G.R. No.

185286

August 18, 2010

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray. In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life. At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 897612 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-0144854.3 First, we unfurl the facts. Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. 4 Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university. Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant. On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of

respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well. In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled. In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room. Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent. Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his children. Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus: Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status. Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves. The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC. The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties. The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City. Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses. SO ORDERED.6 Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7 Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER. IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT. V THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. VI THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. VII THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE. VIII THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8 Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code. In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus: After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition. Article 36 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization." and Art. 68 of the same Code provides: "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children. Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis. xxxx Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological

condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent. The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings. xxxx The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them. The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa. Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years. Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain. 9 In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise: On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features. Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent]. Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself. xxxx [I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions. Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. xxxx In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner]. xxxx As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x. xxxx

What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.10 After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition. Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained: The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12 As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit: 1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE [Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values ( sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family. Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother ( sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices ( sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction ( sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons. Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings ( sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments ( sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and

reason, and less of how she feels ( sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets ( sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic). On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood ( sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials ( sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic). His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic). As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake. His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected. For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so. Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is

characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego. The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic). It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)13 2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him. When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy. xxxx Interpretation of Psychological Data A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning xxxx B. Vocational Preference xxxx C. Socio Emotional Functioning

xxxx In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low selfesteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed. There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others. Diagnostic Impression Axis I : Drug Dependence Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder [Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder] Axis III : None Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems: Severe He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships. Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied) 14 3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation. Diagnosis for [petitioner]: Axis I Partner Relational Problem Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features Axis III No diagnosis Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity) Severity: 4-severe Diagnosis for [respondent] Axis I Partner Relational Problem Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features Axis III No diagnosis Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife) Severity: 4 (severe) xxxx One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model. However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.

[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own. [Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time. From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)15 Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent. We do not agree with the CA. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist. For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sisterin-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments. The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders: A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas: (1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events) (2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response) (3) interpersonal functioning (4) impulse control B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations. C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood. E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder. F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder: A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following: (1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults (5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations (7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another B. The individual is at least 18 years. C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years. D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode. 20 Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts. The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable. The appellate court is mistaken. A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable. Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:23 [T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the
all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations. It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or

psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity. On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals 27 must be independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus: It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x. Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality. xxxx The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Article 68 of the Family Code provides: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features: Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence. x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28 In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon: A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the

petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29
1avvphi1

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30 x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168852

September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.* DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The factual background of the case: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 8 otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO. On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition 11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence. On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they

were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the wellknown rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13 On 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process. On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262. On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17 Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case. On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, March

considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262. The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus: SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied) Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied) Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In People v. Li Wai Cheung, 19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law. Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein. With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23 It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children . - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: xxx (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, thatalarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus: SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally orthrough another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus: SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied) It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children. Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. 25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits. Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182835

April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. The Indictment The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads: That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1 The Facts and the Case The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B). 3 After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: " Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4 Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!" Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan. For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him. Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station. Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the senders number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5 Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed. After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari. The Issues Presented The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The subordinate issues are: 1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262; 2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262; 3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and 4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case. The Courts Rulings Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. xxxx Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: xxxx h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: xxxx 5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus: (e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.) Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her." But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couples relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9 R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous. 10 Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them. But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them. Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them. 11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.
1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference. Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. 12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender. Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such

ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14 Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15 In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008. SO ORDERED.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

April 23, 2010

FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, and COURT STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C. JAMORA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 SYLVIA SANTOS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: These consolidated cases1 stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the respondent sought reconsideration. The immediately preceding case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc. A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated that he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition claiming the sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo (Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon Francisco Ocampo on December 12, 2006 and the case was set for hearing the following day, December 13, 2006. During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the country without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Since then, Milan exercised visitation rights over the minors and communicated with them through their cellular phones. Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then served written interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City. In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and education.

Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment. Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged into the home of Francisco Ocampos parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants therein. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support of P50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him. Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex parte motion to recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007. The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons was served on therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These, coupled with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against her. In her Comment,2 respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No. M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure Order was issued on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service by the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was attempted to be served twice by the Process Server on December 11, 2006, a Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there. On December 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to by the Process Server. Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court calendar was full, nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judge professed that she did not have such intention. The nature of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate action by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was unsuccessful. Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he could have complained during the hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4) months after the fact. At any rate, the scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006 did not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the same day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss) on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was denied and the TPO was issued on the same day. Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal with the right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampos contention in his Answer that he was not contesting his wifes claim that the subject minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.

Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the implementation of the TPO , as the law itself mandates that the court order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4, 2007, and it was received by Milan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer action on Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it would have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that the Petition was filed as early as November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion to Dismiss . In fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Petitioner's Application for a Permanent Protection Order, etc.), claiming that Francisco Ocampo's motion to dismiss was purely dilatory. As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judge maintained that she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would have been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability. Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriffs Report and handwritten notation on the lower portion of the Order dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad Artemio S. Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur A. Curno of the Baguio City Police, stated that respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the custody of subject minors to the petitioner. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, the subject minors themselves belied the claims of Francisco Ocampo regarding the alleged arbitrary manner the TPO was served by the sheriff. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any complaint from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO was served. It was only in the present administrative complaint that the same was raised, leading to the inference that Francisco Ocampos claims were concocted. Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors may not have been in danger, but were safe in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo. The court arrived at a preliminary determination that Milan, being the biological mother and the subject minors being her illegitimate children, was entitled to custody over them. Moreover, Milan may have been granted and was exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the duration thereof, as stated in the Order dated December 13, 2006, was only until the court resolved complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with finality on April 3, 2007. Further, there is a whale of a difference between exercise of visitation rights and custody. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, subject minors, who were over seven years old, declared that they preferred to stay with their mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise confirmed the physical violence committed by complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan Ocampo. According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampos prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by the court on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as early as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period within which to file it before issuing the TPO. Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in favor of Milan alone as the legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an Order dated April 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her Petitionwas for an award of monthly support of not less than P150,000.00, but the court awarded only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate, the support granted by the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to give support as alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely because the court was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a TPO. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already held in abeyance in the Order dated May 2, 2007. Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and the legal separation case do not have any bearing on SP No. M-6375. She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of action taken by the counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24, 2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007 with Ex

Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24, 2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that from all appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No. M-6375. Three, on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really have any genuine administrative cause of action against her. As things turned out, all that complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was their declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody case. In a Resolution3 dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the Memorandum of Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock as a complaint for gross ignorance and gross misconduct against Judge Arcaya-Chua, directed respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from receipt of notice, and suspended respondent Judge pending resolution of the administrative case. It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting, among others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office of Chang Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor. Per the sheriff's return dated May 8, 2007, the Order was not fully implemented insofar as the custody of the subject minor was directed to be turned over to Chang Tan. This development irked Chang Tan, resulting in a heated argument between Chang Tan and the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Branch 144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be issued or that the sheriff be permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to search for the child and then bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua issued an order authorizing the sheriff "to enter the open premises where subject minor may be found for the purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is admonished to maintain peace and order in the conduct thereof." According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing the TPO . Her speedy issuance of the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144. OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch 143, Makati City issued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment for hearing on May 9, 2007 . In view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. On April 20, 2007, respondent, as pairing judge, cancelled the previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-scheduled the hearing to April 23, 2007, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly suspicious in respondents actuation was that there was really no urgency in the application for a writ of preliminary attachment. In her Comment4 dated June 9, 2007, respondent Judge explained that SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was re-raffled to her branch on April 30, 2007, and the records of the case were transmitted to her on the same day. Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition for custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The

complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez. Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother, an exception is when the court orders otherwise. The mother may be divested of her parental authority over her illegitimate child when the court finds compelling reasons to do so . In all cases involving a child, his best interest is of paramount consideration. The court awarded provisional custody over the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but effective for a period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the allegations in the pleadings and the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was already more than seven years old at the time the Order dated May 7, 2007 was issued, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth. Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7, 2007 was not speedily issued. As was her standard operating procedure with respect to newly raffled and re-raffled cases, she immediately studied the records of SP No. M-6373. Even before Chang Tan's Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had already arrived at a preliminary determination that the issuance of a Provisional Order and a TPO was warranted. She also studied Chang Tan's Application on the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the following day, a Saturday, also in her office. She was then planning to avail of her forfeitable leave of absence of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the previous year. To expedite the resolution of motions and preparation of decisions, and to avoid being saddled with much work on her return from her leave, she had been reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No. M-6373 was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as well. Her study of SP No. M-6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007, which culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost lunchtime of the same day. Granting that the one week period in which she issued the May 7, 2007 Order may be considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken against her as she was really a fast worker. She was accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court Attorney for 13 years. Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to implement the Order dated May 7, 2007 at once, because the courts are so mandated to cause the immediate implementation of the TPO under Section 15, R.A. No. 9262. As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of Branch 144, respondent Judge surmised that the same could be merely concocted, as it was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it really transpired. Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007, she gave a directive holding in abeyance further implementation of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she really received money or anything from Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would have ensured complete implementation of the Order dated May 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance. Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and her counsel guilty of the indirect contempt charge against them if it were really true that she received money from Chang Tan. Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order in her branch, she and her family would not have found themselves in such state of financial drain after she had been preventively suspended. As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Moreno, respondent Judge narrated that an Ex Parte Motion for Immediate Resolution of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to her sala being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143. Immediately after reading the motion, she inquired from the Clerk of Court of Branch 143 about the alleged leave of absence of therein Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned that Judge Galapate-Laguilles indeed left for the United States on April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on Intellectual Property and would be back on May 7, 2007. She likewise gathered information from the same Branch Clerk of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad was the reason behind the Application's setting on May 9, 2007, not because the Presiding Judge did not see any urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge also lacked ample time to act thereon since she had a previously scheduled leave of absence. Thus, she determined from the allegations in the ex parte Motion and the Complaint the urgency to act on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. She also took into account the following: (1) the circumstance of prolonged absence of the Presiding Judge of Branch 143; (2) the reason for the setting on May 9,

2007; and (3) the mandatory wordings of Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, i.e., "the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all cases thereat as acting judge therein." Respondent Judge explained that she granted the Application because the allegations in the complaint were adequately supported by documentary and testimonial evidence. She received the records of the RCBC Case on April 20, 2007, a Friday, and as was her standard practice, immediately studied them. She continued her study of the records, and the records of other cases, on April 21, 2007, a Saturday, and on April 23, 2007, a Monday, which culminated in the preparation of the Order on the same day. In her Supplemental Comment5 dated June 22, 2007, respondent Judge added that the manner by which the incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC cases were resolved must not be taken in isolation, but in relation to the manner all incidents were resolved and all decisions and orders were rendered in her sala, such that she resolved all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of alleged irregularities committed by respondent. In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock submitted for the Courts consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC of Makati City. The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24-hour basis. Before the audit team began its audit on May 15, 2007, the members made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora and the court personnel present that actions on the records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no records should be brought outside the court until after the audit. At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap, noticed Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag from a trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was surrendered to the audit team and was found to contain copies of marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua numbering to hundreds. When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents upon respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could not offer any explanation why he chose to dispose of the documents that morning despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed that there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the room where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office. The bags, when retrieved, turned out to contain more copies of marriage certificates. Jamora explained to the audit team that she was aware of the copies of marriage certificates being kept inside their room. However, she alleged that she had no control over them, because matters pertaining to solemnization of marriages were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua. In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the total amount of Five Hundred FortyTwo Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases.6 In a Resolution7 dated September 16, 2008, the Court resolved to consider the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against respondent Judge; require respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to comment on the Memorandum within 10 days from notice thereof; and refer A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630RTJ and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her Affidavit, 8 in lieu of Comment, on the OCA Memorandum dated August 10, 2007. Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr. to dispose of the copies of marriage certificates

In regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recounted that in the second week of April 2007, she, with the help of Noel Umipig (a City Hall employee detailed to her sala), started to pack her personal belongings in anticipation of the impending transfer of her sala from the Gusali ng Katarunganto the Makati City Hall. She asked Umipig to discard her piles of yellowish scratch papers. Umipig put her scratch papers inside big plastic bags and then tied the bags. They also emptied the steel cabinet in her chambers which contained, among other things, the files of marriage certificates, as well as official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees. She previously bundled the said marriage certificates according to month and year of solemnization of the weddings, improvising paper bundles for the purpose. Umipig then put all the marriage certificates inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and placed them in the small room that was between her chambers and the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it would be easy to add or get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home as he was then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him the bags of scratch papers out of her chambers to be thrown away. The following morning, she noticed that there were red patches on the face and arms of Umipig so she did not ask him anymore for help. She removed the official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped them with approximately six paper bundles then placed them inside the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates. In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that the transfer to the Makati City Hall would not push through yet because the furnitures were not complete and portions of the holding room were still being painted. She was told to just standby and to wait for an update about the schedule of transfer. With that advice, she did not find it necessary to return the files of marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees inside the steel cabinet. About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that the bags of garbage had accumulated, she reminded Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away. On May 15, 2007, she was placed under preventive suspension. On May 18, 2007, Indicio told her, through telephone, that he was caught the previous day throwing marriage certificates that were placed in plastic bags. He explained that he thought those bags contained the garbage that she asked him to throw away the previous week. She was then outraged by the news and scolded Indicio, telling him that under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage certificates being the solemnizing officer. In fact, Indicio stated in his affidavit that her specific instruction was "to dispose all the garbage which were stocked" in her sala and "it just turned out that what the plastic bag contained were copies of marriage contracts." Thus, Indicio simply mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees to be the garbage that she instructed him the previous week to throw away. Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not have ordered Indicio to dispose of the copies of the marriage certificates, citing the haphazard manner in which Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that she had nothing to hide and that she would gain nothing by the disposal thereof. Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of payment of the marriage solemnization fees were the official receipts. She categorically stated that all the official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees were inside the plastic bags, together with the marriage certificates. She stressed that she could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, because it is of public knowledge that she had been solemnizing a big number of weddings per day, aside from the fact that she had solemnized weddings of several celebrities, which also included celebrities as sponsors; thus, attracting the attention of many court employees. She was also aware of the consequences of solemnizing a marriage without the solemnization fee so she was very meticulous when it came to checking, among other things, whether there was an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also knew that the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow the registration of a marriage certificate if there was no accompanying official receipt of payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the pervading financial crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money without demanding an official receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained about the absence of the official receipt of the marriage solemnization fee. Further, the Audit Team found from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all the marriage certificates of the weddings that she solemnized were duly registered therein. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the OCC of the MeTC and RTC adopted a wrong and unreliable procedure in verifying from their records whether there was payment of the marriage solemnization fees, simply because most of the dates of the wedding indicated in the marriage certificates were not the

same as the dates indicated in the official receipts. She explained that a couple would often pay the solemnization fee at a certain date, but the solemnization of the wedding would take place on another date for one reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court checked the dates from the copies of their official receipts on file, the dates did not reflect payment of the fees, because payments were made on dates different from the wedding dates. Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases were typed by her staff, namely: Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and Criminal-in-Charge Mary Jane Rafael. As regards the number of marriages solemnized, they would inquire from her and she would then give them the figure as stated in her own logbook. When the Reports were turned over to her for signature, she would first verify the entries from her own logbook before affixing her signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned that the Courts copy of the Reports contained incorrect figures and was different from that which she signed. She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the correct number of marriages in the Monthly Reports, because apart from the fact that she was very meticulous in the accuracy of the entries, she had nothing to gain by not reflecting the correct figures of solemnized marriages. She believed that the blank and incorrect figures appearing in the number of marriages solemnized in the Monthly Reports from January 2004 to March 2007 were the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably tampered the same, because of a serious grudge against her. She added that it was also Umipig who transferred the plastic bags of marriage certificates and official receipts from the small room to the stenographer's room in an attempt to expose the big number of weddings that she had solemnized, which, through his machinations, were not reflected in the Monthly Reports. Re: Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of Circular No. 9-989 Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages inside her chambers or courtroom, and as proof thereof, she pointed to the entry in the marriage certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On few occasions, she had also solemnized weddings in a house or place designated by both contracting parties, but not without the required affidavit of request. She explained that she was able to solemnize many weddings per day, because the rites took only about 10 minutes and involved a maximum of eight couples per batch. She stressed that neither did she demand nor receive money for solemnization of marriages, and only the official receipts of the solemnization fees were given to her. In regard to Victoria Jamora, she explained in her Amended Comment dated October 2, 2008 that she failed to reflect in the Monthly Report of Cases the correct number of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua for the following reasons: 1. She was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua to be present during the marriage ceremony; 2. She had no personal knowledge of the actual number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge; 3. She merely relied on the entries in the Monthly Report as to the number of marriages solemnized. The Monthly Report was prepared by Jane Rafael, who was in charge of criminal cases. When she asked Rafael why there were only such number of marriages solemnized from June 2005 to April 2007, Rafael replied that was the advice of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge Arcaya-Chua signed the reports. As a subordinate designated by respondent Judge as OIC, she was not in a position to question her superior, Judge ArcayaChua, and signed in good faith the Monthly Reports in question. The administrative case was again referred to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigation of the Administrative Complaints On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando scheduled the consolidated cases for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on October 23, 2008. During the hearing on October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), complainant Francisco Ocampo appeared with his counsel, Atty. Jose Aliling IV, while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe C. Aguila appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua appeared in her own behalf. During the said hearing,

complainant Ocampo submitted a Supplemental Affidavit and additional documentary evidence. 10 Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel with a copy of her Affidavit, which incorporated her Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental Comment, the Motion to Recall Preventive Suspension and the Motion to Resolve. Complainant Ocampo testified on direct examination, affirming the truth of the contents of his Complaint and the authenticity of the annexes attached thereto. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined him, but reserved further cross-examination as to the Supplemental Affidavit. Hearing resumed the following day, October 24, 2008, and respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined complainant Ocampo specifically on his Supplemental Affidavit. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked complainant Ocampo questions. During the hearing on October 29, 2008, complainant Ocampo submitted his Offer of Documentary Evidence. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua testified on direct examination, whereby she affirmed the statements in her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, and identified her exhibits, after which, she was cross-examined by complainant Ocampo's counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case and formally offered her documentary evidence, insofar as OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the guidance and information of Justice Salazar-Fernando, the entire original records of SP No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, was ordered brought to her office. On November 3, 2008, OCA started presenting evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case). Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles testified and submitted her Affidavit, and was cross-examined, and was asked questions on redirect-examination. The scheduled hearing for November 4, 2008 was cancelled due to the unavailability of two (2) witnesses, namely, Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino. Hearing on the case resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA presented Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, who both submitted their Affidavits, which were considered as their testimony on direct. They were questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando and cross-examined by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Court records pertaining to SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K.S. Chang Tan v. Stephanie N. Estrella Pulliam, were likewise directed to be brought to the office of Justice Salazar-Fernando for reference and information. During the hearing on November 11, 2008, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati City, Judge Winlove Dumayas, appeared, and questions were propounded to him by Justice Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Atty. James Navarrete from OCA. In order to expedite the proceedings, respondent Judge was allowed to present her defense, and marked in evidence several documents,11 which formed part of her direct testimony. Since the documents submitted by respondent Judge were voluminous, Atty. Navarrete was given until November 20, 2008 to conduct his cross-examination. On November 25, 2008, Atty. James Navarrete continued with the marking of additional documents and submitted in evidence his exhibits.12 Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was cross-examined by Atty. Navarrete. Respondent Judge was also allowed to ask Atty. Navarrete some questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge submitted her Formal Offer of Evidence. Atty. Navarrete was given until November 27, 2008 to file his Opposition, while respondent Judge was given five days to file her Counter-Manifestation. On November 26, 2008, Atty. Navarrete filed his Comment, interposing no objection to respondent's Formal Offer of Exhibits. On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed a Counter-Manifestation and Motion to Correct Transcript of Stenographic Notes. On January 16, 2009, Justice Salazar-Fernando received the rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Court Stenographer Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M. No. 07-5263-RTC, Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City) , which he noted to have been consolidated with A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per Resolution of the Court en banc dated January 15, 2008. Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not included in the earlier investigation, Justice Salazar-Fernando set A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 for hearing on February 8, 2009. Hearing on A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10, 2009, during which the counsels for OCA and respondent stenographer Victoria Jamora appeared. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also attended the hearing. OCA proposed several stipulations for admission to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. She admitted that she solemnized marriages while she was the Judge of the MeTC, Branch 63, Makati City and RTC, Branch 144, Makati City. After

going over the certificates of marriage from January 2004 to August 2004, she admitted that she solemnized those marriages. She also admitted that she solemnized marriages in her chambers or inside her courtroom, except for two other marriages that she could not remember, but proper documents were presented to her. She further admitted that payments of solemnizing fees must be paid before conducting or solemnizing the marriage, and as part of her regular duties, she signed the Monthly Reports. Hearing resumed on February 18, 2009. OCA presented Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, who testified on the incident that occurred on May 17, 2007, which led to the inventory of the certificates of marriage, and the audit conducted on May 15-17, 2007. Atty. Corcelles-Aguila's affidavit13 formed part of the records of the case. In the hearing of March 3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador Indicio, Jr., Arnel Magsombol, Lucia Ticman and Joel Gregorio as its witnesses. The witnesses were questioned by OCA, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Justice Salazar-Fernando. Per request of OCA, notice of hearing was sent to German Averia, for him to appear on the next scheduled hearing as the last witness of OCA. In the hearing of March 23, 2009, German Averia testified in his capacity as Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Statistical Records Division, Court Management Office (CMO) of the Supreme Court. He confirmed having issued certifications and inventory on the monthly report of cases submitted by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to the CMO in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 4-2004. In the same hearing, the counsel for OCA categorically stated that their evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was limited only to the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriage as well as the falsification of the monthly reports.14 With the continuance of the investigation on April 8, 2009, OCA presented in evidence the originals of the monthly reports, and the certified true copies of the monthly reports, whose originals were unavailable. OCA, thereafter, rested its case. In the same hearing, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her exhibits. 15 She manifested that her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit would serve as her testimony on direct examination. On April 21, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented additional exhibits. 16 Her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, as well as the Affidavit of her son, Robert Maurice Chua, formed part of their direct testimonies. Respondent Judge was, thereafter, cross-examined by OCA. During the hearing on May 5, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua offered in evidence her Second Supplemental Affidavit. She also presented additional exhibits. 17 Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's daughter, Beau Mairi Chua testified, with her Affidavit constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by the opposing counsel. Respondent Jamora also testified as witness for respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. At the resumption of the hearing on May 18, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recalled respondent Jamora to the stand and propounded additional questions. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case after respondent Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, testified in her own behalf, with her Amended Comment constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by OCA. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, rested her case. With the conformity of the parties, Justice Salazar-Fernando directed them to file their respective memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her memorandum on July 21, 2009, while respondent Jamora filed her memorandum on August 3, 2009. OCA did not file a memorandum; hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando deemed that it waived the filing of its memorandum. Per this Court's Resolution dated August 24, 2009, the case was submitted for report and recommendation to the Supreme Court. Findings of the Investigating Justice Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case) In regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the Ocampo Case, without necessarily ruling on the correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas Order, Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion vested upon her as a judge. Not giving credence to the evidence presented by the movants with respect to the residence of Milan Ocampo was well within her judicial discretion. Assuming the same was erroneous, no administrative liability attached thereon in the absence of sufficient evidence that she ruled in such manner, because of a corrupt or dishonest motive, bad faith, fraud or malice. The evidence presented by complainant Ocampo as to Milan's residence might constitute proof of her "domicile," but such evidence was not necessarily irreconcilable with the fact that Milan might be maintaining residence elsewhere other than Meycauayan, Bulacan, considering her estranged relationship with complainant Ocampo.

As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable. The order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on December 8, 2006. Thus, there was an interim of at least five days from the issuance of the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that respondent Judge had any hand in the belated service of the notice to the complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that respondent Judge cannot be faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge. According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the application after ex parte determination by the judge that the same be issued. This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus: SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.18 Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before complainant Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor improper. Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family Code states: ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent behavior. A sworn affidavit19 of Emelita S. Valentino, narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant Ocampo, as well as the certification20 from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of a TPO. While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's objections to the matter of support apt and plausible, the same could be merely considered as an error of judgment or an abuse of discretion, but respondent Judge ArcayaChua cannot be held administratively liable thereon. Considering that the matter of support therein was merely provisional, respondent Judge could not be faulted for readily granting the prayer for support without further evaluating evidence with respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in that respect was not gross, the same having been brought about by an innocuous reliance on the Rule on Provisional Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC. Under the said rule, provisional orders for protection and support may be issued without hearing. However, the said rule specifically applies to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage or legal separation. In this case, the matter of support was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody. Justice Salazar-Fernando found that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's alleged over-zealousness in causing the immediate implementation of the TPO was without solid basis. A TPO, much like a TRO in civil cases, is required to be served immediately, precisely to serve its purpose as a protective relief. Respondent Judge issued the TPO on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday, right after the hearing on complainant Ocampo's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss. She clarified that the date of the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's counsel himself. The following day, April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she directed the

implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper or wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case. There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance of the TPO during the Holy Week, as it was complainant Ocampo's counsel himself who, wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent Judge caused its immediate implementation. Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge could not have been privy to the brazen manner in which the TPO was served by the designated sheriff. In the first place, it was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco, who was administratively charged by complainant Ocampo for the allegedly offensive manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge, such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco. Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation of bribery against respondent Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by Justice Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case) should be dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. 21 She cited Espaol v. Mupas,22 which held thus: x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, nonetheless, we have repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his or her official duties. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere credence or speculation. As we held in a recent case: Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent.23 Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case) Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that in the Chang Tan Case, the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262, because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman. The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to "women and their children," not to men. Thus, while the TPO may be justified with respect to the protection accorded the minor, the same is not legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert Chang Tan. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be absurd. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to be gross ignorance of the law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. in Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan,24 which stated, thus: When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority (De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001). When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000). Justice Salazar-Fernando averred that as a family court judge, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua should be the last person to err in the application of R.A. No. 9262, and, in this case, issue a TPO applied for a man, purportedly to protect the latter against his wife. Such is unthinkable under R.A. No. 9262. A careful evaluation of the records in

the Chang Tan Case showed that there was not even any allegation of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against her husband, Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-Fernando found that the TPO against Stephanie, insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of petitioner, to cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or threatening petitioner and to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of petitioner, was anomalous. Be that as it may, with respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's reasons for granting custody over subject minor to Albert Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly conclusive, the evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor of Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie determination that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and would serve her paramount interest. Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper in respondent Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie has not been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as the latter's paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's award of temporary custody to the father could be justified. However, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that she does not necessarily affirm the correctness of the custody award to the father, Chang Tan, since respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007 was annulled and set aside by the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated October 31, 2007.25 In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua allegedly displayed in the said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no substantial evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that respondent Judge received money from Chang Tan. Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally witnessed the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, except for their secondhand accounts that they heard that such incident actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it speculative to attribute the commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on such account. The Investigating Justice stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no personal or actual participation in that incident, because the "heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC, Victoria Jamora. As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in the RCBC Case,Justice Salazar-Fernando found no evidence against respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which she studied and evaluated the application for the writ. Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily issued the ex partehearing on the application having been held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on the succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing impossible or irregular in such feat. Per respondents account, she had been unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she did not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Investigating Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary attachment to be apt. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her duties. She cited, thus: In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.26

Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage Certificates and Monthly Reports) Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of marriages in her court and failure to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports. The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage certificates, which were said to have been contained in four (4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time the judicial audit was being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the fact that she ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic bags. However, as regards the timing of disposal, she explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week of May, days before the judicial audit.27 Such fact was confirmed by Indicio in his testimony.28 He testified that he was ordered by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to dispose of the garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage was due for disposal on May 14, 2007, but since it was election day, the disposal of the garbage was postponed until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the plastic bags caught the attention of the security detail of the Supreme Court. The Investigating Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic bags, which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several days. Why no attempt to dispose of the supposed garbage was made on May 9, 10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were Saturday and Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was the period of judicial audit) was not sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the order to dispose could not have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when the judicial audit was already being conducted. Such conclusion jibes with the account of Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members of the judicial audit team, that upon being immediately confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of the supposed garbage despite the ongoing audit, Indicio "could not offer any explanation." 29 Indicio could not remember the exact date when the order to dispose of the garbage was made by respondent Judge ArcayaChua. He testified, thus: CROSS-EXAMINATION JUDGE CHUA: You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you executed an Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was also done at 8:00 oclock in the morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When did I give my instruction to you to throw away the garbage? MR. INDICIO: You told me before the audit to throw all your trash. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Did you know when that particular day was? MR. INDICIO: That was election day, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Election day of May, 2007? MR. INDICIO: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the garbage? MR. INDICIO: Yes, Your Honor. JUDGE CHUA: May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was subscribed to on May 17. So the last week that you mentioned here was a week before May 17. You mentioned here that last week, I was

instructed by the Presiding Judge to dispose of the garbage which were stocked in her branch. Do you confirm the statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit? MR. INDICIO: Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election day. JUDGE CHUA: I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight. May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here that the said garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May 14, 2007. However, since it was election day, same was not collected. MR. INDICIO: Yes, maam, it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was only on May 17 that he had an opportunity to throw it. JUDGE CHUA: To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to throw away the garbage? MR. INDICIO: I was told before the audit. JUDGE CHUA: The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May 17. Based on paragraph 2 of your Affidavit, I gave the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I gave the instruction to you probably on May 10, is that what you are saying? MR. INDICIO: I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge Chua. xxxx JUSTICE FERNANDO: When you told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already instructed you to throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographers room, how many days after that instruction was given to you did you comply with her instruction? MR. INDICIO: Eight (8) days, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: So if you instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that would be May 9, is that correct? MR. INDICIO: Yes, your Honor.30 According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the timing of the disposal, the manner of disposing the plastic bags of marriage certificates was also open to suspicion. Although there were four plastic bags ready for disposal, which according to Indicio himself were really not too heavy, 31 only one was taken out by the janitor to be disposed, leaving three other plastic bags inside the courtroom. Taking out the plastic bags one by one could have been purposely sought to surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and avoid detection by the security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team. Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite repeated references to the supposed garbage, which were allegedly contained in similar plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the whereabouts of the said plastic bags of garbage were never accounted for. If what were mistakenly attempted to be disposed of by Indicio were the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the plastic bags containing the garbage could have been found elsewhere in

the courtroom. However, as things turned out, there were really no plastic bags of garbage, but only more plastic bags of marriage certificates. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's account of the plastic bags of garbage was unsubstantiated. The Investigating Justice did not give credence to respondent Judges theory as to why the plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in the stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage which she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff, who harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow money from her, could have been responsible in transferring the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers to the stenographer's room before her courtroom was padlocked. According to her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative investigation on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s machinations had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's room, so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can along the corridor, the documents would be discovered by the audit team. Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judges theory difficult to swallow. According to her, it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much cunning to Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big number of weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to do was spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do, per respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account. In regard to the non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, the certifications 32 issued by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC of Makati City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages were paid the corresponding solemnization fees. Justice Salazar-Fernando found no reason to doubt the reliability or integrity of the said certifications, the contents of which were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman, the same persons who personally verified from their records whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were paid. Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure undertaken by Magsombol and Ticman in verifying the payment of solemnization fees, positing that they could have merely relied on the dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, which were often not the same dates stated in the receipts. She contended that most parties paid their solemnization fee on a date different from their wedding; hence, the dates of the receipts would not be the same date as that of the wedding. Thus, respondent Judge postulated that when Magsombol and Ticman verified payment of the solemnization fees based on the dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no receipt to show payment of the solemnization fees, because payment was made on some other date. Justice Salazar-Fernando did not believe the foregoing postulation of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in the light of the categorical declarations of Magsombol and Ticman that they did not merely based their verification on the dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they verified the payment of solemnization fees based on the names of the contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent portions of the testimonies of Magsombol and Ticman state as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION xxxx ATTY. BUGTAS: So how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua? MR. MAGSOMBOL; I checked the names that were handed to me one by one. ATTY. BUGTAS: Did you check all the records? MR. MAGSOMBOL: Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first day of January 2004 up to the last day of office of December 2005. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Are your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to December 2005? MR. MAGSOMBOL: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: How about the other basis which you said, receipts? MR. MAGSOMBOL: In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Did you also check those OR numbers and the receipts? MR. MAGSOMBOL: Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought with me, Your Honor. xxxx JUSTICE FERNANDO: So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC Judge were supposed to be recorded in your daily cash collection book? MR. MAGSOMBOL: Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid. JUSTICE FERNANDO: So if they are not paid, they do not appear in your book? MR. MAGSOMBOL: Yes, we dont know if the marriage happened or not. xxxx (Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman) JUSTICE FERNANDO: Did you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the marriages that were listed in the document were paid? MS. TICMAN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: What was the result of your verification? MS. TICMAN: Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Only 20? Twenty out of? ATTY. BUGTAS: More than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus. xxxx JUSTICE FERNANDO:

What was the basis of your findings? MS. TICMAN: My basis Your Honor is the one coming from the Supreme Court, and the names supplied us by the Supreme Court were verified by us if they were paid or not. JUSTICE FERNANDO: What documents did you check to determine whether the fees were paid or not? MS. TICMAN: The Certificates of Marriage. xxxx ATTY. BUGTAS: What documents or records did you examine in order to determine the marriages that paid the corresponding fees? MS. TICMAN: The logbook of the Accounting Section and official receipts. xxxx ATTY. BUGTAS: Based on your records or receipt that you have, you can inform the inquiring party whether that person or party paid the corresponding fees or not? MS. TICMAN: Yes, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS: In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on your records, you enumerated just 20 marriages as appearing to have paid the corresponding fees. MS. TICMAN: Yes, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS: But based on the records available, the Supreme Court furnished you with a list numbering around 1,344 names of parties for verification but you came out with an Affidavit enumerating only those parties that paid the corresponding fees. Is there a possibility that the contracting parties paid the fees, but your records would not reflect their names? MS. TICMAN: No, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS: So only those that paid will appear in your records. MS. TICMAN: Yes, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS: If a party did not pay, his or her name will not appear in your records? MS. TICMAN: Yes, sir.

xxxx ATTY. BUGTAS: In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated that after a thorough examination of the records of this office (referring to your office) has been ascertained that only 20 marriages have been paid in the OCC RTC Makati city, and you enumerated the 20 marriages that paid the corresponding fees based on your records. When you say you thoroughly examined, can you tell us whether the examination was thorough enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its contents? MS. TICMAN: We examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given by the Supreme Court. 33 Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully convinced by the findings of Magsombol and Ticman that the solemnization fees of a substantial number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were unpaid. As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect the marriages in her monthly reports, Justice SalazarFernando found respondent Judges defense of forgery, nay tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She carefully perused respondent Judges signatures in the monthly reports and compared the same to her signatures in the pleadings, which she submitted during the investigation, as well as in the orders and decisions contained in the records, and found no substantial discrepancies therein or any indication that the same had been forged. According to Justice SalazarFernando, while all her signatures did not exactly appear to be 100 percent similar, there was no reason to suppose that her signatures in the monthly reports and other signatures extant in the records were not signed by one and the same person. Moreover, Justice Salazar-Fernando failed to see any tell-tale signs of tampering, and this could be the reason why respondent Judge herself withdrew such defense. Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua that the anomaly attributed to her was the work of Umipig. The Investigating Justice found it incredible that since January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister scheme, patiently and clandestinely forging respondent Judge's signatures in her monthly reports as vengeance for not lending him money. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it difficult to imagine how Umipig could have harbored such a deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just because the latter refused to loan him money for his enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the reason why Umipig failed to become a lawyer. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages allegedly coming from Umipig to show the latter's extreme hatred of her. The Investigating Justice stated that apart from the fact that it could not be established that it was indeed Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of the text messages did not show that Umipig was the author of all the anomalies relating to the marriage certificates and monthly reports. Respondent Judge quoted Umipig saying, "Hindi bale, may ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo, " which, according to her, could only betray the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to something. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, Umipigs statement could only confirm the existence of the anomalies in respondent Judges court, rather than attribute authorship to Umipig for the anomalies pertaining to the marriage certificates and monthly reports. Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas procedure of signing the monthly reports ahead of her OIC to be irregular, since it is contrary to prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge ArcayaChua admitted that she signed the monthly reports first before her OIC, Ms. Mabalot, during her stint in the MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC. Respondent Judge testified, thus: xxxx JUSTICE FERNANDO: Could you repeat the statement? JUDGE CHUA: I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and then the following morning at around 8:00 o clock, I would see the reports on top of the table of Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus was on the typewritten name of Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

And you expect the reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you signed? JUDGE CHUA: Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael that I have signed the monthly reports. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Do you have to sign first before the clerk of court? JUDGE CHUA: With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of court of MeTC Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to the OCC a few months ago and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would rather do the checking myself, sign and then require them to affix their signatures. JUSTICE FERNANDO: Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge would sign last? JUDGE CHUA: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: In your case, you sign first before the OIC? JUDGE CHUA: Yes, Your Honor.34 Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent Judges justification for signing first before her OIC, reasoning that it does not take a lawyer to know what to indicate in the monthly reports, let alone the mechanical task of indicating how many cases were disposed or how many marriages were solemnized in a month. As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code concerning the place of solemnization of the marriage, the Investigating Justice found no evidence that would show that she disregarded the strictures of the said provision. There is also no concrete evidence showing that respondent Judge demanded and/or received money from the contracting parties for solemnizing the marriage. However, it can be inferred that respondent Judge financially benefited from solemnizing the numerous marriages by the fact that these were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and insufficient solemnizing fees were paid to the court. Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas liability in this case, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated: x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator respectfully submits that there is convincing and substantial evidence to support a finding that anomalies were committed in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court with respect to the solemnization of marriages. The circumstances magnificently fit together: plastic bags containing about 1,975 marriage certificates were surreptitiously being spirited out of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court during the occasion of the judicial audit; when confronted, the person seen disposing the plastic bags stated that he was acting upon the order of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua; when verified, the solemnization fees of the marriages covered by the said marriage certificates were found to have not been paid; despite openly admitting having solemnized all the weddings covered by the said marriage certificates, the monthly reports of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua reflected only a very minimal number of weddings solemnized. Taken together, the circumstances lead to no other conclusion that irregularities were obviously perpetrated by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in solemnizing marriages in her court. In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, Justice Salazar-Fernando found sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to the correct number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge. Jamoras justification that she could not have questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even if there were erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself pregnant with admission that something anomalous could have indeed been taking place. She testified, thus: JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So you affixed your signature without knowing whether the report is accurate or not? MS. JAMORA: Your Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the position to question my superior Judge Chua. JUSTICE FERNANDO: So, by force of circumstances, you just affixed your signature without any question asked, whether they are correct, inaccurate, incomplete, you just affixed your signature. Is that your job as OIC? ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Your Honor, I think she stated her position already in her Comment. JUSTICE FERNANDO: That is why I am asking her for confirmation. MS. JAMORA: Yes, Your Honor. ATTY. VILLANUEVA: More or less, that is the substance of her Comment, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO: So without knowing anything about the figures, you just affixed your signature because you saw already the signature of Rafael and the signature of Judge Chua? MS. JAMORA: Yes, Your Honor.35 Justice Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent Jamora's pretended ignorance of the incorrectness of the monthly reports she had been signing, let alone the figures relating to the number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge. He stressed that it does not take a lawyer to count or at least approximate the number of weddings that respondent Judge had been solemnizing in her court, considering the unusually big number of weddings she had solemnized. Knowing the figures stated in the monthly reports to be incorrect, Jamora condoned the wrongdoing, if she was actually not a willing participant, by affixing her signatures therein. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the reprehensible act or omission of respondent Jamora constitutes dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct. Moreover, she stated that during the investigation, it was revealed that although Jamora was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no knowledge of her duties and responsibilities, and had neither control over the employees under her nor did what was expected of her. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Jamora's plea for compassion and understanding, citing the fact that she was not a lawyer and that the position of OIC Clerk of Court was merely thrust upon her by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, which she reluctantly accepted, was hollow, because her transgression did not have any connection with her status as a non-lawyer or being a reluctant OIC. Her insistence upon her ignorance or lack of knowledge of the incorrectness of the figures stated in the monthly reports, specifically on the number of marriages solemnized, aggravates her offense as it makes a mockery of her oath. The Ruling of the Court The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Justice Salazar-Fernando. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.36 In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her Monthly Reports37 the actual number of marriages she solemnized during her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her.

The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office. Just to mention a portion of the evidence submitted against her: In April 2004, she reported 38 that she did not solemnized any marriage, but there were 29 marriage certificates issued on the said month contained in the plastic bags that were taken from her office.39 In May 2004, she reported40 that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 36 marriage certificates issued on the said month were found in the same plastic bags. 41 In June 2004, she likewise reported 42 that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 45 marriage certificates issued on the said month were contained in the plastic bags.43 From November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly Reports 44indicated that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in the custody of the Court. 45 Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC, Makati City, in his Certification 46 dated June 8, 2007, stated that only 146 of the marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005 paid the corresponding marriage fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of Court VII, OCC, RTC, Makati City, declared in his Certification47 dated June 8, 2007 that from the list furnished by this Court of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the said office per RTC official receipts covering the period from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence, out of the 1,975 marriage certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total of 166 marriages were paid. In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the Monthly Reports. In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on the Monthly Reports represented that she attested to the correctness thereof; hence, it is presumed that she verified or should have verified the facts stated therein. The Monthly Reports specifically state that the signatories thereto, including Victoria Jamora, "declare under oath that the information in this Monthly Report is true and correct to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to the provisions of existing rules/administrative circulars." Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144 from July 2005 to April 2007. 48 It is incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC, was unaware of the big number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated marriage certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said period that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice correctly stated that she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect, but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if she was not actually a willing participant. The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of gross misconduct. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292, known as the AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292. In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains the recommendation of Justice SalvadorFernando that the case be dismissed in the absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charge of "harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service." We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty. Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judges husband, alleged that in the first week of September 2002, she asked respondents help regarding the cases of her friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the Supreme Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latters chamber.

When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be contacted.49 In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denied the charges against her and averred that in the months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing protests, damaging newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of complainant. When she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable resolution of Muoz cases. Respondent declined. Thereafter, complainant started spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused. Complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005 when complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against her. 50 The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007, complainant manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her complaint against respondent. 51 In a Verified Manifestation52 dated September 6, 2007, complainant stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a long and serious discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on complainant that her accusation against respondent was brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject of the present administrative case; that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored friendly relations with each other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in pursuing her administrative case against respondent. In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the allegations in her Complaint. In a Resolution53 dated December 5, 2007, the Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The Court, in the same Resolution, also ordered complainant to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent. Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that: xxxx 2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her administrative complaint against Judge Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not unfounded; 3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondents personal knowledge; 4. The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was because of the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity and harmony in the family, given the fact that Judge Chuas husband is her nephew; 5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their children came to respondents house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later, respondents sister, husband and children, as well as her close friends persuaded her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake of peace and unity in the family; 6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that respondent gave up her complaint against Judge Chua.54

In its Resolution55 dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's compliance was not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with court processes. The Court then resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of the same offense; recall the Resolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice Rebecca D. Salvador56 to conduct an investigation and submit her report and recommendation; and directed complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under pain of contempt of court. In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for grave misconduct and dishonesty. Justice Salvadors findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, are as follows: Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on Muoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainants request for favors in June 2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa before; however, it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer, to reply to complainants first demand letter, was unusual; considering complainants advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that complainant's motive for filing the administrative case was respondent's refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter's friend--was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainants compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against respondent.57 During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador observed that although complainant appeared weary of the demands entailed by the administrative case, she staunchly stood pat over the veracity of her complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same. According to Justice Salvador, respondent had no reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the administrative case against her. Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainants testimony that the return of the money by respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the complaint. The Court sustained the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador, and rendered decision against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. She is WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act in the future shall merit a more severe penalty. 58 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that: (1) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate the failure of Sylvia Santos to present Emerita Muoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, in the proceedings before Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador;

(2) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate that one of the bases for the dismissal of the present case of 5 December 2007 was the Affidavit of Retraction filed by Muoz on 12 January 2006; (3) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the finding of Justice Salvador that [respondent] did not refute Santos declaration during the clarificatory hearing that [respondent] returned the money to her; (4) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the other findings of Justice Salvador; and (5) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in not considering [respondents] testimonial and documentary evidence.59 Respondent prayed that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be directed to submit to this Court the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 and to submit her tape of the proceedings on the said date, and that her motion for reconsideration be granted and that the instant case be dismissed. Respondents prayer for submission to this Court of the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 is an attempt to clarify alleged inaccuracies in the said transcript of stenographic notes. The Court notes that respondent Judge had earlier filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 on this matter, which was already resolved in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on February 13, 2009, thus: Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008, claiming that there were significant omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) particularly in the statement "Ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera;" and that such question was also beyond the scope of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she mention the return of the money, and it was only during the clarifiactory hearing that it surfaces; thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant. Respondent prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant that "the money was returned to me" and "ibinalik naman ho nila and pera" be stricken off; and in case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant. In the Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondents prayer that the corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of complainant be stricken off. The Court, however, granted her prayer and noted her Manifestation that the subject testimony was given only during the clarificatory hearing and in effect without granting her an opportunity to cross-examine complainant about the same. 60
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Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita Muoz, from whom Santos procured theP100,000.00, during the proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos claims against her, and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present case. The Court is not persuaded. Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove the administrative liability of respondent. Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the findings of Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by her. The Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, thus: x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondents guilt is the unwavering stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muoz cases. As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the hearing, was consistent in her testimony: J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: At the start of this afternoons proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the matters stated in your verified complaint? MS. SANTOS: Opo.

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge? MS. SANTOS: My complaint is true. That is all true. xxxx J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: Ano ba ang totoo? MS. SANTOS: Ang sabi ko sa kanya, "Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi." Ang sabi niya, "Sige, Tita, tutulungan ko." Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin. J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: Just tell us what happened. MS. SANTOS: Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00." Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, "Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay Emelita." Unang-una iyang Emelita may utang sa akin ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili sya. JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA: Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue with her testimony because she is already through with her direct examination. J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record. Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report: J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel. Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7, 2007, and which had been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "l-B" and submarkings for respondent. You stated in the verified complaint that the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by "the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion"? MS. SANTOS: Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kamit nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan. J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR: So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood or misapprehended? MS. SANTOS:

Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.61 These testimonies on record are evidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The Investigating Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. 62 The Court found no reason to depart from such rule since Justice Salvadors observations and findings are supported by the records. The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Administrative Sanctions Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based on the provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,63 while disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense and punished with dismissal for the first offense. The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141. The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judges motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093. The Court has held: All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that the administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels, are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression.

Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity have no place in the judiciary. xxx This Court will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the peoples faith in the judiciary. 64 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that: 1. in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is DISMISSED. 2. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. 3. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED. 4. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality. 5. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora of this decision, they are deemed to have vacated their respective office, and their authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are considered automatically terminated. These consolidated administrative cases are referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation regarding the possible disbarment of Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from the practice of the legal profession. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182367

December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner, vs. GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.:

This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father. The Facts and the Case In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. 2 In filling out the blanks in the proforma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the childs father; that the signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him. On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolinas son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order, 5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court. The Issue Presented The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child. The Courts Ruling Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. 6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
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To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. 7 The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. 9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. 10 Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11 It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera. While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate

family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case. ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death? Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as

husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead; (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio; (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1 Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4 The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13 However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of

whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.17 The Civil Code provides: Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . . Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . . This is reiterated in the Family Code thus: Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . . Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . . This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188775

August 24, 2011

CENON R. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON, Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision2 found petitioner Cenon R. Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. THE FACTS On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.3 After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage4 indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint5 accusing petitioner of committing bigamy. Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information6 which reads: That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said marriage having legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita T.

Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime. During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court , Branch 130, Caloocan City, rendered a decision7 dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality 8 issued on 27 June 2006. On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cenon R. Teves, also known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 9 Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed by the prosecution. 10 On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 2070-M2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.11 On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 12 This however, was denied by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.13 Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of." 14 He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined. Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan 15 is inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioners case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that would sustain petitioners contention. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 16 The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the

decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage. 17 It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 18 The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.19 In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.20
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In numerous cases,21 this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners strained reading of the law is against its simple letter. Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. 22 The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191425

September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031. The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Facts The appellate court recited the facts as follows: On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: "That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA." Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts: "1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte; 2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City; 3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001; 5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit." The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued. Evidence for the Prosecution As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows: "xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003. Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about. Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount ofP50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14). Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5). Evidence for the Defense

The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows: "Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7). He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage. He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13). Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development. In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 212). During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5 The Trial Courts Ruling In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino. The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus: The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines). Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority. In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated. The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant

and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows: a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law. b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. SO ORDERED.9 Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion. Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court: The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10 The Appellate Courts Ruling On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision. 11 The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
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In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision. Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010. The Issue The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The Courts Ruling Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court. Elements of Bigamy

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, theabsent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13 The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16 The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate 18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony. A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads: We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information: Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)19 Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read: Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses. Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied with: (a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given; (c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and

(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons. Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen. x x x. Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third. Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized: (a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded; (b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or (c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization. Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties. Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties ( mahrmusamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties. Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21 Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions. [ATTY. CALDINO:] Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract? [NOLLORA:] A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place any Catholic there. xxx Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with your coaccused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?

A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my BalikIslam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir. Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that youre single, Mr. Witness? A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied) xxx [PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:] Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora? A: Yes, maam. Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract? xxx [A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor. xxx Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the permission of your first wife to get married? A: Yes, maam. Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora? A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was always very mad, maam.23 In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
1avvphi1

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law. Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending. In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2 Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance. The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead. In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse presentmust institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse . (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41." The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by : (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.) Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4 More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5 Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at

times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.