Joint Operational Environment The World Through 2030

TheJointOperationalEnvironment
TheWorldThrough2030andBeyond
UnitedStatesJointForcesCommand
May2007
Thispaperisalivingdocumentcollaborativelyupdatedandmodified.Commentsmay beforwardedtotheJ9DeepFuturesGroup, UnitedStatesJointForcesCommand (USJFCOM)
TABLEOFCONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ IV THE IMPORTANCEOFTHE JOINTOPERATING ENVIRONMENT................................................................. IV PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................................. V RESEARCH PROCESS............................................................................................................................. V SECTION1JOINTOPERATINGENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW................................................. 1 FUTUREGEOSTRATEGICLANDSCAPE .................................................................................................... 1 NATIONALPOWER SYNERGY ................................................................................................................ 1 STRATEGIC DEFENSE GUIDANCE ........................................................................................................... 1 CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK .................................................................................................................. 2 CHALLENGES........................................................................................................................................ 3 KEY ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 3 A LOOK AHEADTHE JOE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 4 SECTION2UNDERSTANDINGTHECRITICALVARIABLES ................................................... 7 CRITICALVARIABLE OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... 7 THE CRITICAL12.................................................................................................................................. 7 PhysicalEnvironment.........................................................................................................8 NatureandStabilityof CriticalActors ................................................................................9 SociologicalDemographics ................................................................................................9 Culture...............................................................................................................................9 RegionalandGlobalRelationships .....................................................................................9 MilitaryCapabilities ........................................................................................................10 Information ......................................................................................................................10 Technology.......................................................................................................................11 ExternalOrganizations.....................................................................................................11 NationalWillandWillofCriticalActors...........................................................................11 Time.................................................................................................................................12 Economics........................................................................................................................12 APPLYINGTHE CRITICALVARIABLES .................................................................................................. 13 SECTION3TRENDSSHAPINGTHEFUTUREOPERATIONALENVIRONMENT ................ 14 SocialandCulturalFactors..............................................................................................14 POPULATIONGROWTH................................................................................................15 AGEDISTRIBUTION.......................................................................................................15 HEALTH ..........................................................................................................................16 WEALTHDISTRIBUTION ...............................................................................................16 URBANIZATION..............................................................................................................17 MIGRATION....................................................................................................................17 CRIME.............................................................................................................................18 CULTURE........................................................................................................................19 TRAININGANDEDUCATION.........................................................................................20 ETHNICITY .....................................................................................................................21 GEOPOLITICSANDGOVERNANCE ........................................................................................................ 21 THEPOWERFUL ............................................................................................................21 THEWEAK......................................................................................................................22 FAILEDORFAILINGSTATES ........................................................................................23 GLOBALIZATION............................................................................................................23 REGIONALISM................................................................................................................24 INFORMATION ...............................................................................................................24 TERRORISM....................................................................................................................25 ALLIANCESANDCOALITIONS. .....................................................................................25
JOELivingDraft_1May2007
ECONOMICSANDRESOURCES.............................................................................................................. 25 COMPETITIONFORRESOURCES. ................................................................................25 IMPACTOFTECHNOLOGY ...........................................................................................26 IMPACTOFGLOBALIZATION .......................................................................................27 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,ANDENGINEERING ......................................................................................... 28 BIOLOGICALSYSTEMS..................................................................................................30 MACHINESAND COMPUTERS ......................................................................................31 INFORMATION,KNOWLEDGE,ANDCOMMUNICATIONS ..........................................31 ENERGY. .........................................................................................................................33 ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................................................33 WEAPONSOFMASSEFFECT ........................................................................................33 SECTION4JOEIMPLICATIONSFORCONSIDERATION........................................................ 34 UNDERSTANDINGTHENATUREOF FUTURECONFLICT.......................................................................... 35 NoSanctuary....................................................................................................................35 GlobalBattlespace ...........................................................................................................35 DomainSimultaneity ........................................................................................................35 Regionalism .....................................................................................................................36 RigorofNonlinear,DistributedBattlespace.....................................................................37 PervasivenessandInfluenceofNetworks ..........................................................................37 ImportanceofKnowledge .................................................................................................37 CultureMatters ................................................................................................................38 HighRiskSecond andThirdOrderEffects ......................................................................39 EffectsBasedPlans,Operations,andAssessment .............................................................39 WeaponsofMassEffect....................................................................................................40 SECTION5CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 42 ANNEXAIMPACTONOURNATIONALMILITARYSTRATEGY ........................................... 45 ACTORS ............................................................................................................................................. 45 FOREIGNPERCEPTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 46 CHARACTERISTICSOFMILITARY OPERATIONS ..................................................................................... 47 ImplicationsoftheAmericanWayofWar .........................................................................47 CulturalAwareness ..........................................................................................................49 OperationsonComplex/UrbanTerrain.............................................................................50 MaritimeOperationsinLittorals ......................................................................................50 InformationOperations/InformationWarfare....................................................................51 SpaceOperations .............................................................................................................51 AirOperations..................................................................................................................52 PowerProjectionandStruggleforAccess.........................................................................53 NoSanctuary TerroristDimension .................................................................................53 LimitationsonForceCapabilities.....................................................................................54 IncreasinglyComplexRelationships .................................................................................54 RulesofEngagement ........................................................................................................55 GrowingDiverseGlobalMedia ........................................................................................55 Constrainedresources......................................................................................................55 Ambiguity.........................................................................................................................56 Rapidity............................................................................................................................56 Asymmetry........................................................................................................................56 ForceProtection ..............................................................................................................56 FUTURE INTEGRATED CLOSE COMBAT EXAMPLES ................................................................ 57 Perception........................................................................................................................57 Time/Tempo .....................................................................................................................57 PhysicalEnvironment.......................................................................................................57 Weaponry.........................................................................................................................58 AirSupport.......................................................................................................................58
Deployment ......................................................................................................................58 Specialpurposeforces......................................................................................................59 Information ......................................................................................................................59 Chemical..........................................................................................................................59 Adaption ..........................................................................................................................60 Leadership .......................................................................................................................60 ANNEXBTHEADVERSARYSSTRATEGICDESIGN............................................................... 61 EMERGING ADVERSARY OPERATIONAL DESIGNS ................................................................................. 62 StrategicPreclusion .........................................................................................................62 OperationalExclusion......................................................................................................62 AccessLimitation .............................................................................................................63 OperationalShielding.......................................................................................................63 AdaptiveOperationsandTransitions ................................................................................63 SystemsWarfare...............................................................................................................64 Strike................................................................................................................................64 StrategicAttack ................................................................................................................64 CulturalWarfare ..............................................................................................................65 HOWTHE ADVERSARY WILLFIGHT..................................................................................................... 65 THE10METERTARGET ................................................................................................65 THEEVOLVINGADVERSARY ........................................................................................67 DEMANDSOFANINTENSIFIEDBATTLESPACE........................................................................................ 68 PhysicalEnvironment.......................................................................................................69 Unpredictability ...............................................................................................................70 Technology.......................................................................................................................71 Information ......................................................................................................................72 Time/Tempo .....................................................................................................................73 ANNEXCDOTMLPFDOMAINIMPLICATIONS.......................................................................... 74 Doctrine...........................................................................................................................74 Organizations...................................................................................................................75 TrainingandEducation....................................................................................................77 Materiel ...........................................................................................................................78 Leadership .......................................................................................................................79 ANNEXDDEFINITIONSOFKEYTERMS................................................................................... 82 ANNEXEACRONYMLIST............................................................................................................ 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................. 90 ENDNOTES.........................................................................................................................................102
ThereisarankduetotheUnitedStatesamongnations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it if we desire to secure peace,oneofthemostpowerfulinstrumentsofourrisingprosperity,itmust 1 beknownthatweareatalltimesreadyforwar.
PresidentGeorgeWashington December3,1793
Introduction
THEIMPORTANCEOFTHEJOINTOPERATINGENVIRONMENT RecentlyrevisedArmyandJointpublicationsdefinetheoperationalenvironment as: ...thecompositeoftheconditions,circumstances,andinfluencesthataffectthe employmentofcapabilitiesandbearonthedecisionsofthecommander.It encompassesphysicalareasandfactors(oftheair,land,maritime,andspace domains)andtheinformationenvironment.Includedwithinthesearetheadversary, friendly,andneutralsystemsthatarerelevanttoaspecificjointoperation. JointPub30,Operationsgoesontodiscusstheoperationalenvironmentintermsofthe political,military,economic,social,information,andinfrastructuresystems.This systemsperspectivesupportsjointconceptsbasedonaneffectsbasedapproachto operations,butisnotsuitablefordefiningtherangeofalternativefuturesnecessaryfor experimentation.WhenframingthefutureoperationalenvironmentintheJOEasystems perspectiveconstrainsconsiderationofawiderrangeofalternativefutures.Forthis reason,theJOEcontinuestoframeitsdiscussionaroundtrendsandcriticalvariables. Anunderstandingoftheoperationalenvironmentisacritical elementinour abilitytoengageinandwinany conflict. Tothatend,theJointOperationalEnvironment (JOE)providesaframeworkforconsideringthefutureanddeterminingtheimpactofthe operationalenvironmentonjointforceoperations. Thisdocumentisdesignedto anticipatearangeofpotentialfutureoperationalenvironments.Itdiscussesthosecritical variablesthathelpdescribetheJOE,thetrendsthatwillinfluencethosevariables,the rangeofpossibleconditionsshapedbythosetrends,andthosethreatsthatmayarisein suchfutureoperationalenvironments.Finally,theJOEconsiderstheimplicationsof thesealternativefuturesontheway wewilltrain,equip,andemploythefutureJoint Force.Asthemilitaryseekstobothanticipateandshapethefuture,theJOEformsthe basisforthatdebateandargumentessential toinnovativeandcreativethinking. AmacroconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromthisJOEisthattheUnitedStateswill notoperateinasingle,static,operationalenvironment.Instead,itsforceswilloperatein layersofoperationalenvironments,allconstantlyinflux.Thecomplexity,increasing interaction,andrapidchangedrivenbyglobalization aremanifestedin thevariablesthat willdefinethefuture operationalenvironment. Formorethan50years,Americas militarydominancehasbeenondisplay.TheUnitedStateshasderiveditscurrent militarysuperiorityfromaremarkableabilitytotranslatetechnologicalinnovationand industrialcapacityintoeffectivebattlefieldadvantages.Yet,duringthatsame50years, itsmilitaryhasbeencloselymonitoredandstudied.Thus,historysuggeststhatitisonly amatteroftimeuntilanadaptive,creativeopponentdevelopsamethodofwarthatwill attempttodefeatAmericasestablished,generallypredictablepreoccupationwiththe scienceofwarandtheapplicationofprecisionfirepower. Recentexperiencesuggests
thatthattimemayhavecome.Ourresponsemustbeequallyadaptiveandcreative. The JOEprovidestheflexibilitytoexplorethefullrangeofinnovativewarfightingconcepts andconflictresolutionstrategies. TheJOEestablishesabaselinebothforunderstandingwhatjointoperational environmentsmightbeandawaytothinkthroughtheenormouscomplexitiesthis countrywillfacewhileplanningandconductingoperationsinthefuture. PURPOSE ThisannuallyupdatedWhitePaperisintendedprimarilytoprovideaguidepost forthedevelopmentofJointandserviceconcepts. TheJOEestablishesaframeworkfor developingarangeofpotentialalternativefutureoperationalenvironments.Itexamines future threatcapabilitiesandidentifiesenvironmentalinfluencesonmodernconflict.It thendiscussespotentialimplicationsoffutureoperationalenvironmentsfortheJoint training,experimentation,anddoctrinaldevelopmentcommunities..Furthermore,it establishesthedescription,documentation,andapplicationoffutureoperational environmentsasacorecompetencyandacommandprioritytosupportconcept development,experimentation,andtraining. Byexamininganumberofcriticaltrendsandissuesinfluencingthefuture operationalenvironmentanditsassociatedthreats, thispaperwillserveasacommon frameofreferenceandaguideforseniorcivilianandmilitaryleadersresponsibleforthe capabilitiesbasedjointtransformationprocess. Whilenotintendedtobethedefinitiveforecastofmajorglobaltensionsduring thenext20 25 years,thispaperwillseektoprofilemanyofthedominanttrendsshaping thefutureenvironmentandoutlinetheirconsequencesformilitaryoperations.Itisapart ofacontinuousstudyeffortledbytheUSJFCOM,incooperationwithcomponent services,tostimulateanenduringdialoguethatwillfosterfurtherinvestigationand refinement.Eachnewpublicationwillrepresentthestartpointforthefollowingyears studyplan. RESEARCHPROCESS Thispaperistheresultofaninteractive,ongoing,andevolutionaryexamination ofthefutureoperationalenvironment.Theresearchandstudythathaveservedasthe basisforitsdevelopmentcapitalizeoninputfromawiderangeoforganizationsand individuals.Itreflectsaparticipatoryintellectualinvestigationthathasinvolveda diversearrayofindividualsfromtheU.S.,Europe,Canada,Asia,andtheMiddleEast (seeFigure1).Ithasbeendesignedtofosteranongoingdialogueintendedtobe sustainedduringthenextseveralyears.
Spaceand MissileDefense Command
DefenseAcad ofUK
National Intelligence Council
BAH
BAE Systems DAG 2
SAIC PEWForum NGIC ONR
Sandia CIA
USAWC SSI
CNOStrategic StudiesGroup
DIA Academia
CSIS
USACE
FMSO
GDAIS
Analysis TRADOCFutures Center Center
Joint
TEKNOBOOKS USMCCenterfor Emerging Threats
Study Participants
DTRA
OSDOfficeof Force Transformation SOCOMFuture ConceptsBranch
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
3iUS
NASA DART
PotomacInstitute
NASIC
TRADOC International Officers
NSA
Combatant Commander Reps
NDU DCI
Strategic Assessments Group
AirForce Futures
JFCOMJ2/J9 USAFResearch Lab
Senior Mentors
Molecular Sciences Institute
Figure1.Military,governmental,industry,andnongovernmentalorganizations wereconsultedduringthedevelopmentofthisJOEWhitePaper.
Theauthorsreferenceawiderangeofstudies,documents,books,assessments,all ofwhichhaveservedtocontributetothepapersinsights.Thedocumentationhasbeen furtherdistilledandaugmentedbytheactiveparticipationof dozensof subjectmatter experts(SMEs)inacollaborative,Webbasedeffortinvolvingdiscussiongroups,writing teams,andseminars.Eachdiscussiongroupdebatedtheconditionsandcharacteristics thatwillshapeanddominatethefutureoperationalenvironmentthroughtheyear2030 andbeyond. FutureU.S.defenseplanningwillfocuslessonwhereandwhenaconflictwill occurandmoreonthebroadsetofcapabilitiesU.S.militaryforcesneedtodeter,deny, anddefeatadversarieswhowillrelyonsurprise,deception,andasymmetricwarfareto achievetheirobjectives.
Section1 JointOperatingEnvironmentOverview
FUTUREGEOSTRATEGICLANDSCAPE TheUnitedStateswilllikelyremainthedominanteconomic,military,and politicalpowerduringthenexttwentyfiveyears.Otheractorswillaccumulatepowerin certaindimensionsandsome,perhaps,willdirectlychallengetheUnitedStates.Itis unlikely,however,thatasinglenationwillbeabletomatchtheUnitedStatesacrossall instrumentsofnationalpower(diplomatic,informational,military,andeconomic).Yet,a cleardiffusionofpowerisunderwaywithininternationalrelations.Forexample,the spreadandapplicationoftechnologyspecificallyinformationtechnologyisresulting inthediffusionofpowerawayfromcentralgovernments.2 Morepowerisbeing distributedonsupranationalandsubnationallevelsthaneverbefore.Centralizedstate controlisnolongerthenormandtheseshiftswillaffecthowtheUnitedStatesrelatesto otheractors. NATIONALPOWERSYNERGY Clearlyallinstrumentsofnationalpower,notjusttheuseofmilitaryforce,will remaincrucialastheUnitedStatesconductsitsforeignpolicyandprotectsitsnational interests.Themorepressingfutureissuewillbethesignificanceandeffectivenessof eachtraditionalelementofpower andanationsornonstateactorsabilitytoorchestrate andfosterasynergyofinfluencefromtheseelements.Thecontinueddistributionof powerawayfromthenationstate,globalizationofmarketsandinformation,the acceleratedspreadoftechnology,andtheburgeoninginformationrevolutionraisesthe question:willoneelementofpowerbecomedominantorwilltherebeanewcombination ofelementsthatproducestimelyandsuccessfulresults? STRATEGICDEFENSEGUIDANCE TheNationalSecurityStrategy NSS,thecornerstoneofAmericasinternational planningefforts,affirmstheessentialroleofAmericanmilitarystrength.Moreover,the nationalleadershiphasoutlinedtheneedforabroadnewportfolioofmilitarycapabilities thatarefosteredthroughinnovativethought,nurturedthroughexperimentationwithnew 3 approachestowarfare,andspecificallytailoredtostrengthenfuturejointoperations. TheNSSestablishesanenduringprocessoftransformingdesignedtomaintainU.S. dominanceacrosstheentirespectrumofconflictwellintoanyforeseeablefuture.This processisnotbasedondealingwithaspecificthreatorenvironment,butonproviding thecapabilityofdealingwithavarietyofdynamicandoperationalenvironments.Those environmentswillaffectandbeaffectedbyavariety of threatchallenges(seebelow) amongthelevelsofwarandwiththevagariesofcomplexthreatsandotherentities. The strategicdefenseguidance,inordertoframeitscapabilitiesbasedapproachtoforce development,requiresanaccountingforthecriticalfactorsaffectingtheuseofcoercive force.
Theneedforchangeisnormallydrivenbyrecognitionofanadversarys capabilitiesorintentionsoranopportunity thatresultsfromalteredconditions(for example,atechnologicaladvancement)orasaresultofadversarycapabilitiesand intentions. UnitedStatesgovernmentandmilitaryleadersacknowledgethesechange drivers,aswellastheirconvergenceintoanexusofrationaleforanecessary revolution inmilitaryaffairs.Thethreatandenvironment,inaglobalcontext,haveallshifted dramaticallyoverthepastdecadeanditisreasonabletoassumethattherateandkindsof changeswillcontinuefordecades.Furthermore,theadvancementofinformationand knowledgesystemsprovidesopportunitynotonlyfornewwaysofdoingthings,butalso waystomoreeffectivelyshapeoutcomes. CAPABILITIESFRAMEWORK Since2001theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hasemployedanewcapabilities basedapproachtohowitarrivesatconcepts,developscapabilities,conductsexperiments, buildstrainingproducts,andeducatesleaders.Theformerframeworkforperforming thesefunctions,nestedinthewelldefinedenvironmentandknownthreatoftheCold War,lackedtherange,depth,ormetricsforthetypesofcapabilitiesthatwillberequired tomeetthefuturedemandsofU.S.globalstrategy.Now,on theheelsofanother QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR),theUnitedStatesmustaskwhatcriteriashouldbe usedtoguideandshapethisbroadsetofcapabilitiesneededtodealwiththefullrangeof futurechallenges? Capabilitiesresultfromcombinationsoftechnologies,systems,connectivity, operatingprocedures,doctrine,training,leaders,andpersonnel. Discrete,tactical capabilitiesaredesignedfromthegroundup,withallofthesepiecesservingaspartsof thewhole.Large,operationalcapabilitiesareachievedthroughhorizontalandvertical integration,aswellasinteroperabilityandinterdependenceofforces,processes,agencies, andmateriel.Somecapabilitiesachievepurposeonlywhencombinedwithothers,while somehavepurposestandingontheirown. Withaneyetowardthefutureoperationalenvironment,theongoing transformationofAmericasmilitaryplaceseverythingonthetable.Nothingisinthe margins,andeachtasktobeperformedisbeingreexamined.Planningforoperations 25yearsoutdemandsamoreinnovativeandholisticapproachinthewayweviewthe threat,operationalenvironments,andfutureconflictwritlarge.Arrivingatatransformed forcemustincludeexplorationofnewcapabilities,aswellasthereengineeringof existingcapabilities.Withinthisdynamicenvironmentitwillbeverydifficulttofind fixedpointswithwhichtoanchoradevelopmentalframework.Thedepthofquestions askedtodaywillundoubtedlyimpactthecapabilitiesoftomorrow. HowcantheU.S.deter,deny,anddefeatthewiderangeofunknown adversariesoperatingindiverseandcomplexenvironmentsthatareexpected toemergeinthefuture,whenitsnotsurewhoorwheretheyare? HowwilltheU.S.copewithoraltertheactionsorpossiblyaberrantbehavior ofneutrals,multinationalcorporations(MNC),nongovernmental organizations(NGO),potentialcoalitionpartners,andthelikethatwillbe presentonthefuturebattlefield?
TheprocessbywhichtheU.S.answersthesequestionsisdoubtlessoneofthe mostcomplexanddemandingthatleadershavefacedinrecenthistory.Theprocessmust takeintoaccountthefactthatthemeasuresofeffectivenessforforcedevelopmentmust stillbederivedfromastudyofthethreatandtheenvironmentinacollectivesense. CHALLENGES Inviewofcurrenttrends,domesticfactors,andworldwidepotentialarenasof conflict,theU.S.canexpecttoremainheavilyengagedonaglobalbasis.Astheworld leaderininternationalrelationsandanadvocateofdemocraticprinciples,freemarkets, andhumanrights,theU.S.willfacepotentiallyseriousthreatstoitsnational interests. ThesethreatsposefourchallengestotheU.S.defensecommunity: Traditionalchallengesareposedbystatesemployingrecognizablemilitary forcesinlongestablished,wellknownformsofcompetitionandconflict. Irregularchallengescomefromthosestateandnonstateactorsadoptingand employingunconventionalmethodstocounterouradvantagesintraditional arenas. Catastrophicchallengesareposedbythesurreptitiousacquisition,possession, andpossibleterroristorrogueemploymentofWMEormethodsproducing WMElikeresults. Disruptivechallengesmaycomefromcompetitorsdeveloping,possessing,and employingbreakthroughmethodsortechnologiesthatnegatetheU.S.advantage inkeyoperationalcapabilities. Themagnitudeofthesechallengesincreasesdramaticallywhentheyappearnear simultaneously,inavarietyofcombinationsintime,location,orboth.
KEYASSUMPTIONS Whilenotanallinclusivelist,severalcarefullydeveloped,longrangeplanning assumptionshaveguidedtheresearchandanalysisforthisWhitePaper,including: TheU.S.willsustainitsglobalengagementandcontinuetobeamajorpower. TheabilitytoapplymilitaryforcewillremainavitalinstrumentofU.S. nationalpower. Thepaceoftheglobaltechnologyrevolutionwillaccelerate. Commercialimperativeswillincreasinglydirectthenatureofresearchand development(R&D)andcontrolthedisseminationofkeytechnologies. Theworldspopulationwillincrease,withsignificantgrowthinthe developingandeconomicallypoorcountrieshowever,developednationswill experienceanincreasedelderpopulation.
Theinformationdomain willaffectfuturewarfarejustasdecisivelyasthe industrialagealteredtheconductofwarmorethan100yearsago. Whilenationstateswillremainprincipalactors,nonstateandtransnational actorswillincreasinglyinfluenceworldpoliticsandeconomics. Friend,foe,andneutralwillhaveinstantaccesstocommercialhighquality data,information,andknowledge. ALOOKAHEADTHEJOESUMMARY Basedontheoperationalenvironmentwecurrentlyfindourselvesinandthe guidanceandassumptionsmentionedabove,wecananticipateafutureoperational environmenthavingthecharacteristicsdescribedbelow.Thissummaryoffuture conditionsandcircumstancesissupportedbydetaileddiscussionsinfollowingsections concerningthevariablesthatdescribeourcontemporaryoperational environmentandthe trendsthatwillshapethefutureoperationalenvironment. Inthe2030plustimeframe,armedconflictwilllikelyremaintheprimaryoption forthoseactorswhodonotfeeltheycancompeteorperhapssurvivepeacefullyand withtheirculturesorinterestsintact. Theoperationalenvironmentforthesefuture conflictswillbedangerous,complex,andvolatile,withanunprecedentedweblikesetof interconnectedrelationships.Risksindecisionmakingwillbehigh,particularlyinthe absenceofhighgrade,relevant,andcurrentknowledge.Actionswillhavemultiple effectsastheyspillandcascadeoverlevelsofwar,acrossinterrelationshipsinherentto allaspectsofglobalization,andthroughtheintertwiningnatureofdiplomatic, informational,economic,andmilitaryactivities. Multipleforceswillsettheconditionswithinthisfutureenvironment. Somewill havesignificantimplications,suchasglobalcommercial,financialandeconomic,and informationnetworkstheadvancingtechnologicalrevolutionwidespreadproliferation of WeaponsofMassEffect(WME)andselectedadvancedconventionalweaponsystems. Otherimportantforceswillbedemographicchallengesaconstantlychangingand increasinglyambiguousenvironmentandinnumerableuncertainties.Thedisplacement andmigrationofpeoplewillextendexistingculturalanddemographicfactorswell beyondthelimitsofstateorregionalborders.Thiswilltendtoexpandevenlocal conflictsandincreasethedifficultiesofconflictresolution,giventheconcomitantrisksof unforeseensecondandthirdordereffects.Withinthisenvironment,achievingastable resultwillbeacomplicatedandlengthyprocess.Itwillmostoftenrequireawell plannedcampaignthataccountsforchangesinthenatureofanoperationandmultiple transitions. Demographic"timebombsmay explodeasotherfactorsgenerateinstability orconflict.Insuchcases,correctionoftheimmediateconflictcausalfactorswillnot returntheareatoastateofstability. Inanincreasinglyinterconnectedworld,regional crisiscanquicklyexpandwell beyondtheboundariesoftheaffectedregionortheimmediatecauseoftheconflict. Continuallychangingcoalitions,alliances,partnerships,andnewactors(bothnational andtransnational)willconstantlyappearanddisappearfromthescene. Thereis sufficientevidencethattheseinterconnected,weblikerelationshipswillcontinueto multiply,expandhorizontallyandvertically,andmatureasnewinformationagepatterns
sweepindustrialagenormsoutthedoor,makinganalreadycomplexenvironmenteven moreuncertain. Urbanenvironmentsandothercomplexterrainwillincreasinglybecomecenters ofgravityandthereforerequiredareasofoperation(AOs). TheseemergingAOswill containhumanitariancrisisconditionsrequiringpopulationmanagement,support,and control.Inadditiontomilitaryforcesandcivilians,therewillalsobeanumberof private,nongovernmental,regional,andinternationalorganizations,eachwithitsown agenda,sometimessupporting,sometimescompeting. Theseorganizationsareincreasing inpowerandinfluencetosuchanextentthattheywillbeabletoexertsignificant pressureonmilitaryactorsandstateleadership. Asthestrategiccenterofgravity,theAmericanhomelandwillincreasinglybe targetedfordirectandindirectattack.Asadversaryconventionalmilitarycapability lagsbehindthatoftheUnitedStates,operationallevelvictoryonthebattlefieldwillbe extremelydifficult.Strategicattackorientedonpoliticalandpublicwillbecomes essentialinconfrontinganyU.S.militaryoperation.Inaddition,adversarieswillknow howimportanttimelinessisfordeployment,employment,andsustainment,andoperating conceptssuchasjustintimelogistics. Linesofcommunication(LOCs),force projectionplatforms,accesspoints,stagingareas,andregionalallieswillallbecritical pointsofthreatfocusfordisruptionanddestruction.Meansofdisruptionwillrunthe gamut,from indirectapproachestoinformationoperations(IO),physicalattacksand kidnappings,toWME. Theimportanceofrapidlyexpandingglobalandregionalinformation architectures,systems,andorganizations,bothprivateandpublic,cannotbeoverstated. Theglobalflowofinformation,technology,knowledge,andpowernowcreateafruitful environmentforallfacetsofinformationoperations,aswellasassuringanalmostlevel playingfieldintermsofinformationaccess.Indeed,knowledgewarmaybecomethe preeminentformoffutureconflictin thetwentyfirstcentury.4 Technological advances,diversity,andaccessaregeneratingchangesinforcestructureandmethodsof operation,aswellascreatingconditionsfortechnologicalsurprise.Overthenext25 yearsthisfactorcouldverylikely erodethetechnologicalovermatchtheUnitedStates hasenjoyedoverthelastdecade. Advancedtechnologieswillprovidepotential adversariesthecapabilitytoapplymilitaryforcewithgreaterprecision,lethality,agility, andsurvivabilitythroughoutanexpandedbattlespacethatwillbemorenonlinearthan linear,moreintangiblethantangible,andperhapsmorenonkineticthankinetic. Potentialadversariespresentingatraditionalchallengeinthisenvironmentwill useadaptiveresponsestocounterU.S.conventionalmilitaryadvantages. While intendedprimarilytoprovidealocalorregionalcapability,potentialadversaries recognizethattheriskofaconflictwithUSinterestsmayleadtomilitaryengagement. Tomitigatethisrisk,theywillseekasymmetricmeanstocounterUSstrengths.Theywill seeksanctuaryinurbanandothercomplexterrainwhileattemptingtodenyaccessto U.S.forcesortomakeforceprojection prohibitivelycostly.Itiscriticaltonote, however,thatevenastheydevelopanduseadaptivemeans,somepotentialadversaries willretainandattempttoimprovesubstantialestablishedforcecapabilities. Modernizationandhybridizationofexistingconventionalweaponsystemswillincrease theireffectiveness.Whencoupledwithnewadaptivesystemsandmethods,these
residualandimprovedestablishedforceswillposeatrulysignificantthreattofutureU.S. forces.ThecumulativeeffectofthesefactorssuggeststhattheUnitedStateswillbe facingatimeofdiversestrategic,operational,andtacticalchallenges. Irregularchallengeswilldominatethelandscapeoffuturemilitaryconflict forthe next2025years. Asadversariesrecognizethateventhemostasymmetricapproachto confrontingUSconventionalmilitary powerwithatraditionalforcemayprovetoo costly,many,ifnotmost,traditionalchallengeswillmorphintoirregularones.While maintainingaregionalmilitarycapability,stateswillorganizedomesticmilitiasto augmentaconventionalmilitaryforcewithanirregularwarfarecapability.Inother cases,stateswillsponsormilitiasinneighboringstatestofightasaproxy,furtheringtheir interestwhilehopingtodistancethemselvesfromtherepercussions.Nonstateactors willformmilitiaorganizationstoprovidethemselveswithanirregularwarfarecapability. Somemilitiaorganizationswillarisespontaneouslyasagroup seekstoprotectitselffrom perceivedoractualoppression.Theirregularadversarywilltakemanyshapes,drivenby awiderangeofmotivations.AstheUSprojectsitsmilitarypowerinthefuture operationalenvironmentssupportedbytheJOE,itcanexpectanirregularchallengeasa componentofanymilitaryconfrontation. Campaignsandoperationswillhavetoaccountforamuchbroaderbattlespace thatwillextendwellbeyondtheregionofconflict. Thefuturebattlespacewillbe increasinglyglobal,encompassingland,sea,air,space,andinformation(includingcyber) dimensions.InOperationIraqiFreedom (OIF),forinstance,evenintheabsenceofa significantnavalcapabilityonthepartoftheenemy,theBritishRoyalNavycommitted significantresourcestoprotectabout60Britishmerchantshipsovera5,000mileroute. Over50percentoftheRoyalNavysdeployablefleetwasengagedinescortingdutiesin knownthreatareasandchokepoints.Theincreasingscopeofthefuturebattlespacewill notnecessarilyresultfromactionsbytheconfrontedpower.Itisjustaslikelytoresult fromotherpowersexploitingopportunitiesasaconsequenceofanoverextendedor distractedU.S.orcoalition.Itcouldalsoresultfromtheotherpowersseekingto maintaintheirflexibilityinselfpreservationandselfinterest.Theseotherpowerswill encompassavarietyofactorsfromtransnationalorganizationstostatesorevenadhoc statenonstatecoalitions. Insum,theemergingfutureOEwillbemorecomplex,moreinterconnected,more dynamic,andperhapsmorevolatilethaneverbefore.
Section2 UnderstandingtheCriticalVariables
CRITICALVARIABLEOVERVIEW An operationalenvironment(OE)isdefinedinJointdoctrineasthecompositeofthe conditions,circumstances,andinfluencesthataffecttheemploymentofcapabilitiesand bearonthedecisionsof thecommander.Itencompassesphysicalareasandfactors (ofthe air,land,maritime,andspacedomains)andtheinformationenvironment.Included withinthesearetheadversary,friendly,andneutralsystemsthatarerelevanttoaspecific 5 jointoperation. Thecontextfordevelopingfuturemilitaryconceptsandcapabilitieslies essentiallywithintheanticipatedboundariesoftheoperationalenvironment. Therefore, itisessentialtodefinethoseelementsoftheoperationalenvironmentthathavethe greatestimpactontheapplicationofcoerciveforce. Jointdoctrinefocusesonasystemsapproach(PMESII+)tounderstandingthe OE.Thiscanbeeffectivewhenonecanclearlydefineanoperationalareaandfocus resourcestocreatetherequiredknowledge.Thisenablesanindepthunderstandingofa specificoperationalenvironmentinagiventimeandspace.However,experimentation isfocusedonfutureconceptsandcapabilities.Tosupportexperimentation,thefuture mustbeviewedinamannerwhich accommodatesarangeofpotentialoperational environments.Thisdeliberateambiguitydoesnotallowthedetailedsystemsanalysis envisionedforjointoperationsinawelldefinedjointoperationalarea.Forourpurposes, wewilldiscussfutureoperationalenvironmentsintermsofcriticalvariables. Whileitisdifficulttopredicttheexacttimeandspaceof afutureconflict,itis feasibletodeterminethefactorsthatwillhavethegreatesteffectonmilitaryforcesand thusformthecriticalvariablesinfuturemilitaryoperationalenvironments.When operationalized,thesevariablesdefinetheconditions,circumstances,andinfluencesthat affecttheemploymentofmilitaryforceandinfluencethedecisionsofthecommander. TheconceptualtemplateforthedevelopmentoffutureU.S.militarycapabilitiesmust incorporatetheexpectedcharacteristicsofthesecriticalvariables. THECRITICAL12 Assessmentsofthesevariablesarenotdirectlylinkedtospecifictypesof operations,services,orunitsandtheirpossiblerolesandmissions.Theyareinstead designedtofacilitateexperimentationwithinarealityorientedframeworkthatcan encompassallroles,missionareas,andtypesofoperations,plusalltypesof organizations,units,andformations.Whilethereareanearinfinitenumberofvariables thatcanbeusedtodescribethenationsandregionsoftheworld,thereare12thattendto havethegreatestimpactonmilitaryoperations. Thesevariables(seeFigure2)arethe startingpointforconstructingacommon Jointoperationalenvironment: Physicalenvironment Natureandstabilityofthestate Sociologicaldemographics Culture
Regionalandglobalrelationships Existingmilitarycapabilities Information Technology Externalorganizations Nationalwill Economics Time
Variables intheEnvironment
FailedStates
FutureConflict anditscauses
PowerStruggleintheGlobalCommunity PowerStruggleintheGlobalCommunity WMEandTechnologyProliferation,Ideology WMEandTechnologyProliferation,Ideology Water Food ResourceCompetition Water FoodEnergy Energy ResourceCompetition Migrations,refugeesandimmigration Migrations,refugeesandimmigration Governmentscantmeettheneedsoftheirpopulations Governmentscantmeettheneedsoftheirpopulations Youthbulgeandrapidpopulationincrease Youthbulgeandrapidpopulationincrease CulturalandReligiouscompetition CulturalandReligiouscompetition
Regional Crisis
GlobalCrisis
...servetodefinetheEnvironmentalVariables!
Urbanandothercomplexterrain Failedstates,autocraticrule FracturedSocietyDisenchantedPopulations Systemofsharedbeliefs,values,behaviors. InternationalInterestRegionalInvolvement FullrangeInsurgentstoIndustrialAgeforces Discretehightechsystems/Hybridization Media/InformationOperations NGOs/IOs/Criminal/Supra National EspeciallykeytotheU.S. Criticalearlyadvantagetotheadversary Cansupportintendedlevelofoperations
PhysicalEnvironment NatureoftheState SociologicalFactors Culture Regional/GlobalRelationship MilitaryCapabilities TechApplications Information ExternalOrganizations NationalWill Time Economics
...presentinallconflictenvironments...willaltert hefuture Battlespace
Figure2.Thesecriticalvariablesareexpectedtohavethegreatestimpacton futureoperationalenvironment.
PhysicalEnvironment Thephysicalenvironmentdefinesthephysicalcircumstancesand conditionssurroundingandinfluencingtheexecutionofoperationsthroughoutthe domainsofair,land,seaandspace.Thedefiningfactorsarecomplexterrain to includeurbansettings,weather,topography,hydrology,andenvironmental conditions. Thephysicalenvironmenthasalwaysbeenakeyfactorinmilitary
operations.Historyhasdemonstratedthatthoseforcesabletogainanadvantage byusingvariousaspectsofthephysicalenvironmenthaveamuchhigher probabilityofdefeatingtheiropponents,regardlessofsizeandpowerovermatch. PotentialopponentsoftheUnitedStatesclearlyunderstandthatlesscomplexand openenvironmentsfavortheU.S.withitsstandofftechnology,precisionguided munitions(PGM),andsophisticatedintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissance (ISR)capability.Forthisreason,adversarieswillseektousecomplexterrain suchasurbanenvironments,unfavorableweatherpatterns,andlesstraffickedsea lanes,whenconfrontingU.S.forces.Theywilllooktotakeadvantageof strategic,operational,andtacticalchokepointsforfocusingtheirefforts. Complexterrainfostershighlydecentralizedandoftenunconnectedeventsthat detractfromaconventionalforcesabilitytoconcentrateitsefforts. NatureandStabilityofCriticalActors Thisvariablereferstoanactorsinternalcohesivenesswithrespectto population,economicinfrastructures,politicalprocessesandauthority,military forces,goals,andagendas.Inessence,thenatureandstabilityofthestate or organization referstohowstrongorweakacountry orcriticalactor is.Itis importanttodeterminewheretherealstrengthoftheorganizationliesitmaybe inthepoliticalleadership,themilitary,thepolice,orsomeotherelementofthe population.UnderstandingthisvariablewillallowUSforcestobettervisualize thenatureofthemilitarycampaignandthetrueaimsofathreatcampaign, operation,oraction. Astate orotherentity thatmustcommitsignificant resourcestomaintaininternalcontrol may representlessofathreatin conventionalcombatandmoreofathreatinstabilityandsupportoperations. SociologicalDemographics Demographicsconcern thecharacteristicsofahumanpopulationorpartof it,especiallyitssize,growth,density,distribution,andstatisticsregardingbirth, marriage,disease,anddeath.Thedemographicsofapopulationareasignificant factorcontributingtolikelihoodofconflict. Perceivedinequitiesamongsectors ofapopulationcanbreedenvyandresentment, oftenresultinginconflict. Conditionssuchasoverpopulationandanuneducated,unemployedyouthbulge can aggravateeconomic,ethnic,religious,andotherrivalries. Culture Cultureisasystemofsharedbeliefs,values,customs,behaviors,and artifactsthatthemembersofsocietyusetocopewiththeirworldandwithone another.Understandingaculturerequiresexaminingseveralelements,including itscorevalues,history,myths,traditions,andotherfactors. A culturecanchange overtime.Itssharedvaluesandbeliefsaretransmittedfromgenerationto generationthroughlearningandsocialinteraction.Finally,acultureinandof itselfdoesnotcauseaconflict.Itisthefrictionthatcomesfromtheinteraction betweentwodifferentculturesthatcreates thepotentialforconflict. RegionalandGlobalRelationships
Nationstatesand/ornonstateactorsoftenenterintorelationships,which canberegionalorglobal.Theserelationshipsincludepolitical,economic, military,orculturalmergersandpartnerships.Anactorsmembershipinor allegiancetosucharelationshipcandetermineitsactionsintermsofsupport, motivation,andallianceconstruct.Whenactorscreateregionalorglobal alliances,theycanaddtotheircollectivecapabilityandbroadenthescaleof operationsandactions.Theserelationshipswillbefluidandunpredictable,and theywillhavecommonobjectives.Regionalandglobalrelationshipsofpotential opponentsoralliesandcoalitionpartnersshapethescale,intensity,and perseveranceofantagonistsinmilitaryoperations.Intheageofglobalization, regionalactivitieswillundoubtedlydrawglobalinterestand,potentially, involvement. Effectscreatedinonepartoftheworldattheoperationaloreven tacticallevelcouldhaveglobal,cascadingoutcomesatthestrategiclevel.
MilitaryCapabilities Existingmilitarycapabilitiesarewithoutdoubtthemostcriticalvariable formilitaryoperations,politicalaspirations,resolve,andwill.Itwasoncefairly easytodefinemilitary capabilitieshowever,thisvariableisrapidlybecoming oneofthemostcomplexvariablestoassess. Adversariesincludenotjuststate actorswithconventionalmilitarycapabilities,butalsostateswithadeveloped irregularwarfarecapabilityandnonstateactorsorganizingmilitiasandother paramilitary organizations.Theseadversarieswilluseavarietyof TTPranging fromasymmetricapplicationoftraditionallightinfantryoperationstoterrorism. A commandermustbeabletovisualizeallmilitarycapabilitiesofthethreat.It needstobeemphasizedthatourenemieswillbeflexible,thinking,andadaptive. Theyhavetheknowledgeandabilitytouseacombinationofconventionaland unconventionalcapabilities.Thecommandermusthaveinformationonthe threatsconventionalandunconventionalcapabilities,hisabilitytousemodern technology,andhiseconomicandpoliticalabilitytoimpactonthecommanders mission. Suchcapabilitiesincludeequipment,manpower,traininglevels,resource constraints,andleadershipissues. Irregular,unmodernized,adaptiveforceswith accesstonichetechnologies,willbethenormforthenearterm,buttheywill makeuseof conventionalmilitarycapabilitieswithsimilarpurposes,ifdissimilar methods.Hybridization,rapidtechnologicaladvancement,andcapability developedasaresultofasymmetricconceptsgenerateanenvironmentof constantlychangingrequirementsandneeds.Inaddition,paramilitary organizations,specialforces,orenhancedpoliceorganizationstakeongreater militarysignificanceastheircapabilitiesandrolesexpand. Information Informationinvolvestheaccess,use,manipulation,distribution,and relianceoninformationtechnologysystems,bothcivilianandmilitary,byan entity(state/nonstate,etc.).Informationtechnologyisthesystemsor mechanismsforpreservingortransmittinginformation.Variousactorsseektouse
perceptionmanagementtocontrolandmanipulatehowthepublicseesthings.The threatwillexploitUSmistakesandfailuresandusepropagandatoswaythelocal populationtosupporttheircause.Whilemediaandotherinformationmeanscan makecombatoperationstransparenttotheworld,mediacoveragecanimpacton USpoliticaldecisionmaking,internalopinion,orthesensitivitiesofcoalition members. Thecontinuedandrapidlyincreasingexpansionofinformationtechnology andsystemswillgreatlyassistcommanders. Complicatednetworksoflandlines, radiorelaystations,fiberoptics,cellularservice,andtheInternetprovideavast webofcommunicationscapabilities.Thiscommunicationsredundancyallowsfor theconstantflowofinformation.Developingcountriesmayhavelittleintheway ofcommunicationsinfrastructure.Informationmayflowbylesssophisticated meanscouriers,graffiti,rumorsorgossiping,andlocalprintmedia. Understandingwhatevercommunicationinfrastructureexistsisimportantbecause itultimatelycontrolstheflowofinformationtothepopulationandthethreat. Technology Technologyreflectstheequipmentand/ortechnologicalsophisticationthat anentitycouldbringtotheoperationalenvironment.Thetechnologythatnations ornonstateactorscanbringtotheOEincludewhattheycandevelopand produce,aswellaswhattheycanimport.Accesstotechnologicaladvancesonthe globalmarketisslowlyerodingthetechnologicaladvantagetheUShasenjoyed inthepast. Understandingthisvariablecan determinewhetherthethreathasthe technologicalabilitytoachieveequalityorevenovermatchfriendlyforcesin selectedareas..Thepresenceofsophisticatedtechnology canbeanindicatorof whereopponentsexpecttoachievethegreatestadvantageorperceivethegreatest threat. ExternalOrganizations WhentheUSmilitary goesintoafailedstateorintoareastornbyconflict, itiswillfindnongovernmentorganizations(NGOs),internationalhumanitarian organizations,multinationalcorporations,transnationalorganizations,andother civilianorganizationsatwork.Theseexternalorganizationscanhavebothstated andhiddeninterestsandobjectivesthatcaneitherassistorhinderUSmission accomplishment.Eachorganizationalorindividualparticipantpursuesits interestsandobjectivesinconcertorincompetitionwithotherentities. Organizationsandindividualactorsmayhaveeconomic,political,religious, culturalorprivatemotivations,suchasrevenge,whichdifferfromtheirpublic organizationalmission statements. AdefiningoftheOEshouldinformthe commanderastotheimpactexternalorganizationswouldhaveonmission accomplishment.
NationalWillandWillofCriticalActors NationalWillencompassesaunificationofvalues,morals,andeffort betweenthepopulation,theleadershiporgovernment,andthemilitary.Through thisunity,allpartiesarewillingtosacrificeindividuallyfortheachievementof
theunifiedgoal.Theinteractionofmilitaryactionsandpoliticaljudgments, conditionedbynationalwill,furtherdefinesandlimitstheachievableobjectives ofaconflict,therebydeterminingitsdurationandconditionsoftermination. Thewillingnessofthepeopletosupportthreatmilitaryorparamilitary operationsorbesupportiveofterroristactivitiesorinsurgenciescanbea significantcharacteristicofthebattlefield.Itwillimpactonthetypeandintensity ofresistancethepeoplewillposetoUSmilitaryoperations. 6 Nationalwill isviewedbymostcountriesasaU.S.strategiccenterof gravity.Thedegreetowhich onegroupcanattackitsopponentswillandstill preserveitsownrepresentsinlargemeasureitsabilitytosettheconditionsfor achievingfavorableconflictresolution,eveninthefaceoffierceassault.In a worldoftransparentmilitaryoperations,attackonanddefenseofnationalwill havetactical,operational,andstrategicimplications.Aperceivedattackona groupsculturalidentitywillusuallyservetobolsteritswilltofight,potentially increasingboththeintensityanddurationofaconflict. Time Timeisacriticalfactorandatooltomanipulatetactical,operational,and strategicadvantages.Itdrivestheconductofoperationsandcampaigns.Inmost cases,opponentsviewtimeasbeingtotheiradvantage. Tactically,adversaries willseektocontrolthetempoofoperations,initiatingactionsatthetimeoftheir choosing.AnabilitytodictatethetempoofoperationsservestofrustratetheUS decisionmakingcycleandallowstheadversarytoretaintheinitiative. Operationally,theadversarywillusethetimebetweentheinitiationofacrisisto ourresponsetoshapetheenvironmentandsettheconditionsforconflict. Adversariesperceiveastrategicadvantagein prolongingoperations,increasing friendlycasualties,andforcingexpenditureofresources,assumingthatovertime thiseverrisingcostwillwearawaythewilloftheAmericanpoliticalregimeand erodepublicsupport. Economics Theeconomicvariableestablishestheboundariesbetweenthehaves andthehavenots.Thisgapofeconomicdifferencesamongnationstatesand otheractorscancauseconflict.Differencesamongnationstates,organizationsor groups,regardinghowtheyproduce,distribute,andconsumegoodsandservices maybesignificant.Controlofandaccesstonaturalorstrategicresourcescan causeconflict.Beingabletoaffectanotheractor,positivelyornegatively, througheconomic,notmilitarymeans,maybecomethekeytoregional hegemonicstatusordominance.Economicdeprivationisalsoamajorcauseof conflict.Oneactormayhaveeconomicsuperiorityoveranotherformany reasons,includingaccesstonaturalresourcesorpower. Economicpowerandtheabilitytomobilizeitrepresentanationsorother actorsabilitytorapidlyprocuremilitarycapabilities,mobilizeadditionalforces, andconductsustainedoperations.Italsorevealsexternalrelationshipsthatcould resultinpoliticalormilitaryassistance.Forexample,potentialadversaries understandthattheU.S.economyisacenterofgravitythatisverysensitiveto perturbation.Americaneconomicsandthepowerthatflowsfromitwillbe
invitingtargetsforadversaries.Anydisruptionoftheflowofoilproductswould haveasignificantnegativeimpactonoureconomy.Manyofoureconomic institutionse.g.,theNewYorkStockExchangemayappearvulnerableto cyberattack. Economicsuperiorityratherthanmilitarysuperioritymaybethe keytopowerordominancewithinaregion.Analysisidentifiesthoseelementsof economicpowerthatmaybeasignificantcharacteristicofthebattlefield.Ina globalizedeconomy,thethreatmayleverageitseconomicpowerinamannerthat affectsfriendlyoperations. APPLYINGTHECRITICALVARIABLES Jointconceptdevelopmentandexperimentationrequiresaconsistentandrealistic viewofthefutureoperationalenvironment.Thesecriticalvariableswilldeterminethe natureofthatenvironment. Projectingtheimpactofcurrenttrendsonthesevariables overthenext20 25yearswill yieldnotapredictionofasinglefutureoperational environment,butarangeofpossiblefutureoperationalenvironments.Manipulating thesevariableswithinthatrangeallowsexperimentationtofully challengefullspectrum Jointoperationswithavarietyofspecificscenariosthatallfallwithinanacceptable rangeofalternativefuturesderivedfromtheframeworkoftheJOE. Whileeachvariablemustbeconsideredineveryexperiment,thedegreetowhich avariableimpactsanoperation can beadjusted. Thisallowsforavarietyof environmentswithinthesameexperimentalconstruct.Inaddition,adjustingthe variablespresentsadynamicandfullspectrumenvironmentthatrequiresleaderstotake afreshlookateachexperimentationevent,whilefacilitatingavarietyofadaptiveforce packaging.Dealingwithvariablesandtheirsensitivitywillonlygrowinimportanceover time.
Section3 TrendsShapingtheFutureOperational Environment

Asstatedearlier,thispaperaddressesthelikelycontextoffuturemilitary operationswithinanenvironmentthatrapidly cultivatesglobal,interdependentsituations andcrises.Thesefivestudy areashavethegreatestpotentialforshapingtheboundaries ofthefutureoperationalenvironment: socialand culturalfactorsthedynamicsof geopoliticsandgovernancetheglobalizationofeconomicsandresourcestherevolution inscience,technology,andengineeringandfinally,militarytrendsanddevelopments. Whilethesestudyareasoftenlackdefinitivequantifiabledata,generalpatternsandtrends canbeidentified. SocialandCulturalFactors Sociologyisthescientificstudyofhumanrelationsorgrouplifeanddynamics. Sociologistsexaminethewaysinwhichsocietiesareinfluencedbysocialstructures, institutions,andfactorssuchasethnicity,demographics,culturalcohesiveness, educationandsocialproblems,suchascrimeandpoverty.Theyalsostudyhow societiesinteractwitheachotherinbroaderorlargerstructures.Asocietyisan autonomouspopulationof twoormorepersonswhosemembersaresubjecttothesame politicalauthority,occupyacommonterritory,andhaveacommoncultureandasenseof sharedidentity. Theinterrelatedsystemsofasociety includeitspolitical,economic,and legal elements. Asocietyhascertainattributes.Theseattributeseffectthebehaviorofthatsociety andinsodoinginfluencetheculture(s)extantinthesociety.Possibleattributesinclude: resiliency thatallowsasocietytocontinueovertimeinterrelatedelementsthatbindthe societyandasenseofmembershipthatimpliesastakeinthesuccessofthatsociety. Societiesattempttobeselfsustainingbysocializingtheirmembership selforganizing selfperpetuating anddefendingagainstoutsideinfluences. Fromasociologicalperspective,themostsignificantstrategicimplicationscome fromchangesinthedemographiccharacteristicsofagivenarea.Suchfactorsasdisease, theflowofrefugees,generalpopulationandmigrationtrends,andincreasingdisparities ofwealthwillhaveamajorimpactonstates,militaries,andsocieties.They affecta societyscultureinwaysthatdeterminehowpeoplethink,plan,perceive,decide,act, receiveandinterpretfeedback,andadjust. Sociologicalfactors,embeddedastheyarewithinstate,regional,andglobal environments,will significantlyinfluencetheoperationalenvironment,giventhe multitudeofpotentialtriggersoftensionorconflictinthosefactors. Oneofthemost importantofthesefactorsisasocietysculture. Cultureisasystemofsharedbeliefs, values,customs,behaviors,andartifactsthatthemembersofsocietyusetocopewith theirworldandwithoneanother. Ifcultural factorsarenotinthemselvestherootcause ofconflict, they oftenserveasaveneertoenableandjustifytheescalationofpoliticalor economiccompetitionintoconflict. Operationally,thesocialandculturalfactorsthathavethemostimpacttendtobe thosethathaveadirectlinkagetoaspecificareaorlocation.Socially,denseurban
environmentsposesignificantproblemstomilitaryforcescomparedtoopen,rolling terrainmountainsareasarelikewisephysicallysignificant,butbecausepopulation densityisscarcethereislessofasocialchallenge.Ethnicandreligiousdiversitywill challengethenotionofwhoisinchargeorwhohasalegitimatevoice.Youth,stirredup byunmetemploymentandeducationgoals,willstepforwardtorebel,butthenretreat intothesanctuaryofciviliannoncombatantsforcover.Withpopulationsincreasing worldwide,therewillbesubstantiallymorewomenandchildrenonthebattlefield. Thefollowingexpectedsocial andcultural trendsanddriversofthenextfew decadeswillhelpshapethefutureoperationalenvironment.From them wecanderive potentialstrategicandoperationalimplicationsforthenatureoffutureconflictand providethecontextfortheenvironmentinwhichconflictwilloccur. Trends,Drivers,andImplications POPULATIONGROWTH.Despitetheacademicdebatesurroundingthegenerationof accuratepopulationfiguresforthe20202030timeframe,mostanalystsagreethatthe worldspopulationwillcontinuetoincrease,possiblyto8.2billionby2030.Significant 7 growth,perhapsmorethan90percent,willoccurindevelopingandpoorercountries. Indeed,thecountriesmostaffectedbyfuturepopulationgrowthtrendswilllikelyinclude India,Pakistan,Nigeria,China,Bangladesh,Ethiopia,andtheDemocraticRepublicof Congo. Asaregion,countriesin NorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastarealsopredictedto experiencerapidpopulationincreases. Itisnotcertainthatthesecountrieswillbeableto meettheneedsof theirexpandingpopulations. Thesegrowingpopulationswill increasetheurgencyofthecompetition forresources,notablyfood,water,andenergy. Suchshortages, combinedwith othertensionsintheseareas,couldtriggerconflictinthefuture. Addingtothe pressureofthegrowtharesuchfactorsasagrowingyouthpopulation,inadequate education,inequitabledistributionofwealth,overwhelmedhealthcarecapability, urbanization,andotherfactorsdiscussedbelow.
AGEDISTRIBUTION.Increasedlifeexpectancyandfallingfertilityrateswill contributetoacontinuingshifttowardanagingpopulationinthemostdeveloped countries.By2030,closeto1.4 billionpeopleintheworldwillbeovertheageof 8 60. Medicalscienceandbetterpublichealthprogramsareprolonginglifeand alreadycreatinganincreasinglyolderpopulationinEuropeandtheUnitedStates. Thedecliningratioofworkingpeopletoretireesinagingdevelopedcountries willstrainalreadytaxedsocialservices,pensions,andhealthcare. Conversely,indigentpeopleinpoorcountriescontinuetohavelarge familiesformanyreasons.Prominentamongthemislittleornoaccesstofamily planningservices.Inthepast,manyofthesechildrenwouldhavedied,butnow medicalsciencehassavedthemcreatingayouthbulgeofundereducatedyouth withfewemploymentopportunitiesbutwithheightenedexpectations.Globalized informationnetworkswilltendtoraiseexpectationsinpoorersocieties,creating
envyandmistrustofmoreprosperousstates,whilepopulationagedifferences generatedifferingperspectivesonbothproblemsandsolutions. Itwillbeverydifficultforregionallabormarketsandeconomiestoabsorb 9 thisforthcomingyouthbulge. (15to29yearolds)thatwilloccurinSub SaharanAfrica,LatinAmerica,andtheMiddleEast. Peopleinthe15to29age groupplacesignificantdemandsongovernmentsandsociety.Withouteducation andopportunity,thehigherthedensityofthisagegroup,approaching4050 10 percentofapopulation,thegreaterthepotentialforinstabilityofthestate. Theyouthbulgeprovidesfertilegroundforrecruitsinterroristgroups, criminalelements,anddrugcartels.Historically,ifthissegmentofthepopulation isunabletofindadequateeducationoremploymentandifexpectationsgounmet, thensocialchaosisinevitableandhasthepotentialofturningintoconflict.Ifthis holdstrueinthefuture,theresultingdisparitybetweenaging,developedcountries andcountrieswithyoung,undereducated,underemployedpopulationswill exacerbatethefrustrationofthelessfortunate,whowill understandthebenefits associatedwithglobalization,butwillnotshareinthosebenefits. HEALTH. Although advancesinhealthserviceshavebeenmadeworldwide duringthelastdecade,manypeoplestilllackaccesstobasicmedicalcareand treatment. Itisexpectedthatdisparitiesbetweenhealthcareinthedevelopedand developingworldwillwiden.Chronicandinfectiousdiseaseswillcontinueto haveadramaticeconomicandsocialimpactinAfricaandpartsofAsiaandSouth America,causingmoreresourcestobededicatedtofightingthesediseases,and leavinglessmoneyforotherbasicneeds.Infectiousdiseasesincluding HIV/AIDS,malaria,hepatitis,andtuberculosiswillbepresentinmostfuture operationalenvironments. WEALTHDISTRIBUTION. The2005UNHumanDevelopmentReportcreates apicture of growinginequalityandanincreasingglobalgapbetween richand poor.Therichest50individualsintheworldhaveacombinedincomegreater than thatofthepoorest416millionThe2.5millionpeoplelivingonlessthan$2 aday 40%oftheworldspopulation receiveonly 5%ofglobalincome,while 54%ofglobalincomegoestotherichest10%oftheworldspopulation.Butthe problemisnotjustoneofinequalitybetweencountries.TheHDRpointsoutthat inthelast20yearstheunequaldistributionofincomewithinmany countrieshas grownworse.Ofthe73countriesforwhichfiguresareavailable,53(comprising over80%oftheworldspopulation)haverecorded anincreaseininequalityof distribution.Onlyin9countries(comprisingabout4%oftheworldspopulation) hasthewealthgapbetween richandpoorbeenatallreduced.Differencesare especiallygreatwithinNamibia,Brazil,South Africa,ChileandZimbabwe.Even incountrieswithhigheconomicgrowthrates BrazilandChinaforexample socialdisparitiesremainlarge.Thisriseinwealthdisparity willleadtoincreased tensionandhostilitybetweentherichandpoorinthefuture,asthepoorseek relieffromanyavailablesourcetogarnersomedegreeofparity. 11
URBANIZATION. Increasedurbanizationwillcontinuethroughouttheworld. By2030over60percentoftheworldspopulationispredictedtobelivingin 12 urbanenvironments. Providingforthesegrowingurbanpopulationswill challengelocalgovernmentsandpublicserviceinfrastructures. Manyofthe worldslargestcitiesareinthedevelopingcountries.If theirgovernmentsare unabletoprovidethebasicpublicservices,thepotentialforchaosandcivilunrest willbeheightened. Ontheotherhand,ifgovernmentsmarshalresourcestodeal withurbanissues,theyriskleavingrural areasunder orungoverned,withallthe potentialproblemsthatcouldthendevelop. Urbanenvironmentstypicallyfeaturesubterraneaninfrastructure, shantytowns,andskyscrapercanyons.Thiscomplexitycandegradeorreducethe effectivenessofhightechnologyweapons,communicationsystems,and intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR)capabilities. Inaddition, therearecountlesscomplexsocialandculturalinteractionsthatinfluencehuman intelligenceandopensourceinformation.Asaresult,theriskofcollateral damageincreasesmoreciviliansarelikelytobeharmedorkilledandforce protectionrequirementsmultiply.Thecriticalinfrastructureinsuchareascirca 2030mostlikelywillbeausterewaterandsewerservicesindisrepairlimitedor compromisedelectricalserviceinadequatemedicalcaredirectlyaffectingthe Americanandcoalitionmeanstorespondwithmilitaryforcesorhumanitarian aid.Frequently,smallcombatoperationsteamsthatcombinewarfighting,police, andcivilaffairscapabilitieswillbepresentintheenvironmentasadversaries, allies,orneutrals. MIGRATION.Peoplegenerallymigratetothosestatesandregionsthatcan provideabetterqualityoflife.Migrationcanhavepositiveeffectsasdeveloped nationsreceiveneededhumanresourcesanddevelopingnationslosepopulations theycannotsupport. Indicationsarethatmigrationratesarelikelytoincreasein regionsthatareunabletoprovideeconomicallyforpopulationgrowth. Unfortunately,manyfromtheyouthbulgespreviouslydiscussed,withtheir disillusionsanddesiretorectifytheirstationinlifethroughwhatevermeans possible,willbeapartofthismigration. Anyeconomicisolationandalienation canleadtocivilunrest,potentialbraindraineffects,andagenerallackoffaith ingovernment. Theeffectsoflabormigration,issuesofmigrantintegration,andirregular migrationflowscanbefurthercomplicatedbyillegalactivitiessuchashuman traffickingandthesmugglingofmigrants.Allthesethingswillcontributeto potentialflashpointsofanyfutureoperationalenvironment.Forexample, developingnationswillstruggletoretainskilledandprofessionalworkforces whileallowingunskilledandburdensomeelementstomigrate.Unfortunately, manyimmigrantswilllacktheskillsnecessarytocompeteinthemiddleclass worksettingofthedevelopednationstowhichtheymigrate.Thus,many unskilledimmigrantswillbecomedisenfranchisedminoritieswithlittlevoicein
theirnewcountries, competingwith nativepopulations foradiminishing numberofunskilled laborpositions. Advancesin communications andtransportation willimpactfuture migration,creating virtualborders andcausing migrationtobeless influencedby physicalproximity. Instant communications visionsofabetter life,carriedby radio,television, andtheInternet willbevery influential. The cultural,economic, andhistorical Figure4. Impactofcriminalactivity. impactofamulti ethniclaborforce InternationalCrimeThreatAssessment couldaffectforeignpolicyormilitaryoperations.Forexample,withitslargeand December2000 growingHispanicminority,theU.S. mighteitherhesitateorbepressuredinto conductingmajormilitaryoperationsinLatinorSouthAmerica.Strategic alliances,partnerships,andcoalitionsmay alsobeaffectedbythechanging dynamicsofmemberpopulations.Suchfactorswillimpactmoststrategic decisions,betheypolitical,informational,military,oreconomic. CRIME. Anyfutureoperationalenvironmentwill includethepresenceof criminal elements.Internationalorganizedcrime,motivatedbygreedandself 13 interest,willincreaseaspotentialsecuritythreatstothedevelopedworld. Alongwith ariseinthenumberandpresenceofcriminalorganizations, therewill alsobeanincreasedblurringofcriminalactivities,civilconflict,andpotential terroristactivities(seeFigure4). Theseelementswillblendwiththepopulation andbecomeevermoredifficulttopenetrate. Drugandhumantraffickingare expectedtocontinue. Suchorganizationsandactivitieswillthreatennational orregional stability, structure,andlegitimatepoliticalauthority.This,inturn,canaffectU.S.
interests.Criminalorganizationsandelementswilltakeadvantageofinformation andcommunicationtechnologiesandtheproliferationofweaponstodevelopvery sophisticatedcapabilities.Thedestructivesocial,economic,andpolitical impact ofcrimewillincreaseinbothitsseverityandsophistication.Transnational criminalactivity,fueledbyglobalconnectionstomoneyandarms,willblurthe linesbetweentraditionalmilitaryactionandcriminalactivities.Criminal organizationswillcontinuetoformstrategicallianceswithstatesandnonstate actors,includingterrorists.Terroristsandcriminalswillalsobeactiveinsuchan environment,readytoexploitthesituationfortheirrespectivegains. United Statesjointforces,combinedwithlawenforcementandintelligenceactivitiesina collaborativeinformationenvironment,willhavetodealbothwithenemy militaryforcesandothernontraditionalforces,suchascriminalorganizations, terrorists,orreligiousfanatics,whowillseektoprofitfrominstability. CULTURE. Becauseof (orperhapsinspiteof)globalization,populationgrowth,and othertrendsmentioned,culturewillbecomeanincreasinglyvisiblesourceoffrictionand potentialconflictamongsocieties. Thefutureoperationalenvironmentmust accommodateasignificanttrendin thegrowingnumberandsignificanceof culturesand subcultures.Fedbyglobalization,regionalization,andinformationagecapabilities,new groupingsarediscoveringsometimesrediscoveringasharedculture.Thistrend complicatesourabilitytodefine,understand,andinfluencethefutureoperational environment. Thetrendindicatesthatreligiousideologywilldominateasadriving socialandpoliticalforce. Religionisan aspectofculturethatfrequentlyhas WhatMakesUpACulture? createdfrictionandconflictandmost likelywilldosointhefuture. Whereas CoreValues communismandfascism wereonceused History/Myths/Legends tomotivateoppressed,impoverished,or Traditions culturallyadriftpopulations,peoples SymbolsandNarratives seekingnational,regional,orevenglobal Socialization goalsofdominancewillincreasingly EducationandLiteracy employreligion,particularlyinitsmost Religion extremeform.Indeed,religionhas Language alreadytakenitsplacewith Law neonationalismandraceastheideological EconomicSystems pretextunitingpeoplesandjustifying KinshipandSocialInteractions conflict.Religiousradicalism and Normsof Behavior fundamentalismwillbecomeattractiveto BasicMannersandCourtesies thosewhofeelvictimizedorthreatenedby RelationshiptoEnvironment theculturalandeconomicimpactsof globalizationandincreasedsocial Figure5.ElementsofaCulture. interconnectivity.Theriseofradicalism, includingreligiousradicalism,willcomplicateanystrategicactionfromall 14 elementsofpower,alteringthenatureofcombat. Byitsverynature,ideologyis transnational.Itisgreatlyempoweredbyglobalinformationsystemsthatallow
participation,recruitment,planning,collaboration,andresourcing,regardlessof bordersorstates.Thisnotionchangesthecalculusofconflictinwhichthestakes becomehigher,supremesacrificeismoreprevalent,andtheperspectivesonthe constituentelementsofwillaredifferent. Anothersignificantinsightistheunderstandingthatmany culturaltrends anddriversofsocialchangewillcomefromforcesandinfluencesexternaltoa 15 country orapeople,ratherthanmoretraditionalinternaldrivers. Ingeneral, globalizationisviewedpositively,especiallyinpoorercountriesasopposedto 16 richer,developedcountries. Globalizationwillcontinuetoincreasetheintensity andbreadthofoutsideinfluenceonallcultures,withtheU.S.culturebeingthe 17 dominantglobalinfluence. Theaccesstoandawarenessofothercultures,eitherthroughdirect contactwithindividualsorthroughtechnologiesthatspreadthepopularcultureof others,willincreasedramaticallyby20202030. Westernculturalinfluences, enabledbyinformationtechnologies,haveandwillcontinuetohaveworldwide impact. Suchimpactisnotalwayspositive. Invery underdevelopedcountries withalarge,unemployedyouthbulge,Westerncultural influenceresultsin disaffectionandresentmentboth ofwhichfuelcrime,terrorism,anddrugusage. Externalculturalinfusionleadstoaweakeningofculturalcohesiveness, producingabacklashofnegativeattitudesandactions. Theseattitudesleadtothe developmentandspreadofintenseantiWesternsentimentthatpresentsmajor politicalchallengesorincreasedterroristactsagainstU.S.interestsand 18 personnel. Manyanalystsbelievewearewitnessingafundamentalistreaction totheinfluenceofWesternprimarilyU.S.powerandculture.Thisperceived culturaldominationbytheU.S.inevitablyledtoantiU.S.sentimentsandacts tailoredtocripplethestrategicpowerandimageof theU.S. TRAININGANDEDUCATION. Trendsin trainingandeducationareimportant indicatorsofthestability,productivity,andstrengthofasociety.Educationraises thepotentialforeconomicprosperityandpoliticalactivity.Educationisthe 19 foundationfordevelopmentandafutureplaceintheglobaleconomy. EducationwillbecomemoreWebbasedandeasier,allowingfargreateraccessto knowledgethaneverbefore. Education,however,isafunctionoftherulingbodyanditsinherentbias. ThereisaglobalappreciationforthestrengthandqualityoftheU.S.university levelsystemandadvancedstudiesprograms. Morethan 30percentofall science andengineeringdoctoraldegreesawardedintheU.S.duringacademicyear2002 2003wenttononresidentaliens,withthemajorityofdegreesintheareasof 20 scienceandtechnology. OvertimethiswilltendtoerodeU.S.technicaland scientificleadership.Thiserosion canalreadybeseeninthecaseofIndia,which isnowoneoftheworldleadersincomputersoftwaredevelopment. Another trendisoutsourcingof U.S.researchanddevelopmentandbackofficeandother ITsupport whetherthisoutsourcingispositiveornegativeremainstobeseen.
Further,educationwillraiseawarenessinthedevelopingand underdevelopedworldthatonesownsocietysstandardoflivingisfarbelowthat in thedevelopednations.Theresultinggapbetweenthehavesandhavenotswill createtension,especiallyifpeoplecanbeeducated,buttherearenojobs. Despitethegeneralgrowthineducationalinfrastructure worldwide,in manycountriesaccesstobasiceducationcontinuestobedeniedtocertain segmentsofsociety.Theissueoffundamentaleducationremainsaconcernin manypartsoftheworld,andtheeducationgapiswideningfurther.Asof2000, therewereatleast880millionilliterateadultsglobally250millionchildren 21 worked,andmorethan110millionschoolagechildrendidnotattendschool. Thesefiguresrepresentmorethan1Billion peopleinadequatelyeducatedto participateinorbenefitfromthegrowthoftheglobaleconomy.Providing adequatetrainingandeducationtocompetesuccessfullyinahighlytechnical globalenvironmentisanobligationofsociety. Ifasegmentof apopulationfeels marginalized unabletocompeteforjobseducatedbutwithout outletsforsuch education ordeniedbasiceducation,itislikelythatcivilstrifeandviolence,or evenrevolutionmayoccur. ETHNICITY. Issuesofethniccohesivenessandethnictensionwillbeimportant tomilitaryforcesoperatinginanyfutureoperatingenvironment. Similarto culturalconflicts,ethnicconflictstendtorisewhenidentitiesarechallengedby thekindsofmajorsocialchangesthataccompanymodernization and globalization. Whilecurrentethnicfaultlinestendtobegeographicallycentered, inthenext20yearsglobalizationwilllikelyuniteethnicDiasporasaroundthe world,includingintheUnitedStates. Inthefuture,therefore,understandingand recognizingtheethnicmakeupofagivenenvironmentanditstiestoaglobal community willbeevenmorecritical. Additionally,theethnicmakeupofaparticularoperationalenvironmentnotonly willdeterminepotentialelementsofsupport,butalsowill identify potential centersofresistance.Thatresistancemaycontributemorally,logistically,and financiallyaswellasbyactualphysicalparticipationinaresistancemovement. Additionally,wemustacceptthatAmericaitself willnotnecessarilyremainan enclaveorasafehaven,andwillbemoreandmoreavitalelementofthefuture battlespace. GEOPOLITICSANDGOVERNANCE Trends,Drivers,andImplications THEPOWERFUL. Althoughthetraditional nationstatewill beredefinedand perhapsweakenedinthenext20years,itwill remainakeyelementofinternationaland regionalrelations.In affluentanddevelopedcountriesconsolidationofsome traditionalgovernancefunctionsunderregional economicandpolitical supra organizations,liketheEuropeanUnion(EU),willcontinue,butthemembernation stateswillretainsignificantpowers. ForexampleinEurope,statessuchasBelarusand
Russiamayjointogethertoform alargerstateorunion. Regionalsupraorganizations representapoolingof sovereigntytoachievegreatercollectivepower. Inthem nations havethepotentialtobecomeincreasinglypowerful,capableofconcerteddiplomatic, information,military,andeconomicactions.Theseregionalsupraorganizationscan constrainorfacilitateAmericasabilitytoactorreact. Furtherredefinitionofthenationstatewillbeevidencedaspoliticalidentities blurandsomepowershiftstonontraditionalactors.Forexample,someinternational or privatebusinessorganizationswillproliferateandassumesomeofthepowersnowheld bylocalandnationalgovernments. Othersmaybecomeobsoleteanddissolve, combineintodifferententities,orfadeintoobscuritybecausetheyarenolonger relevant. Nationstateswillfinditincreasinglydifficulttoactunilaterallyandwillhave tobemoreadeptatformingtemporaryalliancesandmultilateralarrangements. Otherwise,theywillfindthemselvesincreasinglyisolated,especially when entitiesin economiczonessuchasEuropeortheFarEastemergewithpowerequaltoorgreater thanthatofstates. Nationsstatesexperiencingsignificanteconomicgrowthwilltendtodevelop pluralisticandliberalsocieties,asdevelopmentandsomeformofdemocracyare usuallyinterdependent.(ItremainstobeseenwhetherChinawillfollowthistendency.) Ineconomicallysuccessfulnations,identities,functionsandallegiancesofindividuals, corporations,governments,andNGOswilldynamicallychange,blend,anddisbandas theinformationrevolution,globalization,andinternationaltravelevolve.Identitywith thenationstatewillhavelessimportanceasdualcitizenshipbecomesmorecommon andasregionalsupraorganizationsmatureandmultinationalcorporationsspread. Allegianceswillbetiedmorecloselytocultural,religious,or ideologicalproclivities. TheInternetwillenableinterestgroupstocometogether,morph,anddisbandwith unprecedentedspeed. Cultureswillmerge,theEnglishlanguagewilldominate,and brandnameproductswillbecomeincreasinglyuniversal.Internationalorganizations andspecialinterestgroups,andfarflungDiasporaswillmakecompetingclaimsonthe loyaltyandallegianceoftheirmembersbecausetheInternetandglobal communicationswillstrengthenthetiesandpowerofscatteredpeoples. Peoplewill increasinglymakedecisionsfromdata thatgenerallyleadstoaninclinationtomake quickjudgmentsandintellectualsnapshotswithnohintofknowledge,understanding, orcomplexity. Thepowerofthemediawillbeenormous. THEWEAK. Thecharacteristictrendsoftheeconomicallysuccessfuland developedworldwill havelittleinfluenceinthenondemocraticstatesofthe noncompetitiveworld.Primaryalliancesaremorelikelytoformaroundatribe, extendedfamily,orreligiousleader,astheeconomiclosersturninwardin frustration.Countriesthatfailtoachievesufficienteconomicgrowthandwealth distributionwillslideintoorremainunderonepartyoronepersonrule. Single resource/cropeconomieswillbesubjecttoarresteddevelopmentandexploitation bynonstateactors. Intheseareas,tribalandreligiousidentificationwillgrowand supplanttheformalgoverningstructureasthedefactogovernmentatthelocal level. Potentially,thesecountriescouldbecomeethnoreligiousstatesheadedby clericsandruledbyreligiousdoctrineorlaw.
FAILEDORFAILINGSTATES
FailedorFailingStates
Characteristics
Politicalviolence/politicalorderchallenged Conspicuousrolesforpoliticalpolice Corruption Lackofcoherentnationalidentity Highdegreeofstatecontrolovermedia Grossviolationsofhumanrights Civilstrife Breakdownoffoodandhealthsystems Disease Displacedpopulations Instability Widespreaddrugtraffickingandusage
Implications
Humanitarianreliefops Peacekeeping/stabilityops Protectionofeconomicenclaves Largescaleevacuationops Intelligenceandinformation collection. Effectsbasedoperations Safehavensfordrugdealers, criminals,andterrorists.
ISSUES Refugees Resources Criminalactivities Havenforarmed bands/terrorists EthnicTension Statevs.NonState Conflictspilloverto neighboringstates Energy/tradeaccess
Figure6. Thefailureofweakenedstateshasglobalimplications. Failedorfailingstateswillariseasaresultofeconomiccollapse,resource competition,ideologicallycenteredmismanagement,andfailedsocial infrastructure. (SeeFigure6.) Pakistan,Indonesia,Iran,SaudiArabia,tropical Africanstates,orIndiamayfragmentorcollapse. Somestatesorregions(for example,NorthKoreaandCentralAfrica)willdependonforeignaidand handoutsforsurvival.Asaresult,aiddispensinginternationalorganizationsor MNCsmayprovidedefactogovernance.Someareasthatarecurrently ungovernedorlackeffectivegovernmentcontrol(NorthwestFrontierProvincein Pakistan,Somalia,largeareasoftropicalAfricaandSouthAmerica)willremain ungovernedandincreaseinnumber.Intheseareas,localwarlords,criminal bosses,triballeaders,andreligiousauthoritieswillrule.Theseareaswillhave increasingimportancetodesperateordisenfranchisedcitizens,whileproviding sanctuaryforterrorists,criminals,andrevolutionaries. Terrorists,drugdealers, andcriminalelementswillthriveinthesesanctuariesandwill usethem asthe basetospreadtheirinfluence.Theywillmigrateandreturnwhennecessary. GLOBALIZATION. Globalizationwillcontinuetohaveaprofoundeffecton governance,onboththepowerfulandtheweak.Itwillsignificantlyimpact, eitherpositivelyornegatively,howexistinggovernmentsandfuturegovernments evolve.Theimpactmaybedirect(throughpoliticalactionsofdominantsupra organizations)orindirect(throughtheinfluenceofglobalcultureorglobal economy).Governmentsandregionalalliancesmaycometoviewglobalization asachallengetotheirrightsandlegitimacyandwill activelycombatorsubvertit. Globalizationislesseningsinglestatedominationofparticularindustries,asit increasestheimportanceoftransnationalorganizations.Thereisanincreased
probabilityofU.S.engagementsinareasthatarenotunderanystatecontrolorof actionsagainstnonstateadversaries.Traditionalapplicationoftheinstruments ofnationalpower,suchasdiplomaticrelationsbetweenstates,maynotbe appropriate. REGIONALISM. Regionalism,agrowingtrend, isthephenomenonthatenables ageographicallydefinedregiontoactasasingleentityinordertoachievea commonobjective.(TheJOEwilluseCommunityofInterestwhendiscussing groupingsofentitiesthatshareacommoninterest,butarenotgeographically bound.) Globalizationandinformationtechnologyhavefacilitatedthe proliferationofcommunitiesofinterest,manyofwhichexistexclusivelyin cyberspace. Globalizationandtheinformationageareenablersofregionalism. Asindividualnationsseeaneedtointeractwiththeglobalcommunity,they questiontheirabilitytodosoeffectively.Oftentheywillformassociationswith othernationsin theirregionandconductbusinessasacooperativegrouping. Informationagetechnologiesfacilitatetheformation,coordination,andcollective actionoftheseentities. Inthecurrentglobalenvironment,economicgrowthandprosperityappear tobethemostcommonmotivationforregionalism.Collectivesecurityagainst externalthreatsfostersaregionalapproach,butonly aslongasthatthreatexists. Acommonconcernoverasharedregionalresource,suchaswaterorthe environmentingeneral,can resultinregionalismfocusedinternally.Inanyof thesecases,cooperationinoneareatendstoencouragecooperationintheothers. Regionalgroupingsgainstrengthwhenbasedonseveralinterrelatedconcerns(for example,security andprosperity)andcontinuetostrengthenovertime. Regionalismandglobalizationareseparatebutrelatedphenomena.Both aremotivatedbyprosperityandstability.Bothareenabledbydependentupon growingaccesstoinformationandinformationtechnologies.Buteithercanexist withouttheotherandcontinuedespitetheother. INFORMATION. Theinformationrevolution willeffectchangeingovernance worldwide.Itcanservegovernancebyempoweringitthroughimproved communicationandeducation,likelyresultinginpositiveeffectsoverall.The informationrevolutioncanalsoservepoliticalrevolutionbecauseitfacilitatesthe identificationandorganizationoflikemindedpersonsaroundtheworld.As notedearlier,ITallowsthemtoformspecialinterestgroups,uniteDiasporas,and sharevastamountsofinformationquickly.Thoseabletoaffordtherelativelylow costofinformationmanagementtechnologieswillhavespectacularadvantages overthosewhodonot. Forexample,byexploitingsuchcapability,friend,foe, andneutralwillattempttocreatepoliticalandeconomicinfluencesthat,takenas awhole,cancascadeacrossnationalandorganizationalboundarieswithimmense effect. Informationtechnology willcontinuetospreadworldopinionthatcan influenceandlimitthepowerofgovernment.Itraisedinternationalattentionand pressureagainstapartheidpoliticsinSouthAfricaandfueledpublicoppositionin EuropeagainstOIF.Theproliferationof ITwillincreasetheinfluenceof
opinionsfromstatesandnonstateactors,aswellasitsuseasameansof 22 disinformation. TERRORISM. Whilenationstateswillcontinuetobuildandmaintain conventionalmilitarycapabilities,theywillbeforcedincreasinglytowardan irregularapproachtowarfightinganddevelopmentof aWMEcapabilitytodeal 23 withmoreadvancedopponents. Physical,psychological,informational,and economicterrorismwillthreatengovernance,althoughtheform,organization, andtacticswillevolvebeyondthatexperiencedtoday.Often,manygroupswho previouslywereunableorunwillingtouseterrorismmayresorttoitastheonly mechanismtofurthertheircauseandcombatexternalinfluenceorthreats. Temporarysecurityalliances,alongthelinesofacoalitionofthewilling,may formtorespondtoregionalorinternationalterrorism. AlthoughtheU.S.will remainthedominantmilitaryforce,lethalnichecapabilitiescouldallowsmall statesandnonstateactors(includingterrorists)to formtemporaryalliancesor coalitionsthatwill threatenthedeploymentandmissionaccomplishmentofU.S. armedforces. ALLIANCESANDCOALITIONS. Futurealliancesandmultilateral arrangementswillinvolveagreaterarrayofactorsthanatpresent. Unitingor disbandingbasedoncommoninterests, thesealliancesandcoalitionswilluse collaborativeinformationsharinganddatabasedevelopmentasaprimarymeans tounite.Traditional nationstatesovereigntywillplayadecreasingrole. Internationalorganizations,regionalsupraorganizations,nationstates,NGOs, localleaders,MNCs,specialinterestgroups,andreligiousorganizationsmaybe partoffuturecoalitions,friendlyoradversarial. Allmembersofalliancesand coalitionswillseektocontrolorfocustheactionsoftheU.S. Itisalsolikelythat U.S. armedforceswillbetaskedtoreconstitutegovernanceorsubstitutefor establishedgovernance. ECONOMICSANDRESOURCES Trends,Drivers,andImplications COMPETITIONFORRESOURCES. Duringthenext25years,therewillbea shiftinthepatternofresourcedependencies.Inthedevelopedworld,political andenvironmentalconcerns,inconcertwithtechnologicalimprovements,will leadustoseekareducedrelianceonfossilfuel.Eventhoughthesesameenergy efficiencieswillbeavailabletodevelopingcountries,theirincreasingneedswill leadtoagreaterdemandforoil.IndiaandChinawillseetheirenergydemands risetofirstworldlevels.Asthesedevelopingnationsprosper,energydemands willgrowasaresultof increasedheating,cooling,industrial,andtransportation needs.Issuesofresourcemanagement(waterandenergysources)become significantinregionswhenpopulationdemandsoutstriplocalresources. Technology,alternativeenergysources,andimprovedconservationmethodswill providesomerelief,butpotentialconflictsoverscarceresourcescouldeasily
destabilizesomeregions.Accesstoresourceswillcontinuetobeaprimary concernofeverystate,andcompetitionforlimitedresourceswillbeacauseof futureconflict.Stateswithoutlargesuppliesofenergy,water,mineralwealth, andagriculturalresourceswillbesignificantlychallengedtomaintaineconomic growthandprosperity.Someadversariesmightbeabletoleveragesuchsituations byattemptingtocreateinstabilityinthosecountriescontrollingorusing resources. Aseconomicsystemsbecomemoreintegrated,interdependent,and globalized,they willbeincreasinglyvulnerabletointentionaldisruptionstothe supplyofvitalresources.Developedcountries,nolongerproducingmuchof theirownelectronics,steel,andenergy willbeparticularly vulnerableto interruption ofthemovementofvitalmaterialsatcriticalpoints. Controlof pipelinepumpingstations,maritimechokepoints,majorports,airfields,keyrail junctures,andothercriticalsegmentsofthetransportationinfrastructurewillbe vital,especiallyduringacrisis. Resourcewarsremainapossibility,andeconomicblocswillplayan importantroleindistributingordenyingaccesstoimportantresources.Internal conflictsmayalsoariseoverresourcedistributionandmanagement,especially becauseofinadequatedistributioninfrastructure.Ironically,countriesthatareor willbeincreasinglyprosperouscouldbeincreasinglyunstablebecauseof inequitabledistributionoftheirnewwealthsuchinstabilitywilllikelyleadto discontent,rebellion,andmigration. IMPACTOFTECHNOLOGY. Changewillbecomemorerapidandoften discontinuouswithinacomplex,interconnected,global,technological environment.Countriesandorganizationswillneedtobeflexibletomanage changeor they willfail. Commandeconomiesandtraditionalsocietieswillbe hardpressedtokeeppace. Tradevolumewillincrease,aswellasthenumberof playersandtheirimpactonworldtrade.Thestockandcommoditymarketswill becomemorevulnerabletoshorttermmanipulationasITpermeatestheglobal environment.Duringtimesofcrisisorwar,adversarieswillusemarket manipulation tosupportorfrustrateinternationalactionsormerelytogarner quickreturns.Adversarieswillstrivetoprofitfromoraffectmarketsasawayto improvetheireconomicpositionwhilereducingthatoftheU.S. Technologywillhavebotheconomicandmilitaryimpact.New technologiescanbetheengineforrapideconomicgrowth,buttheyhaveaprice. Increasingamountsofcapitalmustbespentmerelytokeepupwithtechnological change. Money investedinlegacyorinappropriatetechnologycanretard a nationsabilitytorespondtorapidchange.Militariestendtohavelongterm R&Dcycles,whilebusinessworksonshortertermgoals.Potentialfoeswith accesstobusinesswillbenefit. Informationtechnologywillenablecorporations,governments,orgroups tocoalescequicklytoformpoliticalandeconomicblocsinresponsetochange. Large,temporarysingleissuecoalitionswillbeabletocommunicateand organizeatboththemacroandmicrolevels.Unilateralactionsbyoutsideplayers
maybemorereadilyblockedordiverted,addingsignificantlytothenumberand typeofactorsthatwillbeabletoinfluencemilitaryoperations. IMPACTOFGLOBALIZATION. Thedegreetowhicheconomicglobalization willbesuccessfulandinclusiveisunclear.Successdependsonsustained developmenttheexpansionofacceptedrulesofinternationalcontract,property, andcivillawandtheequitabledistributionofeconomicresources.Much dependsonperceptionmanagementandpoliticaldecisionmaking.Increasingly, informationoperationswillbecomeparamountandpreeminentinall considerationsandplanning.Yet,failureofeconomicglobalizationmayresult fromanincreaseinregionalism,religiousradicalfundamentalism,orworldwide economicrecessionor depression. Increasedinterconnectivityinworldmarkets,whichconsequently affects localdecisionsandpolicies,mayhaveunintendedglobal consequences. The increasingcomplexityandspeedoftheglobaleconomicsystemandlimited resourcesandmarketswillgivemoresignificancetoeconomicandresource alliancesandblocs.Competingforaccesstomarketsandinfluencewill increasinglybecomeajointgovernancebusinessissue,whiletraditionalnational andinternationaleconomicmechanismswillbelesseffective. Changewillbe bettermanagedinthedevelopedcountries,butinsomedevelopingcountriesthe situationmaybecomesocomplexandvolatilethattraditionaleconomic assistancewillnotworkwithoutmajorpoliticalandsocialchangeandpossibly militaryintervention. Tensionsovermonetary,fiscal,environmental,trade,andsafetyand securityissueswillexistamongnationalgovernments,businesses,and internationalorganizations.Aggressivecapitalism,globalization,blatant consumerism,environmentalissues,andpublichealthwillexacerbatetensions andresultinablendingofrolesandresponsibilities.Businesswillacquiregreater leveragewithgovernmentsandinternationalorganizations,becauseitismore flexibleandhasmoreoptions.Corporationsmayformcoalitionstosupportor opposegovernance.Nationallyimportantbusinessesmayassumeagreaterrolein nationalsecuritydecisionmaking.Economicactionsinonelocalemayspark conflictinadistantlocale.Thesecurityforcesoflarge,multinational corporationswillbedefiniteconsiderationsfortheuseofmilitarypower.In addition,thedaywillcomewhen MNCswillpurchasecommercialintelligence andselloremploysurrogateormercenaryforcestoexertinfluenceandtowage conflict. Safetyandsecuritywillbeincreasinglyimportant,andindividuals, groups,corporations,andgovernancewillpayapremiumtohaveit.Securitywill beanexpandingbusiness,ascorporationsandgovernmentsoperateinhighrisk areaswithaconcomitantexpansionofsecurityrisks.Safetyconcernswill overridesomehumanrights,liberties,andprivacy.Industrialespionageandthe adventoflegitimatebusinessintelligencewillincreasetherequirementfor personnel,physical,andelectronicsecurity.Militaryforceswillhavetoexpend additionalresourceson computernetworkoperations(governmentandcorporate) andforceprotection,andtrain aspartnersormembersofacoalition withawider
varietyofmilitary,paramilitary,police,andgovernmentandprivatesecurity forces. Labormarketswillbeintransition.Thetransferofindustrytodeveloping countriescanbringprosperity,orthepromiseofit.Aspreviouslynoted,poolsof unskilledandskilledlaborwillcompeteforjobs,andworkerswillmigrateto affluentcountrieswhilejobsmigratetopoorcountries.Corporationsthatprovide benefitsandjobsecuritymaycommandmoreloyaltythangovernments.Industry willcontinuetomoveamongworkforcesbasedoncosteffectivenessandtheease ofrelocation.Technologywillfacilitatethismovement,allowinglesseducated andlessskilledworkersinunderdevelopedregionstoperformsimilarlytoskilled workersindevelopedlocations.Someregions,suchasEurope,haveanaging skilledworkforce,whileotherregions,suchasSouthAsia,haveayoung unskilledworkforcewithfewemploymentopportunities.Increasingly,the constantmigrationoflaborforcesamongcountriesandorganizationswillenable adversariestoimplantanduse,whenappropriate,sleepers,intelligencecollectors, deceivers,cutoutoperatives,anddirectactionpersonnel. IMPACTOFREGIONALISM. Regionalismcontributestothegrowthofthe globaleconomy. Itallowsindividuallyinsignificantnationstocooperateanddeal asasingleentityontheglobalstage.Thisfosterseconomicgrowththroughout theregionandacrosstheglobe. Rapidlygrowingaccesstoaffordable informationtechnologyandinformationencouragesregionalism.Itenables nationstodiscoveranddiscusscommonissuesanddevelopacoordinated approachtothoseissues.Globalizationwilltendtoacceleratethetrendof regionalism.Astheworldeconomybecomesincreasinglyinterdependent,the globalmarketplacebecomesbothmoreaccessibleandmorecompetitive. The small,independentplayerrisksbecomingmarginalized.Smallernationswill recognizethattheycannotactalone.Theywilltendtoformeconomic relationshipswithintheirregionthatallowtheregiontodealcollectivelywith alliesandcompetitors. Regionalismrequiresandpromotesstability. Often,whenconfrontedwith internalunrestorexternalthreats,anationorgroupofnationscannotadequately focusresourcesonsolvingeconomicorsocialissues.When regionalismtakes hold,itfostersstability.Themorefacetsofregionalismbindtogetheraregion, themorethosebondswillworktoencouragecontinuedstability. Regionalism mitigatesconflict.Focusedoninternalcooperation,regionscandeal withawide rangeofethnic,resourcesharing,demographic,social,andenvironmentalissues thathistoricallyleadtocompetitionandpotentialconflict. SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY,ANDENGINEERING Thekeystrategicimplicationsof science,technologyandengineering(ST&E) willbeshapedbyanddependentonitsglobalavailability.Culturewillhaveagreat influenceonST&Eandviceversaasdifferentculturesdevelop,adopt,andexploit technologyindifferentways.EconomicsandotherfactorswillinfluenceST&Easwell becausemanykeydevelopmentsandbreakthroughswilloccurcommercially. For 24. example,worldwidegovernmentR&Dspendingisdroppingsignificantly.
Increasingly,offshoremanufacturingwilloutstripU.S.domesticmanufacturing. The nextkeytechnologyisunknown,(seeFigure6) butthereisnoguaranteethatitwillbe discoveredorexploitedintheU.S.Thus,militaryscientistsandresearcherswillhaveto havepervasive,sustained,andtrustingrelationshipswiththecommercialsector,athome andabroad.

Machine Machine Research Miniaturization BioInspired Intelligence Capabilities requires Hyperspectral consistent Neuro Sensors science effortand Comms resources.It Molecular Electronics cannotbe Offshore/ Science, Manufacturing turnedonand Technology& Weather Ubiquitous off Prediction Globally Engineering effectivelyor inatimely Multi functional manner. Materials&Structures Mega Thereis Engineering concernthat Nano Human TechnologyDevelopment structured thevagaries Engineering CommercialviceGovernment Materials ofU.S. government Figure6.PotentialST&EDevelopments funding couldput researchat risk.Increasingly,manyof thebestandbrightestadvancedscienceandengineering studentsattendingU.S.universitiesareforeigners,withthenumberofengineeringfull timegraduatestudentswithoutU.S.citizenshipactuallyexceedingU.S.engineering 25 graduatestudents. Mostofthesestudentsreturnhomeatthecompletionoftheir studies.TheU.S.stillleadsothercountriesinR&Dbut70percentofworldR&Dis conductedoutsidetheU.S.,andtheshareofU.S.R&Dintheworldisonadownward 26 trend. WhilenotnecessarilyportendingabraindraininU.S.knowhow,offshore capabilitieswillincrease,oftenapproachingthoseoftheU.S. Forexample,accordingto theAmericanAcademyfortheAdvancementofScience,ChinahasincreaseditsR&D investmentsdramaticallyinrecentyearsandisnowthethirdlargestinvestorinR&D (adjustedforpurchasingpower),behindonlyJapanandtheU.S. Thepaceofglobalrevolutioninscience,technology,andengineering(ST&E) developmentisexpectedtoaccelerateduringthenexttwodecades.Thisrapidrateof changewillremainthehallmarkofST&Efortheforeseeablefutureasinnovative discoverycontinueswithinallscientificfields.TheST&Eworldcanbedividedintofive majorsubjectareas:biologicalsystemsmachinesandcomputersinformation, knowledge,andcommunicationsenergyandenvironment.Thesediscussionareasare broad,butinmanycases,theconnectionsorfaultlinesbetweenthemholdthemost interestinginsightsforamilitaryforcethatisanticipatingthefutureoperational environment.
Trends,Drivers,andImplications AdvancesinST&Ewillprovidesignificantimprovementstomanyaspectsof futurelife. Thingswillbesmaller,lighter,smarter,faster,cheaper,stronger,and moreefficientthanthey aretoday.Multifunctionalmaterialsandstructureswill becomeincreasinglyimportant.Nanostructured, orverysmallscalestructured, materialswillhelpdrivemanyofthesedevelopments. Similarly,thescaleof electronicswillbealtered.Molecularelectronics,usingmoleculestoperform functionsofelectriccircuits,isadirectionthatwillimprovecomputational capabilities.Thesmallsizeandpotentiallyeasyproductionoftheseextremely smallmaterialsandprocesseswillleadtofasterandcheapertools. Whilethereis atrendtowardsmallerthings,therecontinuessimultaneouslytobeactivityatthe oppositeendofthescale. Megaengineeringextremelylargescaleprojects willoccurinthoseregionsoftheworldwhereenoughcapitalandcapabilitycan bebroughttobearonproblems.TheThreeGorgesDaminChinaisagood exampleof suchalargesystem. Whilethisscaleofprojectislikelytocontinue,it maybecomelimitedtoareaswherealternativesolutionsareunavailable.For example,thecombinationofwaterconservationandalternativesourcesofwater (perhapsdesalinization),combinedwiththeabilitytomakeuseofseawater (perhapsforirrigatinggeneticallyalteredplants),willlessentheneedforlarger waterprojects. Thiscouldhavedirectmilitaryimpactbecausethepotentialfora conflictstemmingfromacompetitionforscarceresourceswouldlikelybe reduced.Inotherareas,swarmsofextremelysmallmachinesmaydothework currentlydoneonaverylargescale,suchasminingorremotesensing. BIOLOGICALSYSTEMS. Biologywillcontinuetobeanimportantareaof analysiswithintheST&Eworld. Biologicalsystemsandprocesseswillinspire sensors,manufacturing,andselfmodifyingdiseases,andwill geneticallymodify crops, animalsandpeople. Bioinformaticswillbegintoharnessbiological processestocontinuetherapidgrowthininformationtechnologies.Human capabilitiesandknowledge(health,strength,andcognition)willbeenhancedand improvedinmanyways. Asmedicalscienceadvances,itwillbecome increasinglyeasytoselectthesexandcharacteristicsofbabies.Thismaybe desirableinsomesocieties,asinChinatoday,andmayresultinarelative shortageofwomen. Human engineeringwillalterthewaypeoplewillbeabletothinkandact. Thosewhobenefitfromitwilllivelonger,healthierliveswithmuchgreater potentialtoprovidemeaningfulcontributionstosociety. Theconverse,though, maybedevastating:theshallownessofperspectivebasedonoverrelianceof technologycouldresultinbraindrainandtheerosionofintellectualcapital. Moreover,manyentitieswilluseadvancesintechnologytoseekenhancements thatcan eventually leadtosuperhumanstrengths,cognition,andsenses,while degradingundesirablehuman traits(suchassympathy,emotion,andlove). Someactorswillusethatbiological knowledgeanditspotential powerto doharm.Theprospectsfordesignerbiological(andchemical)warfareagents grow witheachadvanceinthebiologicalsciences.Theabilitytoenhancehuman performanceoralterhumanbehaviorwillbeavailabletoanyindividualorgroup
27 withthefinancialandmentalcapitaltoexploitit. Givenaccesstothescience andtechnologyofbioweaponsontheglobalinformationgrid,itisconceivable thatBioterroristscanproducesignificantamountsofbiologicalagentswith nothingmoresophisticatedthanakitchensinklaboratory. Fortheforeseeable future,theabilitytoproduceagentsfaroutstripstheabilitytodetectthem. Neuroscience,thestudyofhowthehumanbrainprocessesandanalyzes, willcontributetohumancognitionandhealth.Therewillbeagrowthin understandingthebiochemistryofthecellmembraneandhowinformationis receivedandprocessed.Understandinghowinformationisorganizedforuseand storageinbrains(humanandmachineCPUs)willalsoleadtocognitive improvementsofhumanandmachine.
MACHINESANDCOMPUTERS. By20202030machineintelligenceand capabilitiescouldsurpasshumancapabilities.Roboticswillplayanincreasing roleinbusiness,personalactivities,andmilitary affairs. Militarily,robotic swarmswillbecomemoreprevalentaspotentialadversariestakeadvantageof nownascentthinkinganddevelopmentsinminiaturization. Emerging technologieswillcontinuetosupportorsurpassMooresLawofcomputing power(datadensitywilldoubleapproximatelyevery18months),sincethe increasingrateofchangeintechnologyisacriticalfuturetrend.28 Molecular, biological,optical,andeventuallyquantumcomputingwilleventuallystartto replacesiliconbasedintegratedcircuits.Quantumcryptographymaybeavailable withinthenext20years,therebyallowingunbreakablecodestobedevelopedfor massuse.Broadlyspeaking,inthe2030plustimeframe,humanswillbe inextricablylinkedandinsomecasesitwillbeimpossibletodifferentiate betweenmanandmachine.Thisphenomenonwillbeasrealforfriendasforfoe. INFORMATION,KNOWLEDGE,ANDCOMMUNICATIONS. The information,knowledge,andcommunicationsrevolutionwillcontinueto accelerate.Therewillbeteleeverything:teleconferencing,shopping,work, school,andplay.Thelimitsofsiliconbasedprocessingwillbesurpassedby othermaterialsandmethods. Itiseven conceivablethatteleeverythingcouldbe surpassedbyextraordinarysensing,awareness,and,insomecases,machine enhancedextrasensoryperceptionandtelepathyundervariousforumsof performance. Pervasiveinformation,combinedwithlowercostsformany advancedtechnologies,willresultinindividualsandsmallgroupshavingthe abilitytobecomesuperempowered. Theywillemploynichetechnology (WME,forexample)capableofdefeatingkeysystemsandprovidinginexpensive countermeasurestocostlysystems. Thesesuperempoweredpeopleorgroupswillhaveamagnifiedabilityto dobothgoodandevil.Therewillbeagreaterprobabilitythattruedemocracycan flourishinareasthatmakethebestuseofavailabletechnologicalopportunities. Concurrently,someindividualsorgroupswillhavetheabilitytoexertgreater influencethanothers.Timeanddistanceconstraintswillbecomelargely insignificant.Superempoweredgroupswillbeabletoplan,execute,receive feedback,andmodifytheiractions,allwithmaximumsynchronization.
Communicationslinks,enabledbywirelessandbroadbandtechnologyand connectedthroughvastandcomplexnetworks,willcontinuetogrow.These integrated,interdependentsystemswillprovidemuchoftheexpandedlevelof availableknowledge.Indeed,informationwebswillcreategreatercombined intellectualpower.Thecollaborativeinformationenvironment(CIE)enhanced collectivebrainwill cometogetheranddisbandbasedonneed.Hundredsof mindsenhancedbytechnologyandworkingasonewillfaroutdistance individualgeniuses. Theseconnections,moreoftenelectronicorremote,but occurringalsoatapersonallevel,willimprovehowpeoplerelatetoeachother. Whileculturalbiaseswillremain,therelikely willbemuchmoreandeffective communication. Forexample,automatedlanguagetranslatorswillbecomethe normfirstofwrittenelectroniccommunications,andshortlythereafter,direct oraltranslationsbetweenpeople. Thecomplexityofinformationsystemshasacontinuumof risksand strengths,however. Morewebscreategreatercombinedintellectualpower,but theyalsocreatemoreinterdependenciesandthereforemorevulnerability.Indeed, astheU.S.militarytransitionstoandbecomesdependentonnetworkcentric operations,thecomplexity of futurenetworksandinteractivesystemsofsystems willbringoutinherentrisksassociatedwiththelossofinformationonthe network.Suchlosscouldoccurthroughsystemfailure,suchasphysical disruptionofakeynodeorhumanerror.Informationonthenetworkcouldbe modified(possiblywithmaliciouscode)orsensorsandprocessorscouldbe overwhelmedwithdatainput.Presentingmoretargetsinashorttimethancould becounteredwouldalsoposeasignificantthreat. When anetworkisstressedin onearea,thereisgreaterpotentialforwidespreadcascadingeffects,notalwaysin expectedareas. Informationreliabilitybecomescrucialtoanorganization thatis dependentonitforsurvival. Theinterconnectednessoftheworldandtheempowermentofcertain individualsandgroupswillleadtoadesirebysometoinfluenceeventsanda growingbeliefthatpeoplecanaffectanything.Thisbelief,accentuatedby collectiveintellectandman/machinesymbiosis,couldleadtoanew,virulent strainofuncontrolledaggressiveintellectualbehavior,indeed,competition.This isthepsychologicalnexusthattechnologyhaswith thehumanmind. Attimes, andperhapsatalltimes,thiswillbeseeninwarfare.Boundariesofwhatis acceptableinwarfarewillcontinuetoblur.Adversarieswillseekvulnerabilities ininformation systems someunrelatedtomilitaryuse,andexploitthemwith devastatingresults.Swarmsofmicrosize,networkedmachinesmaybeusedto perform intelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissance(ISR) operations,andmay beusedforphysicaldestructionordisablingofanopponentsequipment. Informationwillbecome,essentially,theallyofallwhohavethe capabilityandintenttouseorexploitit.Astheworldembracesinformationage technology,theavailabilityandabilitytomanipulateinformationwillimprove. Bothmilitaryandcivilianapplicationswilloccurmorequicklyandmore effectively.Informationtechnologywillenablequickerandmoresituational militaryactionsorevenchangethenatureofwarassystems,notpeople,are
attackedanddestroyed. Consequently,informationoperationswillincreasein importanceforfriend,foe,andneutral alike. Modelsandsimulationswillbepervasiveandprovidefarmoreaccurate portrayalsofrealitythanpreviouslyachieved. Gamesinsyntheticenvironments withavatarsactingasadversarieswillbecomemoreimportantfortraining, education,andinteractivewargaming. Modelsandsimulationswillbe increasinglysensitivetoinitialconditionsanddetailsembeddedwithinthem. Networksandnetworkcentricity willbefundamental tofutureconflict.Networks willincreaseincomplexity,pervasiveness,effectiveness,anddensity/layering,for example,expandingandcontractingpushandpullmethodologiestoandfrom communitiesofinterest(COI)andcommunitiesofpractice(COP).Theuseof electronicdatawillincrease,andthatsamedatawillbevulnerabletoattack, destruction,manipulation,oralteration/corruption. ENERGY. Alternativeenergysourceswillbecomemoreprevalent.Hydrogen, variousformsofatomicenergy,andhybridsystemscouldpotentially somewhat lessenrelianceonfossilfuels.Asaresult,longmilitarylogistictailswould shorten.Combatforceswouldbeabletooperateforextendedperiodswithout beingtotallyreliantonsupportunits.Sensorsandsystemswill havelonger rangesandgreaterpersistence,poweredbyderivativesofalternateenergysources thatreplaceorenhancecurrentbatterytechnology. Systemsthatcankillwill havegreaterlethality on,above,orundereveryenvironment:land,sea,air,or space. ENVIRONMENT. Earthscienceswillbecapableofmuchbetterunderstanding ofallenvironments,includingland,sea,air,andspace. Moreaccurateprediction ofweatherandgeologicphenomenawillaidinplanningeverythingfromphysical structures topersonaltime.However,theincreasingdensityoftheworlds populationaswellasurbanizationanddevelopmentofeconomicinfrastructure willincreasetheimpactofnaturaldisasterssuchasearthquakes,hurricanes,and tsunamis. WEAPONSOFMASSEFFECT. Fortheforeseeablefuture,itappearsthattheexisting triadofnuclear,biological,andchemicalweaponswillremainthecapabilitiesofchoicein regardtoweaponsofmassdestructionandmasseffect.Ofthethree,nuclearappearstobe themosteffectiveintermsofitsabilitytokillanddestroyinfrastructurewithoneweapon. Biologicalweaponsmaybeconsideredthemostchallenging,inthattheyarecheaplyand easilyproduced,easilytransportedanddispersed,bothphysicallyandpsychologically effective,andtheirearlydetectionisproblematic.Chemicalmaybecomethemost commonandreadilyavailableWMD/E,asmanyindustrialchemicalscanhavetoxic effectsifmisused,intentionallyornot. ThefutureofWMD/Ecanbeseennotonlyintheadvancedtechnologyofweapons development,butalsointheapplicationofdualusetechnologiesandinnovativeuseof existingandemergingtechnologiestoproduceWMD/Elikeeffects.Anticipatedand potentialadvancedtechnologiesinclude:
Bioengineeredweapons.Futurebioagentswillbemorevirulent.Bio engineeringwillallowbioweaponstobetailoredtowardspecifictargetsand groupsoftargets.Theglobalizationoftheworldmarketoffersnumerous vectorsfortheeffectivespreadofbioagents,whichcanhaveanimmediate impactorbetailoredtoremaindormantforaspecifiedtime.Thelikelihoodof bioweaponstargetedagainstmaterialsoil,rubber,metalsmustalsobe considered. ChemicalAgents.Developmentofchemicalagentscontinues,withtheaimto penetrate/defeatourprotectivegear,whichistailoredtoprotectagainstgasand liquidagents. st nd NuclearWeapons.1 and2 generationtechnologiesarereadilyavailableand requiredmaterialsareabundant.ResearchcontinuestoincreaseEMPeffects, improveefficiencyoftheconversiontoenergy,explorealternativefuelsources, andinvestigatethepotentialofantimatterasanenergysourceand/orweapon. DirectedEnergy.Thenext25yearswillseedirectedenergyweaponsbecome areality.DEwillbedevelopedtotargetbothpeopleandmaterials.US dependenceonelectronicsandelectronicnetworkscanmakeDEaneffective WMD/E. Nanotechnology.Whilenanohasthepotentialfordevelopmentofweaponsin itsownright, theuseofnanotechnologyincombinationwithchemical, biological,nuclear,andradiologicalcapabilitiesisperhapsitsgreatestthreat. Nanocanfacilitateproduction,concealment,deliveryandactivationofthese moreconventionalthreats,therebyenhancingtheireffectivenessasWMD/E. Geophysicalweapons.Muchofourenvironmentcanbeexploitedtoproduce masseffectsequivalenttoaconventionalWMD/E.Therewillbetechnological advancesthatcanstimulateand/orenhancenaturaldisasterssuch as earthquakesanddegradetheenvironmentbydeliberatelyacceleratingglobal warming.Manmadeinfrastructure largedams,bridges,etc. canbeattacked tomimictheeffectsofanaturaldisaster. Thehumanbrain.Technologieswillbedevelopedthatcanworkdirectlyon thehumanbrain,causingawidevarietyofeffectsrangingfromimmediate deathtomindcontroltobenignbehaviormodification.
SECTION4JOEIMPLICATIONSFORCONSIDERATION
Havingdescribedthevariablesthatdefinetheoperationalenvironmentand discussedthetrendsthatwill workuponthosevariables,wecannowconsiderthe implicationsofthoseonthefutureoperationalenvironment. Theiterativenatureofthe JOEdictatesthatimplicationswillchangeascircumstancesorvariableschange.This sectionintroducesbothgeneralandspecificimplicationsanddemonstratestheirpotential impactontheoperationalenvironmentofthefuture. Thesefactorswillhelpshape conceptdevelopmentandexperimentationandguidethedevelopmentofspecific
scenariosandsituationsthatwillchallengethefutureforce.Whileneitherinclusivenorin depth,thesebroadimplicationsserveasaconceptualframeworkforfurtherdiscussion. Thenearinfinitevariationsthatresultfromtheinteractionofthesetrendsandvariables uponeachotherensureawiderangeofpotentialfutureenvironmentsforexperimentation eventsthatsupportconceptdevelopment,yetconstrainthesealternativefuturesintothe realmofrealisticandsupportablerealities.AppendicesA(ImpactonUSNational SecurityStrategy)andB(ImpactonAdversaryStrategicDesign)addressthewaysin whichthefutureoperationalenvironmentmay influencethenationalsecuritystrategies ofbothourselvesandanarrayofpotentialadversaries. UNDERSTANDINGTHENATUREOFFUTURECONFLICT TheJointStaff CapstoneConceptforJointOperations(CCJO)istheoverarching conceptofthefamilyofjointconceptsthatguidesthedevelopmentoffuturejoint capabilities.ManyoftheseconceptsarequitedifferentfromwhatU.S.militaryforces haveexperiencedinthepast. Themilitaryestablishmentmustunderstandwhatthese conceptsmeanandwhattheyimplyforthenewAmericanWayofWar. NoSanctuary Nosanctuarieswillexistanywhere. AttackswilloccurinCONUS, againstmilitaryinstallations,linesofcommunication(LOC),seaportsof embarkation(SPOE),andaerialportsofembarkation(APOE),aswellas command,control,communications,computers,intelligence,surveillanceand reconnaissance(C4ISR)facilitiesonandoffbase.Asymmetricattackswilloccur atmultiplelocationswithavarietyofweaponsincludingWME,nonlethal weapons(NLW),andinparticularIO. Nosanctuarymeansthatawarenessand trainingparadigmsmustchangetoincludemilitaryfamilies,keycivilian knowledgeworkers,andownersofcriticalinfrastructurethatsupportDODbases andlinesofcommunications.Suchtrainingalsoincludeslocallawenforcement officialsandorganizations,andstateandlocalofficialswhooperateemergency operationscenters(EOC). GlobalBattlespace Operationswilloccuraroundtheworldatmultiplelocations simultaneously.AsymmetricadversarieswillattackfriendlyforcesandtheU.S. militarywillbetakingthefighttothemaroundtheworldandinalldomainsair, ground,sea,space,andinformation.Fromamacroperspective,themilitaryhas tobroadenitsoutlookofmodernconflicttoonethatismoreholisticandinclusive ofallelementsofnationalandorganizationalpower.Specifically,itmustlearn howtomanagemanyfightssomeinCONUS,someoutside,sometangible, someintangible,acrossmultipledomainsatdifferentlocations,in both spaceand cyberspace. DomainSimultaneity Eventswillnotoccurinisolation exceptforapurpose,suchasdeception. Instead,eventswilloccurinmultiplelocationsacrossmultipledomains(air, ground,sea,space,andinformation)atsynchronizedtimestocreatethegreatest
tangibleandintangiblesecondandthirdordereffects.TheUnitedStatesmust prepareitsleaders,commandandcontrolapparatus,andorganizationsto withstandthesimultaneousassaultofmultipledomainsatmultiplelocations aroundtheworld.TheU.S.militarymustwargamesucheffects,acknowledge complexenvironmentsandhighlycapable,adaptivethreats,andformhypotheses abouttheirsuccess.Italsomustidentifythemosteffectiveuseoftraditionaland nontraditionalinformationcollectiontoconfirmordenythesehypotheses. Regionalism Whilesomemayseeregionalismasathreattocertainaspectsof nationalism,culture,andethnicity,regionalismisinevitableand,ifmanaged properly,beneficial. Thepresumptionthatregionalismrequiresstability internaltoindividualnationsandamongthosenationsisanindicatorofthat benefit.Onlyafterthatstabilityhasbeenachievedcanseparatenationsbeginto cooperateasasingleregionalentity. Anytrendtowardregionalism canbeexpected tobeaccompaniedbya complementarytrendtowardstability. Thisstabilitythenallowsregionalismto developinregardtotheregionseconomichealthandprosperity.Interactingin theglobaleconomyasamajorplayerenablesaneconomyofscalenotavailable tosmallerindividualparties.Theregionisabletonegotiateforhigherpricesfor itsgoodsandserviceswhilecontrollingthecostofcommoditiesitneedsfrom others.Thisencouragesahealthyglobaleconomywhosecontinuedgrowththe globalsecurityenvironment. Althoughregionalismmayencompassthedevelopmentofaregional militaryorganization,thesamefactorsthatmotivatearegionalapproachto economicandsocialdevelopment,servetoconstraintheemploymentofthat militarypower.Aregionbasedmilitarycapabilitywouldenhanceinternal stabilitywhiledeterringexternalthreats. Thestabilityandeconomicgrowthresultingfromregionalismwillalso enhancesocialharmonyandoverallqualityoflife.Highereducationand meaningfulemploymentwilldiminishmany ofthecausesunderlyingsocial conflictandunrest. Cooperationinthemanagementandexploitationofregional resourcescanmitigatethecompetitionthatoftenleadstoconflict.Italsoresults inmoreefficientandeffectiveapproachestowardsocial andenvironmentalissues thatspaninternationalborders. Thephenomenonofnationsandotherentitiesgroupingtogethertofulfill commonobjectivesandaddresscommonissuesisnotwholly dependentupon geographiclocation.Whenthegeographicfacetisabsent, thesegroupingswillbe referredtoascommunitiesofinterest.EnabledlargelybytheInternetandother informationtechnologies,thecommunitiesofinterestaremotivatedbysimilar goalsandcangainsomeofthesameadvantagesintheireconomic,political,and socialinteractionswiththeinternationalcommunity. Currenteconomictrendspredictagrowinggapbetween therichandpoor. Regionalismandglobalizationcanmitigatethistrend.Affordableinformation technologyandreadyaccesstotheinformationdomainareneededtorealizethe
potentialbenefitsofaglobalization,regionalism,andtheglobalmarketplace. Itis clearlytotheadvantageofthedevelopedworldtoincreaseparticipationinthe globaleconomyandfosterprosperitythroughout.Thebenefitsofregionalism stability,prosperity,andsocialharmonymayapplyonaglobalscale. RigorofNonlinear,DistributedBattlespace Whenconceptwritersdiscussnonlinearbattlespace,theyarereferringto operationsincomplexenvironments.Incomplexenvironments,multiple interactionsconstantlyoccurandeffectsofactionsoftenoccurnotonlyrapidly butexponentially.Inacomplexoperationalenvironment,someofthesmallest activitiesandinteractionscausethelargesteffects.Noactivityissubjectto successfulprediction.Instead,outcomeswillbepossibilities(potentialities unboundbyconstraint)thatundergoconfirmationordenialprocesses. Relationshipswillbecriticalbutoftenunfathomabletothehumanmindand, withouttheaidofveryfastcomputers,difficulttofind.Thebroadimplication hereisthatpeopleandorganizationsmuststudyandunderstandcomplexity theoryandapplyittotheirthinking,planning,anddecisionmaking. PervasivenessandInfluenceofNetworks Networksandnetworkcentricoperationswilldominatefutureconflict. Networkcentricisapersonalandorganizationalphilosophyinwhichdecisions aredecentralizedattheedgeofthenetworkknowledgetomakedecisionsis extremelyimportantforholdingriskandsecondandthirdordereffectstoa manageablelevelthenetworkoffersnewwaysofmaneuveringandthenetwork becomesselfsynchronizingandselfhealing.Thesecharacteristicsimplystrong intellectsandstrengthof characterforpeoplemakingdecentralizeddecisions. Thecharacteristicsalsosuggesttheabsoluteneedforpeople,computers,and networkstoprovidethevaluabledata,information,andknowledgeformaking fast,effectivedecisions.Thebroadimplicationisthatthenetworkiscentralto anynotionoffutureconflict.Withthisthoughtinmind,peoplemustthink throughthenotionofthenetworkandnetworkcentricoperations,explainthemin conceptualwork,experimentwiththem,andprovideconclusionstoemergent doctrine. ImportanceofKnowledge Knowledgeiscriticalformakingdecisionsfasterandbetterthanthe adversaryandforsustainingtheadvantageof knowledgeanddecisiondominance. But,becauseitfacessmart,adaptive,learningadversaries,theU.S.military must understandthattheconditionsofsuperiorityanddominancewillbeseverelyand continuouslycontested.Adversarieswill wageaknowledgewarovervaluable knowledgephysicallyandincyberspace. Theprincipaltooltowage thiswar willbeIO.TheUnitedStatesmustincorporateknowledgewarintoitsthinking, lexicon,doctrine,andtraining.Simulationandmodelingmustchangeto representtheinformationdomainandknowledgeenvironmentsandarchitecture inbothtrainingandmissionrehearsals.
Adversarieswillhaveincreasinglyuniformaccesstovaluabledata, information,andknowledge.Someofthisinformationandknowledgewillcome fromcollectionoperations somewillcomefromopensourcessuchastelevision newsandopensourcedatabases.Perhapsthemostdifficultaspectofinformation tocontrolwillbecommercialintelligence.Alongwiththesaleofhighquality imagery,therewillbeincreasinggrowthincommercial HUMINT,measurement andsignatureintelligence(MASINT),andSIGINT.Adversarieswillalsouse commercialknowledgeorintelligenceanalysisincludingknowledgeproduct researchandpackaging.Inaddition,therewillbeaplethoraofcommercial businessintelligencetoolsanddatabasesavailablefromtheInternet.The processorsanddatabasesneededtoengageindataminingandtheveryquick productionoftrends,relationships,andplacesofinterestcontainedinavailable data,information,andknowledgewillbeforsaletoanyone.TheU.S.military musttraintooperateinanenvironmentinwhichitsadversarieshaveaccessto highgradeandtimelydata,information,andknowledgesuchasthatlistedabove. Militarytrainersandeducatorshavetoreplicatesuchadversarieswiththeirintent, money,andaccesstovaluabledata,information,andknowledge.The informationrichenvironmentthattheJOEportraystrulylevelstheplayingfield ofinformation.Withequalityofinformation,theadvantagewilloftengotothe sidemakingthebestuseofinformationtomakefasterandbetterdecisions.
CultureMatters Throughouthistory,theUnitedStateshasacknowledgedtheimportanceof cultureinvaryingdegrees.Havinglostsignificantgroundin theclashofcultures inrecentyears,however,theU.S.findsitself attemptingtocatchup.This involvesacquiringsufficientsubjectmatterexpertiseandintellectualcapital, gatheringinformationregardingthespecificsituation,developingtheconcepts andplanstoeffectivelygaintheinitiative,amassingrequiredresources,and implementingplans.EvolvingU.S.jointoperationsdoctrinepositsanational levelcampaign thatfocusesnationalcapabilitiesdiplomatic,economic, information,andmilitarytowardaverting,deterring,andifnecessarywinning futureconflicts.Onceengaged,theUnitedStates mustconsiderthepolitical, economic,legal,military,andterritorialaspectsoftheadversaryscapability.Itis nowclearthataculturalelementmusttakeitsplaceintheequation. Fortheforeseeablefuture theUnitedStatesisquitecapableofdealing withthemilitaryandterritorialchallengesofaconflict. Ithasboththeexperience andtheresourcestodefeatanymilitaryopponent. Ithasalsowieldeddiplomatic andeconomicpowertoinfluenceanadversaryspoliticalandeconomicsystems. Thechallengenowistorelearntheskillofwinningtheculturalcomponentofa campaign. Asuccessfulcampaignwilldefeatboththeadversaryswillandhis capabilitytocontinuetheconflict.Ofthetwo,thewillisfarmoreimportantin termsofpostconflictstability.Theculturalaspectofasocietywillbekeyin dealingwiththeadversaryswilltocontinuetheconflict. DONOHARM. TheUnitedStatesmustapproachthecultural dimension intwoways.Asaphysiciansfirstruleistodonoharm,theUnitedStates
mustfirstinform itsownactionsandbehaviortoavoidfuelingtheadversarys willtofight.Thisrequiresculturalawarenessatalllevels,fromtheindividual soldierinteractingwiththepopulace,tothefiresupportofficerselectingtargets, tothecommanderformulatinghisintent,tothenationalleadershipsettingpolicy. Thisisarelativelysimplematteroftrainingandeducationcombinedwith growingexperience. INFLUENCETHECULTURE. Thesecondaspectappearsmuchmore challenging.Howcan aculturebeinfluencedtoconformtoadesiredbehavior andcreateafavorableperceptionof American efforts?Toimpactan adversarys willandperceptions,theUnitedStatesmustbeabletoappealtoorneutralizehis emotions,whileinforminghiscognition.Thisrequiresrecognizingthose elementsofaculturethatcanbemanipulated,learninghowtodothat manipulation,andbeingabletopredicttheresultofthatmanipulationwithsome degreeofconfidence. Thereisadual cultural pathwayforfuturesuccess: Developtheculturalsubjectmatterexpertisethroughacombinationofin housetraining,outsidesubjectmatterexperts,andaccesstocentersof excellence. DeveloptheculturalaspectsofemergingJointoperationalconcepts.How doescultureaffecttheway oneplans,conducts,andtransitionsfrom operations?Howdoes oneinfluenceculturetosupportplans,operations, andtransitionfromconflict? HighRiskSecondandThirdOrderEffects Alldecisionmakingwillinvolveriskandpossiblesecondandthirdorder effects.Whencontemplatingactivitiesattheoperational,strategic,andgrand strategic(nationalpolicy)levels,risksarehigherandpossibleoutcomesof secondandthirdordereffectsgreaterthanatthetacticallevel.Thus, knowledgeproducingorganizationsandknowledgeexpertswillhavetoprovide highgradeinformationandknowledgetodecisionmakerstohelpthemkeeprisk andsecondandthirdordereffectsatmanageablelevels.Redesigningtraining eventstoputfutureleadersintosuchenvironmentsisessential.Suchtraining environmentsneedtoprovideconstantly complex,dynamicchallengestohelp participantslearnfromtheirmistakes. EffectsBasedPlans,Operations,andAssessment Becauseofthecomplexityofsocieties,organizations,andthecontinuing effectsofglobalization,antagonistswillbeeffectsbasedintheirpatternof operations.Effectsbasedoperationsviewtheadversaryascomplex,interrelated systemsandadvocatetheuseofallelementsofavailablepowertocreateactions leadingtodesiredeffectsonthosesystems. TheUnitedStates,forexample,seeks tousediplomatic,information,military,andeconomicactivitiestocreateeffects inanadversaryspolitical,military,economic,social,information,and infrastructuresystems. ThemilitarydominanceoftheUnitedStatesanditslikelyallieswillforce manypotentialadversariestoconsideralternativestoconventional warfare. Readyaccesstoinformationtechnologieswillempowermilitarilyinsignificant
adversariestogaintheknowledgetoapplyaneffectsbasedapproachtowardany conflictwiththeUnitedStates.Wecananticipateany adversarywillattackour systemswithwhateverdegreeofsophisticationheiscapableof.TheUnited Statessystemsareparticularlysusceptibletothisapproach.Thissusceptibility derivesfrom thecomplexinteractionsandinterdependenciesofinfrastructureand otherelementsofnationalpower,complexdistributionsystems,thevagariesof globalization,andtheubiquitousnatureofdata,information,andknowledge. Assuch,thefutureoperationalenvironmentwillencompassnotjustour military,buttheUnitedStateshomelandinfrastructureandthepolitical, economic,social,andinformationsystemsthatformthebasisforournational power. Afullscaleeffectbasedconflictwithanearpeercompetitorwould requireahighdegreeofknowledgetobothcreateeffectsintheadversarys systemsanddefendourownsystemsfromasophisticatedattack. Eventheleastsophisticatedadversarywillrecognizethebenefitofan effectbasedapproach.Whileheknowshecannotstanduptoanddefeatthe UnitedStatesmilitary,theadversary canselecttargetsthathebelieveswillerode nationalwillandattackcriticalnodesinthosesystemsvitaltosupportour military operations.Overtime,hehopes,aseriesofsuchattacksmaycreatethe desiredeffectUnitedStateswithdrawal withouthavingtodefeatourmilitary.
WeaponsofMassEffect TheS&Ttrendsdiscussedearlierwillcombinewiththeothertrends mentionedinregardtoglobalization,informationaccess,demographics,and economicstoproduceconditionswheretheuseofWMD/WMEagainsttheUS andouralliesisnotonlypossible,butincreasinglylikely.Theimplicationsof thesetrendsassciencemesheswitheconomicambitionanddemographic pressuresincludethefollowing: Dualusetechnologies.Manyofthefuturetechnologiesdiscussedarebeing developedundertheauspicesoflegitimateprogramswithbeneficialoutputs. Nuclearenergy,bioengineeringofvaccines,chemicalfertilizersandpest controlareallnecessaryforcontinuedsocialandeconomicwellbeing. However,itisarelativelysmallsteptoturnthesetechnologiestowardthe developmentofweaponswithapotentialforWMDand/orWME.Itisprobable thatnumeroussuchprogramscurrentlybeingpursuedthroughouttheworldare concurrentlyservingasacoverforresearchintoanddevelopmentofarangeof WMD/E.Biolabsespeciallyhaveasmallfootprintandtheirdualusenature makesdetectionofabioweaponsprogramparticularlychallenging. ProliferationofWMD/Erelatedtechnologies. Theinformationageand nearuniversalaccesstotheinternethavemadethetechnologiesandprocesses ofdevelopingWMDreadilyavailabletopotentialadversaries.Theknowledge istherefortheaskingallthatremainsisthecapabilitytoputthatknowledgeto use.Whileimplementinganuclearweaponsprogramisstillrelatively
expensiveandtechnicallychallenging,manybiologicalandchemicalagentscan beeasilyandcheaplyproducedinakitchensinklaboratory. UncontrolledWMDmaterials.Potentialweaponsgradenuclearmaterialis abundant,poorlycontrolled,andinsufficientlysecured.Thisrangesfromactual warheadsintheformerSovietUniontospentnuclearfuelstoredthroughoutthe world.Muchmoremaybeproducedin thefutureundertheguiseofnuclear energyprograms.Thismaterialisatriskfromcriminalsseekingtostealand sellit,potentiallyhostilestatesandnonstateentitiesacquiringsuchmaterials eitheropenlyorcovertly,regimechangeinnationshavinganuclearweapons and/orenergycapability,ornationsopenlydevelopingthecapabilityas essentialtotheirnationalsecurity.Thoughthereareprotocolsattemptingto controlnuclearsubstancesandtechnologies,nosuchconventionsexistformuch ofthematerialnecessarytodevelopandproducebiologicaland/orchemical weaponsandweaponsofmassdestruction/effect. Innovativeuseofemergingtechnologies.Itcanbesaidthatevery technologicaladvanceultimatelyresultsinanewweapon.Inmany casessuch astheManhattanProject theweaponitselfisthedriverbehindthetechnology. Nanotechnology,swarming,andbioengineeringareareasbeingpursuedby manyentitiesthroughouttheworld,mostwiththebestofintentions.However, each ofthesetechnologieshasalsobeenthesubjectofatleastonenovel(e.g. MolecularNanotechnologyinMichaelCrichtonsThePrey.)exploringtheir usesasaweapon.Forthefuture,wecanassumethatasatechnologymatures, someonewillfindawaytoapplyitasaweapon. Combiningtechnologies. Inthestudyofwarfare,wehavecometoacceptthe factthatthesynergisticapplicationofcapabilitiesproducesaneffectwell beyondthesimpleadditionofindividualactions.Whilethecontinued developmentofexistingWMDtechnologiesandtheemergenceofnew technologiesareinthemselvesafuturethreat,theabilitytocombineseveral technologiescanmakethisthreatfarmoredifficulttoanticipateandcontrol. Considernanodevicesasavectorforthespreadofabioengineeredvirusa chemicalagentthatmanipulatestheeffectsofanEMorRFdeviceorabio agentthatremainsdormantuntilactivatedbysomeformofDEorEM. Concealment/detection. AnadversarysabilitytoconcealWMD/Eisrapidly outstrippingourabilitytodetectthem.Perhapsthegreatestchallengeto detectionisthesheervolumeofspaceavailabletoanadversarycomparedtothe actualsizeofaWMD/Edevice.Thesuitcasenukeisareality.Thesizeof chemical orbioagentsneededtoproduceamasseffectcanbenegligible. Hiddenamongthevastcommunityofinternationaltradeandtravel,thetraffic ofWMD/Ewouldbeinfinitesimal.Whilewemightbeabletotechnologically developacapabilitytodetectthesedevicesandsubstancesorpoliciestodeny thementry,thecostintime,effort,andefficiencywouldbeprohibitive, unacceptabletooursociety,andincompatiblewithourwayoflife.
Constraintsonuse. Fornationstates,theanticipatedretaliation anduniversal condemnationhaveservedasadeterrenttoindiscriminatefirstuseofWMD. Twoemergingphenomenahavecontributedtosignificantlylooseningthose constraints.Oneistheemergenceofnonstateactors,suchasAlQaida,who offernotargetforphysicalretaliationandnosensitivitytowardglobalopinion. AsecondisthelackofaforensicsignatureforseveraltypesofWMD,enabling theirusewithoutareliable,verifiablewaytoattributetheirorigin.Combine thesetwoanditisvery possibletoenvisionanadversaryconductingaWMD/E attackwithrelativeimpunityand,tohim,acceptablerisk.
Section5 Conclusion
Understandingtheglobalenvironmentandthreatistheintellectualbasisfor transformingtheJointForcetomeetthedemandsoffutureU.S.NationalSecurity Strategy.TheJointOperationalEnvironmentisthecommonframeofreferencefor capabilitiesbasedtransformation.Itprovidesaframeworktosupportexperimentation andfutureconceptdevelopment.TheJOEdiscussesthefourchallengeswewillfacein thefuture operationalenvironment traditional,irregular,catastrophic,anddisruptive, andtheirconfluence.Itthendiscussesthetwelvecriticalvariablesthatareusedto describeanoperationalenvironment.Understandingthosevariablesandhowtheyimpact ontheoperationalenvironmentallowsustodiscovercurrenttrends. Inturn,theJOE appliesthosetrendsto thecriticalvariablesandprojectstheirimpactonthefuture operationalenvironmentof 2030andbeyond.Theresultisaguidefordepictingtherange ofoperationalenvironmentsinwhichthefutureJointForcewilloperate. ThatforcewilloperateinaccordancewiththeU.S.NationalSecurityStrategy (NSS). Astheconditionsandcircumstancesoftheoperationalenvironmentevolve,the NSSmustrecognizeandadapttothenewrealities.AppendixA discussestheimpactof thesetrendsandtheirimplicationsonthepoliciesanddirectivesarticulatedintheNSS. Theoperationalenvironmentwill alsoshapeanddefinethenatureofthefuture adversary.InthetimeframeoftheJOE,theUnitedStatesremainsthedominantmilitary power,yetthereareemergingnearpeersthatmaychallengethisdominance,aswellas regionalactorsthatwillaccepttheriskofaconflictwiththeUnitedStates,andother entitiesthatmayfalselybelievetheycanpursueanagendaofviolencewithimpunity. AppendixBaddressesthefullrangeoftactics,operationaldesign,andstrategiesthat futureadversariesmay pursue. Together,theoperationalenvironmentandtheadversary helpdefinethe requirementsforUnitedStatesJointForcecapabilities. TheJOEprovidesthe frameworkforanunderstandingofnotasinglepredictedfutureoperationalenvironment, butratherarangeofpossibleenvironments.Likewise,thethreatisnottiedtoanysingle adversaryanditsfuturecapability.Rather,itisdiscussedintermsofpotentialcapabilities andalikelyrangeof tactics,operations,andstrategiesthatmayarisetochallengethe
UnitedStatesinnotonlythemilitaryarena,butalsoontheeconomicanddiplomatic stage. Neartermresourcecommitmentsandoperationaldesignrequireaccurate predictiveintelligence.Thatdegreeofaccuracydegradesaswelookoutfurtherintime. Inthetimeframeofthefutureoperational environment2030 andbeyondprecise predictionsbecomemoredifficultandprovideaquestionablefoundationforconcept developmentandexperimentation. Thus,theJOEprovidestheinsightsintothefuture operationalenvironmentthatconceptdevelopmentandexperimentationrequire.By addressingthefutureintermsof variables,trends,andtheirimplications,theJOEframes arangeofpossiblefutureenvironmentsthatenableconceptdevelopmentand experimentationtoexploreabroadspectrumofrealisticchallengesandachievable capabilities.TheJOEdoesthiswhilemitigatingtheriskofbeingeithercompletely wronginasinglepredictionorwanderingaimlesslythroughanearlyinfinitesetof possiblefutures. TheJOEwillremainalivingdraft.Thepracticeof frequently updatingthe JOEbasedon semiannual conferences,continuousresearch andanalysis,andfeedback fromusersoftheJOEhasproventobeviableandvaluable. ThishasledtheJOEto becomeauseful unclassifiedreferenceforexperimentationandconceptdevelopmentsfor theJointForce,acrosstheDepartmentofDefense,andamongtheservices.
ANNEXA ImpactonourNationalMilitaryStrategy
ACTORS Thenexttwodecadeswillcontainaperplexing,complexarrayofsecuritychallenges fortheUnitedStates.Expandingwebsofsocial,economic,political,military,and informationarchitectureswillaffordopportunityforsomeregionalpowerstocompeteon abroaderscaleandemergeonthegloballandscapewithconsiderableinfluence.In addition,regionalpowerstructuresarelikelytochangecontinuously,asregional conflicts,civilwars,andtransnationalactorsreshapeexistingnorms.Itcanbeexpected thatnations,transnationalactors,andnonstateentitieswillchallengeandredefinethe globaldistributionofpower,theconceptofsovereignty,andthenatureofwarfare.Local conflictsandwarswillbecommonplaceandwillalwayscarrytheriskofescalationinto broaderconflicts. ManyactorslookingforaroleontheinternationalscenewillperceivethattheUnited Statesseeksglobalempireandhegemony.Consequently,partnershipsandcoalitionsare likelytoformasameansofmitigatingthedominatinginfluenceofU.S.power structures.Becausemanyoftheseactorsarecurrentlyinastateofflux,theiridentities mayberadicallydifferent20yearshence,andveryfundamentalshiftscouldoccurin theirrelationswitheachother.Thesefactorsindicatethatalliances,coalitions,and partnershipswilllikelybeveryfluid,generatingadynamicenvironmentinwhichpower centerscanshiftrapidlytoleverageopportunityorallayacommonfear.Informationand knowledgewillbecomecriticalcommoditiesandonesstatusingroups,relationships,or coalitionswilldictatepoliciesofsharingandcollaboration. Currenttrendsstillindicatethatthekeypowersinaregionalandglobalcontextwill mostlikelybetheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion,China,Japan,andRussia. 29 However,theemergenceofotherglobalactorsremainsadistinctpossibility. Keyregionalpowers,whoseactivitiesorissueshavethegreatestpossibilityfor creatingglobalconsequences,aremostlikelytobeIndonesia,India,Pakistan,Turkey, Egypt,SouthAfrica,Brazil,theKoreas,China,andMexico.Thisisnottoimplythat thesenationsrepresentthemostpowerfulinagivenregion.Theyaresimplyofferedto illustratethegrowingsignificanceofcertainstates intheglobalsetting.Manyother nationshavethepotentialforfailureasaconsequenceofunderrepresentative governance,aninabilitytomeettheneedsoftheirpopulations,asaproductofethnic, cultural,orreligiousfriction,orlackofaccesstoresourcesormarkets(morethan1 30 31 billionpeopleliveonlessthan$1.00/day andover1billionlackaccesstosafewater ). Globalizationwilldemandinternationalinteractiononawiderangeofissues,often creatingfrictionascultures,religions,governments,people,organizations,andeconomic networkscollideinhighlycompetitiveglobalsettings.Allthingsconsidered,complexity anduncertaintywillbecommoninanystrategicsetting.
FOREIGNPERCEPTIONS PerceptionsoftheUnitedStateswilllikelyhavelongterminfluenceontheactionsof opponentsandalliesalike.Theyaretherootofstrategyintheuseofforce.Nations(or transnationalorganizations)willrelyontheirperceptionsofU.S.poweranditsmilitary forcecapabilitiesastheyseekwaystoneutralize,counter,oroffsetitsadvantages.While suchadesignprincipleisnormal(indeed,allwarfareseekstofocuswhatevermaybeone sidescomparativeadvantagesagainstanenemysrelativeweakness)theemerging phenomenonistheextenttowhichU.S.militaryoperationsarestudiedandusedasa metricfordesign. ForeignperceptionsofU.S.culturetendtobeinfluencedbythecommercialand entertainmentsectors,whicharemostlikelytoexporttheirviews.Thisresultsin distortedperceptionsandamisunderstandingofthetruevaluesoftheAmericanculture. Theseperceptionsaggravatethefrictionthatcomesfrominteractionbetweentwo differentculturesandthey increasethepotentialforconflict. RecentinstancesintheemploymentofU.S.combatpowershapethestudiesand writingsofthemajorityofforeignmilitaryexperts.Areviewofthesestudiesindicates therearesomekeycommonaltiesamongalliesandpotentialadversaries,regardlessof regionormotivationintheirviewsaboutU.S.operations.Ingeneral,commonforeign perceptionsoftheUnitedStatesare: Whileitisunwillingtoacceptheavylosses,ifavoidable,confidenceinits technologicalsuperiorityhasgrownsuchthattheU.S.isincreasinglywilling totakeriskstoachieverapid,decisivevictoryinmilitaryoperations. UnitedStatesconfidencehasledtolessemphasisonthepoliticalfoundations ofwarandplanningforaviablepoliticalendstate. TheU.S.isincreasinglyfocusedoninformationdomination,speed,precision, standofftechnology,anddependenceonairsuperioritytoachieve overwhelmingpoweragainstconventionalforceopponents. Americanleadershipremainssensitivetodomesticopinionandcommits considerableefforttoshapethatopinionthroughdomesticinformation operationswithaneyetowardsrapid,successfulterminationofhostilities. TheUnitedStatesisincreasinglylesssensitivetoworldopinionandmore willingtoactunilaterally. TheU.S.lackscommitmentovertime.Americanmilitaryoperationsare sensitivetocollateraldamagetheyemployindigenousgroupsforclose combatandtheyareofshortduration. TheUnitedStateswillseekcooperationandsupportfromcountriescriticalto militaryoperationsbyapplyingitsconsiderableeconomicresources. (Note, however,thatdivergentregionalinterestsmaymakeitdifficulttoachieveand sustainsuchcooperationinaprotractedconflict.) U.S.preemptiveattackscanbedeterredbytheavailabilityofnuclear weapons.
CHARACTERISTICSOFMILITARYOPERATIONS Characteristicsofmilitaryoperationsembodytheapplicationofcapabilities,andthe influenceofrapidlychangingoperationalsituationsaspartofanyoperationalconstruct. Thesecharacteristicscapturetheconceptthatopportunity,asassessedfromthetotal environment,representsthenewmodelforoperations.Yettheabilitytoexploitthat opportunitywillbeinfluencedbywhattheAmericanleadership,andthepublicthey represent,perceivesasacceptablewaysandmeansofwagingwar.Whilecombatants willseektocreate opportunitiesandtakeadvantageofthosethatleadtotheirdesired endstate,theiractionswillbeconstrainedbyselfimposedlimitationsandrestrictions. Theprevalentcharacteristicsofcurrentandfuturemilitaryoperationsarediscussed below,butitisusefultobeginwithaviewoftheAmericanwayofwar: TheAmericanWayofWar.Thatphrasepopularizedbythemilitaryhistorian RussellWeigleyinhis1973bookof thattitlehascometorefertoagrinding strategyofattrition:thestrategyemployedbyUlyssesS.GranttodestroyRobertE. Leesarmyin186465byJohnJ.PershingtoweardowntheGermanarmyin1918 andbytheU.S.ArmyAirCorpstopulverizeallthemajorcitiesofGermanyand Japanin194445.Inthisview,theCivilWar,WorldWarI,andWorldWarIIwere wonnotbytacticalorstrategicbrilliancebutbythesheerweightofnumbersthe awesomedestructivepowerthatonlyafullymobilizedandhighlyindustrialized democracycanbringtobear.Inalltheseconflicts,U.S.armiescomposedofcitizen soldierssufferedandinflictedmassivecasualties.Ourabilitytobothinflictand enduresuchcasualtiesmoreeffectivelythancouldouradversariesultimatelyresulted invictory. Thisstrategystimeisnowpast,however.Spurredbydramaticadvancesin informationtechnology,theU.S.militaryhasadoptedanewstyleofwarfarethat eschewsthebloodysloggingmatchesofold.Itseeksaquickvictorywithminimal casualtiesonbothsides.Thehallmarksofthisnewstyleofwarfarearespeed, maneuver,flexibility,andsurprise.Itreliesheavilyonprecisionfirepower,special forces,andpsychologicaloperations.Further,itstrivestointegratenaval,air,and landpowerintoaseamlesswhole.Thisapproachwaspowerfullyondisplayinthe recentinvasionofIraq,anditsimplicationsforthefutureofAmericanwarfighting 32 areprofound. Ongoingjointandserviceexperimentationeffortshaveproducedafamilyof emergingwarfightingconceptsthataddressthewaysinwhichtheU.S.willconduct futuremilitaryoperationsandsuggestthemeansthatwillenablethisnewwayofwar. Anecessaryaddendum,though,isaconsiderationofthoseselfimposedconstraintsand culturallimitationsthataffectthewayweengagethethreat.Specifically,thisstudymust examinehowlegalconsiderations,friendlycasualties,informationoperationsandthe media,andculturalawarenessinfluencetheAmerican wayofwartodayandthe operationalenvironmentofthefuture. ImplicationsoftheAmericanWayofWar OngoingoperationsinAfghanistanandIraqprovideaconstantsourceof anecdotesthatdemonstratetheAmericanproclivitytohampertheeffectiveness
andefficiencyofmilitaryoperationsbasedonnonmilitaryinfluences.Forces withdrawratherthandestroyareligioussite.Soldiersacceptadditionalriskin ordertoreducedangertononcombatants.Rulesofengagementlimitasoldiers abilitytoengagepotentialthreatswithdeadlyforce.Thegoodorbad characterizationoftheselimitationsandtheinfluencesthatproducethemare andalwayswillbedebatable.Thefactthattheyareanothersetoffactorsthat mustbeconsideredwhenenvisioningtheoperationalenvironmentisnot.Evenif aconflictthreatensnationalsurvival,Americanforceswilloperateunder constraintsandrestraintsthatdefineouressentialcharacterasAmericans.These limitationsmayvaryinrelationtothethreat,buttheywillalwaysbethere. LegalConsiderations WhiletheUnitedStatesisstillobligatedtorespectandadhereto internationallyacceptedlawsofwarandlegallybindingtreatiesofwhichitisa signatory,thereisincreasingpressuretoapplyconsiderationsappropriateforcivil lawtomilitaryoperationsandfunctions.Thenotionofproportionalityis beginningtocreepintodiscussionsregardingtheappropriatelevelofmilitary response.ThisideaaddressestheAmericanpublicsnotionof fairness.Justas everycrimedoesnotdeservethedeathpenalty,soeverymilitarythreatdoesnot requirefullscalemilitaryretaliation.Althoughthisnotionhasnobasisin militarytheory,theU.S.mustneverthelessbepreparedtoconsiderproportionality andthelikelypublicperceptionoftheappropriatenessofamilitaryresponsetoa threat.Invaryingdegreesallelementsofnationalpower(diplomatic, informational,military,andeconomic)mustbeconsideredandbroughttobearin thecorrectproportionsdependingonthesituation. Othermorespecificlegalissuesarebeingraisedregularly.Inmanycases, individuals/agenciesarechallengingthemilitarysrelativefreedomtowagewar asitseesfit,withintheconstraintsofinternationallawandexistingtreaties.For example,ithasbeensuggestedthatenemydetaineesandprisonersofwarshould beaffordedthesamelegalprotectionsenjoyedbyU.S.citizensandresidents. Regardlessoftheoutcomeofanysinglecase,theU.S.mustacceptthefactthatit willbecontinuallychallengedwithregardtothelegalityofthewaritiswagingat thetimeandthewaysandmeansbywhichitisconducted.Irrespectiveofthe legalityofpolicies,Americanpoliticalandmilitaryleadersmustbesensitiveto publicperception. FriendlyCasualties TheUnitedStatesaversiontocasualtiesappearstohavebecome ingrainedinthenewAmericanWayofWar.Insomeways,currentemphasison interagencyoperations,maneuverwarfare,rapiddecision,IO, precisionfires,and otherapplicationsofpowerisaresultofadesiretopreserveAmericanlives. Militaryoperationsareplannedwiththisinmind,andthepublicsperceptionof eventualsuccessofanongoingconflictisbasedlargelyonthiscasualtyfigure. Incompetitionwiththisdesiretominimizecasualtiesisanalmostequal determinationtominimizecollateraldamagetothecivilianpopulation, infrastructure,andculture.Thereisnoambiguityintheclearchoicebetweena soldierslifeandaninanimatestructure.However,thatchoiceisnotalways
clear.Considerationofthelocalpeopleandtheirinfrastructureisasignificant partofanoverallinformationcampaigntowintheheartsandmindsofthe populace.WhilethisconsiderationwillnotcausetheU.S.militarytodisregard lossoflife,itdoescauseittoacceptagreaterriskofcasualties.Greaterrisk,in turn,islikelytoleadtogreatercasualties. ThefutureAmericanWayofWarmustbeabletobalancethesecompeting trends.Itisunlikelythateitherwillconvenientlydisappearfromthepublics radarscope.Oneofthegreatestchallengesformilitaryandpoliticaldecision makerswillbetostrikeanacceptablebalanceamongthem,focused,asalways, onsuccessful conclusionofhostilities. InformationOperationsandthePress/Media Theimportanceofaskillfullyorchestratedinformationcampaigncannot beunderestimated.Somemayviewthiscampaignasthedrivingfactorforall othercomplementaryoperationspolitical,military,andeconomic.This campaignisdesignedtogainthesupportofthenation,theworld,andthelocal populaceintheoperationalareawhiledrainingthewilloftheadversary.Forthe UnitedStates,thisinformationcampaignmustbebasedonthetruth.Asidefrom thepotentialbacklashofbeingcaughtinalie,itissimplyanacceptedpartofthe Americanvaluesystemhonestyisahallmark.Domesticpublicaffairseffortis designedtobuildsupportforacauseamongtheAmericanpeople,whileboth diplomacyandinternationalmediaeffortsseektobuildinternationalsupport. Insidetheoperationalarea,psychologicaloperations(PSYOP)campaignsare conductedtobothwinsupportofthelocalsandtoattackthewilloftheadversary. Inmanyrespects,thesuccessoftheinformationcampaigndependsonthe outcomeofotherongoingoperations.Greatersoldiercasualtiesmaycausethe publictoquestionU.S.involvementgreatercollateraldamageinthelocalarea forexample,civilianlivesandstructuresmakesitmoredifficulttogainlocal support.Bothofthesecasesmayservetoencouragetheadversary. SometimestheU.S.isavictimofitsownsuccess.Intheneverending questforadequatefundingofmilitaryandmilitaryrelatedprograms,themilitary issometimesguiltyofoversellingitscapabilities.Forexample,dialogueon precisionstrikeandinformationsuperioritycreatestheperceptionthattheU.S. hascompletesituationalawarenessandtheabsolutecapabilitytobeprecise wheneveritchooses.Thereforethereisnoacceptableexcuseforincidental collateraldamage.Athinkingadversarywillturnthisperceptiontohisown advantage,convincingthepublicthatanydamagecausedbyU.S.operationsis patentlyintentional. Againitisincumbentontheleadership,politicalandmilitary,to understandtherelationshipsbetweencombatoperationsandcomplementary information,economic,andpoliticalactivities.Theabilitytoorchestratea successfulinformationcampaignmaybetheultimatemeasureofsuccess. CulturalAwareness Throughouthistory,theUnitedStateshasacknowledgedthatimportance ofcultureinvaryingdegrees.Jointoperationsdoctrinepositsanationallevel
campaignwhichfocusesnationalcapabilitiesdiplomatic,economic, information,andmilitarytowardaverting,deterring,andifnecessarywinning futureconflicts.Onceengaged,theU.S.mustconsiderthepolitical,economic, legal,military,andterritorialaspectsoftheadversaryscapability.Thecultural elementmusttakeitsplaceinthisequation.Asuccessfulcampaignwilldefeat boththeadversaryswillandhiscapabilitytocontinuetheconflict.Ofthetwo, willisfarmoreimportantintermsofpostconflictstability.Theculturalaspect ofasocietywillbekeyindealingwiththeadversaryswilltocontinuethe conflict. OperationsonComplex/UrbanTerrain Currently,49.2percentoftheworldpopulation3.2billionresidesin urbansettings.Overthenext20years(to2025) theurbanpopulationisexpected togrowto4.6billion,approaching60percent.33Thus,itwillbecomeincreasingly moredifficulttoavoidoperationsinanurbanenvironment. Futureadversarieswillfocusonurbanareasandothercomplexterrain, weatherpatterns,andremote,relativelyunpolicedareastonegatetechnological overmatchesinintelligenceandweaponsystems.Suchfocuswillseektostress U.S.militarydoctrineandorganizationaldesign.Doingsoisameansofcreating strongholdswhereopponentscanachievesanctuaryfromeffects,andleverage otheradvantagesoftheenvironment,whilenegatingadvantagestheU.S. possesses.Thesesettingsdegradeweaponsystemstandoff,aretroop andsupply intensive,andaddcomplexitytotheapplicationoffirepowerinordertoavoid collateraldamageandnoncombatantinjuries.Adversarieswilloperateinloose, nonlinearorganizationsguidedbyintermittentintentandmissionorders.These forceswillcapitalizeonthenatureofcitiesandtheirpopulace,aswellasopen sourcedatafortheinformationneededfordecisionmaking.Theywillseekto causeheavycasualtiesandcollateraldamagetoinfluencethewilloftheU.S.and itscoalitionpartners,whiletryingtowintheheartsandmindsofthegiven society. MaritimeOperationsinLittorals PotentialfoeswillfocusondenyingorlimitingaccesstoU.S.forcesinto operationalarea.BecausetheU.S.fleetsprimaryfutureoperatingenvironment willbeintheshallowerwatersofthelittorals,anadversarysabilitytolimit accesswill havegreaterimpactthaninthepast. Becausemanyurbancentersare locatedincoastalareasU.S.maritimeforceswillfocusoninfluencingland operationsandwillhavetoconcentratetheiroperationswhereadversarieswill attempttolimitU.S.littoralfreedomofaction. When U.S.maritimeforces succeedinarrivinginsuchurbanareas,theymustbepreparedforadversary attemptstopreventlodgmentsorinfluenceactionsashore.ThreatstoU.S. maritimeforceswillnotlikelybelargesurfacecombatantsorairforces,given U.S.airandmaritimedominationonthehighseasfortheforeseeablefuture. Instead,opponentswillrelyonlessexpensivebutstillsophisticatedassetsthatare plentiful,easytooperate,anddifficulttodetect.Shallowmines,shorebased surfacetoairmissiles(SAM),torpedoes,andantishipcruiseandballistic
missileswillbeeffectiveweaponscapableofdefendingagainstU.S.navalforces. Opponentswillswarmthesecapabilitieswhereverpossible. Exacerbatingthechallengefornavalexpeditionaryoperationsinthe littoralsarethoseoperationalcharacteristicsthatundermineair,surface,and underseasituationalawareness.Forexample,terrainmaskingcomplicatesclose toshoreairoperationsflyingnapoftheearthprofiles,makingitdifficultto obtainacompleteairpicture.Further,highvolumesofcoastalsurfacetrafficand acousticconditionsincoastalwatersareadvantageoustoadversarysurfaceand subsurfacevesselsthatcaneasilyblendintothelittoralenvironment.These advantageswillalloweventhoseadversarieswithsmallforcesthecapabilityto 34 conducteffectiveandlethalantiaccessoperationsagainstU.S.maritimeforces. InformationOperations/InformationWarfare st Theconceptofknowledgewarinthe21 centuryimpliesthatleaderswho makethebestandquickestdecisionswillachievevictoryonthebattlefield.An inherentcharacteristicofeveryconflictatanypointinhistoryhasalwaysbeenthe needtoknowmorethanonesopponent,turningsuperiorinformationand knowledgeintounderstanding.Informationoperationsthusseektosupportthat understandingatalllevelsofconflictstrategic,operational,andtactical. Informationoperationsinvolveactionstakentoaffectinformationand informationsystemswhileprotectinganddefendingonesowninformationand 35 informationsystems. Technologyhasgivenbothsidestheopportunitytosee, understand,andinfluencethebattlefieldwithgreaterfidelityandresolutionthan everbefore.Informationoperationsareaprincipaltoolforattemptingtoaffect willhence,itwilltargetperceptions,thinking,planning,decisionmaking, actions,andfeedbackaswellassupportinginformationtechnology.Tothatend, potentialadversarieshavemadedetailedstudiesofU.S.capabilitiesandwillseek todegradethosecapabilitiesbyoperatingaroundthemarginsofU.S.technology andstrikingcommand,control,communications,computers,intelligence, surveillance,andreconnaissance(C4ISR)andotherIOrelatedcapabilitiesand 36 platformswithvariedforces. Theirtargetwillbethemindsanddecision processesofpoliticaldecisionmakers,U.S.commanders,coalitionpartners,and neutrals. Opponentswillseekpsychologicaladvantagedomesticallyand internationallybypreservingkeycapabilities,suchasmechanizedforcesand strategicsystems,whileattemptingtodestroykeyhighvisibilityU.S.systems suchasaircraftcarriers,AirborneWarningandControlSystem(AWACS),and JointSurveillanceTargetAttackRadarSystem(JSTARS).Adversarieswilldo thissimplybecauseofthepsychologicalvaluethatdestructionofsuchhigh visibilitysystemsachievestheyaresymbolsinanystruggle,pawnsforIO manipulation.Informationoperationscanturneventsseeminglytacticalinnature intoissuesofstrategicimportance. SpaceOperations Theworldisexperiencinganincreasingmigrationofcapabilitiestospace inordertoexploittheexplosionininformationtechnology.Therelative
advantagetheUnitedStatesnowenjoysinsatellitereconnaissance, communications,andnavigationwillerodeasthenumberofcountriesand coalitionscapableofusingspacebasedprogramsformilitarypurposesincreases. Commercializationofspacecontinuestoincrease,openingaccessglobally.Apart fromthelossoftheU.S.asymmetricadvantageinthisarea,accesstocommercial systemswillallowevenlowtechnologyforcestoentertheworldofinformation agecapabilities.Theabilitytoseethebattlefieldwithtargetingaccuracywillbe 37 reflectedinweaponssystemprocurement. Further,spacecapabilitiesarea decisiveaspectofsystemswarfareinwhichpotentialopponentswillseektostrike thelinksandnodesthattieU.S.capabilitiestogether. AirOperations Competitionintheair,oratleastthatwhichischaracterizedby developmentandemploymentofadvancedfixedwingplatforms,maybeover. Fewcountrieshavethetechnology,financial resources,orpoliticalwillto continuecompetingwiththeUnitedStatesanditsallies.Potentialadversaries insteadaredevelopingnewstrategiesforconductingoperationsinthevertical dimension,evenasAmericanairpowerrulesthesky.Newopportunitiesforthis strategy,enabledbytechnologyandadaptiveoperations,offeraviablecounterto 38 Americanairsuperiority. AdaptiveadversariesrecognizethattheU.S.hasairpowerlimitations.A fewoftheseoperationallimitationsincluderulesofengagement(ROE), geographicconditions,precisionrequirements,andbeddownlocationsfortheater airassets.Inaddition,trackingallplatformsintheverticalbattlespaceremains difficult,andevenwhenenemylowaltitudesystemsaredetected,successful interceptionanddestructioncanbeproblematic.Targetswilloftenbenumerous andmustbedistinguishedfromnonmilitaryplatforms.Decoysandgroundclutter mustbefilteredout,andidentificationfromtheairisfurtherhamperedby complex terrainandadverseweatherconditions.SelfimposedROElimitations requiringhighlevelsofconfidencetoavoidfratricideoftendelayandpotentially disruptengagements.Adversarytheaterballisticmissiles(TBM)andcruise missilestrikesagainstgeographicallyremoteairbasescanlimitorslowU.S. operationsoverthecombatzone.TheinabilityofU.S.airassetstooperatefrom airfieldsclosetogroundforcesoperatingdeeprequiresextendedrangesupport thatoftendecreasesonstationtime. Thesegeographiclimitationscontributeto opportunitiesfortheenemytoconducthisownairoperationsagainstU.S.forces ortocreateeffectsthatconstrainthecapabilitiesofU.S.airpower. Americanairoperations,alreadylimitedbytheadversarysantiaccess campaign,mustalsodealwiththeincreasingnumbersofantiairweaponsystems, oftenforcingairoperationstooperateathigheraltitudes.ShortrangeSAMswill beplentiful,inexpensive,easytooperate,easytohide,andeffective.Their proliferationcreatesanexploitablelowlevelportionoftheverticalbattlespaceto anadaptiveenemy.Agrowingarsenalofaerialweaponsandplatformsis becomingavailabletoevenfinanciallylimitedstates.Advancesinaerialsensors, platforms,munitions,C2,andsupportinginformationsystemsaredrivingrapid advancementinoverallmilitarycapabilitiesworldwide.Thetrendisnotlimited
tonewgenerationweaponsolderweaponssystemsandaffordablehigh technologysubsystemscanbecombinedforadaptivewarfare.Newstylesofair operations,enabledbyimprovedtechnologies,includedispersionofairassetsin urbanandothercomplexenvironments,useofundergroundfacilities,and operationsfromunimprovedareas. Unmannedsystemswillcomplementthenewstylesofairoperationand willbeaffordableandeasytoemploy.Fieldinganunmannedaerialvehicle (UAV)forcewillnotrequireanelaborateforcestructureorhighlytrained engineersortechnicians,andwilloffernewflexibilityandresponsivenessto exploitlowaltitudes.Unmannedcombataerialvehicles(UCAVs)willprovidea precisionstrikecapability,andwillincludespecializedantiradarsystemsand generalattacksystemsemployingmanintheloopguidanceorautonomous guidanceoptions.Landattackcruisemissiles(LACMs)willproliferateand provideadversariesanotheradvancedsystemwithwhichtoattackU.S.forces withconventionalorWMEpayloads.Ranges,payloads,andaccuracieswill increase,andgiventhecostandvulnerabilityoffixedwingforces,theLACM andUCAVwillbehighlydesirablestandoffstrikeplatforms. PowerProjectionandStruggleforAccess InthepastthethreatcenteredoninterdictingU.S.airlinesof communication(ALOCs)andsealinesofcommunication(SLOCs),buttoday thereisaclearfocusonattackingaerialandseaportsofdebarkation (APODs/SPODs)andembarkation(APOEs/SPOEs),andambushingSLOCsto precludeU.S.entryintotheAOR.Theadversarywillseektodisturbdeployment, employment,andsustainmentactivitiesinCONUS,enroute,andinareasof responsibility(AOR).Adversarieswillseeoperationalconceptssuchas seabasingasafocusforattack.Manypotentialadversarieshaveinvestedheavily ininformationoperations,specialoperatingforces(SOF),submarines, increasinglylongerrangemissiles,andWMEcapabilities.TheJointForcewill beforcedtostructureforcesinthefuturetoenablerapiddeploymentoftroops withenhancedlethality.Deploymentstoanylocationin theworld,without lengthystagingperiods,mustnotbedependentupon overseasinfrastructureor 39 prepositionedequipment. Thisglobaldeploymentcapabilitywillalsorequire jointglobalunderstandingandsynchronizationcapabilities.Thatistosay,asthe UnitedStatesdevelopsacapabilitytorapidlydeployacrossregions,joint commanderswillhavetounderstandtheimpactofU.S.actions,operations,or effectsacrossthoseregions,astheyrelateonetoanother.Theflowofpersonnel andmaterielandthecollectionofdata,information,andknowledgewillhaveto besynchronizedandagileenoughtoshiftamonglinksandnodesasthefoe attacksourcombatpower. Politicalandeconomicactionscanalsohaveoperationalandstrategic impactondeploymentoptions.Potentialadversariescanbringpoliticalor economicpressureonpossibleU.S.alliesorcoalitionpartnerstodenybasingor overflightrights,eliminatingtheneedtostrikeAPODsorSPODsoutright. NoSanctuaryTerroristDimension
Terrorismisapervasiveandgrowingcharacteristicofarmedconflictand militaryoperations.Thedilemmaisthatitisoftenasynchronousandalmost alwaysasymmetricinnature.Thus,terrorismcouldoccuranyplace,anytime, employingawiderangeofcapabilitiesandoftenappearingunrelatedtocurrent events.GlobalterrorismandWMEnolongermakesthecontinentalUnitedStates oroverseasstagingareashavensofsecurity.Futureenemieswillattemptto disruptpowerprojectioncapabilitiesby attackinginstallations,information systems,ortransportationnodes.Theseattackswillinvolveair,ground,sea, space,andinformationdomainswithcombinationsofweapons,often synchronizedtoachievethegreatestoutcomes.UnitedStatesterritoriesshouldbe consideredacommunicationzonetotheemergingnotionofU.S.strategic maneuverthatpotentialadversarieswilltarget.40Potentiallymoreimportantis thatterroractionscantakeonanindirectnature.Whileterroristswillseekto strikerelativelysecuremilitarytargetsandinstallationstocreatefearandraise questionsaboutsecurityinthemindsofthecivilianpopulaceandpolitical leaders,theymayalsoattackpublicsupport.ThiscouldcompeltheUnitedStates todeployforcesawayfromthoserelativelysecuremilitaryinstallationstoprotect civilianinfrastructureandpopulation. LimitationsonForceCapabilities Politicalrestrictionswilldictatethesize,composition,timetable, activities,anddurationofforcedeployments. Whilethesizeandnatureofforce packagesareoftendesignedtodemonstratetotheAmericanpeoplethedegree andnatureofU.S.involvementinanycrisis,theyalsoservetocreatean opportunityforpotentialopponents.Adversarieswillseektochangethenatureof theconflictonceU.S.forcesbegindeploymentinordertorendertheforcesin transitineffective.Forceswemaysendtofightamajorcombatoperationarenot ideallysuitedforcounterinsurgency.Thismismatchofforcetotaskcreatesa potentialvulnerabilitythatadversarieswilltrytoexploit. IncreasinglyComplexRelationships Alliancesandcoalitionsarethenormforanyoperationintheworldtoday andtheywillbeforthefuture.Often,however,U.S.partnerswillhavediffering viewsofmeansandendstates,whichcouldresultinconsensusbuildingand compromise,andhavethepotentialtoslowthepaceofoperations.Thisis particularlytrueintheworldofeconomicinterdependenceandpolitical interactionsthatrequirethejointforcetocoordinateandworkwiththe interagencycommunity,allies,NGOsandgovernmentalagencies,MNCs,and multipleservices. Adversariesunderstandthisandotherweaknessesofcoalitions andalliancesandwillseektoformtheirownallianceswithnationsand organizationssympathetictotheircause.Opponentswillsimultaneouslyattempt toexploittensionsamongmembersofaU.S.coalition.Interoperabilityissues willbeexploitedtacticallyandoperationally.Mistrust,classification,language, constraintsininformationsharing,andthelackofacommonoperational frameworkareallcharacteristicsthathavebeenpresentinpreviousU.S. operationsandwillbecomemoreprevalentinthefutureparticularlyasthe
worldmovesawayfrom thetraditionallongterm,fixedalliancesofthepast.In addition,adversarieswilltargetneutralsthatmayhavekeyrelationshipsand influencesonthesuccessorfailureofU.S.operations,forexample,overflightor basingrights.Inthecaseofbothpotentialalliesandneutralactorsontheglobal stage,itisagainclearthatculturalawarenessmustbeemphasized.Justas culturalissuescanintensifytheemotionsofanadversary,sotoocanthey jeopardizefavorablerelationships. RulesofEngagement Rulesofengagementareadirectiveissuedfromcompetentmilitary authoritythatdelineatesthecircumstancesandlimitationsunderwhichU.S. 41 forceswillinitiate/continuecombatengagementwithotherforcesencountered. TheU.S.jointforcewilloperateunderrestrictionsonbothmaneuverand applicationoffirepower.Adversarieswillstudytheserulesandataminimum formhypothesesaboutvariablesinfluencingROE.Theywilltrytoperturbthese variablesandthenformconclusionsaboutwhatactionscausethegreatesteffects. AdversarieswillattempttoexploittheindecisivenessordiminutionofU.S. combatcapabilitiestheserulesgenerate.Theywillalsoattempttoinfluencethe establishmentofmorerestrictiveROEthroughextensiveinformationoperations thatattacknationalwillandcoalitionsensitivities. GrowingDiverseGlobalMedia Theemergenceofadiverseglobalmediahasmademediamanagement bothmoredifficultandmoreimportant.Opponentsunderstandthisandwillseek tocontrolthemediainternallyandexploititexternally.Itspervasivepresence providesadversariesadegreeofsituationalawarenessthattheycouldnot otherwiseobtainandanopportunitytoinfluencepeopleandpoliticiansaroundthe world.FromaU.S.perspective,themediaaffordopponentsapowerfulmeansof attackingU.S.nationalwill.TheU.S.informationagesocietyislikelymore susceptibletomediainfluencethanmostothernationsbecauseofitswidespread accesstoinformationsystems.Forexample,thesceneofaservicemembers deathincombat,capturedliveoronnearrealtimevideohasatraumaticimpact onhisfamilyandfriendsandpersonalizesitforsocietyasawhole.Withseveral generationsofAmericanspossessingverylittlemilitaryexperience,manypeople willinterpretactionsonthebattlefieldandtheirconsequencessolelythroughthe lensofthemediascameras.Whilehavingsuchwidespreadaccesstodatais phenomenal,misinterpretationormisrepresentationpresentsnewdangerstothe collectivepsycheofpeopleeverywhere.Thissituationinvolvestheinsertionofa verybroadanduntrainedaudienceintheevaluationofdecisionsandactions, whichcouldresultinchangestotacticalmilitarydecisionsinnearrealtime. Mediacoverageofoperationsandtherealtimedisseminationofinformationwill alsodramaticallyaffectinternationalrelationsandstrategicinteraction. TheArab newschannelAlJazeerabroadcastsduringOIFhadcriticalpoliticaland 42 psychologicalimpact,especiallyintheArabworld. Constrainedresources
Thejointforcewilloftenhavetooperatewithlimitedresourcesoftime, personnel,andequipment.Inaddition,becausetheUnitedStateshasa doctrinallydrivenandstructuredforcewithdeliberateacquisitionprocesses,itis likelythatfutureopponentswillhavediscreteoperationalandtacticalsystems procuredofftheshelfinrapidfashionthataremoreadvancedthanthatofthe forcedeployed.Additionally,futureopponentsmayliterallyoutspendusinniche areas,orinselectedtechnology. Ambiguity Futureenemieswillattempttostaybelowthethresholdofclear aggressionandmaybepoliticallyandpsychologicallyastutesignalssenttoboth domesticandinternationalcommunitiesandintelligenceorganizationswilloften beambiguous.FutureU.S.jointdoctrinalconstructsmustembracenonlinear aggressionpatterns,aswellastraditionalforceonforceconditions. Rapidity Theglobaltrendistowardthecompressionoftime.Communicationand interconnectivitywillfueladaptationandmutation.Thisrapidityandits influenceoradaptationsandmutationswillbeevidentinbehaviorandother outcomesatthetactical,operational,andstrategiclevelsofwar.Forexample, advancesinnightvisiontechnologyandproliferationofthosesystemshave allowedarmiestoownthenightintermsofISRandlethality.This effectiveness,enhancedbyothercapabilities(oftenincombination)designedto offsetU.S.strengths,haspushedthealreadyrapidoperationaltempotoaneven higherlevel.Physicalandmentalagilityatalljointforceechelonswillbecritical todealwiththesharpincreaseinoperationaltempo.Potentialadversaries recognizethisadvantageandwillinvestincapabilitiestocounterit. Asymmetry MostopponentswillattempttoexploitweaknessesofU.S.militaryforces eventhoughU.S.forceswilllikelybeconsideredunequalledintheexecutionof conventionalmilitaryoperations.Thisperception willleadtotheriseof asymmetricapproaches. Asymmetricwarfarefocuseswhatevermaybeone sidescomparativeadvantageagainstanenemysinabilitytoseeordefend againstactionsofthatnature. ForceProtection Securityprogramsdesignedtoprotectforces,equipment,and infrastructurewillbeacharacteristicofU.S.operations.Itisabsolutelycertain thatourfutureopponentswillfocusonaperceivedU.S.strategiccenterof gravity:masscasualtiesandcollateraldamage. Numerousforeignjournalshave profferedthethoughtthatU.S. ormoreaccurately,U.S.policymakersandthe Americanpublichavelittlestomachforthelossoflifeandwillnotengageif heavycasualtiesarelikely. Therefore,anyfutureconflictwillbecharacterizedby thedesireofadversariestoinflictlargenumbersofcasualtiesasearlyinthe conflictaspossibleinCONUSorelsewhere.Obviously,U.S.securityoperations
willattempttoanticipateandcounter.However,potentialopponentsmayrealize thatadeathbyathousandcutsapproachismoreeffectiveinthelongrun. SustainedU.S.losseswithoutanyapparentattainmentofpoliticalgoalsalsoplays onU.S.nationalwill.ThisisespeciallytruewhenconsideringtheU.S.systemof manningtheforceandutilizingNationalGuardandReserveunits.WME, artillery,rockets,andterrorismwillbetheweaponsofchoice.Partisanscould becomeincreasinglyimportant,iftheyhavepopularsupport,haveaccessto money,weapons,andtechnologyandcreatecontinuouspressureaccentuating degreesofhostilityforU.S.occupationforce. FUTUREINTEGRATEDCLOSECOMBATEXAMPLES Inpracticalterms,whatmightintegratedclosecombatlooklikeinacomplex environment?Inviewofthepremisesestablishedabove,thefollowingexamplesare provided: Perception AdversarieswillpositthatU.S.publicandpoliticalperceptionswillrequirevictories, evenmajorcombatoperations,tobeachievedinarelativelyshorttimeusinghigh technologysystemsandresultinginminimalcasualties.Anintelligentadversarywilluse suchperceptionstohisadvantage.Hisfocuswillbeonnullifyingour technology overmatch,inflictingasmanycasualtiesaspossible,creatingcollateraldamage,inciting indigenousunrest,andprolongingtheconflictbyeverymeansnecessary.Hewill attempttosettheconditionsfortheconflictanddenytheUnitedStatesaquickvictory. Becausecasualtiesamonghisownforceswillnotbeagreatfactorinhisdecisionmaking calculus,theadversaryspainthresholdwillbemuchhigherthanthatofU.S.or coalitionforces.Hewillavoidmassinglargeforcesandreducemovementrequirements. Suchdispersionofcriticalassetsandforceswillbepartofaconsciousefforttorender anyU.S.strategicattackineffective. Time/Tempo Theopponentwillattempttodictatewhereandwhentheintegratedfighttakesplace. Atcriticaltimesofhischoosingandpreferablyatalocationthatallowshimtocapitalize onhisstrengthswhileminimizinghisvulnerabilities,theopponentmaycommitwidely dispersedmobilereserves.Hewill,however,oftenbesatisfiedwithleavingatactical battleafterhavinginflictedcasualtieswithhisownforcesintact.Thepotentialsuccessof thisstrategyincreasesiftheU.S.commitmentresultedfromasituationthatdoesnot threatenavitalAmericaninterest.Inthesesituations,whattheU.S.anditsalliesmay characterizeassmallscalecontingencies(SSC)orstabilityoperationsandsupport operations,theadversarymayviewasnothingshortofwartobewonatanycost. AchievingvictorymayequatetokillingmanyAmericanservicemenandwomenover time(deathbyathousandcuts)andstillbestandingattheendoftheday. PhysicalEnvironment Theadversarywilladaptbothhistacticsandhisapplicationofweaponsystems.Ashe maintainsanantiaccessstrategyacrossalldomains,theadversarywillattempttodraw
U.S.jointforcesintoareaswherehehasplannedforthebattletotakeplace.However, hewilldosoonlyasheavoidssituationsinwhichhecompeteswithU.S.forces conventionallyandheadon.Thus,mostfoeswillseektoforcetheequivalentofhandto handcombatinwhichU.S.advantagesareoftenneutralized.Thephysicalenvironment willreducetheadvantageinrangeandaccuracyprovidedbyhighlycapable,standoff PGMs.Infact,theadversaryplanmaycallforsaturatinganareawithsmallunits,using theterrainforcoverandconcealment,andpresentingfew,ifany,traditionaltargets. Theseforces,deployedindepth,maychoosenottoengageU.S.forcesatmaximum rangebutactuallyletsomeforcespassintotheareabeforestriking.Thiscould potentiallymakeoldsystemsmorelethalthannewones(the40yearoldRPG7rocket propelledgrenadeversusJavelin,forexample).IfhelackstheabilitytodrawU.S.forces in,theadversarymaychoosetoattackairfieldsandshipsatseaasameansofcausing largenumbersofcasualtieswithonlymoderaterisk.Usingunconventionalwarfare forcestotargetstagingairfieldsinneighboringcountriesorshipsinnominallyU.S. friendlyportsprovidesaviabletacticalmethodtoachievestrategiceffects. Weaponry Footandvehicularmobilesniperteams,usingstandard7.62mm sniperriflesornewer 50caliberand15to20mm antimaterial rifles,canbepostedormovedtotheflanksof advancingcoalitionforcestoslowtheadvanceandinflictcasualties.Theapplicationof therulesofwarwouldbeselective,sosnipersmaybeteamedwithcertainweapon systemstodestroymedicalevacuationplatforms. Antimaterial riflesmaybedirectedat higherpriority,lessarmoredsystems.Sniperswouldbeemployedtocoverobstacles, mines,andboobytraps.Manyoftheseboobytrapswillbecrudebuteffective. Claymoretypesystems,remotelydetonatedortripfired,willbeemployedtocanalize dismountedinfantry.Selfhealingminefieldsandantihelicopterminesareemergingas fieldedsystems.TheRPG7hastraditionallybeen usedbylesserdevelopedforces againstavarietyoftargetsrangingfrompersonnel,tohelicopters,toarmoredorlogistics vehicles.TheadvantagegainedinthisfightisthereductionofU.S.jointfiresupport effectivenessbecauseoftheproximityofU.S.forcestoadversaryforces(atacticknown ashugging). AirSupport Longrange,airbornelaunchedantitankguidedmissiles(ATGMs)wouldbeof limitedusebecauseofthescarcity oflongrangeshotsandsignificanttargets.Thiscould causeattackhelicoptersorotheraircrafttomoveinclosertostrikewithgunsanddumb rockets.Likelyroutesofingress,identifiedbythethreatthroughintelligencepreparation ofthebattlespace(IPB),wouldbesownwithairdefenseambushes.Thesecouldbe formedbyjoiningrelativelyhightechnology,passivesoundranging/directionfinding systemswithobsolescentnonemittingairdefensegunsoperatingintandemwithman portableairdefensesystems(MANPADS). Deployment TheadversarywouldalsopreplanfordelayingthecommitmentofU.S.reserveforces. HewouldattackembarkationpointsintheU.S.homelandordebarkationpointsinthe areaofoperations.Hewoulduseminesranginginsophisticationfromcommand
detonated,bottomdwellingseaminestoacousticallydetonated,pressureactivated woodenlandmines.Theuseofsemiactivelaserguidedrounds,firedfromsinglemortars orsinglegunsorpairsofartillerysystemsinhidepositionswouldcovertheseconcealed explosivesorotherantiaccessobstacles.Theadversarymayuseciviliansorrefugeesto blockorcrowdportfacilities,roads,andtrails.Theplanwouldalsoincludetheearly identificationandcoverageofpotentialhelicopterandotheraircraftlandingsites. Specialpurposeforces Theadversarymaychoosetosupporttheintegratedfightthroughtheuseofspecial purposeforces,paramilitaryorganizations,andsympatheticcivilianshiredbycoalition forces.Theireffortswouldbedirectedatkeynodesandsystemssuchascommandposts, telecommunicationnodes,andweapons,suchasMultipleLaunchRocketSystems (MLRS),airdefensesystems,andaircraftatmaintenancesites.Thislatteradaptation accomplishesairdefensebydestroyingplatformsbeforetheyareairborne.Theseforces wouldalsobeemployedtoattacktargetstocreateconfusion,casualties,andmateriel damage.Anysitewithlessthanadequatesecuritywouldbeatarget.Dependingonthe situation,artilleryandotherlongrangefireswouldstillbeused,butmoreselectively, directedathighvaluetargets.Theadversarywouldavoidlongrange,longduration preparatoryfires. Information Intheintegratedfight,aspartofhisknowledgewarconstruct,theadversarywill conductawellintegratedandeffectiveinformationcampaign.Hewillattackoursources ofknowledge,anticipateourforaysintohissourceofknowledge,andprotecthisown.In essence,theadversarywillattacktheU.S.decisionmakingapparatus.Hewillexecutea highlyintegrateddeception planthatwouldincludedecoyunitsandsystems,falseor misleadinginformationprovidedbycivilians,fakeoppositionforcesorradiobroadcasts, andmediaoutlets.Preplanningandmissionstypeorderswouldreduceelectronic emissions.Nontraditionalcommunicationsmeanssuchasstandardandcellularphones wouldaugmentthisplan.Higherlevelcommunicationsmaybefairlywellprotected throughtheuseofsophisticatedcommunications,whilesomethingassimpleasrunners orburiedwiremightbeusedatthelowestlevels.Inanycase,communicationswouldbe bothvariedandredundant. Chemical Thethreatwillnotseetheuseofchemicalweaponsasanescalationoftheconflictand hewillhavethepoliticalsensitivitytoknowwhentousethem. Hemaychooseto employtheseweaponsagainstU.S.forcesintherear or enroute,againstsupporting countries,andagainstorganizationshebelievesarehelpingtheUnitedStateswage conventionalorunconventionaloperations.Hewilldothisforthesolepurposeof inflictingmorecasualtiesandcausingconsiderablehorrificdamage.Theopponentmay alsousechemicalweaponsagainsthisownpeopletocreatetheperceptionathomeand abroadthatU.S.orcoalitionforcesareemployingtheseweaponsagainstcivilians. Dependingonthesituationandtargetsavailable,deliverymeansmaybeascrudeasa civiliantruckorassophisticatedasatacticalballisticmissile.
Adaption Therewillbenoreadilyapparent,logicallaydownforhowthepotentialadversary employshisforcestherefore,itwillbeararityforU.S.forcestofinddoctrinetoexploit. Notwofightswillbethesamepatternswillbeavoided.Knowingtheenemywill becomemoredifficultashewilllearn,adapt,andbecomeboth smarterandmore cunning.Thekeyfortheadversaryissurprise,intermsofwhen,where,andhowthe fighttakesplace.Surpriseextendstothemethodfordeployingandemployingweapon andothersystems.Theirplacementinthebattlespacemayseemillogicalandconfusing: airdefensesystemsforwardofgroundtroopssinglegunsorpairsofartillerysystems relyingsolelyonpreplacementandhidepositionsforsecurityandplacedtotheflanksor forwardofgroundtroopsprepositioningsuppliesinareaswheretheplannedbattleisto takeplace,reducinghislogisticssignatureandmakingthemlesssusceptibleto interdictionanddestruction.Theclose,integratedfightwillliterallybeclose,quick,and violent.Leaderswillhaveminimaldecisionmaking time.Atthetacticallevel,orders willbeverbalfragmentaryorders.Failuretorecognizeenemyintentandthenactwillbe fatal.Inordertoaccomplishthemission,U.S.combatleadersandpersonnelmustexceed theadversaryscapabilitytoadapt. Leadership Futurejointforceleaderswillrequireclearandconcisecommunicationsskillsand mustbeabletoreportcontextually.Theymustpossessafeelfortheenvironment,the battlespacecalculus,andanypoliticalissues,aswellasthedisciplinetoknowwhenand wheretobecomeinvolvedintheactionsofsubordinateunits.TheU.S.militarymust seektogenerateconfidence,understanding,andrapportwithsocietyandthecivilian leadershipitserves.Mediaandotherinformationmeanswillprovidethemechanismto performthatfunctiontheycannotbeignored.
AnnexB TheAdversarysStrategicDesign
Nationstatesandorganizationsconstructmilitarycapabilitiesinaccordancewith theirperceptionsandculturalbiases.Leadersassessexternalandinternalthreatsor opportunitiesaffectingtheirnationalororganizationalinterests.Historically,nation stateshavebuilttheirmilitariestocounterregionalthreats.Itislogicaltoassume, however,thatthecontinuedengagementof theUnitedStateswillcausebothstateand nonstateactorswhopossessaimsandinterestsinimicaltothoseoftheU.S.tobasetheir militaryestimatesandactions,atleastinpart,ontheirperceptionsofU.S.national power. Most,ifnotall,nationsandorganizationsrecognizethefactthattheUnited States,astheworldssolesuperpower,retainstheabilitytoalterthepowerrelationships inanyregionthroughtheapplicationofitsmilitarycapability.Although,when committed,U.S.forcescan andwilleventuallydominatemostmilitarysituations,the processleadingtotheircommitment,alongsidetheshortattentionspanoftheU.S.public andapenchantforimmediateactionandquickreturntonormalcy,offerareasfor exploitationinallphasesofmilitaryoperations. Someforeignwritingsindicateabeliefthatitispossibletocreateconditionsthat permitmilitaryoperationsintheirregionswithoutelicitingU.S.involvement.Such conditionsettinginvolveseitherinitiatingormaintainingalevelortypeofengagement thatavoidsundueattentionbytheUnitedStates,inessenceflyingbelowtheU.S.radar screen,orestablishingahigherthresholdofriskascomparedtotheperceivedlevelof U.S.nationalinterest. Arelatedemergingthoughtisthat,iftheadversarycanincreasethetempoof regional,conventionaloperationsachieverapidconclusionandthenpositionitselfto takeonU.S.forces,thenthereispotentialthattheUnitedStateswillnotengage.Such actionisunderpinnedbystrategicoperations(antiaccessoperations)thatassistinforcing theU.S.tosuchaculminatingpoint.Theadvantageinthisapproachisthatitpositionsa potentialadversarytoaccomplishhisobjectives,prolongtheconflict,inflictcasualties, preservehisownregime,anddealsuccessfullywithanattackbytheUnitedStatesora U.S.ledcoalition. Preemptionisalwaysapartofthestrategiccalculus.Previously,preemptionhas beenaonesidedoption.Now,theuseofpreemptionisbecomingattractive,indeed viable,tobothsidesinapotentialdisputeoractualconflict.Futureadversarieswill considertheoptionofpreemptingthepreemptor,ineffectseizingtheinitiativeand momentumintheU.S.homelandandin theregion oftheJOA.Thisapproachnests withintheoverarchingnotionthatopponentsmayseektoprecludeU.S.engagement throughaggressive,anticipatorybehavior.Moreonthisaspectcanbefoundinthe discussionofemergingadversaryoperational designstofollow. Insummary,astrategicdesignthatbalancesaneedtoengageandevendominate inaregion,whilerecognizingtheneedforshapingandpreparingactionsagainstthe UnitedStates/U.S.ledcoalition,offersadvantagestoarangeofopponents.Further,this designisinaccordwiththetrendofinternationaldiscussionandopinion.Thiswould involveconcertedactionthroughacombinationofmeansandapproacheskineticand nonkineticacrossallelementsofnationalpower.Theadversarywouldactwithan
appropriatedegreeofprecisionandsimultaneityintheU.S.homeland,throughout the region oftheconflict,andonhisowngroundtodominateregionalparticipantsor bystanders,ortoprecludeorengagetheUnitedStatesanditslikelyallies. Theadversary wouldthenquicklytransitiontoadaptive,asymmetricoperationstocounteraU.S.led offensive,denyingaccess,andraisingthecosttoalevelthathebelievestheUnitedStates willultimatelydeemprohibitive. EMERGINGADVERSARYOPERATIONALDESIGNS WhiletherearemanyinnovativewaystocounteraU.S.militaryincursion,most potentialadversariesappeartobediscussingoperationsagainsttheUnitedStates that centeron: PrecludingU.S.involvement Operationallyexcludingitfromtheregion Limitingitsaccess Attackingitssystemofsystems Settingconditionsandconductingtacticalandoperationalstrikes Conductingpervasivestrategicattack Theseoperationsinvolvefixedandadaptivecapabilities,tactics,andactions,used continuouslythroughoutaconflict. StrategicPreclusion Opponentswillattempttoachievestrategicpreclusionbycompletely deterringU.S.involvementorbyseverelylimitingitsscopeandintensity.This willinvolveIO,diplomacy,andeconomicpressure,aswellaspossessingand intimatingtheuseofspecificcapabilities(forexample,WME)thatwillcausethe UnitedStatestoweighthevaluegainedversustheriskininvolvement.States willbethemostlikelyandcapableactorstoconductstrategicpreclusion. However,nonstateentitieswithinterestsandinfluenceinthearea,suchas transnational,ideological,religious,ethnic,orcriminalorganizations,mayalso considerandattempttousepreclusiveactions. Strategicpreclusioninvolvesallelementsofanentityspower.The primarytargetistheinternationalcommunityandU.S.politicalornationalwill. Preclusiveactionsarelikelytobecontinuousthroughoutallstagesofconflict, increasinginviolence,intensity,andscopeastheUnitedStatesmovescloserto 43 action. Whilepursuingpreclusion,adversarieswillengageinoperational preparationandmethodsthatattempttolimitthescopeofU.S.involvementor causeittoterminatequicklybycollapsinginternationalandnationalwill.This couldentailpreemptiveattack. OperationalExclusion
Basedontheirperceptionsofhistoricalpatternsofdeploymentand employment,futureopponentswill applyoperationalexclusiontopreventU.S. forcesfromobtainingandusingoperatingbasesintheregion,andinsodoing, delayorprecludeAmericanmilitaryoperations.Increasedthreatstoforward basesraisetheriskstoU.S.forces,hinderingoperationalphasinganddiminishing hostnationsupportforprotectionofU.S.LOCs.Whileitispossibleforthe UnitedStatestoconductanairandmissilecampaignwithoutforwardbasing,a campaignusingexclusivelystrategicratherthanamixofstrategicandoperational reachwouldbegreatlydiminishedinitseffectiveness,stayingpower,andtempo. Operationalexclusionappliesdiplomacy,demonstration,andcoercionto keepotherregionalplayersonthesidelines.Itincludescapabilitiesthathave operationalreachmediumrangeballisticandcruisemissiles,specialpurpose forces,andWMEtonamejustafew.Astheperceptionoftheinevitabilityof U.S.operationsgrows,exclusionwillentailpreemptiveattack,quitepossiblywith WME. AccessLimitation Militarycapabilityisnotmeasuredintermsofwhatamilitarypossesses, butratherwhatitcaneffectivelybringtobeartoaccomplishpolitical objectives/behaviormodification.Mostpotentialadversariesarebeginningto concludethat,bydevelopingtheabilitytolimit/interruptaccess,itwillbe possibletoreduceU.S.militarycapabilitytoamanageableand,incertaincases, vulnerablelevel,evenifonlyforalimitedperiodoftime.Therefore,an adversary willattempttolimit,meter,ordisruptaccesstotheareaofconflict.He willcontinuouslyattackthejointforceindepth,usingallavailablemeansto strikekeyorcriticalforcecomponents,suchasAPODs/SPODsand 44 APOEs/SPOEs,LOCs,stagingbases,andseaandairtransports. OperationalShielding MostnationshaveconcludedthatU.S.militarysuccessdependson the effectivenessofitsairandmissileforces.Operationalshieldinginvolves employingsystemsandmethodsdesignedtooffsettheeffectsofprecisionlong rangeairandmissileattacks,givingtheopponentadegreeofoperationalfreedom andawaytopreservemilitarycapabilities.Thisentailsnotonlyairandmissile defensecapabilitiesbutalsodispersedformations,operationsconductedfrom areasofmoralandphysicalsanctuary,attacksonairandmissilelaunchbasesand platforms,andtheshieldinginherenttodualusefacilities,suchascommandposts andcivilianhospitals. AdaptiveOperationsandTransitions Conventional,guerrilla,paramilitary,police(regularandspecial),and specialpurposeforcescontinuetobepresentwithinalloperationalenvironments, influencingmilitaryactivities.However,anewoperationaldesignappearstobe emerging,builtaroundtherapiditywithwhichthesecapabilitieschangeand interactastheprincipaloperationalconstruct.Opponentswillseektoredefinethe environmentandcreateadvantageousasymmetricconditionsbyquicklychanging
thenatureoftheconflictwithaneyetowardemployingacapabilityforwhichthe UnitedStatesisleastprepared,unabletoanticipateanddeny,ordeemsunworthy of responding,givenriskassessments.Capabilitiesandtheirparticularstrengths willthusmovetotheforefront. SystemsWarfare TheUnitedStateshasbeenveryopeninitsfocusonjointinteroperability andachievingdecisivecombatpowerthroughthesynergyofallitsresident capabilitiesfunctioninginanetworkedandcoherentfashion.Potential adversariesarebeginningtorealizethat,becausematchingtheUnitedStatesin forceonforcecombatisunrealistic,conflictwithitmustentailanoperational frameworkfordisaggregatinganddegradingtheU.S.systemofsystemsintoits lesscapablecomponentorindividualparts.Iftheycanaccomplishthis,potential adversariescancompetemoreevenlywithgreateroddsoffavorableoutcomes. Futureadversarieswillattempttofindandattackcriticallinks,nodes, seams,andvulnerabilitiesinU.S.systemsthatofferthebestopportunitytolevel theplayingfield.Theywillconductsomevariantofeffectsbasedoperations, planning,andassessmentagainstU.S.activitiesandsystems.ThisentailsISR capabilitieslinkeddirectlytofires(tactical,operationalandstrategic,lethaland nonlethal),tailoredoperationalformations,paramilitary,specialpurpose,and guerrillaunitsalltaskedtoaffectspecificcapabilitieswhoselossordegradation 45 willsignificantlyreduceoverallforceeffectiveness. Strike AlthoughadversarystrategiesagainsttheUnitedStateswillprimarilybe defensiveinnature,opportunitiesforsignificantoffensiveoperationswillbe presentundertherightcircumstancesorwhentherightopportunitycanbe created.Enemieswillmaneuvertheirforcesground,air,maritime,information, andspecialpurposeinordertomasseffectsratherthanforces.Thiswillallow opponentstogainthebenefitsofmaneuverandmasswithoutbeingexposedto theoverwhelmingU.S.advantageinstandoffprecision.However,opponentswill maneuverinthismanneronlywhenservingahigherpurposeandtacticaldecision canbeassured.They willrecognizetheriskinherenttoanymaneuverthatmay exposethemtononlethalattacksorevenrapiddestructioninmoreopencombat. StrategicAttack Defensiveoperationsattheoperationalandtacticallevelswillbe combinedwithstrategicattack. StrategicattackonAmericawillbedesignedto haveadirecteffectonthenationalwill,thecoherenceofnationalpower,the leadership,andU.S.strategy.ToweardownAmericaswilltocontinuea conflict,futureadversarieswillcontinuouslyemploythosestrategicactionsthey believewillelicitthemostpowerfulsecondandthirdordereffects,suchasIO, terrorism,crime,attacksoncoalitionandsupportingnations,andeconomic sabotage.Strategicattackwillseektoexploitseamsinalliancesandcoalitions, focusingonthemostvulnerablepartners.Strategicattackscouldalsofocuson neutrals,NGOs,andpowerfulmultinationalcorporations.Adversariesmay
conductstrategicattackintheU.S.homeland,onthebattlefield,andanywherein between,butinallcasessuchattackswillbemultidimensionalandtimely,and fullyintegratedwithtacticalandoperationaldesigntocreatethegreatesteffects possible. CulturalWarfare Whenanadversaryisfightingonhishomeground,hewilltakeevery opportunitytoaggravateandintensifythefrictionthatoccurswhentwodiffering culturesmustinteractinthecontextofanemergingorongoingconflict,hecan leveragethisfrictiontohisadvantage.Adversarieswillexploiteveryopportunity topublicizeanyrealorperceivedassaultonthenativeculturebytheU.S.Their successwillenablethemtointensifyoppositiontotheU.S.andextendthe durationoftheconflict. HOWTHEADVERSARYWILLFIGHT THE10METERTARGET. Recenteventshavereinforcedourcharacterizationof potentialadversariesassmartandadaptiveentitieswithagoodgraspofUSstrengthsand vulnerabilities.Whilemaintainingafocusontheelementsof operational design discussedabove,theadversarywilladjusttheorganizationsandmethodologieshe pursuestoapplythoseelements. Ourexaminationofafutureoperationalenvironment mustencompassallfourchallengesandaddressthefullarrayofpotentialadversaries. TheJOEincludesadiscussionofpotentialpeercompetitorsandregionalchallengers withtheabilitytopresentacredibletraditionalchallengeaswellasnonstateactorsor evenindividualswhomayposeacatastrophicchallengetoU.S.interestsandforcesinthe 2030timeframe.Atthesametime,wecannotfailtounderstandtheimplicationsof recenteventsintheMiddleEastwhichinformusastothenatureofthe10metertarget. Adversarieshavedemonstratedaninnovation,agility,andadaptivitythatallow themtoseizeandmaintaintheinitiativeandoftenachievetactical andoperational surprisewithstrategicimplications. Tocounterthistrendwemustfirstacknowledge theirsuccessandthenidentifythecriticalenablers. 9/11awakenedustothethreatof aterroristorganization withthemotivationand capabilitytostrikeatourcriticalinfrastructureinthehomeland.Ourreactiontothat threatandtheearlysuccessofouroperationsinAfghanistanandIraqcontributedtothe emergenceof militiasasnonstateactorsintheoperationalenvironment.Othertrends discussedearlierindicatethatmilitiasandsimilarentitieswillcontinuetodevelopfora varietyofreasons.Whiletheycanbecharacterizedaspredominantlyanirregular challenge,militiaswillalmostcertainly developcapabilitieswhichenableacombination oftraditional,catastrophic,anddisruptivechallengestocomplementirregular capabilities. Thechallengesposedbythesemilitiaorganizationswillbeembeddedinthe operationalenvironmentofthefuture. Whilemilitiasorganizeinmanydifferentwaysforavarietyofreasons,themilitia organizationsweareconcernedwitharethosethatarisetofillavacuumofpowerand thenusetheirpowertochallengeUSinterestsandthosemilitiascovertlyraisedbyastate toachieveitsownpurposeswhilemaintainingplausibledeniability.In eithercase,these
militiasaresupportedbyandwillactasaproxyforastatethatisunableorunwillingto challengetheU.S.directly.Statesponsorshipprovidesopenlyorinsecretpolitical cover,sanctuary,financialsupport,equipment,training,technologicaloroperational expertise,andinsomecaseslegitimacy. Statesponsorshipofexistingmilitiasand militialikeorganizationsismanifestedinthefollowingtrends: Accesstoexternaltraining.Militiasoldiersreceivetraininginsanctuaries providedbysympatheticgovernmentsoravailableinungovernedareas.This trainingcoversthespectrumfromabasictrainingregimentospecialweapons trainingtosophisticatedscienceandtechnologyeducations. Accesstoweapons.Sponsorsprovidenotjustthebasicsmallarms,butin manycases,accesstosophisticatedcapabilitiesintheantitank,airdefense, andindirectfirefunctions,andpotentialaccessto technologiesthatwill enablethemtoproduceweaponsofmasseffectsinthebiological,chemical, andnuclearareas. SpecializedsniperweaponsandmunitionsandImprovised ExplosiveDevicetechnologieswillcontinuetoproliferateamongour adversaries. Sophisticatedmediaandinformationoperationssupport.Sponsorsprovide expertiseincraftingtheIOcampaignsmessageaswellasaccessto communicationsanddistributionmethodsandequipment.Itisquitelikely thatthesponsors agendamaydominatetheIOcampaignusingthemilitiato provideasympatheticinterpretationofthatmessage. Supportingtheinformationcampaignwithviolentattacksagainstthenations governance,infrastructure,andpopulation.Militiassucceedwherethereisa vacuumofpower.Theseattackshelpcreatethatvacuum,ortheperceptionof avacuum. Buildinganinternational andregionalpoliticalandsocialconsensustooust externalactors,especiallytheU.S. Whenmilitiasengageininsurgency,they willseektoisolatethegovernmentanddenyexternalsupport.Inmostofour recentandongoingexperience,thetrendistodriveouttheU.S.influencein allareas,notjustamilitarypresence. Militiashavedemonstratedthecapabilitytothoroughlyplanandpreparecomplex operationsagainstamaterially andtechnologicallydominantfoe.Inthefuture operationalenvironmentwecananticipate: Asymmetricapproachattackingweaknesseswhileavoidingstrengths. Welltrainedforcesindividualsandsmallunits. Effectivecommandandcontrolusingavarietyofmeans,
Coordinatedcombinedarmsoperations,e.g.,mortars,lightinfantry, ATGM,MANPADSandsnipersconductingawellsynchronizedand sequencedambush. EffectiveISR,extensiveHUMINTanduseofUAVs. Introductionofleadingedgetechnologies/weapons: IEDwithexplosivelyformedpenetrators,sensors,andpotentially chem./bio/radiologicalpackages. Smallarmsenhancingsniperoperationsandprovidingan anti materiel,armorpiercingcapability. Enhancedindirectfiremunitionsincreasingeffectivenessthroughuse ofproximityfuses,clustermunitions,andsmartmunitions. ImprovedATGMandRPGmunitions,usedagainstavarietyof hardenedpointtargets,notexclusivelyarmoredvehicles. ProliferationoflowaltitudeairdefenseandSAM.Useoftechnology andnumberstooverwhelmdefenses. Thermobarics,enhancingtheeffectsofweaponssystems. IncreaseduseofUAVsinbothanISRandattackrole. Asthesetrendsareintroducedandevolveinthefutureoperationalenvironment, wellplanned,complexoperationsexecutedwithgreatproficiencybywelltrained personnel willbecomethenorm.Theadversary will leverageinformationtechnologies tomanipulatethemediaandthephenomenaoftheglobalinformation gridtoinstantly shareexperienceandlessonslearned.InnovativeTTPwill adoptemergingtechnologies andadapttoexploitsuccessesandavoidrepeatingfailure. Inshort,thiswillbethesmart adaptiveadversarywehaveanticipated. THEEVOLVINGADVERSARY.Asthismilitiathreatgrowsinthefuture operationalenvironment,otherpotentialadversarieswilladoptthosemethodsthat promisesuccess.Howevermuchtheevolutionofthemilitiathreatinformsthe operationsofafutureadversary,itisunlikelytoalterthefundamental operationaldesigns andtacticsfutureadversariesarelikelytouseinaconflictwiththeUnitedStates. Both traditionalandirregularchallengerswillmostlikelyusesomecombinationofthebelow methods: MostoperationsagainsttheUnitedStateswillbeforceoriented,focusedon oneofouruniversallyperceivedstrategiccenters ofgravitymasscasualties. FutureU.S.opponentscannotaffordtofixateonholdingterrainorfacilities. Sophisticatedambushestactical,operational,andstrategicwillbeplanned andconducted.Bothtraditionalandnontraditionalinformationcollection andanalysiswillconvergewithattackstructurestodestroymajorsystems, achievemasscasualties,andreceiverapidfeedbackonoutcomes.These
ambusheswillcutacrossalldomainsland,sea,air,space(groundlinksand nodes),andinformation. Adversarieswillseektocreatesanctuaryinnoncombatantcountries, ungovernedorunpolicedareas,complexterrain,andurbanenvironmentsto offsetU.S.standoffoperationsandnegatetechnologicalovermatch.The adversarywillwidelydispersenaval,ground,andairandmissilecapabilities, formingandconductingoperationsasopportunitiespresentthemselvesorare created.HewillmaneuverduringperiodsofreducedexposuretoISR technologies. Tempowillbeimportanttoopponentsbecauseofitsimportanceinachieving objectives.Earlycontroloftempowillallowthemtosetconditionsforentry denialoperationsbeforetheUnitedStatescangainafootholdintheregion. When U.S.forcesarriveintheAOR,theadversarywillseektoprolongthe conflict,avoiddecisivebattle,andchangethenatureofconflict.Thisis designedtoattacktheperceivedU.S.weaknessoflongtermcommitmentand aversiontoassociatedcostsinlivesandtreasure. Extensiveinternalandexternalinformationoperationsandsystemattackswill becommon. Opponentswillconductantiaccessandentrydenialoperations,attacking APODsandAPOEs,SPODsandSPOEs,aswellasLOCs.Theywillemploy conventionalmunitions,weaponsofmasseffects,informationoperations,and combinations.Preemptiveattackinthiscontextisverylikely. TherewillbesignificantcapabilityupgradestosupportC3D2atall echelons andthroughoutallbattlefieldoperatingsystems.Airandmissiledefense technologyandsystemsarelikelytobeingreatdemand.Currently,thereis intenseR&Dincounterprecisiontechnologythatwillimprovesuch capabilitiesoverthenexttwodecades. Adversarieswillusecommercialintelligencesupportandpackaging,for example,humanintelligence(HUMINT)andspacebasedISRsystems,to supportprecisiontargetingandprovideincreasedsituationalawareness. Cyberspaceintelligenceandknowledgeoperationswillbewidespread. Opponentswillbuildandemploycoalitions,bothfriendlyandadversarial,to limitthenatureofoperations. Adversarieswillleverageterrorismtodenysanctuaryanddisruptforce projectionoperations. Hybridizationofcurrentsystemswithnewtechnologyandacquisitionof discreteadvancedtechnologieswillcreatetechnologicalsurpriseandshort termovermatchinspecificareas. DEMANDSOFANINTENSIFIEDBATTLESPACE Despitepopularnotionsoftechnologybringingtheworldabloodlessandmore humanetypeofwarfare,thefuturebattlespacewillnotbeasterile,nonlethalworldof
fiberopticbasedcommunications,roboticsystems,andarcadewarriors.Indeed,future integratedclosecombatwillbemuchmoreepisodic,dynamic,lethal,unpredictable,and combinatorial,particularlywiththeuseofIO.Itwillpossessgreaterintensity,increased tempo,greaterdomainscope,interrelationships,andinterdependencies,andgreater uncertaintythatplaceincreasedvalueonthehuman(thinking,planning,acting,assessing feedback,andmodifying)ratherthanthetechnologicaldimension.Suchcombatwillalso havegreaterpsychologicalandemotionalimpact.Itwillrequiregreaterteamworkatall levelsacrosstheentirejointforceandwillplacesignificantdemandsonindividualand unitdiscipline.Integrated,closecombatwillrequirematureleadersmentallyand physicallytoughwithsuperbcognitiveandreasoningskillswhoaremastersoftactical warfighting. PhysicalEnvironment Thephysicalenvironmentisandwillremainoneofthemostcritical elementsofintegratedcombat.Itisthedefiningvariablebecauseitprescribesnot onlythenatureofconflict,butalsothenatureoftheforcesthatfight. Consequently,militaryforcesareoftenoptimizedforparticularenvironments. CurrentU.S.forceshavebeenoptimizedforcombatincertain environments.Navalforceswereintendedtofightonthehigh seasandground forcesintherollingandopenhillsofEuropeconditionsaffordingtarget acquisitionandengagementatextendedranges.AllU.S.forcesweredesignedto fightwiththeadvantagesofairdominanceandaphysicalenvironmentwith robustinfrastructure.Tooperateinthistypeofenvironment,theU.S.developed tacticaldoctrinebuiltaroundfocusingeffectsagainstanechelonedfoeand destroyinghimthroughoutthedepthofthebattlespace.Thisdoctrineand supportingforcedesignprovidedtheU.S.militaryovermatchingpoweragainst organizedstateswithconventionalforcesoperatingwithaconventionalstrategy anddoctrine. Mostnationsunderstandtheabove,havingstudiedtheU.S.military structure,organization,doctrine,andtechnicalcapabilities.Futureopponentswill seektoavoidsymmetricaloperationsinenvironmentsoptimizedforU.S. capabilitiesandwilloftenseektooperatefromurbanandothercomplexsettings. Theyrealizethat,althoughprecisionmunitionsprovideatooltostriketargetsin suchsettings,anyassociatedcollateraldamagemaybeunacceptable. Anoteofcautioniswarranted.Thisparadigmwillremaintrueuntil opponentsacquiresystemsortechnologiesthatallowthemtoblindordeceive U.S.ISRandtargetacquisitioncapabilities,neutralizeU.S.precisionattack means,ordevelopequaldirectandindirectfirestandoffsystems.Whenthese typesofsystemsandtechnologiesemerge,adversariesmayoccasionallyseekto gainadvantagefrommobility,maneuver,mass,andmomentuminmore traditionalsettings.Doingsowillallowthemtoregaintheinitiative,continueto pursuetheirobjectivesandcreateopportunitiesforfasterculmination. Operationsincomplexterrainandurbanenvironmentsalterthebasic natureofintegratedclosecombat.Historydemonstratesthatbecauseofthe proximityofforces,engagementswillbemorefrequentandoccurmorerapidly.
Therewillbegreateropportunityforsurprise,andlossofcontactwiththeenemy willhavegreaterconsequencesthaninmoreopenenvironments.Extensive HUMINTnetworks,whicharemoreeffectivethantechnicalISRinthese environments,willprovideopponentsequalorgreatersituationalawarenessto thatofU.S.forces.Integratedclosecombatsignificantlyreducestherangeof weaponsandtargetacquisitionsystems,degradingtheU.S.advantageinstandoff warfare. Althoughprecisionmunitionsdeliveredfromlongrangeswillbe employed,maneuverwarfarewithgreaterprecisionovershortdistanceswillbe required.Highgradecommercialintelligencewillbeavailabletoalladversaries. Communicationswillbehardertokeeprunningbecauseofenvironmental constraintsandinformationoperations.Linesofcommunicationwillbemore difficulttosecureonacontinuousbasisandcombatservicesupportunitswillbe morevulnerable.Therewillbenosanctuaryavailableforforcereorganization andregeneration. Withinthecomplexitiesofthisenvironment,adversarieswillattemptto forceU.S.unitsintorapidandcontinuoustransitionsamongtypesoftactical operationstothrowthemoffbalance,disturbcoherence,slowandalterdecision making,andcreatewindowsofvulnerability.Noncontiguous,nonlinearenemy actionswithinthetacticalandoperationalbattlespacewillforcerapidchangesin organizationforcombat.Theenemywillseektocreateandexploitconditionsfor whichU.S.unitsarenotproperlypreparedeitherinorganizationorinplanning, rapidlyseekingtoexploitU.S.forceswhenfoundillpreparedfortheparticular situation.Battlewillbemoreorlesscontinuouswithsomelullsandsharppeaks inviolence. Finally,futureenemieswillprobablyhavesomewhatlessadvanced systemssystemstheUnitedStatesdiscountsbecauseofrangelimitationsorage. Incomplexterrainandurbansettings,thesesystemsmayagainfindeffective uses.Incertaincircumstances,lowtechnologyorgoodenoughtechnologywill outperformhighcost,cuttingedgetechnology.Whatisthebottomline?United Statesjointforcesmustbeabletorapidlyachievefullspectrumdominanceinany physicalandnonphysicalenvironmentagainstallopponents. Unpredictability Anadversary willbedifficulttotemplateasheadaptsandattemptsto createopportunity.Hewilldeveloppatternsofoperationdifficulttodiscernthat willchangeasheachievessuccessorexperiencesfailureinengagements.His doctrinewillnotchangebuthiswayofoperatingwill.Thereislittlelikelihood thatU.S.forceswillfaceanopponentpredictablyechelonedindepthwho attemptstodestroyU.S.forceswithactionsbasedpurelyonmassand 46 momentum. Instead,hewillsetsophisticatedambushesusingconventional operationalsignaturestolureunitsintokillzonesandattackwithcombinationsof conventionalandunconventionalweapons.Hewillusecivilianpopulationsas hostagesandobstaclesagainstU.S.operationsfromsea,air,land,orinformation domains.Civilianswillprovideawaytoshapethebattlespace.Intodays environment(mostnotablyAfghanistanandIraq)andfortheforeseeablefuture,
thepositioningandactivitiesofenemyforcesaswellasintegrated,close combatmeansandmethodswillbelesspredictable. Thisincreasedunpredictability,coupledwiththedifficultnatureofthe environment,willcreateuncertainty.Withuncertaintycomesincreasedriskanda greaterdangerofunexpectedorunintendedconsequences.Thisappliesina networkcentricforcethatreliesontotalsituationalawarenessasoneofits principaloperatingconstructs,ratherthaninaforceconditionedtolessdetailed views.TheadversarywillwantU.S.leaderstomakedecisionsfromdata.The oddsofmiscalculationanderrorincreaseexponentiallywhenleadersmake decisionsfromdata,particularlyatoperationalandstrategiclevels.The adversarywillexploitthisfact.Hisunpredictabilitywillconfoundourviewof thebattlefieldcalculus. Deceptionoperations,animperativewhenfightingaU.S.force,willfocus onconvincingU.S.commandersthatpredictableconventionaltacticsarebeing employed,therebymakingtheU.S.forcevulnerabletounconventionalformations andactions.ThiswillslowU.S.tacticalandoperationaldecisionmaking.United Statescommanderswillfinditdifficulttofocusthemselvesandtheirunitsona singleactionbutinsteadwillhavetoaccountformultipleactionsandevents. Further,U.S.commandersmayhavemorethanenoughinformationtodetermine wheretheenemyisandeventodeterminetheintentofthevariousunitshehas identified.ThedangeristhatU.S.commanderswilltrytorationalizethis informationwithintheconfinesofaconventionalwarfareconstruct,not interpretingitwithinthelesspredictiveandmoreambiguouscomplex environment. Technology Technologyisanotherfactorthatwillplayheavilyinfutureintegrated combat.Whilenewtechnologieswillincreaseenemycapabilities(andshould thusbecarefullymonitored),theyarebynomeanstheonlymeasureofforce capability.Oldtechnologiesmaybemorevaluabletoopponentsinnewsettings undernewmethodsofoperation.Inaddition,newtechnologieswillcreatenew capabilitiesinoldsystemsashybridizationprovidesrapidsystemsimprovement. Hybridsystemscanoffertacticaltechnicalsurprisebecausetheimprovementin 47 capabilityisofteninternaltothesystemandnotalwayseasilydetectable. Hybridsystemswithnewtechnology,orimprovedsystemsusingnewtechnology, canaltertheconditionsofintegrated,closecombatduringongoingoperations. Theabilitytorapidlyacquireandintegratetechnologywillpresenta significantproblemformilitarycommanders.Inadditiontoadaptiveadversary tacticsthatchangewitheachengagement,thereispotentialforadaptiveadversary systems.Anexamplemightbeacomputerizedfirecontrolsystemthathas limitationsbasedonsoftwareinitssystem.Softwareupgradescanbepurchased fromothernationsortransnationalorganizations,transmittedanddownloaded electronically,andappliedinamatterofminutes.Becausethebasicoperationof thesystemisunchanged,theimprovementistransparenttotheuser,thereby increasingsystemperformancewithnotimeconsumingretraining.Furthermore, therapidgrowthandproliferation ofnewtechnologyallowsopponentstoachieve
equalityorevenovermatchU.S.systemsinnicheareas.Forexample,antiGPS forelectronicattackwilldegradeU.S.precisionattackcapabilities.Further,the wideproliferationofnightvisioncapabilitiesgivesevenlesstechnicallycapable opponentsaparallelnightcapability. Thelackofassuredtechnologicalovermatchplacesgreaterdemandson otherforcequalitiessuchasorganization,training,andleadershipskills. Unfortunately,newinformation systemsandcommunicationtechnologieshave thepotentialforraisingthethreathighbaronthesequalitiesaswell.For example,communicationsystemsandinformationtechnologycouldprovide tacticalexperience,accelerateplanning,andfosterinnovation.Adversarieswill engageincollaborativeinformationenvironmentsessionstodevelopvaluable knowledge.Leadersandunitswithinanareaofconflictwilllinkelectronicallyto alliesandexternalorganizations,individualsorstructuresoutsidetheareato obtainideas,plans,orguidancefordealingwithtacticalproblems.Virtual leadersandoperationalplannerswilladdprofessionalqualitiestoforcesthathave limitedexperience,training,andskill.TheInternetwillcontinuetobeavaluable sourceofinformationaswell.Theresultantexperience,advice,andassistance receivedcouldbeinstrumentalinfutureintegratedcombatoperations. Information Informationisanotherkeyvariableofthetotalenvironmentandis relevanttoclose,integratedcombatsituations.Thecontinuedandrapidly increasingexpansionofITandinformationsystemswillbeofgreatassistanceto commanders,butitisadoubleedgedsword.AdvancesinITmakecombat operationsincreasinglytransparent.Presentandfuturedecisionsandplansmade atthehighestlevels,andtheactionstakenbyservicemembersareoften incorporatedintotheglobalnetworkofdataavailabletothemasses. Futureadversarieswillexploitverticalandpublictransparency,oraccess todata,toproducetacticalandoperationalconfusionandindecisiveaction.They willaccomplishthisbygeneratingconflictinginformationandinsertingitover differentsystemsaimedatmultipleaudiencesfromecheloneddecisionmakersto thepublicatlarge.Tactically,forexample,theadversarycouldprovide conflictingdatathroughreconnaissanceteams,brigadeHUMINT,carriergroup signalsintelligence(SIGINT),theaterJSTARSsystems,andcommunications systems.Ifnottacticallyreconciledin thisverydecentralizedanddispersed threatoperatingpattern,thiscouldresultinconflictingactions,theexpenditureof scarceresources,andrampantconfusionatvariouslevels.Theopportunitiesto createsuchconfusionwilldriveadversariestoexpandpsychologicaloperations, deception,andinformationattackateveryechelon. ItisreadilyapparentthattheUnitedStatescannotfullycontrolthe ubiquitous,fullynetworkedinformationsystemsenvironment.Thiscreatesa problemforU.S.situationalawareness.Incomplexsettings,U.S.technicalISR systemswillhavedifficultyprovidingqualitydata,information,andknowledge, atleastfortheforeseeablefuture.Additionally,itislikelythatadversaries indigenoustotheregionwillpossessgreatersituationalawarenessthanthatof U.S.forces.TheywillusecommercialISRsystemsforthelargerintelligence
picture.Humannetworks(bothHUMINTsourcesandenclavesoflocals)using normaltelephonelinesorwithcellulartelephonescanbeexpectedtobe operating.BytakingadvantageofthisHUMINTelement,adversariescould achievegreatersituationalawarenessconcerningU.S.actionsthantheUnited Statesforcescouldconcerningtheirs. Time/Tempo Thelastandpossiblymostimportantvariableforintegratedclosecombatistime,or tempo.Dictatingthetempoofanoperationoractionaffordsadecidedadvantagetothe sidethatcontrolsit.Historically,U.S.forceshaveattemptedtokeeptheenemyoff balancebyslowingorhaltinghismomentum,thenacceleratingthetempoastheyseek theinitiative.Americanforcesremainattachedtothisparadigm,althoughfordifferent reasons.Withaforceprojectionrequirement,logicallytheywouldseektoslowan opponentsactionsintheearlystagesofanoperationatleastuntilU.S.forcesareable tobuildsufficientcombatpower.Then,U.S.forcesacceleratetempotorapidlydestroy, defeat,orcompel.SuchwereouractionsinDesertStorm,inKosovo,and,more recently,inIraq. SinceKosovo, andcertainlyinIraq, theUnitedStatesisfacingan opponentwhounderstandsthisfactorand,asaconsequence,controlsthepaceandtiming 48 ofhisoperationstofrustrateU.S.attemptstoseizetheinitiative. Controllingtempoat thetacticallevelcanindeedgenerateoperationalandevenstrategicconsequences.U.S. plannerscannotallowthetimingandtempoofU.S.operationstobedictatedbypotential enemies.Thevagariesinvolvedinsettingthepoliticalconditionsandaccommodating politicallydefinedoutcomeswilloftendictatetempo.Adversarieswillattemptto manipulatepoliticalconditionsettingtoattainmilitaryadvantages.ThewaytheUnited Statessolvesthisdilemmawillhavemajorimplicationsforsuccessfulfutureoperations.
ANNEXC DOTMLPFDomainImplications
Fromthepreviousbroad,macroimplications,severalmorespecificimplicationsforthe domainsofdoctrine,organizations,trainingandeducation,materiel,andleadershipcome forth. Doctrine RELEVANCYOFDOCTRINE. Doctrinewillremainrelevantifitis responsivetotherapidlychangingandcomplexenvironmentinwhichU.S. militaryforceswilloperate. DOCTRINALPROCESSES. Severalpointsrelatetodoctrinal processes. Thedoctrinalprocessshouldnotbelongandlaborious.Itshould beresponsivetochangeorthedoctrinerisksbecomingirrelevant. Doctrinewillcontinueasthebasisfortrainingandeducation,and willhaveparticularlyheavyinfluenceonleadership,materiel,and organizational development. Militarypersonnelofallrankswillaccessdoctrinetactics, techniques,andprocedures,(TTP)andlessonslearneddatabasesfrom theirlocationusingpowerfulsearchengines,andintelligentagentsonthe Internet.Personnelwillbenotifiedofchangesindoctrine,TTP,and lessonslearnedbyuserdefinedinstantmessengernotification. VARIATIONONTHETHEMEOFADVANTAGE. Owingto the complexityofoperationalenvironmentsandtoadaptive,learningadversaries, manyrelativeadvantageswillexist.Antagonistswillstruggletoseekandsustain anynumberofadvantages,includingcombinationsofinitiative,momentum, tempo,decision,intellectual(thinkingandplanning),technological,position (physicalandcyberspace),andaction. NEWSOURCESOFDATA,INFORMATION,ANDKNOWLEDGE. Antagonistswillbeinterestedinmorethantraditionalintelligencecollection. Doctrinemustexplainnewparadigmsofcollectionactivitiesandexpandto explainhowknowledgeenvironments,knowledgearchitectures,knowledge experts,knowledgecenters,andknowledgedatabasesfitintomodernconflict. NEWPARTNERS. Doctrinemustdescribeandexplainhownew partnersworkwithU.S.militaryforces.Coalitionpartnerswillalwaysexistand U.S.militarypersonnelandorganizationswilloperatewithinteragency communitypersonnel.MilitaryforceswillalsointeractwithMNCsandNGOsin virtual,collaborativeinformationenvironments. RECOGNITIONOFMEDIAANDINFLUENCESON PERCEPTIONS. Globalizationhasenhancedtheinfluenceofthemediaon populationsaroundtheworld.Doctrinemusthelppeopleunderstandhow importantthemediaisandwillbeforallaspectsofIO.
ASYMMETRICANDCONVENTIONALTHREATS. Doctrinemust presentrealisticviewsofthechanging,adaptive,andlearningthreatstheUnited Stateswillfaceinthefuture.Itmustnotdisregardtheintellectualcapacityof futureadversariesandtheircapabilitytoform/disbandcoalitionsofadversaries (terrorists,drugcartels,nihilists,criminal organizations,nationstatesarmies,and MNCs)asshowninFigure7.
NATION STATES DRUG CARTELS CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
TERRORISTS MNC
NIHILISTS
Figure7. TheNewAdversary
Organizations NETWORKCENTRICORGANIZATIONS. Networkcentric organizationshaveasthecentralideaoftheiroperationalphilosophythenetwork. Thenetwork,inthisrespect,isaconduitforcollaboration.Thenetworkallows commanderstomaneuverdata,information,andknowledge.Networkcentric describesawayofthinkingitencouragesdecentralizeddecisionmakingatthe lowestfeasiblelevels,selfsynchronizingandselfadjusting.Effectiveandfast decentralizeddecisionsrequireacontinuous,responsiveflowofvaluable informationandknowledge.Networkcentricisaubiquitousconduitfortheflow ofdata,information,knowledge,andsharedsituationalawareness.Operatingina networkcentricorganizationwillalsodriveadjustmentstothemilitarydecision makingprocess(MDMP),asdecisionmakinginanetworkcentricorganizationis verydifferentfromdecisionmakinginthetraditionalhierarchicalorganization. ORGANIZATIONALPROCESSESPHYSICALANDVIRTUAL. Organizationalprocesseswilltakeplacebothphysicallyandvirtually. Commanderswillfindthatcollaborativeinformationenvironments(CIEs) provideatremendousadvantage.Organizationsofthefuturewillfindthemselves workingandusingtheirorganizationalprocessesmuchofthetimeinvirtual collaborativesessions.
HYBRIDORGANIZATIONS.ThechallengespresentedintheJOE demandveryflexibleorganizationaldesigns.Suchorganizationswillhave organizationalmodularityandfunctionalmodularitycapabilitiesthatwillquickly formordisbandbasedonsituationaldemands. ORGANIZATIONALDISCIPLINE. WhencontemplatingtheJOE, organizationswillbeoperatinginCIEs,butdecisionmakerswillstillbemaking organizationaldecisions.Organizationswillbetrainedanddisciplinedenoughto shifttoahierarchicalconstructwhencommandersneedtomakedecisions. LEARNINGORGANIZATIONS. Everyorganizationmustbealearning organization.Inamodern,knowledgecentricorganization,thehumanintellectis thecapitaloftheorganization.Itmustbenurtured,maintained,andpurposefully developed.Intellectualdevelopmentandlearningmustbepartofamonitoring mechanismforknowledgereadiness,whichisthestatusoftheconstituent elementsmakingupthecommandersororganizationsknowledgeenvironment.
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KNOWLEDGECENTRICOPERATIONS. Knowledgewillbecriticalnot onlyforseekingandattainingdecisionsuperiorityanddominance,butalsofor intellectualadvantage.Knowledgewillbesocriticaltosuccessthattherewillbea knowledgesuperiorityorganizationresponsibleforISR,IO,knowledgemanagement, knowledgereadiness,cybercollection,andnontraditionalcollectionandanalysis ORGANIZATIONALFLEXIBILITY. Organizationsmustbeflexible enoughtoworkwithadiversenumberofchangingpartnerorganizations,foreignand domestic,incollaborativeinformationenvironmentsfromfunctionalareasasdiverse asforceprotectioninCONUS,tointelligenceoperations,tostabilityoperationsin objectiveareas. TrainingandEducation REPLICATINGTHEOEANDTHREATCAPABILITIES. Themilitarys CombatTrainingCenters(CTCs)andtheJointNationalTrainingCapability(JNTC) mustreplicatetheOE. Asynthetictrainingenvironmentmustcomplementexisting physicalenvironments.TheU.S.militarymusttrainagainstpersonnelrepresenting bothconventionalandasymmetricadversaries. Theinformationdomainisimportant, yetnoplaceexistsfortrainingandgainingexperiencewiththevagaries,speed, complexity,andinvisiblenatureofthisdomainasitinteractswithactivitiesinother domains. VISUALIZINGTHEFUTURE. Theability toenvisionarangeoffuture realitiesandarticulatetheimplicationsofsuchalternativefuturesisavitalskillthat surfacesinthemilitaryonlybyhappenstance. TheUSmilitarymustcultivateand nurturefuturists.Thisskillisessentialtocreatingtheagilityweneedtobuildintoour conceptanddoctrinedevelopmentprocesses. ORGANIZATIONALTRAININGCONUNDRUM. Organizations, includingthemilitary,faceaconundrum.Thatis,withlimitedamountsoftime, organizationsmustensurethattheirpeopleareproficientinthreeareasof concentration:theuseofsoftwaretoolsbusinessrulesgoverningoperationsinboth physicalandcollaborativeworldsandconstantlearningtoimproveknowledge expertise. INFORMATIONDOMAINTRAINING. Allserviceorjointexercises shouldcontainsignificantamountsoftraininginallaspectsoftheinformation domain(humanfactors,IO,ISR,nontraditionalcollection,communications, collaboration,knowledge,andcyberspace). TRAININGANDEDUCATIONFOROPERATIONSIN CYBERSPACE. Alongwiththeneedtotrainintheinformationdomain, commandersneedsimulationandmodelingtotrainthemselvesandtheirstaffsto operateinavirtual,Internetenvironmentandtoconductknowledgeoperations. CONTINUITYOFLEARNING. Learningmustbecoherent.Thatis,what peoplelearnatparticulartimesandatparticularranksorgradesmustcomplement whattheyhavepreviouslylearned.Learningshouldbecomemoredifficult,
complicated,andsophisticatedasmilitarypersonnelbecomemoreseniorinrank. Increasinglytherewillbeatriadoflearningthatincludesindividuallearning, institutionallearning,andorganizationallearning. TheU.S.militarymustnurtureanddevelopgiftedleaders.Theadversarythat theJOEdescribeswillbesuchthattheUnitedStateswillneeditsbestandbrightest asknowledgewarriorswhowillengageadversarycapabilitiesinknowledgewar, becomestrategists,andwagekineticbasedoperationswhennecessary. LEARNINGNECESSARYTOSUPPORTTHEJOE. TheU.S.military mustnurtureandconstantlydeveloptheintellectsofitspeoplewhowilldobattle withtheconventionalandasymmetricthreatcapabilitiesintheJointOperational Environment. AsU.S.militarypersonnellearntomeetthesethreats,adversarieswill alsobelearningtodeny,destroy,oraffectthedata,information,andknowledgeU.S. forcesdependonformakingsuperiordecisions.
DYNAMICCURRICULUM. Curriculamustchangebasedonimprovements inexistingknowledge,newknowledge,changingjointoperational settings,or improvementsinmodelingandsimulation. Materiel DizzyingtechnologyimprovementswillhelptheUnitedStatescopewiththe complexitiesinherentintheJOE.TheJOEsuggestsorimpliesseveralwaystheU.S. militarycanharnesscreativeforcesintechnologybetterthantoday.Someofthese thoughtsinclude: Improvetheinteractionamongtechnologists,scientists,military operators,andmilitaryplanners. Militaryoperatorsandplannersmust decidewhattechnology can dotohelpinfuturesituationsagainstthreat capabilitiespostulatedintheJOE.Militaryoperatorsandplannersmust providespecificrequirementstoscientistsandtechnologists. UnderstandtheVariables.Incomplexenvironmentswithmultiple complexinteractions,variablesinfluenceactionsandultimatelyeffects. Clearly,theJOEputsforththepropositionthatvariableswillbe increasinglyimportant. Reviewassumptions.Owingtothecomplexitiesofoperational settings describedintheJOE,peoplewillnotknoweverythingtheywouldhope. Thus,theyhavetoformassumptions.Theseassumptionsmustbe continuallychallengedandrevisited. Useperturbationsensing.Softwarewillbeabletodiscernpatternsthat humanswillnotseeeventheslightestperturbationinsystemsor activitiesthatwouldindicatethatanadversarymighthavesensedasystem changeapause,ahaltfornetworkmaintenance,resupply,orrest,ora regrouping.
Employautonomousintelligentagents/wizards.Intelligentagentsand wizardswillhelphumanbeingsperformtheirworkmoreefficientlyand effectivelyandwillbecrucialinthestruggleforsupremacyindecision making. Ascertainsuperiority.TheJOEsuggeststheimportanceofinformation superiority,knowledgesuperiority,knowledgedominance,decision superiority,anddecisiondominance.Scientistsandtechnologistsneedto workondevelopingsuperioritymeasuringsystemstohelpleadersmake betterjudgmentsastothepossessionofsuperiority,whentheyachievedit, howlongtheyhadit,whytheyhadit,andtheaspectsofsuperioritythat canbereclaimed. Exploitcyberbotsandcyberspace.TheJointOperationalEnvironment intimatesthatsomeaspectsoffutureconflictwilloccurincyberspace. Scientistsandtechnologistsmustdevelopsoftwarethatperformsavariety ofrolesandmissionsincyberspace,suchasattack,defend,denialand deception,reconnaissance,surveillance,communications,andother operations.Becausehumanbeingscannotentercyberspacephysically, theyenterthisdomainthroughcyberbotsurrogates. Employrobotics.TheJOEpresentsconditionsformilitaryoperations clearlywarrantingincreasedrolesforrobotics.Robotswillperform variousrolesandmissionstoincludesurveillance,reconnaissance, deception,physicalattack,andinformationattack. Prepareforswarmsandcounterswarms.Bothcombatactivitiesand intelligencecollectionwillexperienceariseintheimportanceof swarmingandminiaturization.Increasinglyincombat,asymmetric adversarieswilluseswarmsofcheap,expendablethingstoaffectthe abilityoftheUnitedStatestousealimitednumberofexpensive,precision munitions. Leadership TheJOEsuggeststheneedforleadercapabilitiesfarbeyondwhatleadersare capableoftoday.Thecomplexityandchaos outlinedintheJOE,thespeedof change,theincreasingsophisticationandcapabilitiesofbothconventionaland asymmetricthreats,andtheheavycognitivedemandsoftheinformationdomain demandthatfutureleadersbroadentheirhorizonsandexpandtheirmental capabilitiesandconstructs.Manypreviouslysuccessfulleadershipcapabilitieswill stillberequiredinthefuture.TheU.S.militarymustretainthosecapabilitiesand expandordevelopnewonestomeettheexigenciesoftheJOE.Thefollowing leadershipimplicationsareapplicabletotheJOE: FUTURELEADERSANDWARGAMING. Futureleaderswillhaveto engageconstantlyinwargamingbecauseitcanidentify possibleact,react,and counteractoutcomes.Itcanalsoidentifyadversarypossibilities,variables,andtheir sensitivities.
EXPANDEDTHINKINGCAPABILITIES. Somethinkingcapabilitiesthat futureleadersmustpossessinclude: Intellectualagility Abilitytosynthesize Breadth/depthofknowledgeandunderstanding Awarenessoftendencytomirrorimage Useunorthodoxapproaches Usingvaluableinformationandknowledgetomakefast,effective decisions Intellectualmultitasking Knowledgeofhowtoscopeandprioritizeinformationandknowledge requirements Theintellectualcapacityandthinkingcapabilitytoknowandunderstand theinformationenvironment Thinkinginmultipledomainsphysicalandcyber/virtual Creatingintellectualsynergy Purposefullyinducingconditionsforpromotingorganizationaland individualcreativity Introspection Respectfor,knowledgeof,andunderstandingdifferencesincultural perspectives Mentoring Creativity Beingagamer THEROLEOFINTUITION. Leadersmakingdecisionsinthesituations portrayedintheJOEwillstillusetheirintuition,buttheywillbeaidedbymachine intelligenceandaconstantflowofawarenessdata,information,andvaluable knowledge. LEADINGFROMTHEEDGE. Leadershipwillmakedecisionsattheedge ofthenetworkwhereconflictsareoccurring.Leadersmakingthesedecisionsonthe edgewillbearmedwithablitzofdata,information,andknowledgeandaplethoraof machines. TRADITIONALANDNONTRADITIONALCONFLICT. Futureleaders willhavetodealwithdifferenttypesofconflict. Struggleforcontrolofdistribution.Struggleswilloccuroverdistribution pointssearoutesandchokepoints,andlandandcyberspacedistribution. Knowledgewar.AstheJOEdescribes,thefutureleaderwillengagein knowledgewar.Thatis,thefutureleaderwillattack,destroy,ordisturbknowledge andknowledgemachinerysupportinganadversarysdecisionmakingprocessesand apparatus.
Leadinginphysicalandvirtualenvironments.Withphysicalenvironments, manyoftheleadershipcharacteristicslearnedthroughtheyears(forexample, integrity,bravery,anddevotion)willcontinuetobeimportant.Theleader,though, willalsoleadinvirtualenvironmentswhilecollaboratingwithahostofotherleaders, planners,knowledgeexperts,interagencyplanners,andoperators.Leadershipinthis invisibleenvironmentwilldifferfromleadinginanenvironmentinwhichpeopleare inthephysicalpresenceofoneanother. Allelementsofnationalpower.TheJOEsuggeststheneedforafutureleader whoisanexpertin an effectsbasedapproachtoplanning,operations,andassessment andusestheseprocessestoseek,find,andsustainamultitudeofbattlespace(physical andcyber)advantages.Thefutureleaderwillknowandunderstandallelementsof nationalpower.Heorshewillworkincreasinglywiththeinteragencycommunity andnewcombinationsofcoalitionpartners,NGOsandMNCs,ownersofcritical infrastructuresurroundingmilitaryinstallations,lawenforcement,andstateandlocal officialsworkinginoperationscenters.AleaderperformingintheJointOperational Environmentwillrecognizenewcombinationsofadversariesthatwillformor disbandbasedoninterestandpreservation,forexample,terrorists,drugcartels, nihilists,criminalorganizations,nationstatearmies,andMNCs.
AnnexDDefinitionsofKeyTerms
Note:AllapprovedjointdefinitionsarecontainedinJointPublication102,DODDictionary ofMilitaryandAssociatedTermsasamendedthrough17December2003.
Agency:(DOD,NATO)Inintelligenceusage,anorganizationorindividualengagedin collectingand/orprocessinginformationalsocalledcollectionagency. Airandspaceexpeditionarytaskforce:(DOD)Adeployednumberedairforce(NAF)or commandechelonimmediatelysubordinatetoaNAFprovidedastheUSAirForce componentcommandcommittedtoajointoperationalsocalledAETF. Areaoperations:(DOD,NATO)Inmaritimeusage,operationsconductedinageographical areaandnotrelatedtotheprotectionofaspecificforce. Armedforces:(DOD)Themilitaryforcesofanationoragroupofnations. ArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates:(DOD)Atermusedtodenotecollectivelyall componentsoftheArmy,Navy,AirForce,MarineCorps,andCoastGuard. Battlefieldsurveillance:(DOD,NATO)Systematicobservationofthebattleareaforthe purposeofprovidingtimelyinformationandcombatintelligence. Battlespace:(DOD)Theenvironment,factors,andconditionsthatmustbeunderstoodto successfullyapplycombatpower,protecttheforce,orcompletethemission.Thisincludes theair,land,sea,space,andtheincludedenemyandfriendlyforcesfacilitiesweather terraintheelectromagneticspectrumandtheinformationenvironmentwithinthe operationalareasandareasofinterest. Campaignplan:(DOD)Aplanforaseriesofrelatedmilitaryoperationsaimedat accomplishingastrategicoroperationalobjectivewithinagiventimeandspace. Centersofgravity:(DOD)Thosecharacteristics,capabilities,orsourcesofpowerfrom whichamilitaryforcederivesitsfreedomofaction,physicalstrength,orwilltofightalso calledCOGs. Coalition:(DOD)Anadhocarrangementbetweentwoormorenationsforcommonaction. Coldwar:(DOD)Astateofinternationaltensionwhereinpolitical,economic,technological, sociological,psychological,paramilitary,andmilitarymeasuresshortofovertarmedconflict involvingregularmilitaryforcesareemployedtoachievenationalobjectives. Combatintelligence:(DOD)Thatknowledgeoftheenemy,weather,andgeographical featuresrequiredbyacommanderintheplanningandconductofcombatoperations. Commandandcontrol:(DOD)Theexerciseofauthorityanddirectionbyaproperly designatedcommanderoverassignedandattachedforcesintheaccomplishmentofthe mission.Commandandcontrolfunctionsareperformedthroughanarrangementof personnel,equipment,communications,facilities,andproceduresemployedbyacommander
inplanning,directing,coordinating,andcontrollingforcesandoperationsinthe accomplishmentofthemissionalsocalledC2. Conventionalforces:(DOD)Thoseforcescapableofconductingoperationsusingnon nuclearweapons. Decisiveengagement:(DOD)Inlandandnavalwarfare,anengagementinwhichaunitis consideredfullycommittedandcannotmaneuverorextricateitself.Intheabsenceofoutside assistance,theactionmustbefoughttoaconclusionandeitherwonorlostwiththeforcesat hand. Doctrine:(DOD)Fundamentalprinciplesbywhichthemilitaryforcesorelementsthereof guidetheiractionsinsupportofnationalobjectives.Itisauthoritativebutrequiresjudgment inapplication.SeealsomultinationaldoctrinejointdoctrinemultiServicedoctrine. Economicaction:(DOD)Theplanneduseofeconomicmeasuresdesignedtoinfluencethe policiesoractionsofanotherstate,e.g.,toimpairthewarmakingpotentialofahostile poweror togenerateeconomicstabilitywithinafriendlypower. Economicwarfare:(DOD)Aggressiveuseofeconomicmeanstoachievenational objectives. Electronicintelligence:(DOD)Technicalandgeolocationintelligencederivedfromforeign noncommunicationselectromagneticradiationsemanatingfromotherthannuclear detonationsorradioactivesourcesalsocalledELINT. Elementsofnationalpower:(DOD)Allthemeansthatareavailableforemploymentinthe pursuitofnationalobjectives. Endstate:(DOD) Thesetofrequiredconditionsthatdefinesachievementofthe commander'sobjectives. Force:(DOD)1.Anaggregationofmilitarypersonnel,weaponsystems,equipment,and necessarysupport,orcombinationthereof.2.Amajorsubdivisionofafleet. Forceprojection:(DOD)Theabilitytoprojectthemilitaryelementofnationalpowerfrom thecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)oranothertheater,inresponsetorequirementsfor militaryoperations.Forceprojectionoperationsextendfrommobilizationanddeploymentof forcestoredeploymenttoCONUSorhometheater. Globaldistribution:(DOD)Theprocessthatsynchronizesandintegratesfulfillmentofjoint forcerequirementswithemploymentofthejointforce.Itprovidesnationalresources (personnelandmateriel)tosupportexecutionofjointoperations.Theultimateobjectiveof thisprocessistheeffectiveandefficientaccomplishmentofthejointforcemission. Globalization:Theincreasedmobilityofgoods,services,labor,technologyandcapital throughouttheworld. Guerrillawarfare:(DOD,NATO)Militaryandparamilitaryoperationsconductedin enemyheldorhostileterritorybyirregular,predominantlyindigenousforcesalsocalled GW.Seealsounconventionalwarfare. Hostileact:(DOD)1.Ahostileactisanattackorotheruseofforcebyanycivilian, paramilitary,ormilitaryforceorterrorist(s)(withorwithoutnationaldesignation)againstthe
UnitedStates,USforcesand,incertaincircumstances,USnationals,theirproperty,US commercialassets,orotherdesignatednonUSforces,foreignnationals,andtheirproperty. 2.Forceuseddirectlytoprecludeorimpedethemissionand/ordutiesofUSforces, includingtherecoveryofUSpersonnelandvitalUSGovernmentproperty.Whenahostile actisinprogresstherightexiststouseproportionalforce,includingarmedforce,inself defensebyallnecessarymeansavailabletodeterorneutralizethepotentialattackeror,if necessary,todestroythethreat. Humanintelligence:(DOD,NATO)Acategoryofintelligencederivedfrominformation collectedandprovidedbyhumansourcesalsocalledHUMINT. Humanitarianandcivicassistance:(DOD)Assistancetothelocalpopulaceprovidedby predominantlyUSforcesinconjunctionwithmilitary operationsandexercises.This assistanceisspecificallyauthorizedbytitle10,UnitedStatesCode,section401,andfunded underseparateauthorities.Assistanceprovidedundertheseprovisionsislimitedto(1) medical,dental,andveterinarycareprovidedinruralareasofacountry(2)constructionof rudimentarysurfacetransportationsystems(3)welldrillingandconstructionofbasic sanitationfacilitiesand(4)rudimentaryconstructionandrepairofpublicfacilities. Assistancemustfulfill unittrainingrequirementsthatincidentallycreatehumanitarian benefittothelocalpopulace.AlsocalledHCA. Information:(DOD)1.Facts,data,orinstructionsinanymediumorform.2.Themeaning thatahumanassignstodatabymeansoftheknownconventionsusedintheirrepresentation. Informationoperations:(DOD)Actionstakentoaffectadversaryinformationand informationsystemswhiledefendingone'sowninformationandinformationsystemsalso calledIO. Informationwarfare:(DOD)Informationoperationsconductedduringtimeofcrisisor conflicttoachieveorpromotespecificobjectivesoveraspecificadversaryoradversaries alsocalledIW. Intelligence:(DOD)1.Theproductresultingfromthecollection,processing,integration, analysis,evaluation,andinterpretationofavailableinformationconcerningforeigncountries orareas.2.Informationandknowledgeaboutanadversaryobtainedthroughobservation, investigation,analysis,orunderstanding.Seealsoacousticintelligenceallsource intelligencebasicintelligencecivildefenseintelligencecombatintelligence communicationsintelligencecriticalintelligencecurrentintelligencedepartmental intelligencedomesticintelligenceelectronicintelligenceelectrooptical intelligence foreignintelligenceforeigninstrumentationsignalsintelligencegeneralmilitary intelligencehumanresourcesintelligenceimageryintelligencejointintelligencelaser intelligencemeasurementandsignatureintelligencemedicalintelligencemerchant intelligencemilitaryintelligencenationalintelligencenuclearintelligenceopensource intelligenceoperationalintelligencephotographicintelligencepoliticalintelligenceradar intelligenceradiationintelligencescientificandtechnicalintelligencesecurityintelligence strategicintelligencetacticalintelligencetargetintelligencetechnicalintelligence technicaloperationalintelligenceterrainintelligenceunintentionalradiationintelligence. Intervention:(DOD)Actiontakentodivertaunitorforcefromitstrack,flightpath,or mission.
Joint:(DOD)Connotesactivities,operations,organizations,etc.,inwhichelementsoftwo ormoreMilitaryDepartmentsparticipate. Jointdoctrine:(DOD)Fundamentalprinciplesthatguidetheemploymentofforcesoftwo ormoreMilitaryDepartmentsincoordinatedactiontowardacommonobjective.Itis authoritativeassuch,jointdoctrinewillbefollowedexceptwhen,inthejudgmentofthe commander,exceptional circumstancesdictateotherwise.Itwillbepromulgatedbyorforthe ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,incoordinationwiththecombatantcommandsand Services.SeealsoChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffInstructionChairmanoftheJoint ChiefsofStaffManualdoctrinejointpublicationjointtactics,techniques,andprocedures jointtestpublicationmultinationaldoctrinemultiServicedoctrine. Jointforce:(DOD)Ageneraltermappliedtoaforcecomposedofsignificantelements, assignedorattached,oftwoormoreMilitaryDepartmentsoperatingunderasinglejoint forcecommander. Jointoperations:(DOD)Ageneraltermtodescribemilitaryactionsconductedbyjoint forcesorbyServiceforcesinrelationships(e.g.,support,coordinatingauthority)which,of themselves,donotcreatejointforces. Lineofcommunications:(DOD)Aroute,eitherland,water,and/orair,thatconnectsan operatingmilitaryforcewithabaseofoperationsandalongwhichsuppliesandmilitary forcesmovealsocalledLOC. Linesofoperations:(DOD)Linesthatdefinethedirectionalorientationoftheforceintime andspaceinrelationtotheenemy.Theyconnecttheforcewithitsbaseofoperationsandits objectives. Nationalsecurity:(DOD)Acollectivetermencompassingbothnationaldefenseandforeign relationsoftheUnitedStates.Specifically,theconditionprovidedby:a.amilitaryordefense advantageoveranyforeignnationorgroupofnationsb.afavorableforeignrelations positionorc.adefenseposturecapableofsuccessfullyresistinghostileordestructiveaction fromwithinorwithout,overtorcovert. NationalSecurityStrategy:(DOD)Theartandscienceofdeveloping,applying,and coordinatingtheinstrumentsofnationalpower(diplomatic,economic,military,and informational)toachieveobjectivesthatcontributetonationalsecurityalsocallednational strategyorgrandstrategy. Networkcentric:Informationsuperiorityenabledconceptthatgeneratesincreasedcombat powerbynetworkingsensors,decisionmakers,andshooters. Nongovernmentalorganizations:(DOD)Transnationalorganizationsofprivatecitizens thatmaintainaconsultativestatuswiththeEconomicandSocialCounciloftheUnited Nations.Nongovernmentalorganizationsmaybeprofessionalassociations,foundations, multinationalbusinesses,orsimplygroupswithacommoninterestinhumanitarian assistanceactivities(developmentandrelief)."Nongovernmentalorganizations"isaterm normallyusedbynonUnitedStatesorganizationsalsocalledNGOs. Operationalenvironment:(DOD)Acompositeoftheconditions,circumstances,and influencesthataffecttheemploymentofmilitaryforcesandbearonthedecisionsoftheunit commander.Someexamplesareasfollows.a.permissiveenvironmentOperational
environmentinwhichhostcountrymilitaryandlawenforcementagencieshavecontrolas wellastheintentandcapabilitytoassistoperationsthataunitintendstoconduct.b. uncertainenvironmentOperationalenvironmentinwhichhostgovernmentforces,whether opposedtoorreceptivetooperationsthataunitintendstoconduct,donothavetotally effectivecontroloftheterritoryandpopulationintheintendedoperationalarea.c.hostile environmentOperationalenvironmentinwhichhostileforceshavecontrolaswellasthe intentandcapabilitytoeffectivelyopposeorreacttotheoperationsaunitintendstoconduct. Paramilitaryforces:(DOD)Forcesorgroupsdistinctfromtheregulararmedforcesofany country,butresemblingtheminorganization,equipment,training,ormission. Preventivewar:(DOD)Awarinitiatedinthebeliefthatmilitaryconflict,whilenot imminent,isinevitable,andthattodelaywouldinvolvegreaterrisk. Quantumcryptography:Theuseofquantumphysicstoprovideameansfortwopartiesto exchangeanencipheringkeyoveraprivatechannelwithcompletesecurityof communication Strategy:DOD)Theartandscienceofdevelopingandemployinginstrumentsofnational powerinasynchronizedandintegratedfashiontoachievetheater,national,and/or multinationalobjectives. Terrorism:(DOD)Thecalculateduseofunlawfulviolenceorthreatofunlawfulviolenceto inculcatefearintendedtocoerceortointimidategovernmentsorsocietiesinthepursuitof goalsthataregenerallypolitical,religious,orideological. Weaponsofmassdestruction:(DOD)Weaponsthatarecapableofahighorderof destructionand/orofbeingusedinsuchamannerastodestroylargenumbersofpeople. Weaponsofmassdestructioncanbehighexplosivesornuclear,biological,chemical,and radiologicalweapons,butexcludethemeansoftransportingorpropellingtheweaponwhere suchmeansisaseparableanddivisiblepartof theweaponalsocalledWMD.Weaponsof MassEffectsorWMEareoftenusedtoincludeweapons,suchaschemicalandbiological types,thatmaycausemasscasualtieswithoutdestructionofhumanlife.
AnnexEAcronymList
ALOC AO AOR APOD ATGMs AWACS C2 C3D2 C4ISR CIE COI CONUS COP CTC DES DES DOD DOTMLPF EA EBO EMP EOC EU GNP GPS HUMINT IO IPB ISR airlinesofcommunication areaofoperation areaofresponsibility aerial portofdebarkation airbornelaunchedantitankguidedmissiles AirborneWarningandControlSystem commandandcontrol camouflage,cover,concealment,denial,anddeception command,control,communications,computers,intelligence, surveillance,andreconnaissance collaborativeinformationenvironment communitiesof interest continentalUnitedStates communitiesofpractice CombatTrainingCenters deployment,employment,andsustainment deployment,employment,andsustainment DepartmentofDefense doctrine,organization,training,materiel,leadershipandeducation, personnel,andfacilities effectsassessment effectsbasedoperations electromagneticpulse nonlethalweapons(NLW emergencyoperationscenters EuropeanUnion GrossNationalProduct globalpositioningsystem humanintelligence informationoperations intelligencepreparationofthebattlespace intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance
IT IW J2 JNTC JOE JOpsC JSTARS LACM LOC MASINT MDMP MLRS MNC NGO NSS OIF PGM PSYOP QDR R&D ROE RSOI SAM SIGINT SLOC SME SOF SPOD SSC ST&E TBM TTP
informationtechnology informationwar DirectorofIntelligence JointNationalTrainingCapability JointOperationalEnvironment JointStaffJointOperatingConcept JointSurveillanceTargetAttackRadarSystem Landattackcruisemissiles Linesofcommunication measurementandsignatureintelligence militarydecisionmakingprocess MultipleLaunchRocketSystems multinationalcorporations nongovernmentalorganizations NationalSecurityStrategy OperationIraqiFreedom precisionguidedmunitions psychologicaloperations QuadrennialDefenseReview researchanddevelopment rulesofengagement reception,staging,onwardmovement,andintegration surfacetoairmissiles signalsintelligence sealinesofcommunication subjectmatterexpert specialoperatingforces seaportofdebarkation smallscalecontingencies science,technologyandengineering theaterballisticmissiles tactics,techniques,andprocedures
MANPADS manportableairdefensesystems
UAV UCAV USJFCOM WMD WME
unmannedaerialvehicle Unmannedcombataerialvehicles U.S. JointForcesCommand weaponsofmassdestruction WeaponsofMassEffect
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ENDNOTES
1
PresidentGeorgeWashingtonsFifthAnnualmessagetoCongress,Philadelphia,December3,1793:George WashingtonWritings,editedbyJohnRhodehamel,(NewYork:TheLibraryofAmerica,1997),page848. 2 Nye,JosephS.,Jr.(2002).UnderstandingInternationalConflicts:AnIntroductiontoTheoryandHistory. New York:AddissonWesleyPublishingCompany.page245 3 TheWhiteHouse.TheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica, March2006. 4 Hall,WayneMichael.(2003). StrayVoltage:WarintheInformation Age. Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitute Press.page.2.Mr.Halldescribesknowledgewarasanintensecompetitionforvaluableinformationand knowledgethatbothsidesneedformakingbetterdecisionsfasterthantheiradversary.Thegoalinthistype of conflictistoseek,find,andsustaindecisiondominance,whichleadstoanoveralladvantageindecisionmaking andresultsinatriumphofwillbyonesideortheother. 5 JP3.0,August2006. 6 Hall,WayneMichael.(2003). StrayVoltage:Warin theInformationAge. Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitute Press.Mr.HallDefineswillastheresolution,sacrifice,andperseveranceofindividualsandgroupsofpeople towininacompetitivestruggle. 7 WorldUrbanizationProspects:The2003Revision. NewYork:TheUnitedNations,2004page5. 8 WorldPopulationProspects2004RevisionproducedbytheUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicand SocialAffairs. 9 DeBenitez,SarahThomasetal.(2003) YouthExplosioninDevelopingWorldCities:Approachestoreducing PovertyandConflictinanUrbanAge.Washington,D.C.:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars. page12. 10 DeputyChiefofStaffforIntelligence,USArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand.Sociologypanel,Joint OperationalEnvironment Seminar.Williamsburg,VA,June2003. 11 UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram(UNDP).(2205)HumanDevelopmentReport:Deepeningdemocracy inafragmentedworld. 12 WorldUrbanizationProspects:The2003Revision. NewYork:TheUnitedNations,2004page5. 13 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime. AnnualReport2005.Internet.Availablefrom http://www.unodc.org/unodc/annual_report_2005.html 14 Barnett,ThomasP.M.ThePentagonsNewMap. EsquireMagazine. March2003.OnlineEditionpage2 http://www.esquire.com/features/articles/2004/040510_mfe_barnett_2.html. 15 TRADOCDCSINT.FindingsofWinterJOE ConferenceonCulture,2527January2005.Published22June 2005.. 16 DavidDollar,ThePoorLikeGlobalization,withinYaleGlobal,June23,2003. 17 JointDoctrineandConceptsCentre(JDCC). StrategicTrends:TheSocialDimension.March2003. 18 Lonnie Henley,FactorsSustainingTerrorismandExtremistViolence, DefenseAnalysisReport, (Washington,D.C.:DefenseIntelligenceAgency,17February2004). 19 April2000.KofiAnnan,SpeechtoWorldEducationForum,Dakar,Senegal.http://srch1.un.org. 20 NationalScienceFoundation, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf05300/tables/tab3.xls January2005. 21 UNESCOEducationForAllGlobalMonitoringReport2005 http://efareport.unesco.org. 22 AnthonyBarnett,WorldOpinion:TheNewSuperpower?OpenDemocracyLtd,Mar2003 23 TheOfficeofTransnationalIssuesStrategicAssessmentGroup,TheUnitedStatesandtheThirdWorld Century:HowMuchWillDemographicsStressGeopolitics?,(Washington,D.C.:CentralIntelligenceAgency, February2002),12 24 2005GlobalR&DReport. R&DMagazineOnlineEditionpageG4.. 25 U.S.DepartmentofEducation/NationalCenterforEducationStatistics:IntegratedPostsecondaryEducation DataSystemCompletionsSurvey.Thepercentageofnonresidentaliensreceivingmastersdegreesinscience andengineeringintheU.S.was26.8percentin2000comparedto23.4percentin1991NationalScience Foundation/DivisionofScienceResourceStatistics. GraduateStudentsandPostdoctoratesinScienceand Engineering:Fall2001.Thepercentagedistributionfordoctoraldegreesinscienceandengineeringfor nonresidentalienswasevenhigherat29.4percentin2000.45,014Fulltimeengineeringgradstudentswithout U.S.citizenshipwereenrolledintheU.S.during2001,comparedto32,558withU.S.citizenship.
26
OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD). MainScienceandTechnology Indicators,2002.SharesofTotalWorldR&D,2000.WorldequalsOECDmembersplusArgentina,China, Romania,Israel,RussianFederation,Singapore,Slovenia,Taiwan. 27 DeputyChiefofStaffforIntelligence,USArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand. MadScientist2004 th (TRADOCDCSINT6 AnnualFutureTechnologySeminar)FindingsWhitePaper published05January2005 28 MikeMartin,NanowireCircuitsCouldSpurComputingAdvances, NewsFactorNetwork,March28,2003. AccordingtoHarvardchemistryprofessorCharlesLieber,use ofnanowirecircuitryinplaceofstandard integratedcircuitswilldemonstratepotentialforextremeperformanceinelectronicswellbeyondtheendof MooresLaw. 29 Ibid. 30 InternationalMonetaryFund.Factsheet:HowtheIMFHelpsPoorCountries.April2006. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm 31 InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties.April2004. http://www.ifrc.org/meetings/events/water03/facts.asp 32 Max.Boot.TheNewAmericanWayofWar.FromForeignAffairs,July/August2003. 33 UnitedNations,DepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsHomepage,PopulationDivision,2004.20May 2005http://esa.un.org/unup 34 Work,ColRobertO.,USMC(ret).(2002).TheChallengeofMaritimeTransformation:IsBiggerBetter? Washington:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.pages2526.. 35 JointPub313 JointDoctrineforInformationOperations. 36 DefenseIntelligenceOfficeforGlobalTrendsandProjections, APrimerontheFutureThreat:TheDecades Ahead, (Washington,D.C.:DefenseIntelligenceAgency,July1999),Chap.VI,InformationOperations. Documentclassifiedinformationextractedisunclassified. 37 U.S.SenateSelectCommittee onIntelligence. GlobalThreatsandChallengestotheUnitedStatesandIts InterestsAbroad.Washington:GPO,1999. 38 DefenseIntelligenceOfficeforGlobalTrendsandProjections, APrimerontheFutureThreat:TheDecades Ahead, (Washington,D.C.: DefenseIntelligenceAgency,July1999),Chap.V,AirForceTrends.Document classifiedinformationextractedisunclassified. 39 DepartmentofArmyDCSINT.(1999).ThreatPanelWhitePaper.Washington:GPO. 40 U.S.Army,TRADOC.(1999). WhitePaperSupport:HomelandDefense.FortMonroe:GPO.. 41 st U.S.ArmyWarCollege,StrategicStudiesInstitute.(1999). Warinthe21 CenturyBriefing. 42 TimothyThomas,(2003). EmergingForeignInsightsonOperationIraqiFreedom.FortLeavenworth: ForeignMilitaryStudiesOffice. 43 ThomasM.McNear,etal,(2003) CapstoneSystemThreatAssessmentReport(STAR)forFutureCombat Systems.FortMonroe,VA:U.S.ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand.Chapters3and5.Document classifiedinformationextractedisunclassified.. 44 Ibid,Chap3,12. 45 Ibid,Chap.3,67. 46 Ibid,Chap3,6. 47 DeputyChiefofStaffforIntelligence,U.S.ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(2000).Future OperationalandThreatEnvironment:AViewoftheWorldin2015.FtMonroe,VA:U.S.ArmyTrainingand DoctrineCommand.page7. 48 Ibid,18. 49 WayneMichaelHall, KnowledgePrime. J9,USJointForcesCommand,30June,2003,p.9.

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unmannedaerialvehicle Unmannedcombataerialvehicles U.S. JointForcesCommand weaponsofmassdestruction WeaponsofMassEffect

nd Bates,DanielandPlog,Fred.(1980)CulturalAnthropology,2 Edition.NewYork:Alfred A.Knopf. CitedinTheImportanceofTreatingCultureasaSystem:LessonsonCounter InsurgencyStrategyfromtheBritishIraqiMandatebyMajorWilliamD.Casebeer,USAF, Ph.D.inStrategicInsights,VolumeIV,Issue10.(October2005).

st Hammes,Thomas.(2004). TheSlingandtheStone:OnWarinthe21 Century.NewYork: ZenithPress.

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