LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs. MORENO DUMAPIS et.al. G.R.

163210 August 13, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic juridical entity engaged in mining to which the respondents are employed. All three were assigned at the highgrade area where most of the ores mined are considered of high grade content. On September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers) who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the Mine, went underground to conduct a routinary inspection of the workers and the working conditions therein. However, realizing that highgrading: was being committed he reported the incident to the security investigation office. After investigating, the Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor executed a Joint Affidavit, which provides that Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners, including their supervisor and Stationary Guard Ceasarion Damoslog, committing Highgrading activities and that Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct participation then claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel Gumatin, one of the miners assigned to cooperate with them to commit Highgrading. Also, Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss also positively confirmed the Highgrading activity. Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao that its was messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued rock drilling machine then drilled holes and blasted the same with the assistance of Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan, Benedict Arocod,

Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar and Francisco Liagao. Petitioner found the respondents guilty and dismissed them from employment. Consequently, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal but the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National Labor Relations Commission which rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal of the nine other complainant miners. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the NLRC. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and CA is correct in finding the dismissal of respondents illegal and in considering the Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators as hearsay and therefore inadmissible. HELD: The NLRC and CA is correct in concluding that the Joint Affidavit of Security Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible. Their narration of factual events was not based on their personal knowledge but on disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio thereby falling squarely within Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

The SC also ruled that, it is true that, Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an investigation report. However, the Court clarified that the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial. Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines it was revealed that the facts alleged therein by the Security Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to the facts allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. The Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslogs first and second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit. People vs. Tundag [G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000] Quisumbing, J.: Facts: For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice. In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her. The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows

that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City. Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. In the present case, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending that: THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR INNOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THEINFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TOEXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME. Issue: Whether or not the court correctly took judicial notice of the victim's age without proper hearing Ruling: No. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts.SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with

five(5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accuseds sister. The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose. The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we

find an award of exemplary damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.

under the bridge, sniffing rugby and drinking alcohol with some of friends. Pruna later on brought Lizette to a grassy area and raped her. He was later on arrested. Notwithstanding her minority, Lizette was brought to the witness stand. Finding the same credible, the RTC convictedPrunaof qualified rape and sentenced him to death. Issues: 1. WON Lizette is a competent and credible witness considering that she was only 3 when she was raped and 5 during trial. 2. What are the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Held: 1. YES. The general rule is thatwhen a witness takes a stand it is presumed that hes competent. The burden is upon the party objecting the competency to establish the ground of incompetency. Sec. 21, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence provides thatchildren whose mental maturity rendersthem incapable of perceiving the facts respecting that which they were examined are disqualified to be witnesses. However, no precise minimum age is fixed. The test of competency is intelligence, not age. As long as the child can perceive and make known his perception to other and that hes capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined then he is competent to testify. A childs capacity to receive correct impressions during the incident, to comprehend obligation of an oath, and

G.R. No. 138471 10, 2002

October

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ*, accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Facts: On January 3, 1995, while 3year old LizetteArabelle Gonzales was defecating at their neighbors backyard, Manuel Boy Pruna, the accused-appellant, called him and placed her on his lap. Pruna was then

relate to those facts truthfully to the court at the time hes offered as a witness should be considered. A child should understand the punishment which may result from false swearing. In the case at bar,Pruna failed to discharge the burden of proving Lizettes mental immaturity. The RTC held that Lizette had the capacity of observation, recollection and communication and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. That two years had lapsed since the time of the incident is immaterial considering that it is a most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to have a lasting impression of how the crime was committed and the identity of the aggressor. 2. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 78 It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

STATE PROSECUTOR VS. MURO FACTS: State prosecutors Mariano, Dee and Tac-an filed a complaint against Judge Muro with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of Rule 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct after Muro issued an order dismissing 11 cases against Imelda Marcos for violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of RA 265. Judge Muro issued said order on the basis of newspaper reports concerning the announcement of the President of lifting all foreign

exchange restrictions and that such announcement deprived him of jurisdiction which warrants the dismissal of the 11 cases. Prosecutors contend that Judge Muro taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account as basis for his order is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. ISSUE: WON Judge Muro was correct in taking judicial notice on the ground of public knowledge HELD: NO. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not

generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which

is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

passport to LBC, for which he was issued a receipt.[7] Eubertos boxes were delivered to him via the LBC-Ormoc City Branch on different dates. He inquired about his passport, but the Ormoc City LBC Manager told him that his passport was not in their office. He advised Euberto to wait for a few days, as it might arrive on a later date. Euberto made several follow-ups, to no avail.[11] The passport of Euberto could not be located. Euberto was not able to return to Bahrain and report back for work. On September 22, 1997, Euberto filed a Complaint[14] for damages against LBC Express, Inc. and LBC International, Inc. with the RTC of Naval, Biliran. The complaint alleged that because of the loss of Eubertos passport through the gross negligence of the defendants, he failed to report back for work in Bahrain. The spouses Ado prayed that damages for Eubertos unearned income be awarded to them. To prove their claim for actual damages, spouses Ado offered in evidence a certification from Eubertos employer, which reads: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Mr. Euberto Ado holder of Passport Number L 067892 was working as a Mechanic at our Marine Workshop. He left Bahrain on 08.08.1995 to Manila on holiday for the period of three months. He was getting the basic salary of BD 280.000 (Two hundred & Eighty) only monthly. He was holding the return visa for coming back to after having his leave. Mr. Euberto Ado could not return back

LBC vs. Spouses Ado G.R. No. 161760 FACTS: Euberto Ado was an overseas contract worker, employed as a mechanic in the Marine Workshop of Al Meroouge Group in Bahrain.[2] He was the holder of Passport No. L067892.Al-Mulla Cargo & Packing (AMCP) of Manama, Bahrain was an agent of LBC International, Inc. and LBC Express, Inc. When his two-year contract of employment expired, Euberto, together with his wife Sisinia, decided to take a three-month vacation to the Philippines. They secured a re-entry visa to Bahrain. Before flying to the Philippines, on August 8, 1995, Euberto transported five (5) boxes, [4] with himself as the consignee of the packages Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Ado proceeded to LBCs Customer Service Department, to take delivery of the boxes from Furagganan. Myrna Mendoza, an employee of LBC, suggested that Euberto avail of the custom duty exemptions for his packages, and entrust his passport to her for submission to the Customs Office. He was concerned that his passport might get lost. However, after being assured that his passport, together with his boxes, would be forwarded to him, he acquiesced. He turned over his

to Bahrain [as] his passport was misplace[d] in Manila. Yours (sic) Sincerely, Praful V. Birje (Manager)[18] Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule Held: The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that the respondents failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove that upon his return to Bahrain, he would be automatically employed by his former employer for a period of two years and that he will be given the same job with the same compensation as provided for in his expired employment contract.It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that actual or compensatory damages is not presumed, but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.[29] Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[30] In this case, the only evidence adduced by the respondents to prove that Euberto had been granted a twoyear re-entry visa and that upon his return to Bahrain he would be automatically given a two-year employment contract is Eubertos own testimony and his employers certification. Thus, Eubertos two-year contract of employment had already expired before leaving Bahrain for his threemonth vacation in the Philippines.

Whether or not respondent Eubertos employer would automatically employ him upon his return to Bahrain after his sojourn in the Philippines would depend entirely upon his employer. The respondents failed to adduce any evidence that Eubertos employer would give him his former position under the same terms and conditions stipulated in his previous employment contract. Euberto even failed to prove, by preponderant evidence, other than his self-serving testimony, that the reentry visa issued to him was at his employers behest, with an assurance that upon his return to Bahrain, he would automatically be re-employed. The respondents could very well have secured an undertaking or an authenticated certification from Eubertos employer that upon his return to Bahrain, he would be automatically employed for a period of two years under the same terms and conditions of the first contract. While they adduced in evidence a certification from Eubertos employer that he had been issued a re-entry visa, there was no undertaking to automatically re-employ respondent Euberto for another two years upon his return to Bahrain for a monthly salary of 280 Bahrain Dinars. The CA, thus, erred in affirming the award of actual or compensatory damages ofP480,000.00 to the respondent spouses.

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (GR. 143338) FACTS: Petitioner Consolidated Bank filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents Del Monte Motor Works (Del Monte) and Narciso Morales and spouse in order to bind the conjugal partnership of the latter. Petitioner Consolidated Bank,

domestic banking and trust corporation, extended a loan (P1M) evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents. Respondents defaulted on their payments which already became due and demandable. Oral and written demands were made but to no avail. Respondent corporation filed its manifestation specifically denying the allegations together with its affirmative defenses. Likewise, respondent Morales filed his manifestation specifically denying liability on the promissory note, claiming that the system of separation of property governs and not the conjugal partnership of gains, and making special and affirmative defenses. During the formal offer of evidence, the original copy of the promissory note (Exhibit A) could no longer be found. Thus, petitioner sought the admission of the duplicate original copy of the same as evidence Exhibit E. The court initially admitted the evidence. Later, both respondents claimed that Exhibit E was immaterial, irrelevant, not properly identified and hearsay evidence, and some markings found in the original promissory note were not contained in Exhibit E. Despite such arguments, they still failed to insist that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were not established. The RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioner without giving the latter opportunity to prove that the original promissory note was delivered to respondent corporation. CA affirmed RTC decision. ISSUE: W/N the Best Evidence Rule is applicable. HELD: No. Both the court a quo and CA erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the

allegation in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner. The respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note. Thus, as far as the parties are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear and leaves no room for disagreement. In the respondents pleadings, the defenses were the alleged lack of consideration and that respondent Morales did not sign the note in his personal capacity. In addition, the Best Evidence Rule admits of exception, one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. In the case at bar, the petitioner would have established that the original of the promissory note was in the possession of respondents. Thus, the exception of the Best Evidence Rule is applicable in this case. As stated earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. Thus, their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. When the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered the original of said note. Therefore, CA decision reversed and set aside. Respondents are obligated to petitioner in the amount of P1M and 23% interest per annum.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007 FACTS: M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioners power barges. Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence. Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits. According to the court a quo: The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals.

The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling. Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition. The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention that the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any printout or output, readable by sight or other means". ISSUE: Whether or not the photo copies offered are functional equivalent of their original following the Rules on Electronic Evidence? RULING: An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.5 It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other

means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.6 The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents.7 However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional

equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. Petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence in case the same has been lost.

VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario

y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, The police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of appellant. A search warrant was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. A team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that they

were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 found at the masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 containing 8 pieces of live ammunition found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms. SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate inventories of the seized items The inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique, the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2 Montezon prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search. Appellant assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being contrary to facts

and the law. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. ISSUES: First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in his bedroom; and Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally seized. HELD: Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal. With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Supporting

jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal. The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the Constitution. True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that

matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when there is: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession or control of the petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control. In People v. de Gracia, we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a

firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability. The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of petitioners daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria, the plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure. With particular reference to the two 2way radios that the raiding policemen also seized in the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The radios were not contraband per se. The National Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios at its discretion. The burden is on the prosecution to show that the

two-way radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed twoway radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the two-way radios. Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such radios is not even included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the Information.

G.R. No. 123906 March 27, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROWENA HERMOSO BENEDICTUS, accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., J.: FACTS: The accused-appellant was charged with thecrime of illegal recruitment under Article 38 in relation to Articles 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the above-named accused, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and/or place workers under local or overseas employment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with false pretenses, undertake illegal recruitment activities, placement or deployment for a fee of Napoleon dela Cruz, ErnestoVasquez, Evangeline Magpayo,

Crisanta Vasquez, Evelyn de Dios and Mercy Magpayo for overseas employment to Taiwan. Upon arraignment, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented as witnesses the complaining victims Napoleon de la Cruz, Crisanta Vasquez, Evelyn de Dios, Mercy Magpayo, and Evangeline Magpayo, as well as Barangay Captain Emerlito Calara. The defense had only the appellant as its witness. When appellant failed to send complainants to Taiwan on the promised date, complainants, together with appellant, went to the Barangay Hall and in front of the Barangay Captain, appellant signed a document (Exhs. "C" and "1") and promised to return the money to them. Complainants, signed a Magkakasamang Salaysay (Exhs. "B" to "B-2") and filed a complaint before the Fiscal's office (TSN, August 11, 1994, p. 3). In support of their complaint, they submitted a certification from the POEA dated July 21, 1994 (Exh. "A") to the effect that appellant, in her personal capacity, was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Upon the other hand, the appellant denied having recruited the complainants. She claimed that she had only borrowed money from them. In support of her claim, she presented the "Affidavit of Desistance" executed by the complainants when she and her sister had paid them her "debt." The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and found unmeritorious appellant's defense. It noted that in appellant's statement before Barangay Captain. There was nothing in said statement that showed that such money was a debt. As to the Affidavit of Desistance, the trial court rejected the same, for it was signed by the complainants after all of them testified in court and were paid by the

appellant. The trial court likewise observed that the appellant had failed to refute the statement in the certification issued by the POEA that she was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment, and that she had even admitted in open court that she was not licensed to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners shall be held liable for illegal recruitment in a large scale even despite the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: Yes. The Affidavit of Desistance did not expressly repudiate their testimony in court on the recruitment activities of the appellant. In fact, the appellant admitted that the complaining witnesses executed it after she had paid them back the amounts they had given her. The affidavit was more of an afterthought arising from personal consideration of pity. We have said before that courts should not attach persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another, for such rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. The challenge against the POEA certification (Exh. "A") that the appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment must likewise fail. The trial court correctly ruled that the said certification is a public document issued by a public officer in the performance of an official duty; hence, it is a prima facie evidence of

the facts therein stated pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. In any event, as said court noted, the appellant admitted in open court that she was not licensed or authorized to recruit workers.

RAFAEL S. ORTAES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents. G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997 FRANCISCO, J.: FACTS: Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. Private respondents received the payments for the abovementioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale: 3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner)

shows proof that all the following requirements have been met: (i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.; (ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation; (iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right of way; (iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. . . During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the oral conditions were barred by the parol evidence rule HELD: Yes. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be

notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co.vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforced 15 expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any preconditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms. Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms

were orally agreed upon by the parties. 17 Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such fraud or mistake exists in this case. Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance: [W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper, interpretation of the instrument. In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof. Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents' contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be, "squarely presented." Private respondents

merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional.

CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style of FNCB Finance, petitioners, vs. MODESTA R. SABENIANO, respondent. G.R. No. 156132 12, 2006 October

FACTS: Petitioner Citibank, N.A. (formerly known as the First National City Bank) is a banking corporation duly authorized and existing under the laws of the United States of America and licensed to do commercial banking activities and perform trust functions in the Philippines. Petitioner Investor's Finance Corporation, which did business under the name and style of FNCB Finance, was an affiliate company of

petitioner Citibank, specifically handling money market placements for its clients. It is now, by virtue of a merger, doing business as part of its successor-in-interest, BPI Card Finance Corporation. On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint against petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Respondent claimed to have substantial deposits and money market placements with the petitioners, as well as money market placements with the Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent's accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent alleged that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements despite her repeated demands, thus, compelling respondent to file Civil Case against petitioners for "Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages." Respondent eventually filed an Amended Complaint on 9 October 1985 to include additional claims to deposits and money market placements inadvertently left out from her original Complaint. In their joint Answer and Answer to Amended Complaint, filed on 12 September 1985 and 6 November 1985, respectively, petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits and money market placements with them, including dollar accounts in the Citibank branch in Geneva, Switzerland (CitibankGeneva). Petitioners further alleged that the respondent later obtained several loans from petitioner Citibank, for which she executed Promissory Notes (PNs), and secured by (a) a

Declaration of Pledge of her dollar accounts in Citibank-Geneva, and (b) Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. When respondent failed to pay her loans despite repeated demands by petitioner Citibank, the latter exercised its right to off-set or compensate respondent's outstanding loans with her deposits and money market placements, pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge and the Deeds of Assignment executed by respondent in its favor. Petitioner Citibank supposedly informed respondent Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation through letters, dated 28 September 1979 and 31 October 1979. Petitioners were therefore surprised when six years later, in 1985, respondent and her counsel made repeated requests for the withdrawal of respondent's deposits and money market placements with petitioner Citibank, including her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. Thus, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that the signature was a forgery. Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the pledge produced before the RTC so as to have it examined by experts. Yet, despite several Orders by the RTC, petitioner Citibank failed to comply with the production of the original Declaration of Pledge. It is admitted that Citibank-Geneva had possession of the original copy of the pledge.

When the parties failed to reach a compromise during the pre-trial hearing, trial proper ensued and the parties proceeded with the presentation of their respective evidence. Ten years after the filing of the Complaint on 8 August 1985, a Decision was finally rendered on 24 August 1995 by the fourth Judge who handled the said case, Judge Manuel D. Victorio, holding Petitioners off set as illegal, null and void and was ordered to return the amounts to respondent; while respondent was also ordered to pay its loans with petitioner. ISSUE: WON it was correct for the court to admit as evidence photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's loans. HELD: Best evidence rule This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily dismissing the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the best evidence rule. In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself, to the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence. The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3, which reads SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no

evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was

actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original. Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil 565). x xx 115 This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent's position that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans.

Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof. Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was established through the testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents were personally executed by respondent. The original PNs also went through the whole loan booking system of petitioner Citibank from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the pre-processor, to the signature verifier, back to the pre-processor, then to the processor for 117 booking. The original PNs were seen by Ms.Dondoyano, the processor, who

recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr.Pujeda personally saw the original MCs, proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys. Cleofe and Fernandez, the bank's legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of respondent's loans. The original MCs were presented to Atty. Cleofe who used the same during the preliminary investigation of the case, sometime in years 1986-1987. The original MCs were subsequently turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner Citibank.118 It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the PNs when it moved to a new office. Citibank did not make a similar contention; instead, it explained that the original copies of the PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation of the loan, either through payment or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that they were still looking for the documents in their storage or warehouse to explain the delay and difficulty in the retrieval thereof, but not their absence or loss. The original documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus, unavailable for presentation before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a fire broke out on the 7th floor of the office building of petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the fire was intentionally set. The fire destroyed relevant documents, not just of the present case, but also of other cases, since the 7th floor housed the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of keeping the necessary documents for cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved. The foregoing would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of

photocopies or microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners as secondary evidence to establish the existence of respondent's loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule.