DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOP V HON.

VELEZ Facts On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds: 1. that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and 2. that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order granting respondents motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking for the annulment of the order of the Trial Court, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94214. Issue Raised was whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action. Held As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages. The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action. However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation. Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing. Philippine Rabbit Bus Corp. V. People Facts On August 26, 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioner's driver, Napoleon Roman, figured an accident in San Juan, La Union. Various criminal charges were filed against Roman and was assisted by a private defense lawyer provided for by herein petioner. On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages. The court further ruled that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be subsidiarily liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Accused Roman then jumped-bail and remained at large. Counsel for accused filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. Section 8, Rule124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. On August 6, 1994, petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to petitioner's notice of appeal. On March 2, 1999, respondent thru a private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss. Issue WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. RULING: According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee. The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability. CASUPANAN VS LAROYA FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the

pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal. ISSUE: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. RULING: The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. LANDICHO VS RELOVA FACTS: On February 27, 1962, the petitioner Rolando Landicho was charged of bigamy who is married to Elvira Makatangkay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved then he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia. On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. ISSUE: WON the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. RULING: The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Beltran vs People FACTS: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973. After twentyfour years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In her answer to the petition, the wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage. ISSUE: WON the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case for concubinage. RULING: The court ruled that the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. ABS-CBN CORP V OMBUDSMAN Essence of the case is related to the effect on a civil action upon the death of one of the contracting parties to an agreement of which the civil action stemmed out. Herein petitioners (Lopez Group, with Alfredo Montelibano among others) met and discussed with respondents (KBS with Roberto Benedicto, among others) for the fixing of the rental rate for the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City. Agreements were then stipulated in a letter-lease agreement. Upon failure of compliance by the Benedicto group of its obligations, petitioners' counsel wrote a demand letter to respondents for the payment of rentals for the latter's occupation and use of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letter-agreement. In furtherance of their indifference to comply, petitioners then made a claim against the estate of Benedicto based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. Issue: What is the effect of death upon a civil action? In its disposition of the case, the Supreme Court held that: From petitioners' complaint-affidavits, it is very clear that the late Alfredo Montelibano was the one who talked with Roberto Benedicto, preparatory to the signing of the lease-agreement. As the complainants did not identify exactly which constitute the deceitful act (or the intimidation) which could have induced the Lopezes into accepting the lease agreement, in most probability, the occurrences which vitiated their consent happened during this preliminary discussion. Noticeably however, it is not Alfredo Montelibano, the one who supposedly talked with Benedicto, who is testifying on the alleged "veiled threat" or deceits, if there are. Precisely, because he is already dead. It is submitted that the Lopezes can not now testify on something which are not derived from their own personal perception. The bottomline is that what they are now trying to adduce, pertaining to the alleged deceits or intimidation attending the negotiation of the lease agreement are purely hearsay. This is a matter which only Alfredo Montelibano could testify competently. Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas: 1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: i. Law ii. Contracts iii. Quasi-contracts iv. xxx v. Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.

4.

Consistent with People v. Bayotas, the death of the accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against him, regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code.

In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action. PIMMENTEL VS PIMENTEL FACTS: October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). ISSUE:WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

RULING:There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. Annulment of Marriage is not a prejudicial question in Criminal cases for Parricide Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.