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Who is afraid of ashwaiyyat? Urban change and politics in Egypt

Asef Bayat and Eric Denis Environment and Urbanization 2000 12: 185 DOI: 10.1177/095624780001200215 The online version of this article can be found at: http://eau.sagepub.com/content/12/2/185

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URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT

Who is afraid of ashwaiyyat ? Urban change and politics in Egypt

Asef Bayat and Eric Denis

Asef Bayat is a professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo. Eric Denis is an urban geographer working at the French Research Centre based in Cairo. Address: The American University in Cairo, 113 Kasr El Aini Street, PO Box 2511, Cairo 11511, Egypt; e-mail: abayat@aucegypt.edu

SUMMARY: Drawing on the 1996 census, this paper challenges the orthodox view that rural migrants are causing a rapid expansion of Egyptian cities and have created cities of peasants. It describes how most major cities have ceased to be centres for rural in-migration and looks at the spatial diffusion of urban development through the growth of agro-towns, urban villages and new industrial towns. Many settlements officially classified as rural are growing rapidly and acquiring urban characteristics. The paper also questions commonly held assumptions that the large informal settlements in which much of the urban population live are abnormal and associated with social deviance and political violence.

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Ashwaiyyat, the plural for ashwaiyya (literally meaning half-hazard), is the term used in public to refer to the informal communities in Egypt, some 111 of which exist in the greater Cairo area. Official estimates put the total number of these settlements at about 1,034, accounting for about 12 million, or 45 per cent, of Egypts urban population. Land invasion accounts for a very small proportion of these settlements and the vast majority comprise privately owned homes which are built on purchased agricultural land but which lack planning, construction permits and most conventional urban services. See Assawi, Ali (1996), Al-ashwaiyyat wa namazeg al-tanmiyya (The Informals and Development Patterns), Centre for the Study of Developing Countries, Cairo University, pages 61-62.

NINETEEN NINETY-TWO was a watershed in Egypts recent urban history and in the discourse within Egypt on cities. Imbaba, one of Cairos major informal communities, with around one million inhabitants, had been taken over by the militant Islamic group Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya. Their penetration of this very large informal settlement resulted in the creation, according to foreign correspondents, of a state within the state in Egypt. The Imbaba incident and similar events followed a decade of sustained debate and discourse on cities and politics, often reviving century-old assumptions concerning the social consequences of urban transition. Cairo is currently perceived as a giant city choked by overpopulation, seemingly the result of an influx of fallahin (peasants) which is said to be threatening its urban configuration and turning it into a city of peasants. By the same token, the argument goes, the ecology of the city is being transformed by the spread of ashwaiyyat (informal communities)(1) which are ruralizing Egyptian urban centres. The last ten years have witnessed a growing concern that rural migration is laying the groundwork for a major social explosion because of the prevalence of poverty and joblessness and the undermining of family relations. Some see ashwaiyyat as unnatural communities which trigger social disease and abnormal behaviour such as lack of privacy, overcrowding and violence. Others have commented on the erosion of respect for parents and social control and on the prevalence of immorality.(2) The informal cities are perceived by many in Egypt as representing a Hobbesian locus of lawlessness and extremism, producing a culture of violence and an abnormal way of life.(3) The 1996 Egypt Human Development Report summed up the prevalent
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FEEDBACK Map 1: Greater The Cairo Greater Cairo Region Map 1: The Region
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2. See the expert opinions in interviews conducted in AlAshwaiyyat Sanaa Hokoumiyya, Al-Wafd, March 5, 1999. 3. Nasir, Abdul-Fattah (1999), Al-Ashwaiyya fi Hayatina, Al-Wafd, March 9.

Airport

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expert position thus: During the last 15 years, we have witnessed a process of ruralization of Cairo, with the growth of many rural formations and semi-rural settlements on the fringe of the city. Consequently, many new sub-populations in the city have their distinct lifestyles and tend to travel in insular circuits.(4) Egyptian cities generally are assumed by the national media, academia, government officials and, more significantly, by the planning community, to be spaces of migrants who have ruralized the urban centres, turning them, like Cairo, into cities of peasants. Ashwaiyyat are seen to represent the epitome of ruralized life in cities, exhibiting anomie, poverty, crime and thus political violence. These assumptions view Egyptian cities and the countryside from the vantage point of Janet AbuLughods classic study Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious(5) but seem to
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oa d Sapele R

4. Cairo Institute of National Planning (1996), Egypt Human Development Report 1996, page 56.

5. Abu-Lughod, J (1971), Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious, Princeton University Press.

URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT Figure 1: Annual Population Growth Rates between 1897 and 1996

pay little attention to the significant changes which she later acknowledged had occurred since the 1970s. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate some of these changes, the implications for the current discourse on informal cities and their assumed association with social and political problems. We argue that the demographic changes of the last 20 years or so have produced a more complex spatial pattern. First, cities have ceased to be centres for rural migration (which has levelled off) while villages have begun to assume urban characteristics. These observations thus challenge the assumption of a clear-cut rural-urban dichotomy. Finally, we question the basis of the premise which infers social deviance and political violence from the character of the informal city.

II. DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT

TRACING THE MAJOR developments in Egyptian urbanization over the last 20 years, one can observe two distinct trends. On the one hand, there has been a stabilization and diffusion of urbanization and on the other, a stabilization of rural-urban migration. In other words, Egypt is currently experiencing a double movement of deconcentration at both the metropolitan and national levels. Between 1976 and 1996, Egypts population rose from 36 million to 59 million, an increase equal to the total population of Egypt in 1956. Interestingly, this high growth rate is associated with an end to urban polarization. Contrary to the prevailing idea of a continuous rural-urban influx, the urbanization process in Egypt has been both stabilized and diffused. The urban proportion of the population has declined from 43.8 per cent in 1976 to 43 per cent by 1996. This new pattern of stabilization is associated largely with the urbanization of large villages and the rapid growth of small towns; this will be discussed below (see Figure 1). Although reliable data on this do not exist, we suspect that migration to these villages and small towns may serve as an important stabilizing factor. The second general trend in Egyptian urbanization has to do with the stabilization of rural migration to large cities. Unlike the 1940s and 1960s, when large cities attracted very large numbers of rural people, the trend has slowed considerably. In addition, the metropolitan areas are engaged in a structural movement of centrifugal redistribution from the core areas
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Greater Cairo Region; Population Change

1986 and 1996 Map 2: Greater between Cairo Region; Population Change between 1986 and 1996

Variation of population +270,000 or more +135,000 to 269,999 +27,000 to 134,999 -27,000 to 134,999 -135,000 to 269,999 -270,000 or more

of the big cities to the peripheries a classic trend in megacities all over the world, from Paris to New York, to Mexico, Bombay and Tehran. As the core areas of large cities lose population, new agglomerations emerge around them (see Maps 2 and 4). Thus, over the past ten years, Cairos central districts (i.e. the West Bank, Dokki and Giza) have progressively lost a large proportion of their inhabitants, and six qism, or districts, lost population in 1966. This number increased to 17 in 1976, 18 in 1986 and had reached 22 by 1996. On the whole, central Cairo lost some 580,000 inhabitants between 1986 and 1996 (see Table 1). This trend is not limited to Cairo alone but can be observed also in Alexandria, Tanta, Mansoura and the cities of the Canal (see Map 2). In
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URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT Table 1: Greater Cairo Region; Demographic Trends Since 1947
Number of 1947 1960 3,120 5,049 2,455 4,167 2,065 3,358 389 810 665 882 4 7 45 94 0 0 27 23 101 212 188 254 115 162 90 95 58 67 21 26 194 202 62 64 113 140 106 131 110 124 61 100 64 143 90 125 156 265 96 299 103 143 56 164 46 109 15 84 0 0 75 86 0 39 8 33 6 38 0 0 10 17 10 19 16 30 18 31 2 30 68 104 77 100 106 139 28 75 11 25 30 43 66 87 39 136 19 54 35 71 76 164 15 55 26 36 13 19 0 0 30 40 47 63 87 113 67 83 139 180 43 58 30 49 inhabitants (thousands) Annual growth rate 1966 1976 1986 1996 47/60 60/66 66/76 76/86 6,365 8,227 10,988 13,467 3.8 3.9 2.6 2.9 5,363 6,945 9,061 10,172 4.2 4.3 2.6 2.7 4,232 5,074 6,069 6,867 3.8 3.9 1.8 1.8 1,132 1,871 2,993 3,305 5.8 5.7 5.2 4.8 1,001 1,282 1,927 3,295 2.2 2.1 2.5 4.2 12 34 51 59 5.3 8.7 11.0 4.3 203 283 427 539 5.9 13.7 3.3 4.2 0 0 24 66 50 54 47 70 -1.3 14.1 0.8 -1.5 254 270 255 229 5.9 3.1 0.6 -0.6 277 252 199 156 2.3 1.5 -0.9 -2.3 233 186 165 191 2.7 6.3 -2.2 -1.2 99 88 65 49 0.5 0.6 -1.2 -3.0 63 58 43 29 1.2 -1.2 -0.8 -2.9 21 20 18 13 1.5 -3.3 -0.8 -1.0 202 177 124 75 0.3 0.0 -1.3 -3.6 64 59 45 30 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -2.7 143 133 105 79 1.6 0.4 -0.7 -2.4 135 124 90 59 1.6 0.5 -0.9 -3.1 123 110 79 60 0.9 -0.1 -1.1 -3.2 109 104 84 67 3.9 1.6 -0.5 -2.1 215 292 296 247 6.4 7.1 3.1 0.1 136 129 109 84 2.5 1.4 -0.5 -1.7 283 272 232 178 4.2 1.1 -0.4 -1.6 370 418 401 324 9.1 3.6 1.2 -0.4 159 142 111 90 2.5 1.8 -1.1 -2.4 203 314 341 304 8.6 3.6 4.5 0.8 144 267 327 323 6.9 4.7 6.4 2.0 177 282 440 499 14.1 13.2 4.8 4.6 0 65 167 467 9.9 166 127 126 121 1.0 11.7 -2.6 -0.1 63 102 125 155 8.4 4.9 2.0 63 182 389 469 11.2 11.2 11.3 7.9 86 171 300 306 16.1 14.5 7.2 5.8 0 7 101 357 30.2 20 19 22 15 4.3 2.4 -0.5 1.7 24 56 131 168 5.0 4.1 8.6 8.9 68 188 450 667 5.0 14.4 10.7 9.1 43 62 137 252 4.6 5.6 3.7 8.2 22 24 43 67 24.8 -4.8 0.9 5.8 123 155 255 460 3.3 2.9 2.3 5.1 118 146 220 297 2.0 2.8 2.1 4.2 154 190 257 338 2.1 1.6 2.2 3.1 134 234 369 417 7.8 10.0 5.7 4.7 39 161 345 454 6.8 7.5 15.2 7.9 49 63 84 97 2.1 1.8 2.4 4.3 96 122 185 264 2.8 2.2 2.4 3.0 191 325 484 523 10.2 5.7 5.5 4.1 84 144 182 174 8.1 7.7 5.6 2.3 86 101 107 94 5.5 3.3 1.7 0.6 216 208 259 239 6.0 4.7 -0.4 2.2 98 189 288 454 10.8 10.2 6.7 4.3 43 68 128 200 2.6 3.1 4.7 6.5 32 141 307 538 2.7 9.3 15.9 8.1 0 0 1 35 47 61 92 115 2.0 2.8 2.7 4.2 69 94 128 217 2.3 1.7 3.1 3.2 126 158 229 286 2.1 1.8 2.3 3.8 93 118 174 225 1.6 2.0 2.4 3.9 205 270 438 587 2.0 2.3 2.8 4.9 64 89 140 193 2.2 1.8 3.3 4.6 66 117 247 394 3.8 5.1 5.9 7.8 86/96 2.1 1.6 1.1 2.6 3.3 1.5 2.4 10.5 4.2 -1.1 -2.4 1.5 -2.8 -4.1 -3.1 -4.9 -3.9 -2.8 -4.1 -2.8 -2.2 -1.8 -2.6 -2.6 -2.1 -2.1 -1.1 -0.1 1.3 10.8 -0.4 2.2 1.9 0.2 13.5 -3.6 2.5 4.0 6.3 4.6 6.1 3.0 2.8 1.2 2.8 3.6 1.4 0.8 -0.4 -1.4 -0.8 4.7 4.6 5.8 52.1 2.2 5.4 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.3 4.8 Density 1996 85 185 221 139 32 27 146 52 125 205 339 202 296 382 98 304 217 553 303 571 349 768 598 671 599 184 616 438 752 140 139 37 513 648 149 58 519 509 184 192 37 30 23 409 265 10 95 796 345 194 307 494 114 280 58 38 25 17 21 38 148

Area (ha) METROPOLITAN AREA 158,086 BUILT-UP AREA 54,917 Cairo 31,121 Agglomerate Giza-Qalybiyya 23,796 Out of the built-up area 103,169 al-Tibbn 2,174 Hilwn 3,701 15 Mayu 1,258 al-Ma'd 565 Misr al-Qadma 1,118 al-Sayyda Zaynab 460 al-Khalfa 949 'Abdn 165 al-Msk 75 Qasr al-Nl 131 Blq 247 al-Izbkiyya 140 al-Darb al-Ahmar 143 al-Gamliyya 195 Bb al-Sha'riyya 105 al-Dhhir 192 al-Sharbiyya 322 Shubra 140 Rd al-Farag 265 al-Shil 541 al-Wyl 489 Had'iq al-Qubba 494 al-Zaytn 739 al-Matariyya 663 Madnat Nasr 3,339 Misr al-Gadda 868 al-Nuzha 4,245 'Ain Shams 914 al-Zwyat al-Hamr' 472 al-Salm 2,395 al-Zamlik 266 Minsht Nsir 324 al-Bastn 1,310 al-Marg 1,365 Tura 350 al-Khnka * 12,577 al-Qantir al- Khayriyya * 9,879 Shibn al-Qantir * 14,517 Shubr al-Khaym 1 1,020 Shubr al-Khaym 2 1,714 Qalyb madna 9,392 Qalyb markaz * 2,770 Imbba qism 657 al-'Agza 505 al-Doqqi 484 al-Giza qism 778 Blq al-Dakrr 918 al-Ahrm 1,754 al-'Umrniyya 1,923 6 uctubar * 0 al-Hawmdiyya 1,981 al-Gza markaz * 5,758 al-Badrashayn * 11,440 al-Saf * 13,537 Imbba markaz * 27,670 Awsm * 5,022 al-Warq * 2,670 * markaz - agglomerate

SOURCE : EGIPTE (CEDEJ) and Census of Egypt.

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the meantime, while these cities lost some of their inhabitants, the villages and towns located on their peripheries grew rapidly. Mahalla al-Kubra, the fourth largest city in Egypt, had a growth rate of less than 1 per cent between 1986-96, but the growth rate in the surrounding villages was over 2 per cent per year (see Table 2). Similar patterns prevail in Tanta, Zaqaziq and the city of Dumyat, which experienced a negative (-1.2 per cent) growth rate. Only a few large regional cities in Upper Egypt, such as
Table 2: Secondary Cities (excluding Cairo and Alexandria)
1966 1976 1986 1996 Population growth rate city 1976-86 1986-96 2.13 1.74 2.04 2.69 1.89 2.47 2.79 2.80 1.13 2.04 2.60 2.50 2.57 2.55 2.68 2.60 0.93 0.98 1.53 2.32 0.90 2.05 1.88 1.42 1.07 1.18 1.23 3.63 2.52 1.92 2.34 1.81 Population growth rate rural surroundings 1976-86 1986-96 2.41 2.68 2.38 2.80 2.95 3.28 2.79 2.80 1.13 2.94 2.88 2.90 2.42 2.48 2.73 2.69 2.25 2.17 2.22 2.49 2.35 2.69 1.88 1.97 1.07 2.48 4.02 2.62 2.47 1.79 2.15 2.31

Rank Secondary city

City population (thousands) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Mahalla al-Kubr Tanta Mansr Asyt Zaqzq Faiyym Kafr al-Dawwr Aswn Damanhr Miny Ban Suwf Qin Shg Shibn al-Km Banh Mean 191 230 195 150 150 134 109 125 146 113 90 69 75 81 64 292 283 259 209 203 167 146 145 171 146 118 94 103 103 89 361 337 318 273 244 213 193 191 191 179 152 120 133 132 116 160 cities 395 371 370 343 267 261 232 220 212 201 172 171 170 160 146

SOURCE: CAPMAS, General Census of Population, Housing and Economic Activities, 1966, 1976, 1986, Cairo.

Suhag and Qina, have had higher or equivalent rates of growth over these ten years. In this region, population diffusion into the smaller communities has been delayed and the main cities have continued to attract migrants; moreover, a large number of small towns (such as Qus, Farshut, Luxur and Nagah Hamadi) are able to compete with them in their economic activities. In short, since the 1970s, Egypt has experienced a deconcentration of population at both the metropolitan and national levels. Urbanization has started to diffuse throughout the country and the rural exodus appears to belong to the distant past. Already in 1986 some 80 per cent of migrants recorded in the cities came not from the countryside but from other urban centres. In general, the share of inter-provincial migrants, that is, people born outside a given province, decreased from 11 per cent in 1960 to 7.5 per cent in 1986. Thus, permanent population movement paved the way for an increasingly circular migration pattern.

III. EXPLAINING THE CHANGE

HOW DO WE explain this new pattern? Many people continue to move from one place to another but the pattern of population movement seems to have shifted in the last 20 years. The large cities, notably Cairo, have ceased to attract a large proportion of the migratory population. Greater
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6. A technical note on the size of greater Cairo is necessary. In 1986, Cairo agglomeration covered 260 square kilometres with a further 19 square kilometres for its surrounding urban villages. In 1994, the figures were 320 square kilometres and 15 square kilometres, respectively. The decrease in urban village area is due to the incorporation of some urban villages into the agglomeration (Population Census, 1998). If we link demographic data and physical dynamics within the framework of the limits of the administrative units, we get an extended Cairo agglomeration of 540 square kilometres, equivalent to one-third of the inhabited space of the greater Cairo region. The actual urban spaces built in the form of new cities and

URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT Map 3:

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Greater Cairo Region; Population Change

Map 3: Greater Cairo Region; Population between 1976 and Change 1986 between 1976 and 1986

Variation of population

suburbs on the outskirts of the eastern and western deserts are approximately equivalent to the Cairo agglomeration area but form only 1.4 per cent of the greater Cairo region. The official size of the region is 2,900 square kilometres.

+270,000 or more +135,000 to 269,999 +27,000 to 134,999 -27,000 to 134,999 -135,000 to 269,999 -270,000 or more

7. These figures include rent-controlled, free-market housing as well as flats in uninhabitable condition. See CAPMAS (1996), General Census of Population, Housing and Economic Activities, Cairo, first results.

Cairo, for example, now constitutes 17 per cent of the total population, the same proportion as in 1966.(6) The prime reason for this is an apparent saturation in the big cities for accommodating the low-income (or even very affluent) groups. The current urban conditions have caused many inhabitants to seek residence outside major urban centres. While large cities still provide opportunities for employment, the high price of land, population densities and the shortage of affordable accommodation, associated with the partially free-market cost of housing, force many newcomers as well as long-term residents to think better of staying in the city. Indeed, the existence, by 1996, of some 750,000 vacant apartments (17 per cent of the total) in Cairo has done little to halt this process of out-migration.(7) Essentially, home-seekers lack access to rent-controlled accommoDownloaded from eau.sagepub.com at TU Berlin on September 1, 2011

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Variations in Population Growth Rates for

Map 4: Variations in Population Growth Rates for Official Cities in Egypt, 1986-1996 Official Cities in Egypt, 1986-96

dation even though these flats might not actually be occupied. The very low (controlled) rents encourage holders to retain these homes even if they do not occupy them. Beyond that, the unaffordable prices of newly built formal housing exclude the low-income groups from the housing market. Thus, there remains no other option for young people, in particular those intending to start a family, but to seek housing in the informal market. Hence, they venture out to join the outsiders who inhabit the large ashwaiyyat, the informal agglomerations surrounding metropolitan areas, some of which already accommodate groups of indigenous populations such as villagers or tribal people. Many of the inhabitants of these communities still depend on job
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opportunities within metropolitan areas, to which they commute daily. However, their residential communities are more than simply functional dormitories. Rather, they are the locus for family, networks of friends and recreation as well as job opportunities. In addition, these informal agglomerations perform a significant function in the national economy. They accommodate cheap waged labour subsidized by low-cost housing and provide basic necessities such as affordable land and rents, and food, in particular agricultural products. They offer the inhabitants the possibility of maintaining strong kinship networks, and security and protecTable 3: Settlements and Population Distribution in Egypt, 1947-1996

Distribution of settlements by type 1947 Urban agglomeration Cities Agglomeration of villages Urban villages with more than 10,000 inhabitants Urban villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants Distribution, in percentages, of Egyptian population Urban agglomeration Cities Agglomeration of villages Urban villages with more than 10,000 inhabitants Urban villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants Egypt Urban Egypt 25.9 4.4 2.7 3.2 63.8 100.0 36.2 31.8 4.6 2.9 4.6 56.1 100.0 43.9 34.3 5.1 3.2 5.7 51.7 100.0 48.3 36.4 5.6 3.5 8.0 46.5 100.0 53.5 38.4 5.9 5.7 12.5 37.5 100.0 62.5 36.9 6.2 6.2 17.5 33.2 100.0 66.8 38 45 20 42 5,360 1960 38 58 43 85 5,281 1966 38 68 53 122 5,224 1976 38 76 65 205 5,121 1986 38 84 112 400 4,871 1996 39 90 130 628 4,618

8. Calculated by EGIPTE, CEDEJ, Cairo, 1998.

9. Datt, G, D Jolitte and M Sharma (1997), An Analysis of Household Survey Data for 1997, International Food Policy Research Institute, Food Security Research Project.

tion. Nevertheless, the existence of conflict and competition between various groups in these neighbourhoods, for example, between old timers and newcomers, outsiders and insiders, and owners and renters should not be overlooked. At any rate, such spatial arrangements and community construction owe much to the peculiar Egyptian spatial form its density and the proximity of communities to each other. In 1996, on average, there were 1,600 people per square kilometre, the same density as in the New York metropolitan area, and local units had an average of 4,500 inhabitants.(8) However, beyond density and proximity, a significant factor has been the revolution in informal transportation, the mushrooming of service microbuses which have reduced temporal and spatial distances and led to an interconnected system of cities and villages. The number of microbuses in Cairo jumped from 14,000 in 1990 to 60,000 in 1995. At the cost of traffic congestion and air pollution, the increase in informal transportation has generated the kind of time-space convergence that characterized early twentieth century Egypt, which had one of the oldest train networks in the world. With such transportation, you are never far from the city. As a 1997 national household survey indicates, 91 per cent of Egyptian households are less than half an hour from a permanent bazaar and 74 per cent from ad hoc markets.(9)
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IV. URBAN VILLAGES AND AGRO-TOWNS?

IN ADDITION TO the agglomerations on the fringes of the big cities, the last 20 years or so have also witnessed the dramatic spread of urban villages(with 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants) across the Egyptian countryside. Whilst in 1986, there were only 400 agglomerations with more than 10,000 people, by 1996 Egypt had about 628 such villages, totalling 17.5 per cent of the countrys total population (see Table 3). The arbitrary and restrictive official definition of urban in mere administrative terms (as markaz) conceals an important trend of urbanization. Under the official Egyptian definition, urban is defined in terms of its administrative role and rural is residential. According to such a definition, there are only about 200 cities in Egypt, a clear underestimation. Indeed, if Egypt adopted the Indian definition of urban (communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants), around 80 per cent of Egyptians would be urbanites or, following the definition used in the Philippines, 100 per cent would be living in cities.(10) The Egyptian official definition may be functional for administrative purposes but it hides an alternative process of urbanization, namely, that which concerns mostly small towns and the struggling urban villages with a population of 10,000 or more. Perhaps this pattern of unrecognized urbanism in Egypt expresses Jamal Hamdans idea that urbanism (umran) begins in the village.(11) In-migration has contributed a great deal to the growth of urban villages. With an average population of 15,000, these villages begin to acquire urban characteristics such as greater social distance and anonymity among their inhabitants, a more extensive exchange of goods and services, the division of labour and occupational diversity. In such urban villages, occupations are no longer limited to the traditional barbers, shepherds or butchers but include many modern occupations such as teachers, mechanics, drivers, lawyers, doctors, white collar workers, shopkeepers, employees of day-care centres and government officials. One way of showing how the countryside is being urbanized is to look at the significant changes in the style of housing. For example, in 1996 there were as many apartment buildings being constructed in rural areas as in the cities, and the number built in rural areas was double that of ten years earlier. The construction of flats (as opposed to typically rural dwellings) signifies a convergence in the living conditions between urban and rural areas. In addition, modern transportation, television and new consumption patterns have enabled these villages to develop some aspects of urban life. The more efficient availability of electricity, a significant factor contributing to a more modern way of life, has resulted from the operation of a high dam as well as the unique concentration (in proximity and density) of village communities along the Nile Valley (see Map 4). The vast majority of rural households (86 per cent) enjoy electricity and well over half of them (57 per cent) have access to running water (to their house plot). The agglomeration process of this type of community has a momentum which tends to reproduce the process. As more people gather in these communities, diversification increases and new activities and occupations are created which, in turn, will attract more outsiders. Once businesses grow, there will be a need for coffee houses, restaurants and guest houses to accommodate business people and drivers, and travelers, in turn, create new non-agricultural job opportunities. The growing deregulation of agriculture, moreover, is likely to
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10. See Moriconi, F (1995), Geopolis mesure lurbanisation du monde, Paris. 11. See Hamdan, Jamal (1980-84), Shakhsiyat misr (Egypts Character), Alam alKutub, Cairo (four volumes).

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12. The term used by Hopkins, Nicholas and Kirsten Westergaard (editors) (1998), Directions of Change in Rural Egypt, American University in Cairo Press, page 2. 13. This urbanizing character of rural Egypt is clear from a few case studies which have appeared in recent years. In El-Karanshawys study, for instance, proximity to towns seems to play a significant part in the integration of villages into urban economy and society, notwithstanding the dominance of agriculture. See El-Karanshawy, Samer (1997), Class, family and power in an Egyptian village in Cairo Papers in Social Science Vol 20, No 1, Spring; also Dundon, Tom (1998), AMahallat al-Ruh: understanding physical and social form in a suburban village, unpublished paper, American University in Cairo; and Hopkins, Nicholas (1998), Social Response to Environmental Change and Pollution in Egypt, IDRC report, Cairo, which contains useful data on the village of Akhbaz in the Egyptian delta region.

contribute to the growth of urban villages. A new class of well-to-do villagers, who have benefited from investments in real estate and from construction and cash-cropping, may develop an urban lifestyle, helped by the current abundance and availability of modern consumer goods. To be able to consume new products, it is no longer necessary to be located in large city centres (for example, Cairo or Alexandria); these commodities can be brought even to the villages. We do not intend to present these communities as fully-fledged urban entities since, in this context the term urban defined in terms of diversity, contains many contradictions. In large part, these agglomerations are still dominated by agricultural activities, a feature which defines them, in the words of some experts, as agro-towns(12) and, although diversity is growing, it is still limited. Conventional urban services (such as paved roads, piped water, garbage collection and sewer systems) are largely absent and the illiteracy rate, especially among women, is quite high. However, it must be noted that urbanization of the countryside should be seen not as a uniform spread of urbanity in the hinterland but, rather, as a new trend of polarization at the level of small cities and large villages, or urban villages.(13) Nevertheless, this slow but creeping urbanity represents a significant shift in Egyptian demography and political economy. First, it signifies and contributes to a decline in the pattern of rural-urban migration. Second, it reflects the development of more dynamic communities characterized by increasing mobility, increased commodification and exchange, and a greater availability of consumer goods. Third, a new pattern of social stratification is emerging, where status and influence result not only from family and wealth but also from modern occupations, education and access to new products. Finally, it tends to subvert the rural-urban dichotomy, pointing towards a more hybrid demographic reality. Thus, Egypt at the end of the twentieth century is experiencing a trend in urbanization outside the administrative definition of cities, a sort of spontaneous urbanization of agglomerations on the periphery of the large cities, in larger villages and in small towns.

V. DISCOURSE OF INFORMALITY AND POLITICS

THIS NEW PATTERN of diffuse urbanization raises some important issues regarding assumptions about the urbanization process, in particular about the informal cities and their assumed association with certain social and political problems. To begin with, it challenges the classic premise which attributes current urbanization in Egypt to a supposed massive rural-urban migration and the current urban problems to the influx of fallahin to cities. On the other hand, this pattern points to a shift from a universal, state managed and planned urbanization to a more private and spontaneous one. This post-metropolitanization should be seen as a new trend in, and a challenge to, Egyptian political economy at the end of the twentieth century. Here, post-metropolitanization does not mean a reduction in the economic power of metropolitan Cairo. Rather, it signifies a diffusion of urbanity over a vast area (through the growth and interlinkages of agrotowns, urban villages and new industrial towns) beyond, but close to, greater Cairo, with the latter retaining its dominance. It is this contradiction between massive urban diffusion on the one hand and economic and
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social polarization on the other that characterizes current Egyptian postmetropolitanization. This unplanned urbanization in Egypt highlights not only a concentration of population but also the needs, concerns and possible urban-type conflicts which would directly involve the state. It is not, therefore, surprising that the state refuses to recognize these agglomerations as urban, since doing so would oblige it to make expensive urban provisions such as sewerage, paved roads and running water. Furthermore, changing the status of a village might put certain obligations upon the residents (for example, paying tax) and reduce the power of the local lites. It also becomes evident that the belief that the ruralization of the main
Map 5: Where Children are Concentrated: The Distribution of Inhabitants under 15 years of Age within the Greater Cairo Region in 1996

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14. A random sample of the residents of Dar-Essalam, an informal community in Cairo, reveals the tremendous diversity of occupations. After the housewives group (with 37 per cent), white collar workers constituted the largest group (over 14 per cent) see reference 12.

15. For an elaboration of this discussion, see Bayat, Asef (1997), Un-civil society: the politics of the informal people, Third World Quarterly Vol 18, No 1.

cities is the result of an influx of peasants is rather overstated. In fact, over 80 per cent of the population of Cairo and 86 per cent of that of Alexandria were born there. Of the remaining migrants (over 80 per cent of them) the overwhelmingly majority come from other cities and not from the countryside. Indeed, the strict official definition of what constitutes an urban unit and the invention of the concept of ashwaiyyat as a political category tend to produce new spatial divisions which exclude many citizens from urban participation. The ashwaiyyat are perceived as abnormal places where, in modern conventional wisdom, the non-modern and thus non-urban people, that is, the villagers, the traditionalists, the non-conformists and the unintegrated live. It is indeed puzzling that over 20 per cent of all Egypts and half of greater Cairos populations, who reside in the ashwaiyyat, are considered outsiders, living in abnormal conditions. But what is a normal city? It is viewed primarily as a modern entity, that is, one in which the buildings, streets, means of communication and people (their behaviour, clothes, jobs and lifestyles) are somehow similar to those of the lites. Thus, those neighbourhoods where buildings have no permits, where streets have no formal names, where men wear the traditional galabia, where women sit and socialize in front of their homes in the alleyways and where adults are largely active in the informal economy are considered as non-modern and thus abnormal. Moreover, these settlements are not even thought of as part of the modern city since their inhabitants, mainly migrants, are seen to have, in effect, ruralized their settlements. This simple picture obscures the fact that the populations of informal settlements are involved in the complex urban economy and division of labour, and constitute one significant component of the diversified whole which is the city. In the old sociological tradition, what defines urban is primarily the organic ensemble in a particular space, with a variety of lifestyles and economic activities, and those of the ashwaiyyat are one significant component.(14) It is true that many of the inhabitants in the informal communities pursue an informal life. That is, they tend to function as much as possible outside the boundaries of the state and the modern bureaucratic institutions. They wish to exert some degree of autonomy in their working and cultural lives, basing their relationships on reciprocity, trust and negotiation rather than on the modern notions of individual self-interest, fixed rules and contracts. Thus, they might opt for self-employment or resort to informal dispute resolution rather than report to the police; or they might be married by a local sheikh rather than at government offices; or borrow money from informal credit associations rather than the banks. This is the case not because these people are essentially non- or antimodern but because their conditions of existence force them to seek an informal way of life. Modernity is a costly condition. It is expensive and requires a capacity to conform to types of behaviour (adherence to strict discipline of time, space, contract and so on) which most poor people simply cannot afford. Thus, while these people wish to watch colour television and enjoy clean tap water, they are wary of paying their bills or going to work at a specified time.(15) The activities of Islamist militants in Imbaba, an informal community in Cairo, and the subsequent massive intervention by security forces in the early 1990s have reinforced the image of ashwaiyyat as Hobbesian centres of lawlessness, extremism, crime and poverty. These may indeed
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FEEDBACK Map 6: The Distribution of Population with Education in 1996

be present in the poor squatter areas. However, this type of behaviour is not the result of inhabitants cultural essentials, since ashwaiyyat, despite their appearance, consist of heterogeneous occupational and cultural universes. Although stigmatized as rural, they not only receive migrants from urban core areas but also, more importantly, comprise Cairos youth (20-25 year-olds) and newly married couples the future of Cairo (see Maps 5 and 6). The ashwaiyyat are not simply exclusive poverty belts but the home of many middle-class urbanites, professionals and civil servants. What perhaps may breed lawlessness is not the cultural essentials of residents but, rather, the consequences of their being perceived as outsiders and of the density and lack of spatial clarity of the communities. An outsider community, even if located in the heart of a city, by definition lacks street names, house numbers, maps, a police presence, paved roads for police cars and, thus, state control.
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16. This discussion is based on Bayat, Asef (1999), Detotalizing the historiography of the Islamist movements: the urban poor and the Islamist politics, unpublished paper presented at the workshop on Alternative History, La Paz, Bolivia, May 17-18, 1999.

17. For Al-Rihab private city, see Business Monthly, Cairo, June 1997, pages 4144.

18. Farag, Fatemah (1998), The demolition crew in Al-Ahram Weekly, February 6-11, page 15.

The Islamist violence, which is attributed directly to informal cities social ecology, is more complex than simply being a phenomenon of poverty and ignorance. The militants (from al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and ElJahad) are mostly young, educated individuals, many of whom live in the ashwaiyyat because of the high costs of housing in Cairo which exclude and marginalize many, even middle-class, families. Sociologically, these young, educated people are different from the cultural type portrayed by some academics and planners, and there is little empirical evidence to suggest that they share the features that characterize Oscar Lewis s culture of poverty, that is, lawlessness, lack of ambition, fatalism, lack of respect for authority and a fading adherence to family relations and the like.(16) This tendency to see informality and the ashwaii way of life as producing outsiders has been highlighted by a shift in emphasis from public to private spatial development. This is exemplified by the new, highly exclusive townships exhibiting global styles of urban planning. Thus, if anything is abnormal, it is not the ashwaiyyat (which form half of greater Cairo) but, rather, these recently emerging opulent private cities with lavish properties equipped with swimming pools and athletic facilities and names such as Al-Rihab, New Cairo, Mena Garden City, Dream Land, Utopia and Beverley Hills.(17) This trend points to the transition of Cairo from a European model of a compact city such as London to the American pattern of vast diffused spatial development such as Los Angeles where identity, history, memory and symbolism (e.g. the city centre) are lost to the diversified sub-centres of the vast urban plain. Many factors have led to the emergence of this new urbanity. Cairos super-rich are escaping from high densities, traffic congestion, air and noise pollution, and spatial constraints which are transforming even the upmarket districts. Casual observation would reveal how rapidly the old, spacious villas in the Zamalek and Maadi suburbs of Cairo are being demolished and turned into densely built apartment high-rises.(18) It is no longer Zamalek and Maadi which are the status symbols but, rather, these new private cities. New money (from lucrative private businesses), more efficient means of private transport and communication, and the new ring roads around the city have all enabled the rich to pursue this historic exodus. Yet, the very discourse of the ashwaiyyat as a political spectacle has also contributed to the emergence of these private cities whose inhabitants can keep their distance from the sight and severity of poverty and from the violence and political Islam which is seemingly permeating their old localities. This duality of peripheral informalization on the one hand and planned exclusive suburbanization on the other is a stark manifestation of the urban polarization and social cleavage present in Egyptian society today. Indeed, Egyptian urbanism is characterized by closure or the surrounding-wall paradigm it is not a shared space, rather, it produces outsiders.

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