BOLOS V.

BOLOS 634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010] DOCTRINE: Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) underArticle 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage

between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase under the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word petitions rather than to the wordmarriages. Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, is applicable to the case at bench. HELD: No, it does not. RATIO: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope.This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriagesunder the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation

line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase under the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word petitions rather than to the word marriages. In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO LACAP, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
FACTS OF THE CASE: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10538, granting the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap (respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner). The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business under Carwin Construction was prequalified together with two other contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. On November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was executed by respondent and petitioner. On September 25, 1992, District Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs. On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance. Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project. The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner. However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractors license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the contracts of Carwin Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its contractors license had already expired when the projects were contracted. 2. Whether or not Carwin Construction should be paid for works accomplished despite an expired contractors license at the time the contracts were executed. RULINGS OF THE COURT: With regards to Contractors License Law, it does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor and the government officials or employees concerned. The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at the expense of another. On the question of whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects, Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Penalties. xxx xxx xxx Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. xxx (Emphasis supplied) The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The wordings of Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Moreover, Article 22 of the Civil Code on Human Relations embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury). Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law. WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 102132. March 19, 1993.

DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES, petitioner, vs. RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ, in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator and THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU-TUCP), respondents.
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent and the exclusive collective bargaining agent of the rank and file workers entered into collective bargaining agreement under Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII thereof, provide for sick leave with pay benefits each year to its employees who have rendered at least one (1) year of service with the company, thus: Section 1. Sick Leaves The Company agrees to grant 15 days sick leave with pay each year to every regular non-intermittent worker who already rendered at least one year of service with the company. However, such sick leave can only be enjoyed upon certification by a company designated physician, and if the same is not enjoyed within one year period of the current year, any unenjoyed portion thereof, shall be converted to cash and shall be paid at the end of the said one year period. And provided however, that only those regular workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the herein sick leave privilege. Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members of the Regular Labor Pool shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number of hours rendered including overtime. Upon its renewal, the coverage of the said benefits was expanded to include the "present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this Agreement." Section 3, Article VIII, as revised, provides, thus: "Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members of the

Regular Labor Pool and present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this agreement shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number of hours rendered including overtime. Also, all the field workers of petitioner who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool hours were extended sick leave with pay benefits. Any unenjoyed portion thereof at the end of the current year was converted to cash and paid at the end of the said one-year period pursuant to Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the CBA. The commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent workers or its conversion to cash was, however, discontinued or withdrawn when petitioner-company under a new assistant manager, Mr. Benjamin Marzo (who replaced Mr. Cecilio Beltran, Jr. upon the latter's resignation), stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the ground that they are not entitled to the said benefits under Sections 1 and 3 of the 1989 CBA. The Union objected said discontinuance because it would violate the principle in labor laws that benefits already extended shall not be taken away and that it would result in discrimination between the non-intermittent and the intermittent workers of the petitioner-company. The Union brought it before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and said public respondent issued an award in favour of the Union. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the intermittent field workers are entitled to conversion to cash of any unused sick leave. Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It was said that CBA is not an ordinary contract but impressed with public interest, thus it must yield to the common good. It must be noted that the 1989 CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner's company, namely: (1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the company and are governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA; and (2) intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool as of the signing of the agreement on April 15, 1989 or those workers who have irregular working days and are governed by Section 3, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA. It is thus erroneous for petitioner to isolate Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits, specifically Section 3

thereof, in its attempt to justify the discontinuance or withdrawal of the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefit to regular intermittent workers because well-settled is it that the said privilege of commutation or conversion to cash, being an existing benefit, the petitioner-company may not unilaterally withdraw, or diminish such benefits. It is a fact that petitioner-company had, on several instances in the past, granted and paid the cash equivalent of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefits of some intermittent workers. Under the circumstances, these may be deemed to have ripened into company practice or policy which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., vs.JaniolaG.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

Facts: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondents Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the following grounds; (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question isthat the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal casehaving preceded the civil case. TheMTC granted theRespondentsMotion to Suspend Proceedings.Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised. ISSUE Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on the basis of Prejudicial Question , with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

Held This petition must be granted, pursuanttoSEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of aprejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issuedetermines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law asthat which must precede thecriminal action and which requires a decisionbefore a final judgment can be rendered in the criminalaction.The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution ofthe criminal action.In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filedby the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares thatthe construction agreement between the parties is void forlack of consideration, this would not affect theprosecution of private respondent in the criminal case.The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored forinsufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it isclear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, isabsent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists