Latin America, but at the same time could also open its domestic market very gradually. I think both will happen (interview,

December 14, 2007). When Hu Jintao visited Cuba in November 2008, he donated $8 million to assist Cubas hurricane relief efforts, offered a $70 million credit for modernizing Cubas hospitals, and proposed 37 new projects for Chinese investment on the island. He also extended the deadline for the repayment of a $7 million credit granted in 1998 and deferred until 2018 the payment of Cubas trade imbalance with China accumulated prior to 1995. In the area of education, Hu affirmed that between 2006 and 2011, Cuba will have trained 5,000 Chinese students in medicine, tourism, and Spanish. Among Chinese economic activities in Cuba are sales to state-run

transport sector, nickel extraction, oil exploration, and industrial manufacturing. Local sources report that Chinese electronics manufacturers have built a three-story production
facility in Havana to compile small appliances for sale to the Cuban and Latin American markets, an objective supported by Chinese investment in Cubas transport and telecommunications infrastructure. This initiative is also supported by Ral Castros April 2008 lifting of restrictions on the domestic sale of televisions, VCRs, mobile phones, computers, and electronic appliances. This has legalized the sale of products that were already

widely in circulation through informal channels, effectively formalizing, expanding, and regulating a commercial sector with enormous growth potential between Cuba and China, where most of these products originate.

Increased engagement with Cuba crowds out China, which they perceive as critical to foreign policy goals. Perez 10 (JD Yale Law School 2010 David America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward:
A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis) The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all around the world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested a tremendous amount of soft power in Latin

America, where it is now the continent's third largest trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. n115 American disinterest in Latin America has convinced many countries to adopt a "Pacific view," whereby China steps in to fill the gap left by America's absence. n116 After signing a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United
States as that country's largest export market. China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. n117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at $ 140 billion. n118 Even despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next five years. China's interest in

Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese

officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010. n119 China also timed the release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American

relations to coincide with President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts China's growing relationship with Latin America and promises increased cooperation in scientific and technological research, cross-cultural educational exchanges, as well as political and economic exchanges. n120 As China's role in Latin America increases, American clout correspondingly decreases in terms of relative power. To be sure, the U.S. will remain the major powerbroker in the Americas for decades to come, but will increasingly have to make room for a new player. Given this diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily on diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply economic incentives and disincentives, such as bilateral trade agreements. (7B) China's Strategic Interest in Cuba China's presence in Cuba is rather significant: after Venezuela, China is Cuba's second-largest trading partner with $ 2.3 billion worth of goods exchanged.

n121 In fact, China purchases over 400,000 tons of Cuban sugar, as well as half its annual output of nickel, which is Cuba's top export. n122 In 2008, on a visit to Cuba, Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to not only defer for ten years some of Cuba's debt payments, but also to invest $ 80 million in the island's health industry. n123 Moreover, as long

as Taiwan is a [*225] thorny issue for U.S.-Sino relations, China will have a stake in Cuba. China is neurotic about the functional American presence in Taiwan and has made its intentions for the island known to everyone; the only thing standing between Beijing's re-appropriation of Taipei is Washington. An increased Chinese presence in Cuba might be a strategic move by Beijing to later leverage their presence on the island for a change in America's Taiwan policy.

L Cuba Embargo
Lifting the embargo stops Chinese influence. Berner 13 (Thomas, freelance writer and retired journalism professor. End the
Embargo on Cuba, The Spectator, 3.22.2013, The death of Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela, was a blow to his country, but it may have been a bigger one to the people of Cuba. Chavez was the

patron saint of Cuba, providing, among other things, subsidized oil to a country lacking the means to pay full freight. I was in Cuba when Chavez died and can attest that the country was in a state of shock. People were wondering if Chavezs successor would be as generous as Chavez. Instead of letting the Cubans fret, the United

States should seize this opportunity to befriend them by ending our embargo. China is another influential country in Cuba and I can see that

influence growing. Given that we once were ready to go to war over Soviet missiles in Cuba, why should now stand by and let China bunk 90 miles from our country? Embrace
Cuba now.

Lifting the embargo stops Chinese trade advantage. FFM 12 (Free Free Markets, Cuban Embargo and China, September 22, 2012,
"In a separate local television interview, Mr. Ryan also explained how he had come to change his mind and since 2007 has supported the embargo.", Ryan Criticizes Obamas Cuba Policy and Explains His Shift on the Issue, New York Times, September 22, 2012 Sometimes we conduct our foreign policy like it is still 1980 . I

Obama administration also supports the continued enforcement of the embargo. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Ryan are wrong. Who have we hurt with such a policy? Certainly not the Castro's. We hurt the ordinary citizen of Cuba who are not enemies. Further, at the same time we are increasing the presence of the United States in the Pacific rim much to the dismay of China. If I was in a leadership position in China I would quietly tell the President that I am not happy with the United States flexing its muscles so close to China's borders and, oh by the way, we have decided to increase trade with Cuba. If we don't start supporting Cuba more, China
understand the current

will . The Cuban people are our friends as are the people of Haiti.

L Cuba Embargo (Steel)

a. Lifting the embargo decks Chinese Steel. Cuba Standard, 10 (U.S. steel group uses embargo to hammer China, May 14th,
In written testimony during a House Ways and Means Committee hearing Thursday, a

U.S. steel trade group denounced Chinese steel imports containing Cuban nickel, the Export Law Blog first reported. At the same time, the group said the embargo puts U.S. stainless steel companies at a competitive disadvantage. China is the largest consumer of Cuban nickel. Nickel is a crucial ingredient in stainless steel. Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA) encouraged
stricter enforcement of the U.S. regulations on trade with Cuba, particularly with respect to China, the Washington -based group said in a press release. However, written testimony by the SSINA chairman also says that the embargo

hurts U.S. stainless steel companies. The U.S. embargo places the domestic specialty metals industry at a distinct competitive disadvantage by allowing one of its biggest foreign competitors an opportunity to avail itself of [Cuba's] nickel reserves, while simultaneously denying the U.S. industry the same access, said SSINA Chairman Sunil Widge in his testimony. As long as the embargo remains U.S. law, it
must be enforced, otherwise U.S. stainless steel producers and producers of other nickel-bearing metals will remain disadvantaged by the failure to apply the embargo. Citing section 515.204 of the Cuban assets control regulations, the group argues that the Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) can force importers to certify their stainless steel products dont include Cuban nickel. Three years ago, the Bush Administration announced efforts to crack down on imports of stainless steel products containing Cuban nickel. However, the only publicized recent nickel-related enforcement case involved the U.S. subsidiary of a Chinese company that directly trades nickel. In 2008, OFAC fined Minxia Non-Ferrous Metals. The latest instance in which Japanese and European exporters agreed to being screened for Cuban nickel by the United States was in the early 1980s, according to Export Law Blog author Clif Burns. Even if they were willing to cooperate, Chinese manufacturers would have a hard time truly certifying their products dont include any Cuban nickel, Burns argues. Notwithstanding SSINAs huffing and puffing about the moral imperative behind the Cuba embargo, the trade groups real interest has little to do with U.S. foreign policy and everything to do with Chinese competition, Burns writes in his blog. After all, the alleged competitive disadvantage of U.S.

producers who cant buy Cuban nickel could be solved tomorrow by lifting the embargo, something SSINAs doesnt even whisper as a possible solution to its issues.

b. The steel industry is the life-blood of their economy. SSINA, 8 (A voluntary trade association representing virtually all the producers of
specialty steel in North America, Specialty Steel industry of North America, October 2008, Chinas Specialty Steel Subsidies: Massive, Pervasive, and Illegal, SSINA, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS DOWNSTREAM INDUSTRIES IN CHINAS SPECIALTY STEEL SECTOR TO BE PILLAR INDUSTRIES THAT ARE THE LIFE-BLOOD OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY While China has
taken deliberate steps since the late 1970s to reform Chinas economy, such as allowing certain foreign investment into the country and allowing SOEs a small degree of autonomy, a fundamental element in Chinas drive

to become a leading international economic power has been the Chinese governments extensive industrial policies that direct and manage the countrys economic and industrial development by defining which industries, enterprises, and products should be targeted for preferential support and controlled by the government.9 The overarching objective of Chinas industrial policies has been to foster the growth of certain industrial sectors that the Chinese government considers are essential to the countrys overall

economic prosperity and social stability, while maintaining control of those sectors by encouraging the expansion of SOEs in the industries and protecting them from foreign competition. The Chinese government has identified 14 key industries and seven pillar industries that are the life-blood industries of the national economy.10 These favored

industries are supported by the Chinese government through its industrial policies.11 The industries designated by China as pillar industries, for instance, include the automotive, electronics, oil and gas, aviation and aerospace, construction, pharmaceutical, and machinery industries. Id. Primary downstream consumers of specialty

steel are among the seven pillar industries supported by the Chinese government through its industrial policies.12 Indeed, given specialty steels resistance to corrosion, fire, and heat, hygienic qualities, aesthetic appearance, strengthtoweight advantage, ease of fabrication, and impact resistance, it is an essential material consumed by a broad range of industries in numerous applications:13

L Mexico
Increase engagement and improved relations with Mexico blocks China. Fischer 12 (Howard, Analyst for Capitol Media, Fox says US-Mexico ties deter
China's influence 9/14/12
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said

the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico or get used to the idea of China setting the

- including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor -

international agenda on its own terms."The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the East," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico, he said.If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what
circumstances. "It has to be based on humanism, on compassion, on love, on friendship, on neighborhood and on partnership that we have together," Fox said. "Otherwise, we will keep losing the jobs to the East."

China & Mexico working collaboratively to access US markets US involvement prevents that partnership. Hearn 9 (Adrian, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim. Chinas Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts, Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009, Expanded cooperative ventures with Chinese enterprises, supported or not by an FTA, could enable Mexico to develop mutually beneficial production chains capable of penetrating global markets. Increased intra-industry trade could open access routes to Asian markets and foster the integration of new technologies, thereby reducing face-to-face competition in third markets like the United States (ECLAC 2006). As Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez recently put it, The question is not whether Mexico is losing the U.S. market, but rather how we can establish a strategic relationship with China to penetrate that market together.[...] Many Mexican business executives already understand that they must invest in China with Chinese partners and invest in Mexico with those same partners. Then they can go after the U.S. market together...We are developing three-way businesses between Mexico, China and the United States, and the participants have begun to understand

what globalization of trade means and how to establish a structure that benefits everyone (IADB 2004). Such

a strategy would require careful legal planning in order to avoid infringement of U.S. antitrust
laws, but in principle it is a reasonable solution that resembles the existing practice of shipping components into the NAFTA zone and the special economic areas of Panama (such as the Howard Farfan facility) for assembly and tax-free entry into the United States. Considering the rapid growth of the domestic Chinese

market, Mexican manufacturers should keep abreast of emerging trends and opportunities there, with a view to commercial expansion into niche areas. Costa Rica has shown what

can be achieved, exporting locally manufactured Intel computer chips around the world, including to China (Oppenheimer 2008). As discussed below, some important initial steps toward greater Mexican knowledge of the Chinese market have been advanced through educational exchange and research scholarships.

L Mexico/Cuba
Cuba and/or Mexico are economically and politically key to China. Hearn 9 (Adrian, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim. Chinas Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts, Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009, In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and Cuba are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, for China both hold high strategic value. Examining Chinas relations with Mexico and Cuba opens an analytic window into the way that

bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation programs have adapted to distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gathered during three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positive and negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has produced. It also suggests that China has effectively tailored bilateral programs to local

environments to advance common economic, political, and cultural objectives. Chinas economic impact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has

driven up commodity prices, benefiting exporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang 2005, Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of Jos Luis Len Manrquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and the countries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountable competition from a tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results in part from the structural adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperation with China. To examine this issue in depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de Amrica Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacfico (Latin American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) brought together scholars from IADB member countries to debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments in order to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief (REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that although

Chinas emergence represents a valuable opportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a raw materials corner.
Similarly, a book from the Inter-American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean, argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-term strategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism and education sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greater coordinating role for Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as a backlash to previous import substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export. One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount,

Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed
in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship

between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges

and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

L Venezuela
Venezuela is key China protects its power with energy, agriculture, and telecommunications engagement. Ellis 5 (R. Evan, a fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, he holds a Ph.D. in political
science with a comparative politics specialization in ethnic violence, Chinas role in Latin America US Senate Report,
It can be argued that Venezuela

is currently Chinas principal strategic partner in Latin America, both in terms of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the two countries.29 China currently has over $1.5 billion invested in

Venezuelaprior to the recently announced $100 million in investment commitments, the largest investment position of any country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between China and Venezuela increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2004,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005, based on agreements signed during the state visit of Venezuelas populist president Hugo Chvez Frias to China during the 2004 Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in January 2005.33 These figures reflect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560 million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34 The Chinese relationship

with Venezuela reflects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but

also the receptivity of President Chvez. His interest in developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. influence in the region, make him a strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his high- profile state visit to China, Chvez signed a number of accords in which he committed Venezuela to put its petroleum production at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.36 On the other hand, he is also a potential threat to Chinese interests , insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and anti- globalist causes could foment instability in Chinas trading partners in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the region.

Chinas principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum products. Exports of Venezuelan petroleum products to China registered a 75

percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640 million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to China is limited and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects are under consideration which could sidestep these constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacific portseither across Colombia or Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit of Chvez to China in December 2004, and leveraging the close working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39 Venezuela will give China access to 15 mature oil fields, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese firms to develop and exploit.40 As part of the accord, China will invest $350 million toward bringing these fields on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build refineries on Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the shortfalls in technical management that it created when it fired half of all workers in its state oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing the Chinese to directly develop these fields, Venezuela will be able to almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical capacity to do so, selling significant quantities of oil to China while still serving its traditional markets. As a compliment to its

assistance to Venezuela in extracting its oil, China is also investing $60 million in a number of projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43

During a scheduled state visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong and senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will analyze the viability of even greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44 A third significant element of Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase of Venezuelan ormulsin, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of electricity. Ormulsin is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or no value because of the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven, S.A (Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5 million metric tons of ormulsin per year by the end of 2004. In conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special new type of power plant capable of burning ormulsin in the Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal finalized in 2004, Chinas commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsin annually from Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the Venezuelan ormulsin, which it is able to purchase at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market. Moreover, Venezuela is Chinas natural partner for the ormulsin deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses the worlds largest proven ormulsin reservesalmost double those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source. China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the development of mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan firm, Corpozulia, are slated to sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end of January 2005 that would use Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48

Beyond the domain of extractive industries, the Chinese- Venezuelan partnership has extended to the agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving agricultural productivity coincide with Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the

accords reached between the two nations during the Christmas 2004 visit of Chvez to China, the Asian giant has agreed to provide Venezuela with agricultural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food production.49 In

keeping with the vertically integrated strategy that China has pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to sources of supply for strategic materials, China announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping Venezuela to transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its telecommunications industry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to space. As part of the series of accords reached during the Christmas 2004 visit of Hugo Chvez to
China, the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela, helping the nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader discussions of how China could help Venezuela to develop and modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan telecommunications firm, CVG Telecom.52

L Venezuela Oil
US oil engagement in Venezuela crowds out China. Ziegler 6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. THE ENERGY FACTOR IN CHINAS FOREIGN POLICY, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006.

limited supplies of oil and natural gas have played an important role in broadening that countrys interests beyond the East Asian region .[16] Chinas state-run oil companies, supported by the government, have pursued a strategy of buying energy foreign policy has focused on developing bilateral ties with important selected countries, but it is
properties around the world in an attempt to secure oil and gas supplies. Chinese increasingly willing to work through multilateral institutions with other oil consuming nations. As a major energy consumer and importer, China shares Americas goals of ensuring reliable energy supplies at moderate supplies. Of

Beijing is competing with the United States and other energy importers for these finite resources. Moreover, Chinas pursuit of energy security frequently clashes with U.S. national security interests, as Beijing courts oilrich countries regarded as pariahs by Washington, such as Sudan, Venezuela ,
course, Burma, and Iran.

China specifically depends on Venezuela for oil. Ziegler 6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. THE ENERGY FACTOR IN CHINAS FOREIGN POLICY, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006.
With the Middle East in turmoil, and Russian pipelines uncertain, Chinese

companies have increasingly sought out business opportunities with African and Latin American oil producing states. The share of Chinas crude oil imports from Africa increased from 8.5 percent to 28

percent from 1996 to 1999.[39] East Asian imports of crude from West Africa for the first three months of 2004 were 1.3 to 1.4 million bpd, considerably higher than the one million bpd average in 2003. Most of this was driven by Chinas surging demand for sweet crude.[40] Chinas interest in Africa during the Cold War was to present an alternative to the superpower rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union. Competition then was for ideological influence with the developing world, through such projects as the Tanzania-Zambia railway and aid to Mozambique, in which China presented itself as a defender of the poorest Third World states. This ideologically driven approach declined after Dengs pragmatic market reforms were begun, and policy toward the African continent now is driven more by a blend of political and economic interests. The political side of Chinas recent attention to Africa is a response to Taiwans efforts to spread largesse in exchange for diplomatic recognition from smaller nations on the continent.[41] Chinas search for new energy supplies also accounts for a significant part of Beijings Africa policy. In 2002 China provided $1.8 billion in development assistance to African countries, while Chinas trade with the continent reached $12.4 billion.[42] China can help

Africas energy exporting states by providing direct investment and technology. In turn, China receives much-needed oil and other raw materials, in addition to a more visible presence on the continent. In February

2004 President Hu Jintao visited Algeria, Egypt and Gabon, all major oil producers. In Algeria, Hu and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika signed a framework energy agreement and accords on technological cooperation and educational exchanges, and China extended a preferential loan worth $48 million. Major Chinese projects in Algeria include a CNPC refining agreement worth $350 million, a $525 million contract with Sinopec to develop the Zarzaitine oil field in the

Sahara, and a contract for China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company to build an oil refinery near Adrar. Chinese firms are involved in the construction of an air terminal at Hourari Boumedienne airport, a teaching hospital in Oran, and some 55,000 apartments. Algeria is eager to increase its output from the current one million bpd to 1.5 million bpd, and China is a willing customer.[43] Gabon has far less oil than Algeria (current production, at 270,000 bpd, is down more than a third from the peak year 1997), but it is still important given Chinas status as a latecomer to the ranks of oil importing nations. During Hus 2004 visit Total Gabon and Chinas Unipec (a subsidiary of Sinopec) signed the first contact for the delivery of Gabon crude, and Sinopec has exploration plans for the West African nation.[44] Sudan is a key energy producing state for China in Africa. Government-sponsored massacres in the western region of Darfur have resulted in U.S. economic sanctions, and most major oil companies have reduced their presence in this troubled country. China resists criticism that its energy investments in Sudan have funded the brutal Janjaweed militias, arguing that China and Sudan have normal business relations. Sudan has received the bulk of Chinese investment in Africa, but Beijing argues this is simply normal business relations. Chinas National Petroleum Corporation has developed a plan to invest $1 billion in upgrading Sudans refineries and pipelines. Approximately $700 million of this would go toward constructing a 750 kilometer pipeline from the Kordofan field to the coast, while the remainder would be used to increase capacity at the Khartoum refinery.[45] Sudan only supplies a small fraction of Chinas oil imports, but it is crucial as a base for energy development in Africa. The African oil producing states have relatively backward energy technologies and need foreign investment to modernize their facilities. In some cases, such as Sudan, U.S.-imposed sanctions and pressures from human rights organizations have led Western oil firms to pull out, giving Chinese companies a chance to establish a foothold. The Chinese government provides foreign assistance to complement the investment from its oil companies. For example, the Chinese have financed administrative offices in Gabon and the Ivory Coast, an airport terminal in Algeria, and communications networks in Ethiopia.[46] Chinese involvement in Latin America is small but

growing, and much of the interest can be attributed to the continents raw materials, including oil and gas. Beijing has requested permanent observer status in the Organization of American

States. In 2004 the Brazilian oil major Petrobras invited Sinopec to bid on an offshore bloc, to conduct oil exploration. Petrobras plan is to contribute technology, while the Sinopec Group would provide funding for the joint exploration venture. China is reported willing to contribute one billion dollars to refurbish Brazilian ports, in exchange for oil and raw materials. Brazils President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva provided political support for the project during his May 2004 visit to Beijing.[47] China is Brazils third largest trading partner, after the United States and Argentina. Venezuela is

South Americas largest producer of crude, and PetroChina has identified Venezuela as one of the top four countries from which it expects to obtain oil over the next seven years . Venezuela under President Hugo Chavez is highly critical of the United States, although the country continues to supply well over one million barrels of oil per day to the U.S. In 2000 Venezuela signed an agreement to export 6.5 million tons per year of orimulsion, a coal substitute, for use in Chinas thermal power plants and steel mills. The deal was touted as greatly expanding Venezuelas exports of this unique form of energy. However, the Venezuelan Energy Ministry suspended orimulsion production in mid-2004 as unprofitable.[48] In June 2004, Chinas ambassador to Caracas has public reiterated his countrys goal of developing large-scale energy projects with Venezuela. But this country, like Middle Eastern oil producers, is volatile, with major labor unrest cutting oil production sharply in 2002 and 2003.

L Energy
Chinas energy security depends on competitive oil access in regions not currently invested in by the US the plan would freak out Chia. Blumenthal 8 (Dan is a resident fellow at AEI. Concerns with Respect to China's
Energy Policy, July 1, If the Chinese perception of energy security as a zero-sum game persists alongside suspicion of U.S. strategic intentions, SinoU.S. relations will become more competitive . If China continues to grow richer and stronger, Beijing will develop
capabilities to defend its oil supply, just as other rising powers have done. While such a development need not inevitably lead to conflict with the United States, barring changes in Chinas national aspirations, Washington is likely to view greater Chinese power projection capability as threatening. The United States is engaging China in

countless attempts to cooperate on energy security in such areas as clean coal and the U.S.China Oil and Gas Industry Forum. But these initiatives seem to be having a limited impact on Chinas strategic perceptions. Such efforts should continue, but Washington should be humble about its ability to change Chinas policy. As
long as China vies for preeminence in Asia, it will view Washington as a threat standing in the way of that ambition. Beijings strategies will be conceived with an America threat in mind. Because energy policy is closely

tied to foreign policy, China will only change its approach to energy security if it accepts the current system of international politics. Beijings Perceptions Chinas

concern over energy security has become significantly more pal- pable since it became a net oil importer in 1993. But fears of containment accelerated since the United States launched the war on terror. For many Chinese strategists, the United States is boxing China in along its periphery, with a presence in Central Asia; partnerships with India, Pakistan, Japan, Korea, and Australia; and increased engagement with Vietnam and the Phil- ippines. Americas objective is said by some to be to prevent Chinas influ- ence from rising in the region.9 Washingtons deployments and increased presence in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East have fueled the Chinese perception of a contain- ment strategy that includes impeding Chinese access to oil. Although Beijing had initially supported U.S. operations in the region, China became increasingly suspicious of the American presence once the United States began to encourage Central Asian states to undertake political reform and the color revolutions unfolded.10 The turbulence that China assumes will accompany political reform in Central Asia is perceived in Beijing to place its resource suppliers at risk and threaten Chinese Communist Party regime stability. An overwhelming reliance on Middle Eastern suppliers has compounded Chinese anxiety over energy security. In particular, American naval control of regional sea lines of communication, through which most of Beijings crude passes, is seen as a troubling vulnerability.11 The fact that over 80 per- cent of the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRC) oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca in particular has caused some alarm in the Chinese media, who refer to it as the Malacca dilemma.12 Zhao Nianyu of the state coun- cilrun Shanghai Institute for International Studies pointed to the Regional Military Security Initiative (RMSI)a collective security exercise to protect the sea lanes that was proposed in 2004as a first step by the U.S. military to garrison the Strait under the guise of counterterrorist measures.13 It should be noted that the RMSI was mischaracterized by the media and soon scrapped as sovereignty-sensitive Indonesia and Malaysia quickly stepped up antipiracy measures such as patrols and aerial surveillance. Chinese responses to an increased sense of vulnerability, as James Hol- mes and Toshi Yoshihara have documented, have included an important debate about the necessity of sea control for a nation reliant upon foreign commerce. Officers writing in Chinese military journals speak in Maha- nian terms: [he] who controls the seas controls the world;14 the command of communications on the sea . . . is vital for the future and destiny of the nation;15 it is extremely risky for a major power such as China to become overly dependent on foreign import without adequate protection.16 Some Chinese scholars, such as Zhang Wenmu of the Center for Strategic Stud- ies at Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics, also advocate naval expansion. Zhang has bluntly stated that [China] must build up our navy as quickly as possible to prepare for sea battlethe way in which many sea- faring nations have previously resolved economic disputes.17 In some quarters of the PLA, even Taiwan is viewed in geostrategic terms because its acquisition would ease Chinas breakout to the open ocean. For General Wen Zongren of the PLA Academy of Sciences, regaining control of Taiwan would be of far reaching significance to breaking international forces blockade against Chinas maritime security. . . . Only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about Chinas rise. . . . China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development.18 The Chinese view of Washington as an obstacle to its rise reinforces mer- cantilist inclinations. Why would America not use its dominance to starve China of its economic lifeline if Washington objected to Chinas behavior? America controls the sea lane and the shipping chokepoints. From Beijings perspective, the oil weapon is a potent one in Americas arsenal. Americas oil weapon would be especially threatening if China thought its actions would provoke a response, for example in a Taiwan, South China Sea, or Japan

contingency. A China that believes Washington is intent on containment will inevitably view its energy supply lines as insecure. Given the salience of these perceptions of geopolitics, Chinas energy policy is troubling but not altogether surprising. Chinas Energy Policy and the Rogues To circumvent Americas perceived control

of the energy market, Beijing is pursuing relationships with oil producers isolated by Washington. China views oil diplomacy, particularly the formation of special relation- ships with oil producers, as an important element of its energy security strategy. Sudan, Iran, and Burma are cases in point.

China needs Latin American oil the plan prevents their development. Blumenthal 8 (Dan is a resident fellow at AEI. Concerns with Respect to China's
Energy Policy, July 1, The tremendous increase in Chinas appetite for energy, and the response to this by regional powers, is changing the dynamics of international politics.
Over the past two decades, the growth in Chinas demand for natural resources has been dramatic. Twenty years ago China was East Asias largest oil exporter; now it is the worlds second largest oil importer. Accord- ing to various estimates, in the last two years the increase in Chinas energy demand has made up anywhere from 2040 percent of worldwide growth. Chinas expanding portion of the worldwide demand for energy

and other natural resources helps to explain Chinas booming presence on the international stage. Chinas share of worldwide aluminum, nickel, and iron ore con- sumption, which are now each approximately 20 percent, doubled from 1990 to 2000 and will probably double again by the decades end.1 As China scours the globe for energy resources, it has become a new player in some important regions. It receives between 40 and 45 percent of its energy imports from the Middle East,
11 percent from Iran alone. More than 30 percent of its oil now comes from Africa. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have worked hard to secure and protect Chinas far-flung invest- ments. Through high-level diplomacy, economic aid, and military relations, Chinese leaders have increased Beijings influence in oil -

producing states. As a latecomer to the world energy consumption game, Beijing has entered markets forbidden
the United States: for example,

to Americans. Some of these relationships have strength- ened the hand of dangerous regimes looking for an alternative to

Chinas presence in Latin American resource markets no longer will the United States be the dominant

has allowed Hugo Chavez to boast that

consumer of Venezuelan oil ; now, [Venezuela is] free and place[s] this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland.2 Washington is concerned that China is

underwriting dangerous and repressive dictatorships from Khartoum to Tehran. Its response, within the framework of a diplomacy that encourages China to become a responsi- ble stakeholder in international affairs, is to persuade China to embrace the international energy market rather than lock-up upstream resources. The United States is also trying to convince China that supporting dictators in oil-producing states is not conducive to the long-term stability of the international system and does not even enhance Beijings own oil supply security. As Chinese energy investments expand around the globe, Chinese strat- egists and officials are debating options for securing Chinas oil supply. This debate is unfolding in the context of Beijings larger debate regarding Chi- nas strategic direction. To be sure, the Chinese energy debate has produced some policies consistent with evolving international norms. For example, Beijing is constructing a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, participating in the spot oil market, and making efforts to increase energy efficiency at home and therefore decrease demand. Still, some major elements of Chinas energy security

policy remain attempts to lock-up energy supplies at the source, develop strategic relationships with oil producers, and develop the military capability to deter hostile supply disruptions.3 The policy is informed by suspicion of the United States and regionally powerful nations including Japan and India, as well as by the economic nationalist impulse that China should have as much control as possible over its own strategic resources. Beijing perceives the United States to be opposed to key Chinese strategic objectives . China sees Washington as standing in the way of unification with Taiwan and suspects that the United States has a longer-term objective of containing Chinas rise. This perception reinforces a

widespread Chinese belief that the United States controls the oil market and will manipulate it to Chinas detriment. Moreover, many in Beijing believe that the United

States will use its dominance at sea to interrupt fuel supplies should China behave in a manner that displeases Washington. These views about American policy help to explain why China has not moved more toward the liberal end of the economic policy spectrum.4


Economic presence is zero-sum US economic engagement directly competes with Chinas power. Malik 6 (Mohan, PhD in International Relations, "China's Growing Involvement in
Latin America," June 12,
With the United States preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has obviously been busy carving out a large sphere of influence for itself in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With the presence of China being felt everywhere, from the backwaters of the Amazon to mines in the Andes, U.S. dominance in its own backyard is no

longer unquestioned or unrivaled. Opinion is divided on whether China's economic engagement is Doctrine, while others are more skeptical. Over the long term, Chinese intentions in Latin America may not be as benign as some China-watchers suggest. Nor can China's expansion be equated with Japan's or Spain's interest in Latin America because of the highly competitive nature of the U.S.-China relationship. Beijing calculates that one of the consequences of the burgeoning Sino-Latin American trade and resource dependency will be a widening of the gap between U.S. and Latin American interests . As U.S. Deputy

guided only by commercial interests or is a ruse to divert attention from Beijing's geostrategic goals in the region. Some contend that the Chinese presence in Latin America marks the end of the Monroe

Assistant Defense Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Pardo-Maurer points out: "China has its own set of political, economic and military interests, requiring us to carefully distinguish between legitimate commercial initiatives and the possibility of political or diplomatic efforts to weaken the democratic alliances we have forged." While

Beijing's forays do not indicate a seismic change in the balance of power within Latin America, the very presence of China does make U.S. diplomacy difficult. Increasingly, " the China option" affords Latin American countries greater room for maneuver and an additional source of leverage vis--vis Washington . While the Chinese may not want to be drawn into Venezuela, Brazil or Cuba's problems with the United States, that does not mean that these countries will not play "the China card" in their relations with the United States. Likewise, the revival of the old ideological debate over which political system -- Chinese authoritarianism or Western democracy -- delivers more people from poverty, and whether wealth or elections are a greater measure of freedom does not bode well for Washington's efforts to promote transparency and democracy. Beijing's strategic interests and unconditional investments prop up many authoritarian regimes, thereby undercutting Washington's ability to persuade them to change their behavior. Just as the United States can no longer take the Latin American countries' allegiances for granted, its access to the region's resources is also far from assured. Washington is increasingly concerned over
Beijing's efforts to "lock up" oil and mineral supplies with new ventures in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and Russia, and the Middle East. Hong Kong-based Takungpao News recently quoted General Xiong Guangkai, the former PLA deputy chief of staff, as saying that "in the long term, the strategic race for the world's energy may result in regional tension and even trigger a military clash." In particular, Beijing's newly cultivated energy alliances with populist left-wing leaders in Latin America have caused alarm in Washington and prompted the dispatch in May 2006 of Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, to hold first-ever talks with his Chinese counterpart on China's role in a region that some analysts fear could become a site for great power rivalry.

Economic engagement is zero-sum US involvement takes away investment opportunities and finite markets from China that they need for growth. Farnsworth 12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in
Washington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas. Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012,
There is no other region of the world where the U.S. pursues a similar course, nor would any other regional policy and advocacy community accept it as the most appropriate foreign policy framework.4 So far, we have gotten away with it: in the absence of strategic challenges from the region, this policy approach has sufficed. But we may not have that luxury much longer. As the U.S. has continued to look beyond this hemisphere in pursuit of what are perceived to be more urgent foreign policy goals, China has entered the region aggressively and is changing the

game. The expansion of Chinese trade and investment with Latin America is a new economic and commercial challenge in a previously consolidated market. On the positive side, to the extent that it has contributed to regional growth and kept financial contagion from
the global economic crisis at bay, Chinas engagement with the region has been beneficial. An economically growing region means that the pie is expanding for everyone, including the United States. That is a global public good, which International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Christine Lagarde acknowledged during her late 2011 travel to the region. Nonetheless, for the U.S., individual investment opportunities and market

share are being lost to China, whose share of Latin American trade grew from less than 2 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2010. Over the same period, the U.S. went from 53 to 39 percent of Latin American trade. To paraphrase Obama, this is not ideologyits math. While the U.S. remains the top trading partner overall, the challenge is readily apparent. In a postCold War world, where global competition is as much economic as military, the inability or unwillingness to contend for markets abroad has strategic implications. Complacently watching as established markets are captured by others is inexplicable, particularly when some of those markets were originally developed by years of patient, taxpayerfinanced efforts to reduce violence, build capacity and support democracy. Just when the U.S. should be reaping the reward, others are swooping in to gain the advantage. From a foreign policy perspective, the story is even more compelling. The reality is this: Chinas still-early but growing efforts in the Americas provide Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options that reduce U.S. leverage to promote open market, democratic values. This is not about exporting revolution or communism or any such thing. In fact, Chinas
efforts in the Americas are not driven by whether the potential partner is communist, populist, autocratic, or democratic. Otherwise, the Chinese would have stronger economic and political relations with Cuba and the other Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra AmricaTratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas ALBA) countries (primarily Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) than with Brazil, Chile and Peru . But

China goes where the natural resources and primary commodities are and, unlike the actions of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, cares little about the nature of the government that controls them. The Chinese are not necessarily looking for a political relationship, nor do they have much sympathy for ideologically driven regional leaders, some of whom they regard as buffoons. Rather, they are looking for economic benefits based on the domestic political calculus of the leadership in Beijing.

EE Key
Economic engagement key to overall influence and relations. Zhang 12 (Kunsheng, Assistant Foreign Minister of China On Strengthening Chinas
Relations with Latin American and Caribbean Countries under New Situation, CIIS, Oct 30, 2012, Second, the convergence of interests between the two sides is deepening with the sustained economic development of China and Latin America and the
Caribbean. Since China and Latin America and the Caribbean are facing the tasks of developing economy and improving peoples livelihood,

economic and trade cooperation is the most vibrant and

promising field in developing relations between the two sides . With the increasingly strong complementarity of economy and trade between China and Latin America and the Caribbean, their pragmatic cooperation has entered a new stage. Particularly, in

coping with the international financial crisis, China and Latin America and the Caribbean have adopted proper measures. In general, the economies of China and Latin America and the Caribbean have maintained stable and rapid growth, thus becoming important engines driving the recovery of the world economy. The two sides have grasped the opportunities and reached a great number of pragmatic cooperative projects. These projects are playing an active role in promoting common development and in bringing tangible benefits to the peoples of the two sides. We can see the effects in

the following three aspects: The trade is continuing to grow rapidly. China has become the second largest trading partner of Latin American and Caribbean

countries, while the Latin American and Caribbean region is also one of regions with fastest growth of exports to China. In 2000, the trade volume between the two sides exceeded US$ 10 billion, hitting US$ 12.6 billion; the volume exceeded US$ 100 billion in 2007; it surpassed US$ 200 billion in 2011, hitting a record high of US$ 241.5 billion. In the first half of 2012, the trade volume of the two sides hit US$ 124.8 billion, up 17.5%. It is expected that in the next five years, the trade volume between the two sides will exceed US$ 400 billion. The trade between the two sides is relatively balanced, with the trade structure getting more optimized. Chinas exports to Latin America and the Caribbean are mostly mechanical and electrical products and high-tech products, while its imports from this region are mostly minerals for energy use and agricultural products. China hopes and is ready to import more high value-added products from Latin American and Caribbean countries. China has signed and implemented free trade agreements with Chile, Peru and Costa Rica, and reached an agreement with Colombia on a joint feasibility study in launching a bilateral free trade agreement. The

two-way investment is vibrant. In recent years, expanding mutual investment has become the consensus of the governments and entrepreneurs of China and Latin America and the Caribbean. The Chinese government

proactively encourages and supports competitive and reputable enterprises to invest in this region. As a result, Chinese enterprises are expanding the investment scale and widening the scope for investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to statistics released by Chinas Ministry of Commerce, by December 2011, the non-financial direct investment by China in Latin America and the Caribbean totaled US$ 54 billion, involving the fields of energy, resources, agriculture, manufacturing and processing, etc. In the meantime, the investment in China by Latin American and Caribbean countries is also growing. By the end of 2011, the number of investment projects in China by Latin American and Caribbean countries totaled 27,875, with the cumulative actual investment amounting to US$ 153.3 billion, accounting for 13.1% of the global cumulative actual investment in China. The financial cooperation

exhibits good momentum. The relevant financial institutions of China have stepped up efforts to provide

financing support for the economic and trade cooperation between China and Latin America and the Caribbean, and supported key projects in infrastructure, energy, mining, agriculture and social development for Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Peoples Bank of China, Chinas central bank, signed a 70 billion yuan (or 38 billion pesos) bilateral currency swap agreement with the Central Bank of Argentina and a 190 billion yuan (or R$ 60 billion) bilateral currency swap agreement with the Central Bank of Brazil. The two sides also stepped up consultation and exchanges on macroeconomic situation and economic and financial policies, and supported commercial banks to establish bank branches in each others countries. In June 2012, when visiting Latin America, Premier Wen Jiabao declared that China will initiate a cooperation fund with the first tranche of US$ 5 billion between the two sides, and China will provide a special loan of US$ 10 billion to facilitate the cooperation in infrastructure development, creating favorable conditions for expanding the economic and trade cooperation between the two sides.

LA Key
Latin America key to Chinas global strategy. Zhang 12 (Kunsheng, Assistant Foreign Minister of China On Strengthening Chinas
Relations with Latin American and Caribbean Countries under New Situation, CIIS, Oct 30, 2012, The Chinese Government made public its first policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008. The document stressed that China views its relations with the region from a strategic heigh t and seeks to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common
development with countries in the region. It was the third time for China to issue a policy paper on a region following the release of such documents on the EU and Africa. It

showed that China gives top priority and is strategically committed to developing relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. During his trip to the region in June 2012, Premier Wen Jiabao put forward a series of important initiatives and measures on deepening ties. His proposals, which received a positive response from state leaders and people from all walks of life in Latin American and Caribbean countries, charted the course for the development of Chinas relations with these countries at a higher level.

Mistrust Link Magnifier

China perceives any action as competitive because of distrust and suspicion. Blumenthal 8 (Dan is a resident fellow at AEI. Concerns with Respect to China's
Energy Policy, July 01, 2008, Still, some major elements of Chinas energy security policy remain attempts to lock-up energy supplies at the source, develop strategic relationships with oil producers, and develop the military capability to deter hostile supply disruptions.3 The policy is informed by suspicion of the United States and regionally powerful nations including Japan and India, as well as by the economic nationalist impulse that China should have as much control as possible over its own strategic resources. Beijing perceives the United States to be opposed to key Chinese strategic objectives . China sees Washington as standing in the way of unification with Taiwan and suspects that the United States has a longer-term objective of containing Chinas rise. This perception reinforces a widespread Chinese belief that the United States controls the oil market and will manipulate it to Chinas detriment. Moreover, many in Beijing believe that the United States will use its dominance at sea to interrupt fuel
supplies should China behave in a manner that displeases Washington. These views about American policy help to explain why China has not moved more toward the liberal end of the economic policy spectrum.4


# - Chinese Growth
Chinese influence key to secure Latin American resources key to growth. Lettieri 5 (Michael, research associate, "Bush goes to Beijing, China goes to Latin
America" Council on Hemispheric Affairs -- November 14 -- Latin Americas Strategic Importance to China.
As Chinas economy has boomed,

racking up continuous growth rates of 9%, and its population has become increasingly urbanized, the countrys need

for raw materials has skyrocketed. The need was exacerbated by the decision to become a fully

motorized consumer economy, meaning that in short order China would require in the order of twice of its present level of consumption of petroleum. It is relevant to note that today China is the third largest manufacturer of automobiles in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that according to the Washington Post, Beijing has estimated that by 2020 the country would need 600 million tons of crude oil annually. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in a report in Februarys issue of Poder magazine, China has displaced the United States as the worlds largest

consumer of most industrial raw materials, including copper, aluminum, nickel, platinum, and iron ore. An Embarrassment of Riches. Latin America offers in abundance many of those key resources now coveted by China, and its history and experience of serving as a raw-goods-exporting economic enclave for the industrialized metropolis be it Spain, the U.K. or the U.S., has been at different stages of its history further enhances the regions appeal to Beijing. In its eagerness to secure access to the Latin American resources it so prizes, the PRC has skillfully wielded its economic soft power to convince regional governments to amicably open up their countries to Chinese penetrations. Not that much persuasion was necessary,
considering the desire of countries like Brazil to find an outside foreign partner capable of counterbalancing the U.S.

Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse & war over Taiwan. Lewis 8 (Dan, Research Director Economic Research Council, The Nightmare of a
Chinese Economic Collapse, World Finance, 5/13,
In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the worlds largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned China Hands rejected Changs thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. Chinas expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter which we in the West hear very little about are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the Citys most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, Chinas undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease Chinas rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in

Chinas economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep Chinas society stable ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesnt end there. That will at best bring a global recession . The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions so far. But when multiethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they dont become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. Theres a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union chaos, civil unrest and internecine war . In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan whom America is pledged to defend.

Global nuclear war Hunkovic 9 American Military University (Lee J., The Chinese-Taiwanese
Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and
China are the two most dominant members.

-- Growth Ext
Alternative to robust Chinese influence is internal conflict Mead 9 (Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign
Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, 2/4/9, The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of antiforeign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.

Chinese economic growth and competitiveness is key to prevent global economic collapse and nuclear conflict Buzan and Foot, 04 professor of International Relations at the London School
of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's

global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there

are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states.
Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other

Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in
play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes

weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal.

The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

Slow growth causes nationalist lash-outs, regional conflicts, economic collapse, and cyber attacks on the US. Chang, 4/14 (Gordon G., Contributor at Forbes, The Biggest Threat To China's
Economy 2013,

North Asia looks like the worlds most volatile region at the moment. An assertive China is working to push America aside, grab territory from an arc of
nations from India in the south to South Korea in the north, and close off the South China Sea so that it becomes an internal Chinese lake. Last month, while Chinese leaders talked about enhancing cooperation in the region, two Chinese vessels attacked a Vietnamese fishing boat, setting it on fire. There are many reasons for

Beijing new assertiveness, but one stands out: slowing GDP growth , evident since the early summer of 2011. The economic problems in particular have created a dangerous dynamic, trapping China in a self-reinforcingand selfdefeating loop. In this loop, the slumping economy is leading to a crisis of legitimacy , the legitimacy crisis is causing Beijing to fall back on nationalism and increase friction
with its neighbors, and the increased friction is aggravating the countrys economic difficulties. Caught in a trap of their own making, Beijing

leaders will continue to blame foreigners for the problems evident in Chinese society and then lash out , as they did in September against Japan, over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. And as they lash out, they are making their problems worse. The anti-Japan protests in China last
fall, for instance, are resulting in Japanese industry reducing its commitment to China by shifting investments into Southeast Asia, as Nissan announced at the end of October. That, in turn, could push the Chinese economy past the tipping point. Moreover, the

North Korean crisis , which Beijing has been aggravating

behind the scenes, is not helping the Chinese economy either. Commerce between China and the North seems

largely unaffected, as various reports from the border crossings indicate. But the Kim regime in Pyongyang seems to be targeting the South Korean economy with its threats, and that is beginning to have some effect. The North Koreans are now using the propaganda in an extreme form to try to damage foreign direct investments into South Korea, says Tom Coyner, author of Doing Business in Korea, to the New York Times. They are, in a sense at this point, winning in an asymmetrical psychological warfare, attacking the economic strength of South Korea. And as the Times points out, South Koreans know their globalized economy has much more to lose than the Norths isolated and already highly sanctioned economy. Yet Pyongyang leaders may be taking down more than just the South. In an interconnected world, they may be damaging the other networked economies in the region, those of Japan and China. All three economiesSouth Korea, Japan, and Chinahave integrated themselves into the others, for instance making the others part of the global supply chains of their companies. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that only South Korea will be damaged. The South is Chinas third-largest trading partner, and it is Chinas fifth-largest source of foreign direct investment. Trade between China and South Korea increased 40 times in 20 years. It rose 18.6% in 2011 to $245.6 billion, a record high. So South Koreas troubles will eventually becomes Chinas. Ultimately, Beijings strategy of making itself a danger to its neighbors cannot be good for its economy. Worse, China is making itself an adversary of its most

important customer, the United States. Last month, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper elevated cyber attacks above terrorism as the most serious national security threat. China, of course, is Americas number one cyber adversary. Being named your biggest customers biggest threat is not smart strategy.

# - CCP Legitimacy
China engagement in Latin America key to growth & CCP legitimacy. Shapiro 5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, Chinese Engagement in Latin
America Should Enhance U.S., Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21, 2005,
China in the Western Hemisphere We see two major trends in China's engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean: first and foremost, growing trade and investment are necessary to fuel China's own

rapid domestic development. Second, China wants to match its growing economic strength with political influence in order to advance its own national agenda. China's Economic Influence China is the world's seventh-largest economy (with an economy about the same size as Italy's), the world's third-largest trading nation, and a major destination for foreign-direct investment from around the world. Its economy has grown at over 9.5% per year for the past twenty-five years. Rapid growth and development are significant sources of legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party. To sustain that growth, China has increasingly engaged with the rest of the world, including with Latin America, to secure inputs it needs and markets for its surging exports. China's demand for Latin American goods has helped fuel economic growth in many countries. At the same

time, however, China's exports, especially in textiles, apparel, and shoes, pose stiff competition for some Latin American and Caribbean producers, primarily in third-country markets. -- China's imports from Latin America reached $22 billion in 2004 and are up 16% in the first half of this year. Primary imports from Latin America include metal ores, soybeans, and copper. -- China's exports to Latin America reached $18 billion in 2004 and were up an additional 32% in the first half of this year. China's top exports to Latin America include machinery, electronics and apparel. -- While it is difficult to attribute what portion of overall economic growth in Latin America is attributable to particular factors, it is clear

that China's boom has expanded markets for Latin exports, and thus contributes to economic growth. For example, the value of Chile's net exports to China more than

doubled in 2004, increasing by about $1 billion in a $94 billion economy. -- China is an important new investor in the region as it searches for resources. Still, Chinese investment is rather small, at approximately $8.3 billion at the end of 2004, according to Chinese data. And the lion's share of that sum consists of investments in tax haven countries, such as the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands. However, deals for future investments, primarily in infrastructure and extractive sectors, could be a significant boost to the region if realized. -- China is now the world's

second-largest consumer of petroleum, and has become a net importer of oil. We believe that securing reliable access to petroleum products from Hemisphere is an important element of China's
engagement in the region, especially with Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.

-- CCP Ext
The plan dooms CCP credibility a. Growth Without dominant access to resources, slowed growth ensures revolution and domestic instability. Oxley 12 (Lieutenant Commander Audry, Dragon Training at Home Exploring the
Possibilities for Collaboration Between the U.S. and Chinese Navies in the Western Hemisphere, Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS, 21st CENTURY DEFENSE INITIATIVE POLICY PAPER, 10 July 2012)
Over the past two decades, Chinas industrialization has reordered the allocation of capital and resources across the globe. The better Americans are able understand this phenomenon, the fewer reasons they may have to feel threatened by it. Perhaps Clem Sunter, the noted South African futurologist, described it best: Britain put 30 million

people through an industrial revolution in the mid-19th century, and had its colonies to draw its raw materials from. America put 150 million people through an industrial revolution at the turn of the 20th century and had its own raw materials. Today China is putting 1.3 billion people through an industrial revolution with neither colonies nor substantial indigenous resources besides coal.1 With its abundant supply of cheap labor and urgent need to industrialize, China seemed almost destined to become the worlds manufacturing hub, and subsequently, its engine for growth. Factoring in an urbanization rate that this year passed 50 percent, along with a burgeoning middle class, Chinas need for resources becomes obvious.2 Accordingly, China is now the destination for a massive share of global raw materials. The domestic political pressures

within China are also well known . China needs reliable and continued economic growth to appease a growing middle class which is not yet politically vocal, but may turn out to be if the ...tacit bargain in which well off city-dwellers have traded political choice for fast-growing prosperity3 unravels. Chinese policymakers certainly want to avoid a jasmine revolution.

b. Perceived influence key to regime stability US involvement threatens it. Ellis, 11 (R. Evans is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, JFQ, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011,
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained

growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits from the

challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above,
the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

# Soft Power Module

a. Chinese economic engagement key to their soft power. Ellis 11 (R. Evans is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, JFQ, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011,
This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America . The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's economic footprint in Latin America, and its attempts to

engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has expanded enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United

States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of
the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although

China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist"
regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.The core of Chinese soft power in Latin

America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

b. Chinese soft power is an existential impact it controls every scenario for extinction Zhang 12 [Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. The Rise of
Chinas Political Softpower 9/4/12 ] As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world

faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita
consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development

for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist,
the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives

for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing
modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's

political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As
the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

-- Soft Power Ext

Successful engagement in Latin America key to Chinese global soft power. Malik 6 (Mohan, PhD in International Relations, "China's Growing Involvement in
Latin America," June 12, China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower. Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to

support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa,

China is rapidly expanding its economic and

diplomatic presence in Latin America -- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States. In Latin America, China is viewed differently in

different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela). While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit

resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in its pursuit of global

influence . China's Grand Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Bu ild a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power " and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms

Chinese soft power is key to Asian stability Wiggin 10 [Stu. Staffer for China Radio Intl. American Dream now a Chinese
Reality 8/10/10 Xinhua]
As part of the commentary which focuses upon the general relationship between the developed and developing world, more often than not a clear delineation is drawn between the way of life pursued by the people in the Eastern hemisphere and that of the developed Western world, while Africa is generally left out altogether. Although it is necessary to acknowledge differences during any analysis of East and West, the reality is that the most powerful

country in the 'new' Eastern/Asian bloc, i.e. China, has inherited many of the characteristics that made America into the power it is today. The number of similarities between the two societies is astounding. China is not only on the verge of becoming an equal partner within the world balance of power over the next 50 years; it is also set to take America's place as a beacon for prosperity and opportunity. The United States of America, as we know it today, came to
being as a result of the culmination of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the Second World War. These two events allowed America to emerge as the worlds strongest power and accelerated the decline of former colonial powers Britain, France and Germany. At this time, Asia was not even part of the equation. Today, however, it is possible to see a very similar situation. This time it is China that remains well afloat within a sea of global recession

and Middle Eastern skirmishes. The fact that China holds huge dollar-denominated assets as part of their foreign exchange reserves reaffirms Americas remaining importance within the global financial system, but it is generally accepted by all that China will eventually balance America in terms of both hard and soft power. The soft power that China cultivates often exists within the developing world and is often seen as a rallying bloc contrasted against the self-seeking interests of developed nations. Building soft

power was a priority for America post 1949 as it is for China going into the 21st Century. China is going through the same stages of formation, albeit at an accelerated pace, that the United States went through from the 1920s onwards. Disregarding the question of history (i.e. that China boasts a 5000 year history which nobody below the age of 50 is willing to study in-depth, and America only possesses around 200 years of modern history, most of which they would rather forget to a large extent), the similarities are quite clear to see. Not unlike America, China has become home to many people from outside of its borders. Many people have set up a home here in hope of pursuing what is fast becoming the Chinese dream: making their fortune. In Guangzhou, a 10-square-kilometer area centered around Hongqiao, affectionately referred to by locals as Chocolate City, serves as home to a mix of Chinese and foreign dwellers, the majority of which are of African descent. According to Guangzhou Daily, the total number of Africans in this city alone is thought to be almost 100,000, and is only set to rise further. This influx is, at this moment in time, a novel feature of certain cities for many Chinese people, but so too was the influx of immigrants to America in the 1920s. What is more, it is not only immigrants expecting to find fortune in China. As Lester R. Brown, President of Earth Policy Institute in Washington has stated, "for China's 1.3 billion people, the American dream is fast becoming the Chinese dreamMillions of Chinese are living like Americans: eating more meat, driving cars, traveling abroad, and otherwise spending their fast-rising incomes much as Americans do." In this sense, China bears a greater resemblance to the America of the 1920s and 30s than modern America does today. Aside from demographic or financial similarities between China and the United States, one must also acknowledge the general similarity between the psyche of the American and Chinese peoples. Both peoples are generally insular, largely unconcerned with foreign affairs, and their grasp of geography outside of their respective continents is rather poor. Forays into foreign countries are usually the result of humanitarian efforts or as part of their search for natural resources, glaring examples being Chinas involvement in Africa and Americas obvious involvement in Iraq. There is no working class sentiment in China or America, and both countries are fiercely patriotic. Patriotism seems to have filled the void of any class sentimentality and it is for this reason that the hope of one People's Daily writer of restructuring Chinese growth in the context of globalization, as stated in the recent article "Why can't China climb up the value chain?," will always be constrained so long as unions are non-existent and labor remains cheap. Though the creation of a "Chinese Dream" may seem like an achievement for the country, there is also the idea that the American Dream could become a Chinese nightmare (USA Today, June 2005), with the possibility that consumption could outstrip global output. And even though the above paragraphs detail the likenesses that exist between the two countries, vast differences remain, mostly in political terms. It is no secret that the two countries have endured a tumultuous relationship, which has most recently been seen when the United States came to China with its tail between its legs regarding a global economic bailout. China, meanwhile, is the arbiter of East Asian stability and is often a thorn in

America's side in their pursuit of Western-led initiatives. Hilary Clinton said that global issues could not be solved by the United States or China alone, but without participation of the two countries, no problems would likely be solved. As it turns out, when they do work together nothing gets done, hence the stalemate with the South Korean Yellow Sea missile, a result of a strategic alliance between China and North Korea.

# Energy Module
The plan changes the oil dynamic and guts Chinese influence causes energy insecurity for China. Xiaoxia, 5/6 (Wang, ECONOMIC OBSERVER/Worldcrunch, In America's
Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, May 5, 2013, -mikee
Initially, Chinas activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has

gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply
chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and

the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its

Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current

practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested

in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States.

Energy insecurity sparks Asian war Clement 12 [Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25,] The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining feature of the strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct conflict, there are several areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing points in the future. Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each
nation are largely based on geopolitical considerations. First, it is important to recognize that energy cooperation between China and India over the past decade has been increasing. In January 2006, for example, both nations signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas which encouraged collaboration between their enterprises, including joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. Escalations in global energy prices and political uncertainties in the Middle East, however, have resulted in both countries looking for long-term arrangements. As

China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy policies, based on notions of traditional security . Ultimately,

what we see is the arrival of military and political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages.

Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown
in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the worlds GDP and, as such, will require vast amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such,

the competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security. Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and powerful blue-water navy. Indias drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in 2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with
plans to further increase naval spending 40 percent by 2014. Chinas thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.

terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine that control of the choke points would be useful Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military implications.

The geopolitical rivalry in Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance for both China and India due to its location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is presented as a source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India for access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had frequent discussions about building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from Myanmars available resources. In 2005, for example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas. For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait of Malacca. The potential for the Malacca Strait to

be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to China, since as much as 85 percent of Chinas oil is shipped through the region. For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan and has been expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a feeling of Chinese encirclement. Indias interest in Myanmar directly relates to the growing presence and influence

of China in the region. Chinas string of pearls strategy refers to attempts to negotiate basing rights along the sea route linking the Middle East with China, including creating strong diplomatic ties with important states in the region. Not only does this contain Indias naval projection of power, it also directly threatens Indias energy access and the regional balanc e of power. While military confrontation between China and India remains unlikely, it is important to recognize that China and Indias energy policies revolve around traditional ideas of security, which highlight military and political balancing. Their energy policies are largely based on geopolitical and security considerations, and not just with regards to the global oil market. As such, it is critical for there to be ongoing diplomatic engagement

between China and India to avoid unnecessary or accidental escalation.

-- Energy Ext
Oil shortages collapse Chinese growth and triggers regime instability. Ziegler 6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. THE ENERGY FACTOR IN CHINAS FOREIGN POLICY, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006. energy is a politicized commodity , critical to economic and military strength and therefore vital to national security. The significance of energy as a component of foreign trade far outweighs its proportion of the total value of turnover. Simply put, political leaders view oil in a different category than footwear, electronics,
ystein Noreng has argued that for governments,

or automobiles.[2] Energy, and in particular oil, is too important to be left to market forces alone.[3] Considerable attention has been paid in the international relations literature to the link between economic interdependence and conflict. Liberalists in the field, going back to Kant, argue that greater economic interdependence moderates the prospects for conflict, while realists contend that economic ties exacerbate conflict by increasing a states vulnerability in an anarchic environment.[4] Surprisingly few academic studies have focused on oil in foreign policy despite the strategic nature of this commodity. Logically, support for either realist or liberal theories from a study of energy interdependence should be particularly persuasive, given the vital importance of oil for national security. For example, oil dependence heightens uncertainty, and there is evidence that major powers in the past have gone to great lengths, including war, to ensure oil supplies. If the worlds major rising power is employing cooperative strategies rather than using military means to ensure energy supplies, that choice may have significant theoretical and policy implications. The vulnerability of oil

consuming states depends on whether they have alternative forms of energy available either domestically or in the international environment. Consumer states can reduce dependence on oil through various strategies, with resort to war as only the

most extreme measure . Domestically, states can provide incentives for exploration and enhanced production, assuming that sufficient reserves exist or are suspected to exist, to make such efforts worthwhile. Governments can also adopt conservation policies to reduce consumption. A third strategy to reduce strategic dependence is to shift from imported oil to alternate fuelscoal, natural gas, nuclear power, wind or solar energywherever possible. Finally, states may establish strategic reserves to dampen the shock of unexpected supply interruptions or to even out severe price fluctuation. Internationally, consumer states may improve their energy security by diversifying imports, obtaining oil from as many suppliers are possible. Second, they may form or join multilateral organizations in order to bargain more effectively with supply
cartels or with major producers. Third, states may encourage oil majors within the country to acquire oil properties abroad, to control upstream production. States that do not have nationalized oil companies may enter into corporatist arrangements with private companies, since the interests of the government and those of private energy companies overlap significantly. Finally, states that are sufficiently powerful may use military force to ensure the flow of oil. For

modern industrial and industrializing states oil is a vital component in economic growth . Oil prices are closely tied to inflation and economic growth rates. For example, the Energy Information Administration estimates that doubling the price of oil 1999Given the strong emphasis Chinas leaders place on social stability and continued rates of high economic growth, steep price increases and shortages threaten domestic order.

2000, from $11 to $22 per barrel, resulted in a .50% increase in inflation in the United States in 1999, and a .75% increase in 2000 The same price increase resulted in a .50% decline in GDP for growth 1999, and a full 1.0% decline in GDP in 2000. The surge in world oil prices to over $65 per barrel in 2005 has further constrained growth and fueled inflation.

Energy insecurity in Asia causes great power wars. Blumenthal, 8 (Dan is a resident fellow at AEI. Concerns with Respect to China's
Energy Policy, July 01, 2008, Tokyo, which used to be the dominant Asian player in energy markets, has been shocked by Chinas growing oil needs. Japans view of Chinese energy policies is shaped by its perception that a stronger China is asserting itself regionally and globally to Tokyos detriment. In particular, Japan views the dispute over

territorial demarcation and oil and gas resources in the East China Sea as part of a more aggressive Chinese posture. Japan has responded assertively as well, chasing away a Chinese nuclear submarine that intruded into Japanese waters in 2004. In 2005 relations deteriorated when China and Japan accused one another of beginning to extract resources in contested regions of the East China Sea.51 China sent a small fleet led by Sovremennyy- class destroyers in a show of force around the gas field, and a Chinese ship reportedly trained its guns on a Japanese P-3C patrol craft.52 Japan declared for the first time in its 2004 defense white paper that Chinese naval power should be a cause of concern for all of Asia. The

prospect of two Asian powers using military force to emphasize or settle competing claims for oil and gas is unsettling. The United States has significant treaty obligations to Japan, meaning that risk of conflict with Japan is a risk of conflict with the United States. Japan is alarmed by the rate of Chinas energy consumption growth and a perceived mercantilist tilt in Chinas energy policy .53 This Japanese
perception has prompted Japanese national security policymakers to take a tougher line with China and upgrade the alliance with the United States. Japanese energy policy is likewise responding: following a two-decade period of liberalization, Japans latest energy strategy has a more nationalist cast, with calls for government intervention to compete on an equal footing with China for international resources.54 To be sure, Japan is also taking measures to reduce demand and proposing multilateral cooperation, but a view insisting that energy is a strategic

resource, and that Japan will need to compete for it with China, has grown prominent of late in Tokyo. Tokyos and Beijings recent competition for Russian energy supplies from East Siberia and Sakhalin is a case in point. An energy policy that fuels great power competition threatens the security of Asia. Given Japanese and Indian angst over Beijings energy strategy, it is incumbent upon the United States to maintain its predominance in Asia through robust economic and military presence. The appearance of Ameri- can withdrawal or inattention would create a vacuum to be filled by intensi- fied security competition among the three major powers, two of whom have nuclear weapons.

-- Turns Case
China oil influence improves US energy security. Xiaoxia, 13 (Wang, ECONOMIC OBSERVER/Worldcrunch, In Americas Backyard:
Chinas Rising Influence In Latin America, May 6, 2013,
So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. Chinas involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a

threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached loans-for-oil swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries livelihood and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S.


A2: Slow Growth Non-Unique

Growth is stable now experts agree. Muk, 6/17 (Elva, Experts largely dismiss threats to China's growth - Asian Investor
6/17/13, Experts largely dismiss threats to China's growth . Despite concerns, including shadow banking and potential political and social upheaval, panelists at AsianInvestor's summit are upbeat on China's growth prospects and stability. All eyes are on China after the
country's leadership change this March, with president Xi Jinping and his seven-strong Politburo Standing Committee tasked with controlling China's development over the next five years. A diverse panel of market analysts discussed their fears and expectations for these new leaders at AsianInvestor's recent Asian Investment Summit in Hong Kong. They considered how political and social change could impact portfolios as the government engineers a structural slowdown as it rebalances its economy towards domestic consumption. Tom Byrne, senior vice-president at credit agency

Moodys who oversees sovereign risk in Asia and the Middle East, sees healthy growth prospects for China over the next five years, estimating that its GDP will maintain an annual 7-8% growth rate, with inflation at 2-3%. He points out that there have only been three periods of major economic reform in China, the most recent of which was when China entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001. That helped to boost China's GDP to 10%, from 8% previously meaning that maintaining a growth rate of 8% is equivalent to what it was a little over a decade ago. The participants also note that domestic consumers will begin to drive China's growth, rather than external investment. But as Stephen Joske, senior manager at

AustralianSuper, points out, this economic transition will be far slower than many market pundits are forecasting, largely because China is still very much a poor and developing country in need of major investment. While Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen and Guangzhou are leading the way economically, the rest of the country still has a lot of catching up to do in terms of industrialisation, Joske says, adding that he expects China's economy to be driven by investment for a number of years yet. The issue of shadow banking or non-bank lending is also prominent in the minds of investors. However, Byrne sought to sooth frayed nerves, saying that while China's economy has become "very dependent on credit growth" post-2008, the country does not rely on external financing or have a large net-

liability position, so the chances of a 2008-style crash are remote .

Even if growth has slowed, it just provides us a brink. Silk, 6/13 (Richard, Goldman Strategists 6% Call for China Growth, 2013,
A steady drizzle of disappointing data in the last few weeks on everything from exports to electricity generation has experts busily downgrading their forecasts for Chinas economy. Most expect between 7% and 8% growth

this year, after a decade of world-beating double-digit rates. Looking further out, some analysts expect things to get worse. China has basically said goodbye to 8% GDP growth in spirit if not in statistics and will have to embrace slower growth, with the average annual growth rate in the
next seven years to 2020 perhaps falling to the vicinity of 6%, wrote Goldman Sachs GS -1.75% China strategist Jiming Ha in a June 10 research report. There used to be a widely held view that China had to

maintain growth of 8% to keep a lid on social unrest; now, the official target is 7.5% and analysts think 7% may still be within the governments comfort zone. But anything less than that would cross a psychological threshold, taking
growth to its lowest levels in more than 20 years.

A2: Hege/Miltiary Turns

Chinas involvement is economic, not hegemonic. Len-Manrquez 12 (Jos Luis Len-Manrquez is Professor of International and
East Asian Studies at the Metropolitan Autonomous University in Mexico City. Should we worry about Chinas engagement in Latin America? 08/06/2012, 3100/language/en-US/Default.aspx)
But I argue rather, at least for the time being, that China

doesnt have fully fledged hegemonic intentions in Latin America. Unlike the USSR during the Cold War, the Chinese strategy for the LAC region is much more economic than either ideological or geopolitical. By
stating this, I am not buying the Chinese mantra of a peaceful rise. As far as I can see, no great power behaves as Saint Francis of Assisi. I therefore subscribe to the neorealist idea that power politics is explained by

states capabilities and interests. The subjective intentions of political leaders are usually constrained by systemic arrangements in the international arena.

China influence allows for cooperation instead of US dominance. Shapiro, 5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, Chinese Engagement in Latin
America Should Enhance U.S., Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21, 2005,
As China's

engagement in the region expands, the United States hopes this will produce positive benefits and not detract from the U.S. hemispheric agenda. "We support

China's engagement in the region in ways that create prosperity and promote transparency, good governance, and respect for human rights," Shapiro said. "We need to work with China and with our friends and allies to ensure that every effort is taken to promote polices that converge with our interests." He said the United States will continue to monitor China's presence in the Latin America to ensure that it does not detract from the U.S. goals of prosperity, democracy and respect for human right in the region. Shapiro concluded that China's increased engagement in Latin

America should lead to increased cooperation between the United States,

China and Latin American and Caribbean governments, while not diminishing U.S. capabilities and influence in the region. "Our allies throughout Latin America believe good U.S.-China relations

are important to global peace, prosperity and stability," he said. "Our efforts to work with China should enhance, not impair, our regional alliances."

China engagement only effects economic growth it doesnt link to your security or political influence impacts. Cunningham 11 (Nelson, McLarty Associates, China, Latin America, and the
United States: The New Triangle, January 2011, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas)
Nelson Cunningham of McLarty Associates argued that from a strategic perspective,

Chinas interests

appear to be purely commercial. This is distinct from Russias ideologically-based military and diplomatic alliance with the government of Venezuela, described by Cunningham as aimed at balancing US influence in the region. Latin American countries may have initially pursued the Chinese

market to serve as a strategic counterweight to the regions historical commercial and political dependence on the United States. Yet the relationship has not necessarily fulfilled these expectations. For example, popular accusations have been leveled against Brazilian President Lula da
Silva that China took advantage of him through both the commercial arrangements between the two countries and in negotiations over Chinas accession to the WTO. Building a strategic relationship with China

challenging not only because of low levels of Chinese investment in the region, but also because the investment that does occur generally employs Chinese laborers and materials brought


over for specific infrastructure projects. While Chinas lack of human rights and environmental restrictions makes it an easier commercial partner as compared to the United States and Europe, the relationship lacks the deep

cultural kinship that exists between Latin America and these other two areas of the world. Within this context, Cunningham posited that the relationship between China and Latin America will remain strictly commercial, but recommended that the

United States be vigilant regarding the way that increasing commercial ties can transform into political alliances. In order for the United States to maintain its privileged relationship with the region, it must compete with China at the commercial level. This consists of lowering trade barriers to Latin American exports and expanding pre- existing commercial and corporate ties.

Chinas rise is peaceful but economic downturn triggers the worst impacts We have comparative evidence. Japan Times 12 (The real China threat Mar 8, 2012, Considerable attention has been devoted to the threat seemingly posed by the growth of Chinas power and influence. It seems like every week the country is marking some an economic rather than a military challenge. And the problem is not Chinas strength that should be the focus of policymakers, but its weaknesses. The unraveling of the Chinese economy would deal a body blow to the global economy and ripple through the region and the world. The China
story in modern memory has been its outstanding growth. The country has registered 10 percent growth on average for three decades, overtaking Japan to become the worlds second largest economy and the worlds largest exporter of goods. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty and its middle class is now equal to or exceeds in size the entire population of most countries. Its dynamism powered the global economy. Despite the downturn triggered in 2008, Chinas economic resilience, while the rest of the world flirted with a new depression, imbued the country with a status and image that exceeds its actual wealth. In recent months, however, economists are troubled by the

new first in its military modernization program, all of which are said to be underwritten by a desire to become the preeminent power in Asia. In fact, if China threatens international stability, it is more likely

prospect of a hard landing as the Chinese economy slows. The countrys

manufacturing sector has shrunk for four consecutive months, as global demand slows. With a glut of housing it is estimated that there are 10 million to 65 million unoccupied units nationwide the average prices for homes have fallen in 100 cities for five consecutive months. Meanwhile, consumer goods prices are creeping up, with inflation hitting 4.5 percent in January; food prices, which make up a third of the consumer index, ballooned 10.5 percent in January. Real estate problems are especially worrisome. The real estate sector is said to account for about 20 percent of the Chinese economy. It is the primary asset of many households; a widespread drop in value could stir unrest. But the spillover effects are most troubling. Local governments rely on land sales to raise revenues; in 2011, land sale revenues dropped 13 percent year on year. Banks have considerable exposure to the real estate market. Banks were also the primary vehicle for the massive stimulus program that Beijing implemented after the 2007-08 financial crisis to stave off a downturn. There is little faith that those funds were invested well and there are concerns about a banking crisis when those loans come due. Most economists anticipate a gradual slowing of the Chinese economy, a drop from double-digit growth to a more reasonable level. After expanding 9.2 percent in 2011, the World Bank estimated in November that China will register growth in excess of 8 percent in 2012, although some fear that 8 percent could be a ceiling. It is a core belief in

China that 8 percent growth is the minimum necessary to absorb new labor market entrants and workers displaced by privatization. Anything less risks social unrest and potential political instability. It is not at all clear how the Beijing And how will a downturn impact those economies, like Japans, that have grown on

government or the people will handle a downturn like that which has gripped the advanced economies during the last few years. Will it unleash nationalism? Will China look overseas for scapegoats to distract the public?

the back of Chinas own expansion? Most observers believe that the stakes as too high especially during a time of political transition for the economic situation in China to get out of hand. In other words, the Chinese government will do whatever is necessary to keep the economy expanding and maintain popular support.

A2: China Bad LA Econ

Mutually beneficial and results in more aid & development for Latin America. Mingde, 12 (Zhang is a professor of diplomatic policy at the Shanghai Institutes for
International Studies in China. A senior Shanghai scholar says China poses no threat to the region, Americas Quarterly, January 11, 2012,
In some quarters, we

hear concerns about the so-called China threat and China looting (that unfair trade practices will undermine local economies). Nothing could be further from the truth : the ChinaLatin America relationship is normal and founded on mutual respect and interest. Chinas growth of investment and trade in Latin America is organized entirely around the principles of cooperation, mutual benefit and common development. Some people also claim that the development of ChinaLatin America relations, especially economic and trade relations, threatens the interests of other powers in Latin America. I believe the contrary. Our economic and trade relations do not pose any potential threat to the interests of the United States and European countries in Latin America; they will instead help to alleviate the pressure on the U.S. and European countries to provide aid to Latin America.

Commodity dependence is non-unique. Len-Manrquez 12 (Jos Luis Len-Manrquez is Professor of International and
East Asian Studies at the Metropolitan Autonomous University in Mexico City. Should we worry about Chinas engagement in Latin America? 08/06/2012, 3100/language/en-US/Default.aspx) But this is far from a new problem. In the 1980s and 1990s most of Latin American countries switched to liberal economic policies, which meant the dismantling of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and the opening up to foreign trade. These measures unfortunately brought back a scheme of international insertion based on Ricardian comparative advantages. With a handful of exceptions such as countries like Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean underwent swift processes of de-industrialisation and simultaneously re-primarised their exports. By 2010, 76% of Latin American exports
were still composed of primary commodities. Even Brazil, widely heralded as a BRIC member and emerging power, has experienced a similar trend, with two-thirds of its exports constituted by raw materials. Despite decades of

industrialising efforts, in the early 21st century the structure of Latin American foreign trade is not too different from what it was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

China EE good for LA economies. O'Neil 12 (Shannon K., Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, October 26, 2012,

On the good side, trade

with China has helped spur Latin Americas economic growth. Increased ties with China have played a big part of the strong (by Latin American standards) GDP growth of last decade. Especially for Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, connections to the worlds economic engine were important in wake of the world financial crisis. Comparing Brazils and Mexicos growth rates in 2010 tells that storyand the positive role that China can and does play. Chinas trade has also benefited Latin Americas consumers. The big story of the last two decades is the rise of a middle class in many Latin
American countries. Achieving a middle class lifestyle relies in part on higher incomes, but also on greater purchasing power. Access to more goods of better quality and at lower prices, has changed the lives of many. Chinas sales

of clothing, electronics, and even cars have benefited those in the middle and lower middle ranks.

A2: Mexico Turn

No China threat to Mexico alt causes Armony 13. Ariel C. Armony. Director of the University of Miamis Center for Latin
American Studies, designated as a Title VI National Re- source Center by the U.S. Department of Education, is also the Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas. China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations. Center for Latin American Studies. 5/17/13
to the triangle. This is the core of the argument advanced by Ralph Watkins in his chapter.4 He argues that the

However, when assessing the US-Mexico-China TR along the dimension of trade, it is necessary to consider the role of other actors external

loss of market share by Mexico and the United States in the NAFTA market is not solely explained by the expansion of Chinas exports to the NAFTA-region, but also by the decrease of NAFTAs imports from other Asian countries, such as Japan. In the US case, Watkins notes that the most relevant shift of production was from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to China, and not from the United States to China. Using the same logic, he anticipates that the current slow-down in Chinas manufacturing may accentuate the shift in laborintensive production to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Watkinss analysis also indicates that it is necessary to drill down into specific sectors to explore the nature of the competition between Mexico and China in the US market. As he shows, geography matters, as

Mexicos comparative advantage in transportation costs makes it more competitive than China with regards to exports characterized by a high weight and volume to value ratio. Though more optimistic about the role of NAFTA in facilitating US and
Mexican competitive edge than Gallagher and Dussel Peters, Watkins comes to a similar con- clusion: the integration of the North American side of the triangle is fundamental for the competitiveness of the regions manufacturing industry.5 Thus any policies oriented to deepen NAFTAs integrationfrom investment in infrastructure to enforcement of intellectual property rights are vital for the future of these economies.

Chinese investment in Mexico is beneficial increased export value and debt reduction Wang 13. Ping Wang. Is the Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at
Nankai University, Tianjin, China. She is also the vice president of the China Association of Latin American Historical Studies, and senior research fellow of the Institute of Global Studies of Hong Kong and the Chinese Foreign Economic and Trade University. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas. China and the Future of USMexico Relations. Center for Latin American Studies. 5/17/13 Additionally, Chinas economic growth has had positive impacts on Mexico in other aspects as well: (1) The huge demand for raw materials driven by Chinese industrialization and urbanization has increased their price on the global market, benefitting Mexico and other resource-rich Latin American countries. (2) The incremental appreciation of the Chinese yuan may have a spillover effect, which to a certain extent would contribute to the reduction of external debts and help Mexico and other Latin American countries achieve macroeconomic stability, given that Chinas yuan has become so strong that Chinese goods may not be the bargain they once were. Such currency dynamics are not the case between the U.S. and Mexico, however. As the dollar weakened, the Mexican pesos value dropped as well. Therefore, while
the yuan was becoming stronger and the dollar becoming weaker, the pesos value dropped accordi ngly, making Mexico a viable alternative to China in terms of trade.



US Dominant Now
US influence is still unchallenged culture, proximity, and economic relations. Ben-Ami, 6/5 (Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister and internal
security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace. Is the US Losing Latin America? Jun. 5, 2013,
Yet it

would be a mistake to regard Latin Americas broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the USs fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is Americas second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic,
stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Irans nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obamas recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another allimportant lever. President Sebastian Piera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after. Language and culture

matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion
could secure US influence in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better

positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

US Engagement High
US stepping up engagement now. Goodman, 5/29 (Joshua, Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America
Ties, 2013, U.S. Outreach Bidens tour, which began May 26 in Colombia, included a frank and at times brutal discussion about trade, economic growth and security with 15 Caribbean leaders in Trinidad yesterday, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said, without giving more details. The leaders signed an accord to boost investment and economic cooperation. Our country is deeply invested and wants to be more deeply invested in the region, Biden said in Port of Spain. Yesterdays accord will give us all a vehicle to overcome special, specific,
practical barriers to trade and investment. Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone. In Colombia, Biden said a one-year-old free-trade agreement between the two countries is just

beginning, citing a doubling of the period for which entry visas are valid and efforts to expand trade ties further. State Visit The outreach follows President Barack Obamas visits in May to Mexico region is brisk even in the absence of a region-wide free-trade agreement that the U.S. pursued for more than a
decade and that anti-U.S. allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez helped bury in 2005. Buoyed by bilateral agreements signed since then with Peru, Panama and Colombia, U.S. exports to Latin America have


and Costa Rica and precedes talks at the White House in June with the leaders of Chile and Peru. In October, Obama will host Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to a state dinner at the White House. U.S. business with the

more than doubled since 2000 to a record $400 billion last year. The region last year bought 26 percent
of U.S. exports, an increase from 22 percent in 2000. Brazil Surplus In Rio, Biden will tour a research facility operated by state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA. U.S. exports of capital goods are helping Brazil develop the biggest oil discoveries in the Americas since 1976 and are one reason why the U.S. in 2009 began posting a trade surplus with Brazil, the regions biggest economy, for the first time in a decade.

Competition Now
US & China competing for influence now. Business Times, 5/30 (US and China compete for influence in Latin America,

The competition between the world's two biggest economies

display this week as US Vice-President Joe Biden arrived in Rio

for influence in Latin America is on

de Janeiro near the end of a three-nation tour of the region with Chinese President Xi Jinping close behind. The

duelling visits - Mr Biden departs Brazil tomorrow, the same day Mr Xi arrives in Trinidad & Tobago to begin his first tour of the region since China's political transition ended in March - underscore how Latin America's natural resources and rising middle class are making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the world's top two economies. Competing with China's cheque book isn't easy for the United States. Seeking

South American soya, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from Latin America twenty-fold, to US$86 billion in 2011 from US$3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the US policy of pursuing free trade accords has been controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University economist. The Latin America visits come as the International Monetary Fund forecasts the region's economies will expand 3.4 per cent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world.

Battle for influence now. Malln, 5/30 (Patricia Ray, Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase
Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean, 2013, The battle is on. The world's two largest economic superpowers, China and the United States, are making moves on Latin America, hoping to gain more geopolitical influence in a booming region. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden arrived in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday, while Chinese President Xi Jinping just landed in the Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago and is following closely in Bidens steps.

Bidens visit to Brazil marks the end of a six-day swing through the region, which included stops in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago. Xis trip to Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico is the first since the formal transition of power ended in China in March. These parallel journeys from the worlds top powers to Latin America

emphasize how the regions vast natural resources and steady economic growth are making it an increasingly attractive trading partner.

China Econ Down

Chinas economy is down. Mullany, 6/8 (Gerry, Chinas Export Growth Slows Amid Concern of Slowdown,
NY Times, 2013, Concern is rising about the sputtering Chinese economy and tightening liquidity. The European Union, Chinas biggest trading partner, remains mired in a stubborn economic downturn,

while in the United States, Chinas next-largest export market, the Federal Reserve has recently been sending signals it may start curtailing its stimulative monetary policies. Chinas figures showed it had a trade surplus of $20.4 billion in May, up from $19.3 billion, as imports declined 0.3 percent, the Customs Administration said. The drop in imports however slight was a possible sign of weakness in the domestic economy. Chinese stocks declined last

week, their first weekly decline in six weeks, amid signs of tightening liquidity within China. A clearer picture of the Chinese economy is expected Sunday, when the government releases data on retail sales, industrial output and inflation. Economists had expected the May figures to show a slowdown, as the government has begun a campaign to prevent companies from overstating their exports. Many

businesses are believed to have done so in March and April as a way to bypass currency controls and bring more money into the country to speculate on further appreciation of Chinas renminbi. The main evidence for such strategies lay in official statistics showing soaring exports to Hong Kong and bonded export zones on the mainland even as exports to the rest of the world from these places remained weak.

Chinas finances are dooming growth now. Business Times, 5/30 (Fitch: China credit bubble shows crisis is brewing 2013,
CHINESE banks are adding assets at the rate of an entire US banking system in five years. To Charlene Chu of Fitch Ratings, that signals a crisis is brewing. Total lending from banks and other financial institutions in China was 198 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) last year, compared with 125 per cent four years earlier, according to calculations by Chu, the company's Beijing-based head of China financial institutions. Fitch cut the nation's long-term

local currency debt rating last month, in the first downgrade by one of the top three rating companies in 14 years. "There is just no way to grow out of a debt problem when credit is already twice as large as GDP and growing nearly twice as fast," Chu said in an interview. Chu's view puts her in a minority among those charting the future of the world's biggest nation. She questions how long China can maintain the model of growth driven by bank lending that has allowed its economy to sidestep the global financial crisis. Fitch's sovereign-debt downgrade to "A+", the fifth-highest level, has sparked a debate in which Chu's
calculations have been called "biased" by an Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd economist and a "misinterpretation" by Everbright Securities Co. Her views have struck a nerve.

Chinas economy is structurally ruined too many alt causes to growth. Chang, 4/14 (Gordon G., Contributor at Forbes, The Biggest Threat To China's
Economy 2013,
On Tuesday, Fitch

Ratings downgraded Chinas long-term local currency debt one primary reason for the move was the countrys too-rapid expansion of credit, one of the underlying structural weaknesses the agency cited in its announcement. Many analysts in fact think the debt resulting from then Premier Wen Jiabaos borrowing binge, which began to accumulate in earnest in late 2008, is now Chinas number one economic
notch, from AA- to A+. The

risk. There are, of course, other risk factors now undermining the countrys economic growth. Among them are an eroding environment, unfavorable demographic trends, and persistent internal discontent . Yet the events since early last month in North Asiathe tearing up of the Korean War armistice, Pyongyangs promises of pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the U.S., and the deployment of North Koreas mobile missiles, to name just a few of themsuggest the biggest threat to the Chinese economy may be the least discussed one: turmoil in the region. As Fitch carefully noted in its explanation of Tuesdays downgrade, The ratings assume there is no significant
deterioration of geopolitical risk, for example a conflict between China and Japan or an outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.


No Trade-off
Engagement is not zero-sum the US & China have different interests. Cerna 11 (Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at
Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, April 15, 2011. China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region. While Chinas commodity-based trade structure is currently lucrative, it does not encourage diversification of Latin Americas exports into more value-added goods,

manufactured products, and modern services. Economic relations are dependent on often unstable commodity market demands. U.S. investment in the region is far more diversified and spans a

range of value-added activities, including manufacturing, finance, telecom, retail and other services.

Going back to a comparison with the United States, while China accounts for 6.7% of the regions total exports, the United States continues to be the largest buyer, with a 40% share. Latin Americas exports to the U.S. are more diversified and remain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut-off in Latin America. Roughly 24% of the regions exports are raw materials, another 12% consists of resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik of Latin Trade also sees enormous risks for the region: The steep overvaluation of the regions currenciesdue in part to the flood of investment flows and export proceedsis eroding the competitiveness of its highervalue added goods and services. This could in turn fuel its already high level of overdependence on commodities. Future Implications With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different

sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and

diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.

No trade-off, the US & China offer different form of engagement. Shapiro 5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, Chinese Engagement in Latin
America Should Enhance U.S., Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21, 2005,
However, even

though China has expanded commercial ties with Latin America U.S. trade and investment in the Americas continues to dwarf that of China. U.S. trade with the region exceeded $445 billion in 2004, 10 times
and is an important new investor in the region,

China's level, Shapiro said. He noted that Latin America's exports to the United States are up 10 percent and imports from the U.S. are up 15 percent in the first half of 2005 compared to 2004 levels. And whereas Chinese investment in the region is approximately $8.3 billion, U.S. investment in Latin America is more than $300 billion, the State Department official said. Apart from the significant difference in scale, Shapiro explained, the United

States' economic engagement in Latin America fundamentally differs from that of China. Chinese exports, particularly in the areas of textiles and apparel, provide stiff competition for some Latin American and Caribbean producers but the United States provides high-tech and knowledge-based goods and services, he said.


No US Impact
No impact China influence doesnt trade-off and isnt a high priority. Mingde 12 (Zhang is a professor of diplomatic policy at the Shanghai Institutes for
International Studies in China. A senior Shanghai scholar says China poses no threat to the region, Americas Quarterly, January 11, 2012,
Some people also claim that the development of ChinaLatin America relations, especially economic and trade relations, threatens the interests of other powers in Latin America. I believe the contrary. Our economic and trade

relations do not pose any potential threat to the interests of the United States and European countries in Latin America; they will instead help to alleviate the pressure on the U.S. and European countries to provide aid to Latin America. Of course, China and Latin America are not the first priority in either sides foreign policy strategies. The U.S., the European Union and the countries on the periphery of China in Asia are Chinas diplomatic priorities. At the same time, Latin Americas diplomatic priorities are the U.S., the European Union and its hemispheric neighbors. Thats only natural. And it is for that reason that the development of China Latin America relations should not affect U.S. and EU positions in respect to their relationship or diplomacy with Latin America.

No trade-off engagement is not zero-sum and Chinas not a threat. Pei 12 (Minxin, Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise Does China represent an
economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere? January 11, 2012, Does China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere?

With Chinas growing economic presence in the Western Hemisphere, it is inevitable that a question like this will arise. The answer, fortunately, is an emphatic no. To think otherwise is to see

international commerce as a zero-sum game and exaggerate Chinas capabilities. In terms of Chinas growing economic clout in Latin America, it hardly constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, which are both deep and extensive in the region. Chinese economic activities, concentrated mostly in imports of commodities and exports of consumer goods (with modest investments in natural resources and infrastructure), do not compete directly against U.S. firms, which specialize in other sectors (services, hi-tech, automotive, and banking). In the political realm, Chinese influence is modest at best and cannot compete effectively with the United States. Chinas political regime, a one-party dictatorship, hardly appeals to the region, where democratization since the early 1980s has discredited authoritarian rule. China has also cautiously avoided encroaching upon U.S. security interests or needlessly antagonizing the U.S. by befriending Cuba and Venezuelathe two countries disliked benefits. It will divert precious resources from Chinas efforts to defend its interests closer to homein East Asia.

most by the United States. Based on Chinese national interests, Beijing has no incentive to compete against the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. Such competition would be costly and have meager geopolitical

No CCP Impact
CCP is resilient and instability impacts are empirically denied. Li 13 (Eric X. is a board of directors China Europe International Business School,
fellow Aspen Institute, The Life of the Party, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Jan/Feb)
Even if critics accept that the Chinese government is adaptable and meritocratic, they still

question its legitimacy. Westerners assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy. Because China does not hold such elections, they argue, the CCP'S rule rests on inherently shaky ground. Following this logic, critics have predicted the party's collapse for decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its hold on power only because it has delivered economic growth -- so-called performance legitimacy. No doubt, performance is a major source of the party's popularity. In a poll of Chinese attitudes published by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 87 percent of respondents noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country , 66 percent reported significant progress in their lives in the past five years, and a whopping 74 percent said they expected the future to be even better. Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party's popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy. When the CCP built the Monument to the People's Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it
included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People's Republic. One would expect the CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, to have its most symbolic political narrative begin with communism -- the writing of The Communist Manifesto, for example, or perhaps the birth of the CCP in 1921. Instead, the first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty's imperial minister, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China's subsequent loss to the British inaugurated the so-called century of humiliation. In the following hundred years, China suffered countless invasions, wars, and famines -- all, in the popular telling, to reach 1949. And today, the Monument to the People's Heroes remains a sacred public site and the most significant symbol of the CCP'S national moral authority. The CCP'S role in saving and modernizing China is a far

more durable source of its legitimacy than the country's economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party's rule in the past 63 years, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. China's recent achievements, from economic growth to space exploration, are only strengthening nationalist sentiments in the country, especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades to come. A final type of staying power comes from repression , which China watchers in the West claim is the real force behind the CCP. They point to censorship and the regime's harsh treatment of dissidents, which undoubtedly exist. Still, the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks to employ smart containment. The strategy is to give the vast majority of people the widest range possible of personal liberties. And today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory; most of them can live where they want and work as they choose, go into business
without hindrance, travel within and out of the country, and openly criticize the government online without retaliation. Meanwhile, state power focuses on containing a small number of individuals

who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. As any casual observer would know, over the last ten years, the quantity of criticism against the government online and in print has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. Every year, there are tens of thousands of local protests against specific policies. Most of the disputes are resolved peacefully. But the government deals forcefully with the very few who aim to subvert China's political system, such as Liu Xiaobo, an activist who calls for the end of single-party rule and who is currently in jail. That is not to say that there aren't problems. Corruption, for one, could seriously harm the CCP'S reputation. But it will not derail party rule anytime soon. Far from being a problem inherent to

the Chinese political system, corruption is largely a byproduct of the country's rapid transformation. When the United States was going through its industrialization 150 years ago, violence, the wealth gap, and corruption in the country were just as bad as, if not worse than, in China today. According to Transparency International, China ranks 75th in global corruption and is gradually getting better. It is less corrupt than Greece (80th), India (95th), Indonesia and Argentina (tied at 100th), and the Philippines (129th) -- all of which are electoral democracies.

Understood in such a context, the Chinese government's corruption is by no means insurmountable. And the party's deeply rooted popular support will allow it the breathing room to grapple with even the toughest problems.

No China Soft Power Impact

Chinese soft power decline inevitable internal flaws and resentment. Kurlantzick 7, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowments China Program
(Joshua, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. p. 232233) China also may not be able to build its soft power indefinitely. As we have seen, greater familiarity with China will expose many countries to the People's Republic's flaws. China's promises of aid and investment could take years to materialize, yet Beijing has created heightened expectations about its potential as a donor and investor in many countries. China's exportation of labor, environmental, and governance problems alienates average people in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. China's support for autocratic rulers in countries like Zimbabwe and Sudan angers civil society leaders and opposition politicians. If Beijing seems to be dropping its preference for noninterference and "win-win" relations, it will spark fears in countries like Vietnam already suspicious of China. It also could reinforce the idea that despite Beijing's rhetoric of cooperation, when it comes to core interests, China, like any great power, will think of itself first. The Mekong River offers an obvious example.
Though China promises to cooperate peacefully with other countries, in the development of the river, China has proven both uncooperative and meddling. It has meddled by refusing to join the multilateral group monitoring the river and by injecting itself into other nations' domestic politics to get politicians to support China's damming of the river.8 China

could further alienate other nations if it seems to be using multilateral institutions as a cover, without jettisoning Beijing's own more aggressive, even military aims. Despite signing a deal with the Philippines and Vietnam for joint exploration of the disputed South China Sea, Beijing has not retracted its claim to large swaths of the water. Any Chinese decision that appears arrogant or targeted toward Chinese domination of the region will cause a backlash. Even as officials in Vietnam signed the join exploration deal, they privately warned that they still could not trust their Chinese counterparts enough to share the most important data to Beijing. Chinas trade relations, too, ultimately could limit its soft power. If China builds the kind of trade surpluses with the developing world that it enjoys with the United States, it could stoke local resentment. Eventually, Beijing could wind up looking little different to people in Asia or Africa or Latin America than the old colonial powers, who mined and
dug up their colonies, doing little to improve the capacity of locals on the ground. Whole regions could become trapped in a cycle of mercantilism, in which they sell natural resources to China and buy higher-value manufactured Chinese goods.

No Taiwan War
No war economies too intertwined Bhakal 12 (Maitreya- Freelance Writer at ABSAS Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Five reasons
why China will not invade Taiwan, and an analysis of Cross-strait Relation. China has always placed economics at the forefront of most other matters.
Despite the often-tumultuous state of Sino-Indian relations (and an unresolved border dispute), trade has touched $63 billion. China is Indias second largest trading partner. In the Senkaku island dispute with Japan, Deng Xiaoping, as soon as he came into power in 1978, proposed that China and Japan jointly explore the oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands without touching on the issue of sovereignty. China has also sought joint exploration in the resource-rich Spratlys, a solution which is the right step forward and is in fact more urgent than sovereignty, which the Philippines and Vietnam and have so far been reluctant to do. China doesnt mind waiting and biding its time until

sovereignty issues get resolved. As Deng Xiaoping famously remarked regarding the Senkaku dispute, It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, 10 years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on
this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all. Unlike hi s predecessor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has used a softer approach towards Taiwan,

promoting stronger economic and cultural ties, high-level official visits and direct flights in order to reduce tensions. This pragmatic approach is on display even in the Taiwan dispute. China is Taiwans largest trading partner, and Taiwan is Chinas seventh largest. Two-thirds of all Taiwanese companies have made investments in China in recent years. In 2010, China (including Hong Kong) accounted for over 29.0% of
Taiwans total trade and 41.8% of Taiwans exports. The ECFA was heavily tilted in Taiwans favor. It cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products entering Taiwan. Under the agreement, approximately 16.1 % of exports to China and 10.5 % of imports to China will be tariff free by 2013. Taiwanese firms have invested $200 billion in the mainland, and trade between the two sides has exceeded $150 billion. Taiwanese trade with China. Source: Reuters

Both China and Taiwan have a lot to lose by fighting with each other. Another factor to consider is the incalculable loss that an invasion will have on the Chinese economy, not to mention scaring away potential investors.


Cyber Attack Turn

Chinese presence enables cyber-terror attacks. Ellis 13 (R. Evan Ellis is associate professor for Hemispheric Defense Studies,
China's New Backyard: Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag? JUNE 6, 2013, erica) The challenge to Washington from China's presence in the region also extends beyond economics and policy objectives. The U.S. Defense Department's critical posture regarding Chinese cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the United States and China, though highly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable. In such a conflict, China-operated ports, airports, telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts of the Chinese commercial presence in Latin America would represent potential assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against the United States.

Cyber-attack would destroys the US economy Vatis, 2000 (Michael, FBI, Congressional Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime
in the House and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Service, 2/29, l/n) And this is not just a criminal problem; it is also a national security problem. This is because our nation's critical infrastructures -- and by that I mean those services that are vital to our economy and to our national security, such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and government operations -- are now all dependent on computer technology for their very operations. And that dependence makes them vulnerable to an attack which, if successful, could deny service on a very broad scale. The same basic types of cyber attacks that therefore have become attractive to criminals are also attractive to foreign intelligence services, who seek new ways to obtain sensitive government or proprietary information, and also to terrorists and hostile foreign nations, who are bent on attacking U.S. interests.

Mexico Turn
China is outcompeting U.S.-Mexican trade in the status quo future disruption is only going to increase Gallagher and Peters, 13. Kevin P. Gallagher. Is an associate professor of
international relations at Boston University, where he directs the Global Economic Governance Initiative and the Global Development Policy Masters Program. Enrique Dussel Peters. Is a Professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autnoma de M xico (UNAM), 1993 to present. Consultant for several Mexican and international institutions. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas. China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations. Center for Latin American Studies. 5/17/13 The analysis presented herein shows that Chinas rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each countrys respective trade dynamics. For instance, today China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume. As we have seen from our examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 2000-2011 both the U.S. and

Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories and garments, among many others. NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the re- gion was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the gaps between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexicos highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA, the integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-...), NAFTA has shown a de- terioration of this process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade, among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in part two of this paper). The first section of this paper argues that since Chinas entry into the WTO in 2001 and up to 2011, we find that China

is outcompeting Mexico in the U.S. market, and is further beginning to compete with the United States in the Mexican market. In fact, we have identified 52 sectors in Mexico in which the U.S. is losing market share and China is gaining, thus appearing to allow Mexico to make efficiency gains and become more competitive in U.S. markets. However, Mexico is losing market share in the United States in those same 52 sectors, which represent 49 percent of all of Mexicos exports to the U.S. The second section of this document examines in detail the features of both phases. The trade analysis clearly shows how Mexicos share over total U.S. imports increased from 2001-2004 second only to Canada and was subsequently displaced by China. In Mexicos case, while the U.S. has historically been its primary trading partner, U.S. share over total Mexican imports fell from

levels above 75% in the first five years after NAFTA to a share below 50% since 2009. As shown by multiple calculations, in both cases China is the determining factor behind this process of disintegration. Chinas share in Mexicos top twenty exports to the U.S., as well as its share in U.S. exports to Mexico, increased substantially since 2000. Regarding the top twenty U.S. exports to Mexico, U.S. share over Mexican total exports fell from 72 percent to 41.54 percent during the period 2000-2009, while Chinas share jumped from 1.09 percent to 17.83 percent. Furthermore, Chinas Weisss methodology is substantial, affecting 96 percent of U.S. manufacturing exports to Mexico and 81 percent of Mexicos manufacturing exports to the U.S. Finally, we examine the triple threat, in terms of sectors in which the U.S. is losing market share to China in the Mexican market and Mexico is losing market share to China in the U.S. market. As a result of this trade analysis and the recent triangular relationship, we find that China

threat to Mexican and U.S. markets as calculated using Lall and

is rapidly outcom- peting Mexico in the U.S. market, as well as the United States in the Mexican market. Trade falling under the category of direct threat suggests that these trends will continue in the future.

Mexican economic decline causes a flood of refugees, resulting in terrorism. Brown 9 (Michael Brown, Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response
in the Department of Homeland Security, Border Control: Collapse of Mexico Is A Homeland Security & National Security Issue, 1/14/2009, By failing to secure the borders and control immigration, we have opened ourselves up to a frightening scenario. The United States could face a flood of refugees from Mexico if it were to collapse, overwhelming state and local governments along the U.S.-Mexico border. During a time of economic duress, the costs would be overwhelming and would simply add to the already burgeoning costs at the federal level.
Immigration and border control never was nor should it ever be about racism. Immigration and border control are national security and homeland security issues. Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could,

and probably already have, infiltrated the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time.

LA Growth Turn
Chinese economic engagement dampens long-term South American growth Gallagher 11. Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of international relations at
Boston University. China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory by Adrian H. Hearn and Jos Luis Len-Manrquez. 2011. Americas Quaterly. Much of the recent scholarship has concluded that Chinas growing economic ties, while fairly beneficial to South American countries, have been costlypolitically and economicallyto Mexico and Central America. South America has natural resources that it sells to the Chinese, but many Central American countries have suffered retaliation from China because of their recognition of Taiwan. And Mexicos fewer natural resources not only offer little opportunity for exporting to China but make it more difficult to compete globally with Chinese firms. Meanwhile, U.S. observers are increasingly alarmed that South Americans may be creating political alliances with the Chinese. Not all alliances are of

concern, but loans-for-oil deals with Venezuela and satellite cooperation between Brazil and China have raised eyebrows in some Washington circles. While there is some truth to that overall view, this book goes deeper and wider. Economic essays do a nice job of separating some of the benefits and costs of the ChinaLatin America relationship. For example, as Javier Santiso of ESADE Business School and Rolando Avendano of the OECD Development Centre point out, China offers a new source of trade and finance for many countries, and, as the U.S. economy continues to slump, this diversified portfolio is a good thing for many Latin Americans. However, there are costs as well. Chinese

imports are putting pressure on Latin American firms by out-competing them in both world and home markets, and Chinese investment in natural resources can exact a heavy environmental and social toll. The combined effect can push up the value of a countrys currency and threaten long-term economic growth. In Brazil, for example, China has triggered a debate over de-industrialization and the future of
economic growth. In the essay Chinas Challenge to Latin American Development Enrique Dussel Peters of the Universidad Naci onal Autnoma de Mxico shows how Chinese creating new sets of winners and losers across the hemisphere. Dussel shows that despite

economic activity is accentuating inequalities and the increasing exports of primary commodities to China from the region (winners), the region as a whole experiences a significant trade deficit due to the import of light manufactured goods (losers).

China engagement causes Dutch disease for Latin America dooms growth. O'Neil 12 (Shannon K., Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, October 26, 2012, The downsides also exist. These same imports that make consumers happy hit the economy at large. They directly compete with Latin American producers, both in home markets as well as abroad in the United States and the European Union. Anecdotal

evidence points to factories closing, and aggregate trade data shows Latin American producers losing world market share to China. Still, estimates suggest this head to head competition occurs in roughly 12 percent of exports from Latin Americas biggest economiessignificant, but not everywhere. The indirect effects of Chinas rise

have also caused problemsespecially through the Dutch disease. This occurs when the success of commodity exports raises the currency, making it harder for manufacturing companies to compete internationally. Many argue countries is that they are losing their hard fought gains. Over the last few decades many both successfully opened their economies and diversified their production. Looking at the breakdown of exports, one can see a manufacturing surge in Mexico, Brazil,

that this has occurred in Brazil (and helps account for the decline in manufacturing production as a percent of exports) it may also be happening in Venezuela, Argentina, and Peru. The bigger worry for Latin American

and Colombia since the 1980s. But

Chinas pressure on its trading partners threatens to undo these gains. Whether or not Latin America can continue to climb the economic value-added chain matters for the long term. Commodity dependency leaves countries more vulnerable to global commodity price swings, and makes it harder to plan and implement long-term policies as a result. It also limits the job opportunities for the growing number of educated, urban, and ambitious peoplethe new middle

Democracy Turn
China influence decks democracy in the region. Farnsworth 12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in
Washington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas. Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012,
Is China a Threat to the Normative Advances in the Hemisphere? Since the end of the Cold War, however, the

region has struggled to develop a regime of democratic behavior that is intended to prevail in the hemispheric community of nations. Democracy ,

including freedom of the press, is to be respected; labor and the environment protected; corruption and illegal activities inspected and prosecuted. It is difficult to implement such standards unless leverage exists to develop a broad consensus that promotes certain behaviors, and at least one nation or regional organization is willing and able to enforce the regime effectively. For example, U.S. efforts to promote labor and environmental

reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions. Programs of multilateral lending agencies like the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank that promote financial reforms and good governance become less relevant if borrowing nations can receive funds from China or elsewhere, including Venezuela, without conditions. To put it starkly, the oftmaligned IMF has no influence with nations such as Argentina that do not currently require IMF funding or access to global capital markets.5 In fact, Chinas huge purchases of hemispheric commodities and the provision of credits on favorable terms have

greatly assisted Latin American commodities exporters in the ongoing global economic crisis. In some cases this has allowed leaders the flexibility to postpone indefinitely the necessary economic and political reforms that would otherwise be consistent with open market, healthy democratic governance. Ironically, this has allowed some democratically elected leaders to undermine democratic institutions, including freedom of the press, and return to the days of corporatist, rent-seeking economies. This model failed spectacularly during the twentieth century, but it is now enabled, if not promoted, by Chinese economic engagement. At the microeconomic level, firms with government connections have profited handsomely from
these arrangements, but such an economic model tends not to foster innovation, dynamism or sustainable, broad-based economic growth over time. It just makes the politically connected more wealthy

exaggerating what has traditionally been one of the fundamental problems of Latin Americas economic development. Additionally, the behavior of Chinese firms has not

always followed the Western model, which includes corporate social responsibility activities, payment of taxes, job creation in the local economy, environmental mitigation, anti-corruption policies, and the like. This will be an increasingly important issue because China is laying the groundwork for a long-term relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes student exchanges and the export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu across Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004.