MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

Foreign
Ballistic Missile
Capabilities

APRIL 2009

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

Approved for Public Release

09-MDA-4495 (10 APR 09)
This Missile Defense Agency publication was
developed to provide an unclassified picture of the
ballistic missile capabilities of foreign countries. This
publication was developed from a series of U.S.
government Intelligence Community documents,
testimony from senior Intelligence Community leaders,
and Department of Defense documents. Please see
the attached endnotes for complete sourcing.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 1

Ballistic Missile Basics 1

Overview of Select Ballistic Missile Programs 3

Select Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 6

and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)

Select Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and 10

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs)

Select Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) 16

Select Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) 20

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 22

Summary 26

Endnotes 27

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INTRODUCTION

Ballistic missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used effectively against
an adversary with a formidable air defense system where an attack with manned aircraft
would be too impractical or costly. Additionally, missiles can be used as a deterrent or as an
instrument of terror. Missiles also offer the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and
logistical requirements than manned aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons can be
devastating because ballistic missiles can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear
warheads.1

Ballistic missile capabilities continue to increase with the proliferation of missile technology.
Over 20 countries have ballistic missile systems and it is likely that missiles will be a threat
in future conflicts involving U.S. forces. Ballistic missiles have been used in several conflicts
over the last 20 years, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the war in Yemen,
the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf conflicts, and the Russian military action in Chechnya. 2

In order to better understand ballistic missile capabilities, this document addresses ballistic
missile basics, characteristics, proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from
select ballistic missile capable countries.

BALLISTIC MISSILE BASICS

WHAT IS A BALLISTIC MISSILE?

Ballistic missiles are a means to rapidly and accurately deliver a lethal payload to a target.3
Once its fuel has been consumed, the ballistic missile (or, more commonly, a weapon-
carrying payload that separates from the booster section) follows an elliptical orbit around
the center of the Earth, defined strictly by the combination of velocity/flight angle at
burnout and the Earth’s gravity. By careful control of the missile during its powered flight,
the payload can be very accurately placed at the desired target point. 4

Operational ballistic missiles are deployed in silos, on submarines, and on land-mobile

launchers. Mobile missiles are favored by many nations because they can be hidden,
which greatly increases their survivability.5

In many short-range ballistic missiles, the entire missile remains intact until the warhead
detonates. In longer-range ballistic missiles, warheads are contained in separating reentry
vehicles (RVs). Some long-range ballistic missiles carry multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which hold up to 10 RVs per missile. RVs reenter the Earth’s
atmosphere at very high velocities, on the order of 4-5 miles per second. 6

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Ballistic missiles are composed of one or more stages. Multiple-stage missiles, which are
configured so that each stage has its own independent propulsion system, are more
efficient for longer range missions.7 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) typically have
two or three stages with powerful liquid-propellant engines or solid propellant motors that
propel the payload toward the target, as well as a post-boost vehicle (PBV) with a much
smaller propulsion system. Some RVs, defined as maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs),
have independent maneuvering capability.8

MISSILE COMPONENTS

All ballistic missiles are made up of three essential elements: a propulsion system, which
provides the energy necessary to reach the target; a guidance system, which controls
steering of the missile during powered flight and ensures the correct initial conditions for
the ballistic trajectory; and the payload, which destroys the target.9

Propulsion
Rocket propulsion involves combining fuel and an oxidizer in a combustion chamber, in
which chemical reactions produce a high-pressure, high temperature gas. Exhausting that
gas produces a thrust that propels the missile.10

Ballistic missiles can use

solid or liquid propellant
rocket propulsion systems. In
general, liquid systems are
somewhat more energetic
than solid systems because
liquid fuels and oxidizers
that yield more energy can
be chosen. The advantage
of solid propellant systems
is that they are rugged,
easily stored, transportable,
and have no moving parts.
The trend in modern missile Ballistic Missile Components
systems has been toward the
use of solid propellants because of their simplicity of operation and reduced logistical
requirements; however, some countries have greater access to liquid propellant technology
and, therefore, continue to develop new liquid propellant missiles.11

Guidance System
The accuracy of a ballistic missile depends on its ability to achieve an exact velocity and
location in space at the end of its powered flight. Ensuring that this velocity and location are
precisely attained is the job of the guidance and control system. Throughout the powered
phase of flight, the instruments in the inertial navigation system (INS) must continually sense
all the components of the missile’s acceleration. The guidance computer uses these sensed
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accelerations to determine the missile’s “state” (velocity, location, and orientation) and
sends corrective messages to the missile’s steering system to eliminate deviations from the
required flight profile.12

Payload
The function of the ballistic missile payload subsystem is to ensure that the weapon reaches
the target and detonates at the correct time and place.13 Ballistic missile payloads can be
nuclear, conventional, or chemical/biological. Chemical and biological weapons have also
been incorporated into payload systems for short-range ballistic missiles. The effectiveness
of these designs, and their ability to be scaled to longer ranges, is speculative.14

BALLISTIC MISSILES CLASSES AND RANGE 15

Ballistic Missiles are classified into the following categories.

Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM):

< 1,000 km
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM):
1,000-3,000 km
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
(IRBM): 3,000-5,500 km
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM):
> 5,500 km
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
(SLBM): Any ballistic missile launched
from a submarine, regardless of maximum
range
Space Launch Vehicle (SLV):
Used to deliver a payload to orbit

OVERVIEW OF SELECT BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

Many countries view ballistic missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of
national power. In addition, they present an asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower. Many
ballistic missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction.

North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missile
technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. On 4 and 5 July 2006, North Korea
flight-tested the Taepo Dong-2 SLV/ICBM for the first time, which failed shortly after launch. At the
same time it successfully flight tested six theater ballistic missiles. These successes demonstrated
the capability to target U.S. forces and allies in South Korea and Japan.16 In April 2009 North
Korea launched the TD-2 for the second time in a failed attempt to orbit a satellite.17

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 Iran has an extensive missile development program and has
received support from entities in Russia, China, and North
Korea.18 Beyond the steady growth in its missile and rocket
inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness
of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new
submunition payloads. Iran has publicized exercises featuring
missile launches.19

China’s deployed missile inventory includes nuclear-armed

ICBMs, IRBMs and MRBMs, and conventional MRBMs and
SRBMs. China’s nuclear force is becoming more survivable with
the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs and
the eventual deployment of the JL-2 SLBM. China currently has
fewer than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United States;
however, the number of ICBM warheads capable of reaching
the United States could more than double in the next 15 years,
DF-31 especially if MIRVs are employed. China has fielded over 1,000
CSS-6 and CSS-7 conventional SRBMs opposite Taiwan. It also
is developing more capable conventional missiles able to range U.S. and allied military
installations in the region. Chinese conventional missile upgrades may include MaRVs with
multiple constellation, satellite-aided navigation and terminal guidance.20

Russia still has several thousand nuclear warheads deployed on ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the United States, and is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic
missiles outside the United States.21

India views the development and possession

of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles as symbols
of world power and an important component
of self-reliance. New Delhi believes that
a nuclear-capable missile is necessary to
deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons
and preserve the option to wage a limited
conventional war. 22 It has development and
production infrastructures for both solid- and
liquid-propellant missiles. India’s ballistic Noble Prophet 2
missile programs have benefited from the
acquisition of foreign equipment and technology, especially from Russia. 23

Since the 1980s, Pakistan has pursued an indigenous ballistic missile development
capability in order to avoid reliance on any foreign entity.24 Pakistan’s goal is to produce
increasingly longer-range missiles.25 Pakistan has development and production facilities for
both solid- and liquid-propellant missiles;26 however, Pakistan likely will continue to require
significant foreign assistance in key technologies for several years. 27

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PROLIFERATION TRENDS

Transfers of technologies, components and raw materials support WMD and missile programs
development, especially across the Middle East and South Asia. Such technology transfers
have lasting consequences. China’s provision of solid-propellant missile technology more
than 15 years ago helped Pakistan develop the Shaheen II medium-range and Abdali
short-range ballistic missiles. Other examples include an agreement between China and
Turkey regarding an SRBM, Beijing’s active marketing of their latest developmental SRBM,
the P12; and Egyptian Scud production from North Korea. 28

While some of these transferred items

are proscribed under various WMD-
related control regimes, many others
are dual-use with legitimate industrial
applications. Examples include: multi-
axis computer numerically controlled
machine tools that have applications
in nuclear and missile programs, but
are also commonly used throughout Shaheen II
legitimate industry. Specialty metals
such as 7000-series aluminum used in nuclear and missile programs are also commonly
used in aircraft and other industries. 29

Most state programs now emphasize self-

sufficiency to reduce reliance upon external
suppliers, and limit their vulnerability to detection
and interdiction. Iranian weapon makers advertise
their ability to manufacture guidance and control
components, such as dynamically tuned gyros.
Instead of importing ballistic missile systems,
Tehran now produces the Scud B and C, Shahab 3
and Fateh-110 even though it still depends on
outside sources for many of the related dual-use
raw materials and components. 30

Consequently, as some countries forego imports

in favor of indigenous WMD-related production,
they position themselves anew as potential
“secondary proliferators.” One example is North
Korea’s proliferation of ballistic missile systems
based on Soviet-designed Scud missiles acquired
Shahab 3 in the 1980s.31 North Korea has exported missile
technology to Iran and Pakistan. 32 For example,
Iran’s Shahab 3 MRBM is based on the North Korean No Dong.33

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Even though most advanced nations
cooperate against WMD proliferation,
a number of trends beyond direct
government control still fuel proliferation.
They include commercial scientific
advances, the availability of relevant dual-
use studies and information, scientists’
enthusiasm for sharing their research
and the availability of dual-use training and
education.34
Pakistani Ghauri MRBM
LAUNCH TRENDS

Key countries with ballistic missile development programs, including North Korea, Iran,
China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Syria have conducted several hundred launches of
ballistic missiles over the past decade. This includes short-range, medium-range,
intermediate-range, intercontinental, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 35

The two countries launching the majority of these

ballistic missiles in the past decade are China and
Russia, accounting for eighty to ninety percent of all
ballistic missile launches. Although both China and
Russia have conducted a large number of flight tests,
a large percentage of the Russian launches include
several hundred combat launches against Chechnya
between 1999 and 2003. In the past five years, China has
steadily increased its average number of ballistic missile
launches per year, showing an increased emphasis on the
development and testing of ballistic missiles. 36

North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Syria have averaged

much smaller numbers of ballistic missile launches per year
over the past decade. Two notable exceptions to this
have been North Korea’s launch of seven ballistic missiles
SS-27 Launch in July 2006, and Iran’s launch of nine missiles and rockets
of various types during an exercise in July 2008. 37

SELECT INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs)

AND SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES (SLVs)

Very few countries have developed and deployed ICBMs. For several countries ICBM
development has coincided with SLV development because of the commonality of

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required technology. As an example, when North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo
Dong-1 (TD-1) MRBM in 1998, it publicly characterized it as an SLV. 38 Although the small
third stage failed to place a satellite in orbit, the two-stage missile booster apparently
performed successfully.39 The launch demonstrated several key technologies required to
develop an ICBM, including stage separation. The existence of a third stage itself was an
unanticipated development in the North Korean ballistic missile program.40

NORTH KOREA

North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2),

a two- or three-stage liquid-propellant missile 41 capable of
carrying a nuclear payload.42 The two-stage TD-2 option
could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 10,000
km, which is sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of
the continental United States.43 A three-stage option could
deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 15,000 km,
which is sufficient to strike all of North America if the third
stage is similar to the one used on the TD-1 in 1998. 44 The
TD-2 may be exported to other countries in the future. 45

North Korea conducted the first test launch of the TD-2 on

4 July 2006 from the Taepo Dong test site. This launch, which
failed in flight less than one minute after launch, could
have been a test of a long-range missile or an attempted
TD-2 Launch 2009
satellite launch. 46

North Korea launched a TD-2 missile on 5 April 2009 as a space launch vehicle. The launch
failed: stage one of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan and the remaining stages along
with the payload itself landed in the Pacific Ocean.47

IRAN

Iran does not yet have the technical capability to produce an ICBM, but it is believed they
may develop one by 2015.48 Iran has continued research and development on its longer
range ballistic missile programs and has publicly reiterated its commitment to developing
SLVs, which contain most of the key building blocks for an ICBM. 49 Iran launched its Safir
SLV on 17 August 2008 in a failed attempt to orbit its indigenously produced Omid satellite.50
On 2 February 2009 Iran again launched a Safir SLV, successfully inserting the Omid satellite
into orbit.51 This success shows progress in some technologies relevant to ICBMs.52

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CHINA

China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic

forces. Currently, China has less than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting
the United States; however, the number of ICBM warheads capable
of reaching the United States could more than double in the next 15
years, especially if MIRVs are employed. This includes approximately
20 silo-based, nuclear-armed, liquid-propellant CSS-4 ICBMs.53

China has been developing advanced new mobile, solid-propellant

ICBMs, including the solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A
ICBMs, which were deployed respectively in 2006 and 2007. The DF-
31 is a three-stage missile
carried inside a canister.
CSS-4 Launch
The deployment of road-
mobile ICBMs will enhance the survivability of the
Chinese strategic missile force. The DF-31 will be
capable of reaching targets throughout Europe
and Asia as well as parts of Canada and the
northwestern United States. 54 The DF-31A, with a
range of 11,200 km, can target any location in DF-31 ICBM in Transit
the continental United States (CONUS). 55

RUSSIA

Russia views its strategic missile forces, especially its nuclear-armed missiles, as a symbol of
great power status and a key deterrent.56 Although the size of the Russian ICBM force will
continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource
constraints, Russia probably will retain the largest ICBM force outside the United States. 57

Efforts to maintain and modernize the force

are underway. The Russian SS-27 ICBM, a missile
designed with countermeasures to ballistic missile
defense systems, is now deployed in silos in five
regiments. Prime Minister Putin and other Russian
officials claim that a new class of hypersonic
vehicle is being developed to allow Russian
strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense
systems. 58 Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)
SS-27 is extending the service life of its older ICBMs –
silo-based SS-18s and SS-19s, and road-mobile SS-25s – in part to compensate for the slow
deployment of the SS-27. 59

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 Representative ICBMs

ICBM Characteristics60
Producer Number Warheads Deployment Maximum
Missile Propellant
and / or User of Stages per Missile Mode Range (km)

Taepo Dong-2 North Korea 2 1 Liquid Unknown 5,440+

Silo /
CSS-3 China 2 1 Liquid 5,440+
transportable
CSS-4 Mod 1 China 2 1 Liquid Silo 12,800+

CSS-4 Mod 2 China 2 1 Liquid Silo 12,800+

DF-31 China 3 1 Solid Road-mobile 7,200+

DF-31A China 3 1 Solid Mobile 11,200+

SS-18 Mod 4 Russia 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 8,800+

SS-18 Mod 5 Russia 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 9,600+

SS-19 Mod 3 Russia 2 + PBV 6 Liquid Silo 8,800+

SS-25 Russia 3 + PBV 1 Solid Road-mobile 11,200+

Silo /
SS-27 Russia 3 + PBV 1 Solid 11,200+
Road-mobile
New ICBM Russia Unknown Unknown Solid Silo / mobile 8,800+

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SELECT MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (MRBMs)
AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (IRBMs)

New MRBM and/or IRBM systems are in development in North Korea, Iran, China, India,
and Pakistan. These are strategic systems, and most will be armed with nonconventional
warheads. Russia no longer produces or retains any MRBM or IRBM systems because they
are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which entered into
force in 1988. China has been very active in its development of MRBMs. 61

NORTH KOREA

Chinese MRBM / IRBM Range Rings North Korean MRBM / IRBM Range Rings

North Korea has fewer than 50 launchers62 for its indigenously-developed No Dong MRBM,
which uses a scaled-up Scud engine. It can threaten Japan, South Korea, and U.S. bases
in the vicinity of North Korea. It was first flight-tested in 1993.63 Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s
Shahab-3 MRBMs are based on the No Dong.64 North Korea is also developing a new IRBM65
that has not been flight-tested to date, but could be exported to other countries. 66

IRAN

The Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM is based on the North

Korean No Dong missile. Iran modified the Shahab 3 to
extend its range and effectiveness and has claimed
to have tested an improved version of the Shahab
3 in 2004. Subsequent statements by Iranian officials
suggest the range is up to 2,000 km for the improved
Shahab 3, with the capability to mass produce Shahab
3 missiles.67 Iran is focusing its main developmental
efforts on the improved version of its Shahab 3 MRBM,
Shahab 3 including a new type of RV. 68

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Tehran is developing the new 2,000 km range Ashura MRBM.69 Iran has also indicated it
has a solid-propellant MRBM in development,70 and it may seek to develop additional
longer-range MRBMs and IRBMs. This includes a variant of the North Korean new IRBM which
reportedly has been sold to Iran.71

Iranian Theater Ballistic Missile Range Rings

CHINA

An area of clear investment for China has involved the pursuit of MRBMs, including the
CSS-5, a two-stage, solid-propellant MRBM capable of reaching targets in the Pacific
Theater and most of Asia. 72 China is
acquiring conventional MRBMs to
increase the range to which it can
conduct precision strikes, to include
targeting naval ships, including
aircraft carriers, operating far from
China’s shores. 73 China is developing
an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
based on a variant of the CSS-5
MRBM as a component of its anti-
access strategy. As described in an
Schematic Diagram of the Anti-Ship Ballistic
authoritative 2004 article for the Missile’s use of midcourse and terminal guidance
Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could to strike an aircraft carrier used in a 2006 article
from the Second Artillery Engineering College.

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employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-
munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-
borne planes, the control tower and other
easily damaged and vital positions.” 74 The
ASBM has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is
armed with a maneuverable warhead, and
when incorporated into a sophisticated
command and control system, is intended
to provide the PLA the capability to attack
ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the CSS-5
western Pacific Ocean. 75

The PLA has replaced older liquid-fueled nuclear-capable CSS-3 IRBMs with more
advanced solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBMs in Western China. 76 China also has fewer than 50
of the CSS-2 IRBM, which is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, limited mobility system with
a range of 3,000+ km. China also supplied the CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia. 77

RUSSIA

Russia has not fielded any Medium- or Intermediate-

Range Ballistic Missiles; however, Russian entities have
provided substantial missile-related technology, training,
and expertise to Iran, which has helped to accelerate
Iranian efforts to build new, indigenous ballistic missile
systems. Materials and technology obtained from Russia
helped hasten Iranian development of the Shahab 3
MRBM. 78

INDIA/PAKISTAN

India and Pakistan are continuing development of

MRBM systems capable of carrying weapons of mass
destruction. India has indicated it plans to deploy the
new solid-propellant Agni II MRBM. A longer-range Agni
III IRBM is also under development.79 The Agni II will allow
India to strike all of Pakistan and most of China. 80 The
Agni III will allow India to strike targets as far away as Shaheen II
Beijing.81 Pakistan conducted the first flight test of its new
two-stage, solid-propellant Shaheen II MRBM in 2004. The Shaheen II could have a range
of 2,000 km or more, in the same class as the Indian Agni II.82 Pakistan also has the Ghauri
single-stage, liquid fueled, road-mobile MRBM which is based on the North Korean No
Dong.83 Additionally, Chinese assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial
production of solid-propellant MRBMs.84

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 Representative MRBMs and IRBMs

MRBM and IRBM Characteristics85

Producer Number Maximum
Missile Propellant Deployment Mode
and / or User of Stages Range (km)

No Dong North Korea 1 Liquid Road-mobile 1,300

New IRBM North Korea 1 Liquid Mobile 3,200+

Shahab 3 Iran 1 Liquid Road-mobile 1,300+

Shahab 3 Vari- Iran 1 Liquid Road-mobile 2,000
ant
Ashura Iran Unknown Unknown Unknown 2,000

New MRBM Iran Unknown Solid Unknown 1,920

CSS-2 China 1 Liquid Transportable 3,000+

CSS-5 Mod 1 China 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,770+

CSS-5 Mod 2 China 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,770+

CSS-5 ASBM China 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,500

Agni II India 2 Solid Mobile 2,000+

Agni III India 2 Solid Mobile 3,200+

Ghauri Pakistan 1 Liquid Road-mobile 1,300

Shaheen II Pakistan 2 Solid Road-mobile 2,000+

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 FOREIGN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

UNITED KINGDOM BELARUS UKRAINE SYRIA TURKMENISTAN KAZAKHSTAN

Trident D-5 Scud B Scud B Scud B/C/D Scud B Scud B
SS-21 SS-21 SS-21 SS-21
RUSSIA
SS-21 Mod 2/3
SS-26
Iskander-E
Scud B
FRANCE
SS-1c Mod 2
M45
SS-18
M51
SS-19
SS-25
SS-27
New ICBM
SS-N-18
CHINA SS-N-20
CSS-6 SS-N-23
CSS-7 Sineva
CSS-5 Bulava-30
ISRAEL CSS-2
Jericho 1 CSS-3
Jericho 2 CSS-4
DF-31
DF-31A
CSS-NX-3
JL-2

LIBYA NORTH KOREA

Scud B Scud B/C
Al Fatah No Dong
Taepo Dong-1
New IRBM
Taepo Dong-2
EGYPT
Scud B
SOUTH KOREA
NHK-1
NHK-A

IRAN VIETNAM
Fateh-110 Scud B
Scud B/C SAUDI ARABIA YEMEN UAE PAKISTAN INDIA
CSS-8 CSS-2 Scud B Scud B Hatf 1 Prithvi 1/2
Shahab 3 SS-21 Ghaznavi Dhanush
SRBM Shahab 3 Variant Shaheen I Agni 1 Sources:
Ashura Ghauri Agni 2/3 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and
MRBM/IRBM Shaheen II Sagarika Cruise Missile Threat, 2006

ICBM Congressional Research Service, Ballistic & Cruise Missiles

of Foreign Countries, 2004
SLBM Federal Aviation Administration, Quarterly Launch Report 1997

– 15 –
SELECT SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (SRBMs)

Several countries are now producing and/or developing SRBM

systems, while many other countries have purchased missiles or
missile technologies from one or more of the missile producers.
New SRBM systems are in development in several countries. 86

The Russian SS-1c Mod 1, also called the Scud B, has been
exported to more countries than any other type of guided
ballistic missile. It has proven to be an adaptable and versatile
weapon. For example, the Iraqi Scud missiles used during the
1991 Persian Gulf War had been modified to double their
range. North Korea has produced its own version of the Scud
B, as well as the Scud C, an extended-range version of the
Scud B.87
Scud B

Although the Scud was originally designed as a tactical battlefield support weapon, many
countries view it and other SRBM systems as strategic weapons to be used against urban
areas. Iraq used extended-range Scud missiles as strategic weapons during both the Iran-
Iraq war and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the future, other countries could modify Scud
missiles to significantly improve their accuracy and use them against high-value military
targets and cities. 88

NORTH KOREA

North Korea has over 500 Scud missiles available for use against targets on the Korean
peninsula,89 including 300 km Scud B and 500 km Scud C SRBMs. 90 North Korea produces
both its own version of the Russian Scud B and the Scud C, an indigenous, extended-range
version of the Scud B.91 In 2005, North Korea tested a new solid-propellant short-range
ballistic missile.92

IRAN

Iran has a force of several hundred Scud Bs,

Scud Cs, Fateh-110s, and Chinese-made CSS-8
SRBMs.93 Iran also produces Scud missiles with
assistance from North Korea.94 Iran has a solid-
fuel rocket infrastructure and has produced
short-range rockets. 95 Iranian engineers are
also likely working to improve the accuracy of
the country’s SRBMs.96

Fateh-110

– 16 –
 North Korean SRBM Range Rings Iranian SRBM Range Rings

CHINA

China has deployed a very large force of modern solid propellant SRBMs in the vicinity
of Taiwan. 97 These include the CSS-7 and CSS-6 single-stage, solid-propellant missiles with
ranges of 300 km and 600 km respectively.98 All Chinese SRBMs are mobile and can deploy
throughout the country.99 As of September 2008, China had 1,050-1,150 SRBMs and is
increasing its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year. While China’s first-generation
SRBMs do not possess true precision strike capability, later generations have greater ranges,
improved accuracy, and a wider variety of conventional payloads, including unitary and
submunition warheads.100

RUSSIA

Russian SS-21 and SS-26 SRBMs provide Russian ground forces with a rapid, precision-guided,
theater deep-strike capability.101 Russia continues to maintain a significant number of
SRBMs, particularly SS-21s and Scuds that were retained from deactivated units. Russia fired
SS-21s and Scuds against Chechen forces in the fall of 1999.102 Russia is also offering the
advanced new Iskander-E SRBM for export.103

INDIA

Indian SRBMs include the Prithvi I and Prithvi II, as well as the ship-launched Dhanush. The
Prithvi I is deployed with the Indian Army. 104 The Prithvi II is a modified Prithvi I for use by
India’s Air Force. 105 The Dhanush is a naval version of the Prithvi and is undergoing sea-
based flight tests from an Indian naval surface ship.106 The Indian military is preparing to
field several new or updated SRBMs.107

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PAKISTAN

Pakistan has several active SRBM programs, including the Ghaznavi.108 Pakistan is attempting
to market the Hatf I as an inexpensive and easy to operate system.109 Pakistani officials
claim the Shaheen I is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.110

Ghaznavi Prithvi
SYRIA

Syria has a combined total of several hundred SS-21, Scud B, C, and D SRBMs.111 Syria’s
liquid-propellant ballistic missile program continues to depend on foreign equipment and
assistance, primarily from North Korean entities. 112 Syria also continues to acquire Scud-
related equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran and produces the Scud C with
North Korean assistance. 113 Syria is fielding updated SRBMs to replace older and shorter-
range variants.114

LIBYA

Libya has pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 km and
payloads greater than 500 kg and to allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify
these actions.115 Libya has disclosed several dozen facilities, including their deployed
Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-assisted Scud C production line. 116 The Scud C
program has been disbanded, including five completed systems, two partial systems, and
all related equipment.117 The Al Fatah is an indigenously-developed, 200 km range SRBM
which is currently undergoing testing.118

– 18 –
 Representative SRBMs

SRBM Characteristics119
Producer Number Deployment Maximum
Missile Propellant
and / or User of Stages Mode Range (km)

Scud B North Korea, Iran, Syria,

1 Liquid Road-mobile 300
(SS-1C Mod 1) Russia, Libya

North Korea, Iran,

Scud C 1 Liquid Road-mobile 500
Syria, Libya

Fateh-110 Iran 1 Solid Road-mobile 193

1st Stage – Solid
CSS-8 Iran, China 2 Road-mobile 150
2nd Stage – Liquid
CSS-6 China 1 Solid Road-mobile 600

CSS-7 China 1 Solid Road-mobile 300

SS-21 Mod 2 Russia 1 Liquid Road-mobile 70

SS-21 Mod 3 Russia 1 Solid Road-mobile 120

SS-26 Russia 1 Solid Road-mobile 300+

Iskander-E Russia 1 Solid Road-mobile 272+

Prithvi India 1 Liquid Road-mobile 150

Prithvi II India 1 Liquid Road-mobile 250

Agni I India 1 Solid Road-mobile 700

Dhanush India 1 Liquid Ship-based 400

Hatf I Pakistan 1 Solid Road-mobile 80

Ghaznavi Pakistan 1 Solid Road-mobile 400

Shaheen I Pakistan 1 Solid Road-mobile 450+

SS-21 Syria 1 Liquid Road-mobile 70

Scud D Syria 1 Liquid Road-mobile 700

Al Fatah Libya Unknown Liquid Road-mobile 200

– 19 –
SELECT SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMs)

CHINA

China has no deployed SLBMs. China has designed a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) called the Type 094, which will carry the new JL-2 SLBM. 120 The JL-2 SLBM is
a three-stage, solid-propellant missile. This missile is not yet deployed, but it is capable of a
7,200 km range. The JL-2 is expected to be capable of targeting the entire United States.121
The introduction of a new generation SLBM on China’s new ballistic missile submarine will
provide an additional survivable nuclear option.122

CSS-NX-3 SLBM Launch Sequence

The CSS-NX-3 SLBM is a two-stage, solid-propellant missile that is launched from a Xia class
SSBN. China has 12 launch tubes, but this missile is not yet deployed. The CSS-NX-3 is capable
of a 1,600+ km range. 123

RUSSIA

Russia still maintains a substantial force of SSBNs with intercontinental-range missiles. They
are developing new and improved SLBM weapon systems to replace its current inventory
of Cold War vintage systems. 124

The SS-N-18 SLBM is a two stage, liquid-

Bulava-30 SLBM Launch from a Typhoon
propellant missile that is launched from
a Delta III class SSBN. 125 The SS-N-20 SLBM
is a three stage, solid-propellant missile
that is launched from a Typhoon class
SSBN. 126 The SS-N-23 SLBM is a three
stage, liquid-propellant missile that is
launched from a Delta IV class SSBN. 127
The Sineva is an upgrade to the SS-
N-23 and is intended to replace it on
Delta IVs. 128 The Bulava-30 SLBM is a new
three-stage, solid-propellant missile that
is launched from both the Typhoon and
Dolgorukiy class SSBNs, but the missile is
not yet deployed. 129

– 20 –
INDIA

India, with Russian assistance, is currently developing an SLBM known as the Sagarika.130
The Sagarika could be operational after 2010.131

UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom (U.K.) is committed to retaining an independent nuclear deterrent.

As a result of decisions taken by the Government in late 2006, the U.K. will develop a new
generation SSBN to replace the current Vanguard-class submarine from the mid 2020s.
The U.K. is also participating in the life extension program for the U.S. Navy’s Trident II D-5
SLBM, and is undertaking a review of the optimum life of its current warhead stockpile and
analysis of the range of replacement options that might
be available. These measures will enable the U.K. to
sustain a nuclear deterrent force well into the future.132

FRANCE

France has also committed to maintaining a modern

nuclear force. In support of this policy, France is
committed to the modernization of its sea-based ballistic
missile force. Currently, France is developing a new
Triomphant-class SSBN to be deployed in 2010; a new
SLBM (M-51) to be deployed in 2010; and new warheads
for both their SLBMs and air-to-ground missiles. 133 M-51 SLBM

Representative SLBMs

– 21 –
 SLBM Characteristics130

Producer Number Warheads Maximum

Missile Propellant Submarine
and / or User of Stages per Missile Range (km)

CSS-NX-3 China 2 1 Solid Xia 1,600+

JL-2 China 3 1 Solid Type 094 7,200+

SS-N-18 Russia 2 + PBV 3 Liquid Delta III 5,600+

SS-N-20 Russia 3 + PBV 10 Solid Typhoon 8,800+

SS-N-23 Russia 3 + PBV 4 Liquid Delta IV 8,000+

Sineva Russia Unknown 10 Liquid Delta IV 8,000+

Typhoon /
Bulava-30 Russia 3 + PBV Unknown Solid 8,000+
Dolgorukiy

Sagarika India Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 288+

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

OVERVIEW

Ballistic missiles can be armed with conventional or nonconventional warheads.

Conventional warheads are filled with a chemical explosive, such as TNT, and rely on
the detonation of the explosive and the resulting metal casing fragmentation as kill

Warhead

– 22 –
mechanisms. Nonconventional warheads include weapons of mass destruction (nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons), as well as nonlethal warheads, a relatively new class
of warhead designed to disable equipment rather than harm personnel. Conventional,
biological, and chemical weapons can be packaged in unitary (single) warheads and in
submunitions (multiple small bomblets that are released at altitude to disperse over a wide
area). 135

Almost all of the longer-range

ballistic missiles carry nuclear
warheads. Most of these
warheads have an explosive
force that is tens to hundreds
of times more powerful than
the atomic bombs used in
World War II. Chemical and
biological weapons are at-
tractive to many Third World
countr-ies because they are
much easier to produce than
nuclear weapons. Many
countries with chemical and
biological warfare programs Nuclear Explosion
also are equipped with bal-
listic missiles. Accuracy is not very important for these weapons when used against urban
areas or large concentrations of military forces. Chemical and biological weapons are
capable of producing massive casualties, inducing panic and chaos in civilian populations,
and severely degrading military operations. 136

PROLIFERATION

The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons in the world is
shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and
arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. About a
dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number
have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow as new technologies
are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology
continues. Nearly all countries that reportedly have or are seeking nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons also have ballistic missiles.137

Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to
export weapons technology. The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown,
and concern about the ability of individual actors like the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q.
Khan, to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably. 138

– 23 –
COUNTRY INFORMATION

North Korea
On 10 February 2005, North Korea announced for the first time publicly that
it has nuclear arms; they claimed the nuclear weapons development was
for self-defense purposes. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first
nuclear test.139

North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s. It has acquired
dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support
biological weapons efforts. 140 North Korea is enhancing its biological weapons potential
as it builds a legitimate biotechnology infrastructure and is believed to possess a munitions
production infrastructure that would allow agent weaponization. It may have biological
weapons available for use. 141

North Korea has a long-standing chemical weapons program.142 It is not a party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention and continues to acquire dual-use chemicals that could
be weaponized. 143

North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of
nerve, blister, choking, and blood agent using a sizeable, though aging, chemical industry.
It possesses a stockpile of agents and weapons of unknown size, which it could employ by
a variety of delivery means. 144

Iran
In November 2007, the Intelligence Community judged with high confidence
that in Fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons program, to include weapon
design, weaponization work, and covert uranium conversion-related and
uranium enrichment-related work.145 As of mid-2007 Iran had not restarted
the program.146 Although the Intelligence Community judges that Iran does
not yet have a nuclear weapon, 147 it is currently developing its nuclear infrastructure,
which could produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for a nuclear weapons
program.148 The Intelligence Community judges with high confidence that Iran will not be
technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before
about 2015.149

Iran’s biological weapons program began during the Iran/Iraq War, employing limited
amounts of agent against Iraqi troops.150 Iran has a growing biotechnology industry,
significant pharmaceutical experience, and the overall infrastructure that could be used
to support a biological warfare program.151 It is believed that Iran maintains offensive
chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development,152 is
technically capable of producing at least rudimentary bulk-fill biological warheads for a
variety of delivery systems, including missiles,153 and continues to aggressively seek foreign
technology, training, and expertise to advance its biotechnology industry.154 Iran has

– 24 –
produced blister, blood, and choking agents, and is believed to be conducting research
on nerve agents. 155 Iran also possesses weaponized stockpiles of agents, is capable of
agent delivery, and trains military forces to operate in contaminated environments. 156

China
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper states that: 1) the purpose of China’s
nuclear force is to “deter other countries from using or threatening to
use nuclear weapons against China;” 2) China “upholds the principles
of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear
weapons;” and, 3) China “has never entered into and will never enter into a
nuclear arms race with any other country.” The document reiterated China’s commitment
to a declaratory policy of “no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any
circumstances,” and states China “unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones.”
Doctrinal materials suggest additional missions for China’s nuclear forces include deterring
conventional attacks against China nuclear assets or conventional attacks with WMD-like
effects, reinforcing China’s great power status, and increasing freedom of action by limiting
the extent to which others can coerce China with nuclear threats.157

China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological weapons program

and possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop
and produce biological agents.158 While China has affirmed its commitment not to
develop BW, it likely has retained elements of its offensive program.159 China is believed
to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development,
production, and weaponization.160 International sales of CW have been a source of foreign
exchange.161

Russia
Russia maintains a full compliment of nuclear weapons, including a relatively
large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. Russia also continues
research and development that could support its chemical and biological
warfare programs.162

India
India is building larger stockpiles of fission weapons and is likely working on
advanced warhead and delivery system designs to increase the effective-
ness of these weapons.163 Additionally, India has the infrastructure to
support biological and some aspects of their chemical warfare programs.164
India had five underground nuclear tests in May 1998165 and is capable of
manufacturing complete sets of components for plutonium-based nuclear weapons. In
the biological arena, India has substantial biotechnical infrastructure and expertise166 and
is conducting biological warfare defense research. 167 India acknowledged a chemical
warfare program in 1997 and opened its facilities to inspection.168 A sizeable chemical
industry could be a source for proliferation and weaponization of dual-use chemicals.169

– 25 –
Syria
Syria possesses a biotechnical infrastructure that is adequate to support
limited biological warfare programs,170 and it is believed that Syria maintains
an offensive biological weapons research and development program.171
Syria is also believed to be pursuing select biological agent development.172
Additionally, Syria has an active chemical weapons program 173 and is
currently making improvements to its chemical infrastructure. Syria has developed CW
warheads for its Scud missiles, 174 and it continues to seek CW related expertise from foreign
sources, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. 175

In September 2007, Israel bombed a covert nuclear reactor in eastern Syria. North Korea
assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities, and the reactor, which was damaged beyond
repair, was capable of producing plutonium. In defiance of its international obligations,
Syria did not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the construction of
the reactor, and, after it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury evidence of its
existence. The construction of the reactor was a dangerous and potentially destabilizing
development for the region and the world.176

SUMMARY

Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to continue increasing
while growing more complex over the next decade. Current trends indicate that adversary
ballistic missile systems, with advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems, are
becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate while also presenting
longer ranges. Prelaunch survivability is also likely to increase as potential adversaries
strengthen their denial and deception measures and increasingly base their missiles on
mobile sea- and land-based platforms. Adversary nations are increasingly adopting
technical and operational countermeasures to defeat missile defenses. For example, China,
Iran and North Korea exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to
defeat these defenses. The availability of weapons of mass destruction for use on ballistic
missiles vastly increases the significance of this threat.177

Viewed from a global perspective, Russia probably will retain the largest force of strategic
ballistic missiles outside the United States. China is capable of producing technologically
advanced ballistic missiles and has sold ballistic missile technology to other countries.
China has an extensive theater missile program and has deployed a large force of ballistic
missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. North Korea is continuing the development of the Taepo
Dong-2 ICBM and has a new IRBM in development. Any North Korean ballistic missiles may
be exported to other countries in the future. With continued foreign assistance, Iran also
could have an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. 178

Ballistic missiles, with their relatively low operating costs, their high probability of penetrating
existing defense systems, and their value as a symbol of national power, will continue to be
the offensive weapons of choice for many nations. As such, they are threats that must be
carefully considered in future military planning and operations.179
– 26 –
ENDNOTES

All sources used for this document are unclassified and have been released to the public by
the originating agencies.

1
“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), NASIC-1031-
0985-06, March 2006, p. 1 (B&CM Threat 2006)
2
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 1
3
“Ballistic Missiles: Delivery Systems For Weapons of Mass Destruction,” DCI Center for Weapons
Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC), May 1995, p. 3 (WINPAC 1995)
4
WINPAC 1995, p. 3
5
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
6
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
7
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
8
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
9
WINPAC 1995, p. 3
10
WINPAC 1995, p. 5
11
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3; WINPAC 1995, p. 5
12
WINPAC 1995, p. 16-18
13
WINPAC 1995, p. 21
14
WINPAC 1995, p. 23
15
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
16
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples Statement for the Record to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 18 January 2007, p. 10-11 (Maples 18 Jan 2007)
17
NORAD News Release, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean Launch,” North American
Aerospace Defense Command, 5 April 2009
18
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
19
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 27 February 2008, p. 11, 29
(Maples 27 Feb 2008); DoD, Armed Forces Press Article, 9 July 2008
20
Maples, 27 Feb 2008, p. 15
21
B&CM Threat 2006, inside front cover
22
Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
Through 2015,” National Intelligence Council, December 2001, p. 13 (Unclassified NIE 2001)
23
“Proliferation: Threat and Response,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001 p. 25 (PTR)
24
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13
25
PTR, p. 30
26
PTR, p. 28
27
PTR, p. 30
28
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
29
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
30
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
31
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
32
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
33
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
34
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
35
MSIC, Response to MDA PR A128-08-0082/2, September 2008 (MISC Sep 2008)
36
MISC Sep 2008
37
MISC Sep 2008

– 27 –
38
PTR p. 11
39
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
40
PTR, p. 11
41
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
24 February 2004, p. 9 (Jacoby 24 Feb 2004)
42
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11; “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a
Long-Term Strategy” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, Porter J. Goss before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 5 (Goss 16 Feb 2005); and B&CM 2006 Threat, inside
cover
43
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 9
44
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 9
45
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17; Jacoby 24 Feb 2004, p. 9
46
“Press briefing on the North Korean Missile Launch,” White House Press Secretary, Tony Snow and
National Security Advisor, Steven Hadley, 4 July 2006, p. 1; “Recent Developments in U.S.-Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) Relations,” Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Christopher R. Hill before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 20 July 2006, p. 1
47
NORAD News Release, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean Launch,” North American
Aerospace Defense Command, 5 April 2009
48
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
16 February 2005, p. 11 (Jacoby 16 Feb 2005)
49
“The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony of Director of
Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February
2004, p. 10 (Tenet 24 Feb 2004)
50
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2008 Worldwide Space Launches, 1 October 2008.
51
Spacewarn Bulletin No. 664, 01 March 2009, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
52
Annual Threat Assessment, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate,
Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 10 March 2009
53
B&CM Threat 2008, p. 17; Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 15; “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of
the People’s Republic of China 2009,” Department of Defense Report to Congress, p. 24 (China Annual
Report 2009)
54
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17, China Annual Report 2009, p. 24
55
China Annual Report 2009, p. 48
56
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, 17 March 2005, p. 11 (Jacoby 17
Mar 2005)
57
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17
58
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17
59
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 7
60
China Annual Report 2008, p. 56; Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Annual Threat
Assessment, 27 Feb 2008 (Senate 27 Feb 2008); Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat
2006; Senate Armed Services Holds Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for U.S. Pacific Command and
U.S. Forces-Korea, 11 March 2008 (Senate 11 Mar 2008)
61
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
62
B&CM Threat 2006, p.10
63
Rumsfeld Report Exsum, p. 7
64
PTR, pp. 30 and 38
65
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11
66
B&CM Threat 2006, pp.9, 10; Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11
67
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 28 February 2006, p. 12
(Maples 28 Feb 2006); B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9

– 28 –
68
PTR, pp. 36-38; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 15 and “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005 p. 11 (Jacoby 16 Feb 2005)
69
Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 11
70
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
71
PTR, p. 35; “Oral Statement by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,” Lieutenant General Michael
D. Maples to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment Hearing, 5 February
2008 (Maples 5 Feb 2008)
72
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 8
73
China Annual Report 2008, p. 24
74
China Annual Report 2009, p. 21
75
China Annual Report 2009, p. 48
76
China Annual Report 2009, p. 29
77
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 10, and China Annual Report 2008, p. 2
78
PTR p. 58; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
79
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
80
PTR, p. 25
81
PTR, p. 25
82
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
83
PTR, p. 30
84
“Attachment A, Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions,” CIA Report to Congress, 1 January through 30 June 2003, p. 10 (Unclassified
Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003)
85
China Annual Report 2008; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat
2006; Senate 11 Mar 2008
86
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
87
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
88
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
89
PTR, p. 11
90
“An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program,” Unclassified Appendix to Rumsfeld Commission
Report, 15 July 1998, David Wright, p. 1 (Wright Unclass Appendix to Rumsfeld Report)
91
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
92
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5
93
PTR, p. 36; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 4
94
PTR, p. 36
95
Rumsfeld Report Exsum, p. 8
96
Jacoby 17 Mar 2005, p. 11
97
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
98
B&CM Threat 2006, pp. 4 and 6, and China Annual Report 2008, p. 56
99
MSIC Response to A128-06-00171, March 2006 and China Annual Report 2006, p. 11
100
China Annual Report 2009, p. 22
101
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 8
102
PTR, p. 54
103
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28
104
PTR, p. 24
105
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13; PTR, p. 24
106
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
107
Jacoby 16 Feb 2005, p. 12
108
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 4

– 29 –
109
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13
110
PTR, p. 30
111
PTR, p. 45; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 6
112
Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 11
113
PTR, p. 45
114
Jacoby 17 Mar 2005, p. 12
115
“The President’s National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya’s Announcement”, Fact Sheet,
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 December 2003, p. 1 (Libya Announcement)
116
Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 9
117
“The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges,” Testimony of
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, before the House
International Relations Committee, 30 March 2004, p. 4 (Bolton 30 Mar 2004)
118
PTR, pp. 47-48
119
China Annual Report 2008, p. 3; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM
Threat 2006, p. 6; Senate 11 Mar 2008
120
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
121
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
122
China Annual Report 2005, p. 29
123
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
124
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
125
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
126
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
127
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
128
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
129
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
130
PTR, p. 25
131
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13
132
“National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman
and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, September 2008, p. 9 (Bodman and Gates Sep 2008)
133
Bodman and Gates Sep 2008, p. 9
134
China Annual Report 2008, p. 56; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM
Threat 2006; Senate 11 Mar 2008
135
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 2
136
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 2
137
“Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,” Congressional Research
Service, 20 February 2008 (CRS 2008)
138
CRS 2008
139
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 9
140
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5
141
Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 9
142
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5
143
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 9
144
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5
145
Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, National
Intelligence Council, November 2007, p. 6 (Unclassified NIE 2007)
146
Unclassified NIE 2007, p. 6
147
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 10
148
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5
149
Unclassified NIE 2007, p. 8

– 30 –
150
PTR, p. 36
151
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
152
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5
153
“Adherence to and Compliance with Arms, Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments,” U. S. Department of State, August 2005, p. 21 (Disarmament Agreements)
154
Disarmament Agreements, p. 21
155
PTR, p. 36
156
PTR, p. 35
157
China Annual Report 2008, p. 26.
158
Maples, 18 Jan 2007
159
PTR, p. 14
160
PTR, p. 15
161
PTR, p. 15
162
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 10
163
Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
164
Attachment A: Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, “CIA Report to Congress, 1 January – 30 June 1999”, p. 6.
165
PTR, p. 24
166
PTR, p. 24
167
PTR, p. 24
168
PTR, p. 25
169
PTR, p. 24
170
Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
171
Maples, 28 Feb 2006, p. 10
172
Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
173
PTR, p. 43
174
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 6
175
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 12
176
Statement by the White House Press Secretary, 24 April 2008
177
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28; Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 29
178
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28
179
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28

All range rings are sourced from the included tables.

All photos are from “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
NASIC-1031-0985-06, March 2006, with the following exceptions:

Ballistic Missile Components: Steeljaw Scribe, http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007/05/missile-defense-

101-icbm-fundamentals.html, accessed 16 October 2008.

Noble Prophet 2: National Air and Space Intelligence Center classified website.

Shahab 3: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Iran’s arsenal of missiles,” 10 July 2008, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7499601.stm, accessed 03 November 2008.

Fateh-110: Washington Times, AP article, “Iran Moves Closer to Nukes Capability,” 25 September 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/25/tehrans-threat/, accessed 17 October 2008.

M-51 SLBM: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “France to reduce nuclear warheads,” 21 March 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7308563.stm, accessed 10 November 2008.

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works of the United States Government.

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