Child Development, May/June 2002, Volume 73, Number 3, Pages 841856

The Development of Reasoning about the Teaching of Values in School and Family Contexts
Angela Prencipe and Charles C. Helwig

This study investigated childrens, adolescents, and young adults reasoning about the teaching of a variety of values in the school and family contexts. One-hundred and sixty participants in four age groups (8-, 10-, and 13-year-olds, and college students) evaluated acts involving the teaching of values and laws that regulate the teaching of these values. Both the valence (positive or negative) of values and the context in which they were presented (school, family) were systematically varied. Results showed that a variety of factors were considered in evaluating the teaching of values, including context, the valence of the value, and the type of value being taught. Participants reasoning about values education was found to be multifaceted and included distinctions between moral values that reect justice and rights, and values that reect other forms of personality traits and social values. The ndings suggest that conceptions of values education may be better understood within models of social reasoning that draw distinctions between types of values (e.g., moral and other values) and account for the increasing capacity to differentiate social contexts and spheres of legitimate governmental regulation with development.

INTRODUCTION Promoting values in children is an important goal for educators, policy theorists, psychologists, parents, and most adults concerned with the construction and preservation of a shared civil society. Values education, in the service of promoting moral or virtuous conduct, has been addressed historically by gures such as Aristotle (1947), and, in more recent years, in debates about the role of character education in public schools and the family (e.g., Nucci, 1997, 2001; Wynne, 1991). For example, in a campaign speech on public education, U.S. President George W. Bush advocated tripling the national budget for character education in the schools to encourage the teaching of values such as respect, responsibility, self-restraint, family commitment, civic duty, fairness, and compassion, through means such as identifying these values in the lives of exemplary historical gures, and through behavioral methods such as having children take daily pledges of virtues (Bruni, 1999). In his 1997 State of the Union Address, former U.S. President Clinton also made reference to fostering childrens character as a national priority for public education (Bennet, 1997). In response to several highly publicized school shootings, many school boards across the United States have considered posting the Ten Commandments as a way to encourage moral behavior among students (Johnson, 2000). Similar concerns with regard to promoting values and character education have also been raised by researchers, administrators, and public gures in Canada (Nikiforuk, 1993; Smyth, 2001), Europe (Halstead & Taylor, 2000), and Asia (Chu, Park, & Hoge, 1996).

A challenge for any pluralist society is agreement on which values are to be passed on to future generations, and how these values are to be taught and promoted. Debates in the moral development literature about values education have typically revolved around two contrasting perspectives. Some moral educators and psychologists have called for an emphasis on character in programs of values education in the public schools (e.g., Bennett, 1992; Wynne, 1989). Within this view, commonly referred to as the character education approach, morality is dened in terms of the norms of the culture and its central social and moral institutions, and consists of abiding by the values and traditions of the society. Adherents to this view typically align morality with character traits or habits deemed generally to be important (and often identied as such in research on moral development and behavior), such as honesty, self-control, responsibility, loyalty, courage, and obedience (e.g., Hartshorne & May, 19281930; Havighurst & Taba, 1949; Nelsen, Grinder, & Mutterer, 1969). Accordingly, moral development is construed broadly within this approach to include concepts of the self, character, motivation, goals, values, identity, personal growth, selfesteem, and achievement, among others (e.g., Campbell & Christopher, 1996). Proponents of the character education approach have argued for a more extensive role for schools in the teaching of societal values, both by providing good role models in the form of teachers and other authorities, and by explicit instruction de 2002 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc. All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2002/7303-0012

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signed to inculcate fundamental virtues such as honesty, discipline, and hard work. Critics of this approach have perceived its emphasis on instilling cultural norms and its focus on desirable personality traits as problematic features of any theory that might seek to construe morality in terms of universally based tenets or principles (Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). Although most character educators, philosophers, and even laypersons may agree on some virtues, such as honesty, justice, and wisdom; other virtues, such as allegiance, patriotism, religiosity, perseverance, secrecy, order, and chastity, may not be unanimously endorsed (Kohn, 1997), even among educators themselves. For example, in a cross-national survey of teachers, Stephenson, Ling, Burman, and Cooper (1998) found that although most teachers support the idea of raising standards of behavior, there was a large amount of variability and ambiguity with regard to the identication of values, their philosophical underpinnings, and the procedures used to instill them. Because of the ambiguity with respect to which values form a core set of virtues, structural developmentalists (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971) have criticized character or virtueoriented moral theories as endorsing a sort of bag of virtues approach to morality. Values identied as virtues in one culture or historical period (e.g., allegiance, chastity) reect arbitrary or culturally bound choices (i.e., a bag of virtues) and may not be identied as such in another culture or time period. Instead, cognitivedevelopmental theorists (e.g., Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989) have argued that moral education should take the form of stimulating reasoning based on universal moral values that can be rationally defended and generalized across cultural contexts, over and above arbitrary or contingent value choices made by individuals or cultures. Correspondingly, cognitive developmentalists such as Kohlberg dene morality more narrowly in terms of principles of justice and human dignity, which are believed to be universal values that cut across diverse cultural contexts, historical periods, and particular conceptions of the good life (see also Habermas, 1990; Rawls, 1987). Some support for these propositions is found in research that was carried out within the paradigm of Kohlbergs developmental theory (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Walker, 1989, 1991) and from other research that was derived from an alternative theoretical perspective known as the social domain approach (Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990; Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1998). In studies conducted in a variety of settings and cultures, Kohlberg and colleagues (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) have identied a six-stage developmental sequence in which moral reasoning becomes increasingly differ-

entiated from contingent or arbitrary social conventions, customs, or laws, and more focused on universal principles of justice and respect for human dignity with development. Research within the social-domain approach (Turiel, 1998) that directly investigated childrens and adults ability to distinguish morality from social conventions found that moral issues that involved justice, fairness, and harm were distinguished from arbitrary social customs and conventions, even by young children. For example, acts that involve harm or unfairness to others (dened as moral acts in this approach) were seen as wrong across cultural contexts and wrong even in the absence of explicit social sanctions, customs, rules, or the dictates of authorities. In contrast, social conventions (dened as behavioral uniformities that serve functions of coordination within social systems), including issues such as forms of address and prescriptions regarding attire and etiquette (e.g., Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1985), genderrole conventions (e.g., Stoddart & Turiel, 1985; Turiel, 1983), and sexual and religious conventions (e.g., Nucci, 1986; Nucci & Turiel, 1993), were judged by children and adults to be relative to societies or social systems and alterable by authority or consensus. The distinction between morality and social convention has been found in studies conducted in diverse cultural settings, including North America, Indonesia, Nigeria, India, Korea, Japan, Brazil, and Columbia (for a review, see Turiel, 1998). Although these ndings provide support for the distinction between universal moral values based on justice and human welfare and other social values, customs, and conventions in peoples judgments and reasoning, criticisms of the Kohlbergian approach to moral development and education have been raised, even by some of its key proponents (e.g., Blasi, 1993; Walker, 1999; Walker & Hennig, 1997; Walker & Pitts, 1998). Mainly, these criticisms have pointed to the relative neglect within this approach of other possible inuences on moral judgment and behavior, such as the role of personality in moral development. For example, Walker and Pitts (1998), in a study of personality traits of moral exemplars, found that moral exemplars were seen as embodying traits such as ethical, caring, and honest, in addition to being conscientious, hardworking, self-disciplined, responsible, and dependable. Accordingly, it has been argued that research on moral reasoning should also include consideration of the role of aspects relating primarily to the self, including the values, needs, and goals viewed as central to the selfs denition and to human ourishing (Campbell & Christopher, 1996). Other cognitive developmental theorists such as Blasi (1993) have identied personality constructs or traits

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such as moral identity and responsibility as playing an important role in helping to bridge the gap between moral cognition and action. A concern with character traits or moral virtues such as honesty, courage, and the like has also been a part of philosophical and traditional treatments of morality (e.g., MacIntyre, 1981), along with the emphasis on principles of justice favored by the cognitivedevelopmental approach. In sum, a variety of moral norms, virtues, and values may be perceived as candidates for values education, and investigations into individuals judgments about this area need to bear in mind both the diversity and scope of these values and the important ways in which they may differ in individuals social and moral thinking. In addition, the role of social context in reasoning about values education has been virtually ignored within both the character education and cognitive developmental perspectives. Neither approach draws distinctions between particular agents of socialization or considers how social context and the particular values being taught may interact. For example, the differing roles of parents, teachers, and governments as agents of moral education are insufciently specied, and little is known about whether or in what ways individuals may account for these variables in their reasoning about values education. Moreover, although research has examined childrens moral reasoning in general or the effectiveness of various programs of values education, there has been little direct investigation of childrens own judgments and reasoning about the teaching of values themselves. In addition to its signicance for central debates in the eld of moral development, childrens own perspectives may be relevant to whether children are receptive to various programs of values education, and thus to the formulation of educational and social policy in this important area. The current study drew on social domain theory (Turiel, 1998) and models of social and moral reasoning that emphasize social context (Helwig, 1995a, 1997) to investigate childrens, adolescents, and young adults judgments about the teaching of a wide range of values in the school and family settingssettings in which values education is likely to occur. This research also explored conceptions of the role of government in promoting and regulating the teaching of values in these social contexts. The purpose of the present study was to explore ways in which different types of values and social contexts intersect in judgments and reasoning about the teaching of values and governmental regulation of values education. The values investigated were of different types, including basic moral values that re-

ect issues of justice and harm (e.g., efforts to eliminate prejudice or racism); more abstract politicomoral values that relate to issues of political fairness, such as democratic perspectives or beliefs; characterrelated moral values such as honesty, as well as nonmoral character values such as industriousness; and other social values such as patriotism and religious values. These values were chosen as representative of those identied in the moral education literature as candidates for values education efforts, and for their importance in distinguishing among the different theoretical perspectives on moral education found in the literature (e.g., Bennett, 1992; Kohlberg, 1971; Nucci, 2001; Ryan, 1989). For purposes of conceptual clarity, the term moral is used in the preceding typology of values to refer to acts or values believed to have direct implications for others welfare or rights or for issues of justice or fairness, consistent with its usage in social domain accounts of moral judgment (e.g., Turiel, 1998). This is not to deny, of course, that this term may have a broader or different meaning in the context of other approaches or in everyday usage. Participants were asked for their judgments of the desirability of the teaching of these values by agents (parents, teachers) appropriate to the family and school contexts, and for their judgments about whether governmental regulation of values education (in the form of formal laws) is appropriate. The design incorporated the systematic variation of the valence of the value in question along positive or negative dimensions; for example, participants were asked about whether values education efforts directed at eliminating racism or prejudice were acceptable and whether they should be required by law, as well as whether efforts by authorities (e.g., parents, teachers) to teach negative or socially unshared values (such as prejudice) were acceptable and whether they should be prohibited by law. Judgments of laws that prohibit the teaching of negative values in the family were viewed as especially important for determining the boundaries of perceptions of parental autonomy in childrens socialization, given previous research (Helwig, 1997) that showed that with age, the family is increasingly seen to be independent of governmental regulation for some issues. The judgments and reasoning of four age groups were assessed: 8-year-olds, 10-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and college students. These age groups were selected to provide information about how conceptions of values education develop across childhood and adolescence and into adulthood. Prior research has demonstrated important developments between 8 years of age and young adulthood in the ability to

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differentiate social contexts in judgments and reasoning about areas such as rights and civil liberties (Helwig, 1997; Helwig, Miles, & Prencipe, 2000). The current study focused mainly on this period to investigate key issues expected to show development during this time, such as the construction of the family as an autonomous sphere from governmental regulation, and the impact of developing conceptions of democracy (Helwig, 1998) on support for the teaching of democratic values. Older adolescents (i.e., high school students) were not included because prior research on related issues, such as social context and civil liberties (e.g., Helwig, 1995b), has found relatively minimal differences between the judgments of high school and college students. Similarly, younger children were not included because no developmental differences were anticipated on these aspects of reasoning prior to 8 years of age, and because pilot testing determined that not all of the scenarios used in the present study were appropriate for use with younger children. In the absence of prior research on these questions, the current study must be seen as exploratory; however, it is possible to make some predictions by drawing on previous research in the moral and social judgment elds on related topics. Based on issues raised in the debates between character education and cognitivedevelopmental perspectives outlined earlier, and on previous research (Turiel, 1998), it was expected that childrens judgments of values education would be multifaceted and include distinctions between moral values that reect justice and rights and moral character traits and other forms of desirable personality traits and values. For example, it was expected that children at all ages would endorse the teaching of basic moral values that involve prevention of harm and unfairness across social contexts, based on previous research that showed that children make generalizable moral judgments about these kinds of acts (Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1998). It was also expected that children would endorse values education for corresponding politico-moral values, such as an appreciation of democracy. This prediction was based on previous ndings that showed that children exhibit conceptions of political fairness in which democratic systems of government and decision making are seen as more just than nondemocratic systems (Helwig, 1998; Helwig & Kim, 1999). As children become increasingly aware of the importance of civic education for a shared civil society (Gallatin, 1985), however, they may be more likely, with development, to view democratic political education as a more necessary feature of values education

efforts in the school than in the family context, especially given its traditional association with school civics education programs (Torney-Purta, Schwille, & Amadeo, 1999). It was also expected that with increasing age, children would distinguish the teaching of other values, such as religious or patriotic values, by social context. Previous research (Helwig, 1997) has shown that with development, children are more likely to see it as acceptable for parents, but not school ofcials or governments, to choose or regulate their childs religious afliation and practice. As children become more aware of variation in attitudes and values, and the importance of accommodating a variety of perspectivesincluding dissentin public education efforts, attempts to teach strong patriotic or religious values in the school may be seen as raising concerns with indoctrination or viewpoint coercion (Moshman, 1986, 1989; Snook, 1972). Wainryb and colleagues (Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998) found that children exhibit increasing tolerance for some forms of dissent in belief and expression with age (although not dissent on moral values and beliefs). Similarly, Helwig and Prencipe (1999) found that although both younger and older children tend to view antipatriotic sentiment expressed in acts of ag burning as wrong, children were less likely with age to advocate laws that prohibit ag burning, reecting their concern with censorship of the expression of unpopular beliefs. Given the paucity of research on nonmoral character values in the social-cognitive development literature, it was not possible to make specic predications about this area, except to say that although children may endorse the teaching of relevant nonmoral character values (such as industriousness) in school settings, they may be less likely to view them as obligatory by law or to see them as necessary candidates for values education than they would moral values (Nucci, 1997). Overall, it was expected that with development, children would increasingly consider and coordinate issues such as the goals of different social contexts and the nature of different types of values in their reasoning about when and where values education is justied or necessary, consistent with patterns found in other areas of socialcognitive development (Helwig, 1995b, 1997; Helwig & Kim, 1999). Because prior research has found some variation across issues in the ages at which these developmental patterns become manifest, however, it was not possible in the current study to formulate more precise hypotheses about the specic ages at which differences in judgments would be found.

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METHOD Participants The sample consisted of 160 Canadian children, adolescents, and adults, evenly divided into four age groups, with equal numbers of males and females in each: 8-year-olds (M 8,6, range 7,109,1), 10-year-olds (M 10,6, range 9,311,6), 13-yearolds (M 13,5, range 13,014,0), and college students (M 20,11, range 18,832,3). The children and adolescents were recruited through a database maintained at the University of Toronto that contained names of families residing in the Toronto metropolitan area who had agreed to participate in research. Families in the database were originally recruited from hospitals and day-care centers in the region or through mass mailings. The college students were drawn from an introductory psychology course at a public university in the area and received extra credit for participation in psychological research. The ethnic background of the sample was 80% European American, 14% Asian American, and 6% various other backgrounds. Eighty-ve percent of participants (childrens parents or college students) elected to provide information about parental occupation and education level on a demographic questionnaire. Of these, 80% were employed in professional, sales, managerial, or other technical occupations; 15% were employed in service occupations, trades, or manufacturing; and 5% (mostly mothers) were homemakers. Fifty-six percent had completed university or also had some postgraduate education, 20% had some postsecondary schooling, 21% had completed high school only, and 3% had completed grade school only. Design and Procedure Participants were given a structured interview of approximately 40 min in length, that contained scenarios in which the teaching of values by adult authorities was described. For half the participants, the interview described values education by parents in the family; for the other half it described values education by teachers in a public school. The values investigated comprised six general themes: (1) moral values involved those with direct implications for others welfare or issues of justice and rights (e.g., racial equality); (2) moral character values comprised values that have implications for others welfare or rights, but are also closely associated with individual personality or character traits (e.g., honesty); (3) nonmoral character values pertained to traits of character that, although not typically seen as having direct consequences for others welfare and rights, are some-

times identied as personal virtues by individuals or cultural value systems (e.g., industriousness); (4) politico-moral values pertained to those values that have potential implications for justice and fairness in the political sphere, such as democratic values; (5) traditional political values involved other political values, such as patriotism or love of country; and (6) religious values pertained to those values that reect commitment to a religious system of belief or practice. These types of values were chosen to represent those that have been identied as important in debates about the education of values (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Ryan, 1989). In addition, to investigate how children and adults reason about the teaching of negative, or less commonly held values, the design incorporated the systematic variation of values along this dimension. Thus, each value type investigated included two examples, each representing a positive or socially shared and negative or socially unshared manifestation of the value. The specic examples used in the study were as follows. For moral values, the positive or commonly shared value was racial equality, or belief in the equality of all people regardless of skin color; whereas its negative counterpart was racial prejudice, or belief in the superiority of one race. For moral character values, the positive or commonly shared value was honesty; whereas its negative counterpart was dishonesty. For the nonmoral character values, the positive or commonly shared value was hardworking or industriousness; whereas the corresponding negative value was laziness or slothfulness. For politico-moral values, the positive or commonly shared value was a commitment to a democratic system of government (democratic); which was contrasted with a negative value (antidemocratic) involving commitment to a nondemocratic system (an oligarchy) in which only the wealthy hold political power (this example was derived from Helwig, 1998). For traditional political values, the more commonly held value of patriotism or respect and love for ones country was contrasted with the negative or less commonly endorsed value of nationalism, or belief in the moral superiority of ones country over that of others. Finally, for religious values, the more commonly shared belief in the value of religion in general (religious) was contrasted with the more negative value (religious superiority) of holding ones own religion to be superior to that of others. The interview described the teaching of values by adult authorities in the school or family setting. The school and family were chosen as settings in which children are most likely to encounter the teaching of values by adult authorities. Participants were pre-

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sented with hypothetical situations in which teachers in a school or parents in a family sought to promote values in children. The interview began with a brief preamble that introduced the context. For example, for the school context, children were told that the principal and teachers of a public school were trying to decide what they should teach the children, and that in addition to subjects like math and spelling, they thought that children should learn other things that were considered important. Participants were then presented with short scenarios corresponding to each of the six value types in which the teachers taught the children a specic value content (e.g., that you should be proud of your country and love it; that lying is not ok). The family context described a similar situation in which parents in a family teach their children specic values. The education method used in all scenarios took the form of straightforward teaching of the value, such as authorities (teachers, parents) explaining to children why they believed the value was good or important. All of the scenarios were closely matched in structure and wording. Order of presentation of values and their valence (positive/negative) was systematically counterbalanced. Assessments were made of judgments of acts of values education (i.e., is it okay or not okay for the parent/teacher to teach the value?) and of hypothetical laws that regulate (i.e., prohibit or require) the teaching of the value. Both qualitative and quantitative assessments were made. Qualitative judgments involved simple afrmative or nonafrmative judgments (e.g., okay versus not okay), and quantitative judgments were comprised of ratings on an interval scale. Prior to testing, participants were familiarized with the rating scale. The design of this rating scale was adapted from previous research (Helwig & Prencipe, 1999; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). The scale consisted of an array of differently sized rectangles, on a 43.5 cm 30 cm card, comprising a 7-point scale with a neutral midpoint. For judgments of acts, participants were told that the largest rectangle on the far left indicated a lot not okay, the next rectangle was medium not okay, and the smallest was a little not okay. Correspondingly, the rectangles to the right of center were described as a little okay, the next rectangle as medium okay, then a lot okay. To help differentiate the positive and negative sides of the scale, the positive rectangles were shown in green, the negative rectangles were red, and the midpoint was black. Judgments of laws (see below) used a similar scale in which quantitative evaluations of laws as good or bad were assessed. Following familiarization with the scale, the scenar-

ios that involved values education were presented. Participants were then asked to judge and reason about both the acceptability of acts of values education (e.g., Do you think its okay or not okay for the teacher/parent to teach kids that [X]? Why/Why not?) and to evaluate (as good or bad) a government law that either requires the teaching of the value (for positive or commonly shared values) or prohibits the teaching of the value (for negative or less commonly shared values). After each act acceptability (okay versus not okay) and law (good law/bad law) evaluation, participants were directed to the appropriate scales and asked to provide quantitative assessments of their judgments of act acceptability and of laws. Justications were assessed for both act and law evaluations. Coding and Reliability Fifty percent of the interviews, evenly distributed across age, gender, and context, were randomly selected to devise a coding scheme. This coding system was used to code the remaining portion of the interviews. Two types of responses were coded: evaluations and justications. All qualitative act and law evaluations were coded as endorsements (e.g., its okay; there should be a law) or nonendorsements (e.g., its not okay; there should not be a law), and yes/ no or conditional responses (e.g., its okay and not okay; there should be a law and there shouldnt be a law). Justications that supported each of the evaluations were coded according to the coding scheme summarized in Table 1. The coding scheme included categories relating to the different types of values and judgments examined in the study, such as references to moral features (such as harm and injustice); to other values such as achievement or respect, loyalty, and tradition; and to personal jurisdiction or choice. Twenty percent of the interviews, evenly distributed over age, gender, and context, were coded by an independent judge for comparison with the original coding. Intercoder agreement, expressed as Cohens , was .95 for act and law evaluations and .92 for justications. RESULTS Results (quantitative ratings of acts and laws and justications) are presented separately for items that involve the teaching of positive (commonly shared) and negative (less commonly shared) values. Because qualitative evaluations were essentially encompassed within ratings and provided little additional information, they are not presented here. Quantitative evaluations and justications were analyzed using analy-

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Table 1 Description and Examples of Justication Categories Approval/disapproval Simple affirmative or nonaffirmative judgements of act or law (Its okay to teach that.; Theres nothing bad about that law.). Personal jurisdiction Reference to either individuals right to engage in the activity in question or to limits of governmental jurisdiction with respect to intervention in the family or school (Its not the governments place to tell them that.; The parents should be able to teach them what they want.; The teachers shouldnt have to teach that.). Welfare/fairness Reference to physical or psychological welfare or harm, including general references to societal harmony or conflict (It hurts peoples feelings.; Then they might be sad.; That could lead to a big war.). Also, references to fairness, justice or injustice, discrimination, and democratic principles, including notions of the equality of all people and countries, including political, cultural, and religious systems (Everybody should be treated equally, no matter what color your skin is.; Thats discrimination.; One religion isnt better than others.). Socialization/achievement Reference to positive or negative effects on socialization and personal achievement or character (The child might grow up to be a criminal or a bad person.; They wont be able to find work when they get older.; They might fail grades.; The kids might not be able to achieve any of their goals.). Respect/loyalty/tradition Reference to the importance of respect or loyalty to ones country or regard for tradition (Its important to respect your country.; Its good to follow the same religion as your parents.). Learning Reference to the importance of acquiring knowledge about certain values, including the effects of this knowledge on ones ability to participate in religious or democratic systems (Its good for them to learn about God.; Then theyll know how to vote.). Indoctrination Reference to indoctrination or viewpoint coercion in teaching children values (Thats brainwashing.; They cant force the kids to believe that.). Authority/punishment Appeal to authority, rules, obligations, or punishment (He might get in trouble.; She might get fired if she teaches that.). Relationships/trust References to effects on social relationships or trust. (Youll lose your friends that way.; No one will trust you if you lie all the time.). Relativism/truth Reference to the veracity of the value or the validity of varying points of view (Thats bad to teach that because its not true.; No one can say whats the best religion.). Other Reference to other possible consequences, including economic and environmental effects, as well as to the impracticality of teaching a value or implementing a law to promote or prohibit it (Then theyll keep their country clean.; Then they might get lots of money.; Not everyone will follow that rule.).

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ses of variance (ANOVAs) on major variables of interest. Proportionate usage of justications was calculated and corrected for nonnormality with an arcsin transformation (Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991). Only elaborated justication categories that comprised 10% or more of responses overall were analyzed. Where multiple ANOVAs were performed, the level was set at .01 to control for Type 1 errors. Post hoc comparisons for all analyses were performed using the Bonferroni test, with critical value set at p .05. Positive (Commonly Shared) Values Act evaluations. Table 2 contains means and standard deviations for ratings of acts involving the teaching of positive values, and of government laws that require the teaching of these values, in the school and family contexts by age group and value type. A 4 (age group) 2 (gender) 2 (context) 6 (value) ANOVA conducted on mean ratings of act evaluations revealed main effects of value F(5, 140) 49.87, p .001, and age group F(3, 144) 3.32, p .03, qualied by a Value Age Group interaction F(15, 426) 4.54, p .001. As expected, evaluations of the teaching of values varied by the type of value being taught, especially among older participants. Post hoc comparisons revealed that older participants were less accepting of the teaching of religious and patriotic values. College students rated the teaching of both of these values less positively than did 10- and 8-yearolds, and 13-year-olds rated the teaching of these values less positively than did 8-year-olds. In addition, 13-year-olds rated the teaching of patriotism less positively than did 10-year-olds. The opposite pattern was found for the politico-moral value of democracy, however. Post hoc tests revealed that 8-year-olds rated the teaching of democracy less positively than did all other age groups. A main effect of context was also found, F(1, 144) 5.34, p .03, with post hoc comparisons indicating that the teaching of positive or commonly shared values was rated more positively in the family than in the school context. Law evaluations. A 4 (age group) 2 (gender) 2 (context) 6 (value) ANOVA conducted on mean ratings of laws (Table 2) revealed a number of patterns consistent with expectations. For most values, older participants evaluated laws that require the teaching of values less positively than did younger participants. Main effects of value, F(5, 140) 27.14, p .001, and age group, F(3, 144) 20.14, p .001, were qualied by a Value Age Group interaction F (15, 426) 3.43, p .001. Post hoc tests revealed that college students rated laws that require the teaching of all values except democracy less positively than

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Table 2 Mean Ratings (and SDs) for Act and Law Evaluations for Positive Values by Age, Context, and Value Age 8 Years Evaluation Act Value Racial equality Honesty Hardworking Religious Patriotism Democratic Racial equality Honesty Hardworking Religious Patriotism Democratic School 1.20 (.41) 1.70 (1.34) 1.20 (.41) 2.00 (1.92) 1.75 (1.37) 3.30 (1.87) 5.90 (1.71) 6.10 (1.83) 5.80 (1.70) 4.05 (2.44) 5.53 (1.74) 4.25 (1.80) Family 1.20 (.69) 1.75 (1.86) 1.30 (.73) 1.90 (1.29) 1.35 (.93) 3.10 (2.19) 6.35 (1.27) 6.10 (1.55) 6.47 (1.12) 5.15 (2.18) 5.60 (2.06) 4.45 (2.16) 10 Years School 1.10 (.45) 1.40 (.75) 1.30 (.73) 2.75 (1.71) 1.55 (.94) 2.30 (1.53) 6.25 (1.48) 5.50 (1.91) 5.75 (1.52) 4.32 (2.14) 5.42 (1.50) 4.70 (1.89) Family 1.10 (.45) 1.50 (.95) 1.25 (.72) 2.35 (1.66) 1.55 (.94) 2.20 (1.82) 5.65 (1.79) 5.75 (1.74) 5.35 (1.69) 4.45 (2.19) 4.70 (2.32) 4.75 (1.92) 13 Years School 1.20 (.52) 1.84 (1.07) 1.30 (.57) 4.00 (2.03) 2.60 (1.35) 1.75 (1.48) 6.55 (.69) 4.89 (2.21) 5.45 (1.96) 2.72 (1.93) 4.05 (1.90) 5.53 (1.84) Family 1.10 (.31) 2.15 (1.42) 1.60 (1.10) 3.20 (1.79) 2.00 (1.41) 1.50 (.83) 5.55 (2.01) 4.80 (2.12) 4.30 (2.36) 2.28 (1.84) 3.25 (1.74) 4.85 (2.23) College School 1.25 (.72) 1.60 (1.09) 1.20 (.70) 5.35 (1.81) 2.45 (1.19) 1.90 (1.48) 5.45 (2.06) 4.35 (1.79) 4.35 (2.16) 1.35 (1.09) 3.25 (1.68) 4.95 (2.06) Family 1.05 (.22) 1.50 (1.36) 1.10 (.31) 3.25 (2.17) 2.25 (1.29) 1.70 (.92) 4.20 (2.01) 3.50 (1.96) 3.45 (1.79) 1.60 (.88) 2.90 (2.05) 3.35 (1.79)

Law

Note: Judgments were rated on a 7-point scale; higher numbers indicate decreasing acceptability for acts (1 most acceptable/okay to 7 least acceptable/not okay) and increasing acceptability for laws (1 least acceptable/bad law to 7 most acceptable/good law), with 4 as the neutral point for both scales.

did 8- or 10-year-olds. College students also rated laws that require teaching of racial equality and religious values less positively than did 13-year-olds. Thirteen-year-olds rated laws that require the teaching of character (hardworking), religious, and patriotic values less positively than did 8-year-olds, and they rated laws that require the teaching of religion and patriotism less positively than did 10-year-olds. The expectation that the family would be viewed as more autonomous than the school with respect to governmental regulations and laws received some support. A near-signicant main effect of context, F(1, 144) 3.69, p .057, was found, with laws that require the teaching of values rated more positively in the school context than in the family. A signicant higher order interaction involving gender and context was also found (a Value Context Age Group Gender interaction), F(35, 720) 1.69, p .008. Post hoc tests indicated that in certain specic instances, females rated laws that require the teaching of values in the school more positively than did males (i.e., 13year-olds for hardworking and patriotism); and in other instances, males rated laws that require the teaching of values in the family more positively than did females (i.e., 10-year-olds for racial equality and 13-year-olds for hardworking). Justications. Percentage usage of justications for positive values are found in Table 3. Three categories comprised at least 10% of responses: personal jurisdiction, welfare/fairness, and socialization/ achievement. A 4 (age group) 2 (gender) 2 (context) 6 (value) ANOVA was conducted on propor-

tionate usage of each of these categories. Results of signicant post hoc comparisons are found in footnotes to the table. For personal jurisdiction, main effects of value, F(5, 139) 224.32, p .001, age group, F(3, 143) 12.86, p .001, and context, F(1, 143) 10.24, p .003, were found. Usage of personal jurisdiction justications was consistent with the expectation that the family context would be seen as a sphere insulated from governmental intrusion. Post hoc tests showed that personal jurisdiction responses were more frequent in the family than in the school, and were found more in the religious value than in other values. Personal jurisdiction justications were also used more frequently by older than by younger participants. References to welfare/fairness tended to occur most in values that have direct implications for others welfare or for justice, such as the moral (racial equality) and democratic values (Table 3). Main effects of value, F(5, 139) 88.98, p .001, and a Value Age Group Context interaction, F(15, 423) 2.22, p .007, were qualied by a Value Age Group Context Gender interaction, F(15, 423) 2.46, p .003. Post hoc comparisons that investigated the fourway interaction revealed a number of signicant effects (Table 3), all of them indicating greater use of welfare/fairness by females. References to socialization/achievement were most frequent for the character value (hardworking). A main effect of value, F(5, 139) 100.49, p .001, was qualied by a two-way interaction of value and age group, F(15, 423) 3.05, p .001. Post hoc tests

Prencipe and Helwig

Table 3 Percentage Useage of Justications by Value and Context for Positive Values Value and Context Racial Equality Justication Category Approval/disapproval Personal jurisdictiona Welfare/justiceb Socialization/achievementc Respect/loyalty/tradition Learning Indoctrination Authority/punishment Relationships/trust Relativism/truth Other School 1 5 69 6 0 6 0 2 5 1 5 Family 2 10 66 10 0 2 0 1 4 3 2 Honesty Hardworking Religious Patriotism

849

Democratic

School Family School Family School Family School Family School Family 12 7 31 14 0 2 0 12 9 4 9 9 7 23 17 0 2 0 12 19 5 7 1 10 12 63 0 6 1 0 0 1 6 4 16 11 56 0 2 1 0 1 0 9 7 30 28 3 2 11 8 1 0 3 6 4 39 22 6 5 10 3 0 1 0 10 8 9 25 2 24 6 2 1 0 1 22 8 17 21 2 23 3 1 1 0 1 21 5 11 48 2 0 18 1 1 0 10 5 5 14 53 2 0 13 1 0 0 2 8

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Findings of signicant post hoc comparisons for main effects and interactions are presented in the footnotes below. (When main effects were qualied by higher order interactions, results for comparisons that examined the highest order interaction alone are given.) All post hoc comparisons are presented in abbreviated form (e.g., patriotism racial equality indicates that this category was used more frequently in the patriotism value scenario than the racial equality scenario). a Value main effect (religion all other values; hardworking racial equality and honesty; patriotism racial equality); age group main effect (college all other age groups); context main effect (family context school context). b Value Age Group Context Gender interaction (8-year-olds: females males for honesty in school context; 10-year-olds: females males for racial equality in school; 10-year-olds and college: females males for patriotism in school; 13-year-olds: females males for patriotism in family). c Value Age Group interaction (college all other age groups for honesty; college and 13-year-olds 8-year-olds for racial equality).

that examined the interaction indicated that older participants tended to use socialization/achievement more frequently than younger participants when reasoning about moral (racial equality) and moral character (honesty) values. Negative (Less Commonly Shared) Values Act evaluations. Table 4 presents means and standard deviations for ratings of acts of teaching negative values, and of government laws that prohibit the teaching of these values, in the school and family contexts by age and value type. The table indicates that the teaching of all of these values was judged to be wrong by all age groups, consistent with the characterization of these values as negative or not commonly shared. A 4 (age group) 2 (gender) 2 (context) 6 (value) ANOVA conducted on mean ratings of acts revealed main effects of value, F(5, 140) 20.93, p .001, and context, F(1, 144) 7.66, p .007. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the teaching of nationalism was judged as less wrong than the teaching of all other negative values, and the teaching of religious superiority was rated as less wrong than the teaching of all other negative values except for nationalism. Post hoc comparisons that explored the main effect of context revealed that the teaching of

negative values was rated as more wrong in the school than in the family. Law evaluations. A 4 (age group) 2 (gender) 2 (context) 6 (value) ANOVA was conducted on mean ratings of laws that prohibit the teaching of negative values (Table 4). Older age groups evaluated laws that prohibit the teaching of many negative values less positively than did younger age groups. Main effects of value, F(5, 140) 13.01, p .001, and age group, F(3, 144) 27.11, p .001, were qualied by a Value Age Group interaction, F(15, 426) 2.20, p .007. Post hoc comparisons indicated that college students rated laws that prohibit the teaching of all negative values except religious superiority less positively than did all other age groups. College students rated laws that prohibit the teaching of religious superiority less positively than did 10-year-olds only. Thirteen-year-olds rated laws that prohibit the teaching of negative moral character (dishonesty), character (laziness), and nationalistic values less positively than did 8-year-olds. Thirteen-year-olds also rated laws that prohibit the teaching of dishonesty less positively than did 10-year-olds. Evidence bearing on the expectation that the family would be more likely than the school to be viewed as a sphere separate from governmental regulation was indicated by a main effect of context, F(1, 144) 36.90, p .001, which was

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Table 4 Mean Ratings (and SDs) for Act and Law Evaluations for Negative Values by Age, Context, and Value Age 8 Years Evaluation Act Value Racial prejudice Dishonesty Laziness Religious superiority Nationalism Antidemocratic Racial prejudice Dishonesty Laziness Religious superiority Nationalism Antidemocratic School 6.70 (.66) 6.70 (.92) 6.80 (.52) 6.10 (1.65) 6.05 (1.54) 6.05 (1.88) 6.80 (.41) 6.68 (1.16) 6.60 (.68) 6.05 (1.67) 6.00 (1.52) 6.20 (1.85) Family 6.47 (.84) 6.50 (1.19) 6.35 (1.42) 5.30 (1.89) 5.15 (2.37) 6.65 (.75) 6.85 (.37) 6.15 (1.23) 6.40 (1.27) 5.55 (1.99) 6.10 (1.74) 5.90 (1.77) 10 Years School 6.80 (.52) 6.85 (.37) 6.80 (.41) 6.20 (1.47) 5.70 (1.42) 6.40 (.68) 6.70 (.66) 6.89 (.32) 6.55 (.94) 6.37 (.83) 5.84 (1.42) 6.05 (1.47) Family 6.65 (.75) 6.75 (.72) 6.65 (.81) 6.25 (.97) 5.40 (1.64) 6.40 (1.19) 6.45 (.94) 6.20 (1.36) 5.74 (1.88) 5.50 (1.79) 5.50 (1.93) 6.35 (1.04) 13 Years School 6.95 (.22) 6.30 (1.08) 6.40 (1.43) 6.25 (1.25) 5.55 (1.82) 6.85 (.49) 6.80 (.41) 5.75 (1.21) 6.00 (1.26) 5.89 (1.64) 5.65 (1.78) 6.40 (.99) Family 6.80 (.41) 6.40 (1.10) 6.60 (.99) 5.35 (1.87) 4.95 (1.90) 6.75 (.55) 6.00 (1.62) 5.15 (1.76) 5.15 (1.76) 5.32 (2.08) 4.16 (1.54) 5.20 (1.96) College School 7.00 (.00) 6.80 (.70) 6.75 (.72) 6.40 (1.57) 5.75 (1.29) 6.95 (.22) 6.20 (1.77) 5.50 (1.85) 4.80 (2.12) 6.32 (1.20) 5.15 (1.53) 5.55 (2.11) Family 6.80 (.70) 6.30 (1.34) 6.45 (.83) 5.68 (1.73) 4.60 (1.98) 6.85 (.37) 4.65 (2.21) 3.15 (2.01) 2.95 (1.64) 3.40 (1.90) 2.65 (1.60) 3.50 (2.06)

Law

Note: Judgments were rated on a 7-point scale; higher numbers indicate decreasing acceptability for acts (1 most acceptable/okay to 7 least acceptable/not okay) and increasing acceptability for laws (1 least acceptable/bad law to 7 most acceptable/good law), with 4 as the neutral point for both scales.

qualied by an interaction between context and age group, F(3, 144) 7.54, p .001. Post hoc tests revealed that older (13-year-olds and college students), but not younger, age groups distinguished laws that prohibit the teaching of negative values by social context, with older participants evaluating such laws more negatively in the family than in the school. Justications. Table 5 contains percentage usage of justications for negative values. Personal jurisdiction, welfare/fairness, and socialization/achievement t the analysis criterion of comprising at least 10% of responses. These categories were analyzed in a 4 (age) 2 (gender) 2 (context) 6 (value) ANOVA conducted on proportionate usage of each of the categories, with results of post hoc tests summarized in footnotes to Table 5. For personal jurisdiction, main effects of age group, F(3, 144) 23.87, p .001, and context, F(1, 144) 40.30, p .001, were qualied by an Age Context interaction, F(3, 144) 9.05, p .001. Post hoc comparisons revealed greater use of personal jurisdiction by older participants in the family than in the school context, consistent with their evaluation responses that suggest greater autonomy of the family from governmental intrusion. A main effect of value, F(5, 140) 9.52, p .001, was also found. Post hoc tests indicated that personal jurisdiction justications were more frequently used in reasoning about religious superiority than in all other negative values, and in reasoning about nationalism than in racial prejudice and dishonesty. References to welfare and fairness tended to occur

most often for the teaching of values that have direct or indirect potential consequences for others welfare or for issues of justice, including moral (racial prejudice), moral character (dishonesty), and antidemocratic values. Issues of welfare and justice were also frequently identied in reasoning about the teaching of nationalism and religious superiority (Table 5). Main effects of value, F(5, 140) 147.13, p .001, and age group, F(3, 144) 6.82, p .001, were qualied by a Value Age Group interaction, F(15, 426) 2.49, p .003. Post hoc comparisons that examined the interaction showed that older participants were less likely to refer to welfare and justice for the teaching of racial prejudice than were younger participants. References to socialization/achievement were most frequent when reasoning about the character value (laziness). Main effects of value, F(5, 140) 97.38, p .001, and age group, F(3, 144) 7.06, p .001, were qualied by a Value Age Group interaction, F(15, 426) 3.45, p .001. Use of socialization/ achievement for negative values followed a pattern similar to that for positive values, with older participants using socialization/achievement more when reasoning about the teaching of the moral (racial prejudice) and moral character (dishonesty) values than did younger participants. DISCUSSION The results of this study indicate that childrens, adolescents and young adults reasoning about values

Prencipe and Helwig

Table 5 Percentage Usage of Justications by Value and Context for Negative Values Value and Context Religious Superiority School 1 15 48 2 2 2 6 1 0 14 8

851

Racial Prejudice Justication Category Approval/disapproval Personal jurisdictiona Welfare/fairnessb Socialization/achievementc Respect/loyalty/tradition Learning Indoctrination Authority/punishment Relationships/trust Relativism/truth Other School 3 1 76 8 0 2 1 1 2 5 1 Family 1 7 70 8 0 1 1 2 4 3 2

Dishonesty School Family 12 1 26 16 0 2 0 15 17 2 8 5 10 19 19 0 1 1 18 18 2 6

Laziness School Family 2 3 10 66 0 7 0 0 1 0 10 4 13 13 49 0 3 0 2 1 1 12

Nationalism

Antidemocratic

Family School Family School Family 4 23 51 5 1 2 3 0 1 6 5 3 5 58 1 4 2 2 0 1 11 11 2 18 47 2 4 1 1 0 0 15 8 2 3 77 3 0 3 0 0 0 2 10 3 12 72 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 5

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Findings of signicant post hoc comparisons for main effects and interactions are presented in the footnotes below. (When main effects were qualied by higher order interactions, results for comparisons that examined the highest order interaction alone are given.) All post hoc comparisons are presented in abbreviated form (e.g., nationalism racial prejudice indicates that this category was used more frequently in the nationalism value scenario than the racial prejudice scenario). a Value main effect (religious superiority all other values; nationalism racial prejudice, dishonesty); Age Group Context Interaction (for 13-year-olds and college: family school context). b Value Age Group interaction (for racial prejudice: 8-year-olds 13-year-olds, college; 10-year-olds college). c Value Age Group interaction (for racial prejudice and dishonesty: 13-year-olds, college 8-year-olds; college 10-year-olds).

education is multifaceted and includes distinctions between moral values that reect justice and rights and moral character traits, and other forms of desirable personality traits and social values. Children and young adults considered a number of factors in evaluating the teaching of values, including the valence (positive or negative) of the value, the social context in which the value is taught, and the type of value being educated. These factors appear to become better differentiated and coordinated in judgments and reasoning with development. As expected, participants applied moral concepts of harm and justice to evaluate the teaching of values in the school and family. Issues of harm and fairness were considered by all age groups in evaluating the teaching of moral and moral character values such as racial equality and honesty; participants generally endorsed the teaching of these values and rejected the teaching of their negative counterparts, such as racial prejudice or dishonesty. Children and young adults also applied concepts of harm and rights to evaluate the teaching of other, less commonly shared or negative values, such as religious superiority or nationalism. The teaching of these values often was seen to implicate issues such as fairness or equality, or their teaching was seen as contributing to social conict or even leading to wars between nations. At all ages, judgments in the moral domain (Smetana, 1995;

Turiel, 1998) appeared to guide and inform evaluations of values education efforts. The family context was viewed increasingly with age as an autonomous sphere, insulated from governmental intrusion in the form of laws that prescribe values education. Here, older age groups were more likely than were younger children to regard laws that require the teaching of positive values as unacceptable, and they were more likely to use references to personal jurisdiction to justify their judgments. The same was found even with respect to negative (socially unshared) values: laws that prohibit their teaching were less likely to be endorsed in the family context than in the school. Only laws that prohibit the teaching of racial prejudice or those that require the teaching of racial equality in the family were viewed as acceptable by signicant proportions of college students (approximately 50%). The emergence by early adolescence of conceptions of the family as a sphere in which governmental regulation is seen as unwarranted (for some issues) parallels ndings from other research. For example, Helwig (1997) examined reasoning about whether various authorities could restrict childrens religious freedom in the school, the family, and society at large. Although younger children in that study judged restrictions on childrens religious freedom as equally acceptable by authorities in all three social contexts,

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Child Development

adolescents and young adults were more likely to view restrictions on the religious freedom of children (in the form of parents socialization of a particular religion) as acceptable only within the family. Results from the present study indicate that the family constitutes an arena in which parental authority is accorded a considerable degree of freedom in the socialization of a variety of values, including, in some instances, values whose teaching is judged, nonetheless, as wrong (e.g., laziness, dishonesty, antidemocratic values). Only when the moral ramications for issues of fairness or justice are fairly extreme (as in the teaching of racial prejudice) did a signicant proportion of college students believe that intrusion by government into the family sphere is warranted. In contrast, the school was perceived as an institution for values education over which governments were judged to have considerable regulatory power. For example, at all ages it was judged acceptable for governments to prohibit the teaching of negative values in the school, consistent with the general conceptualization of the school as an important arena for the socialization of positive societal values. Particular aspects of the schools role in this process, however, were found to change with age. Younger children perceived a much broader role for government in mandating the teaching of an array of values in the school, as they did in the family. Specically, younger children thought it was acceptable for governments to require the teaching of such values as racial equality, honesty, industriousness, and patriotism in the school. With age, the governments role in regulating positive values education in schools became increasingly conned to those values having direct implications for moral principles of justice and fairness. Most college students, for example, believed that the government should mandate the teaching of moral and politicomoral values, such as racial equality and democracy. On the other hand, ratings of laws that require the teaching of other values, such as honesty or industriousness, tended toward the neutral midpoint of the scale and reected considerable disagreement over the governments role. Although college students did not tend to view the teaching of moral character or character values such as honesty or industriousness in the school as necessary (i.e., required by law), many of them did regard it as good for these values to be taught in schools, as indicated by their act evaluations. Young adults appear to conceptualize the teaching of moral character and character values as acceptable but discretionary in the school context, in contrast to moral and politicomoral values such as racial equality and democracy, whose teaching was seen as necessary. In research

that examined childrens reasoning about different types of obligations, Kahn (1992) found that some acts, particularly those involving issues of welfare and virtuous character (e.g., generosity), were reasoned about as discretionary moral actions (i.e., as good or praiseworthy, but not obligatory or required by law), in contrast to other more straightforward moral acts (e.g., stealing) typically studied in research on social domains (Turiel, 1998). The ndings of the present study suggest that this distinction between discretionary and obligatory moral obligations may be useful in explaining the variations found in laypersons reasoning about the teaching of different kinds of values, and may also help to inform current debates about the role of government in promoting values education efforts in the school (Nucci, 1997). The growing support with age for the teaching of democratic values parallels ndings from recent research on developing conceptions of democracy. These studies showed that with age, children become increasingly aware of democratic principles and procedures, and their appropriate application in social contexts such as the school, the family, and society at large (Helwig, 1998; Helwig & Kim, 1999). The present study revealed that reasoning about other values, such as patriotism and religion, however, followed a different pattern. Older participants were less likely than were younger children to regard the teaching of religious or patriotic values in the school as acceptable, and they were more likely to negatively evaluate laws that require the teaching of these values. Despite giving schools free-ranging jurisdiction over values education, even young children (8-year-olds) often negatively evaluated laws that require the teaching of religion in the public schools. Overall, these patterns in childrens and young adults reasoning appear to mirror issues raised in debates about values education encountered in the moral development and education literatures (Nucci, 1997, 2001; Wynne, 1989). Agreement is more likely to exist about the role of values education in school curricula for some values, such as democracy or racial equality, whereas other values, such as patriotism, nationalism, or religious values, are seen as more contentious (Kohlberg, 1971). Another developmental pattern evident in responses was a greater differentiation between judgments of acts of values education and judgments of governmental regulation of these acts. Younger children appeared to base their judgments of legal or governmental regulation largely on whether the teaching of the value was judged to be acceptable or not. For older participants, especially college students, however, judgments of acts and laws sometimes exhibited

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853

a good deal of independence. For example, although college students tended to evaluate the teaching of all of the negative values as wrong, they rejected laws that prohibit the teaching of these values in the family context (with the exception of racial prejudice). These patterns are similar to those obtained in other studies (Helwig, 1995b, 1998; Zelazo et al., 1996) that showed an increasing ability to distinguish among different dimensions of social and moral judgments with development, and point to the importance of assessing social reasoning using specic measures designed to tap different features of social and moral concepts. The different assessments (act and law evaluations) employed in the present study revealed that childrens judgments of acts and governmental regulation become better differentiated as they develop a clearer understanding of the role of legal regulation in different social spheres. The ndings of this study have implications for existing theories of values education. Consistent with the values identied as important within the cognitive-developmental approach, the ndings reveal a strong concern with moral issues such as rights, harm, and justice. Children and young adults were concerned not only with generalizable moral values, however, but also with more culture- or contextspecic issues of character, along with other social values. Participants at all ages viewed efforts to educate character values such as industriousness as acceptable in both the family and the schools. Concerns with the socialization of appropriate character traits were also manifest in adolescents and young adults reasoning about moral and moral character values, such as racial equality and honesty, as seen in the justication ndings. Reasoning about values education often appeared to reect attempts to integrate, and yet to differentiate among, moral values and the development of positive character traits (cf. Walker & Pitts, 1998). These nding suggest that the cognitivedevelopmental approach to values education does indeed require some expansion, to properly account for the role of personality and character in judgments of values education, while maintaining important distinctions between these and other values such as justice. The character education perspective as well may need to take greater heed of distinctions between types of values and the social contexts of values education. In particular, this approach may need to better account for the unique role played by morality and issues of justice among social values. In addition, as the ndings from the current study show, the school was seen as different from the family in important ways not usually acknowledged by this approach. For example, the same latitude of socialization of values

was not granted to school authorities as to parents in the family. By adolescence, values education efforts that focus on religious or patriotic values in the school were viewed with considerable scepticism, despite the appearance of these values in many programs of values education advocated by proponents of the character education approach (e.g., Wynne, 1989). These ndings also have practical implications in that they suggest that children and adolescents may be less likely to accept certain kinds of values education programs than others. The perspective of the recipients of values education efforts thus will need to be considered when gauging the likely effectiveness and the desirabilityof any such programs. The ndings of this study suggest that emerging conceptions of values education may be better explained by models of social reasoning that draw distinctions between types of values (e.g., moral and other values) and account for childrens increasing developmental capacity to differentiate social contexts and spheres of legitimate governmental regulation (e.g., Helwig, 1995a, 1997; Turiel, 1998). However, although the current study revealed patterns in judgments and reasoning about values that could be accounted for by the typology of values that were proposed, it is important to stress that we do not expect all manifestations of reasoning about values necessarily to fall into these patterns. As has been found in other areas of social and moral reasoning, values may be applied in particular situations or contexts that elicit a multiplicity of concerns (cf. Smetana, 1983, multifaceted issues). For example, a character value such as laziness may have moral implications in cooperative or interdependent situations in which others may be negatively affected by an individuals failure to perform his or her job effectively. The ndings associated with the typology of values provided in the current study should be taken as a starting point that might prove useful in investigations of more complex instances, and not as exhaustive of all the forms of reasoning about values likely to be encountered. The gender differences found in the current study were unanticipated, given the absence of gender effects in most research on related topics in social cognition (for an interesting exception, see Killen & Stangor, 2001). It is essential, however, not to overestimate the import of these ndings, as they occurred somewhat sporadically in investigations of higher order interactions and often did not t into any clearly interpretable general pattern. Nevertheless, the nding that females were more likely to refer to issues of welfare and fairness in several comparisons may suggest that females may be somewhat more attuned

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Child Development

than males to considering the effects of the teaching of values on others welfare or their implications for issues of justice. It is interesting, in this regard, that several of the signicant gender effects involved the value of patriotism, perhaps suggesting that females are somewhat more likely than males to consider how teaching of patriotic values may have moral implications for others or for the country as a whole. Again, it is important to stress that these gender effects were of a local nature and did not represent global differences in the reasoning of males and females, which overall was highly similar across social contexts, ages, and types of values. The substantiation and further interpretation of these potential gender differences awaits additional research. There are several qualications to the present studys ndings that may indicate some fruitful directions for future research. To examine a range of different types of values, the study was restricted to one example (in positive and negative manifestations) of each type. These examples were chosen to represent prototypical or straightforward instances of some of the kinds of values that have been proposed by different theoretical perspectives as candidates for values education, but further investigation of other examples is surely needed to conrm the generality of the patterns found in the present study. Second, the present study examined reasoning about values education in a largely middle-class sample from North America (Canada). Many aspects of the ndings appear to be consistent with developmental patterns found in other studies, but further research with additional samples that vary in socioeconomic status as well as cultural and national background is needed to begin to disentangle developmental from other sources of variation in reasoning. It is not known, for example, whether the decline with age in endorsement of government laws that mandate the teaching of patriotism or religious values also would be found among more traditional populations or in nations with a stronger culture of patriotism or religious commitment than Canada. Finally, the current study examined reasoning under circumstances in which the process of values education involved straightforward teaching as the mechanism. The study did not investigate the role of other processes in judgments of values education, especially those that might be seen as more coercive or involving harmful forms of indoctrination (Moshman, 1986, 1989; Snook, 1972). The present study showed that children and adults make distinctions among the content of values and the social context of their teaching, but little is known about how these variables may intersect with the development of judgments about the process of values education. For example, what is the role of reective or cognitive

processes versus behavioral methods (such as instilling habits) in values education? Is it ever viewed as permissible to teach positive values through indoctrination or use of coercive methods? At what point might the methods of values education be considered too extreme and government intervention in the family be seen as necessary? Investigation of these questions should help to shed further light on some of the important issues raised in debates between character education and constructivist approaches over how values education may be best accomplished. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to the second author. The authors wish to express their gratitude to the college students, and children and their parents who participated in the study. This project would not have been possible without the dedication of many students who contributed in important ways to various aspects of the research, among them Jackie Chiang, Julia Janes, Heidy Morales, and Margaret Nur. The authors would like to thank the action editor and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. This study was submitted in partial fulllment of the requirements for the Masters of Science degree in Psychology at the University of Toronto by the rst author. Portions of this research were presented at the meeting of the Jean Piaget Society in Berkeley, CA, in June 2001. ADDRESSES AND AFFILIATION Corresponding author: Charles C. Helwig, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Sidney Smith Hall, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada; e-mail: helwig@psych.utoronto.ca. Angela Prencipe is also at the University of Toronto.

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