Century Canning Corporation Facts: July 15, 1997: Century Canning Corporation (Century) hired Gloria Palad (Palad)

) as fish cleaner at Century tuna and sardines factory. July 17, 1997: Palad signs an apprenticeship agreement. She shall receive daily apprentice allowance of P138.75. July 25, 1997: Century submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to TESDA. September 26, 2997: TESDA approved the apprenticeship program. November 15, 1997: a performance evaluation was conducted wherein Palad got a rating of N.I. or Needs Improvement since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Palad also incurred numerous tardiness and absences. November 22, 1997: Century informed Palad of her termination which will be effective at the close of business hours on November 28, 1997. Palad filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for year 1997. February 25, 1999: Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered to pay Palad her last salary and her pro-rated 13th pay. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification of the Labor Arbiter decision. Court of Appeals: Dismissal is illegal.

sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in December 1997.17 On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September 1997.18 Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval from the TESDA. Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDAs approval of petitioners apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a "fish cleaner." Clearly, the job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioners business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 28021 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. II. Yes

Under Article 27922 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes or for authorized causes.24 Furthermore, under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the performance evaluation to prove Palads inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of termination because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.

Issue/s: 1. 2. Whether Palad is an apprentice. Whether Century illegally dismissed Palad.

Held: I. No.

The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an employer. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition

Bernardo vs. NLRC Facts: Complainants (the deaf-mutes) were hired on various dates from 1988 to 1993 by Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) as money sorters and counters through a uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. During the existence of the said employment agreement, there a re 56 deaf-mutes hired and such employment shall be renewed every six months. However, complainants filed a case for illegal dismissal when FEBTC terminated their employment on these grounds: They were only hired temporarily under a special employment arrangement made by some civic and political personalities. No plantilla position for money sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. The special position" which was created no longer exist after FEBTC had decided not to renew their special employment contracts.

Only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment were illegal. The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term. Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code. The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensibility of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exist. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Brent Ruling not applicable The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts,

The labor arbiter and NLRC ruled against the petitioners.

Arguments: Petitioners: I. They should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. II. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees. FEBTC: I. Petitioners were hired only as "special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank." Rather, they were "special" workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. II. They were told from the start, "with the assistance of government representatives," that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for "money sorters," whose task used to be performed by tellers. III. The "special position" that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts." Issue: Whether petitioners become regular employees Held:

imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law. Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other." Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees. Other grounds cited by respondent Mere accommodation employees: This fact does not change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them. No plantilla position available for their position: "The determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring . . . but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its continued existence." They informed from the beginning that they will never become regular employees: The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work performed. Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.