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A Nonhuman Eye:
Deleuze on Cinema
Temenuga Trifonova
abridged and necessarily limited version of our entire mental life. To restore the
richness and complexity of that mental life, they believe, subjectivity has to be
suppressed or surpassed, which in turn calls for a redefinition of representation.
Deleuze’s Cinema I: The Movement-Image and Cinema II: The Time-Image1
exemplify the changes in our understanding of representation as they trace the
transition from a cinema dominated by movement-images to the modern cinema
of the time-image. In the regime of movement-images, time is subordinated to
movement: things and events determine psychological duration. The drawback
of the movement-image, according to Deleuze, is that it fails to present duration,
but subordinates it to movement or spatialized time. Deleuze’s contention is that
modern cinema has liberated itself from subjectivity or representation; however,
his theory of the time-image does not get rid of subjectivity, but only reformulates
the notion of the object. The object for Deleuze is a pure image, a “mental image”
purged of any materiality and no longer subordinated to sensory-motor
schemata.
Deleuze believes that to restore its original nature as a being rather than an
object of knowledge, the subject must become even more subjective: it must
constitute itself “above” its own representations; it must create hyper-
representations. Deleuze privileges the time-image over the movement-image
because the former constitutes itself beyond representation, thus reaffirming the
subject’s autonomy. The subordination of movement to time achieves namely
this: when duration dictates what is happening, rather than events determining
time, the subject has restored its independence from the world. While the
representation of the world still presupposes an essential difference between things
and their descriptions, the time-image eliminates this difference, replacing things
with their descriptions.
The relationship Deleuze establishes between things and their descriptions
is similar to the one Baudrillard posits between objects and signs. Like Baudrillard,
Deleuze appears to believe that simply placing the description of a thing in the
“place” (this “place” is within the system of representation) usually occupied by
the thing itself renders the description pure, or thing-like. All referential material,
all objectivity is evacuated from the time-image, but precisely because of that,
Deleuze contends, the time-image is not a subjective representation, but a thing
in itself, a pure expression. This is so because the idea of an object always
presupposes the idea of a subject (representation is not only the presentation of
the world as a reflection of the subject but also, and to an equal degree, the self-
objectification of the subject) and the end of representation is the annihilation of
both subject and object. However, Deleuze fails to take into account the fact that
the act by which an end is put to representation cannot itself be bracketed out.
Something of the subject always remains and it is namely (and only) from the
point of view of this remainder of subjectivity that the end of subjectivity is posited
and simultaneously proven impossible.2
The impossibility of eliminating point of view applies both to literature and
to cinema. In Novel and Film: Essays in Two Genres, Bruce Morrissette describes
an excellent example of this impossibility in the work of novelist/filmmaker Alain
Robbe-Grillet. Taking the case of Robbe-Grillet as an example of the attempt to
get rid of the specific, situated point of view and substitute it with a purely
“geometric and visual perspective”(45), Morrissette demonstrates how this project
eventually restores, though in a slightly modified form, the omniscient narrator:
Is it possible to separate point of view in itself, as localization of a camera
objective or of an authorial eye, from the reason or internal justification of
this same point of view? Does this “observer,” who for Robbe-Grillet…need
not be a “character” in the narrative, have the privilege of randomly
positioning himself almost anywhere? …Can he displace himself at will?
What will then prevent such an eye of the camera or of the novelist from
becoming, once again, an eye “everywhere at once,” if not an eye that is
perpetually omniscient and omnipresent like the eye of God? …Yet if we
grant the camera an absolute liberty of movement…an omni-optique
system is obviously created, the justification for which seems as difficult
or arbitrary as in the case of the omniscient author. (46)
to the sheer presence of things and human beings (by avoiding the humanization
of the world), the modern novel and film do not get rid of man but rather achieve
the opposite effect: they make man aware of the very real distance between him
and the rest of the world. The less anthropocentric the novel/film, the more
realistic. Robbe-Grillet explains that it is not a question of getting rid of subjectivity,
but rather of eliminating the inside/outside opposition that has always determined
the idea of subjectivity. The objectification of mental content—for example, the
treatment of imagination and memory as physical reality4—is the ultimate form
of realism, since it finally acknowledges the reality of what has always been
dismissed as a merely “subjective point of view.” Unlike Deleuze, Robbe-Grillet
is very much aware of the impossibility of a “total impersonality of
observation”(18), despite the fact that the most common critique of his novels
has been their allegedly “dehumanized” or “neutral” nature:
Even if many objects are presented and are described with great care,
there is always, and especially, the eye which sees them, the thought which
reexamines them, the passion which distorts them. The objects in our
novels never have a presence outside human perception, real or imaginary.
(Robbe-Grillet 137)
Contrary to what critics of the New Novel argue, “the New Novel [and, I add,
the cinema of the time-image Deleuze discusses in Cinema II] aims only at a
total subjectivity” (138).
Toward the end of the second volume of Cinema, Deleuze argues that cinema
can and should be seen as the condition of possibility for signification in general,
that cinema provides us with access to being, that it reconstitutes the dawn of
the world before the birth of human perception or consciousness. Cinema is not
a language. Deleuze insists that the best analogue for the frame in cinema “is to
be found in an information system rather than a linguistic one. The elements
[within the frame] are the data…which are sometimes very numerous, sometimes
of limited number. The frame is therefore inseparable from two tendencies:
towards saturation or towards rarefaction”(Cinema I 12). An information system
is pre-human, neutral, pre-linguistic, inasmuch as information or data is
ontologically older than signification or signs. There is an interesting reversal
here: although information systems are empirically “younger” than signification
or language (we started talking about “information systems” considerably
recently), they appear to have already surpassed a certain limit of “humanism”
or “subjectivity” and are now projected retrospectively as preceding signification
or are characterized as “inhuman.” Such a gesture is necessary from a humanist
point of view: since we cannot comprehend how the human has evolved into
something so foreign to humanity as pure information, the only response we
[The human eye’s] relative immobility as a receptive organ means that all
images vary for a single one, in relation to a privileged image. And, if the
camera is considered as apparatus for shooting film, it is subject to the
same conditioning limitation. But the cinema is not simply the camera: it
is montage. And if from the point of view of the human eye, montage is
undoubtedly a construction, from the point of view of another eye, it ceases
to be one; it is the pure vision of a non-human eye, of an eye which would
be in things. Universal variation, universal interaction (modulation) is
what Cezanne had already called the world before man, “dawn of
ourselves,” “iridescent chaos,” “virginity of the world.” It is not surprising
that we have to construct it since it is given only to the eye which we do not have.
(Cinema I 81, my italics)5
makes this clear. We encounter the former in the habitual recognition of images
(Bergson’s habit memory) and the latter in spontaneous recollection (Bergson’s
pure memory). The movement-image prolongs a perception-image into a
sensory-motor response: instead of perceiving for the sake of perceiving, we utilize
our perception for some practical purpose at hand, extending the image into a
certain action upon the image. However, in the case of the time-image we perceive
purely for the sake of perceiving: we do not respond to the image by acting
upon it, but, rather, we stop at the perception or—what amounts to the same—
we are returned to a kind of perception purged of any sensory-motor necessity.
Now, in a movie there are obviously no such distinctions among the images we
see on the screen: it is not that some of the images are real things while others we
perceive as images. All images on the screen are images. A spectator perceiving
an image on the screen obviously does not attempt to act upon it as he would act
on a real thing. What Deleuze actually wants to argue is that certain images are
perceived as if they were real things, whereas others are perceived for their own
sake. Although such a distinction can certainly be posited, Deleuze fails to explain
what is unique in the movement-image and the time-image in cinema, as opposed
to these two types of images in everyday perception.
A movement-image is impure, by which Deleuze means that we perceive it
with an ulterior motive (the intention to act on it). In the movement-image, a
thing on the screen appears only as a thing, creating the illusion that we can
respond to it in the same way we respond to real, external stimulation. There is
an odd reversal here: the thing as such (the movement-image) is a representation
or a signification, since it refers to some real object that we recognize in it
automatically. Only when we substitute a description of the thing for the thing
itself, Deleuze argues, does the image become pure expression. The material
world as such is already a signification, whereas the pure mental image we have
of it (the description with which we replace it) is pure expression. For Deleuze,
the movement-image belongs to the regime of signification because it provokes
a sensory-motor response from us—i.e., the body is the ultimate source of
signification. Common sense, however, has always treated signification as
something “mental.” Taking over Bergson’s idea of the body as a special image,
Deleuze contends that natural perception is already signification: merely by
reflecting images back upon themselves and thus making them appear to us,
we are representing them. This is a radical shift in the understanding of the
nature of signification or representation, for Deleuze implies that representation
is not a manifestation of a reflective consciousness; instead, representation marks
the birth of perception. Representation is not produced by an act of addition but by
an act of dissociation.
On one side, the time-image has a strictly historical origin—it would not
have been possible without the war, whose effect was the shattering of sensory-
motor schemata—but on the other side, the time-image is said to be ontologically
superior to the movement-image, which is only a cliché. Yet this superiority of
the time-image is the result of a failure—the jamming of sensory-motor linkages—
that is both a historically specific phenomenon and one that benefits us
immensely since it allows us a more “authentic” or direct access to material
reality. Since Deleuze considers the time-image aesthetically and ontologically
superior to the movement-image, he seems to suggest that the failure of sensory-
motor linkages, which happened at a particular point in history, has to be
encouraged, fostered—that it was a serendipitous failure. Only something that
traumatic and unspeakable could have changed our idea of what an image is
and made us understand that the material world is made of images. Thus, a
particular historical event is credited with the utmost ontological significance,
just as a particular film “school”—Italian neo-realism—is supposed to reveal the
inherently cinematic nature of the material world.
And yet, Deleuze insists that we cannot experience time directly in everyday
perception: the “I” who perceives cannot experience nonchronological time
because the “I” cannot get rid of itself in normal perception, cannot bracket
itself out and become as impersonal and anonymous as the camera. Natural
perception is necessarily subjective or substractive, whereas cinematographic
perception is anonymous or “crystalline.” The pure optical or sound image—
the time-image—is a de-serialized image that cannot link up with other images.
In addition, it is de-serialized from no one’s point of view, whereas a natural
perception-image is de-serialized (insofar as perception is a kind of framing or
de-serialization) from the point of view of the subject. However, can an image be
de-serialized from a non-existent point of view? Can the failure of a pure optical
image to link up with other images be established not from a subject’s point of
view but from a no-place or from an any-point-of-view-whatever? The answers
to these questions hinge upon what Deleuze means by “point of view.” Point of
view generally signifies interest. The time-image, on the other hand, is perceived
in a disinterested manner, as if it were not perceived by us, but, rather, by other
images.
subjective” (82-83). Being (time) now becomes coextensive with subjectivity, the
individual human being appearing “smaller” than subjectivity: the more absent
we are from the actual, from the present, or the more we lose ourselves in
recollection, the more we expand our original objectivity and become more and
more subjective. This reversal of the traditional understanding of the subject/
object relationship according to which the objective is ‘bigger’ than the subjective
liberates us from the bitter resentment or fear of never being objective enough. It
also frees us from postmodernism, which is a valid standpoint only as long as
the subject is conceived as a point of view, necessarily limited, among many
other relative points of view. However, if one starts from Deleuze’s assumption
that we are always already objective, subjectivity becomes a retreating horizon
toward which we are able to advance. The objective or the present is now
considered a point of view, whereas subjectivity becomes the most impersonal,
inhuman mode of consciousness.
To illustrate his notion of the time-image as an inhuman event, Deleuze
asks us to imagine
... an earthly event which is assumed to be transmitted to different planets,
one of which will receive it at the same time (at the speed of light), but the
second more quickly, and the third less quickly, hence before it happened
and after. The latter would not yet have received it, the second would
already have received it, the first would be receiving it, in three
simultaneous presents bound into the same universe. This would be a
sidereal time, a system of relativity, where the characters would be not so
much human as planetary. …It would be a pluralist cosmology, where one
and the same event is played out in these different worlds, in incompatible
versions. (Cinema II 102)
acts, which no longer have particular causes and effects (the very notions of
“cause” and “effect” rest on the ascription of value to things; however, in a virtual
world the question of value can no longer arise). While Deleuze interprets the
humbling of the subject to the status of any-point-of-view-whatever as a liberation
of things (of other images) from the necessity to be true or consistent, Baudrillard
does not think such liberation possible, arguing instead that although the old
idea of truth has long disappeared, it has been replaced with the idea of credibility.
Credibility does not describe a state where all images are “equal” and none
subordinated to a central, privileged image; rather, credibility is the principle of
truth gone mad.
Deleuze describes the pure optical and sound image in terms of a spectacle.
In modern cinema the situation is not extended into action but remains a purely
optical or sound description or inventory of things and characters. This has the
effect of inflating the image or its significance, making it spectacular (self-
sufficient) even when it is everyday. The “spectacle,” however, has completely
different connotations for Baudrillard and Deleuze: the former identifies the
spectacular with the hyperreal, whereas for the latter the spectacular is the very
nature of the time-image. The spectacle oscillates between the simulacral image
and the time-image as the “direct presentation of time.” The pure image is
independent of subjectivity because subjectivity is possible only as a relation
between the subject and the world. Replacing a thing with its description does
not constitute the triumph of the subject, but its disappearance.
For Baudrillard, too, when a thing is replaced by its image, the image
becomes self-sufficient and independent from the subject. The subject exists only
as the difference between itself and something else (a world), but as soon as the
subject projects its images or descriptions of things on those things, the things
underneath disappear, the difference between subject and object disappears.
Everywhere it looks, the subject sees only itself, which means that it cannot see
itself any more because seeing is possible only as the positing of oneself as different
from what one sees. The appearance of the hyperreal signals the disappearance
of subjectivity. Thus, at the very moment when the subject’s power seems to
have reached the limit—things are replaced with their descriptions or images—
the subject annihilates itself: a pure optical image is independent of the subject.
Paradoxically, by derealizing the world, by making things as references vanish,
the subject constructs precisely what it was always lacking as long as it was
locked in the system of reference and representation: an absolutely sovereign
world, which is not subordinated to the subject, but includes it as merely one
virtuality among many. Only by making the world virtual can the subject ensure
that there is something different from itself, something over which it has no
control. Once the real is no longer sufficient (no longer different enough from
the subject), but appears as a mere construct of the subject, the only way to save
the real is to make it hyperreal, to posit it as the absolutely sovereign being that
the subject has always wanted to be but never was/is. True sovereignty is not
possible as long as the subject identifies itself as an interiority separate (and thus
dependent upon) something outside it. Subjectivity cannot be abolished
completely, but there always remains a “place” from which the suppression of
subjectivity is announced, a “place” where subjectivity retreats to preserve itself.
What Baudrillard calls “the fatal object” is not an object that exists independently
of subjectivity. Rather, the fatal object is the subject having finally attained
sovereignty, the subject as absolute exteriority.
The transition from the movement-image to the time-image in cinema reveals
the decreasing role of the subject as an agent of representation. The movement-
image still belongs to a system of representation, whereas in modern cinema the
story or plot is replaced by pure (nonreferential) time-images or pure
(nonreferential) language:
For the time-image to be born…the actual image must enter into relation
with its own virtual image as such; from the outset pure description must
divide into two, “repeat itself, take itself up again, fork, contradict itself.”
An image which is double–sided, both actual and virtual, must be
constituted. We are no longer in the situation of a relationship between the
actual image and other virtual images, recollections, or dreams, which
thus become actual in turn: this is still a mode of linkage. We are in the
situation of an actual image and its own virtual image, to the extent that
there is no longer any linkage of the real with the imaginary, but
indiscernibility of the two, a perpetual exchange. (Cinema II 273-275)
Works Cited
Notes
1. Readings of Deleuze’s two books on cinema tend to reduce the cinematographic image to
thought, disregarding the specificities of the cinematographic image and subordinating
it to an examination of Deleuze’s ontology in general. See The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and
the Philosophy of Cinema, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000).
2. See Martin Schwab, “Escape from the Image: Deleuze’s Image Ontology” in The Brain Is the
Screen, 109-139. Schwab argues that Deleuze’s books on cinema develop an “image-
ontology [that] remains insensitive to the specificities of cinema”(109). More importantly,
however, Schwab shows that there is an irreconcilable gap between Deleuze’s idea of
subjectivity as a force of differentiation (the subject is a special sort of image dissociated
or substracted from the aggregate of movement-images) and, on the other hand, his
belief that it is necessary to restore the original undifferentiated flow of images. How,
asks Schwab, can the subject be both an agent of differentiation and de-differentiation,
or how can the subject willfully abolish itself and “dissolve” in pure perception? Schwab
rightfully notes that although Deleuze considers himself (and is considered by others) a
philosopher of difference, he still clings to the Romantic idea “that our world has fallen
and that subjectivity is an alienated condition” (133) and presents the subject as a sort
of impurity of which the world has to be cleansed.
3. The refusal to represent subjectivity does not result in the dissolution of the point of
view in the world of things, because it is always carried out with some ulterior
(subjective) purpose in mind. See the chapters “Modes of ‘Point of View’” and “The
Alienated ‘I’” in Novel and Film, where Morrissette analyzes the paradoxical effect of the
first-person point of view (in Robbe-Grillet’s novels it obstructs rather than fosters the
reader’s self-identification with the protagonist) and of the third-person point of view
(in Dostoevsky’s works, it has the opposite effect of ensuring self-identification with
morally objectionable characters).