71

APPENDIX iA ExtractOs from 30 Cor._opralion Inrstruction No.47 dl- teod 3 IFeb 43

.
t

"V E R i I\FORLMATI0I,

TA

P L

Ow O
(a)

Tps

First Cdn Ar:my. is resuming- the offensive on the

Northern sector of thei Western Front. Initially, First Ctdn Army is attacking on a one corps front with '0 Brit Corps Subsequently, 2 Cdn Corps is
sector fronm 30 BrLit Corps a. rnd the at-tack will con.tinue on a two corps front... 2 Cdn Corps is cont-

to take over the LEFT

inuing to hold 1NJIJEGEN and the bridgehead across the 'R VWAALV **(b) Second Brit ArnAy will operate on the RIGHT flank at a later date.

undaPri es

PLI0E, wvith- 3

orps ( w e f 1000 hrs D minus 1 )

All inclusive 30 C.(- -ps road and railway crossing -755403 thence railway to road and railway crossing 71 74,85 R .MAAS at -722492 - thence exclusive R ILAS to 765477 iinclusive R NIERS to 821449 -all inc]lusive .iOM,,ERSUM: 823l4 - road to HASSUI 8504.37 cross roads 896428 - cross roads 907417. rNO'TE: This boundary will be modified as the battle progresseso (Operative. wef 1000 hrs D minus 1 )

LEFT vwith 2 Cdn Crs

All inclusive to 30 Coirps GUAVE bridge - inclusive C IVMAPLE IEAF route to road junction 690609 -cross roads 706608 road junction 707614 cross roads way to 1R HE,,'MER 733617 7 - then to R WA.L 717630 and EAST along that. river to EI\,iERICH. 53< 'Command a '(a) o

7156 4 - road junction 719608 - cross roads 732610 0 road. and' railway junction 734616 - thence along rail-

30 Corps is to assume responsibiilwty for sector CUIJK AA/L .and command of 2 Cdn Inf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Div wef 1000 hrs D minus 1.
J-

(b)

2 Cdn Inf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Div are to revert to command 2 Cdn Corps at a later stage in the operation.

.. 72 INTIM NTION 30 Corps will destroy the enermy between the R iMAAS and R. RHINBEi and. brealk through in a Southerly direction between these two riverso Y', TIHOD 5. 30 Corps will attack with five divs up, as under From RIGHT to IEFT

51 (I) Inf Dii 53 (W) TInf Div.. 15 (S) Iif Div

2 Cdn Inf Div 3 Cdn Inf Div

RESERVE and FOLLOWU

-

UP

Guards Armd Div 3 Iluf Div .

60

Groupin.
li

....

Under Co0ilrnaln(

In Supr

(a) (b)

^Guards iAnd Div 15j(S) Lnf Dr

Det 4 Svy Regt

2 HCR 6 Guards AriT Bdde 836 P d Regt '(SP) 14' Pld Regt 1 98/73 AntiLtank

64 M.[,ied Regt
22 DC-NS 141 PRAC less 'A' Sqn 6 Assault Regt RE less 82 Sqn I Cdn AFC Regt less one sqcn 49 AFC Regt 84 Med Regt

Bty (SP)

.. ,

234/73 Anti-tankr'

'.B y (SP)
Deot 4 Svy Regt Det 1 O0 Radar Bty 'B' FPl. 662 AOP Sqn Tp 356 SL Bty

(c)

431Inf Div

8 ... irmcad Bde less one "re St'plus ono sqn

121 Med Regt

13/18 H
73 Anti-tank RRoegt

less two btys

Det 4 Svy Regt 'C' Flt 662. AOP Sqn

(a)

51 (j

Inf Div

107 RAC

6 Fd Regt

'

14,6/63 Anti.-tank
Del 4 Svy Regt--

Bty (SP)

'C' Plt 652 A0OP Sqn Det 100 Radar Bty Tp 356 SL Bty

'B? Sqn 1 LOTHLtNS 1. FPP YEO less 'B' & I'C Sqns 42 Assault Regt RE less 16 and 617 Sqns

79 Med Regt

.753
Undler C omloand
.1 _

In S

ortc

(oe)

53jY Infj

Di

3' Arimd Bdle less

, RTR, 107 RAC P.g . .(SP) 19 Cdn 56 Cdn- Anti-l'-tank

W DCIGNS less 'At Sqn 'A' Sqn 141 RAC 82 Assault Scqn RE 72 Moed Regt

Bty;(SP)
Dotl 4
t

'SvyRegt

A ? Fit 662 AOP Sqn De t 100 Radar Bty t-y 6S Tp 356

(f) 2 Ccdn nf Div

*One s qn

-5/18H

A' PFit 660 AOP .:jqn

0One tp 'CI Sqn I LOTHIINIS One tp 617 Assault S qn RE L. Cdn Moed Regt

(g)

53Cl il-rf D iv

H les s one sqn C, FPt 660. OP Sqn Tp 557 SL BPbty

13/1. t

617 Assault Sqn RE less one tp 'C Sqn 1 LOTHIANS less tp : 'i '{TR less 'C' Scfn If required (- 5 Assault Regt . less 26 Sqn ( 7 Cdn Med. Regt 805 Pnr Smoke Coy Two pls 810 Pnr Smoke Coy 112 Pnr Smoke Coy 106
iA Bde

(h)

CC_-:

3 ACR+J.

5 AGCA 5 .. A 9 GRAe
27 LAA ' ReL

,
;"

Under Op Control 2 Cdn AtR

4. Svy Regt
' oss dets'

556 SL.B1y
less thrlee tTps

557 SL Ity
less one 4p 660 AOP Sqn less three fitsJ

662 AOP Sqn .

1 Cd:n Rocket

less three -fits Unit

NOTES (i) Following t-ps do not come under cormnand 43 1500 hrs D4Dayo Inf Div till NOTTS YES )(. . Oom JL 9RPOT) One Sqni 153/18 H (fom 2 Cdn. Inf Div) 8 MX (from PEPPEKR2' ' ] T-o Btys 73 An;.tank. Roegt (Towed.)
(from
-pEEPpEt

4/7 DG-

RPOT )

(ii)

45 Inf Div:will t-tke m.eo

R egtir d.uring .hl

coimiand 14.7 FPd ard, move for ,

(iii)'

G-ua.rds Armd D''v will take under conmmand 86 Pd Regt du.,ing thei:Lt move forwvard.

*../(iv)

- 74
(iv) 2 HCR will come under colmmLandd 15 (S) Inf Div
on arrival in assembly area and revert Guards Alrmd Div at a later stage.

Tasks of Forinations

(a)

15(
(i) (ii)

Inf -Div will

Capture iJIWEJ1NBURG and the spur about 814545. Breach bthe SIEGF2RIED defences NORTH of PEICHSWMAiLD and capture the NUTTEEPDEN feature. Capture the MAT,iRBORN feature. Despatch strong mobile columns to capture, if possible, U'DEM and CALCARi and to clear the El,M1,TERICH road up to the WEST bank of R RHINE EAST of railw-vay. Clear and holdL. CLEVEo

(iii) (iv)

(v)

(b)

'53. ()
(i) (ii)

Inf Div will Capture BPRAND:EIEBUG-G features 8053. Advance along, and clear, the high ground which runs through the Northern part of the REICHSWALD. Capture S1TO-FELTBEG f eatures 8553o Conceentrate operationso Div wYill .in mobile reserve for future

(iii) (i-)

(c)

5C) 1_ljm L (i)

Captuwre, clear and hold firmly the area EREUDEBERGCT 7852 - RIETHORST 7450 -NI JERF

CO:LONJIES 7553.
(ii) Open the route L.0K ENLEP
.

HEqNS - C.GOCH.

(iii)
(iv)

* Take over fromn 43 Inf Div the town of GOCH.

Destroy the enenmy between road MOOK NEIt:lENS - GOCH and R MJLS.
.

GENNEP

(cl )

2Cdn Inf Div w11

(i) (ii)

'Capture DEN. EIRJTEL 7756 and AYLERo Open the main road BERGQEN ..KRANENBURGCo .
. . ..

DAL -to exclusive

(e)

5'Cdn Inf Div-, will.

(i) (ii) Protect' the LEFT flank of 2 Cdn and 15 (S)
Divs.

Inf

Captur e and clear the. low. ground between the main

road I;YLER - IRANENBIRiGLCLEVTJ and R RHINE up to

line of railway CLEVE

CRELi':'.USEN 9-159. ... /43 IfnDiv

-75
{() ~345 I^n-j (i) Dilv will. Be prepare -to pass through 15 (S) Inf Div onr capture of iVLJTEiRBORNT feature by that f or aat iorn Capture C-GH o Be preparedj t-o hand over GOCI to 51 (H) Inf Div and exploit in a SE directiona by capturing in succession VJEEZE.JiJ:TFLA.R 9632 arnd GEIDERND

(ii) (iii)

(g)

Guards Armid Div will be- prepared to . (i) Pass through the MATEPdBOiN area ijmnediately in rear of 43 Inf D ivo Advance, on athe axis UDEM':- IIMI.IFUBRUCH 0756 ' VIESEL ' Capture and holclfirnly the high ground NORTH

(ii)

(iii).

of SOMNJSBECK 0535 .. .
(iv)

..

Push forward a strong mobile column with the bridge if it is uSEL, , object of capturin the intacto still T Capture XANEN C . .will Operate ini tially .nder corm.ancd 15 (S) Inf Divo formta 1 14E

(v) (h) 2 (i) (ii:)

cthat d Guards mrian.. Div -when Pabs to comi.and' tion passes through 15 (S) Inf Div.

(;iii)

Be prepared to operate under command HQ 50 Corps or 45 Inf Di'L should the nered for such an ar.ange. menrt arise On being oQrder-ed forward by 1 5 (S) Inf Div, 'will de.ploy on a wide front inra protective recce role boetween rivers IMAAS an!d RIIINE and push patrols oTERBROEK 9716 LE as far 30SUH as the road RHLIIBE:R. 2-1 2i8 RFiEURDT 1 21'3

(iv)

Phas haes
(a)

Phace
(i)

.....

o'......

Capture of the MLATETEBORN feature arad the opening of exits through wvhich 2 HCR can pass.

Capture of the high ground. running through (ii) .: .Northiern ' part of] the Ed'IC -3W.'LD from inclusive BRA'NDEIBERG- 805.5 to inclusive SIOPPELBERG 8553. (iiiL)
. Capture' of the area FIIEU,'J'TI'

BERG 7852

RLTETURST1 7451 (b) Phase 2 ( i) (ii)

NIJERF COLONIES 75553 .

-Capture of GOCH, UDEI,,M and CAILCARo Openiing of roacd M) OK -

.iilP - GOCH.

, 76 (c) Phase (i)

.

Capture of 7WAAL'ECK 9623, CGELDERN, and BOINING 16353 .. 'Cacpture of V-ESEL bridge if Recce to line toESTE'PRBROE still

ISSUM1

0927

(ii.) (iii) 9. T xlingj s (a) D-Day

-intact..

RIEUR.DT. - RHEINBERG. I

8 Feb..

53.(W) Inf Div

15 (S)
Eveninfg D-Day for attack by 10o.

Inf Div

2 Cdn Inf Div 3 Cdn Inf Div

Inter Div Bou.jdaries: and Junct'icn Points. See Append:hx AA attached.

1 1.

Co ua-mnd ' (a) 2 Cdn Inf Div an:d 3 Cdln Inf D iv ;will revert to cormiaand 2 Cdn Corps afterG -the captureo ofG.. CCH ,and when EiAitT route from MOOIK to .- OCH has been opened. Inter corps bouncdary will then probably run as under ' All. exclusive 30 Corps road ,TYLER ie-,LA:LENieBUDR& DONSBRUGGEN C o 8657 CEE
/, ' .-. - .

(b1!)

NOTlE

2 Cdn Corps icary still require running rights on the secondary route CtROES3BEK T,CALANSEEG

81 5,.
-

'"r1 -

-AEP o
..

12o.

R2
(a)

.-

The attack will oo in undcer a Corps' barrage controlled by CCORA Div artys and ALGP.A will be allotted deployment areas by COCPi. CCRA -Till a11lot arty to forma t'ions for support .'uring various phases of the oper- tiono
(J'-rdim~te-'-:fire . I-) '.

(b)

(c)

(d)

CCRA will coordirnate'.fire plans of formations during various phases of the operation. The'"following area will be reserved for the deployment of an ACRLA:-

(e)

Squares 7952 1 3 OaEPLERPOTS p

8052

7951

8051

30 Cos Operation.c Instruction No'.5 deals with this subject. NOT included.

77
14. iA (a)
GBneral

-AA defence is being co-ordinated by C ormander 74 AA Bde, Coimnander 106 A-A-Bde is responsible for AAI defence of area MOOK bridge and gunr areas SOUTH of R MA.ASo

(sb)

ment

lely -

Resources will be provided for tasks as follows

. (i) Div areas ancd g.tu areas NORTH of R-I MMAS

Three LAA' tps by each. 2 Cdn Inf' Div. 3 Cdn

Inf Div, 15 (S) Inf Div, 43 Inf Div, 53 (')

In;f Divo Two LA'A tps by Guards Arnmd Div.

27 LAA Re.gt
Existing... defenc-es of 74 AA Bde in area

*:
(ii).

SNIJMEGEN.
4 ALR ad9 A

Gum areas of 3 AC

71 LAA Regt..(iii) Area MOMK bridge

109 H'A Reg-G will be deployed in a primary ground role by.. day. and a priinary--A:A -r ole -by n.ight, (Nc) Ruless fOr Enga..es r enap.lyet

Normal rules for engagement apply,

Guns not connected to targets. tAIiNISTRATION 'AAOR will not engage unseen

15.

Separate acdinistration instruction is

being issued.

INTERC OVTIUIJNICAT ION

16.

Location of H sq
Main HQ 30 Corps Probable next location Rear HQ 30 Corps Probable next location C onmmander s R ecce

.HATERT 679583 GOCT .91 43 cfzAEvIj 615517 CTENNEP 784.6 Probably to CLEVE 8955
(when situation penmits)

Guards Armd Div

15 (S)

Inf Div

Tac 43 Inf Div Iain 43 Inf Div 51 (H) Inf Div

255380 714,614 717622 I-ULMEN 4822 717523 .*/53 (W) Inf Div

- 78 53 (W) I.nf, Div 2 Cdn Inf'Div 5 Cdn Inf Div 2 Cdn Corps
17
0.

717537 693594 - .737604 . WIJCBEN 6158

Wireless Res.tric-tions

Owing, to the large number of wireless stations working in the Corps sector, formations having adequate line coimunications and those not actively engaged in the operations will minimise their wireless vvorking. :18.

. Wireless silence until 0100 hrs D-Day. nets will open at this time.

Only essential

Signal time vwill be. taken from BBC transmissions.

Times of transmissions Will be distributed through

Signals-channels 20. Liaison Officers (a)

Liaison, Officers from 6 uards Be A rmd Bde and j4 Armd Bde wrill report to HQ 30 -"orps D minus 1. They will bring scout ' cars netted to their own bde .. control... fwd 2 HCR will send Liaison Officers to Guards Arimd Div and 45 Inf Div on D minus 1.

(b) 21.

Passwords
Passwords will be uni-fonm throughout 30 Corps.

- 79 Appendix 'AA to 30 Corps

^^^S^I^ ^.. . . .

^i All

lusive

jInf Div

'' , Cross roads. 702539 - cross roads 705542 cross r oads 71.:55:d.. jcion 718538 thence exclusive 53 (Wt) Inf Div road junction 717534 thence inclusive 53. (W) Inf Div road junction 751544 track junction 792532-- track junction 800527 cro ss trackS .- 0252. - cross ' tr cks,854501 thence -road. to ro-ad and. t.ick crossing 864513 thence inclusive 51 (.H) 'Inf-'.Div track to cross tracks 2. Inte DivBouac an^c^ -: Jtween iv (H) In Div- and D 15

Inf Div

3.

Road. and railway crossing 7185'97 -road and ;rrack junction 733570 track junction 743557 - road junction 756553 thence road to rc-d junction 790548 track junction 810543 t hence edge of wood to 81 6536 cross ro ads 819532 thence edge of wood 843539 thence .edge of vood to 853549 thence SE to road junction 8'66543 - corner of-wood 883526. Inter Div Bour r between 15 ID iv and2 CdnInf Div All inclusive 2 Cdn. Inf D'iv Road junction 75}3609 - road junction 740607 thence SE down road to road junction 751594 thence inclusive 15 (S) Inf Div track. junction 755569 and track EAST road and track junction 797566.
B I4n tor

Div Botundar-ty between 15 (SlInf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Div

AllJ inclusive 15 _S) Inf Div Road and tracl 797567 SE down road to road and railway crossing at 831552 thence all inclusive 3 Cdn Inf Div railway line to railvway bridg- over canal

at 901562 thence inclusive 15 (S) Inf Div to 914573.

5 Inter Divoundar beteen 2 and 3 C Inf Divs

All inclusive 3 Cdn Inf Div Road junction 717628 thence SE along read to road and track junction 764598 thence inclusive to 2 Cdn Inf Div SE down road to road. and track junction

.797567.

- 80 6.

* Jx (a)

0 6tiorzPoinrts

Betweo.. 5i.<()

Inf Div. an

53

f Div

: 791 532 anid cross roads 8235m4.-

(.b)

BQtween. . .D

(S) Inf

Cross rcd.-s as.825.':. 7:" Southern corner of wod 796546 810544: 818534. Track

junctiOn 8515351 8553'550 866543.

(c) Btwe.n .15 '-IfDiv and 2 '. n Inf Div

881572

892567

901562.

-81 APPENDIX BSEVATIONS

T 'B

ON

OEST

FIGHTING -W-lTH

REFERENCE
INTROCWT ION.
T*-..

PARTIC LAR

TO

TE

REICHE

A MIL

1 B.'"

.a.

~The. :follow~ing notes are produced as a result of conversations

with Commnanders and Staff Officers within 158 Inf Bcle, of 53 (W) Inf Div. This Bde foughmt its way almost entirely through the REICHSVIALD Forest from the VT to- the SE corners. 2.0 The REIC:HsVLAID Forest is ' mainly coniferous with an inner belt of deciduous growth. Large patches have been cut clear with little or no attempt at replanting. These areas are covered with low scrub -. 'Visibility--aries from a few yds to two to three hundred in the cleared areas. Being a .Stat. forest it is inters.ected :'systematically in rectangles by numerous :tracks and rides These beinc cut straight, gave visibility .in many cases up to several hundred'ydso ..Map reacding was complicated by the fact that many tracks shown did not exist or were overgrovmw new. ones had been develo ed, and :nany "of the clearings had be en extended or new ones cut:., There are two lmain concrete two way roacds through the Fores t -from NORTH to SOUTH, from CLEVE' and FASSEiL.T, converging -EKCEaNSo Mat There are none from WEST to EAST. The.various tracks were one way only, unmetalled and became a good ft or more of heavy mud after the passage .of a few vehicles,"
1 COMUMNICCT IOTS

53.

(a)

This presents probably the great.:st difficulty to be overcomie both on the Bdce and Bn levels, and to a very large exten't .controls -tactics particularly within the Bn. (See paragraph 6 (a) below) T-his Bde found it essential, in order adequately to control its B ns, to establish its HQ. not more than 2,000 yds behind the leading Bnso At this .range the wireless 'sets worked well . BEns found the.No, 18 set unsatisfactory in-this type of -country and regar.ed bhem as a pleasant bonus if they wvorked, but did not rely on them in their Signal planso (Casualties within Bn Signal Sections had b6en heavy during the iARDEMTES fighting a few weeks earlier and reinforcements. w~ere not .by any means fully trained. This must be taken into consideration therefore in assessing the .merits of these sets.)o . The same remarks as in (b) above' applied to the 38 set. In particular. it was fountd, in. this opera.tion in- the Forest, that. co-opeation with the tanks by this means did not .worko TFWithin Bns,' cabl-.e ad runner, backed by .a .liberaluse of officers as Liaison: Officers, proved the only really reliable means of conmiunication -

(b)i

(c)

(d)

. /ACKS

-ANJD MT

,"82 i TR..CKS AND MT 40 (a) Forest tracks,, in any weather' conditions,Q gWill ' de' , ri atte ,apidty. ' In-. bad 'eaether, such as existed during .'his'"peration' 9 'they 'wiii' lisintegrate af ter the passage of only a few vwhe6elc1 vehicles and completely after even one heavy tank has run: Over' them. This factor makes it essential that staffs must give an early decision on the use of .cortain tracks for wheels -andd others 'for tracked vehicles... It is a most diffi-,'cult decision to make a ground recce. is essential.

This can only be done 'by the.fowa:rd tps as they

;advance and the. tactical situation may well impose a complete reversal of decisions and ..plans already issued.'o , .. , In this operation the Bde, very wisely as it turned out,, banned all wheeled vehicles except. jeeps. Bn F ,echelons were entirely'tracked us ingthe carriers -within -the Bns, as was also the .improvised Bde HQ. The latter converted a half track as a form of rather inadequate Commanand Vehicle o . (b) Labour'for track mnaintenance is an acute problem. It; cannot usually be solved, within a Bde when every man is required for his primary, business of fighting* PRE resources do not go very far.,. Careful planning on'the highest level 'is. therefore essential.,' Within Bns the MICOs recce party should always be right forward, hehind the leading coy, in this type of operation. As the advance continues it is. :then in a position to recce the tracks., and all necessary diversions, and to tape and sign the whole route. Once an objective is captured the necessaryx vehicles can then *be brought 'forward without delay ,. nd without fear of .blocking the route '' .. WfEASELS proved invaluable'e but all' concerned stress the necessity f or 'properly, trained and permanent drivers. The irnf carrier driver cannot get the best use out of thqse highly specialised vehicles after a short fewv days course, and he does not take the same interest in a vehicle which he knows is only on loan for a short : period. , : ' LOYD Carriers were successful in getting forward the ''anti-tank guns in this operation. This ~ws due almost -entirely 'to the very careful route recce carrieda out by the MTOs recce partieso . In certain cases special diversions were taped for these vehicles alone.

(c)

(d)

(e)

VMAP 5.

G.E D:

_1ECTION FINDING. A

D IESSAG.' WRITING

. :.. It- vwas anticipated that Map Reading would. be a difficult problem and probably fur ther complicated by certain inevitable recent changes in the Forest due to fresh areas being. cut, new tracks made to these areas etc. To simplify . this. matter oertain precautions. were insisted, upon before the'operation started.''

(a)

Bde HQ issued a trace of the Forest, on a wide

distribution, embodying a very large nunber of code nanes. ,.'. For instance every single forward track was given a name and every single lateral track a number. .. ./All clearings

- 83 All clearings shown on the map, and any other features

.....

on the map-, were also named,. on corimpass bearings, whether by night or

clay, and they maintained regular navigating parties thr.oughout' including pacee checkers- and the use of white .tape 'knotted every 1.00 yds' O.n account of the above precautions all movement .- 'worked. smoothly alnd direc..tion" was accurately maintainedo Messagev.writing proved extremely s'iple and the inevitable delays prodduced by .the use of MAPLAY and 'SLIDEX were almost entirely eliminatecd. Any variations between gr. and .and .map were quickly spotted., and :thetre Wrere manyo

(b)... Bns advancedoc

TACTICS

6..

- (2a)S

0..Experience.

-gained by this Bde inthe ADENNES, followed .by special training prior to this.'.EICHSWALD Porest -_opera'tion , proved the absolute es'sential of' a Bn advncing on a' single axis, in other. words one coy up. To attempt a "wider front in for:es.t.fighting leads not only t'o loss of' control by the Bn- Conmnander but probably to the actual loss., maybe for several hrs, of sub-units and of vehicles. In forest. :fighting it is probably more necessary for aBn C.olmmander to have a firm control of his sub-units than in any other type of operation ' Wireless, within' the Bn, cannot be re.lied upon in this sort of country. Cable or runners must us.eexist ing tracks. .If frequent laterals do" *.not exist, a Bn C~onmmander, if he has deployed on two *axes,. must stay back at some track junction until another lateral has"been cleared. '; If he does this he tends to become out of touch v,.ith his battle. By fighting on one;axis only one main cable.has to be laid, 'runners can-quickly function without fear of being lost, the Bn Conmmander' can. himself be right forvward and he has his' sub-units under his hando Flank protection; to- the main axis'is a difficult. problem. - When'fighting through- a.'forest to reach definite objectives, as opposed to, clearing, certain risks miust be accopted. ' If a Bn Commander feels 'ueasy about a flank, the best Lethod .to deal with it has proved to be to detail :one coy'to provide a series of flank picquets on the NW Frontier principle These are seldom more than one hundred yds from the main axis. ' Operating on the .one axis bounds given to the leading coy. are strictly limited and are usually at most some -four to five hundred yds. :Leap frogging the next coy through. is then' "adopteled. .In this' way the Bn Cormmander retains -a tight .'old on his' fighting sub-units.

(b)'

(c)

:(4)

;Leading coys usually move two pls up, one on each side of the axis. These pls are "deployed o'n a very narrow

front,' probably not exceeding fifty to sixty'yds.

The wholeg again 9 being restricted: in certain of control. (,e)". order 'to make

There 'is a definite 'danger from enemy -striking at the. .tail of a Bn .on one axis if this tail becomes too long. In an dvance -to.seize" d(ef'inite objectives,
.. ./as was

84 as was. the case. in the PEICHSWALD Forest, enemy will

certainly.. beleft uirvnopped--up on either flank,

will take every opportunity to attack the tail

He
of a

.unit,~ or .-attack the unit frori. the flank. or rear when :Every effort must its objective.. has., been seized,
be made thoef ore to, prevent the'Bn straggling out

alon, -the axis. all-round watCh. must be maintained )throughout 'and al.-..roUmcl def ence once the objective
-is reached. must be stressed to an even greater degree

than nor:.mallyo

The endeavour should be to have as

tight.. a formation, as .posnsible when.moving and a solid,

compact defensive layI out when halted,

(f) e enemy on th.- move, and It is; essential o ..keep If he has a cont'act once gained must' nPot: be los'to

chance to stabilize hiA'n!elf he will be all the more

As, difficult to dig out. support can seldor be used in forest. fighting, arty this becomes all the more

importanto; :To e "ect 1this a .Bn Commander must be .. w.well foraiard in' order t..o leap frog his coys without
delay.

R'isks

.be

takoi .must in this respect even to

'the extent of pushing through the next coy before the first is finally consolidated.,

7.

(a): .All

sectionsfwere miade ,up to two Stens for this

operation. -They. proved .invaluable. (:b) The 5 in .mortar was la.rgely man-.;:arried on account of
the" indifferent "b'racks. uring the advance the arty

could give. lit-tle or no- sp-oport so that the mortar, especially for snmoke, pro 'vd its value many times. (c)) . The enemy opposit-ion enco.u. .eod usually consisted of some. forty to;. fifty inf support.ed by one or .more SP The Hun showed shoot .to down th tracks. guns .sited
.PI.T.o a adefinite. respect fo. the usually damaoegd it : -ut even' if A hit on an SP gun it. did not it seldom

stayed. in that posit-on 'i;o recoive a second shot. The PsIAT, in o)e Bn anyway, are fought in pairs dr threess. One *-shoots and t-he second observes, the strike This .if: necessary -sends in the second round. and sav.es any time "lag whils't the first weapon is being
reloaded. The carriage of amInmunition presents a

"definite problem. on a long ad-.ance such as during this operation. Twevlve bombs -per coywas found to', be all
that could be taken. PsIAi::i; were also effectively

used as mortars ir

some instances.

eman with the will not face a dLtermined (d) ..The Hun sti1 bayonet. On one occasion an SP gun supported by a
dcoy of inf was holding up the advance across a clearing

in t he Forest.

'The enemy weree some two hundred yds

After, all ordinary methods away,. maybe a litutle more. to6' shift hiam had failed, the, coy co.mmander concerned .ground. f The enmy- d'cii not'wai't for it -to arrive and a PIAT finished off the SP gun. There were five
O

led his whole coy in a bayonet charge across the open

"casualties only tO' oiur o"wn .tps. (e) One Bn :improvi.sed. a further ri.fle p1 which was placed under the Carr, ie. P1 Comianrcer, '.he whole acting as a (1Thae carriers themselves very useful.. two .i fire coy.0 ' be'ing .used in .this. pera-t.ion as P 'echelon transport

-, ./vehicles).

85
vehicles). This improvisation was possible' as the /Bn was well up to strength with reinforcements. NCOs and men were withdrawn from Rifle Coys to form it, and the.-necessary weapons were found from the WASP Section of the Carrier P1.... (f)i ")'Arty: could seldom support the advance owing to lack of observation and danger to our own tp 0 Only when the situation. stabilised' on any, particular . objective was support possible anrid it then proved invaluable for holding or breakinrg up enemy- counter-attacks . Th'e .inf were. *supported by- tanks. throughout. The difficulty of manoeuvre in .face of SP guns sited to fire dowv the tracks i''and thb presence of some rmines,, inevitably cause casualties to tankso'.: But particular ly .ii. view of .the lack "of possible arty support, the The pr.esenc.e. of tanks is considered of great value. morale effect on our. oWl-S inf cannot be over estimated, and for this reason tank casualties should be'accepted. Comxnunications between tank and. inf still remains a problem. In this operation the. 38 set did not work. A system of Verey light signals requires considerable . preparation and tying up so that it is ensured that tank crews are on the look out for them. Any such system, however' makes changes of plan difficult to improvise rapidly. No.26 Yellow' smoke generators were used oxtoefsively in this operation to stop tank fire when necessary. In one Bn all men in all sections carried one of these generators. (h) Searchlights proved of real value in this Forest fighting. In spite of the fact that lights were not in direct support of this Bde, there was no unreasonable delay in passing demandso IiMessages were acted on usually in approximately half an hr.

(*:g) '

AD1MINIST RTION 8. Prior to the operation it was fully appreciated that normal supply during th:- advance through the forest could not be expected. In consequence 24/hrs ration packs and' self heating soup were issued and carried in Bns F echelon transport. This precaution proved itself for it'was the only food many of th-e tps had for over two days. Everyone concerned had nothing but praise for the 2.4 hrs' ration pack and even more particularly for the self heating. soups which were of inestimable value in the continuously wet, weather. All wished that the issue could have be-en bigger. The water problem was also a verv real one since there could bo no possibility of bringing fo:-ward unit water carts or trailers. Arrangements were made within th Div for all

forward tps to carry one.additional water bottle per man

either on the person or in Bn F echelon transport. This was done by "borrowing" water bottles from the men of the ITAA Regt and other Div Tps.. This arrangement proved an unqualified success.

../CONCLUSION

- 86 -

CONCLUSION

'

There is- nbt' t.he--slightest doubt but that this Bde learnt many invaluable lessons from their fighting, under ARDDEI,;NESo -

the worSt possible cond.itions of snow -and..iceg, in :the

:These lessons were .rammed . homo, practised. and in tie 'REICHSWALDo0 -- The great-:success achi. eved. during.. this .'latter optration: proves .how sound the training was.

pe:feoCted. during the training period p'ior to the operation There w.s 'ad'equate- tin also: apart from training, to. study andpann'la in cOsideerable -detail ffor: this operation....l:oth mod~el rehearsals- werei carri-ed out at all levels, and., as
always.
,.,~

proved. their value when the operation began.

. . .. .... . , . . '. . . . ., - . ,...

' There 'is- little that is new .really 'in the various poinits'[disc.ussed above.It is mostly a reiteration of lessoont lea.rned in the past but so often forgotten., Many of th "points are very minor ones but it is to the attention of such ddetail that~~~~~U success is won.
8... is ......

87
. APPEDIX 'C' TO~1\ CL ITING

-These notes a-e' vrittenr

on the experiences of a Bn

'which has taken part in clearing two lar ge towns, GTNEP

and .GOCH, a;gainst a: '"dete'rmined and. organised enemy,. One :town 'had been heavily bombed.; 'but the other had not; c'ivilians. had been 'evacuatedd from both. The lessons learnt 'show that the princ'iple'sa]sa laid ' dowve in Inf Training Part ;' ;VIiI.: are' so-und' as ar as: they. go. 1. ' ' Plannin g More than in any other' operation, veryTcareful and

detailed planning is necessary before launching any unit

or subiunit a hps,, into a defended towne *Large' scale 'enlarged air photographs -and. particularly low obliques, are 'nectessary. s as. o to determine the key buildings upon which i:t- is likely the -enemy 'will base his- defence.,, He does not hold. every house- or factory' but those from where he can obtain, a good'.field- of f'ire and part'iduJ!arly ";hose from .where: -'he can st'op any encircling movement. to, his 'rear. The'; ideal'-is for each section to be able to see .exactly which 'buildings it is to clear before crossing the. ' start line. ; 2. Princiles It .is essential that each sub-unit starts from a very firm base, has a small compact objective, usually a "key" building, of which the Commnander '-has made .,a personal visual recce before starting. .

- "Within

the rifle coy, it

has been

'proved that it

is'

'*unwise to have more than one sub-unit working at. onre time "and .that thheC ommander of' the succeeding unit or: sub-unit must be right forward waith the attacking Comnminder to see the As always' toho, a results .and. carry 'out his own recce.' .reserve must be kept to deal with the unexpected posts which' . .- ..... suddenly come to life.
. , , . - . : , : -. .f - t , s

'' ''': The noise and echoes of.street clearing are disconcerting and menr must always be' on the "qui vive'" to try and looate'the enemy'- the most difficult factor ofall. 'It is essential that they fight lightly clad and without the small pack and picl and shovel vwhich catch in win.,dovrframes, cellar.doors, etc.' A rifle and bayonet, the Bren, a liberal supply of grenadese stout'hearts and a very high standard of leadership are all "that' is .:'require. d 'The de'gr'e.e of control 'that leadovs mustC keep in' :these operations must '' be' great, Individuals and Sections must be kept'to their objeotives and not. allowred to chase the odd German. It has indeed been learnt by bitter experience that tovwn clearing is a tedious.:and. most tiring operation which cannot' be hurried.

* -

/3.

88 -

3. .

Dy or. Night It has been proved that even in complete darkness inf can seize a limited, objective in a tovm and completely clear that area, provided, it is kept small, It is perhaps the best way to get a footing in a defended area, to rush it immnediiately the arty concentrations lift in the darkness, and catch t;he enemy whilst he is still below ground. Large scale'clearing operations are not possible in the dark as'it-s s-- impossible niot' .:o by-pass enemy a principle wh6 come to life with claylight and cause darmage and confusion out of. o!ll.. proportion to- their numbers.. Searchlights are not of an'y great assistance in a town

4.

Suporting F ire .:' * Before ;zero "the grealtest w-eight of arty is required, `but :at-:zero and :afte.rwrds it -shoi&d. 'lift f-rom the objectives ;to- the fa:r outskirts of .toe 'town, as. it is disconcertirg to tps- clearing :to -hear 'explosions 'in-f:^ont of -them; italso d.ovwns -the :noise of sni"pers if fiy .d .in close support. "Homwever::.well t-rained, -in a streoot it is impossible to say with accuracy whose shell it was and the,'ffeotf (f a 25 pr on a house is" not suf.ioient to arrant its -use in the close support 'of tps Clearing a toVwn, 4.2 in mortars, on the .other hand, are valuable as the bombs, reach the ground floor; they - because of -their.danger area.,natur.l]ly are best used 'on' the back end of the town...Fire and movement by the inf- remains as important as ever, and. the 77 grenade has proved its .grat itefulness to cover street crossings.

5'.;
.

2:

To"Bomb or'Not to Bomnb :

v '

From the irnfantryiran's poirn of iw heavy bombing has every disadvantage and no adivantageo. unless carried out "imnediately before the- assaulto Then. air photographs lose some of thei. va'lue and -the danger area for heavy bombs -precludes the idiediate .. shing of 'the objectives as the 'last 'bomb falls, : Urater and .rubble preclude the use of tanks, .CROCODBILLS or VWASS and make th.e'' evacuation of casualties even more difficult, it 'makes the dill of clearing through the back gardens impracticable, and clearing houses from the top, iampossible..' It also makes the enemrys task of 'hid.ing arnd camouflaging himiself many times easier; his .snipers always preclude the use of a bulldozer till very ...late in the operations. :
.-. . .. . . . . . : .:

' ;:"' :Fcm;- our experiance in clea'ring a :own not bombed, to.. one tha'- has been heavily bombed, there :.'s little doubt the infantryman would 'ask' the airman to go elsewhere, particuilarly .as -he does not kill or even frighten the d efene-rs tho infan' tryman is' going to meet 6. Eneo Methods .

Ve- he f'ound' that the German -we :have met, mostly paratroopers7, have concentrated in axt- fought from, the key
buildings, and. then from th ground floors;' only the odd Spanclau and snipers have be,3n up a storey or two'. Booby traps were not met- vitih in any large .numberz; mines were, however..laid in and about a"'l' -he': t .. key road junctions and' in csome gardens.s but "ae :latt-!er. were usually marked.
"'.lt_'ons,
,I ,-

./7.

I/ 0

89

7.

The Results of Experience Thinking back on our experiences, we especially note are perhaps : (a) (b) (c). How slow an operation it get tired. is, the points that

and how quickly tps

The smallness of the objective a pl can take for certainty. The immediate effect of "flame vwarfare"l this was no surprise, but the speed with which the enemy reacted was. The great additional difficulties which the after effect of heavy bombs makes for the infantryman.
f or Tow Cearing

(d)
8. Printiles

Lastly, the principles we will work on for the next German town we clear : (a) Always plan to the last detail and brief each soldier visually if possible. Each man must know his particular role in the pl "Drill". Start each operation from a very firm base. Never operate more than one pl at a time within a coy
area.

(b) (c) (d)

Keep your reserve ready, but don't keep tps hanging about waiting their turn under fire. Once down they are sometimes difficult to got up again. Limit your objectives severely and base your operations on the "key" buildings. Never, never by-pass an enemy post -this does not apply to "cut-off" tps if sent wide round. the whole objective. Fire and movement applies as much as ever wherever possible. Don't overload the soldier. Pray tlat the tps are in great heart, eager to destroy the enemy in yet another German stronghold, for without the highest fighting spirit being present, the best plans made by the leaders will be of no avail. use flame

(e) (f)

(g) (h) (i)

- 90 APIEENDIX 'D ' RA ORDER OF BATTLE

Formation 1 Guards Armd Div G

Undeer Command Dot 4 Svy Regt

ein pSU-ort 64 Med Regt 84 Med Regt

2.

15 (S) Inf Div

86 Fcl Regt (SP) -147 Fd Regt- (SP)

198/73 Anti-tank B ty (SP) 234/73 Anti-tank Bty (SP) IDot 4 Svy Re'gt

Tp 356 SL Bty
B' Filt 662 AOP Sqn Det 100 Radar Bty

3.

43 Inf Div

73 Anti-tank Regt less two bty.s Det 4 Svy Regt 'C' Fit 662 AOP Sqn 6 Fd Rogt ".

1 21 Med Regt

4.

If Div

146/63 Anti-tank Bty (SP)

Det 4 Svy R-egt Tp 356 SL Bty 'C' Flt 652 AOP Sqn Det 1 00 Radar Bty

79 Med Regt

5.

I L

(W)Inf Div

19 Cdn Fd Regt (SP)

56/6 Cdn Anti-tank B' ty (SP) Det 4 Svy Regt 'A' Fit 662 AOP Sqn Tp 356 SL Bty Det 100 Radar Bty

72 Med Regt

6.

2 Cdn Inf Div

Det 2 Cdn Svy Regt 'A' Fit 660 AOP Sqn Det 2 Cdn Svy Regt 'C Fit 660 AOP Sqn Tp 557 SL Bty 3 AGRA "ith under command
three sees 'B' Fit

4 Cdn Moed Regt 7 Cdn Meed Regt

7.

dan Inf Div

8.

CCRA

74 AA Bde

660 AOP Sqn 4 AGRA with under conmand three secs 'B' Fit

106 AA Bdo

660 A0OP Sqn

5 AGRA iwith under command two 7.2 in btys 3 AG,-RA

'B' Fit 658 AOP Sqn

CBO 30 Corps
. ./9 AGLA

91 Formation 8, OCRn (Caont.o ) Under Command 9 AGRA with under comnmand 53 Heavy Regt 3 Super-heavy Regt 'A' .Ft 658 AOP Sqn CBOI-'12- Cbops
27LAA Regt

In support

4 Svy Regt less dets .. 356 SL Bty less three tps 557, SL Bty .less. oiu' tp 660 AOP Sqn less three fits 662 AOP-,Sqn less -three: flt. .I C.dn Rocket Unit

TOTAL 'GUNS 576 32 248 40

-

25 prs-

4.5 in guns

5.5 in hovos
155 rmm
v~:

36
2 ,

7.2 in hovws
8 in

. .4

-3.s7

240 rmn in HAA

- 92 -

APPENDIX 'E'
.RA
_U~L~"Dlzrculrrr~rrrr~rrrrrusr~u~llrrrr

DUMPING
2_e

PROG-RAME
-

.._

, - . s.

ROUNDS DUMPED

NIGHT
Preliminary ,

Fd.
72,800

Med
28, 000

155 mm

7. 2
2, 000

S-hy

HAA

D -14/D

-13

33,600
14,400

3,600
14,400 2,000

D - 13/0 - 12

D - 12/D-

11

30,00

12,700

1 400

D - 11/D-

10

25,200

24,000

400

1,600

D - 10/D

7,200

25,200

800

1,200

D - 9/D - 8
D - 8/D - 7 D - 7/D - 6 D.- 6/D5

7,200
18,000 16,000 21,000

7,200
4,800

800

800
288 240 21,600 16,800

D - 5/D r 4

4/D-

3
14,400

D - 3/D - 2

TOTAL
olprr.rlao9prpL-*-LIICZ1-C---- --

345,400

119,600

3,700
pgabe~ird~rr _

8,000
arr-~P~ __ c

528

52,800
_ _ __~CI~pls~P~r

--l-----;L6*-----Ubi"i)*l---

-93 APPENDIX 'F' ACTIVITIES OF I CANADIAN ROCKET AD BATTERY DURING

OPERATIOS .VRITABLE (Source 1. SUlARY 'OF' AC TI (a) TIES

BLOCKBUSTER

RA.Pirst Cdn Arimy)

1. .

The Rocket Battery fired from six different positions in support of the. following sev"e"n operations n .Date

Operation

Number of
targets

,Approx number of rounds fired!.. 00 2,400

8 FPeb Preliminary bombard: ment : 15 Feb 16 F'eb 18 Feb 26 Peb 43 I-nf Div to neutralise FORST CLEVE 9249. 51 (H) Inf Div to capture ASPERDEN 8745: and EERVORST 8945 15 (S) Inf Div to capture CGOCH 9043

13

2,000

1 2

'350 1,500

2 Cdn Inf Div to capture high ground .0047' 4 Cdn Armd Div to advance along railway SOUTH of

28 Feb

2,400.

HOCHWALD Forest
8 Mar 2 Cdn Inf Div to

capt ure XANTEN 1141 (b) 2.

650

Attached to Diagram 3 is Trace ' S' showing -battery position and targets engaged.

NATURE OF TARGETS (a) -*Targets on D-Day formed part of preliminary bombardment on enemy defensive positions. (.b). (c)Targets'engaged:"on 15, 16, 18 and 26 Feb and 8 lar. .. were in.each case inif objectives.,. : .-Targets on 28 Feb were chiefiy suspected enemy FUPs for counter-attack and. can be considered to be in the nature of DFP.

3.

VOLUME OFFIRE With the exception of the operation in support 2 Cdn Inf Div on 8 Mar, all targets were engaged by simultaneous salvoes from all 12 projectors. The numbers of salvoes on
each target varied from 1 - 3.

... /In

the

94 -

In the case of 8 Mar two salvoes from four projectors were fired on each target, 4. RESULTS

(a)

8 Feob Rockets formed only a small part of full bombardment programme~ but ground checks of three targets engaged showed MPsI to be in the target area.

(b)

i5 Feb
The task was to neutralise the FORST CLEVE and prevent There was no any enemy counter-attack from it. counter-attack delivered from this area and therefore the operation must be considered a success.

(c)

16 Feb
The following is ASPERDEN : an extract from. a Coy Commander's

report on the part played by rockets in the attack on "My Coy attacked the NORTH end of-ASPERDEN at night under an arty barrage with rockets timed to f ire during Owing to various circumstances we were the barrage. very late on to our objective and the rockets had fired possibly when we were one hr.s distance away. My general impression, however, is that it is a magnificent weapon for an area shoot, and I am certain that it was one of the chief factors in keeping the enemy inf umderground -whilst we approached the objective. in their We took many prisoners all of which vrwere still My Coy wotld definitely like rocket support cellars. for any set piece attack they do., The results of the salvoes on ASPERDEN were inspected and the village was found to be closely pitted with rocket craters - and evidence everywrhere of heavy It was not fragmentation and rocket ammunition. possible, however, to differentiate between damage
caused by rockets and that by arty bombardment and.

Typhoon attacks to which the village was subjected. (d) 18 PFb The order to stop firing was received'after one salvo had been fired on GOCH, as a report had been received that our own tps were already in the town. A ground check showed that rounds fell within the target area. (e) 26 Feb, 28 Feb and 8 Mar
Results not known. 5. PREPARATION OF AIltSMNITION Ammunition for D-Day expenditure was received unassembled It was necessary to employ less than a week before D-Day. 200 men, in addition to the battery, in assembling ammunition so as to ensure that the required number of rounds would be on the position before D-Day.

- 95 6.
CONCLUSIONS

(a)

Eloyment
Neutralisation by rocket salvoes of an area containing enemy under light cover is only temporary. It is. essential, therefore, that the: .inf close in on the objective as soon as possible after the fire has lifted. The comparatively large zone of dispersion of the rocket means that the inf are not able to approach as close as they can to a concentration of 25 pr. It follows, therefore, that an objective should, whenever possible, be neutralised by 25 prs in addition to rockets and the f ire of the former continued until the last possible moment.

(b)

Retaliatory Fire
Danger of battery position being given away by smoke or flash is not great when projectors are well sited and si'ted in an area together with a large volume of active arty.

(c) -Prepart

of Ammunition

Where large scale amun.ition expenditure in a short time is envisaged, time must be -given for' assembly before fire plan :

RECOMMNDATIONS
A. (a) (b) (c)

(By BRA First Cd-n Army)

an area neutralising weapon. a harassing fire role.

Rocket is

Rocket can be used in

It is mobile and develops great fire power over short period of time, * It is not as accurate as field or medium arty.

(d) -(e.)

It is unsuited to observed shooting, cumbersome in switching and lacks the flexibility of field arty. It supplements and cannot replace any existing arty weapons, .. :'-

(f)

Bo.

It is considered the following methods of employment be subject of further experience : (a) (b) (c) Use of whole battery on area neutralisation. Use of single equipments in harassing fire role, Use of battery in decentralised role by tps of four to divs.