Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan Facts: FRANCISCO M.

LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.[1] They now seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence. Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red[2] won as KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this electoral exercise as he was no longer qualified for the position after having already passed the age limit fixed by law. On 7 January 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral representative of the KBs to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the invitation of one of its members,Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his appointment had been cleared by the Governor of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda as one of the subjects discussed in the meeting. Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January 1986. [4] But it was only on 23 April 1986, when then President Corazon C. Aquino was already in power,[5] that he forwarded these documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by the mayor to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period 16 January 1986 to 30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986 and then authorized someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in his behalf. On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine (9) months from the date he received his appointment papers from President Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of the KB and took his oath of office sometime in 1985 before then Assemblywoman Carmencita O. Reyes his assumption of the KB presidency upon the expiration of the term of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was valid. Conversely, the accused Lenlie Lecaroz ceased to be a member of the KB on the last Sunday of November 1985 and, as such, was no longer the legitimate representative of the youth sector in the municipal council of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The accused MAYOR's acts would fall under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code which reads: Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary public who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: x x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. xxxx Clearly, falsification of public documents has been committed by accused MAYOR LECAROZ. Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE LECAROZ, was able to draw salaries from the municipality to which he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered. This constitutes Estafa x x x x the deceit being the falsification made, and the prejudice being that caused to the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE LECAROZ who was not entitled thereto. Issue: WON petitioners are guilty Held: No

Ratio: The petition is meritorious. The basic propositions upon which the Sandiganbayan premised its conviction of the accused are: (a) although Jowil Red was duly elected KB Chairman he could not validly assume a seat in the Sanggunian as KB sectoral representative for failure to show a valid appointment; and, (b) Lenlie Lecaroz who was the incumbent KB representative could not hold over after his term expired because pertinent laws do not provide for holdover. 1. The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB. We disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. [6] It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.[7] In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.[8] The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment,[9] otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same. The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733[14]on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office.[15] Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer,[16] or at least a de facto officer[17] entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for encroachment of public office 2. On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were convicted, i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code, areintentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice.[19] If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him

the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of petitioners. First. When Jowil Red showed up at the meeting of the Sanggunian on 7 January 1986, what he presented to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz was a mere telegram purportedly sent by Imee Marcos-Manotoc informing him of his supposed appointment to the SB, together with a photocopy of a "Mass Appointment." Second. It appears from the records that although Red received his appointment papers signed by President Marcos in January 1986, he forwarded the same to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz only on 23 April 1986 during which time President Marcos had already been deposed and President Aquino had already taken over the helm of government. Third. Petitioners presented six (6) certified copies of opinions of the Secretaries of Justice of Presidents Macapagal, Marcos and Aquino concerning the doctrine of holdover. This consistently expressed the view espoused by the executive branch for more than thirty (30) years that the mere fixing of the term of office in a statute without an express prohibition against holdover is not indicative of a legislative intent to prohibit it, Fourth. It is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is highly regarded and respected in the community, would deliberately blemish his good name, and worse, involve his own son in a misconduct for a measly sum of P23,675.00, such as this case before us. The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith In ascribing malice and bad faith to petitioner Mayor Lecaroz, the Sandiganbayan cited two (2) circumstances which purportedly indicated criminal intent. It pointed out that the name of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not in the municipal payroll for the first quincena of 1986 which meant that his term had finally ended, and that the reinstatement of Lenlie Lecaroz by Mayor Francisco Lecaroz in the payroll periods from 15 January 1986 and thereafter for the next twelve and a half (12 -1/2) months was for no other purpose than to enable him to draw salaries from the municipality.[29] There is however no evidence, documentary or otherwise, that Mayor Francisco Lecaroz himself caused the name of Lenlie Lecaroz to be dropped from the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986. On the contrary, it is significant that while Lenlie Lecaroz' name did not appear in the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986, yet, in the payroll for the next quincena accused Lenlie Lecaroz was paid for both the first and second quincenas, and not merely for the second half of the month which would have been the case if he was actually "dropped" from the payroll for the first fifteen (15) days and then "reinstated" in the succeeding payroll period, as held by the court a quo. 3. Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. The first and third elements of the offense have not been established in this case. In approving the payment of salaries to Lenlie Lecaroz, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz signed uniformly-worded certifications thus - I hereby certify on my official oath that the above payroll is correct, and that the services above stated have been duly rendered. Payment for such services is also hereby approved from the appropriations indicated. When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was making not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as member of the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position. This is an opinion undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of this kind cannot constitute the crime of false pretenses The third element requiring that the narration of facts be absolutely false is not even adequately satisfied as the belief of Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member of the Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of holdover. La

mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito. [33] If the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to have been committed. Republic v Singun Facts: -Singun was the former Chief Trade and Industry Development Specialist of DTI-RO2 of Cagayan Province. On November 1999, he wrote to Regional Director Hipolito signifying his intention for a 8-month leave and intention to retire on August the next year (after leave). He filed application for leave of absence and early retirement but both were denied. Singun reiterated application. This time, Director Hipolito endorsed the application to Assec Maglaya for comment. HOWEVER, W/O WAITING FOR THE COMMENT, Singun filed an application for leave of absence for a shorter period (2 months) and signified his INTENTION TO RESIGN effective the close of office hours of January 2000. Director Hipolito APPROVED APPLICATION for LOA and resignation. Director Hipolito issued memorandum containing approval and notified Regional Director of CSC of his acceptance to the resignation -On January 14,, 2000 (date when resignation became effective), DTI-RO2 received through fax Memo Order No. 20 detailing Singun to the Office of the Undersecretary for Regional Operations effective 17 January 2000. Respondent then wrote to Director Hipolito stating that he was reconsidering his earlier letter of resignation and decided to wait until he could qualify for early retirement. Dir. Hipolito wrote to Atty. Soria for an opinion on WON Singun was considered resigned. Atty. Soria issued an opinion wherein SINGUN WAS DEEMED TO HAVE EFFECTIVELY RESIGNED ON 14 JANUARY 2000: (1) Singuns voluntary written notice informing Director Hipolito that he was relinqu ishing his position and the effectivity date of said resignation and (2) Director Hipolitos acceptance in writing which indicated the date of effectivity of the resignation. Singuns letter of withdrawal of resignation DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTORE HIM TO HIS POSITION, still subject to approval of Dir. Hipolito. -In accordance with this, Dir. Hipolito informed Undersec Ordonez that Singun had resigned 14 January 2000 so the detail was w/o effect. Singun has already accepted employment with Philippine Rural Banking Corporation Singun wrote to Undersec Ordonez, in effect saying that HE DID NOT RESIGN: a. HIS APPLICATION FOR RESIGNATION WAS MADE UNDER DURESS, imposed by Director Hipolito as a condition for the approval of his application for LOA. b. He intended to resign August 2000 after completing 15 years of service -Undersec Ordonez required Dir. Hipolito to comment on the letter and to show evidence that Singun reveived a copy of Dir. Hipolitos acceptance in writing of Singuns letter of resignat ion. Dir Hipolito: No force, intimidation, threat and undue pressure for Singun to resign. As to acceptance in writing, Singun was given a copy of the Memo regarding the acceptance of the resignation. CSC Regional Office: considered Singun as resigned because the detail order made no mention that issuance meant acceptance of his resignation was revoked. Since Undersec Ordonez was not the appointing authority, he had no power to accept Singuns withdrawal of resignation. Singun appealed to CSC CSC: RESIGNATION INOPERATIVE AND INEFFICACIOUS. PAY SALARIES AND OTHER BENEFITS: Act of Undersec Ordonez is a tacit, if not express, repudiation and revocation of the acceptance by the latter of the supposed resignation of Singun. If ever tender of resignation accepted: acceptance inoperative and inefficacious because THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT SINGUN WAS DULY INFORMED OF ACCEPTANCE MR, DENIED CA: Deny appeal, affirm CSC: CSCs finding must be respected, as long as findings are supported by substantial evidence. Act of resignation CANNOT BE PRESUMED BY RELYING ON MEMORANDA OR LETTERS MERELY

SHOWING APPROVAL OF RESIGNATION, NO SHOWING OF CLEAR INTENTION TO SURRENDER. NO ABANDONMENT: inconsistent with: (1) motion for reconsideration of CSC-RO2s Opinion No. LO-000202, (2) appeal questioning CSC-RO2s Decision No. A-000601, and (3) bringing the matter to the National Office of the CSC for resolution. No denial of due process on part of DTI, it had opportunity to explain side or to seek reconsideration. ISSUE: WON there was complete and operative resignation Held: NO. Ratio: No indication that Singun was duly informed of the acceptance of his resignation. The Final Act of a Resignations Acceptance is the Notice of Acceptance. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. *complete and operative resignation from public office: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. ACCEPTANCE: In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor. In this case, the Court of Appeals and the CSC declared that there was nothing in the records to show that respondent was duly informed of the acceptance of his resignation. There was no indication that respondent received a copy of his 12 November 1999 application for leave of absence and resignation as accepted by Director Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that respondent received Director Hipolitos 12 November 1999 Memorandum informing him of the acceptance of his resignation. IN THIS CASE, Notice of approval of leave of absence does not necessarily mean the acceptance of resignation Employment with PRBC was undertaken during an approved LOA so NO ABANDONMENT. Resignation may be Withdrawn before its Acceptance: Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is revocable. And the resignation is not effective where it was withdrawn before it was accepted. IN THIS CASE: Since no valid notification of acceptance, Singun could validly withdraw his resignation. No need for Dir. Hipolito to accept withdrawal since there was no valid acceptance of the application of resignation in the first place. Detail Order by Undersec Ordonez also valid as there was no effective resignation yet Public Interest Center Inc. v Elma Facts: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Coumsel CPLC (Jan 1999 during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC. Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced by Sabio as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he was appointed SOLGEN. Arguments: Public Interest Center CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent appointments CPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices

Arguments: Elma As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His appointment falls under the exceptions in Art IX-B, Sec7. The 2 positions are not incompatible NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench. LAWS: Art. VII, Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. x x x Art. IX-B, Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to anypublic office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Issue: whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution Held: YES. Ratio: The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,[12] this Court ruled that, [t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. [I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are incompatible at common law. x x x ***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. *note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with the rank of Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)) Issue: whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Held: NO if based on position. YES if based on primary functions test.

Ratio: the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions. *Review ulit CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment. The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials office. The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an ex -officio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.[18] Thus, it will not suffice that no additional compensation shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is mandatory that the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity. *Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. Rosales v Mijares Facts: -Rosales was elected as mayor of Catarman. Shortly after assuming office, he called department heads (among which was Mijares as the MUNICIPAL ENGINEER) and told Mijares to resign under pain of abolition of his position. Mijares offered to be transferred at the Provincial Engineering Office instead. Rosales then indorsed Mijares as Asst. Provincial Engineer (and informed him so, with the validity of endorsement for 30 days). Mijares continued reporting at the Municipal Engineers Office as Provincial Governor did not act on Rosales endorsement. -Rosales wrote to respondent again, this time informing Mijares of his separation as the 30d period given to Mijares to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office has elapsed. Mijares requested Rosales to withdraw separation letter as his transfer to the Provincial Engineers Office was not acted upon, and thus, Mijares did not cease to be an employee of the municipal government. Rosales used MC No. 39, S. 1993 as the reason for Mijares termination. Rosales offered to reinstate respondent. Mijares filed COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL TERMINATION vs. Rosales before CSC. Fact-finding investigation conducted. Fact Finding requested Rosales to produce the request for transfer which Rosales said to be merely verbal. Plus used CMC MC no. 38 as reason (expiration to permit to transfer w/o transfer being effected)

CSC: Reinstate Mijares as Municipal engineer, pay backwages.permission to transfer not free and voluntary made. It was a shrewd machination or clever ploy resorted by Rosales to oust Mijares, THUS ILLEGAL Request for transfer MUST BE IN WRITING. No evidence of verbal request, as well as date of effectivity of transfer .letter of Rosales was merely a detail to Office of the Provi ncial Engineer. MR DENIED, filed petition for review with CA. CA: Dismiss petition, affirm CSC -expiration of permit to transfer to remove Mijares was purely technical, too flimsy to override consti mandate upholding right to security of tenure. MR DENIED. HELD CSC MC 93-38: Transfer is a movement from one position without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. The transfer may be from one agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same agency. An employee who seeks transfer to another office shall first secure permission from the head of the department or agency where he is employed stating the effective date of the transfer. If the request to transfer of an employee is not granted by the head of the agency where he is employed, it shall be deemed approved after the lapse of 30 days from the date of notice to the agency head. If, for whatever reason, the employee fails to transfer on the specified date, he shall be considered resigned and his reemployment in his former office shall be at the discretion of his head. -for CSC MC to be effective: 1. written request for transfer 2. Request express and unequivocal, not merely implied or ambiguous 3. request must be such that he intended to surrender his permanent office -a transfer connotes an absolute relinquishment of an office in exchange for another office. Such request must be voluntary on the part of the officer concerned and not vitiated by force, coercion, or intimidation or even deceit. -Sta. Maria v. Lopez: A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to lure the employee away from his permanent position, cannot be done without the employees consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position. -unconsented transfer is anathema to security of tenure. A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal. An employee cannot be transferred unless for causes provided for by law and after due process. Any attempt to breach the protective wall built around the employees right to security of tenure should be slain on sight. The right of employees to security of tenure should never be sacrificed merely at the whims and pleasure of some unscrupulous and heartless politicians. -IN THIS CASE: Mijares was a well-known supporter of the opposing political party. Mijares was coerced to resign, even threatened to abolish position if Mijares did not resign. The respondent, in his letter to the petitioner dated October 2, 1998, admitted that during their second meeting on August 10, 1998, he suggested that he was open to a transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office or, at least to be detailed thereat, in lieu of resignation, to which the petitioner agreed; and that upon the petitioners orders, the respondent accomplished the requisite Form 212, secured copies of his service records, and submitted the same to the Office of the Provincial Governor for a possible appointment as Assistant Provincial Engineer; and that the petitioner endorsed and recommended the same to the Provincial Governor. However, taking into consideration the entirety of the contents of the letter, and the facts and circumstances which impelled the respondent to write the same, it cannot thereby be concluded that the respondent had voluntarily and unequivocally decided to transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. ON MIJARES being open to transfer: In light of the demands and threats of the petitioner, the respondent had only three options: to resign, to agree to transfer to another office, or to remain as Municipal Engineer with the threat of the petitioner to have his position abolished hanging over his head.

Admittedly, rather than resign as demanded by the petitioner, the respondent opted to make himself available for appointment by the Provincial Governor as Assistant Provincial Engineer. However, the Form 212 submitted by the respondent to the Provincial Governor is not the written request envisaged in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 for the following reasons: (a) the respondent continued reporting and performing his duties as Municipal Engineer of Catarman and receiving his salary as such; and (b) the respondent did not send any written request to the petitioner for transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer -Letter to Mijares is merely a detail for 30d to the Office of Provincial Engineer: Mijares temporarily moved for a period of 30 days not a transfer (which is longer?) By his September 24, 1998 letter to the respondent, the petitioner made it appear that he had granted the respondent permission to transfer within thirty days, and that the respondent failed to effect his transfer. This was done by the petitioner despite the absence of any letter from the respondent requesting for such transfer. By his August 12, 1998 letter, the petitioner merely detailed the respondent to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. It must be stressed that the only legal effect of a detail of an employee, upon the lapse of the period of such detail, is for that employee to return to his permanent station. Thus, the respondent retained his position as Municipal Engineer despite his detail to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. -On alleged deprivation of Due Process: CSC reveived all of Rosales comments and annexes and evaluated the same. However, no shred of evidence was shown that Mijares requested for his transfer WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD -Cant rely on Opinion of CSC Regional Director on the application of MC 93 -38: (a) the petitioner falsely represented to the Regional Director and Provincial Prosecutor that the respondent had requested for a transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer when, in truth and in fact, the respondent had not done so; (b) the Regional Director and the Provincial Prosecutor were not even furnished with copies of the October 2, 1998 Letter of the respondent to the petitioner; and (c) the opinion of the CSC Regional Director and Provincial Prosecutor were not conclusive on the CSC, as the latter could still reverse the said opinion on appeal ON ESTOPPEL: Mijares even appealed to CSC! -ON PRESCRIPTION: procedural rules need not strictly be observed. MAUNA VS. CSC: it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties plus: Mijares did contest separation w/n 1y from separation + belated raising issue on appeal