Realism, Liberalism in FPA

Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict Author(s): Thomas S.
Mowle Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 561-592 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792326 . Accessed: 03/02/2013 16:28
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Vol.24, No. 3, 2003 PoliticalPsychology,
in Foreign Worldviews Liberalism, Policy:Realism, and External Conflict

Thomas S. Mowle
United States Air Force Academy
relations International studieshave been unableto determine whether realistor liberal theories in various have better becausethese studies situations, fitstatebehavior possibly attributed and actionto thestatesrather thanto thedecision-makers them. motive within Thisarticledevelopsa new,moredirect this approachto resolving problem. Hypotheses weretested conditions underwhich decision-makers are likely to articulate a regarding consistent with liberalor realist elements Thiswas representation problem ofa worldview. done by content about36 foreign analysisof statements conflicts by thegovernments of three nations-theUnited States, Canada, and India-over a 16-year "bystander" period. Thefindings indicatethatsystemic and situational than factorsare far moreimportant domestic wars in congruence withliberalism factors.Statestendto represent primarily whentheir is alreadyassuredby another does not security poweror whentheconflict involve orfellowdemocracies. most the realism are allies,rivals, Thus, of expectations of at thepsychological level. supported
KEY WORDS: problem content worldview, representation, foreign policydecision-making, analyStatesforeign international relations sis,United policy, theory
Liberaland realist theories of international behavior present quitedifferent visions ofhowstates interact with oneanother. individual scholars differ Although in their of theseparadigms, thosein each schooltendto sharesome presentation basic principles. For example, realists that interstate generally suggest cooperationis severely limited its own security in a by each state'sneed to guarantee ofanarchy, whereas liberals that canbe made globalcondition suggest cooperation moretenable formal or informal institutions. Thesepositions havebeen through debated overtheyears-from Carr(1939) through Grieco(1988, 1990,1993)and Keohane(1993)-but politicalscientists have so farbeen unableto show that either of theseunderstandings of theworldbetter explainshow statesactually behave.
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0162-895X0 2003 International of Political Society Psychology Published OX4 2DQ Inc.,350 Main Street, Malden,MA 02148,USA, and 9600 Garsington Road,Oxford, by BlackwellPublishing.
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to choose between thetwoexplanations is One reasonit has been difficult scholars differ wheninterpreting theevidence: Where one scholar sees liberal that At thebroadest level ofpolicy, sees self-interest. another institutionalism, Layne U.S. foreign and Schwarz (1993,p. 5) described policysincethe1950sas "liberal President Clinton's whereas Mearsheimer internationalist," (1995,p. 5) contrasted narrower Ata much with Cold War"balanceofpower "neo-Wilsonism" politics." Grieco(1993,p. 327) and Keohane(1993,p. 280) bothexamined levelofpolicy, WhileGriecowrote toa steelanti-dumping thesamestates' agreement. opposition forrelative that realist concern theopposition showed that gains,Keohanewrote forabsolute theopposition showedliberalconcern gains.As Keohaneadmitted tooneanother's "twoparties that areindifferent is that (1993,p. 279),theproblem careaboutrelative as ifthey welfare willbehave,at themargin, gains."Keohane as theyare of is right: Liberalism and realismare as muchqualitiesof motive mustsomehow A comparison of thetwoapproaches action. pryopentheintent the the level of analysisfrom behindthe action.In other words,it mustshift within intent norindependent action-to theindividuals state-whichhas neither as suggested andPollack(2001). thestate whodirect action, byByman purposive to breakthrough This article uses problem and worldviews representations stateactions. theambiguity often foundwhenone triesto interpret large-scale in thecontext ofa common, andunderThesequestions areexamined important, A state is facedwith an "external conflict"-awarorother milstudied situation: a in action to which it is not which it later (but intervene). initially party may itary This article's consistent withthesystemic and situational are generally findings factors (1993). suggested byWaltz(1979), Grieco(1988), andMaoz andRussett In particular, itappears that decision-makers tendto express a problem represena realist worldview in situations tation consistent with more often whentheexternal conflict is objectively moreimportant to that state. and Problem Worldviews Representations A state'sbehavior is notreflexive; it flowsfrom theway itsforeign rather, understand whatis happening. Forexample, members of policydecision-makers theReagan administration in themid-1980s believedthatcooperation withthe Sovietswouldproduce Sovietassertiveness, notfurther 1988, (Jervis, cooperation could(anddid) define thesituation andtheappropriate U.S. stratp. 326). Others These assumptions-which include actors in the egydifferently. imagesof other causal beliefs abouthowthey interact with one another, andprescriptions world, about appropriate coursesof action-constitute a "worldview" (Barber,1993, & McCoy,1998,p. 117;Doyle,1997,p. 17;Young,1998,p. 215). p. 131;Cottam The worldview influences theway individuals interact withreality: "Beliefsset and whenan eventoccurs, we are likely to interpret theevent up expectations, in relation to ourexpectations" (Voss & Dorsey,1992,p. 11). Relatedresearch includesHolsti's (1962) and Jervis'(1976) workwithperception, Brecher's
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ofthemeaning of andWendt's (1992,p. 397) discussion (1972) attitudinal prism, anarchy. to The worldview is not,unfortunately, observable. One approach directly in detail is to followin the footsteps an individual worldview of describing orGeorge's(1979) operational Axelrod's codes,as has (1977) cognitive mapping andCrichlow beendonebyDille (2000),Dille andYoung(2000), Schafer (2000), is similar to Hermann's on Hafez andWalker (1988) work (1995). Thisapproach is difficult to apply, wheremany actors are relal-Assad.This method however, theresults cannot be generalized toother indiina state. evant Furthermore, easily SaddamHussein. viduals,even (in Hermann's case) to Assad's fellowBaathist realism is notwell suited to addressing thedebatebetween Hence,thisapproach in international it is an essential ofunderand liberalism relations, part although of a specific and itsleader. andpredicting thebehavior state standing The approach is notto developa fullmap of theworldused in thisarticle relevant to the to addressonlythoseaspectsof theworldview view,butrather it assumes ofexternal thisapproach, conflicts. Further representation simplifying or liberalism. thatthispartial worldview could alignmoreor less withrealism the This is a reasonable if we consider where worldviews, assumption especially The worldviews of foreign lens of academia decision-makers, policy originate. either frames theirvision of international affairs. ultimately They are trained in universities or advisors with formal Their vision, however, directly by training. will be somewhat Decision-makers are usuallynottheorists blurred. (Kissinger decibecausethey must usejudgment to makeforeign beingan exception), policy sionsthataffect of their state(George,1993). Therefore, whattheyunderstand in international will be down-a the worldview political lacking theory stripped of thetheories ofWaltz(1979) or Russett (1993). subtlety Mostcommonly, national decision-makers will see thebroadoutlines, dimly traced to illuminating of as to whatactions are lectures, assertions undergraduate In other worldviews do from not words, generally appropriate. spring randomly each individual's butare learned of a combination uniqueexperiences, through formal and with other socialization study policymakers. Doyle (1997,p. 36) sugtheseworldviews will be parallelto countries, gestedthatat leastin "Western" the majortheoretical Tetlock(1993) observedthat"policymakers approaches. have beenfound to relyheavily on theory-driven as opposedto data-driven proevidence"(p. 323) and that"the influence tacticsthat cessing of incoming colored by psychological and political policymakers adopt are profoundly foreliciting (a) themosteffective assumptions theyhold concerning strategies desired from other states and(b) thenature ofother states andtheprobresponses able responses of thestates" (p. 326). Theories of international contain assertions politics analogousto thoseof a worldview abouthow international actors behave.A leadermaynaively believe thata multilateral institution can lead to lasting between the states; cooperation astute theorist that thepresence oforderly alters thebasic mayconclude regimes causal variables thatwouldotherwise conflict between states(Krasner, promote
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drives thathumannature leadermay simply be certain 1983, p. 361). Another deduce other leadersto lustforpower;thesophisticated may politicalscientist the because otherwise not security-seeking, thatstatesmustbe power-seeking, dilemmawould have fallen apart years ago to produce harmony security 2001; Schweller, 1996,pp. 117-118). Keohane(1986), referring (Mearsheimer, "No onecan has stated, from ofdeveloping totheimportance assumptions, theory or theaid either of a theory without of world thecomplexities politics cope with for howeverpoorly, thatsubstitute, and propositions of implicit assumptions between intocategories, andrelationships drawn has tobe ordered Reality theory. events" (p. 4). can that to infer a worldview evaluates Thismethod problem representations is a mental A problem and liberalism. be compared withrealism representation about the and expectations model of goals, constraints, solutions, preferred ofvarious tactics effectiveness (Beasley,1998,pp.81-83; Newell& Simon,1972; to Snyder, and Sapin's (1962, pp. Bruck, Voss, 1998,pp. 9-13). This is similar ofa situation" 1992,p. 6). Problem (Voss & Dorsey, 64-65) "definition representhem down to solve decision-makers tations complex problems by breaking help tied are These intosmaller, more representations inherently manageable problems. as discussed Simon to elements of their beliefstructure, (1969, 68-72), pp. by (1991,p. 328), and SylvanandVoss (1998). Majeski,andMilliken Sylvan, can influence future coursesof action.Allison The problem representation the offendid Soviet Union asked, 1) (1971, p. classically "Why place strategic thatthe the situation, he specified sive missilesin Cuba?" By so structuring was "How should we respond to thestrateU.S. decision-makers problem facing that in Further research has shown once ExComm missiles Cuba?" offensive gic misraw information as "Soviet offensive the intelligence strategic interpreted "deterrent enhancements to the Cuban right to siles" (as opposedto, perhaps, members less to choose the less forceful defend its became itself"), likely options 1992; Thorson, 1984). (Sylvan& Thorson, can be found in official statements issuedaboutthe Problem representations raises an important state'spolicy and purpose.This use of public statements whichmustbe addressed before of thisapproach, questionaboutthe validity in define terms of observable not One must behavior, foreign policy proceeding. an unobservable Public observable can be statements, behavior, "goals." aggrein policystances(Hermann, 1978). Much of thebest gatedto discovertrends relations research international (Grieco,1990, pp. 182-183; Hellman& Wolf, to seekoutliberalism orrealism. 1993;Mastanduno, 1991)usespolicystatements Thisholdsas wellfor much oftheresearch doneon problem (e.g., representations follows theapproach 1998; Tetlock, 1985; Young,1998). This article Breuning, of Cottam and McCoy (1998, pp. 129-139),whoemphasized that werenot they the collective thosethatrepresented Carter images,but rather seekingprivate Because "foreign one can meanadministration. policyis a publicenterprise.., referto publicly-expressed ingfully problemrepresentations" (Sylvan, 1998,
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are rarely one has little choice:Internal documents extent, p. 340). To a certain andthey willnotprovide casestobuildupon. availablefor very many comparison, memoirs are opento theauthor's Private may spin,and evenallegedtranscripts notfaithfully theproceedings 1992,pp. 172-176).Analyz(Gaenslen, represent to discern theunderlying Riker's worldviews movestoward ingpublicstatements in small, (1977, pp. 28-29) ideal of scientific progress through studying patterns events rather than to "generalize abouthugeevents which turn out repeated trying to belongto classes withveryfewmembers." Witha largeN, trialballoonsor statements thatdo notaccurately reflect theofficial can problem representation be expectedto have limited on the overall and such inaccurate impact study, wouldtendto maketheanalytical results problem representations appearto be less significant if than would be we were able to exclude such cases. they Further the concern about of the this statements, reducing validity public is notconcerned article withindividuals and their worldviews. Instead, personal thefocusis on observable "official" that result from the representations problem In order to to an external conflict other (or any policymaking process. respond thedecision-makers mustagreeupon,or agreeto accept,a "group" situation), Hoffman exam(1993) and Janis (1982) bothprovided problem representation. of that come to a common of ples decision-making groups accept representation theproblem their own held views. and Hermann (1998) despite privately Billings there concluded, "Amonggroupmembers maybe different problem representations butitis most that thegroup can moveto closure on a deciinitially, unlikely sionwithout tacit if not total most members on the acceptance, agreement, among (1998) and SylvanandHaddad problem representation" (p. 56). Rubino-Hallman theformation of grouprepresentations in their (1998) have bothdemonstrated work. Voss and thework ofCottam (1977), conempirical Dorsey(1992), citing with theapproach usedinthis article: "From thepolicyadopted curred bya given one can infer a prevailing worldview that heldby a hypostate, approximating thetical decision maker" worldviews wouldproduce different (p. 16). If different then we can infer elements oftheunderlying collective problem representations, worldview with theproblem bybeginning representation. This approach us to be able to isolateelements of problem requires reprefrom whichone infers a worldview to compare with realism and libsentations, eralism. We can beginbytreating realism andliberalism as coherent worldviews. We can then deducewhatsort of problem wouldbe developed representation by a hypothetical whoseworldview to realism or libperson corresponded precisely eralism. We can identify theelements of thoseideal problem of representations an external conflict that wouldbe distinctly realist orliberal. Five suchindicators aredescribed below.We can then search for thoseindicators among problem representations in official found statements aboutexternal conflicts. The presence of these indicators can be usedto infer theextent to which theactualworldview that to a purelyrealistor shaped a particular problem representation corresponds liberal worldview.
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Indicators ofRealistand LiberalWorldviews and indicators of theseideal worldviews, Beforeidentifying characteristic of realism on to develophypotheses, we mustestablish thenature thenmoving theterms have andliberalism. Thisis more difficult than onemight for anticipate, is not the time. the other this article beenused somewhat over On hand, casually of realism and for which there are to recreate the entire liberalism, place history in addition to those described sources many existing here.1 in describing thestandard division the Doyle (1997, pp. 93-136) followed and structural the classical realismtypified (1985, pp. 4-17) by Morgenthau realismtypified by Waltz (1979, pp. 105-107). Legro and Moravcsik(1999, ofall realisms is that the relevant actors a coreassumption that pp. 12-17) asserted in other states. units are"rational Moreover, words, anarchy"-in unitary political or disstategoals are fundamentally conflictual, although they maybe "deterred wielded their suaded" from pursuing preferences by superior power by other between states areresolved on thebasis of material states. Conflicts capabilities. Theresulting ofbehavior, as described (1995,pp. 11-12), byMearsheimer pattern on short-term is mutual fearand suspicion between an emphasis states, interests, overother states. Mearsheimer and thepursuit of relative (2001) has advantage which has beencalled offentheview that states seek power, further elaborated sive realism, thatif all Schweller's(1996, pp. 117-118) observation following thenthebasis of conflict wouldhave dwindled statesonlyseek security, away This is therealism that forms thebasis of boththecriteria belowand overtime. thelaterhypotheses. even less unified. Liberalism is, if anything, Nye (1988, p. 246) described and institutional theseset aside commercial, democratic, variants; sociological, whichis moreakinto theutopianism theWilsonian "liberal idealism," critiqued tendto overlap, as described by Carr(1939). These liberalisms by Doyle (1997, has at its root a phenomenon pp. 230-300), in thateach typeof liberalism described either moddefined, (1983,p. 361): An institution, by Krasner broadly erates state orconstrains state actions. Rather than on preferences relying directly "actors invoke norms as shortcuts totheir self-interests, powerto achievenarrow decision criteria andthelater 1993,p. 471). Thefollowing (Kratochwil, problems"
For additional of thedifferences and commonalities between liberalism and realism, descriptions see Baldwin(1993, pp. 4-8), Kegley(1995), Mearsheimer (1991, (1995), Niou and Ordeshook (1992, pp. 391-393). Realismis also described p. 484), Powell (1994, pp. 340-343), and Wendt by Claude (1962, pp. 90-92), Grieco (1990), Hellmanand Wolf (1993), and Kaplan (1957, is described etal. (1957), Doyle (1986), Goldstein andKeohane pp. 23-29). Liberalism byDeutsch (1993), Keohane(1984), Keohaneand Nye (1977), Lake (1992), Maoz and Russett (1993), Martin is advocated (1992), Mitrany (1966), and Rosenau(1990). Collectivesecurity (1988, by Bennett p. 135), Cusack and Stoll (1992, p. 5), and Riggs and Plano (1994, pp. 100-101) and is seen as unworkable by Betts (1992), Claude (1962, pp. 97-110), Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), Mearsheimer (1995), andMorgenthau (1985, p. 452).
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of liberalism, withsomeemphasis followthisgeneral understanding hypotheses on the most relevant variants-thoseof democratic peace, derivedfromthe research best institutionalism, (1993), andneoliberal agendapioneered byRussett described by Keohane(1993). Fromtheseidealizedforms ofrealism andliberalism, thefollowing fivecriteria can be deducedas beingmostlikely to distinguish a problem representation from of an external conflict thatflowsfrom a realist worldview one thatflows from a liberal worldview: 1. Concern versus absolutegainsaccruing todifferent actorsas forrelative a result the This is external indicator central to the literature (see, conflict. of e.g., Keohane,1993; Niou & Ordeshook, 1991; Waltz,1979). A realist problem representation ofan external conflict wouldinclude thequestion "Can mystate suffer a relative loss based on theoutcomeof thisconflict?" If some other statecan achievea relative then some action or should be taken to (external internal) gain, counter it. Likewise,people witha realistworldview would be interested in the conflict, any potential exploiting gains theirown statecould accrue from or intrastate. whether it is interstate If a coalition realists would exists, expectto see dissension the over the of war (see Krasner, among partners distributing spoils on theother "based 1991). Those witha liberalworldview, hand,takepositions on their assessments of their ownwelfare, notthat of others" (Keohane,1984,p. to thegainsachieved 66) and are "indifferent (Grieco,1988,p. 487). by others" A liberal wouldaddress whether one's ownstate can gain problem representation or lose power,without explicitconcernfor the differential impacton other states. 2. A primary concern with versus collective norms and one's own interests interests. Neither side of thedebateexcludestherelevance of either norms or buttheemphasis differs. Some realists assert that the interests, interests, beyond basicinterest ofsurvival, areassigned distribution ofnational bytherelative capabilities however-those (Powell,1994,pp. 317-318). The more interests, precise to be found in policystatements-would be endogenous anduniqueto the likely state.Liberals,on theother norms can changestate hand,believeinstitutional leaders'conceptions of their own interests (Keohane, 1993, p. 271). A realist wouldconsider theeffects of a conflict on thematerial, problem representation short-term and security-related, interests ofthestate. A liberal problem representation would derivelonger-term "interests" from thenorms of an international often enshrined in a formal institution. One exampleof thisis U.S. community, National Advisor Lake's 1993remark that "totheextent democSecurity Anthony economics hold swayin other ourown nation will be nations, racyand market moresecure, and influential" (citedby Layne, 1994,p. 46). Lake's prosperous andlater UN involvement in several internal that these remarks, conflicts, suggest norms haveevolvedto coverinternal as well as international A collecconflicts. tivesecurity wouldbe theultimate of a liberalism in which system expression interests aredefined in terms of a community norm ofpeaceful resolution ofdis-
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balanceof power" of powerreplaces "community putes.In Betts'(1992) words, in on protection 3. Emphasis ofothers protection of one's ownstateversus of for balance The classic an international power(e.g., community. arguments others fearthat Claude, 1962,p. 127; Waltz,1979,p. 118) relyon theultimate state. In threaten one's own whobecomemore contrast, mayeventually powerful thanby fear. The illegitimate is motivated moreby outrage theliberalresponse whichmust an institution of stability, use of force constitutes "cheating" against be brought down(Axelrod & Keohane,1993,pp. lesttheinstitution be punished backto Kantandespe94-105; Powell,1991,p. 1308). Thisviewcan be traced with one shares a common interest In a Kantian to Grotius. worldview, many cially is justiwhom action an set of others any "oppressors" against against opposing that states must follow The Grotian worldview evenobligatory. fied, emphasizes a WorldInternational rulesso as to maintain Society(Bull, 1985,pp. 30-33). the would focus on "justice"and identifying Liberal problem representations and wouldfocus on "danger" whereas realist problem representations "aggressor," one. focusthan theprevious "threat." Thisindicator has a more military narrowly interms versus 4. Viewing theconflict's ofthecombatants only, ramifications and libstates.Bothrealists be taken in terms byother ofthelessonsthat might of a conflict, butrealism once again themselves with theaftermath eralsconcern in a balance more Claude(1962,p. 127) saw states caststhese concerns narrowly. intheconflict. with theparticipants as most concerned (1985, Morgenthau system in war as often leadingto imperialist policies.Waltz(1979) p. 67) saw victory ifitwins. wouldalso focuson thepotential relative gainbyone ofthecombatants if Serbiawere in theearly1990s might have argued that For example, a realist Macedoniaor from to attack notprevented Bosnia,it wouldnexttry conquering thatanyother recover Croatia.Therewouldbe no reasonto presume, however, it also coulduse military that statewouldobserveSerbiansuccessand conclude The liberal on theother conto resolve border force worldview, hand, grievances. must be siderstheimpact on other countries' behavior: "Aggression" punished, couldencourage other becausethesuccessful use offorce or "genocide" stopped, Axis powers ofthe1930s,in which all three countries to followsuit.The history to each other's seemto have been encouraged response by thelack of effective a solid The of was not actions, provides example. policy appeasement military of "liberal"idealismas an expression of liberalism-it was a combination to divert war toward critiqued heavilyby Carr(1939) and a realismof trying in & to Serbia the 1990s, other 1990). Returning (Christensen Snyder, targets the liberalwould have been concerned thatSerbianvictory undermine might international normsagainst overrunning sovereignmembersof the United andusingarmed force minorities, Nations, against religious committing genocide follow lead other countries for to to settle This (Russia, example) disputes. might Clinton thesamestrategy. (1993) citedPresident alongthese Layneand Schwarz lines.
(p.203).
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5. Viewing alliancesand multilateral institutions as a toolofthestateversus as thegoal of thestate.For realists, coalitions are usefultools forimproving the futuredistribution of national one's chances of favorably influencing where today's alliance marriagesof convenience, capabilities-"temporary be tomorrow's 1995,p. 11). Anycoalition(Mearsheimer, partner might enemy" of any initialactionstaken, would be independent however, buildingeffort, ifthere is one,must be addressed withor without becausethethreat, assistance. The states wouldalso tend notto allowthealliancetodirect their because actions, interest inretaining states havea strong their 1993, (Grieco, independence p. 315; see also Hellman & Wolf,1993,pp. 9-10; Morgenthau, 1985,pp. 201-202;Walt, on theother has defined hand,theinternational 1987). For liberals, community the norms violated. which not need be Institutions, (Stein, being organizations states to workmultilaterally evenwhere interests do not 1993,p. 46), encourage Because the institution is an in value indiitself, converge. maintaining important vidualstates defer to thegroup decision on actions tobe taken, evenifthat decision is notthestate'sideal policychoice(Stein,1993). Thus,theposition taken withrespect to theexternal conflict will followthelead and guidanceof other in theinstitution. states In principle, of course, a problem couldinclude bothsidesof representation some of thesecriteria. For example, thestatecouldbe concerned withboththe immediate combatants and thelessonothers wouldtakefrom it.Likewise, both national and community interests couldbe affected by a war.If botharepresent, thenone looksto other indicators to decidewhether theproblem representation seemsto better fit realism or liberalism; iftheseare inconclusive, then one evaluatestheproblem as mixed.Nothing in thismethod assumesthat representation all problem can be categorized, northat all theworldviews one representations infers from them willbe close to an ideal form of liberalism or realism.
Hypotheses
This article examines states' to external wars responses conflicts-"foreign" and military in which werenotan initial Suchconengagements they participant. flicts from (as in Somalia),orthey maybe remote anypowerinterest mayinvolve a military rival(as in theSovietinvasion of Afghanistan) or threaten an importanteconomicresource (as in theIraqi invasionof Kuwait).In some of these theinitial nation intervenes withdiplomatic, ecoconflicts, bystander eventually or military nomic, power. This topicis suitablemethodologically, a largenumber of cases, yielding because the leadersof statesmustconsider how their stateshouldreactto an external conflict much more often than toone inwhich their state is an initial proSubstantive reasons also this choice of issue area. As Levy(1989, tagonist. guide thefieldof international relations has paid too little attention p. 216) has noted,
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intoongoing conflicts.2 This seemscurious, considto theissue of interventions a states. For the as conflict between two that all wars example, major begin ering war in the of initial were rather Austro-Serbian decisions "bystanders" important warof 1939,theKoreancivilwarof 1950,and the of 1914,theGerman-Polish forexamining thecondiwarof 1990.Thisarticle laysa foundation Iraq-Kuwait conflict is likely, andtheexpected nature whenintervention intoan ongoing tions of that intervention. Peace is definedusing the StockholmInternational "Externalconflict" of war (Sollenberg, "a contested ResearchInstitute's definition 1995, p. 20): is concerns and/or where armed force which government territory incompatibility twoparties, of whichat leastone is thegovernment of a state"used between is thegovernment orcitizenry ofthestate andfor this neither observstudy, party on theconflict, as in thecommon ingthewar.This does notplace a lowerlimit definition used by Small and Singer(1982), in partforthesake ofthoroughness stateunderstudy cannot and in partbecausetheleadersof theinitial bystander of casualties. This study does notdistinguish be sureof thefinal extent between intrastate conflicts becausethat andinterstate question maybe wrapped up in the as in Bosnia.Furthermore, have manyoftheseconflicts problem representation, bothintrastate and interstate elements. with this choiceofsubject is that One difficulty theliterature on international of specific whata sparsein terms politicsis relatively hypotheses concerning or a liberalmight to an external realist focuson withrespect conflict. Blainey about bystanders' (1988, pp. 57-67) notedthatthe combatants' expectations behavior are important, butdid notoffer a wayto predict that behavior. Liberals tend tobe less concerned aboutexternal conflict than realists. (1985) Morgenthau "the that standard for ... involvement and for the suggested judging determining of... was whether in an shift the distribution response policymakers important of powerwas taking place and henceof thestatus quo" (p. 57). This raisesthe of the conflict was question why "important." The following are thussomewhat in their eclectic sources. hypotheses They aregrouped intothree levelsof analysis. The twosystemic basedon hypotheses, a state'spositionin the international mustbe derivedprimarily from system, because liberalism have does not a version. Situational realism, fullysystemic based on attributes oftheconflicts comefrom a mixture themselves, hypotheses, of realistand liberalsources.Threeof theseare derived from Grieco's(1988) assertion that"thecoefficient fora state'ssensitivity to gaps in payoffs.., .will ifa state's be greater is a rather than a partner long-term adversary long-term ally;
2
Thisquestion was a majorfocusofBlainey(1988) andhas also beenexamined and Bueno byAlteld de Mesquita andWilkenfeld (1979),Brecher (1982),Buenode Mesquita (1981),Butterworth (1978), Cusack and Eberwein and Azar (1978), Gochmanand Long (1982), Eberwein (1982), Eckhardt and Maoz (1984), Haas (1983), Kaw (1990), Kegleyand Raymond (1983), Gochman (1986), Kim andKegley(1987), andSiverson andKing(1980). Alker (1991), Pearson (1974a, 1974b),Raymond and Christenson circumstances under which the (1972) andAlkerand Greenberg (1977) examined in wars. United Nations intervenes
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iftheissue involves rather than economic ifthestate'srelasecurity well-being; ontherise"(p. 501). To these tivepower has beenonthedecline rather than realist a democracy is in theconflict. we add a liberal one basedon whether hypotheses, we have three domestic The one based on economicperhypotheses. Finally, is enoughof a stateattribute to be derived formance from whereas the realism, other twomust be derived from becauserealists do notlook liberalism, primarily within thestate. thisarticle Note that does nothypothesize that worldview is anyindividual so readily from to idealism. liberalism realist andliberal thechanging Although oriescan be viewedas distinct "ideal"worldviews, this is notto saythat anyindiholds such a "pure" liberal or realist vidual, or any group of individuals, worldview wouldalmost be (Doyle, 1997,pp. 17-37). Real worldviews certainly more the lines Russett in his nor(1993, 31-34) complex, suggested along by pp. mative of thedemocracy-peace in a market explanation puzzle.Decision-makers to tend have one set of beliefs about how other market democdemocracy may racieswillbehaveorreact, anda very different setofbeliefs about howtheleaders of less developed states willbehaveorreact, couldeasily yetthesesetsofbeliefs coexistwithin a singlecoherent In thiscase, the hypotheses worldview. will that are to the more realist or liberal dimensions of suggest scripts likely trigger thecomplexactualworldview Shank & FurtherAbelson,1977). (Larson,1994; thisarticle does notdefine butinfers a "group more, worldview, anyindividual worldview" thathas been expressedin the group's problemrepresentation. Changesin theproblem representation mayreflect competition amongmembers of the decisiongroup,as seen in the Carteradministration (Campbell,2001; Lebow & Stein,1993) or in debatewithin the first Bush administration over whether thewarin Bosnia was an internal or international conflict (Baker,1995, does not 2000, pp. 217-231). This article p. 637; Bert,1997,p. 97; Woodward, address theprocessby whicha singleproblem is developed from representation each decision-maker's individual representation.3 Systemic Hypotheses 1: Ifa statehas itssecurity then it state, Hypothesis guaranteed byanother willbe morelikely to express a liberalproblem conrepresentation of external
in complexsituations are discovered the decision Axelrod(1977) arguedthatinterests through notseparately from it. Shapiroand Bonham(1982) argued that thepowerand interests of process, theindividuals inthegroup influence thefinal Thebestrecent work strongly problem representation. on thesubject is by SylvanandVoss (1998). Within that that text, Beasley(1998) found approaches Voss (1998) indicated thatonce individuals form emphasize "competing preferences" inadequate. their with reluctance: with the problem representations, they onlychangethem Theytendto tinker solution or searchforscapegoats before a representation. He believedthat redeveloping changeis morelikelyin a group context. similar to thestory model Sylvanand Haddad(1998), in a manner ofjurydeliberation set forth and Hastie(1987), suggested that by Pennington groupsselectfrom on thebasis of whichone creates themorecompelling amongcompeting problem representations narrative.
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than states that must their ownsecurity. Waltz(1979) suggested that flicts provide realismmaybe less common wereprovided amongstateswhose"preservation reduces their concern overrelative by others" (pp. 70-71). Thisprotection gains and losses.(See Table 1 fortheoperationalization ofthisand all other independentvariables.) Liberaltheory wouldnotexpectthisto be a significant factor. 2: If a statehas itssecurity then it state, guaranteed byanother Hypothesis will be morelikely to express a liberalproblem conrepresentation of external whenthedistribution in theinternational is bipolar flicts of capabilities system thanwhen itis notbipolar.BothWaltz(1964; 1979,pp. 161-193) andJames and Brecher realist have asserted thata multipolar (1988), following theory, system is less stable, in thesenseof preventing distribution of capawar,thana bipolar bilities. A "protected" stateshouldbe less readyto pursue liberal policieswhen theinternational is not because war and alliances could system bipolar, shifting its status. be as change protected today's system Although might unipolar opposed to multipolar, (2001) illustrated Layne(1993,p. 7) andMearsheimer whyrealists wouldexpectother statesin a unipolar to if behave as the were system system Because states must balance to will balance multipolar. getsecurity, they against even an apparently benevolent (1994), working unipole.Kegleyand Raymond from liberal theopposite-that a future world could theory, suggested multipolar be peaceful and stable. Situational Hypotheses 3: If no long-term is involved in theexternal Hypothesis adversary conflict, either as an initial as or a that has chosento intervene, participant bystander then an initially statewillbe morelikely to express a liberal bystanding problem than it in would where such an is involved. representation conflicts adversary Grieco(1988, p. 501), writing from realist that thepresence of theory, suggested an adversary is one of thesituations that wouldincrease "a state'ssensitivity to gaps in payoffs." 4: If noformal allies oftheobserving statewereinitial Hypothesis military then thebystander statewouldbe morelikely to express a partiesto theconflict, liberal thanitwouldtoward inwhich suchallies problem representation conflicts wereinitial Thishypothesis also flows from realist seenin Grieco parties. theory, (1988,p. 501), andhas beensupported (1994,p. 496) andMoul (1988). byReiter the mere current involvement of a rival is enoughto trigger the Although forthisone theally mustbe an initialparty, nota later preceding hypothesis, participant. 5: Ifone oftheinitial combatants is perceived tobe a procedural Hypothesis then democracies are morelikely to express a democracy, bystanding procedural realist thanthey wouldtoward in problem representation oftheconflict conflicts which no procedural is an initial combatant. Realisttheorists would democracy notexpecttheregime to affect butliberal theorists type problem representations,
in ForeignPolicy Worldviews Table 1. Variable Operationalization Hypothesis 1 2 3 Variable Guaranteed security Bipolar security Current rival Value = 1 ifthestate has itssecurity guaranteed by a pole,= 0 ifthe takesresponsibility foritsownsecurity. state
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= 1 ifthesecurity is from a bipole(pre-31December guarantee 1991),= 0 otherwise. = 1 ifone of themilitary is a current in theconflict participants rivalof theobserving as defined state, by Diehl (1985); = 0 otherwise. = 1 ifat leastone of themilitary in theconflict is a participants rivalof theobserving as defined state, long-term by Geller(1993, on Wayman and Jones (1991, pp. 5pp. 180-181),based in turn 6); = 0 otherwise. = 1 ifat leastone of theinitial in theconflict is a participants formal as defined state, by Kegley military allyof theobserving and Raymond (1990, p. 52) and Sorokin (1994, p. 425) [Walt's of allianceis too vagueand Reiter's (1987, p. 12) definition (1994, = 0 otherwise. p. 495) is too restrictive]; = 1 ifone or moreof theprincipal in theconflict receives a parties on democracy scoreof 7 or greater in thePOLITY III index & Gurr, POLITY II (Gurr, 1995),whichupdates 1990) (Jaggers [Lake (1992, p. 35) and Maoz & Russett (1993, pp. 628-629) also use thisdefinition, whichis similar to thestandard definitions used in comparative suchas Linz (1975, pp. 182-183)];= 0 politics, otherwise. = 1 iftheconflict = 0 ifitis is outside thesphere of interests, within it. = 1 ifeconomic is negative fortwoconsecutive growth quarters, = 0 otherwise. = 1 iftheeconomy is growing at a slowerratethan theG-7 [using theOECD as an alternative wouldproduce the comparison group same results; no comparison forIndia],= 0 groupwas found otherwise. = thepercentage of theAmerican saying they "approve" and its (in TheGallupPoll Monthly president's "job performance" TheGallupReport andtheGallupOpinion Index)or predecessors, who wouldvotefortheprime in Canada (as minister's party in Hastings & Hastings, are 1978-1994).Poll answers reported assumedto be validfor1 month oruntil thenext poll is taken, whichever is shorter. Insufficient datawerefound to include this forIndia.A smallamount variable of dataare missing forCanada and theUnited Stateswhenthegap between consecutive polls exceeded1 month.
Long-term rival
Ally
Democracy
6 7 7
Distance Absolute recession Relative recession
Popularity
willoccurin thenext3 months 1994, (Meernik, Approaching = 1 ifan election election p. 131),= 0 otherwise.
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would.This hypothesis but notethatall interstate may seem counterintuitive, external conflicts either Thus,they (so far)involveat leastone non-democracy. or betweendemocracies and non-democracies. are betweennon-democracies in support tendto form coalitions of Lake (1992) has shownthatdemocracies Thisimmediate other democracies under attack. mutual support amongdemocrain which cies should "starts" thewar, case theinitial applyevenifthedemocracy is would be that the war for a reason beingfought legitimate (Doyle, assumption alliancesarefeatures of liberalism, such 1986,pp. 1160-1162).Although lasting tactical coalitions a current or imminent threat are more consistent with against realism. As withtheprior two situational the value of this variable hypotheses, can change thecourseoftheconflict: Democratic nations maycease to be during ones mayadopta democratic such,or non-democratic regime. a conflict tothebystander 6: As thedistance stateincreases, from Hypothesis a liberal becomes more to be Walt(1987) problem representation likely expressed. as of usedgeographic one the reasons a state will leading perceive proximity why a threat from another. Realisttheory wouldexpect therepresentation of an external conflict to be based in part on theextent of a military so conflicts that threat, a realist occurclose to a state's borders wouldbe viewedthrough lens.Suchconflicts are morelikelyto spilloverintoone's own state, and theyare also more than to in an distant conflicts result increased threat. Moredistant likely military on the other would be more than ones to be repreconflicts, hand, likely nearby sentedin terms of liberalism. as (1985) used theMonroeDoctrine Morgenthau an exampleof a state's overconflicts concern in itsimmediate heightened neighborhood(pp. 55-57). Blainey(1988, pp. 228-242) saw proximity as a leading cause of warswidening to include his assessment other fits what realists powers; wouldfind means more than a border. Bremer (1993, important. Proximity sharing toinclude states less than150milesdistant. A somep. 236) defined "contiguous" whatless arbitrary method measures on thebasis of a broader proximity geosimilar to theold realist notion of "spheres of influence" or the graphic region, American For the UnitedStates,thisregion phrase"in our own backyard." includes theCaribbean basin:theCaribbean Islands,Central America, Panama, in LatinAmerica Colombia,and Venezuela. Nearlyall of theU.S. interventions occurred in thisregion; ithas specialtrade and strategic relevance to theUnited States(see Pastor, scheme for 1992,pp. 22-25). President Reagan'sdevelopment LatinAmerica, theCaribbean Basin Initiative, limited itself to thisregion. Domestic Hypotheses 7: If a state'seconomy is in decline,thenit is morelikely to Hypothesis a realist thanwhenits economy is growing. A express problem representation number of scholars in thisdebatehave suggested involved thatlinksshouldbe between thedomestic level and theprevalence of realism or liberalism sought
575
(Axelrod& Keohane,1993,pp. 101-102; Baldwin,1993,p. 23; Grieco,1993, from realism that p. 328; Keohane,1993,p. 294). Grieco(1988, p. 501) argued economicdeclineare moresensitive statesexperiencing to relative than gains will be morerealist. This could stateswhosepoweris increasing-that is, they be seen as a corollary of Wolfers' rich"idea: A statein a reces(1962) "security sionor depression will adopta moreself-interested viewof theworld becauseit can see morepotential threats. the state also seek to enhance its Although might in to economic such liberalism that issue area institutions, economy by adhering wouldnottendto be mirrored on security by liberalism issues.4 8: As a leader's popularity among his or her constituency Hypothesis so does the that hisor hergovernment willexpress a liberal increases, probability The final twohypotheses derive from indomestic liberal interest perspective. politics.Hagan (1993) argued that can makeit moredifficult forleaders opposition to maintain a foreign unlessbroad nationalinterests are policy commitment involved. It wouldfollowthat leaderswhoperceive a greater threat to their own holdon power wouldbe more torepresent interms ofrealist indilikely problems cators. of thisin a democracy One measure is thepopularity of theheadof government. Another measure wouldneedto be found if thisstudy wereto include non-democracies. 9: Ifno election in which a leadercouldlose office is scheduled Hypothesis or required to be heldwithin the 3 months, then thestateis morelikely following to express a liberal thanat times when suchan election is approachperspective of current a leaderwouldbe moresensitive to losing ing.Regardless popularity, office as an electionapproaches as discussedby (in procedural democracies), Meernik of either thishypothesis or thepre(1994). To someextent, acceptance one would tend to the relevance of worldviews as a held ceding negate strongly beliefsystem. One could argue, thatthedecision-makers' fullworldhowever, view includes a value on retaining overrides thevalue they personal powerthat on the national interest. place Methodology This study focuses on theperiod1978-1994.Reasonable peoplecan always for an extension of time under There is no obvioustemargue any period study. for this The is to select a that features a variety poralboundary study. goal period of conditions in theinternational to avoid the system, limiting findings' generalwhilekeepingtheresearch izability manageable. Duringtheseyears,relations theendof d6tente to a renewed Cold War, amongthemajorpowersmovedfrom
The "diversionary ofwar"(Blainey, 1988,pp. 72-86) does notdirectly theory applybecausewe are at bystanders, notinitial combatants. little evidence to support Furthermore, looking Blaineyfound theidea that states start warsto divert their their own internal publicfrom problems.
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itself. followed much Moving bytheendoftheCold Warandtheendofbipolarity in theVietnam earlier theresearch difficult wouldenmesh war,adding questions aboutcodingthatconflict without a compensatory gain in explanatory power. further intothepost-ColdWarera, Movingmuchlaterin timetakesthestudy whichone finds a remarkable lack of variance in theindependent variduring ables. Once again, the extension would not add immediate substance. Later shouldcertainly under research, however, expandthetimeperiod study. and the earlier as well as Tillema SIPRI Yearbooks, (1995) UsingSollenberg andSivard(1993),onefinds 140military conflicts that time. (forthcoming) during of these 140 conflicts a in an variable Eight experienced change independent theconflict, because of a changeto or from or the during generally democracy or withdrawal insertion of a rival'smilitary so for of this forces, purposes study one couldconsider there to be 148 conflicts from whichto choose.Table 2 lists the36 conflicts selected from theoriginal 140 (about26% of thetotal). Threeof the36 conflicts a in an so one could variable, experienced change independent that 39 of 148 conflicts these latter numbers (stillabout26%) wereselected; argue in Table 2. The conflicts are reflected wereselected in order to achievea representative distribution oftheindependent variables. Forexample, 12 (26%) ofthe 47 conflicts that involved a democracy wereincluded inthesample, and27 (27%) ofthe101 conflicts that didnotinvolve a democracy wereincluded inthesample. Table 2 describes thedistribution in thesampleversus of conflicts thefullsetof conflicts. To ensure variation at thesystem uses theUnited Statesas level,thisstudy a great Canadaas a lesser andIndiaas a lesser power, power allyofa great power, is notan allyof a great the States, powerthat power. AmongalliesoftheUnited choiceof Canada bestminimizes theeffect of geography, historic memories of and extreme cultural differences. Indiais a regional conflict, powerwithaspirationsto international state leadership; choosinga less ambitious non-aligned wouldreduce thefrequency ofproblem Other "inderepresentations beingstated. or great medium suchas China,theSovietUnion/Russia, Iran, pendent" powers, orSouth arepoorer for selections initial because either Africa, Nigeria, study, they internal focusor are morelikelyto have leaderswith adopt a predominantly worldviews aliento realism andliberalism. India'sleadership has links culturally to theBritish tradition of politics, its own historical with experience balancing anditsmorerecent ofinternational institutions as a amongkingdoms, promotion meansof promoting peace. CodingProblem Representations Thisstudy useda nearly setofstatements on the36 conflicts complete bythe United The Canadian ofExternal Affairs and States, Canada,andIndia.5 Ministry
' Most Indiantexts for1993 and 1994 weremissing.
in ForeignPolicy Worldviews SelectedforThis Study Table 2. Conflicts

intrastate (1992-94) Algeria intrastate (1978-79) Argentine Burmaintrastate (1978-94) war(1980-90) Contra-Sandinista Former (1991-94) Yugoslavia Ghanaintrastate (1981) Granadaoccupation (1983) India-Pakistan (1982-92) (1987-94) Intifada war(1980-88) Iran-Iraq crisis(1979-81) Iranian hostage war Iraq-Kuwait (1990-91) Conflicts a long-term rival Involving a current rival Involving Not involving a rival a democracy Involving Notinvolving a democracy an ally Involving Notinvolving an ally Within a sphere of interest of interest Outsidea sphere Kagarawar(1978-79) Liberiaintrastate I (1985-88) Liberiaintrastate II (1989-94) Mexicointrastate (1994) raid(1981) Osirakreactor Pakistan intrastate (1978-87) Panamaoccupation (1989-90) Peruintrastate (1981-94)* intrastate (1978-94)* Philippines war(1979-89) Russo-Afghan Shaba crisis(1978-79) Somaliaintrastate (1991-94) Total 9 15 124 47 101 40 108 25 123
577
intrastate SouthAfrica (1983-92) SouthAtlantic war(1982) Sri Lankaintrastate (1983-94) Sudanintrastate (1983-94)* Third Indochina war(1978-89) U.S.-Libyaclashes(1981-86) (1981-91) Ugandaintrastate Saharanwar(1978-91) Western Yemenintrastate (1986-87) Yemenintrastate (1994) Yemenwar(1979) North-South Zaire-Zambia (1982) Sampled 3 3 33 12 27 12 27 6 33 Percentage 33% 20% 27% 26% 27% 30% 25% 24% 27%
in 1987. Sudan 1991.The Philippines are codedas a democracy *Peruis codedas a democracy beginning through is coded as a democracy from 1986 to 1988.Thus,36 conflicts are listedabove,butthenumbers belowrepresent thisperiodforwhichan independent 39 conflicts selected. The fiveunselected conflicts variablechanged during were Rhodesia/Zimbabwe coded as a democracy in 1978 only; El Salvadorintrastate, coded as a intrastate, after1983; Bangladesh coded as a democracy after1990; theOgadenwar,whichincluded intrastate, democracy forces of a U.S. rivaluntil whichincluded forces of a U.S. rivaluntil August August1979; andAngolaintrastate, 1988.
International Tradepublishes speechesand pressreleasesin severalcollections. Thesespeeches, and someissuedbytheCanadianMissionto theUnited Nations and theOffice of thePrime in Barrett are indexed Minister, (1982, 1987, 1994). The United Statespublishes relevant in twocollections. documents ComWeekly Documents includes all statements issuedbythepresident pilation ofPresidential or his office. and itssuccessor, U.S. Department Department ofStateBulletin of StateDispatch, includeselectedstatements on foreign policy, primarily by officials in the State Department. India's Ministry of External Affairs publishes a monthly collectionof statements, Record,which includes ForeignAffairs of government A searchofthese officials. ministry pressreleasesand statements and a supplemental Lexis/Nexis identified sources, search, 2,249 codablecases,
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conflict in a text.6 Each ofthese where of a particular a "case" is a representation forms a sampling unit(Krippendorff, texts referred 1980,pp. 57-61). If thetext then itwas evaluated once to morethanone of theselected conflicts, repeatedly, in it. foreach of theconflicts addressed wereevaluated witha thematic content similar to that of The texts analysis oftheconflict ineachtext Winter andStewart was coded (1977). Each discussion tothefive indicators ofrealist andliberal worldviews twicewith discussed respect above:onceforevidence ofeach oftheliberal andagainforevidence indicators, indicators. Each indicator was scored intherange ofeachoftherealist 0-2, where 2 indicates thetrait was notobserved, clearevidence for thetrait, and 0 indicates I indicates weaker or unclear evidence. and a Thus,each case has botha liberal in value from realist 0 to 10. score,each ranging aggregate nor Neither these the worldviews inferred from them representations problem shouldbe expected to correspond to either or Pure realism liberalism. perfectly realism andpureliberalism arelocatedwithin a large N-dimensional within space whichpossibleworldviews can be located. A linesegment drawn between those two pointscan be an axis within thatspace. Like all such line segments, this realist-liberal axis can be bisected an the intersurface; (n 1)-dimensional by section of that surface with thelinesegment can be assigned thevalue0. Evaluif worldviews as were on a continuum between realism andliberalism ating they is in effect to project theobserved one infers which (from problem representation the worldview) ontothatline and measureits distance from the neutral point. When we hypothesize thata statewould be morelikelyto expressa realist of theconflict, we do notmeanthatin thissituation it problem representation shifts from to liberal realist. the of the is variable to Rather, impact fully fully movetheprojection of theproblem linesegment in the representation alongthat ofrealism, direction because now indicators of realism are mixed in with perhaps indicators of liberalism. To project theproblem ontothat theaggreaxis,onecombines representation results into a value: gatecoding single / (1 + y = ln[(1 + I LiberalIndicators) RealistIndicators)] The ratiois used to locatetheinferred worldview relative to a "pure"realist or liberalworldview. The "1" is added to avoid division by zero.The natural log
set of texts included an additional 217 cases (<10% extra).Manyof thesecases never 6 The initial
should havebeenincluded intheset,suchas duplicate statements texts, bynon-governmental figures, thejointstatements of international and statements felloutside that thetimespan ofthe groupings, waritself. Others included information that couldnotbe coded,and somereferences only"factual" weretoo brief or vagueto be coded as realist or liberal. of theseexcluded tests included Fifty-five moreelaborate references to a war,butnotreferences that couldbe linked to either realism or libSome of thesetexts, eralism. withreferences to immediate humanitarian and mainly consequences wishesforpeace, maybe evidence of a third the"paxian"(discussed worldview, below).
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This modelassumesthata distriintoa linearform: transforms thisexpression of is as froman indeterminate bution(realist, liberal) (7,0) exactly "distant" where worldview as thedistribution the ratio "1" alone,however, (0,7). By using first would the value wouldindicate a neutral the distribution have .125 value, from I arenotthesame.The logandthelatter thevalue8.0. The linear distances on the other values of -2.079 and 2.079, arithmic hand,yields transformation, of from the neutral 0 (In 1).7 equidistant point, With nature ofthematic content relithepossibly analysis, coding subjective A seniorgraduate student is important. coded 2% of the ability independently was reached on more than 80% oftheindicators andclose agreetexts; agreement ment on morethan80% of thefinal worldview The indicator inferences. match ratereached in thelater-coded 85% as thesecondcoderbecamemoreproficient texts. These results, and in particular theevidence of a learning indicate curve, that thesefindings wouldbe replicable. Because theninehypotheses all addressthesame dependent variable-the or realism inferred from theobserved degreeof liberalism problem representation-the effects ofthevarious areevaluated variables independent usinga mulThe multiple whichare tipleregression. regression produces signedcoefficients, neededto support thehypotheses. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) wouldnot mostof theindependent variables Moreover, yieldsignedcoefficients. although are dichotomous, an ANOVA is notappropriate becauseone of theindependent variables is roughly (leaderpopularity) continuous.8 Linearregression assumesthatthe dependent variableis continuous. The theprojection of theobserved onto variable, dependent problem representation therealist/liberal is notcontinuous, butthevalueofy,where the line,technically twosumsvary between 0 and 10,can assumemany values.Normalized values P werecompared, rather than theBs, becausetheeffect of each oftheseindependentvariables can onlybe evaluated relative to that of theother variindependent ables. (An absolute suchas "All other the of effect, things beingequal, presence a long-term rivalof theobserving statein theconflict causes thenatural log of theincremented sumof theliberal indicators divided the incremented sum of by therealist indicators to move .6168 units in thedirection of realism," is clearly x [ln(A) - In(B)] = which is thedesired One aberration in thisformula is that itwouldassign -1 x [ln(A/B)], property. = 2/1= 2). Thisscorewouldthus a high valueto a 1-0 score(worldview ratio thesameweight carry as scoresof 3-1 or 5-2, despite in whichtheauthor has very little confidence. beinga distribution All 1-0 distributions werereassigned to thesameratioas a 4-3 distribution. can be resolved intointerval "bins."An ANOVArunin problem by grouping popularity 8 The latter of theregression found all theFs to be significant at .001,excepttheapproach of an elecsupport tion.These results are "stronger" thanthoseof theregression, buttheyobscurethefactthat two variables wouldbe significant in the"wrong" direction. The loss of datainvolved inrecoding "popcontributed to its beingsignificant in theANOVA and veryinsignificant in the ularity" probably regression.
terms, In(A/B)= In(A) - In(B). Thus,ln(B/A)= In(B) - In(A) = 7 In general
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whether each P willbe >0 (indiThe hypotheses beyondinterpretation.) predict or<0 (indicating a tendency toward a tendency toward realism). liberalism) cating at .05. Table 3 presents theresults. significant pvalueswereconsidered Findings from the the evaluation of the hypotheses Table 4 summarizes resulting in of the two is Table 3. One regression reported systemic hypotheses supported, are supported, and none of the three threeof the foursituational hypotheses domestic are This that and situational hypotheses supported. suggests systemic factors influence the inferred worldview morethandomestic factors do. This research finds realist where realist theories would problem representations usually to five them be found: Three of the more realist were expect hypotheses supported, but onlyone of thefourliberalhypotheses was supported Waltz (democracy). seems to have been correct about the of states with (1979, pp. 70-71) policies at least when the are Western as in states democracies the "guaranteed security," studied here. Grieco's comment seems "The (1988) prophetic: sample especially ifa state's coefficient fora state's to gapsin payoffs ... willbe greater sensitivity is a rather than a if the issue involves long-term partner long-term adversary ally; if rather than economic the state's relative has been security well-being; power on thedecline rather than on therise"(p. 501). His statement has beensupported, evendownto therelative of the1s forrivalsand allies. weights the under a trend toward liberalism couldbe inferred study, During period from thedata. Each U.S. administration from Carter morefreClinton through in a manner consistent with liberalism than theone quently represented problems before. This trend is notnecessarily a lasting one that one, and notnecessarily extendsintoissue areas otherthanexternal conflict. The trend best be might variables that wouldtrigger realism: explained by theabsenceof thesituational in the1990sless often Conflicts involved American alliesorrivals, or evenother so a response consistent with liberalism couldbe anticipated. Amerdemocracies, icanreaction tothedirect attack 2001 is outside the byal-Qaedaon 11 September becausetheUnited Stateswas nota bystander. American scope ofthisstudy, repof goingto war in Iraq after resentations thatattack wouldalso lie outside the forthesamereason: there is continuity from Desert scopeofthisstudy, Although theIraq-Kuwait warendedin 1991,andthe2003 U.S.-ledwarinIraqconStorm, stitutes a separate conflict. Once again,theUnited Statesis nota bystander. Both of thesesituations are worthy of further study usingthisapproach. Validity and realismas concepts.This studyassumesthat Validity of liberalism liberalism and realism are reasonable fortheworldviews. categories Typologies suchas decision-making versus realist 1993), (Ripley, many-headed eagle (Rosati
Table 3. Regression Results Hyp. Variable Expected sign >0 >0 <0 <0 <0 <0 >0 <0 <0 >0 <0 United States, Canada,India UnitedStates and Canada UnitedStates Sig T * * -.207 -.267 -.174 -.173 .077 .277 -.087 .030 .042
P
1 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 7 8 9 Guaranteed security Bipolarsecurity Current rival rival Long-term Ally Democracy Distance Absolute recession Relativerecession Popularity election Approaching .208 -.149 -.228 -.255 -.204 -.129 .049 .240 t .030
Sig T .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .1297 .0000 t .1287
P
.265 -.153 -. 177 -.252 -.134 -.176 .105 .249 -.080 .039 .031
Sig T .0000 .0002 .0000 .0000 .0099 .0000 .0503 .0000 .0009 .2101 .1578
* * .0000 .0000 .0023 .0000 .1923 .0000 .0007 .2524 .0776
AdjustedR2 F Sig F (df)
.156 47.147 .0000 (2,239)
.180 36.144 .0000 (1,745)
.145 31.052 .0000 (1,578)
*Thesevariables couldnotbe evaluated wereconstant forthisstateoverthedataset. becausethey couldnotbe evaluated becausedataweremissing. tThese variables
582 Table 4. Hypothesis Evaluation Hypothesis 1 Variable Guaranteed security Bipolar security Rival involved Ally Evaluation
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Statesare morelikely to represent external conflict in Supported. a manner with worldview ifthey areprotected consistent a liberal states. by other to represent remained Statesprotected by others likely Rejected. external conflict consistent with a liberal worldview after ended. bipolarity Statesare morelikely to represent external in conflict Supported. ifa current a manner consistent with a realist worldview or longterm rivalis participating in theconflict. Statesare morelikely to represent external conflict in Supported. a manner with a realist ifan allyis an initial consistent worldview to theconflict. party Statesare morelikely to represent in external conflict Supported. a manner with ifa democracy consistent a realist worldview is in theconflict. participating Statesarenotmorelikely to represent conflict external Rejected. in a manner consistent a realist with worldview whentheconflict is within their of influence. sphere to represent external conflict Rejected.Statesare notmorelikely in a manner consistent with a realist worldview whentheir is in recession. economy Statesare notmorelikely to represent external conflict Rejected. in a manner consistent a realist with worldview whentheleaderis unpopular.
Democracy
Distance
Recession
Popularity
Statesare notmorelikely to represent external conflict Approaching Rejected. in a manner election consistent witha realist worldview whenan election is near.
& Creed,1997),hard-liner versusaccommodationist (Vasquez, 1987), or isolationist versusinternationalist distinct 1986) do notultimately (Wittkopf, present alternatives to realismversusliberalism. A problem withthecategories would lead to a lackofvariation in thecoding results oran inability tocode cases. likely of theseproblems Neither Thereis sufficient in thecoding variation developed: and the"strong" fora worldview inferences in each statewereat least results, doublethe"weak" inferences. of thetexts revealeda cleartilt Seventy percent toward one worldview or theother, withan absolute value of y greater than.5, and less than15% of thetexts werecoded as "neutral" between realism and liberalism. This is notsurprising, becauserealism and/or liberalism are partof the
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if nottheleadersthemselves, of theforeign education standard policyadvisors, others. in thesecountries and in many textssuggested a perspective consistent Some of theuncodableor neutral These texts indiliterature with thepeace studies 1991; 1987). (Barash, Vayrynen, moral for individual catea concern Marks, 1988; 1980), (Clark, judgments, rights that This maybe thecoreof another and peace processes. worldview, "paxism," should Further research toCarr's(1939,p. 6) "utopianism." bearssomesimilarity forthem worldviews and search other systematdevelopthepaxianand perhaps seems to remain realist-liberal distinction the valid-paxism ically;nonetheless, in thesetexts. is a rarepattern official As discussed statements. and earlier, ofusingofficial Validity probity "official" location for common and statements are a problem finding appropriate Direcletus lookat National As a spotcheck, however, Security representations. via the National of and obtained thePersianGulfwar 1991 tivesissuedduring on the Gulfwar remains Archive. The American open to perspective Security on and fear of based material factors debate:Was U.S. intervention (oil Iraqi and antior norms (Kuwaiti sovereignty weapons of mass destruction) reflects thisambiguity. In general, thecodingof publicstatements aggression)? a more realist was a cleartendency to present In thosestatements, there however, Thistenintheconflict, anda more liberal one later. early problem representation Directive in formerly classified documents. NationalSecurity dencyis mirrored realist 45, 20 August1990,is clearly (y = -.811) in its focuson thecontinued ifoil is cut threat to SaudiArabiaandthepotential damageto theU.S. economy in itsposition that theU.S. is acting and theUnited Nations and especially off, Directive liber54, 15 January 1991,tendstoward Security joiningin. National focuson thethreat alism(y = .336) in itsreduced to theUnitedStatesas comthelong listof UN resolutions and actingin concert witha paredto following broadcoalition. In somecases,ofcourse, theassumption that reflect policystatements policy intent can be checked behavior. overt against large-scale Although policyactions arevery often Forexample, somesituations areunambiguous. Canaambiguous, in SouthAfrica was to worktoward dianpolicytoward civil unrest multilateral in the liberaltradition. sanctions-a tacticstrongly Theirproblem mandatory on this issue were consistent with liberal a worldview. representations strongly in in On theother the unilateral of harbors defiance of hand, mining Nicaragua, international is in a realist In tradition. this one finds that law, strongly case, American from the 1980sdo reflect a realist worldview representations problem the conflict in Central America. U.S. actions even to regarding corresponded in over time the and wars. changes perspective during Soviet-Afghan Iran-Iraq thisapproach assumesthat official statements on external conflicts Finally, reflect a singleunderlying "official" A problem representation.deeperlook at thecases supports thisassumption. This research examined whether or notthe was affected ofthespeaker, the representation expressed problem bytheidentity
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of theaudience, whether it was delivered in a foreign or domestic composition for the different what leaders were After or present. setting, foreign controlling we see and international contexts over the 17 conflicts, leadership styles, years, of suchvariation. The greatest suchevidence little evidence wouldbe a tendency a moreliberalproblem forAmerican to present when speakers representation a statement to an overseas audience. Even be this,however, delivering may an artifact of thetypeof conflicts thatone mentions to suchan audience.If these thenone factors altered the expressed systematically problem representations, wouldnotexpectto havethesignificant that were findings produced. Does theworldview matter? one is leftwondering if it matters that Finally, a state orliberal a realist ofan external conflict. expresses problem representation A preliminary look suggests that a liberal as representation problem corresponds, Betts(1992) anticipated, to a higher likelihood ofeventual involvement. Because theconflicts werenotselected with an eye to thisissue,there aremany questions that could be raisedregarding thisfinding. It seemsworth further investigation, ifonlyto showthat theacademicdebatehas realpolicyramifications. however, Conclusions This article has developed a newapproach forassessing theworldviews that thedecisions motivate of stateleaders. Problem found in official representations statements we needto be able to infer in a worldviews give us theinformation of cases. This method wide number can yielduseful information acrossa larger number of states and decision-makers thanwouldbe provided a by constructing fullcognitive of all relevant and how interact as a map persons assessing they theinfrequent situations where we havesuchfullmodels should group-although be used to supplement studies conducted withthisapproach. One couldextend thisapproach to other issueareasandother worldviews. Suchresearch, however, must be careful intwoareas.First, itmust be possibletodefine criteria that would be observable inproblem in the issue area. it must be reaSecond, representations sonableto assumethat theideal worldviews a baseline for inference bear setting someresemblance to elements of theactualworldview. Thisarticle usesthis toilluminate a debate within thestudy ofinterapproach national relations. Thisresearch indicates that theWestern democracies included in the sample expressproblem consistent withliberalism and representations realism under thesituational andsystemic circumstances in international predicted relations literature. will be morelikely Such states to express problem representations consistent witha liberalworldview whentheir is guaranteed security by another oftheoverall distribution ofpower inthesystem. These power, regardless statesare also morelikelyto expressproblem consistent with representations a realistworldview whena rival,ally,or fellowdemocracy is involved in the conflict.
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at theindividual or decision Thereshouldbe roomforanalysisconducted such a One can move to theoften level within beyond trying interpret study. group on theless of states attention actions by focusing policy ambiguous large-scale small-scale actions-official statements of In a larger policy. policy ambiguous two major to bridgethe gap between and analysisattempts sense,thistheory one centered on thestatewithin of international a schoolsin thestudy politics: the It toward the decision-maker within state. and the other oriented system, and peace reminds school-to whichliberals, theformer structuralists, realists, forces in do notrespond to universal scientists all seemto belong-that"states" to laws of or ideal rational matter the thewaythat beings respond physics responds from the of states cannot be finally to thelaws of logic.The reaction separated of individuals whohelpshapethosereactions. perceptions also challenges thedecision-making schoolto applyits disThis research to larger coveriesaboutindividual and groupdecision-making patpsychology terns of activity. Much of theworkin thisarea focuseson a fewcase studies, has deepened ourunderstanding ofhuman sometimes onlyone.Suchan approach and bureaucratic and thepolitics of policymaking. It is now approprireasoning to someof thelarger of interstate ate to applythisknowledge interacquestions tions.This worldview a way out of the deadlockrevealedin approachoffers in an understanding Baldwin(1993). Other of theprocessby models, grounded whichforeign and implemented, couldinform other policyis developed puzzles where thestateand system levelsof analysis haveproven inconclusive. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A muchearlier version ofthisarticle was presented at theannualmeeting of theInternational Studies San Diego, May 1996. I thank Paul Bolt, Association, Janet DamonColetta, StevenGreene, Charles Box-Steffensmeier, Burden, Barry Patrick Elisabeth Blair Hermann, Hermann, James, Johansson, Margaret King, Richard Meltz, Kevin Murrin,Brian Pollins, Bryan Schmiedeler, Randall and Michael Schweller, Smith,Donald Sylvan,Herbert Courtney Weisberg, for their comments on of text. I this also thank T. D. Scott Ashok, Young portions Praveen Paul Mike David Bennett, Diehl, Chaudhry, RalphLysyshyn, McCaffrey, and Janice for Stein Milne,Tinaz Pavri,Bruce Russett, Margareta Sollenberg, their research The assistance these does of not, course, guidance. given by people indicate their of thearticle endorsement or itsconclusions-allerrors belongto theauthor. The viewsexpressed in thisarticle arethoseof theauthor and do not reflect theofficial of theUnitedStatesAirForce, necessarily policyor position of or the U.S. Government. this Department Defense, Correspondence concerning article shouldbe sentto ThomasS. Mowle,UnitedStatesAir ForceAcademy, USAFA/DFPS,2354 Fairchild Hall, Suite 6L112, USAFA, CO 80840. E-mail: tom.mowle @ usafa.af.mil
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Realism, Liberalism in FPA

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Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict Author(s): Thomas S.

Vol.24, No. 3, 2003 PoliticalPsychology,

in Foreign Worldviews Liberalism, Policy:Realism, and External Conflict

Distance Absolute recession Relative recession

in ForeignPolicy Worldviews SelectedforThis Study Table 2. Conflicts

* * .0000 .0000 .0023 .0000 .1923 .0000 .0007 .2524 .0776

AdjustedR2 F Sig F (df)

.156 47.147 .0000 (2,239)

.180 36.144 .0000 (1,745)

.145 31.052 .0000 (1,578)

inForeign Worldviews Policy

inForeign Worldviews Policy

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