Aquinas's Division of Being According To Modes of Existing

Aquinas's Division of Being According to Modes of Existing Author(s): John Tomarchio Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.
54, No. 3 (Mar., 2001), pp. 585-613 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131577 . Accessed: 08/08/2013 03:49
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OF BEING DIVISION AQUINAS'S OF EXISTING ACCORDING TOMODES

JOHNTOMARCHIO
One menides'
COULD SAY THAT THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS was wondering how to divide being. His reasoning, the terms
born
of Par that
namely
nothing belonging
in no way exists,
to being could divide it, and that nonbeing, since it

cannot divide anything, set of the problem
within which the great Western traditions of Platonic and Aristotelian In reply to this Parmenidian challenge to di metaphysics developed. vide being, Plato writes in the Sophist of the participation of being in
" of a pros hen equivoca in the Metaphysics and Aristotle "the other, to same to the In response seminal tion of the name challenge "being." de veritate in the Quaestiones divide being, Thomas speaks Aquinas
of modes sendi).
of being (modi entis) and of modes of existing (modi es Yet this terminology is barely acknowledged by Thomistic
in this article is to show that there is a properly meta
commentators.1 My purpose
physical
sense
of
the
term
"mode"
in Aquinas's
existential
MD
in on the concept of modes of existing of commentators is, peremptory?that thought tend to be incidental and somewhat Aquinas's of texts. See, for example, not based on any systematic Joseph explication Christian (Houston: Center for Tho Metaphysics Owens, An Elementary con "sterile" christological mistic Studies, 1985), who cites philosophically a embraced tradition also criticizes travenes Owens by commentary (p. 152). an essence sees a mode as completing Maritain which (see note 51 below). see notes 12 and 63 below. The importance of this con For other citations, me in the course of lexicolog became clear to for cept Aquinas's metaphysics in aliquo est in eo per modum ical research on the principle Quod recipitur I learned that Lawrence 15 below), during which (see note recipientis in Aquinas for of existing Dewan had been studying the concept of modes on Medieval some time. He gave a paper at the 32nd International Congress Studies at Western Michigan University (1997) entitled "The Individual as a to Thomas Aquinas." In this paper, he tends to em Mode of Being according on comments phasize the notion of "measures" of being, based on Aquinas's see my re et ordo-, on these points, the Augustian species, triplet modus, marks at notes 24 and 67-70 below. The Review of Metaphysics
Metaphysics
Correspondence 21404. 1 The remarks
to: St. John's
College,
P. O. Box
2800, Annapolis,
54 (March 2001): 585-613. Copyright ? 2001 by The Review of
586
metaphysics the secondary pothesis that presents literature.
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a yet unreconnoitered field of discussion in I to want of Further, propose by way hy the term's primary sense is existential deter the determination he extends of an individual the term being's to essence
mination, act of existing,
that for Aquinas and in particular and
that by analogy
and to any potential principle of entitative determination. Lastly, I that his of modes of into relief his in concept suggest existing brings
novation over his classical sources. When Aquinas than form, namely ultimate being more existence, tential diversity becomes to complete the ancient division necessary of being according to formal differences. The Thomistic of a concept mode of existing arises with an account of the multiplicity of being in terms of existence a This article to is but the (esse). propaedeutic and systematic comprehensive study of the term "mode" in Aquinas's a sense of posits an account of exis
metaphysics.2
Analogical
the term "mode" When he his career. veritate, follows:
Inflections
" of the Term uMode. The importance of

of de as
can be seen from the very beginning for Aquinas the young Thomas set to writing his Quaestiones to the Parmenidian to divide being replied challenge
of as most known and into the intellect first conceives [T]hat which is "being" [ens]it resolves all its conceptions which [I]t is therefore of the intellect be understood that all other conceptions necessary by an addition to "being." However nothing can be added to "being" as though . . . but some things are said to be added to "being" inas extraneous much as they express a mode of the being itself [modum ipsius entis] in two ways. that is not expressed by the name "being," which happens is a certain special mode of being [spe In one way, the mode expressed cialis modus entis]-, for there are diverse degrees of being a being [di are understood to which diverse versi gradus entitatis], according
2The of lexicology study is a work in progress. Using the computerized cum Roberto Busa with his Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, hypertextibus review of 2d ed. (Milan, 1993), I am doing a systematic in CD-ROM, use of the term modus-i in connection with other metaphysically Aquinas's modus essentiae, modus f?r substantiae, terms, such as modus significant modus modus entis, existendi, mete, modus essendi, modus materiae, modus modus modus rei, and so on. recipientis, agentis, modus patientis, see note 15 below. of my methodology, For publications
OF BEING DIVISION AQUINAS'S
587
to these modes modes of existing [diversi modi essendi], and according of things are understood: for "substance" does the diverse categories a certain nature superad not add to "being" any difference designating a certain is expressed ded to the being, but by the name of substance of modus be mode namely existing quidam [specialis essendi], special In another way, ing through itself, and likewise in the other categories. is a general mode the mode upon every being expressed following omne ens].3 consequent [modus generalis
Aquinas begins by granting Parmenides his premise: there is nothing extraneous to being that could be added to it so as to divide it.4 He
are nevertheless that there diverse to argue, however, proceeds a Neopla to being with intrinsic itself. of existing modes Beginning to diverse natures of things according of the diverse tonic construal contrasts the determi he of gradus entitatis), (diversi being degrees nation that results of a being of it according determination from the superadding to modes that express of a nature something as two with about a
the being itself (modi ipsius

lian categories expressions of existing "one," (modi and of being: the Medieval he calls
entis).
He then identifies the Aristote

such modal
transcendentals
(modi "true," and
essendi), "good,"
and
more modes the categories specifically as such transcendental properties every being
genereralis 3 Translated
accompanying general modes omne consequens ens).5
in S. Thomae de veritate, from Quaestiones disputatae Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII. P. M. edita, ed. Fratres Ordinis Aquinatis, Praedicatorum (Rome and Paris, 1882-), q. 1, a. 1 (tm. 22, vol. 1, p. 5,11. 100 to tome All further citations will be of the Leonine edition according 25). unless otherwise (vol.), page (p.), and lines (11.), as applicable, (tm.), volume are my own. Note that I always translate indicated. All English translations ens as "being" or "entity" and esse as "existing" or "existence." 4 In his De trinitate, q. 4, a. 1, Aquinas says that since Super Boetium one being is divided from an is from divided being except nonbeing, nothing in it the negation of the other being. there is included other only because contra gentiles in the Summa II, chap. 52, Aquinas says that exist Likewise, cannot be diverse, but can be diversified ence insofar as it is existence only as the existence of a rock is other than through something beyond existence, to reply to Parmenides' di That he is attempting of a man. the existence is clear enough (see lemma with a concept of relative negation or contrariety note 72 below); for additional remarks, see notes 43, 72, and 73 below. 5For a historical overview of the rise of the doctrine of the transcenden own tals in the Middle Ages as well as a comprehensive study of Aquinas's see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval and the Transcendentals: doctrine, Philosphy 25-48. The Case of Thomas Aquinas (New York: E. J. Brill, 1996), especially a close analysis of De veritate conducts Aertsen q. 1, a. 1 in chapter 2, of the Transcendentals," noting that the text is "Aquinas's General Account In neither his translation nor his analysis often cited but seldom analyzed. between modes of existing does Aersten (modi essendi) and distinguish
588
What does Aquinas exactly itself in contradistinction we must first mean by
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a mode of the "expressing" a nature? to "superadding" To answer whether to take ens as substan
being this question,
consider
tively (perhaps better rendered in English by "abeing" or "the being") or participially (with the abstract sense of "being a being").6 Is
of every being as a being or, as in De veritate speaking in general He may 1, of being 21, article question (ens universale)? so as to embrace at first well intend the term ambivalently, both senses. In either case, De veritate 1 concerns the question 1, article Aquinas here and by the time Aquinas transcendentals, gets to them it is quite clear that they are substantives: every being they accompany ens). (omne on as to enumerate them "one" goes Aquinas (unum), "good" The "true" and truth. and unity, (verum)?not goodness, (bonum), transcendentals being is one, are properties of beings true, and so forth. good, as beings: every being as a
What would thing that comes counter anything,

some being.
itmean, then, to take being substantively? "The first before the intellect is the being." When we first en we necessarily first of all judge that it exists: this is
thus asserts later in this question that the name
Aquinas
"being" (ens) is taken from the thing's act of existing (actus essendi).7 Judging that it exists is the prerequisite of our asking anything else about it: there is something there of which to ask, "What is it?"When we then judge that the being exists in itself rather than in something
else?that it is a substance?we it has from is, in what way ing is undivided existence. itself that it exists, how concerning we be when that the Likewise, judge it is one? from all else?that and divided judge
modes
of being (modi entis); see, for example, pages 88, 93, and 104. of the "modal explication" he rightly emphasizes Likewise, although treatment (p. 107), Aertsen does not interpret this crucial modus Aquinas's essence and existence between in light of the distinction terminology but rather in terms of to in the text (see note 36 below), adverts Aquinas theo Summa of being, relying upon another "contractions" text, namely of this a. 1. I his think that ad interpretation particular 3, I, q. 5, logiae other text betrays Aquinas's whole point inDe veritate q. 1, a. 1, namely, that of being express modes of existing and transcendental modes categorical inwhich na to in the contradistinction the about way being itself, something also does a John F. Wippel to it, as I shall explain further. tures superadd a in in Thomas "Truth 1 De veritate of close analysis q. 1, Aquinas," Review es both modus Like he renders 307-21. 43 Aertsen, (1989): of Metaphysics and explica entis as "mode of being" in his translations sendi and modus in his paraphras tions; he carefully follows Aquinas's use of the term modus on its not does remark but p. 308). (see especially significance ing,

we
589
Such categorical and transcendental of modes judge how it exists. and "one" arise from expressive about being as "substance" judgments a the being's that its about when is, being, being By contrast, existing.
we
we add something new in kind judge that it is a dog, for example, we are to our conception of the being, namely content; quidditative or articulating our primary not simply further existential expressing
judgment.
about
Indeed, Aquinas seems to hold that the primary judgments

existing and modes of existing precede a clear grasp of
a thing's
what the thing is: "Once it is known whether something exists

it remains to inquire how it exists [quomodo est], in order
[an est],
to know
what it is [quid est]."s Thus in response to the Parmenidian

Aquinas uses the term "mode" in De three divisions of being:
challenge
to divide being,
1 to veritate question 1, article a division of predicable being ac distinguish to the genera and species of things; a categorical division of cording a to tran the of of and modes special existing things; being according
scendental division of being according to general modes of being, that

of every being properties is, universal a is not thing only of Aquinas's nology he introduces for example, the Physics, sions modes of being according of predicating.9 to modes as a being. Such modal termi on In his commentary youth. Aristotle's as divi categories to that are proportional
of existing
on Metaphysics book in commenting Likewise senses of of Aristotle's he enumeration being 4, chapter 2, reorganizes which to four modes of existing: and privations, negations according and in the mind; have no existence except corruptions, generations, of nonbeing; which exist with an admixture quanti motions, qualities, which and have and weak existence; substances, ties, properties, which have a firm and solid existence.10
6For this see Super libros Sententiarum, bk. 1, d. 25, q. 1, a. distinction, de veritate, q. 21, 4; compare d. 22, q. 1, a. 1. As we shall see, in Quaestiones ens a. 1, Aquinas ens he between and universale; particulare distinguishes of existing of the latter but says that they the categorical modes predicates are based on the existence of things. See my remarks at notes 42-5 below. 7For a see note 36 below. citation, 8 "Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum rest?t quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit"; Summa theologiae I, q. 3 (tm. 4, p. 35). 9See Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum bk. 3, chap. Aristotelis, n. 5 114 lc. p. 3, (tm. 2, 15). 10See In Aristotelis ed. M.-R. Cathala commentaria, Metaphysicam 1935), bk. 4, lc. 1, p. 183 n. 540. (Turin: Marietti,
590
Yet
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the prominence of the term "mode" in Aquinas's divi despite of being, and in particular of the phrase "mode of existing," there of the term has been no thematic in the literature. study secondary This oversight and may be due to the term's commonplace meaning sion it means well "way" and occurs simply high frequency: in Aquinas's commentators times Some pass writings.11 as as or over the term as a general it is one, imprecise useful, perhaps as such phrases useful because Some acknowledge imprecise.12 accordingly over 11,460 "mode cal of the receiver" and "mode of the knower" and in need import but to be flexible as a way of speaking of existing" "mode take phrase Many Aquinas's None of these opinions is based on a thematic about essence.14 study of his use a systematic of the term. search The term came to my attention in the course of for occurrences of an axiom uses that Aquinas is received accord but more universal to have metaphysi of further determination.13
"Whatever is received his metaphysics: throughout a In receiver." less to the of the mode frequent ing that abstracts from of the axiom formulation emerges cording course the principal of to the mode of my examining as term: that some "Whatever
in which
"mode" reception, is in it ac is in anything in the clear it is." It became in which Aquinas applies
300 contexts
11 in of the lemma modus-i This is the figure given for occurrences cum hypertextibus in CD-ROM; this fig Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, of the dative and ablative form does not include occurrences ure, however, which because their of modo, high frequency are grouped with those of the lemma modo adverb under a single pseudo 16,891). (frequency homographie 12 This judgment about the term's metaphysical import is implicit in as is received accord axiom "Whatever is received of the Thomistic sessments ing to the mode of the receiver," inwhich "mode of the receiver" is the salient
concept. M.-D. Chenu calls this axiom a vague common sense statement ap
St. Aquinas, See Toward Understanding to any kind of recipient. plicable trans. A.-M. Landry and Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964), 186-7. to refer in the most general Robert Pasnau writes, "By mode Aquinas means of the recipient"; Pasnau, and conditions "Aquinas way to the characteristics 75 (1998): 296. In a similar Schoolman and the Content Fallacy," The Modem vein, a reviewer of an article on the axiom submitted by me to another jour is intentionally that the phrase "mode of the recipient" nal asserted vague: "Mode, in other words, can mean virtually anything." 13 that This is the judgment of R. J. Henle on the "modus formulae" of the of uses to in recep "principle knowledge questions applying Aquinas and Platonism in the preceding tion" mentioned (The note; see St. Aquinas 331-3. Martinus 1956), Nyhoff, Hague: 14 See note 63 below for citations.
OF BEING 591 DIVISION AQUINAS'S

of modes of existing that his concept the principle the unity of the principle's cal key to understanding clear became that the term It also plications.15 one a general and imprecise merely inflection of determinate analogical nificant metaphysical import. of "way," many their of philosophical sense for Aquinas but if the principle is the hermeneuti wide "mode" ranging cannot ap be
rather must is to have
admit any sig
To illustrate that if the word modus
is only taken in the ordinary

assertions a variety lose much of his meta
of Aquinas's metaphysical run through we can force, of the Summa
physical formulations.
mulations from
Let us begin with the following list of short for

pars theologiae:
the prima
that God be present it is necessary For as long as a thing has existence it has existence to the mode in which to it according [secundum mo dum quo esse habet].16 of existence, of all things pertain to the perfection The perfections they have existence they are perfect in some manner or other because some mode [aliquo modo esse habeant].17 is brought into act according that is in potency Everything sui esse].18 of its existence [secundum modum naturally Everything desiderat].19 desires existence in its own mode for in
to the mode
[suo modo
esse
15 research on this prin For a general account of my initial computerized results, see my "Thomistic Axiomat ciple and a summary of its philosophical 16 (1999): 249 ics in an Age of Computers," History Quarterly of Philosophy revised re of my subsequently 76; for indices and a fully detailed account and statistical analyses, see my "Four Indices for the Th search methodology in aliquo est in eo per modum omistic Principle Quod recipitur recipien In his careful textual survey of 60 (1998): 315-67. Studies tis," Mediaeval and act is unlimited," "Unreceived two closely related principles, namely, that receives "Act is not limited except by a distinct potency it," John. F. Wip offer pel faithfully represents Aquinas's use of the term "mode" but without or "mode not does he comment distinguish intepretation; ing any particular or commentary. See of existing" from "mode of being" in his translations Act is Unlimited," Review "Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived 550-1. 51 (1998): 538, 542, 543, 554, 556, and especially ofMetaphysics 16 de Summa I, q. 8, a. 1 (tm. 4, p. 82). Compare Quaestiones theologiae
potentia,
17 Summa 18 Summa 19 Summa
q. 3, a. 3.
theologiae theologiae theologiae
I, q. 4, a. 2 (tm. 4, p. 52). I, q. 7, a 4, ad 1 (tm. 4, p. 79). I, q. 75, a. 6 (tm. 5, p. 204).
592
The operation of each thing is in accord with substantial [secundum modum eius].20 is according Knowledge cognoscentis].21 [A thing] is knowable dum sui actus].22 to the mode
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the mode of its substance
of the knower
[secundum
modum
according
to the mode
of its act
[secundum
mo
[The receiver] receives according dum modum sui esse].23 In the secunda termination"
to the mode
of its existence
[secun
pars of the Summa as a synonym for "mode"
specifying quality, He first of existence. Augustine and says
offers "de theologiae Aquinas in his division of the species of are at issue determinations that the determinations to a definition ad of Augustine's: is what measure "Mode, preestab to of as
appeals in Super Gen. it means
lishes, some measure."24 existence: which
therefore
litteram, a certain determination
two He then goes on to identify of a substance is the difference the quality is determined of matter the potency according an accidental of a subject
according modes specific
to according to substantial to according to accidental
likewise existence; the potency which existence.25 In the De dents
is the difference quality is determined according the term
extends veritate, Aquinas in the context of his to substance and reception of existence:
"mode" concern
from with
acci the
creationist
conferral
that there be a it is necessary received, [W]henever there is something to the receiver, and is limited according the received because mode, of a creature and the essential existence thus since both the accidental is found not only in accidents but also in substances.26 is received, mode
I, q. 50, a 2 (tm. 5, p. 6). I, q. 14, a 1, ad 3 (tm. 4, p. 167). I, q. 14, a 3 (tm. 4, p. 170). I, q. 75, a 6 (tm. 5, p. 204). I?II, q. 49, a 2 (tm. 6, p. 311). I think that itwould of ex be a mistake concept of modes bearings on the Thomistic texts on these Rather from terminology. Augustine's isting should support analyses of the abundant passages where Aquinas uses the as "mode of existing" For a caveat about interpreting term ex professo. see my remarks at notes 66-70 below. "measure of existence," 25 Summa I?II, q. 49, a 2 (tm. 6, p. 311). theologiae theologiae theologiae theologiae theologiae theologiae to take one's such comments
20 Summa 21 Summa 22 Summa 23 Summa 24 Summa
AQUINAS'S DIVISION OF BEING

Note that in considering it according a perfection to a distinct as received, one existence individual
593
is ipso facto and not ab
considering
as one does when the ratio of the perfection in it stractly, considering a or form of of the mode self. The notion essence, nature, perfection, enters in with to existence. of its relation the consideration However, ence. the term is not "mode" own restricted to received and finite distinction exist even
Aquinas "To be his for God: alone."27 He
utilizes
as a term of existential
God tarian unity
theology of the divine
existence is the proper mode of subsisting uses the phrase modus in his Trini existendi to explain the distinction within the of divine persons even nature.28
In his mature
formulation of participation
the universal of existing
in the De substantiis
proper of existing proper to species and
separatis, distinguishes Aquinas modes to God from the determinate to individuals within species:
mode
that the things that participate existence from the We must consider in existence a to mode first being do not participate universal according to a of existing, as it is in the first principle, but particularly, according of existing, mode each conforms certain determinate by which [con For each thing is adapted [ad venu] either to this genus or this species. to one determinate mode of existing in accord with the mode aptatur] Moreover the mode of any substance of its substance. composed from it belongs to a matter and form is in accord with the form through which In this way, therefore, a thing composed from mat determinate species. it of existence ter and form, through its form, comes to be participant to a certain proper mode.29 self from God, according
26 Quaestiones 85).
de veritate,
q. 21, a. 6, ad 5 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 610,11.
179
27 "Solius autem Dei essendi est ut sit suum esse subsis proprius modus su I, q. 12, a 4 (tm. 4, p. 121). Compare Scriptum tens"; Summa theologiae and M. F. Moos, 4 vols. (Paris: ed. R. P. Mandonnet per libros Sententiarum, L?thielleux, 1929-47), 1:866: "Deus enim est in rebus temporaliter per modum rerum, sed res ab aeterno in Deo per modum Dei"; and Summa I, theologiae sit altior quam divinae essentiae q. 14, a. 1, ad 3 (tm. 4, p. 167): "cum modus
modus
28See de potentia, q. 2, a. 1, ad 13; q. 2, a. 5, ad 4 and ad 5; q. Quaestiones a. 17. ad 15, 3, 29 seu de angelorum natura ad Fratrem Regi De substantiis separatis suum carissimum, in Divi Thomae Aquinatis naldum socium Opuscula ed. Raymundi M. Spiazzi (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954), Philosophica, chap. 8 (p. 34 n. 88).
quo
creaturae
sunt."
594
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or essence, but rather two modes: states that its mode the former the mode of ac of
Aquinas does not here identify the thing's "mode of existing" with its
substance and the mode existing cords with the latter.30 contraposes of its substance. He These two modes
are correlative:
a thing's essence and the mode are necessarily of its existence propor to one another. tionate This proportion constitutes the thing's proper modus. mode?quidam proprius Aquinas an individual also speaks in the De potentia of the mode of existing
proper to the individual being: "There are three things to consider

substance: one is the nature is the mode second isting in the singulars; for the nature of the genus and species in the singular exists as proper stance to this individual, and not as common to many;
in
of the genus and species ex of existing of such a nature, sub third
is the principle from which this [mode] is caused."31

In short, metaphysical physical construed the one logical properly the term if the term "mode" does not then many significance, are tantamount assertions to vagaries. a general as denoting notion simply of nontechnical and on for Aquinas precise of his most meta important have Nor need the term be on it admits, ana hand, of in its than because the other
hand, inflections.
metaphysical "mode"
senses, In a word, I submit that the term modus inflections is no less precise for Aquinas
being (ens), existing (esse), or essence

most of all to divide Quaestiones stance from de potentia,
(essentid).
In fact, he employs
primary is divided into first "[W]hen substance not a division of the genus into species to diverse modes of existing.... according sion of an analogical notion
notions. In the analogical for example, he distinguishes second sub in terms substance of a mode of existing: and second it is [substance], ... but a division of the genus a divi It is therefore more
than of a genus."32
L.-B. Geiger, La participation la philosophie dans de s. in the Aquinas d'Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1942), 247. For Geiger's participation to essentialism to essences, of existing by his reducing modes capitulation see note 63 below. 31 de potentia, in S. Thomae Aquinatis Dis Quaestiones Quaestiones ed. Bazzi, et al., 9th ed., rev. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, putatae, 1949), q. 9, a. 2, ad 1 (tm. 2, p. 228). 32 de potentia, q. 2, ad 6 (from the Marietti edition, tm. 2, p. Quaestiones 228).
30Pace

The term
595
ence
"mode" emerges with considerations of exist precisely or rather with considerations than of essence, of the exis one same essence sin of essence: has its naturally tential modulations rather in things, another of existing and intentional as a universal of existing in the mind of a knower, as a divine mode of existing and exemplary idea in the mode It is no of his that Aquinas surprise, therefore, puts of existential "Since being: 'being' analogy of all things, the same mode of existing for some If Aquinas's by his partici sun
gular and material immaterial mode and an eternal mind of
the creator.33
the term at the heart is not must pate
univocally predicated in everything that is said to exist; not be sought more and some less so."34 existence perfectly, of the term "mode" are in fact governed
dry uses what
existential
analogy of being, then the question

is the term's primary meaning?
that naturally presents
itself is:
n The Primary Aquinas's individual him phrase sense I propose that the primary of Analogate. as such of a is the determination "mode of existing" for constitutes act of existing. Such a determination in general a "modification" (esse commune) or "qualification" essence. to acts or existence that To deter
being's a limitation of existence
as such mines clearly return We
esse), (ipsum it for an individual it to or proportions refer primarily of existing that modes de to veritate. Quaestiones briefly have seen that natures with in De veritate diverse correlates the genera in terms diverse question of diverse
see more let us
of existing, 1 Aquinas
1, article degrees modes
un
derstands he thus in turn relates
and species
categorical that superadd
of being, which of existing. He to the being
a nature
33For see the Subject and Corollary indices (s. v. "Knowl citations, edge") of my "Four Indices" cited in note 15 above. 34 De substantiis separatis, chap. 8 (Marietti, p. 33 n. 86). Compare Su edi bk. 1, d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 (from the Lethielleux per libros Sententiarum, et univocum. analogum tion, tm. 1, p. 538): "aliter dividiturr aequivocum, vero dividi res significata, univocum enim dividitur secundum Aequivocum diver sed analogum dividitur secundum diversas differentias; tur secundum dividi sos modos. Unde cum ens praedicetur anaiogice de decem generibus, diversos modos." tur in ea secundum
596
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of existing the be that express about to categorical modes something to these itself. He goes on, however, categori special distinguish ing of being that accom from transcendental modes of existing cal modes pany and every is first being as a whole. The existential in Aquinas's object of consideration comes first of all the intellect before
composite becomes
metaphysics?what a composite, a being the entitative of all named (ens)?is essence act of existing.35 It and a distinct of an individual a being's essence and between clear that the real distinction 1, article 1 when he states that the term "be
its act of existing is at the heart of Aquinas's modal divisions of being

in De veritate question
ing" originates with the individual thing's act of existing: "[B]eing [ens] is taken from the act of existing [ab actu essendi], but the name
of a thing expresses the being's quiddity or essence."36
Thus whereas
and genera cal divisions acts upon
the quidditative
divisions
of being according
to
of beings, the categori follow upon the essences species follow upon their to modes of existing of being according follow of being the transcendental while of existing, properties taken as a whole, the name and its its essence both embracing so is taken from the act of existing, acts of existing. taken from diverse
the being As existence. the various
modes
"being" are of being
Ultimately, not only categorical modes
of existing but all modes
of be
a is in a
act of existing: in one view or other of a being's ing are predicated a being an act of a it has because is called existing; being being in itself and not it has its act of existing because called a substance to a conformed it has existence because thing else; it is something quiddity or essence; it is one because it has an undivided act of exist
35 apprehension Aquinas denies that there can be any direct intellectual holds that there is an intellectual of material singulars; but he nonetheless See Summa of the individual being or supposit. I, q. theologiae conception a. 2. The de aa 1 and a. q. 2, 2, Quaestiones ql. quolibet, q. 2; 17, 4; HI, 30, that reader should note that I follow the line of Thomistic interpretation essence and between a distinction real and assert to takes Aquinas necessary and citations of other lines of in every finite being. For comments existence "Unreceived Act is Unlimited," see Wippel, 534-5; for treat interpretation, in Thomas Aquinas Themes of primary texts, see his Metaphysical ments of America Press, 1984), 107-62. (Washington, D. C: The Catholic University 36 de veritate, q. 1, a. 1 (tm. 22, vol. 1, p. 5,11. 137-9); com Quaestiones bk. 1, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, and In pare ad 3. See also Super libros Sententiarum, 2. lc. bk. 4, commentaria, Metaphysicam
597
of a being's act of existing ing; and so on. Each of these articulations a will call Thomas mode of He in holds fact that "the Aquinas existing. of existing of things is manifold."37 mode In the first article of question takes up the theme of 21, Aquinas a for the division of being second time in the De veritate, and ex on establishes the term "mode" as a term of distinction based pressly of things. In doing so he argues the individual existence that the cate are determi of modes universal constitute These modes gories being.
nations intrinsic to being itself that divide itwithout adding to it from without. As he will laterwrite in the Summa theologiae, the limitation of being is necessarily based on being itself (that is, on negations of being), unlike the division of a genus by extrinsic differences.38 Using
the term "mode" is Aquinas's way of trying to formulate such an intrin
sic diversification of being through correlative negations. He thus makes his own the Platonic and Aristotelian strategy of replying to Parmenides by dividing being from within by relativity, otherness, or
contrariety.39 It is crucial 1 of sions to see that Aquinas's reasoning is analogical, de veritate as a propaedeutic of essence in the order does not of existence. add in question 21, article that he outlines divi to reasoning analogi To argue that the tran to the transcendental in which one es
the Quaestiones in the order about divisions "good"
cally scendental
by distinguishing begins "being," Aquinas essence. sence can be added to another In the first way, what it is added, thing to which is added in the way
anything three ways is outside that of
the essence adds
of
the
"white"
to "body."40
37 "Est autem essendi rerum"; Summa multiplex modus I, q. theologiae use of the singular here may at first seem a. 4 (tm. 4, p. 120). Aquinas's 12, Just odd. It suggests to me a transcendental notion of existential distinction. as we might assert that "being is multiple" to affirm that there are many be to af ings, so Aquinas affirms that "the way in which things exist is multiple" firm that there are multiple determinations of existence. 38 "Therefore it is the case that in being, by reason of its commonness, the privation of being is based in being, which is not the case in privations of or any other of this sort." It is note special forms, such as sight or whiteness con to an objection that Aquinas makes this statement in response worthy unum the of the See transcendentals and multitude. cerning opposition Summa I, q. 11, a. 2 (tm. 4, p. 110). theologiae 391 discuss this strategy further at notes 71-3 below. 40 de veritate, q. 21, a. 1 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 592,11. 90-4). Quaestiones
598
The ceives. key
JOHNTOMARCHIO
here is that the receiver point altogether In the second way, what is added is added to which lacks what it re or by contracting to "an something that which of man is de is con
that it is added, as "man" adds determining imal": "'animal' is contracted 'man' because through and actually contained in the definition terminately
tained implicitly and as itwere potentially
in the definition of animal."

or determination is another (that thing added is, in in to
that this addition specifies Aquinas by contraction the case of "animal" does not mean that there "man" that is wholly to add outside the essence
of "animal"
it from without);
man is said In the
rather, "the determination

to animal
in definition of that which
is based on some thing [in aliqua refun third one thing to another, of adding what is way datur]."41 on any thing in reality, is not based added for example, when "blind to "man"; rather, what ness" is added is added only in thought is added and is a being only of reason.
Aquinas
first,
thus distinguishes
addition
between
to one
three additions
of another
in thought:
essence re
the predicational addition on actual
essence
ally distinct from it in actuality

predicational itself, based and
(as in "white animal"); second,

of an intrinsic determination
the
of
to an essence
natures that essence having (as in "rational ani a essence addition to the of a negation third, mal"); predicational of some existing reality (as in "blind animal"). When this analysis can be of how one essence Aquinas applies to the question of another of what the transcendental predicated to moves adds the transcendental he into the order of "good" "being," some existence. He begins critical distinctions. by making First, he two senses between of being: universal distinguishes being and particular He asserts versale) being (ens particulare). to being from without taken universally, ing can be added (ens uni that noth although
there can be additions to being conceived of as "abeing":

to universal being in the first way, although Nothing can add something in this way to some particular being; for there could be some addition there is nothing of any nature which is outside the essence of universal being, although something may be outside the essence of this being.42
41 Quaestiones 42 Quaestiones
de veritate, de veritate,
q. 21, a q. 21, a
1 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 592,11. 94-110). 1 (tm. 22, vol. 3, pp. 592-3,11. 124-9).

This tion distinction inmodes of consideration of Aquinas. challenge of wrong, in another being. Where is crucial the existential of It is at the heart to account for
599
for understanding of his resolu the simultaneous that was Par in
metaphysics the Parmenidian
and multiplicity unity was menides simply one way wrong and
Aristotle
Aquinas right:
states if being
argues that Parmenides
is considered
as it is com
mon
one
to all the categories (ens commune), then it is true that being is but one; being is not one if it is considered only as it pertains to any
to the others in contradistinction category (for example, being as as versus substance being quality).43 can be considered On Aquinas's and account, universally being its from actual to this that and determination unitarily by abstracting particular being or way of being, but in such a way that the conception in and indeterminately contains contained of it implicitly everything as entita those actual determinations.44 Being can also be considered determinate, at hand, question tively draws as distinctly in particular In the realized beings. De veritate question 1, in which 21, article Aquinas and predications of essences of between predications emerges as Aquinas's key term of distinction for
a parallel "mode" categories,
the individual existences

However ond way, of which is which
of things:
there are some things that are found to add to being in the sec to the ten categories, each since being is contracted according to being: not any accident, nor any difference adds something outside the essence of being, but a determinate mode of exist modum is based on the very exist essendi], which ing [determinatum ence of the thing [fundaturin ipsa existentia rei].45
43See In libros bk. 3, chap. 3, lc. 5 (tm. 2, p. 114 n. 15); and Physicorum, bk. 4, lc. 1 (Marietti, p. 183 n. 540). In Metaphysicam, 44 In Summa theologiae I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3, and a. 2, ad 3, Aquinas makes a as such (ipsum esse) and existence considered between parallel distinction as participated considered existence (esse participatum), stating that exist ence as such does contain within itself all other perfections (which do not as it is received and formal and cannot add anything to being), but existence of et formale) does not contain all the perfections (ipsum esse ut receptum 45 de veritate, q. 21, a. 1 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 593, 11. 129-36). Quaestiones of this passage is much clarified by the Leonine edi Note that the meaning rei in lieu of ipsa essentia tion's correction of ipsa existentia rei; compare 9th ed., rev. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, Quaestiones 1953), tm. 1, disputatae, vol. 1, p. 376. being.
600
Aquinas existence
JOHNTOMARCHIO
an analogy is drawing between determination and determination in the order of essence. by specific differences and to actually in the order Just of as a genus
determinate species so taken univer implicitly indeterminately, being is contracted of existing to categorical modes di by determinate sally as to it. Further, visions intrinsic a the of determination to just genus that it contains a species termination is based on the natures according of being of real individual things, so the de to a category is based on real individ existentia rei. It is moreover crucial determinate means of pre things. exist
is contracted
in ipsa fundatur to understand to say that categorically that for Aquinas are based on the existence of existing modes of things cisely They ence that these modes precisely being. are not reducible modes are modes of individual of existing,
ual existence:
to the essences of the participated
In the following reply to an objection

Aquinas makes an interesting epexegetical
in the Summa
remark about
theologiae,
his existen
tial terminology:
itself is of all things the most perfect, for it is related to all [E]xistence things as act. For nothing has actuality except insofar as it is, and there fore existence itself is the actuality of all things and even of the forms when I speak of the existence themselves_For of man or of horse or of any other thing, existence itself is considered formally and as re not to which that existence and ceived, belongs.46 The "when I speak" to of this last sentence that Aquinas signals In contradistinction the distinct of being existence existence, is con either pertains, to its ex
sciously to the Aquinas istence
employing or being will refer as modified
singular terminology. to which the essence qualitatively susceptible
to a thing's and thus
considered/ormate accords with or
et receptum.47 even Therefore, the form or essence, though it is not the thing's mode of existing to it. The existence reducible of a man
46 Summa I, q. 4, a 1, ad 3 (tm. 4, p. 50). theologiae 47 extension of the term "quality" this to Aristotle's analogical Compare to substance: "Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the the quality with reference term 'white';... but species and genus determine to a substance: differentiated." See Cate they signify substance qualitatively in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard trans. E. M. Edghill, goriae, McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 5.3M5-23.

or else of a horse, can be considered the existence proper to human or equine Thus existence.48
601
essence, as modified the con formally, a of not mode should be to reduced of the various cept any principles of being?essence, a to reduced it. form, or matter?nor they Rather, finite mode of existing as the qualification should be understood ex of istence that is necessary with existence There essence, must is not to its union whether be modified, for Aquinas with with these a pure determined To be in principles. or a form material to a certain kind of is
composition composite, of existence. common precisely substantial,
existence an equine material,
to this or that.
a parceling out the existence Rather,
of portions of a horse
existence, proportionate and so forth. Aquinas
to equine essence: finite, asserts the need of such a
proportion in any unity in difference: "[TJhere is required a proportion of the object to the knowing power, just as of the active [principle] to
the passive, the relation Maritain's and of a perfection to the perfectible."49 to With respect a finite being's essence and its existence, I share H. of that formulation "the act of ex approbation Diepen's between
isting is of itself perfectly adapted and accommodated to the essence which is its formal principle; so perfectly that it can be joined to no
other essence in the actuation of the latter."50
On the other hand, I disagree with Maritain's approbation of the

commentary of essence, sion of tradition that sees a mode as a pure terminus in the order the closing its existence.51 off of the essence On the contrary, that allows I propose it to take posses that it is a pure
48 For such a use of the adjective

low.
"modified"
by Aquinas,
see note
76 be
49 Summa theologiae I, q. 88, a. 1, ad 3 (tm. 5, p. 366). 50 "On the Notion of Subsistence," 4 in Dis Jacques Maritain, Appendix or The Degrees to Unite trans. G. B. Phelan tinguish of Knowledge, (New York: Charles Scribner's "La cri Sons, 1959), 434 n. 1; compare H. Diepen, selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue thomiste 50 (1950): tique du Baslieme 115 and 304. 51 In Existence and the Existent (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948), Maritain follows Cretan and John of St. Thomas in distinguishing subsis tence from essence and existence as the ter subsistence both; he describes in the order of essence of a given nature, allowing mination it to take posses sion of the act of existing for which it is created and which transcends it (p. as a mode of existing, pertains to 64). Iwould argue, rather, that subsistence, the act of existing, which confers upon the essence the perfection of subsist see Owens, Elementary Christian Meta ing. For another interpretation, 152. physics,
602
terminus in the order of existence, the qualification receive it from
JOHNTOMARCHIO
of an act of exist
ing that determines
it to and for an individual essence.

is its completion
Things do not
The ter
of existence; take possession they that any essence mination requires
the creator.
by an act of exist
ing proper to it, by which

sence example, of a complete Aquinas
it is actually constituted
In the course
the individual es
persons, constitution for
being. writes: "Existence
of discussing to the very pertains of a complete
of the person, and in this respect has the formality of a limit. Thus the
unity of the person as such."52 istence A mode requires the unity and personal ex
to essence itself or existence is not reducible of existing in the order of It is a pure terminus quid. itself, but nor is it a tertium an individual between relation of the intrinsic existence, expressive act of existing. and constitutively essence and its correlatively proper The mode or form is in po of the being's essence, nature, substance, the prior is in act, and in accord with of existing its mode tency what existence to the first over mode act of thing's pertains potency, ity of a be accommodation The mutual to its essence. and secondarily and its existence ing's essence from the act whereby timately of essence tative composite entailed for its constitution creates the being, In the passage derives ul the creator and existence. the enti from
uses 8 of the De substantiis earlier, Aquinas separatis quoted chapter to existence of to speak of the adaptation the verb convenio natures, of a thing to its proper to speak of the adaptation and the verb adapto mode of existence.53 This mutual with of an essence composition of the thing and the mode proportion its proper of the is the prerequisite It constitutes existence.
is the measure
of its creation.
In his discussion
of relative nonbeing, John F. Wippel criticizes
essence to a mode of exist reduce who would of Aquinas interpreters these as a limitation of content, devoid ence understood prime among a defi on the necessity for I agree with Wippel being W. E. Carlo.54 a really for existence, of reception nite or specific namely principle
ad hoc
52"Nam esse et sic quantum personae: pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem se habet in ratione termini. Et ideo imitas personae requirit unitatem Summa et personalis"; III, q. 19, a 1, ad 4 theologiae ipsius esse completi (tm. 11, p. 242). 53 Quoted at note 29 above.

distinct essence.
603
can I agree with him against Carlo that an essence or specification to the limitation not be reduced itself of an act of ex or the limitation and that cannot of existence be istence, specification a really diverse essence. effected without I nonetheless would grant to Carlo such or thematizes the limitation that Aquinas of an act of existing, irreducible to the essence of the essence. specification itself or even as to
In short, I say that if essence the mode is not reducible to a limitation of existence, neither is a limitation of existence identi an essence. ac cal with the mode of a thing's act of existing Rather, cords the with or is proportioned to the mode of its essence. The mode of or itself is this proportion relation between its essence and that a mode of existing is the specific to its composition with uses determination
thing its act of existing. I am arguing
of an act of existing necessary sence. Imaintain that Aquinas ification itself that an act
of existing
es a particular to name the spec the term modus in relation to has as constituted
an individual essence
are
and as proper to the finite being of which

of an essence order of the
they
and of
or proportion The measure the principles.55 in time but in the its existence is prior not
creator's
54See "Thomas and Derivation of the Many Aquinas on the Distinction Between from the One: A Dialectic Being and Nonbeing," Review of Meta 38 (1985): 585-90. Compare W. E. Carlo: "Essence is not something physics limits and determines extrinsic to existence which it... but essence is rather There is nothing in an existent which is the place where existence stops.... not existence. is the intrinsic limitation of esse, the crystallization of Essence can speak of es bordered by nothingness. This is why Aquinas existence, sence as nonbeing. This is why it is not so much created but rather con-cre rather than an existent"; The Ultimate Re ated. This is why it is a coexistent to Existence in Existential ducibility of Essence (The Hague: Metaphysics Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 103-4. 55 Pace Carlo: "This is what we mean when we say that essence is the in trinsic limitation of existence. It is not that which limits esse, it is the limita tion of esse; it is not that which receives, determines and specifies esse, it is the very specification itself of existence"; The Ultimate Reducibility of Es that although I hold to sence, 104. The reader can infer from my formulations the necessity of a real diversity of essence and existence, I nonethelss take is sue with the common formulation that essence limits existence. Aquinas, this assertion in the passive voice: existence is rather, almost always makes to essence. common limited according at defends the formulation Wippel Act is Unlimited." length in "Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived with his readings are beyond the scope of this article and My disagreement matter for another, projected article.
604
intention, constituting
pated existence and
JOHNTOMARCHIO
are not and cannot be
the very possibility

its proportionate
of finite being. A partici
essence
limited before being joined. Rather their proportion is prior to their composition in the intention of the creative agent which orders them
to one another and proportionately limits them to one another in cre
ating the being of which they are the principles. This colimitation is the prerequisite of their being the composite principles of a complete
The finite being is what being.56 sence and determinate existence another The in its creation. term modus belongs to Aquinas's cannot exist metaphysics in another of existence. the creator are cocreated es its individual creates; and determined to one
He holds that the existence

"the perfection of one thing
of each individual thing is unique, so that

according other" suffice to the
determinate
the supposit, lutely?Aquinas so:
existence
that it had in that thing."57 It is the diversity of

that "makes being, of nature does not abso to do
the complete individual asserts that diversity
not only the na "Other" [aliud] means diversity of substance. However as is said in Book V of the is called substance, ture, but also the supposit And so diversity of nature does not suffice to call some Metaphysics. to supposit. But thing other simply, unless there be diversity according diversity of nature "makes other" [only] in a certain respect, namely ac cording to nature, if there is no diversity of supposit.58
56 I, q. 45, a. 4 (tm. 4, p. 468): "Existing per Compare Summa theologiae to that which has existence, tains properly that is, what is subsisting by its own existence. forms and accidents However and other things of this sort are not called beings as though they themselves exist, but because by them and so they ought to be called cocreated exists... rather than cre something ated. Properly speaking subsisting things are what are created." This analy sis holds for a thing's essence and its act of existing as for any form or acci de potentia, dent. Compare Quaestiones q. 3, a. 1, ad 17 (Marietti, tm. 2, p. God at the same time produces that which receives 41): "In giving existence 57 de veritate, q. 2, a. 2 (tm. 22, vol. 1, p. 44,11.134-6). Com Quaestiones bk. 1, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ag. 2 (Lethielleux, tm. 1, pare Super libros Sententiarum, bk. 1, d. p. 227): "cum unius rei sit unicum esse"; Super libros Sententiarum, tm. 1, p. 819): "unum esse non est nisi in una re"; 35, q. 1, a 4 (Lethielleux, de potentia, q. 7, a. 3 (Marietti, tm. 2, p. 193): "esse uniuscu Quaestiones et distinctum alterius ab esse ciyuslibet rei"; jusque rei est ei proprium est quod Summa III, q. 17, a 2 (tm. 11, p. 222): "quia impossibile theologiae unius rei non sit unum esse." 58 Summa III, q. 17, a. 1, ad 7 (tm. 11, p. 220). theologiae
existence."

The distinctions in virtue of both essential and accidental existence differences
605
are ac
tual only
of the determinate
and actually complete term "mode" to refer
of a real supposit, of a distinct use of the individual Aquinas's being.59 to this ultimate determination and primary dis term. mode asserts to each that God gives of existing, is in each one according to the proper mode of each.60 Indeed, we He thus
tinction of being, namely the distinction of a real individual being, is

use of the his primary creature its own proper its proper mode,
and knows
have seen that Aquinas applies this term of existential distinction to God himself: "[I]t is the proper mode of existing of God alone that he
be mode finite his existence."61 does not speak of the subsisting Aquinas or of materiality; of infinity, or of creatureliness, he speaks of in or finite modes or spiritual modes of existing, material of exist so forth. The of things. own
or accidental modes of existing, and ing, substantial are for Aquinas of existing modes the modes of existing
59 "Thomas definition of an individual could not be clearer. Aquinas's in the ratio or notion of an individual: one is There are, he says, two elements that an individual is a being in actuality, and the other is that it is undivided in in Aquinas's Su "Individuation itself, but divided from all else"; Kevin White, De Trinitate, Catholic Philosophical Q. 4," American per Boetium Quar of actuality, White cites Super li terly 69, no. 4 (1995): 1; for the requirement bros Sententiarum, bk. 4, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qa 3, ad 3. The unity of the supposit or complete derives from its existence: "sed esse est id in entity accordingly quo fundatur unitas suppositi"; Quaestiones quodlibetales, ql. 9, q. 2, ad 2 in of is virtue It the act distinct of existence p. (Marietti, 181). by which a na can accrue to it. See ture exists simply that any other accidental perfections Quaestiones ql. 9, a. 2; Summa quodlibetales, III, q. 17, a 2 (tm. theologiae bk. 1, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4 (Lethielleux, 11, p. 222); and Super libros Sententiarum, tm. 1, p. 819). 60 to all creatures in general, nevertheless "Although he gives existence he gives to each creature a proper mode of existing; and thus insofar as he is in all things by his essence, presence, and power, he is found to be in differ ent things differently and in each according to its proper mode"; Quaestiones de veritate, q. 10, a 11, ad 8 (tm. 22, vol. 2, p. 337,11. 290-6). Compare Super libros Sententiarum, bk. 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2 (Lethielleux, tm. 1, p. 901): "God does not only know the thing, but the proper mode of the thing; he knows therefore that there are diverse modes in diverse things." See also a 3. 61See Summa I, q. 12, a. 4, quoted in note 27 above. theologiae
606 III
JOHNTOMARCHIO
Aquinas's Need for a New Term of Distinction.

mode first emerges as a metaphysical rubric when
The notion of a
form is not taken
for granted in the consideration

more izing ultimate of form act, namely in Aquinas's the meaning
of being but rather is relativized by a

this relativ separatis
One can see the act of existing. in De substantiis the reasoning of nonbeing:
concerning
If by saying "nonbeing" [esse [non ens] I only exclude existing actually in in itself is nonbeing but participates in actu], then form considered If however existence "nonbeing" not only excludes [esse participants]. actually existing but also the act or form by which anything participates a subsisting form is is nonbeing; then matter in existence, furthermore, in the ulti is the form, participating not nonbeing but is an act, which mate act, which is existence.62 There terms a sense of being more is for Aquinas form must be understood, of which ultimate namely than form and None in
existence.
theless, it is critical to understand that in this Thomistic metaphysical

Imaintain that it is a se up in existence. shift, form is not swallowed as a a Thomistic modus essendi to understand rious misinterpretation as or even to Aristotelian for or successor substitute theoretical form, a way ence.63 of understanding Existence The mode form is received or essence in and within limited a metaphysics of exist to to anything according es or nature is that essence,
form, its distinct for existence, possibility capacity proportionate infinite per of the intrinsically in and articulation for a participation to is that according The mode of an essence of existence. fection or to for It it. is is due of a particular which existence quality degree sence's this proper reason that actual beings can be measured against the mode to the mode to their essence, or nature: "[F]or according
its mode.64
of a thing's
form,
inwhich
tude
[something] is complete
in its act is the mode of the magni
of its power."65 or essence a form, nature, to which The mode partici according not is form to it. In this sense, is intrinsic existence any more pates Form as the an than it was for the ancients. for Aquinas questionable swer to the question about being different remains ultimate. Form be
62 De substantiis
separatis,
chap. 8 (tm. 40, p. D55,11.
236-44).
DIVISION OF BEING AQUINAS'S

comes
607
an in the Thomistic purview only as the ultimate questionable swer to about the When question actually Aquinas being. the Aristotelian assertions he ac contextualizes about which form, that form as act does not exhaust the assertion existence, cepts, with which is the actuality itself of all acts, he extends the purview a new set of questions. He also thereby generates physics. a how for asked form is multiplied. unitary cients, example, and and this question and a response with the former of meta The an
Aquinas
must ask of existence not only how it ismultiplied but also diversified,
integrate question response. of existing To speak of the mode to a specific proper form, or else is to make of an individual of existing, the problem of the form's mode one and the many, the same and the other, refer to existence first and to form tion modes secondarily of existence and derivatively. in many is realized perfec to manifold subjects according different from, albeit not unrelated or to different in many individuals To speak of how the one
is to speak about something to exist to, how one form comes
63 I know of no comprehensive This opinion is a common one, although or systematic term "mode" to of the support it: "The being and truth of study an form become a Thomistic Aristotelian material realities is rehabilitated by modus (The Hague: Mar essend."; R. J. Henle, Saint Thomas andPlatonism refers of being to which St. Aquinas tinus Nyhoff, 1956), 318. "The modes ac essences are in both ad finite De 6, 5m] I?II, XXI, general, 85,4c; Ver., [ST, are limitations of being"; Owens, insofar as essences cidental and substantial, est 152 n. 13. "[L]a notion de modus Christian Metaphysics, Elementary cette di Elle traduit tr?s exactement de l'in?galit? formelle. caract?ristique versit? purement qualitative ? l'int?rieur d'une unit? non univoque"; L.-B. Gei de s. Thomas d'Aquin, 242. "In dans la philosophie ger, La participation contrast, every act other than the act of existing, that is, every form or quiddi tative act, is an act limited of itself [De pot. 7,3, resp.] insofar as it is, primor of being idea of a certain mode [De ver. 3,2,ad 6; ST I, dially, a creative "St. Thomas Aquinas: The Limitation of Potency 15,2c]"; Francis J. Kovach, Tomistico Internazionale mAtti Dell'VIII (Vatican City: Congresso by Act," the in Librer?a Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 5:405. "[T]he species, and especially no longer on a purely logical level but rather as are considered dividuals, of being in concrete modes reality"; Cornelio Fabro, "The Intensive Herme 27 (1974): 485. neutics of Thomistic Philosophy," Review ofMetaphysics 64 ipsius, et ideo ter u[E]sse enim recipitur in aliquo secundum modum se et alia de communis sicut minatur, est, et secundum forma, quae quaelibet bk. quod recipitur in aliquo, terminatur ad illud"; Super libros Sententiarum, tm. 1, p. 202). 1, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1 (Lethielleux, 65 contra gentiles Summa I, chap. 43 (tm. 13, p. 124,11. al-42).
608
degrees. difference the Aristotelian Thus, as ultimate remains queries. must However, be assertion
JOHNTOMARCHIO
that form for Aquinas with the horizon is the principle of as for Aristotle as replies of existence under
to the original forms
stood as the ultimate and formally infinite act, the diversity of the
themselves explained in terms of the transcendental
participation of all finite entity and principles of entity in the universal

as well as in the infinite of existence perfection cause of finite existence. of God, the universal mode ence: subsisting existence
If form is the ultimate principle of quidditative difference,

a transcendental is for Aquinas of existential concept as such of acts in the sense of the distinction difference require distinction. a formal principle uses Aquinas diversity not only also of
then
differ
of exist of recep the term
in any being but God ing, which and tion for their determination "mode" He and can
to express the manifold analogically thus use the term to express difference and ways of beings being and created and form but of form
existence.
kinds among created subsisting one of form absence
of being, but beings, where and absence existence
among beings, un between is the the
the difference of form, distinguishes for
not very
divine By
of essence of a duality and existence from all other existence.
term of existential transcendental Aquinas's calling modus a we guard against to that of mea reduction of the notion distinction, a to sure of existence. With its mode of existing is creature, respect
the determination
limitation lation,
of its act of being in both senses of that word: it is a

of existence, of existence modes and at the same time an articu to some kind of being and way of as modifications of existing of exist measures rather than as of existence consonant discourse. modus more means commonly is to look to the of measures of degrees with Aquinas's existen
of the fullness
a determination
Understanding existing. ence on an analogy with on an analogy tial metaphysics Even with and
quality is more quantity its adverbial the Latin
though
word
the tendency of commentators "way" than "measure," a sense The notion for second metaphysical analogue.66 of existence seems to accord with the Neoplatonic
notion
of being.
Moreover
this notion
of
seems
to find textual support

triplet modus, pondus, should
in
et
Aquinas's explications in terms of the ordo However, I think
the Augustinian
scriptural that such ad
triplet mensura, discussions litteram
species, et ordo.67 take sec

ond to his frequent place think that the secondary sense means use of the term ex professo. of measure should On this Furthermore, be
609
I in
sense of
light of the primary for Aquinas existing" sense
"way." measure
than of quantity An of being proportioned to it. can even This interpretation ad litteram Thus discussions
or degree.
interpreted "mode of interpretation, more in the sense of proportion essence's existence is measured in the
Aquinas's sense of measure.
find textual in some of support use of mode of Augustine's in the in his consideration in the Summa theologiae identifies required the mode of a form as the
of whether
the formality (ratio) of good consists, as Augustine says, in

and order, Aquinas of its principles for its perfection:
mode, species, commensuration
to be perfect and good, it is necessary that it have a [For] something for it, and the things which fol form, the things which are prerequisite or commensu low upon it. Prerequisite for a form is the determination ration of its principles, whether of the material ones, or of the ones that effect it, and this is signified through mode; thus is it said that the mea sure preestablishes the mode.68 We site have here a notion of mode as measure in the sense can of a prerequi receive is what
commensuration
or proportion.
"Nothing
66 An extreme case of this is Carlo: "The ultimate reducibility of essence essence to esse provides a natural, intrinsic proportion between and esse. If essence is a mode of esse, then the essence varies with the degree, or to put it are as it were quanta of existence. crudely, the amount of esse. Essences or accommodation There is therefore no need of an artificial adaptation of essence and esse as reciprocal causes, related as metal to mold or the inter Such a proportion flows naturally from the locking pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. to esse"; The Ultimate Reducibility, 102 n. very structure of being, intrinsic 2. The converse of Carlo's reduction of essence to modes of existence is a re duction by other commentators of modes of existence to essence; see note 63 Imaintain are betrayals of Aquinas's above. that both reductions existential of finite being and multiplicity of be insight, namely, that the very possibility ing requires a duality within being of essence and existence. 67See Summa I, q. 45, a. 7 (tm. 4, p. 476); compare Quaes theologiae tiones de veritate, q. 21, a. 6 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 608), and Summa I, theologiae interest here for the interpretation of q. 5, a. 5 (tm. 4, p. 63). Of principal of this triplet is that he consistently associates the term exegesis Aquinas's in contradistinction modus with existence to species as denoting precisely form. See, for example Quaestiones de veritate, q. 21, a 6, s.c. 4 (tm. 22, vol. and q. 21, a 3, p. 608,11. 93-5); q. 21, a. 6, ad 3 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 609,11.164-70); 6, so. (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 609,11.138-48). 68 Summa theologiae I, q. 5, a. 5 (tm. 4, p. 63).
610
JOHNTOMARCHIO
its measure."69 A form's mode the existence it beyond predetermines of receiving; its mode is capable the determination and expresses commensuration creates accord has of a complete of the creature in with with and simultaneously A thing's existence its essence. a mode in accord with its form. A thing's mode is, together with and its order to its end, constitutive of its its principles that it requires the existence being, he causes to exist. When God
the formality of its species and goodness.70 existence It is true that Aquinas
often
invokes
the quantitative in this comparison in the case of forms as the unit is added is added are
analogy the
of
fered by Aristotle between

numbers. However, there
the hierarchy of forms and the order of

is implicit is added all to yield a each time no pas the or
important disanalogy new species is not the same each time, but rather what to yield a new number, ble
that what
and qualitatively per se diverse perfections. on the Liber of his de causis, commentary sage of quidditative Aristotelian principles gradation
increasingly In the following Aquinas to the possession reduces
privation of irreducibly diverse formal differences:

to a certain contrariety: for [T]hings that differ formally differ according as in to is the difference says form, contrariety Philosopher according there is in the case of contraries, However Book X of the Metaphysics. as is said in book I of and one less excellent, always one more excellent is priva And this is the case because the first contrariety the Physics. as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics. And for tion and possession, the Philosopher this reason in Book VII of the Metaphysics says that the in kind by the forms of things are like numbers, which are diversified addition of one upon another.71 I propose vation tends there count with saw that Aquinas as necessary and pri that the contrariety of possession ex in of the forms Aristotle hierarchy by to the order of existence: equal necessity In his contrariety.72 on Boethius's commentary existential De ac
asserted
and analogical without cannot be diversity of diversity in his
trinitate,
libros Senten suam"; Super "[N]ihil potest recipere ultra mensuram tm. 1, p. 197). tiarum, bk. 1, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2 (Lethielleux, 70 Summa I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2 (tm. 4, p. 63). theologiae 11 lc. 4 (Marietti, pp. 249-50 n. 115). In Librum de causis, 72 On Aquinas's derivation of diversity and plurality from the contrariety see his Super Boetium De trinitate, between q. 4, a 1. being and nonbeing, "Thomas Aquinas on the For a close reading of this text, see John F. Wippel, of the Many from the One," 563-90. and Derivation Distinction
69

Aquinas perfections reduces the Aristotelian primary contrariety contrariety to a more
611
of having and not having of being and nonbeing:
It is not possible for being to be divded from being insofar as it is being; is divided from being except nonbeing. for nothing And therefore this there is included being is not divided from that being unless it is because in this being the negation of that being.... just as a being is Therefore, to be one insofar as it is undivided, so too the discovered immediately of and is discovered after the plurality simple things prior immediately division of being and non being. The notion of diversity follows on this inasmuch as there remains in it the force of its cause, namely plurality of being and nonbeing.73 the opposition For Aquinas, the absolute diversity the species of the hierarchy stitute of the simple differentiae that con of natures to a contrariety reduces
of being and nonbeing (ens et non ens). Each simple being imitates the first cause in a different way by being like it in one way and not be
Each has within itself as a consequence ing like it in another way. of the first cause's both the negation infinite mode of being and the ne finite mode of being. The same opposi gation of every other being's com of being and nonbeing tion or contrariety that obtains among plete being beings between and their constitutive and differences Essence obtains within each its essence that makes existence. of is the principle or "modifica as such could not
partial negation tion" of existence. be diversified
According essence without uses
possible to Aquinas,
the diversification existence
Aquinas negation.74 of existence. diversifications The various kinds
as a contrary of differential principle the term "mode" precisely to thematize these treated in Aquinas's thought God is one with
of determination
are necessary his existence
ticipated
metaphysics it is impossible that there be more than one unpar For God to create is for him to cause an act of existence.75 and
to a creationist
in which
73Sancti Thomae de Aquino Exposition de trini super librum Boethii tate, ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), pp. 135-6,11. 5-8, 23-4, and
1-3.
74 This theme well exceeds the scope of this paper. For a resume of rele vant texts, see John F. Wippel, in the Cambridge "Metaphysics," Companion to Thomas Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York: Press, 1993). Cambridge University 75 libros Sententiarum, bk. 1, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1; See, for example, Super de potentia, Quaestiones q. 7, a. 2, ql. 3, q. 8, a. 1; Quaestiones quodlibetales, a. 1; In librum Bo?tii De hebdomadibus ex ad 3; De spiritualibus creaturis, librum 4. lc. De causis lc. 2; positio, Super expositio,
612
existing creature some according has to a mode determined
JOHNTOMARCHIO
by his creative limited mode shows idea, a mode that it is from the crea
that is both an articulation and a limitation: "For the very fact that the
a substance The modified same and principle."76 enunciates which creaturely that expresses
ture's deficiency
source a whole verse
relative to the unqualified perfection

also its proper
of its infinite
is a better and manifold things that
beings of existing
within the created whole, perfection source of infinite for all its di the expression of existing.77 The proper modes modes of creatures from one another are to their principle to a according of perfection is in any creature, to an eminent in God according
moreover unique wholly

mode."78
preeminently divine mode: preexists and
distinguish attributable "[WJhatever is contained
The ticulation ual thing's
term
"mode"
of existence existence:
to the metaphysical account of the ar belongs an to the articulation of individ and primarily
to to some form: and therefore according is according [E]very existence of a thing, there follows upon it a mode, species, and or every existence and order, insofar as he is a der, such that a man has a species, mode, insofar as he is white, he has a mode, man; and similarly, species, and
76"Nam hoc et fini ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam a sit Summa demonstrat q. 93, a. I, theologiae quod quodam principio"; tam, to di 6 (tm. 5, p. 407). Although we have seen Aquinas apply the term modus use the term in treatments of creation and par vine being, he will sometimes the finite being of creatures from the infinity to contradistinguish ticipation sub of the Creator: "Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus essendi d?termin?t, stantiae rei; sed hoc nomen QUI EST, nullum modum sub ad omnes, et ideo nominat sed se habet indeterminate ipsum pelagius stantiae infinitum"; Summa I, q. 13, a 11 (tm. 4, p. 162). Such for theologiae discourse are uncommon. With respect to analogical however, mulations, the notion inwhich about God, they may be seen as part of the via negativa, it connotes when said of any fi is purged of the limitation of determination one must nite act of existence. deny of God not only the finite de However, of matter of created being but also the infinite ind?termination termination the term "mode," Thus in the via eminentiae, and of mere possibility. to attribute to of limitation, is used by Aquinas purged of the connotation to infi and a unique determination God actuality, distinction from creatures, nite subsistence. See Quaestiones ql. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. quodlibetales, 77 and diver of the creation for the multiplicity On the greater perfection a aa. treatment of this 1-2. see For Summa of q. 47, I, theologiae sity beings, see Oliva Blanchette, The Perfection theme in Aquinas's writings, of the Uni A Teleological verse According to Aquinas: Park, (University Cosmology State University Penn.: The Pennsylvania Press, 1992). 78 Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a 6 (tm. 4, p. 176).

order; and insofar as he is virtuous, and insofar as he is knowing, cording to all the things which are said of him.79 It is precisely created of such because will use because as well there as upon is a mode every
613
and ac
good universal
upon every kind of consequent being that the term "mode" admits The term is flexible, not it is so precise. Aquinas of whatever is being con from Plato, man as distinct subsistence as
and various
it is so indefinite, the entitative it to name
application.80 but rather because distinction
as distinct it be Socrates sidered, whether as distinct a substance from from horse,
an accident,
distinct from inherence, material being as distinct from immaterial, the good as distinct from the true, the creator as distinct from the
creature, and so on. In every case, of the thing with In sum, in the metaphysics in terms of essential of being whole a view to its proper is signified is the distinction that is, to its existence. actuality, of Thomas of the the account Aquinas what differences has its necessary com
The of existence. of it in terms of distinctions in an account plement so are the ways of having and modes of being are the ways existence, Such Thomas divides in reply to Parmenides, in which, being. Aquinas cause: "Therefore of being have God as their ultimate divisions just as
the divine wisdom

of the perfection ity."81 Ultimately, modes
is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake

of the universe, the diversity in each so too is it the cause is due of of being to the first cause's its inequal lim
iting the act of existing
in accord with his exemplary

instance at once,
ideas of finite
of existing, creating act and the potency at once, both the participated that God at the same time produces ceive the act: "In giving existence, the manifold to Aquinas, which receives existence."82 According first of existing of things to communicate being reduces and ultimately represent to the its goodness intention of the be in other
and necessarily to re proportioned
mode
ings.83 St. John's
College
79 Summa I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 3 (tm. 4, p. 63). theologiae 80 Summa theologiae I?II, q. 85, a 4 (tm. 7, p. 114). 81 Summa theologiae I, q. 47, a 2 (tm. 4, p. 487). 82 "Deus simul dans id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet esse, producit de potentia, q. 3, a 1, ad 17 Quaestiones quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti"; tm. 2, p. 41). (Marietti, of Kevin White and Jeff Haus 831 am grateful for the particular goodness on drafts of this paper. in commenting

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Aquinas's Division of Being According to Modes of Existing Author(s): John Tomarchio Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.

OF BEING DIVISION AQUINAS'S OF EXISTING ACCORDING TOMODES

to being could divide it, and that nonbeing, since it

Correspondence 21404. 1 The remarks

to: St. John's

54 (March 2001): 585-613. Copyright ? 2001 by The Review of

mination, act of existing,

that for Aquinas and in particular and

" of the Term uMode. The importance of

OF BEING DIVISION AQUINAS'S

the being itself (modi ipsius

He then identifies the Aristote

(modi "true," and

accompanying general modes omne consequens ens).5

being this question,

What would thing that comes counter anything,

OF BEING DIVISION AQUINAS'S

Indeed, Aquinas seems to hold that the primary judgments

what the thing is: "Once it is known whether something exists

what it is [quid est]."s Thus in response to the Parmenidian

scendental division of being according to general modes of being, that

OF BEING 591 DIVISION AQUINAS'S

rather must is to have

admit any sig

To illustrate that if the word modus

is only taken in the ordinary

of Aquinas's metaphysical run through we can force, of the Summa

Let us begin with the following list of short for

17 Summa 18 Summa 19 Summa

theologiae theologiae theologiae

I, q. 4, a. 2 (tm. 4, p. 52). I, q. 7, a 4, ad 1 (tm. 4, p. 79). I, q. 75, a. 6 (tm. 5, p. 204).

pars of the Summa as a synonym for "mode"

specifying quality, He first of existence. Augustine and says

appeals in Super Gen. it means

lishes, some measure."24 existence: which

litteram, a certain determination

according modes specific

to according to substantial to according to accidental

likewise existence; the potency which existence.25 In the De dents

is the difference quality is determined according the term

20 Summa 21 Summa 22 Summa 23 Summa 24 Summa

AQUINAS'S DIVISION OF BEING

Aquinas "To be his for God: alone."27 He

God tarian unity

theology of the divine

q. 21, a. 6, ad 5 (tm. 22, vol. 3, p. 610,11.

proper to the individual being: "There are three things to consider

of the genus and species ex of existing of such a nature, sub third

is the principle from which this [mode] is caused."31

being (ens), existing (esse), or essence

AQUINAS'S DIVISION OF BEING

gular and material immaterial mode and an eternal mind of

the term at the heart is not must pate

dry uses what

analogy of being, then the question

that naturally presents

being's a limitation of existence

as such mines clearly return We

see more let us

1, article degrees modes

derstands he thus in turn relates

categorical that superadd

of being, which of existing. He to the being