CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY The 1987 Constitution was created after the horrifying era of President Ferdinand Marcos. This Constitution was the reaction to the abuses that was present in the Marcos regime. This is when checks and balances of the judiciary, executive and legislative started. But other than the Judiciary, Executive and Legislative, the 1987 Constitution also Created Offices or Commissions that would help better serve the country. Some of the constitutionally created offices are the Commission on Election, Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman.1

These constitutionally created offices were given powers and functions by the Constitution. The Constitution itself, also gave to some of these offices independence against other branches of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is one of the offices that were given such independence.2 Section 5 of Article XI 3 provides:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
1 2

1987 Constitution Article XI, Section 5, 1987 Constitution 3 ID

The Office of the Ombudsman has the power and function to prosecute public officials, employees, office or agency when there is an illegal act or omission. 4 However as we all have learned from history independence and freedom can be taken away easily if one takes it from them.

The Supreme Court of the Philippines has administrative control and supervision over all employees of the judiciary which includes judges.5 It is, however, stated that the Ombudsman has sole jurisdiction over cases involving illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient acts of public officers.6 The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created office and such is independent from the judiciary.7

In the case of Caoibes v Ombudsman8 a judge filed against judge Caoibes a criminal case in the Office of the Ombudsman and an administrative case in the Supreme Court. Judge Caoibes wanted to suspend the proceedings in the Ombudsman as there was an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Office of the Ombudsman cannot determine whether the case is an administrative case or not suspending the case in the Ombudsman.9 Therefore, every

4 5 6 7 8

Article XI, Section 13, 1987 Constitution 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 11

RA 6770, Section 15

1987 Constitution, Aricle XI, Section 5 Gr no. 132177, July 19, 2001) 9 Judge Caoibes v The Honorable Ombudsman, Gr no. 132177, July 19 2001)

case that involves a judiciary employee or officer must first be referred to the Supreme Court before the Office of the Ombudsman can act on any case.10

B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Decision of the Supreme Court in said case undermines the independence that the 1987 Constitution gave to the Office of the Ombudsman. Given the fact that all cases whether criminal or civil of judiciary employees or officers should first be referred to the Supreme Court would make the office of the ombudsman dependent on such court.

The Scope and Powers of the Ombudsman covers all executive, legislative and judiciary officers. The three branches are co-equal branches of the government. Allowing this kind of process to the judiciary would allow preference in one branch of government. The 1987 Constitution does not distinguish who is covered within the scope of the Ombudsman. Therefore, what is not distinguish we should not distinguish.

The decision of the Supreme Court also undermines the prosecuting power of the Ombudsman. It is true that the Supreme Court has administrative control over all Judiciary employees and officers.11 Since the Supreme Court has administrative control over its employees the office of the Ombudsman cannot determine whether a case is an administrative proceeding since such is in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

10 11

id. 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 11

However, The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to determine whether a case is a criminal or civil case against a public officer. Not allowing the Ombudsman to continue a criminal or civil case against a public officer would limit the powers given to it by the Constitution.

C. OBJECTIVES The main objective of this paper is to review and analyse the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Judge Caoibes v Office of the Ombudsman 12 and to show that the said ruling would undermine and prejudice the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. With this purpose in mind, the proponent further aims to: 1) Examine and determine the proper interpretation of the applicable law/s specifically Act no. 6770, 2) Discuss the powers, function and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Office of the Ombudsman, 3) To show that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is threatened and how important it is for the Office of the Ombudsman in order for such office to exercise such power and function. Finally, the proponent would like to recommend the overturn of the ruling and amend laws which limit the powers of the Ombudsman that are not found in the 1987 Constitution.

D. METHODOLOGY In order to achieve the objectives above mentioned the proponent would analyse all or sample jurisprudence of administrative cases in the judiciary, executive and legislative. Since all cases of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance of public

12

Gr no. 132177, July 19, 2001

officers are within the scope of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is just right to compare the three departments. It will also be helpful to research and find available resources such as laws, book and commentaries on the power and scope of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is already known that the powers and functions of the ombudsman can be found on Article XI of the 1987 Constitution but republic acts and implementing rules and regulations were created in pursuant to this act. There should be a strict comparison between the laws and the Constitution in order to figure out whether the law is with conformity with the 1987 Constitution. The proponent would also make a case review of cases that have reached the Supreme Court involving the Office of the Ombudsman. Most of the jurisprudence that will be in this paper would involve administrative cases of the Supreme Court which coincides with criminal and civil cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY Independence of a branch of government or a government office is important for them to exercise their powers and functions to the fullest. But how is this limited? The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not the exercise of the power or function is unconstitutional. However, one wrong interpretation of the Constitution can leave an office, just like the Ombudsman, without a leg. And power and function given to offices or branch of government would be worthless since they cannot exercise them independently. Such would have to wait hand and foot for the decision of the Supreme Court to continue to do work. Just like the

case of Caiobes v Ombudsman

13

where the Office of the Ombudsman had to wait for

the decision of the Supreme Court in order to continue even though its within the scope and function given to it by the Constitution.14

F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS This study will limit itself within the powers and scope of the Office of the Ombudsman.It will also limit itself in differentiating administrative cases and criminal cases.It will also tackle the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over executive, legislative and judiciary officers.It will also discuss the power of control and supervision of the Supreme Court over its employees and officers.

G. ORGANZATION OF THE PAPER Chapter II will concentrate on the Office of the Ombudsman. First part of Chapter II is the History would discuss the how, when and why the Ombudsman was created. Second part is the discussion on the scope, powers and functions of the Ombudsman. Finally laws and administrative orders that give power to the ombudsman. Chapter III will concentrate on the Supreme Court. It will discuss the power and functions of the Supreme Court. It will also discuss the brief History of such. Also it will be imperative to write the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court over its employees and officers. In this part of the chapter it will also be discussed whether the Supreme Court has control or supervision over the Office of the Ombudsman

13 14

id Article XI, section 13, 1987 Constitution

Chapter IV concentrates on independence. What does independence mean? What can it do for a branch of government? And finally how is it being exercised by such government? Chapter V concentrates on cases. First is the analysis of administrative cases of judiciary employees and officers. Second is the analysis of criminal and civil cases of judiciary employees and officers within the scope of the Ombudsman. And then comparing the two scenarios whether the two can co-exist with one another.And finally the analysis of the case of Caiobes v Office of the Ombudsman which is the main cases of this paper. Chapter VI is the Critique and analysis of the paper. This part would analyse and combine all the chapters and find a conclusion on the problem as well as a possible recommendation to the problem. Chapter VII is the recommendation and conclusion of the thesis. This would lead to a suggestion of overturning the decision of the Supreme Court and possible amendment on the laws that violate the Constitution.

CHAPTER II: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN A. HISTORY The concept of Ombudsman originated in the Scandinavian countries referring to an officer appointed by the legislature who is tasked with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the appropriate agency based on his findings. Basically, it was aimed at giving the common people a tribunal to which they can readily

ventilate their grievances against the government15. This is the classical Ombudsman model. The present Philippine Ombudsman, however, departs from this model. In the Philippine context, the precursor for the current Office of the Ombudsman was created in 1978 under Pres. Marcos regime. The 1973 Constitution (Sections 5 and 6, Article XIII) provided for the establishment of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and an Office of the Ombudsman known as the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate

recommendations, and in appropriate cases, file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases before the proper court or body. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. 16 Today, the Office of the Ombudsman as created by the 1987 Constitution placed a higher level of accountability for government workers based on the principle that public office is a public trust. The Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which continued to exercise powers except those belonging to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is now armed as the prosecutor for the erring public officers and employees. To sum it up, the present Ombudsman, as an institution, is designated as the Protector of the People charged to monitor the general and specific performance of government officials and employees.17

15

Official website of Ombudsman.http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&navId=MQ==&subNavId=ODU= accessed on August 10, 2013 16 Official website of Ombudsman.http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&navId=MQ==&subNavId=ODU= accessed on August 10, 2013 17 Atty. Fred October 3rd, 2006 TheOffice of the Ombudsman, mandatedasProtector of the People

B. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution.18 Among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any

act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. X XX

Ombudsman cases are complaints filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or employee, including those in the government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.19 First, let us define what is a public officer or employee. Agpalo (2005) stated that public officers or employees of the Government are either in national or local, elective or appointive, whose offices are either created by the Constitution or by statutes. He
.http://jlp-law.com/blog/ombudsman-philippines-protector-people/accessed on August 10, 2013
18 19

Article XI, Accountability of Public Officers. Ombudsman Official Website, http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&navId=MTI=, accessed on July 25, 2013

further classified public officers into executive, legislative, and judiciary which is dictated by the nature of the primary functions of the branch of government to which they belong20. There are a few acts and laws that provides for the specific definition of public officer and employee. One is the Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code. This law provides for distinction between a public officer and a public employee. It states: (14) "Officer" as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function. (15) "Employee", when used with reference to a person in the public service, includes any person in the service of the government or any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities.

Another is under Sec. 2 (b) of R.A. 3019 or ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, on the other hand, defines "public officer" as that which includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from

20

Agpalo, Ruben, 2005, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, Rex Bookstore, Inc., Philippines, pp. 250251

10

the government. The term government has been defined under the same Act as that which includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches (Sec. 2 (a)). Likewise, Sec. 3 (b) of RA 6713 or Code of Ethical Standards for Government Officials and Employees defines Public Officials as that which includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount. The Revised Penal Code also provides for definition but it was different in some way. In Azarcon v Sandiganbayan21, it was held that to be a public officer under Art. 203 of RPC, one must: (1) take part in the performance of public functions in the government, or perform in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent , or subordinate official, or any rank or class; and (2) that his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be: (a) by direct provision of law, or (b) by popular election, or (c) appointment authority. It is quite comprehensive, embracing as it obliterates the distinction between public officer and public employee. In the previous laws regarding the Ombudsman which was described as the classical Ombudsman model and which function is merely to receive and process the peoples complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel, RA 6770 gave the present Ombudsman the duty to investigate and prosecute for and in their behalf,
21

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents. [G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997]

11

civil, criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees22. In effect, the legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions23. We should also take a look at the case of Uy v Sandiganbayan where it further described that the powers of the Ombudsman is legislated as broad enough to cover any acts or omissions committed by any public officers and employees without regard to their ranks. It has been ruled in that case that: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. 24

C. Laws, Administrative Orders vs. The Constitution While it is true that the Ombudsman was established and was given the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be

22

GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents, G.R. Nos. 105965-70. March 20, 2001
23

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v COURT OF APPEALS and LOREA L. SANTOS, G.R. No. 167844, November 22, 2006 citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, 20 March 2001, 354 SCRA 651, 666. 24 GEORGE UY vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR , G.R. Nos. 105965-70. March 20, 2001

12

illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient25, it was, however, limited by a provision under Administrative Order No.7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The said has delimited the public officers and employees that the powers of the Ombudsman can cover: Section 2. Public officers covered; exceptions. - All elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local governments, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. Excepted from the foregoing are Members of Congress, the Judiciary, and officials removable only by impeachment; provided, however, that the Office of the Ombudsman may investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable only by impeachment for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. Moreover, a number of case laws or jurisprudence has been promulgated by the Supreme Court concluding that it is within its arms to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government, especially Ombudsman, that may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.26 Such being the case, the problem posed now is that the power of the Ombudsman is delimited by such provision instead of allowing it to exercise its

25
26

Sec. 13, Article XI, 1987 Consitution

RODOLFO B. GARCIA vs. PRIMO C. MIRO, OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS etc., G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009

13

independent discretion and authority against erringgovernment employees and officers without due regard to the branch of office he belongs to.

CHAPTER III: The SUPREME Court A. A Little Background Story The current judicial systemhas a long history even since before the Spanish conquest because of the fact that Filipinos have already established their own way to deal with legal controversies. But when the Spaniards came to the Philippines, the Royal Audencia was established which served as the highest tribunal in the year 1583. It then became known as Audencia Territorial de Manila which has power to decide over civil and criminal cases. In 1861, it was converted to a purely judicial body but its decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court in Madrid, Spain.When it was the Americans time to reign, a military government was established organizing court martialsor provost courts. But on May 1988, the Audencia was re-established giving it jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases. It was only until June 11, 1901 marked the birth of the Supreme court when the Act No. 136 or the Judiciary Law of the Second Philippine Commission enacted it. By virtue of that law, judicial power was vested in the Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and Justice of the Peace Courts. However, complete Filipinization of the courts was only achieved upon the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1935. At the present, under the 1987 Constitution, Sec. 1, Art. VIII, judicial power is now vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.27

27

Ng, Peter, et. Al (2007) Legal Research and Bibliography. Phil. College of Medical Researchers, Foundation, Inc. pp. 45- 46

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Under the definition of judicial power provided by Cruz (2002), the courts of justice are authorized not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (p. 247).28 The first part is the traditional concept of judicial power where the courts role is to settle disputes on legal rights while the second part is broader judicial power enabling it to review the acts or discretion of the executive and legislative departments of the government. The latter definition in effect gives to Supreme Court the teeth to declare acts of such political departments invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction when they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The 1987 Constitution, under Sec. 5 of Article VIII, provides for the specific powers which the Supreme Court has. It states that the Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus; 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
28

Cruz, Isagani (2002) Philippine Political Law. Central Lawbook Publishing Co. p. 247

15

b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. 4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

16

According to Bernas (2009), the powers of the Supreme Court are classified into two: (1) the irreducible jurisdiction and (2) the auxiliary administrative powers. The former refers to par. 1 and 2 of the above provision where it represents the jurisdiction over cases. On the other hand, the latter type refers to paragraphs 3 to 6.29

B. Supervision over the Judiciary employees and officers. In addition to the powers granted by the 1987 Constitution, under Sec. 5 of Article VIII, to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court is given the power of

administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. In the original set-up, under the 1973 Constitution, it was under the Department of Justice and as an effect, this impaired independence of judges had manifested to defer the pressures and suggestions of the executive department in exchange of favourable action on their requests and administrative problems30. Hence, the 1987 Constitution under Section 6, Article VIII, has now transferred that power to the Supreme Court. Consequently, in a number of cases that has been decided by the Supreme Court, it repeatedly announced that it has the authority to supervise administratively all courts and their personnel. Its task is to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.31

29

Bernas, Joaquin SJ (2009) The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary. Rex Bookstore Inc, pp. 967-968 30 Cruz, Isagani (2002) Philippine Political Law. Central Lawbook Publishing Co. p. 283-284
31

RODOLFO B. GARCIA vs. PRIMO C. MIRO, OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS etc., G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009

17

C. Jurisdiction of The Supreme Court over the Office of the Ombudsman In the case of Caoibes v Ombudsman, two members of the judiciary got entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. One of the judges filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint before this Court over the same incident. When the Ombudsman denied the motion of Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme Court, he filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the reversal of the order. In granting the petition, the Court held that: Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. Adopting in the same view, in the case of Fuentes v Ombudsman where the issue was whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over the acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court. According to the Court, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner

18

judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Another is the case of JUDGE DOLALAS where she was charged of undue delay in the disposition of the case. It was held that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an investigation on the said charge which, in essence, is a violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3[7] of the Code of Judicial Conduct, hence, relates to a judges performance of her official duties over which the Supreme Court has administrative control and supervision, as mandated under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, in the case of QUIONES v JUDGE LOPEZ JR. 32, , The Office of the Ombudsman referred to this Court the charge against Judge Lopez on the alleged conspiracy among Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr., Atty. Francisco G. Geronilla and Manuel B. Guiez in the improvident filing of the latters certifica te of candidacy. It reiterated the case of Maceda v Vasquez ruling that due to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is exclusively vested with administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Courts of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. With the cases that were mentioned above, Supreme Court has just marked its territoryand pronounced that there is no other branch of government that may intrude into the power looking over at its own officers and employees. Otherwise,it would run afoul on the doctrine of separation of powers.

32

MAYOR ARFRAN L. QUIONES v JUDGE FRANCISCO H. LOPEZ JR., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1428, April 9, 2003

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CHAPTER IV: INDEPENDENCE A. What is Independence? What does it mean for a branch of Government Independence the word basically means, its the opposite of dependence, The prefix in indicates it. It is synonymous to freedom, a state of not being subject to control by others thus self governing. The concept of sovereignty divest in the state, and it extends to the three branches of the government, the Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary. It is the so called Separation of Powers of the three branches government. However these powers can be delegated to the co-equal branches. The Executive Branch have the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. An example of this quasi-legislative powers is exercised in his capacity to make Executive Orders or Administrative Orders. On his quasi-Judicial powers, he has the power to grant amnesty or pardon to convicted criminals. The Legislative branch also have a Quasi-executive and Quasi-Judicial power. Power to appointment of its officers, to affirm treaties, power to confirm Presidential appointees through the Commission on Appointments, are examples of its quasi-judicial powers. Its quasi-judicial powers are exercised through its power to punish, suspend or expel its Members for disorderly behavior, to concur and approve amnesty declare by the President of the Philippines, to initiate, prosecute and thereafter decide cases of impeachment and to decide electoral protest of its members through the respective Electoral Tribunal. Lastly, the Judiciary also have these quasi-executive and quasi-legislative powers. It has the power to appoint officers. The Supreme Court has the administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel in exercise of its quasi-executive powers.

20

The power to promulgate laws and judicial legislation through doctrines laid down on its decisions are within its exercise of quasi-legislative powers. the congress has the power to Checks and Balance among the three branches

PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES The three co-equal departments are established by the constitution in as balanced positions as possible. To maintain this balance or to restore it if upset, each department is given certain powers with which to check the others. Checks by the President may veto or disapprove bills enacted by the Congress (Sec. 27:1) through pardoning power, he may modify or set aside the judgments of courts33 Checks by the Congress Congress may override the veto of the President (Sec. 27:1) Reject certain appointments of the President34 Revoke the

proclamation of martial law or suspension the writ of habeas corpus by of the President35 Amend or revoke the decision of the Court by the enactment of a new law or by an amendment of the old - The power to impeach the President and the members of the Supreme Court. Checks by the Judiciary the Supreme Court as the final arbiter may declare legislative measures or executive acts unconstitutional36 determine whether

Art VII, Sec 19 Art. VII, Sec. 16 35 Art. VII, Section 18 36 Art. VIII, Sec 4:2
33 34

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or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Congress or President37 How is it being exercised by The Courts The Executive Branch has the power to execute laws, to effectively ensure that this power is exercised the Department of Justice is created under the Executive. The purpose of this department is to ensure that the rule of law is observed. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Prosecutor is created to stand for the Government in Criminal Cases as crimes are in violation to the state and the criminal liability or injured party is the state. Both the Judiciary and Department of Justice through the office of the prosecutor has the power to conduct preliminary investigations in Criminal cases and determine if there is probable cause. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. it is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor, who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. It is an exercise of its quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. This duty is independent to that Judicial determination of probable cause. It is not the duty of the prosecutor to assist the judge in determining the probable cause in the issuance of the warrant of arrest, as that duty is solely of the judge.

37

Art. VIII, Sec. 2:2)

22

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The Judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause the Judge cannot be forced to issue an arrest warrant.
38

The judge cannot compel the prosecutor to present additional evidence in order to resolve his doubt on whether there exist probable cause in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The mandatory duty of the prosecutor is to conduct preliminary investigation where he will determine whether or not probable cause exists which would result in the filing of an action in court.

V. CAN CASES Co- EXIST? The case of Caoibes v. Ombudsman and Alumbre is a recent case (2001) decided by the Supreme Court delineating the constitutionally granted power of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the power of the Ombudsman, on public officers' administrative and criminal liabilities, alike. In the said case, Judge Caoibes was charged with criminal acts of physical injuries, malicious mishief and assault upon a person in authority. The case, upon reaching the Ombudsman, Judge Caoibes, quesioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over judges, asked for the case to be dropped and submitted to the Supreme Court for its determination of the case. Supreme Court decided in favor of

38

Leviste v Hon. Alameda GR NO 182677, Aug. 3, 2010

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Judge Caoibes invoking the constitutional power granted to them by the Constitution on administrative supervision over all court and its personnel. The decision mentioned was rendered by the Supreme Court over the issue: whether or not Ombudsman has the jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the same issue in this study. The Ombudsman, being vested with the powers to investigate and prosecute cases where a public officer is involved. A a closer look however, there is a likelihood of confusion if the administrative power of the Supreme Court over judges and its personnel comes in to the picture. In an earlier case decided by the Supreme Court, Maceda v. Ombudsman and Abiera39, which made reference to another case Orap v. Sandiganbayan, the same issue faced the Supreme Court, the decision, in the said case was focused on the procedural aspect of cases, more specifically, jurisdiction. It was clear, a judge maybe administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct or inefficiency, but criminally liable against the State, before the regular courts. Supreme Court, in its decision further said that prior to the exercise of the Ombudsman of its jurisdiction over the cases, The Honorable Court should have first a determination whether or not an officer, a judge in particular is liable administratively. Supreme Court decisions over both cases were anchored on the time-known principle of Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court being vested with judicial power being the highest court in the Judiciary and the Ombudsman being an administrative body vested with quasi-judicial power. This paper submits to the principle of Separation

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Maceda v. Ombudsman and Abiera39 (GR No. 102781),

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of Powers and its functions, but argues that the investigation of the Ombudsman of criminal cases does not encroach to the power of the Supreme Court. This paper is now faced with the questions as to when a case has both a criminal and administrative aspects, who has juriscition over the matter. The researcher says both may proceed independently of each other. The Revised Penal Code provides for a separate title on Criminal offenses committed by public officials. It is a well-known rule that when it is under the Revised Penal Code, such case is punishable by regular courts, as initially investigated by the public prosecutors. In the Adminsitrative Order No. 08, entitled Clarifying and Modifying certain Rules of Procedure, it was said that the power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation in any Ombudsman case may be exercised by any investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. There is now a clear question on the independence of a criminal case and an administrative case against each other. In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court, dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 40 it said that "knowingly rendering unjust judgement" is both a criminal and an administrative case, since the fourth element of the said offense is bad faith. This case is an example of an offense, having both criminal and administrative aspect. In another case, Diego v. Castillo41, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673. August 11, 2004, quoting Alfero v. Santos, it said: even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt
40 41

Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 Diego v. Castillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673. August 11, 2004,
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purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. This paper, could therefore state that criminal liability and administrative liability can be dealt with separately. Thus, Supreme Court may proceed with the administrative aspects of a case while the Ombudsman may proceed with the other, criminal aspect at that. Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan,42 G.R. NO. 161067, strongly made an argument that a criminal case to be heard by the Sandiganbayan or Ombudsman shall not be made to wait for the determination of the administrative case also pending against a certain official. To wit: the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. This will also amount to untold delays in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will be made to await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the laws governing public officers. Criminal actions may proceeds independently of administrative actions, as what was laid down by the Ang Tibay case, administrative determinations are based on substantial evidence, while the law imposes that criminal determinations shall be based on proof beyond reasonable doubt.

42

Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 161067

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VI. CRITIQUE and ANALYSIS The Office of the Ombudsman is constitutionally created office of the 1987 Constitution.43 The power, scope limitation of the Ombudsman is specifically stated in the Constitution.44 The Ombudsman, being the protector of the people against acts and omissions of public officers that appear to be unjust, illegal, improper or inefficient, is mandated to act promptly on complaints.45 The reason why the Ombudsman is created is in order to have a quick, inexpensive and effective manner of complaints against public officials and officers who abuse their power while sitting in the government.46 In order to accomplish the quick, inexpensive and effective manner of complaints against government officials, the Office of the Ombudsman must be equipped with independence. The independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is clearly stated in Article XI, section47 which states: Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.

43 44

1987 Constitution Article XI, Section 13 45 Uy v Sandiganbayan, Gr no. 105965-70, March 20, 2001.
46

Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p 1124
47

1987 Constitution

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Formal complaint is not even necessary for them to start and investigation. 48 Moreover in order to ensure the independence of the office it is given fiscal autonomy. 49 In the case of Judge Caoibes v Office of the Ombudsman50, the Supreme Court ordered the Ombudsman to suspend the proceedings because the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to decide whether the case was of an administrative case. However, the proponent sees that the suspension of the proceedings of the Ombudsman is a direct violation of its independence as provided for in the Constitution. It is true that the Supreme Court has administrative powers over all employees and officers of the judiciary.51 This does not, however, mean that the Supreme Court can suspend a criminal or civil proceeding filed in the Ombudsman. Allowing such control over the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute Public officers would lead to a dependent Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman can be likened with the office of the prosecutor or the fiscal. Since both of their main function is to prosecute but the Office of the Ombudsman is limited to public officials and officers. And it has been held in so many jurisprudences that the Office of the prosecutor assumes full discretion and control over a case.52 The Office of the Prosecutor is independent and has sole discretion and control in prosecuting the case. Such office cannot be forced to suspend or continue to prosecute a case if it sees that there is no probable cause.53 As a general rule, this

48 49

Raro v Sandiganbayan, Gr. No. 108431, July 14, 2000 Article XI, Section 14, 1987 Constitutions 50 Gr no. 132177, July 19, 2001 51 Article VIII, 1987 Constitution 52 th Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, 11 edition 53 (Quizo v Sandiganbayan, et al., Gr no. 77120, April 6, 1987

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power vested in the fiscal cannot be interfered with even by the courts. 54 The Independence, discretion and control over cases within the scope of the Ombudsman should be given the same respect given to a fiscal or to the Office of the special prosecutor. The Powers vested in the Office of the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution should not be interfered by the judiciary namely the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in suspending complaint filed in the Office of the Ombudsman did not only overstep but abusively took the discretion and control of the Office of the Ombudsman of cases that such should handle. Only the Office of the Ombudsman has the discretion whether or not to prosecute the public officer. It is true that the Supreme Court has administrative control and supervision over all its employees.
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And because of this the Office of the Ombudsman should suspend

the complaint filed with them on cases involving judiciary employees and officers. 56 But administrative proceedings or cases are violation of the internal rules while criminal proceedings refer to the violation of law or the Revised Penal Code. The two proceedings are totally different from one another and can move separately. Like in a company, an employee can be fired for a crime committed during work which in this case is an administrative proceeding within the company however it does not mean that once he is punished internally he can no longer be punished under laws or the Revised Penal Code. The same is true in the case of Judge Caiobes v Office of the Ombudsman57, the Supreme Court can make and administrative proceeding against

54

University of the Philippines vs. City Fiscal of Quezon City, Gr no. L-18562, July 18, 1961)

55 56

Article VIII, 1987 Constitution) Judge Caoibes v Office of the OmbudsmanGr no. 132177, July 19, 2001) 57 Id.

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the judiciary officer or employee for violating the internal rule of the judiciary but this does not preclude the Office of the Ombudsman in investigating and prosecuting the criminal aspect of the case. Finally, the Office of the Ombudsmans power covers all public officers and employees. That means even the judiciary are within the scope of the Office of the Ombudsman. What the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. If this were allowed to happen the judiciary employees and officers would have a favourable position since the Supreme Court would protect them from the Ombudsman by Suspending the complaint filed with such office. It is the discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute and investigate and not even the judiciary can interfere with such power given to it by the 1987 Constitution. This is how the Office of the Ombudsman exercises their independence and such should not be disturbed.

VII. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION The proponent therefore concludes that the Supreme Court threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman because of the doctrine provided in Judge Caiobes v Office of the Ombudsman(ID). The discretion and independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is essential for the practice or exercise of it function. The Supreme Court should not be allowed to supervise or control the discretion of the Ombudsman. Such discretion is given to them by the 1987 Constitution. This proponent recommends the re-evaluation of the jurisprudence. It is suggested that the administrative case will be tried by the Supreme Court and the

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criminal aspect of the case should be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman if they deem to find probable cause against the public employee or officer. Suspension of the proceedings filed in the Office of the Ombudsman can only be decided by such office unless there is grave abuse of discretion. Like the Office of the Prosecutor or the Fiscal, the judiciary cannot compel the fiscal to prosecute the case or not to continue for that matter. It is only the Office of the Ombudsman who has the discretion to continue and prosecute the case or withhold and stop the proceedings and no one else.

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