LONZANIDA VS COMELEC FACTS : Lonzanida was elected as mayor and served two consecutive terms from 1988 to 1995.

Hethen ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties asmayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC,w h i c h r u l e d t h a t t h e r e was a failure of elections and declared the position of m a y o r v a c a n t . T h e COMELEC affirmed this decision and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate his post. In the 1998elections, Lonzanida again filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor but was protested against due tothe reason that he allegedly had served 3 consecutive terms already. ISSUE : Whether or not it may be considered that petitioner had served 3 consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in 1995. HELD: Negative. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen.

ISSUE : Whether or not an assumption to office through recall election should be considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. HELD: Negative. The court held that Talaga cannot be construed as having beenelected and served for t h r e e c o n s e c u t i v e t e r m s . H i s l o s s i n the 1998 elections was considered as an inte rruption in t h e continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, Talaga lived as a private citizen.

SOCRATES VS COMELEC FACTS: Edward Hagedorn had already served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor,Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the sameyear, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4 th consecutive term. ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election. ADORMEO VS COMELEC FACTS: Ramon Talaga was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran for a thirdterm but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his then opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recallelections of May 2000, Talaga won and served for the unexpir ed term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his COC for the mayoralty post. This was questioned on the ground that he hadalready served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms. HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The court ruled that the rationale behind the 3-term rule was to p r e v e n t consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election.

BORJA VS COMELEC FACTS: Jose Capco was first elected as vice mayor but upon the death of the then incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for 2 more terms as mayor. He again filed his candidacy for mayor for the succeeding election but was protested against. ISSUE : Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served that term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the constitution. HELD: Negative. The court held that when Capco occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of mayor, he served first as a vice mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other.

HELD: Affirmative. Upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, Latasa continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There may be some changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as an LGU but no substantial changes occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.

ONG VS ALEGRE FACTS: Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Francis Ong. The petition to disqualify was predicated onthe threeconsecutive term rule. Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as Mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. The First Division of COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petitionof Alegre, rationalizing that Francis might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998;1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Alegre was the "legally elected Mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte." ISSUE: Whether or not Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. HELD: Affirmative. Ong is disqualified as even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without effect as the declaration only took place AFTER the expiration of the contested office.

LATASA VS COMELEC FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos in the elections of 1992, 1995and 1998. During his third term, the municipality was declared as a component city. This event marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, since the post is vacant, Latasa was mandated to serve a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Latasa filed his COC for the 2001 elections but was protested against by Sunga, saying that Latasa is not eligible to run for mayor since he already served for three consecutive terms from 1992-2001. ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is disqualified from running again for mayor, but this time, for the CITY OF DIGOS.

BORJA, JR. VS. COMELEC Background: According to Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution, the term of elective officials, except for barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This provision was restated in the Section 43 of the Local Government Code which states that No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Facts:

was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected." Capco won in the elections against Borja. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the threeterm limit. Ruling:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that. (1989-1992 when he succeeded the deceased Mayor Cesar Borja; 1992-1995 when he ran for Mayor and won; and 1995-1998 when he was re-elected. Pag isasama yung period na nag-succeed siya magiging three consecutive terms na, ibig sabihin nun, di na siya ulit puedeng tumakbo for that position). The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that "In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official

The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives. Who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such representative serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, petition id dismissed.

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO FACTS: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, asAsilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office, preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for

a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.