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Yi Man
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing
LI, Rita Yi Man, Department of Economics and Finance Hong Kong Shue Yan University Hong Kong SAR, China Email: ritarec1@yahoo.com.hk / ritarec@hotmail.com
First Author
Abstract
Modern underground space planning knowledge sharing no longer depends on face-to-face meetings, lectures or phone calls only. The conventional read-only Web 1.0 designed by HTML helps us know about the World wide underground space planning. Nevertheless, during the era of Web 1.0, online users can only read but cannot add anything new or express their ideas. The current change to Web 2.0 has been regarded as an evolution of World Wide Web from a static to a dynamic concept. Rapid and dynamic cross border knowledge sharing among planners become possible with the help of Web 2.0. The use of Web 2.0 as a knowledge sharing method, however, is still not very common nowadays among urban planners. In this paper, it reviews Web 2.0 tools available for underground space planners, their motivations on knowledge sharing via Game Theory.
Keywords: Game Theory, Underground Space Planning, Knowledge Sharing, Web 2.0 1. Introduction
The quest for more space in cities is a world-wide phenomenon. It is self evident that as cities develop due to populations growth and concentrations of business activities [1]. For example, the highest share of underground transportation in Tokyo (55%) helps relieve the pressure of the above ground transportation system. Similar facilities can also be found in cities like Hong Kong and Paris (Figure 3). Besides, underground space provides extra space for utilities, e.g. the significant share of utilities infrastructure in Stockholm (41%) have been constructed due to severe climate and the needs for heating facilities [2]. Extra underground space also opens up opportunities for businessmen to open shopping malls in densely populated cities such as Singapore (Figure 1) and Taipei (Figure 2). It also gives room to storage of materials [3]. Although underground space use needs heavy construction costs, the running costs are low. Furthermore, it provides resilience during earthquakes which are important to cities locate in earthquake prone area. There is no doubt that underground space use, the benefits and shortcomings has been very well studied descriptively. There are even suggestions on introducing zoning for underground space [4]. Nevertheless, little is known about the knowledge sharing motivations and resistance via Web 2.0 [5]. This paper sheds light on the above issues with Game theory as the backbone of research.
International Journal of Engineering and Industries(IJEI) Volume4. Number1. March 2012 doi: 10.4156/IJEI.vol4.issue1.1
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
2. Game Theory
Game theory is the study of how strategic interactions among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the preference of those players. It deals with decision-making processes which involve two or more parties, also known as players with partial or complete conflict of interest. Each of the players in a game faces a choice between the two strategies. At least one agent can maximize his utility through anticipating (either consciously or implicitly in his behavior) the responses to his actions by one or more of the players. In academia, game theories are used extensively in modeling and complex behaviors analysis in wide range of fields such as social interactions, economics, theoretical biology, security, politics and defense [6].
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
Social Network Communities Blog Bookmark Journal Articles Chatroom Instant messager Create User Group
Be2camp X
Youtube
2 Collab
X X X X X X
Email X Forum X Files upload Free X Profile of Users X Tag Table 1 Examples of Web 2.0 tools [15]. Keywords
X X
Number of search Valid outcomes outcome Underground space planning 136 2 Underground space safety 213 3 Underground space construction 623 2 Table 2 Underground space planning knowledge sharing in Youtube (Authors research results)
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
Location Korea
Title, Content The Revolution of Underground Spaces [Arirang Today] With a limited amount of land, Korea is expanding her facilities underground, the latest revolution in land use planning. This clip provides case studies on Koreas university underground land use, shopping malls and others. Preview of No Escape: Dangers of Confined Spaces It records the history of how and why confined space construction accident occurred near Denver on October 2, 2007. 5 people were killed and 3 others injured when a fire erupted 1,000 feet underground in Colorado. Confined spaces: deadly spaces Designed for municipal workers, it illustrates the basic rules for working in confined spaces. Oxygen deficiency and other potential hazards are covered. Furthermore, the health effects and physical characteristics of toxic gases which are examined. Confined Spaces: Safe Yesterday, Deadly Today It identifies the safety and health hazard in confined space. City of Edmonton: Leader in tunneling construction The clips shows the advantages to proceed underground space construction, the construction team's expertise and response to emergency situation, such as a road collapse due to sewer or water mains failure ,or flooding. Underground Pelasgian cities in Cappadocia 01 This clip provides information about the underground facilities of the Underground Pelasgian cities in Cappadocia, its history and construction method.
US
Vancouv er Canada
Undergrou Moscow, Moscow Metro : Kropotkinskaya Russia The clips show cut and cover technique used in nd space Kropotkinskayas construction of a massive open trench. constructio n Table 3 underground space plannin
http://www.youtu be.com/watch?v= K1X9l9JhPhk&f eature=autoplay &list=PL567F45 4A60118B20&in dex=75&playnex t=2 http://www.youtu be.com/watch?v= 9XqjT_Gmz7M
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
5. Underground space planning knowledge via Web 2.0: a review based on Game theories
We often encounter situations where our interests are in conflict with the interests of the others. Social dilemmas are situations in which and collective and personal interests are at odds [16]. Since 1970s, considerable effort has been devoted to apply game-theoretic techniques in industrial economics. Many of these are of direct relevance to competitive strategy. These include issues such as the importance of first-mover, reputation formation and exploitation. Despite its popularity, there is also critic about game theories. Rational models of competitive interaction posit players engage in complex reasoning environment. Yet, our decision-makers are far less analytic and perform far less comprehensive analyses thla these models posit [17]. Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken were chosen to illustrate the motives of underground space planning knowledge sharing. These games were chosen because they are well-known symmetric 22 games [18]. The payoff under game theories can be visualized as I, II, III, IV in Table 4. For example, if player 1 chooses to share his knowledge but player 2 chooses to withhold knowledge, the playoffs will be I for player 1, III for Player 2 as shown in the shaded boxes of Table 4. Player 2 Share knowledge Keep the knowledge Player Share knowledge I,I II,III 1 Keep the knowledge II,II I,IV Table 4Payoff matrix of knowledge sharing game between knowledge holder and receiver [9]
Player B Share knowledge Player Share knowledge 5,5 A Withhold knowledge 7,1 Table 5 Prisoners dilemma knowledge sharing game [9]
In N-persons game which simulates the real environment of knowledge sharing, payoff for each player depends on the acts among the pool of players. Suppose that there are N people, the knowledge
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
sharers and shirkers receives payoff p(n) and s(n) respectively. According to Li and Poon [9], a knowledge holder chooses to share knowledge if and only if p(n+1)>s(n). In case of prisoners dilemma where s(n) > p(n+1), number of people use Web 2.0 as tools of underground space planning knowledge sharing does not affect participants knowledge sharing behaviors, the new comer only chooses to shirk.
Player A
Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man
T 1
T-1(RT) [27]
6. Conclusion
Although there more and more online users in modern society, underground space planners seldom use this tools to share their knowledge via these tools. The Prisoners dilemma and game of chicken show that different web 2.0 owners have to use different tactics to attract people to use these tools.
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