SUGGESTED QUESTIONS ON

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Commissioners Designated for Steinberg: Lehman, Roemer

(1) Given that you endorse the creation of a DNI, what specific authorities should a
DNI have vis-a-vis the Defense and the Homeland Security Departments—such as:

- the authority to execute appropriations,

- to reallocate funds within the Intelligence Community without a cabinet
secretary's consent, and
- to consolidate and standardize intelligence personnel systems?

(2) You also argue that the U.S. needs a single individual with responsibility and
accountability for all counterterrorism information, both foreign and domestic.

- What would this mean for entities within the Homeland Security Department
such as the Secret Service, the Customs Service, legacy-INS, and the Coast
Guard?

- What would this mean for the FBI?

(3) You endorse the creation of a domestic security agency and note that placing the
agency in the Department of Homeland Security would connect the agency to other
homeland security functions, while having the agency report to the DNI would
make the agency independent from policy agencies.

- Given that you call for a single official over all intelligence activities related to
counterterrorism, shouldn't the agency report to the DNI?

- Wouldn't having the agency report to the DNI facilitate transnational

intelligence collection and analysis?

(4) You call for the handling of information to be decentralized and modeled on a
"network approach," and you also advocate greater centralization of authority
within the Intelligence Community and more broadly.

- Is there a conflict between decentralization of information and centralization of

authority?

(5) You argue that effective counterterrorism requires dramatic organizational change
and recalibrating the balance between security and information-sharing. However,
the U.S. faces not just terrorism but also traditional state actors.

- Would the changes you advocate increase our counterterrorism effectiveness

while decreasing our Intelligence Community's capability vis-a-vis state
actors?
(6) In 1947, President Truman opted for a decentralized rather than a consolidated
Intelligence Community for fear of creating an American Gestapo.

- Do you believe that there are risks to civil liberties from the manner of
organizing U.S. intelligence capabilities, such as having one person in charge?

Does the nature of the terrorist and WMD threat outweigh such risks?

(7) You suggest a number of changes in the architecture of the Intelligence

Community, the FBI, and the Executive Office of the President in order to meet the
challenges of the terrorist threat.

- Which of your recommendations do you consider to be essential?

- Can essential reforms be achieved without creating a DNI?