NATIONAL COMMISSION ON

TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Minutes of the Meeting of May 21-22,2003

The Chair called the Commission to order at 5:15 PM on May 21st. Chairman Kean,
Vice-Chair Hamilton, and Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Fielding, Gorton, Lehman and
Roemer were in attendance.

The minutes of the May 1st meeting were approved on a motion by Commissioner
Roemer, seconded by Commissioner Ben-Veniste. Commissioners provided guidance
that minutes of future meetings should be recorded in the same manner as the minutes of
the May 1st meeting.

Family Liaison. The Chair introduced family liaison representatives Emily Walker and
Ellie Hartz. They spoke to their personal backgrounds. Emily mentioned her ideas about
a 1-800 phone number for the Commission, a place on the Commission website for
families, and a place where the families' questions to the Commission can be included.
Ellie spoke to the importance of the Commission reaching out to all 9/11 families, not
just to family representative groups.

Commissioners welcomed the Chair's fulfillment of his commitment to create a liaison to

families. Commissioner Roemer noted that with increased outreach, more information
would be flowing to the Commission from the families, and this would require increased
staff resources to respond. Emily Walker responded that she intends to code all incoming
information, track it and respond to requests in a timely manner. Several Commissioners
noted the importance of managing expectations, that the Commission can fulfill some
requests from the families, but not all. Commissioner Roemer noted that he had heard
very positive reports from the Chair's meeting of May 15th with the families, and added
that it is very important that Emily and Ellie be seen as facilitators of access to the
Commissioners and Commission information. Emily Walker closed by noting that a key
part of their mission was to ensure that families and the Commission worked together on
behalf of shared goals. She noted further that the families were interested in a Public
Affairs plan for the Commission (She and the Deputy for Communications are working
on such a plan), as well as an announcement of the next date for public hearings.

Schedule. The Chair announced a schedule of future Commission meeting dates and
possible hearing dates, upon which he and the Vice Chair had agreed: Thursday June 5th,
Thursday June 26th, Tuesday-Wednesday July 8-9th (possible hearing), Thursday July
31st, Wednesday-Thursday August 13-14* (possible hearing), Tuesday August 26th,
Tuesday-Wednesday September 9-10th (possible hearing), Tuesday September 23rd,
Tuesday-Wednesday October 14-15th (possible hearing), Wednesday October 29th,
Wednesday-Thursday November 19th-20th (possible hearing), Tuesday November 25th,
Monday/Tuesday December 8-9th (possible hearing), Monday January 5th or Tuesday
January 6th, Thursday-Friday J'an^^-SO* (possible hearing).

Team 9 Work Plan. The Commission then turned to Team Work Plans, hearing first
from Team 9. Team leader John Farmer introduced his team, and spoke to his team's
mission: to give a comprehensive description to the events of 9/11 from the perspective of
emergency response in NYC and DC. Farmer noted his work plans organizational
approach, based on how emergency responders would have reacted — dealing with
buildings, evacuations, and consequence management. For example, radios did not
work, and it immediately became apparent how all planning for high-rise fires went out
the window. The McKinsey reports will be very valuable; the Fire Department
cooperated with McKinsey, and the Police Department did not. Staff is also in the
process of obtaining the Pentagon's own history of the event. The question of
coordination of Police, Fire, FEMA and FBI is very important. A key obstacle in getting
the work done is New York City. The climate is a poor one, with lots of recrimination
and lots of worries about lawsuits. Team leader Farmer and General Counsel Marcus
will meet with NY City's Corporation Counsel next week to try to work through some of
the information access issues.

The Vice Chair noted that the Work Plan had a long, long list of documents and interview
candidates. He stressed the importance of interim reports, probably from each of the
work teams. He stressed the importance of recommendations and options.
Commissioner Roemer used the story of John ONeil to ask the question of how much
intelligence was available to Port Authority security: in other words, how do TTIC and
Homeland Security provide information to the state, local and private sector?

Commissioner Lehman asked if there was a post-1993 after-action report. Team Leader
Farmer answered that Kroll Associates did one for the Port Authority, and that he will try
to get it. Commissioners Gorton and Lehman both noted that New York City 's concern
about lawsuits will adversely affect their cooperation. The General Counsel noted that
City officials also have a strong interest in putting their best foot forward and telling their
story. Both Commissioner Ben-Veniste and the Vice Chair agreed that it was important
to provide City officials some assurance about how the Commission would handle
information provided by the City. The Vice Chair added that City officials need to know
the Commission intends to be reasonable and does not want to impact lawsuits, but it has
a job to do and is serious about getting it done. He noted that the Commission has made
some progress in conveying this message of reassurance to Federal agencies, and needs to
do the same with the City.

Team 3 Work Plan. Acting Team Leader Dan Byman introduced the members of Team
3 (international counterterrorism policy) and spoke to its Work Plan. He framed the
central issue: How well did policymakers understand the threat from al-Qaeda? He
stated that the team wanted to present a high-level view of the goals of the US
Government at critical turning points, and how and why choices were made with respect
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to law enforcement, sanctions, diplomacy, military and other options. He stated that the
team would devote special attention to case studies (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Germany); would look at the question of safe havens (Afghanistan, Sudan); and look at
the question of permissive environments (in the United States and elsewhere). Byman
noted that this team needed key White House documents, and would need to interview
the most senior people in government.

Commissioner Lehman thought that the work plan was framed too narrowly. He would
like the Commission to address the issue in the context of Hizbollah and the 1983
destruction of the Marine Barracks in Beirut and the broader roots of terrorism, including
the growth of Madrassas. The Executive Director responded by noting that the
Commission cannot lose is focus on the central 9/11 story: There was full strategic
warning after August 1998, and the policy issue carries through to the fall of buildings in
September 2001. This core policy story needs to be told in an authoritative way.
Commissioner Lehman stated that the same people who blew up our Marines are still
training terrorists. He and Team Leader Byman agreed that the role of Hizbollah is not
the subject of investigation, but needs to be part of the narration. The Vice-Chair
observed that the Plan for Team 3 looks very good, but he is very worried about the
calendar. He observed that it is important for this team, and probably the staff as a
whole, to have a calendar spelling out its work plan, with appropriate deadlines included.

Team 4 Work Plan. Team Leader John Roth introduced the members of Team 4
(terrorist financing) and stated its key issues: the failure to share information
("stovepiping") within the USG, the level of international cooperation against terrorist
financial transactions, and the extent to which problems, when identified, got fixed. The
Executive Director added that the Team is doing the tick-tock on the money flows of
9/11. The Chair asked if this team would look at questions of stock manipulation prior
to 9/11 (a concern raised by the families), and asked whether the team would look at
financial issues under the PATRIOT Act. The answer to his question was affirmative.
Commissioner Roemer asked how terrorist finance issues got handled under Dick Clarke,
and the Executive Director replied that these issues were handled by William Wechsler
and Lee Wolosky, working in Clarke's directorate. He added further that several teams
will want to talk to Dick Clarke, and that the Commission staff will have to work through
how best to handle this question. Commissioner Lehman observed that there is a strong
sense in the financial community that we now have the worst of both worlds: restrictions
on financial flows can slow but not stop terrorist financing, and the cost is very high.
Investors from the Arab world and the Muslim world are pulling their money out of US
markets and helping to support the Euro.

Team 5 Work Plan. Team Leader Betty Swope introduced members of Team 5 (border
security and foreign visitors) and spoke to the team's central issues: how did the 19 get
in, and how did the border systems fail? She stated that the team would try to nail the
story of how the hijackers got here. She detailed that there are six different ways you can
get into the United States, of which non-immigrant visas are just one way. The team will
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look at watchlisting, and will look at questions of document fraud and how fraud fits into
the terrorist tool kit. The team will also look at the enforcement of immigration laws.

The Chair noted that this team, as well as other teams, will get into the question of civil
liberties issues. The Executive Director noted that watchlist issues will be taken up not
only by this team but by Teams 2 and 6 as well, but Team 5 has the lead on this topic. On
the question of detentions, Team 5 will work closely with Team 6.

The Chair noted that he and the Vice Chair had spoken to Porter Goss yesterday and had
just come from a conversation with Judge Gonzales. The Vice Chair summarized those
conversations, as well as a conversation with Transportation Secretary Mineta.

Chairman Goss. The Vice Chair said that Chairman Goss wants to be cooperative. He
intends by the end of May to provide the Commission both a declassified version of the
Joint Inquiry Report, as well as the classified JI Report with 3 sensitive redactions. The
question of redactions in the classified document may also be cleared up, but Goss did not
promise this outcome. Chairman Goss stated that "one way or another" the JI report will
be provided to the Commission; he thought it would take a vote of his Committee to
accomplish this. The Vice Chair observed that it looked as if it would be just a few days
until the JI report is provided to the Commission.

Commissioner Roemer observed that even if Porter wants to help the Commission — and
he does — receipt of the report is still likely several weeks away, plus six weeks for
printing. The Chair interjected that if this situation isn't resolved by the end of May,
Porter said that he will find a way to get the report to us.

Secretary Mineta. The Vice Chair noted that he had just spoken with Secretary Mineta,
who said that he will testify, but that he has concerns about a number of the
Commission's witnesses who are highly critical of the government, including Bogdan
Dzakovic. The Executive Director observed that the Commission is seeking the
testimony of Secretary Mineta to gain knowledge of core facts: How were decisions made
on the day of 9/11? Commissioner Roemer and Lehman stated their belief that the
Commission has exactly the right approach in bringing forward witnesses who are critical
of the aviation security system.

White House Counsel Gonzales. The Vice Chair recounted the meeting he and
Chairman Kean held with Judge Gonzales. The Judge made the following 10 points:
1) The White House wants to cooperate and be responsive.
2) When the Commission is seeking information, it should try as much as possible to get
it from the concerned agencies.
3) He cannot bind the President; he cannot state when or how the President will make
the assertion of Executive privilege. But at this time he could not identify any
information on which the President intended to assert such a privilege.
4) He encouraged the Chair and Vice Chair to come to him when problems arise.
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5) From the White House point of view, any comments in the media (including those in
a recent Newsweek piece by Michael Isikoff) about these matters are not helpful and
make the task of cooperation harder.
6) Adam Ciongoli has been instructed to respond to Commission requests promptly.
7) The transcripts previously requested [Bob Woodward's and others' White House
interviews] will be delivered by the end of the week.
8) Work is continuing on transcripts of interviews with the President and NS A Rice,
including the judgment on the meaning of the word "immediate response." For now,
the White House will define this term to run through 9/20/01 [our preference];
9) The White House will redact for material that may inadvertently disclose classified
information or is beyond the scope of the Commission's inquiry.
10) Procedures will be set up to allow Commission staff to what was redacted in order to
verify that this practice is not being abused.

Seeking NSC Documents. The Vice Chair recounted that he told the Judge bluntly "we
will hit glitches," and that he and the Chair would need to come back to the Judge. The
Judge specifically mentioned the question of NSC documents, and it was the Vice Chair's
clear impression that the Judge wanted the Commission to seek documents from the
agencies first.

Commissioner Roemer said that it is very important for members of the Commission to
ask when they will be able to meet with President Bush and President Clinton. He said
that the NSC is the nexus where all budget and policy questions are addressed. The JI
didn't get NSC documents, and Commissioner Roemer asked how the Commission can
get at key NSC documents. The Vice Chair replied that these will be some of the
glitches.

The General Counsel asked if the Judge had commented at all on interviews of NSC staff.
The Vice Chair answered no.

The General Counsel described the Presidential Records Act, and the additional
difficulties of seeking documents from a previous White House, which require the
approval of representatives of the former Administration as well as the current
Administration. Commissioner Ben-Veniste recommended that the staff try to get a
detailee seconded from the National Archives to help on this and related document
management issues.

Commissioner Roemer asked what subjects the Administration regards as highly

sensitive. The Vice Chair replied that the Administration will construe the constraint of
relevance strictly.

Commissioner Roemer asked how the White House arrived at the date of 9/20/01 as a
cut-off date for its definition of immediate response. Both he and Commissioner Ben-
Veniste, upon reviewing the statute, believed that "immediate" should not be construed so
narrowly.1

Commissioner Gorton recommended that the Commission incrementally step up its

requests, until it gets most of what they are willing to provide us. He recommended that
the Commission not hit the wall too early. Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated his belief
that the Commission will soon hit some resistance, and its most important recourse will
be the power of public suasion. He observed that if the Commission gives the slightest
scintilla of evidence that it is not protecting their secrets, it will kill the Commission. The
Chair noted that he and the Vice Chair had given their assurances on the safe handling of
materials.

Commissioners Roemer and Gorton recommended, with general assent, that the
Commission test the Gonzales representations with document requests.

Press Guidelines. The Commissioners began a discussion on the topic of press

guidelines. They adjourned at 9:30 PM, and resumed their discussions at 5:30 PM the
next day, after the close of a day of hearings. Commissioner Gorelick joined the
discussion. She stated her view that Commissioners should not rehearse their arguments
outside the room before discussing them inside the room. The Chair agreed strongly, that
Commissioners need to stay together and not be divided by the press. Commissioner
Gorton noted his strong agreement that Commissioners ought not to be divided on

1 After the meeting, the Executive Director explained to Commissioner Ben-Veniste that document requests
actually fell into three categories: (1) facts and circumstances relating to the 9/11 attack; (2) the "immediate
response" of the United States to the attacks; and (3) the mandate to identify, review, and evaluate the
lessons learned from the attack in order to make recommendations for the future. The first category opens
up a full documentary investigation of the pre 9/11 period. We are construing the second category broadly,
to open up a full documentary investigation not only of 9/11 itself but other responses out to 9/20. Yet
there is also the third category, which allows for a general inquiry, including briefings and key policy
documents, on lessons learned and the current activities up to the present day.
procedural matters now, as the substantive questions later will be hard enough.
Commissioner Gorelick proposed that Commissioners e-mail the Press Deputy to keep
him informed of press calls and pending issues. The Chair proposed, and Commissioners
agreed, that the Press Deputy should prepare a draft proposal on press guidelines for
discussion at the next Commission meeting. Commissioner Gorelick further proposed
that the Press Deputy serve up a possible schedule of press and media events for
Commissioners.

Hearings. The Commissioners turned to a discussion of hearings. Commissioner Ben-

Veniste observed that if you haven't worked with your witnesses and gone through the
paces, hearings fall flat, and Commissioner Gorelick agreed with the pitfalls as he
described them.

Commissioner Gorelick suggested further a hearing on the issue of local law

enforcement. There is a big Joint Terrorism Task Force presence in Chicago; a hearing
could be held there, taking up the issue of how a JTTF works and how information is
shared up and down. Commissioner Fielding agreed with the idea, that police chiefs and
mayors would support such a hearing. The Chair was more skeptical, that the
Commission hearing would become a vehicle for those parties' increased budget requests.
The Vice Chair supported the Chair.

The Vice Chair observed that hearings are important to help the public judge whether the
Commission is working. Commissioner Gorton agree with the importance of a public
presence for the Commission, but that hearings were an inefficient way of gaining
knowledge. He proposed that the smallest number of public hearings, consistent with
making the Commission's presence known, was the best course. Commissioner Ben-
Venise thought hearings ought to be backloaded, and agreed with the Vice Chair on the
importance of staying in the public eye and Commissioner Gorton's concern about the
importance of not wasting staff time. Commissioners agreed with the Vice Chair's
recommendation that staff prepare a proposed schedule of hearings for the duration of the
life of the Commission.