1. Actual possession GUADALUPE S. REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITA L. RAYMUNDO, respondents.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[7] It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy. [8] This declaration is conformably with Art. 524 of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised in ones own name or in the name another. 2. Adverse possession -The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 15 JAMES R. BRACEWELL, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents. -We agree with the Court of Appeals. Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.[3] Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.[4] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.[5] The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.[6] Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites,[7] it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a

claim of ownership.[8] In Pensader v. Pensader[9] we ruled that while the verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession. In Espique v. Espique[10] we held There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the done has taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner, or, as this Court well said: While the verbal donation, under which the defendants and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question, is not effective as a transfer of title, yet it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession (Pensader v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 673, 680). This is also an action for partition. It was shown that the donation of the property was made not even in a private document but only verbally. It was also shown that the defendants, through their predecessors-in-interest, were in adverse and continuous possession of the lands for a period of over 30 years. Yet, the court decided the case in favor of defendants on the ground of acquisitive prescription. There is a close parallelism between the facts of this case and the present. HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING, represented by DELFIN, GIL, EMMA, MANUEL, RACQUEL, ESTER, REMEDIOS and JESSIE, all surnamed PARAYNO, MAXIMA PARAYNO, LEONARDO PARAYNO and FELICISIMA PARAYNO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE BAUZON (deceased), represented by his heirs and co-defendants Luis and Eriberta Bauzon; LUIS BAUZON, ERIBERTA BAUZON (deceased), substituted by her husband PLACIDO ZULUETA, and JOSE PARAYNO, respondents. 3. Civil Possession -Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "Natural possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right by a person. Civil possession is the same holding or enjoyment, together with the intention of acquiring ownership of the thing or right." G.R. No. L-5396 March 12, 1910

CANUTO REYES, petitioner-appellee, vs. JACINTO LIMJAP, opponent-appellant. 4. Constructive possession -http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/198585.pdf 5. Material Possession

Material possession involves only the enjoyment of the thing possessed, its use, and the collection of its fruits, and these are the only benefits of which the possessor is deprived in losing his possession. The value of the thing is represented by the thing itself, not by the products which it may yield. PEDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JULIAN SANTIAGO, guardian of the minors Gaspara and Santiago, surnamed Santiago, and MAXIMO ANGELES, defendants-appellees.

6. Mortgage in possession . . . Whenever a deed absolute on its face is thus treated as a mortgage, the parties are clothed with all the rights, are subject to all the liabilities, and are entitled to all the remedies of ordinary mortgagors and mortgagees. The grantee may maintain an action for the foreclosure of the grantor's equity of redemption; the grantor may maintain an action to redeem and to compel a reconveyance upon his payment of the debt secured. If the grantee goes into possession, he is in reality a mortgagee in possession, and as such is liable to account for the rents and profits. (3 Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 1196.) The preceding discussion conducts us to the conclusion that, so far as this case is concerned, the estate of Francisco Gutierrez Repide occupies substantially the position of a mortgagee in possession. The question then arises as to what are the legal rights of the plaintiff as against the Repide estate, judged by the facts alleged and relief sought in the complaint as at present framed, and in this connection the circumstances is not to be ignored that the complaint contains in usual form the prayer for general. The respective rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of antichresis, under the Civil Code, appear to be similar and in many respects identical with those recognized in the equity jurisprudence of England and American as incident to the position of a mortgagee in possession, in reference to which the following propositions may be taken to be established, namely, that if the mortgagee acquires possession in any lawful manner, he is entitled to retain such possession until the indebtedness is satisfied and the property redeemed; that the nonpayment of the debt within the term agreed does not vest the ownership of the property in the creditor; that the general duty of the mortgagee in possession towards the premises is that of the ordinary prudent owner' that the mortgagee must account for the rents and profits of the land, or its value for purposes of use and occupation, any amount thus realized going towards the discharge of the mortgage debt; that if the mortgagee remains in possession after the

mortgage debt has been satisfied, he becomes a trustee for the mortgagor as to the excess of the rents and profits over such debt; and, lastly, that the mortgagor can only enforce his rights to the land by an equitable action for an account and to redeem. (3 Pom. Eq. Jur., sex. 12151218.) G.R. No. 18574 September 20, 1922

JOSE C. MACAPINLAC, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ REPIDE, ET AL., defendants FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ REPIDE, defendant-appellee. J. F. BOOMER, defendant-appellant. And in 27 Cyc., 1237, note 71 to paragraph 4, it is also held that: Where possession was gained under foreclosure proceedings, the mortgagee occupies the position of a mortgagee in possession, although such proceedings were defective or even voidable for irregularity. (Blain vs. Rivard, 19 Ill., 477; Bryan vs. Branius, 162 U. S., 415; 16 S. Ct., 803; 40 Law. ed., 1022; Stevens vs. Lord, 2 Jur., 92) . . .. And "the term mortgagee in possession is applied to one who has lawfully acquired actual or constructive possession of the premises mortgaged to him, standing upon his rights as mortgagee and not claiming under another title, for the purpose of enforcing his security upon such property or making its income help to pay his debt. . . . G.R. No. L-24824 January 30, 1926 VICENTE DIAZ and TEODORA RUBILLOS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SECUNDINO DE MENDEZONA ET AL., defendants. SECUNDINO DE MENDEZONA, Appellant. 7. Symbolic possession
The possession mentioned in Article 1544 for determining who has better right when the same piece of land has been sold several times by the same vendor includes not only the material but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the execution of a public instrument. This means that after the sale of a realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not transmit anything to the second vendee, and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the thing, he does it as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the thing lawfully acquired by the first vendee (Quimson vs. Rosete, 87 Phil. 159; Sanchez vs. Ramos, 40 Phil. 614; Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388). In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to respondent Arsenio Nares by means of a public instrument is clearly tantamount to a delivery of the land resulting in the material and symbolic possession thereof by the latter. Verily, factual evidence points to the prior actual possession by respondent Nares before he was evicted from the land by petitioners and their predecessors in 1957 when the latter entered the disputed property. No other evidence exists on record to show the contrary.
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G.R. No. L-56838 April 26, 1990

GENARO NAVERA AND EMMA AMADOR, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ARSENIO NARES AND FELIX NARES, Respondents.