Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2012-2013 PART IB PAPER 03: ETHICS

Objectives Students taking this paper will be expected to: 1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the central arguments contained in the texts studied on the topics chosen. 2. Acquire an understanding of how the different topics studied relate to one another. 3. Engage in close criticism with the arguments studied. 4. Develop their own powers of philosophical analysis and argument, through study of the readings set for the topics chosen. Preliminary Reading BENNETT, J., The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). [Especially chs. 4-8] DANCY, J., Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). GLOVER, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1994), chs. 12-15. SMITH, M., The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). [Especially chs. 3-5] WATSON, G., ed., Free Will. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). WILLIAMS, B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Collins, 1995).

SYLLABUS Responsibility and voluntariness. Morality, action and consequence; intention and foresight; acts and omissions. Reasons for action: Hume on reason, sentiment and passion; internal and external reasons. Universalization, impartiality and generality. Moral relativism. Life and death issues: suicide; euthanasia.

COURSE OUTLINE This paper covers a wide range of topics in moral philosophy, ranging from the most abstract and theoretical questions about the nature of morality on the one hand, to the most concrete and applied questions of what it is permissible to do on the other. At the abstract and theoretical end are questions of moral relativism versus universalist theories of morality, questions about the nature of moral responsibility and voluntariness and the connection between these concepts and the concepts of freedom and coercion, as well as questions about the nature of reasons for action and their relationship to motivation. At the concrete and applied end are questions about life and death issues, such as suicide and euthanasia. In between, there are questions about the universalisation, impartiality and generality of moral claims and principles, and questions about the relationship between morality, action, and consequence (including the ethical significance of acts versus omissions, and intention versus foresight). Prerequisites There are no formal prerequisites, but those who have not already taken the Part IA Ethics course are strongly advised to study some of the recommended reading for that course, especially on the topics Fact and Value, Objectivity and Subjectivity, Morality and the Self, and Forms of Consequentialism. READING LIST
*Material marked with an asterisk* is important

RESPONSIBILITY AND VOLUNTARINESS *FRANKFURT, H., The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chs. 1 & 3. *SCANLON, T., Moral Dimensions: Permissability, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2008), ch. 4: 'Blame'. *STRAWSON, P.F., 'Freedom and Resentment', in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 1-25. Also in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 59-80. [Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=178684] FISCHER, J.M., 'Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities', in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds., Moral Responsiblity and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 27-52. Reprinted in his My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.38-62. KAMTEKAR, R., 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character', Ethics, 114 (2004): 458-91. NOZICK, R., 'Coercion', in his Socratic Puzzles (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 15-44. OLSARETTI, S., Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 6.
2

STRAWSON, G., 'The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility', Philosophical Studies, 75 (1994): 5-24. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 212-28. TAYLOR, C., 'Responsibility for Self', in A. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: California University Press, 1976), pp. 181-99. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 111-26. WATSON, G., 'The Two Faces of Responsibility', Philosophical Topics, 24 (1996): 227-48. WILLIAMS, B., Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chs. 1 & 2. WOLF, S., 'Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility', in F. Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 46-62. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 372-87. [Also available on Camtools]

Reprinted in J. Harris, ed., Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 205-99 (especially sects. 4-5.8). THOMSON, J.J., 'Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem', The Monist, 59 (1976): 204-17. Reprinted in her Rights, Restitution and Risk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.78-93. THOMSON, J.J., 'The Trolley Problem', Yale Law Journal, 94, no. 6 (1985): 1395-415. Reprinted in her Rights, Restitution and Risk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 94-116. UNGER, P., Living High and Letting Die (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 2-4. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com]

REASONS FOR ACTION Hume on Reason, Sentiment and Passion a) General and Background

MORALITY, ACTION AND CONSEQUENCE Intention and Foresight; Acts and Omissions *BENNETT, J., The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chs. 4-8 & 11. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] *KAMM, F., 'Nonconsequentialism', in H. LaFollette, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 205-26. An expanded version is reprinted in F. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 11-47. [Also available online at: http://bit.ly/Lafollette2000] APPIAH, A.K., Experiments in Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). FOOT, P., 'The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect', in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), pp. 19-32. Reprinted in B. Steinbeck and A. Norcoss, eds., Killing and Letting Die. 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), pp.266-79; also in D. Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), ch. 3. [This introduces the original 'trolley problem'] GREENE, J.D., 'The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul', in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Moral Psychology. Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 35-80. QUINN, W., 'Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing', Philosophical Review, 98 (1989): 287-312. Also in his Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 149-74. Reprinted in B. Steinbock and A. Norcross, eds., Killing and Letting Die (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994). QUINN, W., 'Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 18, no. 3 (1989): 334-51. Reprinted in his Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 175-93. RAKOWSKI, E., 'Taking and Saving Lives', Columbia Law Review, 93 (1993): 1063-156
3

*COHON, R., 'Hume's Moral Philosophy', in E.N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 ed.) [Online]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hume-moral/ (Accessed: 19 June 2012). *NORTON, D.F., 'Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality', in D.F. Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 141-81. [Also available online at: http://cco.cambridge.org] BAILLIE, J., Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2000), chs. 4-6. [Introductory] DARWALL, S., 'Hume: Norms and the Obligation to Be Just', in his The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 10. SCHNEEWIND, B., 'Hume: Virtue Naturalized', in his The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 17. b) Reason, sentiment and passion *HUME, D., Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. [Especially sects. I-II, VI, IX & appendix I-II] *STROUD, B., Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), chs. 7 & 8. HUME, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, ch. 3, sect. 3; Book III, ch. 1, sects. 1-2. [Also available online at: www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705] MILLER, D., Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), ch. 2. PENELHULM, T., 'Hume', in D.F. Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 117-47. [Also available online at: http://cco.cambridge.org] SNARE, F., Morals, Motivation, & Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chs. 1-5.
4

Internal and external reasons *PARFIT, D., 'Reasons and Motivation', Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol., 71 (1997): 99-130. *SMITH, M., The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), ch. 4. *WILLIAMS, B., 'Internal and External Reasons', in T.R. Harrison, ed., Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 17-28. Reprinted in B. Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13. Also in P.K. Moser, ed., Rationality in Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 387-97. DANCY, J., Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 26-48 & 70-76. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] KORSGAARD, C., 'Skepticism About Practical Reason', Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986): 5-26. Reprinted in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 373-87. MCDOWELL, J., 'Might There Be External Reasons?' in J.E.J. Altham and T.R. Harrison, eds., World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 68-85. Reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 95-111. MILLGRAM, E., 'Williams' Argument against External Reasons', Nous, 30, no. 2 (1996): 197-220. SCHROEDER, M., Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). [Especially chs. 1 & 11. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] WILLIAMS, B., 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', in his Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45. WILLIAMS, B., 'Values, Reasons and the Theory of Persuasion', in his Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 109-18.

WIGGINS, D., 'Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth', in his Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 59-86. WINCH, P., 'The Universalisability of Moral Judgements', The Monist, 49 (1965): 196-214. Reprinted in his Ethics and Action (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 151-70.

MORAL RELATIVISM *HARMAN, G., and J.J. THOMSON, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), chs. 1-5 & 9. *WILLIAMS, B., 'Relativism and Reflection', in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 156-73. [Also available online at: www.mylibrary.com/?id=62206] BLACKBURN, S., Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 9. HARMAN, G., 'Moral Relativism Defended', Philosophical Review, 84 (1975): 3-22. Reprinted in G. Harman, Explaining Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 3-19, which is available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com. Also in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of ethics: an anthology (Oxford : Blackwell, 2007) pp. 84-92. HARMAN, G., 'What Is Moral Relativism?' in A.I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds., Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 143-61. Reprinted in G. Harman, Explaining Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 20-38. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] LEAR, J., 'Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism', Mind, 92 (1983): 38-60. MOODY-ADAMS, M.M., Fieldwork in Familiar Places (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), chs. 1 & 2. SCANLON, T.M., 'Relativism', in his What We Owe to Each Other? (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), ch. 8. WILLIAMS, B., 'The Truth in Relativism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 75 (1974): 215-28. Reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 132-43. WONG, D.B., Moral Relativity (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1984), chs. 3-6. WONG, D.B., Natural Moralities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 1-3.

UNIVERSALISATION, IMPARTIALITY AND GENERALITY *DANCY, J., Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 3-12 & 73-117. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] *HARE, R.M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), chs. 2 & 3. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] *MACKIE, J.L., 'Universalization', in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), ch. 4. COTTINGHAM, J., 'Ethics and Impartiality', Philosophical Studies, 43 (1983): 83-99. HARE, R.M., Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), ch. 6. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] KAGAN, S., Normative Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 256-70. KORSGAARD, C., 'The Reasons We Can Share', Social Philosophy and Policy, 10 (1993): 24-51. Reprinted in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 275-310. MCKEEVER, S., and M. RIDGE, Principled Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 1-4. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com]
5

LIFE AND DEATH ISSUES Suicide and Euthanasia *DWORKIN, R., Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia (London: Harper Collins, 1993), chs. 7 & 8. Parts of ch. 8 are reprinted as 'Life Past Reason' in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999; 2nd ed. 2006), pp. 305-11. *KEOWN, M., Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chs. 1-7. [Also available online at: http://cco.cambridge.org]
6

BRUECKNER, A.L., and J.M. FISCHER, 'Why Is Death Bad?' Philosophical Studies, 50, no. 2 (1986): 213-21. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer, ed., The Metaphysics of Death (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 222-29. DRESSER, R., 'Dworkin on Dementia', Hastings Center Report, 25 (1995): 32-38. Reprinted in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 312-20. FELDMAN, F., Confrontations with the Reaper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [Overview] FINNIS, J., 'A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia', in J. Keown, ed., Euthanasia Examined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 23-36 & 46-56. HARDWIG, J., 'Is There a Duty to Die?' Hastings Center Report, 27 (1997): 34-42. Reprinted in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 339-48. HUME, D., 'On Suicide', in his Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 19-28. JAWORSKA, A., 'Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28, no. 2 (1999): 105-38. JONES, D.A., 'Is There a Logical Slippery Slope Argument from Voluntary to Non-Voluntary Euthanasia?', Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 21 (2011): 379-404. Available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2011.0018. NAGEL, T., 'Death', Nous, 4 (1970): 73-80. Reprinted in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 1. RACHELS, J., 'Active and Passive Euthanasia', New England Journal of Medicine, 292 (1975): 78-80. Reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 29-36. Also in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 227-30. ROSENBERG, J., Thinking Clearly About Death. 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). [Overview] SHIFFRIN, S.V., 'Autonomy, Beneficience, and the Permanently Demented', in J. Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 195-217. WILLIAMS, B., 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), ch. 6. Reprinted in J. Fischer, ed., The Metaphysics of Death (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 71-92.