Marketplace Metacognition and Social Intelligence

PETER WRIGHT*
Consumers develop over their life span a pragmatic expertise in marketplace metacognition and marketplace interactions. Marketplace metacognition and social intelligence refer to peoples beliefs about their own mental states and the mental states, strategies, and intentions of others as these pertain directly to the social domain of marketplace interactions. Drawing from the recent study of evolutionary psychology, theory of mind, multiple life-span intelligences, and everyday persuasion knowledge, I discuss the importance to our eld of studying marketplace metacognition and social intelligence and of research-based consumer education programs on those topics.

his is the fourth decade in which I have written for the Journal of Consumer Research, but this feels different. This time I have an editorial mandate to be provocative and far-reaching about consumer research in the years ahead. The freedom is disorienting. Before, in JCR submissions, the social mind-reading task (how to anticipate and handle the mental activities of the notorious Masked Reviewer, aka Sluggo) became easier with practice and peer consultation (as do, I suppose, many domain-specic social mind-reading tasks). I am now an academic ancient, writing mainly to a young generation of scholars with different educational experiences than mine who face a different scholarly zeitgeist than the one shared by my research cohort. To stretch or excite those young minds, I must do social mind reading across generations. Those of you intending to do frontier research over the next decade may already have considered the implications of evolutionary psychology, theory of mind, and life-span theories of multiple intelligences. If not, read on. It is, in fact, the task of social mind reading across generations about which I want to talk.

MARKETPLACE METACOGNITION AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE CORE CONSUMER RESEARCH TOPIC
The study of marketplace metacognition and social intelligence is among the most important new research frontiers facing adventurous consumer researchers. The study of marketplace metacognition and social intelligence will, I believe, come to dominate the eld of consumer research in the next decade or so. If so, that will be a healthy development, and substantive transformation will elevate the prominence of consumer research and marketplace studies among the social sciences. Marketplace metacognition refers to everyday individuals thinking about market-related thinking. This includes peoples beliefs about their own and others mental states and processes and their beliefs about other peoples beliefs on those topics as these beliefs pertain to the specic domain of marketplace cooperation and manipulation. Marketplace social intelligence refers to the cognitive routines and contents dedicated to achieving marketplace efcacy that are accessible to individuals by virtue of functionally specialized evolutionary processes and the development of this functionally specialized expertise over an individuals life span. Metacognition has been a loosely dened term. It was initially more closely associated with peoples self-knowledge and self-control than with their beliefs about others mental states, others psychological thinking about social inuence, and achieving self-control over others social effects. For example, in Alba and Hutchinsons (2000) integrative discussion of consumer knowledge calibration, metacognition is conceived mainly as ones knowledge about own knowledge. Socially focused and self-focused metacognition about the
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2002 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 28 March 2002 All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2002/2804-0012$10.00

*Peter Wright is the Edwin E. and June Woldt Cone Professor of Marketing, Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon (pwright@oregon.uoregon.edu). He was a professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business from 1974 to 1997, and was also on the University of Illinois faculty and a visiting scholar at the Harvard Business School. He is a fellow in the Institute for Cognitive and Decision Sciences at the University of Oregon and a fellow of the Association for Consumer Research (ACR). He has also been president of ACR. He thanks Marian Friestad, research partner, for many ideas embedded throughout this essay. He also thanks Meg Campbell, Amna Kirmani, Eric Koch, KaRin Kricorian, David Mick, and participants in the evolutionary psychology and theory of mind workshops of the Institute for Cognitive and Decision Sciences at Oregon for stimulating the thinking presented here.

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enduring human problem of cooperative exchange in a marketplace is my topic here. How do consumers come to understand the psychological beliefs, strategies, and intentions of marketing agents? How do they communicate about their own or others states of mind or psychological processes? How do they understand how to control own mental states as these relate to marketplace interactions and activities? How does this differ across generations, cultures, and individual life spans? How does it adapt as signicant changes occur in marketers communication and research technologies? As the future study of marketplace metacognition and social intelligence progresses, its leaders will draw theoretical inspiration from research on evolutionary psychology, theory of mind, folk-theoretic models of intentionality and social explanation, and the life-span development of multiple intelligences, including practical marketplace intelligence. The marketplace interaction per se will be treated as the focal domain of our theoretical analysis more so than in past research. Perhaps a eld of scholarship called behavioral marketplace theory will emerge. It will provide an intellectually comfortable shared identity for researchers who have until now tended to identify themselves as studying either consumer behavior or marketing management/ tactics/research. Behavioral marketplace theory would parse the eld of study in accordance with a central problem of human evolutioncooperative exchange in a market. This aligns the research problem with a theoretical premise about functionality in human problem solving and human development. We will begin by assuming that marketplace-focused social intelligence is a central domain of specialized human thought, evolved and continually developing to handle the complexities of cooperative market-based exchanges, and then wholeheartedly study it as such. The study of consumer behavior and marketer behavior will converge much more than in past research and theory, becoming the study of dynamic interactive reective marketplace behavior over time. Research will examine how consumers and marketers, in continual interaction with one another, develop and use their metacognitive beliefs about cooperative marketplace mind games to play out variants of those cooperative marketplace mind games. My central proposal then is that a domain of metacognitive marketplace social intelligence or expertise represents the core of consumer development, consumer education, consumer participation in marketplace social interactions broadly conceived and, hence, consumer research. Acknowledging this will refocus our attention on the marketplaces inherently social nature, and therefore on the necessity of capturing social interactive knowledge and thinking in our studies of consumers. Acknowledging it will also have a prosocial effect on the eld of consumer research. It will enhance consumer researchers awareness of the importance of the phenomenon they study and of their potential inuence in disseminating knowledge on marketplace metacognition in an egalitarian fashion throughout society.

My research colleagues and I have been thinking along these lines for a while now, but an accumulation of recent writings has provided added inspiration. These writings share in common a strong emphasis on the social foundation of, and deeply social focus of, the human mind. They are each in their own way about everyday common sense and folk psychology. They include these four books: Interactive Minds (Baltes and Staudinger 1996), Machiavellian Intelligence II (Whiten and Byrne 1997), The Descent of Mind (Corballis and Lea 1999), and Intentions and Intentionality (Malle, Moses, and Baldwin 2001). As prelude to telling what these writings suggest to me about consumer research, I will briey summarize what they are about. Each volume is an edited collection of the writings of a dozen or so imaginative scholars, and so no summary can do justice to the multitude of good ideas they offer. Interactive Minds: Life-Span Perspectives on the Social Foundation of Cognition (Baltes and Staudinger 1996) is a collection of 14 papers edited by Paul Baltes and Ursula Staudinger of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education. The papers deal with the biologicalevolutionary aspects of cooperation, collaborative peer problem solving and collaborative memory as a form of adult human development, the psychology of wisdom in adulthood, cooperative construction of expertise, and other issues related to mental capabilities and competency over the life span. Of particular interest is the underlying assumption that as adults age they gain enhanced pragmatic intelligence, as opposed to academic intelligence, by focusing on deeply understanding a few high-priority problem domains. Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations (Whiten and Byrne 1997) is a fascinating collection of 14 papers edited by Andrew Whiten and Richard Byrne of the University of St. Andrews. These papers further extend the fundamental Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis rst aired in the 1980s by presenting more research on primate social strategies and by relating the hypothesis to human behavior. These papers collectively assert (a) that social intelligence is qualitatively different from nonsocial intelligence because the social environment is more complex, less predictable, and more challenging than the ecological environment; (b) that social intelligence preceded nonsocial intelligence in human evolution (and hence that the ability to think about other peoples minds is the essence of humanity); (c) that social intelligence is therefore generative of nonsocial intelligence, not vice versa; and (d) that the prodigious neurological evolution of the human brain is indeed an outcome of its focus on human social complexities. The Descent of Mind: Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution (Corballis and Lea 1999) is a collection of 14 equally fascinating papers on evolutionary psychology edited by Michael Corballis of Auckland University and Stephen Lea of the University of Exeter. Particularly interesting here are papers on the evolution in humans of a theory of mind, or metamind, and discussion of how development of and interactions among deep social minds

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create a cycle throughout history wherein social mind reading supports egalitarianism and egalitarianism supports a cooperative, shared mind reading. Finally, Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (Malle et al. 2001) brings us fully into the realm of humans theories of each others mental world and interpretations of each others strategic behavior in social interactions. It is a collection of 18 papers edited by Bertram Malle, Louis Moses, and Dare Baldwin, all of the University of Oregon. The papers present an exciting and far-ranging picture of the folk-theoretic approach to studying how people interpret and explain human behavior. The folk-theoretic approach, unlike other causal judgment approaches to human explanation, emphasizes and distinguishes peoples everyday explanations in which a social interactive context is explicitly considered (i.e., human-human social interactions, as opposed to, say, human-object interactions) and in which the judgment by one person of anothers intentionality is paramount.

THE MIND IS DOMAIN SPECIFIC AND MARKETPLACE METACOGNITION IS A KEY DOMAIN OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
One idea I derive from all this concerns the functionality of the human mind. The human mind has arguably evolved primarily to cope with the complexity of controlling the social world, not the physical world. The core problem domain that human minds have evolved to deal with is essentially a social one. In this evolutionary process there have emerged, in addition to domain-general cognitive mechanisms, some critical domain-specic mechanisms that are functionally specialized to solve particular adaptive problems. This contrasts with the traditional assumption in cognitive social psychology, and in consumer research for the last several decades, that we should hope to discover the minds general-purpose cognitive mechanisms, in the name of parsimony (and to make our research world much easier.) Suppose we assume instead that the mind develops toward a deep content-saturated understanding of social cooperation and that the common form of cooperative exchange semiformalized as a marketplace is a key domain (at least, subdomain) of social intelligence historically. Then we can and should concentrate consumer studies on that content domain. In so doing, we will intentionally delegate the task of searching out grand domain-general cognitive processes to the thousands and thousands of other researchers who will keep doing that. We are few, they are many! We will as a eld make a collective bet that the specic domain of social intelligence we have dened as our eld is worthy of focused study in its own right. Very few, if any, of the consumer researchers alive today reading this will ever identify a domaingeneral psychological principle. Why not embrace the domain-specic perspective wholeheartedly for a while, as a eld, and see where it leads?

If we entertain this domain-specicity notion, where might it lead our thinking? Some time ago, Marian Friestad and I offered a characterization of a subdomain of social intelligence we called persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994). The cornerstone of persuasion knowledge is, we conjectured, an individuals beliefs about the mental states and psychological change processes that operate as mediators of persuasion or intentional social inuence. In initial explorations, it became apparent that adults harbor rich conceptions of mental states involved in persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1995). Subsequently, it is plausibly argued that rich content saturation is characteristic of a specialized evolved domain of social intelligence. So, if we let ourselves speculatively elaborate a truly saturated domainspecic content of marketplace metacognition, what might it contain? Consumers marketplace metacognitive social expertise could include developed, or developing, metaknowledge of the following as they pertain directly to own and others marketplace mentalities: metaknowledge about (a) attention getting and holding (meta-attention), (b) belief formation (metabelief), (c) remembering (metamemory), (d) trust (metatrust), (e) desire (metadesire), (f) emotion (metaemotion), (g) deception (metadeception), and (h) intention (metaintention). It could include a persons metaknowledge about enduring human traits and about psychological uidity and change processes. Deep marketplace metacognition could include metabeliefs contextualized to common knowledge parsings of the types of stimuli marketing agents can manipulate or the contexts in which they operate. For example, an individuals marketplace metamind may parse the external environment such that it can understand and operate its own minitheory of advertising, minitheory of interpersonal selling, minitheory of relationship marketing, minitheory of pricing and bargaining, minitheory of visual design and display, and so on. If we acknowledge the essentially social nature of marketplace-related thought and action, then to me that implies that we as a eld wholeheartedly study consumers in explicitly social contexts. We would not study people in contexts where they face choices between inanimate tools, objects, or devices presented in a socially sterile and apparently benign fashion, that is, in contexts where their social suspicions and expertise are not activated. We should instead only study consumer choices made in contexts supersaturated with the social game-playing and consequences embedded in and characteristic of the marketplace. One key idea about a domain-specic intelligence or expertise is that it is highly context sensitive. A domain-specic intelligence is activated when it recognizes that the problem context it faces demands it, rather than demanding some other domain-specic intelligence. The implication to me is that the selection by researchers of a stimulus and environmental problem context is critical in determining whether or not a persons deep marketplace intelligence is activated as they serve as a subject of study. For example,

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persons presented with a context, stimulus, and problem that they construe to be an intellectual mathematical-deductive word problem akin to an academic exam will activate their mathematical logical word-problem-solving academic intelligence. In that situation, their marketplace-related social intelligence, however deeply developed, will remain untapped, leaving their performance unguided by that domainspecic intelligence and researchers ignorant about what happens when it is activated. To give this perspective, consider a spectrum of inuenceand-choice problem construals. At one extreme, people (e.g., consumers, human subjects) choose among inanimate objects (physical products) presented to them in a context where the presenter is not represented as (nor construed as) a skillful, cunning practitioner of manipulative strategy. At the opposite end of the spectrum, people face choices that are highly complex in social terms, for example, where the decision alternatives per se are humans (e.g., service relationships) or human-object combinations (e.g., most contemporary service offerings, many types of product offerings) and where those human alternatives are themselves explicitly presented by human social strategists well known to be skillful at and intent on artfully manipulating the choice that is made. Or, to ratchet up the social realism even further, there are choices where the consumers (or subjects) problem is, in addition to all the above, that the agent making the presentation may only be suspected of having manipulative intent, and may in fact be a true disciple of Machiavelli who knows to display benign cooperation as a guise. The latter is the problem our minds have been developing metacognitive expertise to deal with; activating that knowledge is the only way to examine it. As I look back on our eld, we seem often to settle for socially impoverished research settings. My line of speculation here argues that in the future we all eschew socially barren stimulus contexts. Or at least we make the construction of the stimulus research context an explicit one, justied in terms of its relationship to the domain of human intelligence or expertise a researcher seeks to examine. The difference, as I understand it, between a researcher who believes only in domain-general cognitive mechanisms and in a general intelligence and one who believes, as many more are coming to, in the likelihood of domain-specic intelligences that are functionally specialized is that the former tend to feel that any stimulus context is ne, whereas the latter believe that choosing the relevant stimulus context is crucial. For example, the former camp of researchers think it is irrelevant whether the stimulus-choice options are simple objects presented via word problems or are complex human relationships presented by manipulative social strategists; the latter believe that difference may matter very much. I realize fully why researchers migrate toward simple socially impoverished situations to study; I have sometimes done so myself. Researchers, like those they study, engage in simplifying behavior if it minimally sufces. Now, however, I advocate grappling with the complexities of highly

social marketplace situations. I do this self-consciously; I am toward the end of my research career and will not bear the burden. But, in a research career, better not to understand something complex than not to understand something simple (certainly more heroic at least).

CONSUMER EDUCATION ON MARKETPLACE METACOGNITION OVER THE LIFE SPAN

Consumers can be educated about marketplace metacognitive matters, just as prospective or actual marketers can. The expertise or practical intelligence we speak of here is a uid one that continues to develop over an individuals life span, with individual differences of course. To position our eld to contribute to societal consumer education, however, requires to some degree a reframing of research priorities. To do this will make our eld more egalitarian than it has been. In our elds infancy (up until now), consumer social intelligence has not been treated as a competency in the same way that other essential life topics are treated. But it should be. In so doing our eld of scholars will gain a prosocial balance that we have not historically achieved. This is both a matter of how we behave as educators and professionals and of how we subtly shade our choices of research topics. Many of us active in consumer research over the last decades found academic homes in business schools, where we educate prospective marketers on how to think metacognitively and strategically about inuencing consumers. We may believe our research will ultimately improve consumer decision making, negotiation skill, or welfare. But, the actual dissemination of metacognitive knowledge we achieve most often exclusively benets those who intend to use it as marketers rather than as consumers. How can educational interventions on marketplace metacognition and social expertise best serve the developmental needs of young children, adolescents, young adults, and mature or elderly lay adults? Pondering this has been a natural extension of thought among those of us who began contemplating everyday persuasion knowledge. As an example, in Friestad and Wright (2001) we call on the consumer research community, in collaboration with scholars from other disciplines, to develop programs for Preadult Education on Marketplace Persuasion Tactics (PREEMPT programs). These may be seen as marketplace literacy programs, related to but focused differently than the media literacy programs introduced worldwide over the last quarter century. It is enlightening to consider what the curriculum for such an educational program might be. Eventually we would like to be able to postulate a developmental model for the acquisition of knowledge about marketplace persuasion and inuence. While some research exists on how children acquire a theory of mind, on the changes that occur in middle childhood in childrens oral persuasive communication practices, and on childrens socialization as consumers, we still know little about how youngsters, teens,

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and young adults acquire marketplace expertise with and without exposure to formalized instruction on the topic. Ideally, we would like to customize the curriculum of a PREEMPT program so its pace exploits the natural knowledge-acquisition process and anticipates how to direct and expedite metacognitive marketplace learning to a students benet. To do so, we need a consensus about what constitutes the path of increased competence or expertise in the domain of marketplace persuasion knowledge. Second, we need a conception of developmental change in this type of knowledge. Does gaining added competence in this domain require learning concepts or skills in some sequence? If so, what sequence? What specic contextual domains could be highlighted in a PREEMPT program? For example, does a youngster need to focus rst on one situation (say, TV advertising), then extend to another (say, in-store shopping), and so on? Or do youngsters best acquire an interpretive framework by concurrent consideration of several marketplace contexts for comparison and analysis purposes? How can we measure these types of social intelligence? What levels of knowledge or cognitive performance will we deem as threshold competence? Does marketplace intelligence constitute a core domain of adult pragmatic intelligence that the vast majority of successfully aging people concentrate their minds on developing as they mature? Or does it become a core domain of practical intelligence only among a segment of the adult population? Finally, thinking in these terms about consumers over their life spans leads to some fascinating questions about cross-generational matchups in marketplace mind games. Consider the interplay of the generational mismatches in marketplace mind games. Sometimes a youngster who is a true novice is matched against a young adult who is perhaps a seminovice marketer. Sometimes a youngster is matched against mature adult marketers with children of their own and extensive metacognitive savvy. Sometimes young adult seminovice consumers are matched against more expert adult marketers. Sometimes, however, the matchups favor the experienced consumer, as when young adult seminovice marketers (fresh college graduates) are matched against adult consumers with considerable marketplace expertise. Examining how such matchups get played out, especially when the two players are aware of the expertise disparity, is a wonderful future research activity. By treating marketplace metacognition as an evolved potentiality and a uid pragmatic intelligence that individuals grow and rene somehow over the life span, research questions we have not been curious about crystallize as logical and necessary.

TOWARD A RE-VISION, REVITALIZATION, AND RENAISSANCE

Do my reections here converge in spirit with intellectual themes evident recently within the consumer research eld? Certainly. The pioneering naturalistic phenomenological studies have played an important role in reawakening in me an appreciation for the marketplaces wonderful richness

and its centrality to human lives. Indeed, within some of those inquiries, consumers own marketplace metacognitive thoughts have surfaced (e.g., Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf 1988; Ritson and Elliott 1999; Thompson, Locander, and Pollio 1990; Thompson, Pollio, and Locander 1994), although uncovering these was not usually the expressed goal. The impact of those studies is evident in research explicitly undertaken to examine consumers metacognitive knowledge. For example, Moore and Lutz (2000) conducted an interpretive study to augment their experimental work on childrens thoughts about advertising, as did Friestad and Wright (1995) to augment their structured study of metacognitive beliefs about persuasion. More directly, a growing body of research on everyday persuasion knowledge has developed, suggestive of a (small) movement. This work delves into a range of issues on the acquisition, content, accessibility, and measurement of marketplace metacognitive expertise (e.g., Aaker, Brumbaugh, and Grier 2000; Boush, Friestad, and Rose 1994; Campbell 1995, 1999; Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Friestad and Wright 1994, 1995, 1999, 2001; Kirmani 1990; Kirmani and Wright 1989; Koch 2001; Kricorian 1999; Obermiller and Spangenberg 1999). Also related is work on how people automatically access social knowledge to interact with machines (e.g., Moon 2000). The reective essays of other recent JCR contributors also seem convergent in spirit with the current proposal. These include discussions of the historical human fascination with persuasion (McGuire 2000), the mind and consciousness (Zaltman 2000), causal attribution (Weiner 2000), collective intentionality grounded in individuals mental states (Bagozzi 2000), and fundamental consumer competencies (Bazerman 2001; Wallendorf 2001). However, our eld needs I believe to consolidate itself around a shared vision in order to elevate itself as a social science. We are few, very few, spread very thin in terms of research directions and intellectual allegiances, and in danger of becoming so splintered as to remain more ineffectual as a science and a societal presence than we would all like. I have suggested a direction for that consolidationfocusing on the specialized functionally evolved domain of human knowledge and expertise I call marketplace metacognition and social intelligence. Let us make the marketplace our centerpiece, even to the extent inherent in my presumptuous invention of a new eldbehavioral marketplace theory and researchin which the study of consumers metacognitive social worlds is inherently entangled with that of everyday marketers and vice versa. To me there is an attractive and compelling logic to this. What about the consumer education initiative? Does that follow logically, or just lead to a further splintering of our eld? It follows logically, indeed inevitably, if one takes as a binding vision the study of the functionally specialized domain of thought and expertise. Should individual researchers then get directly involved in all the program design, administration, and evaluation issues of consumer education? That is a matter of individual choice, obviously.

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JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH (2001), Pre-adult Education on Marketplace Persuasion Tactics, working paper, Department of Marketing, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403. Kirmani, Amna (1990), The Effect of Perceived Advertising Costs on Brand Perceptions, Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (September), 160171. Kirmani, Amna and Peter Wright (1989), Money Talks: Perceived Advertising Expense and Expected Product Quality, Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (December), 344353. Koch, Eric Charles (2001), The Use of Persuasion Expertise to Interpret Marketers Persuasion Attempts, unpublished dissertation, Department of Marketing, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403. Kricorian, Karin Turner (1999), The Judgment and Memory Effects of the Activation of General Knowledge Structures Related to Persuasion and Information, unpublished dissertation, Department of Marketing, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. Malle, Bertram F., Louis J. Moses, and Dare A. Baldwin, eds. (2001), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McGuire, William J. (2000), Standing on the Shoulders of Ancients: Consumer Research, Persuasion, and Figurative Language, Journal of Consumer Research, 27 (June), 109114. Moon, Youngme (2000), Intimate Exchanges: Using Computers to Elicit Self-Disclosure from Consumers, Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (March), 323339. Moore, Elizabeth S. and Richard J. Lutz (2000), Children, Advertising, and Product Experiences: A Multimethod Inquiry, Journal of Consumer Research, 27 (June), 3148. Obermiller, Carl and Eric R. Spangenberg (1999), Development of a Scale to Measure Consumer Skepticism of Advertising, Journal of Consumer Psychology, 7 (2), 159186. Ritson, Mark and Richard Elliott (1999), The Social Uses of Advertising, Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (December), 260277. Thompson, Craig J., William B. Locander, and Howard R. Pollio (1990), The Lived Meaning of Free Choice: An ExistentialPhenomenological Description of Everyday Consumer Experiences of Contemporary Married Women, Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (December), 346361. Thompson, Craig J., Howard R. Pollio, and William B. Locander (1994), The Spoken and the Unspoken: A Hermeneutic Approach to Understanding the Cultural Viewpoints That Underlie Consumers Expressed Meanings, Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (December), 432452. Wallendorf, Melanie (2001), Literally Literacy, Journal of Consumer Research, 27 (March), 505512 Weiner, Bernard (2000), Attributional Thoughts about Consumer Behavior, Journal of Consumer Research, 27 (December), 382387. Whiten, Andrew and Richard W. Byrne, eds. (1997), Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zaltman, Gerald (2000), Consumer Researchers: Take a Hike! Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (March), 423428.

But wouldnt it be nice if a decade from now the eld would be clearly acknowledged as a primary resource for, participant in, and even a leader of the creation of egalitarian research-based marketplace education programs in society? [David Glen Mick served as editor for this article.]

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