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ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, Petitioner v. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondent. ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, Petitioner v.

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), Respondent G.R. No. 148076; G.R. No. 153161 January 12, 2011 DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: Petitioner Antonio M. Carandang (Carandang) challenges the jurisdiction over him of the Ombudsman and of the Sandiganbayan on the ground that he was being held to account for acts committed while he was serving as general manager and chief operating officer of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), which was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; hence, he was not a public official or employee. In G.R. No. 148076, Carandang seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing him from the service for grave misconduct. In G.R. No. 153161, Carandang assails on certiorari the resolutions dated October 17, 2001 and March 14, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) that sustained the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the criminal complaint charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). Antecedents Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto) was a stockholder of RPN, a private corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In March 1986, the Government ordered the sequestration of RPNs properties, assets, and business. On November 3, 1990, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) entered into a compromise agreement with Benedicto, whereby he ceded to the Government, through the PCGG, all his shares of stock in RPN. Consequently, upon motion of the PCGG, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) directed the president and corporate secretary of RPN to transfer to

the PCGG Benedictos shares representing 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN. However, Benedicto moved for a reconsideration, contending that his RPN shares ceded to the Government, through the PCGG, represented only 32.4% of RPNs outstanding capital stock, not 72.4%. Benedictos motion for reconsideration has remained unresolved to this date. Administrative Complaint for Grave Misconduct On July 28, 1998, Carandang assumed office as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN. On April 19, 1999, Carandang and other RPN officials were charged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman. The charge alleged that Carandang, in his capacity as the general manager of RPN, had entered into a contract with AF Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being an incorporator, director, and stockholder of that corporation; that he had thus held financial and material interest in a contract that had required the approval of his office; and that the transaction was prohibited under Section 7 (a) and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave misconduct. Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative charge on the ground that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a governmentowned or -controlled corporation. On May 7, 1999, the Ombudsman suspended Carandang from his positions in RPN. On September 8, 1999, Carandang manifested that he was no longer interested and had no further claim to his positions in RPN. He was subsequently replaced by Edgar San Luis.In its decision dated January 26, 2000, the Ombudsman found Carandang guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service.

Carandang moved for reconsideration on two grounds: (a) that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; and (b) that he had no financial and material interest in the contract that required the approval of his office. The Ombudsman denied Carandangs motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2000. On appeal (CA G.R. SP No. 58204), the CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman on February 12, 2001, stating: The threshold question to be resolved in the present case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the herein petitioner. It is therefore of paramount importance to consider the definitions of the following basic terms, to wit: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the state to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. (San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 276: Chapter I, Section 1, Mechem, A Treatise on Law of Public Offices and Officers). The individual so invested is called the public officer which includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in xxx [Sec. 2 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended]. (Sec. 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. With these time-honored definitions and the substantial findings of the Ombudsman, We are constrained to conclude that, indeed, the herein petitioner (Antonio M. Carandang) is a public officer. Precisely, since he (Antonio M. Carandang) was appointed by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN-9 (page 127 of the Rollo). As a presidential

appointee, the petitioner derives his authority from the Philippine Government. It is luce clarius that the function of the herein petitioner (as a presidential appointee), relates to public duty, i.e., to represent the interest of the Philippine Government in RPN-9 and not purely personal matter, thus, the matter transcends the petitioners personal pique or pride. xxx Having declared earlier that the herein petitioner is a public officer, it follows therefore that, that jurisdiction over him is lodged in the Office of the Ombudsman. It is worth remembering that as protector of the people, the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any, subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. (Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770). xxx Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman is, therefore, clothed with the proper armor when it assumed jurisdiction over the case filed against the herein petitioner. x x x xxx It appears that RPN-9 is a private corporation established to install, operate and manage radio broadcasting and/or television stations in the Philippines (pages 59-79 of the Rollo). On March 2, 1986, when RPN-9 was sequestered by the Government on ground that the same was considered as an illegally obtained property (page 3 of the Petition for Review; page 2 of the Respondents Comment; pages 10 and 302 of the Rollo), RPN-9 has shed-off its private status. In other words, there can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its sequestration by the Government, RPN-9, while retaining its own corporate existence, became a

government-owned or controlled corporation within the Constitutional precept. Be it noted that a government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether government or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock; Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the department of Budget, the Civil Service, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations. (Section 2 , Executive Order No. 292). Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, this Court is of the view and so holds that RPN-9 perfectly falls under the foregoing definition. For one, the governments interest to RPN-9 amounts to 72.4% of RPNs capital stock with an uncontested portion of 32.4% and a contested or litigated portion of 40%. (page 3 of the Petition for Review; pages 8-9 of the Respondents Comment). On this score, it ought to be pointed out that while the forty percent (40%) of the seventy two point four percent (72.4%) is still contested and litigated, until the matter becomes formally settled, the government, for all interests and purposes still has the right over said portion, for the law is on its side. Hence, We can safely say that for the moment, RPN-9 is a government owned and controlled corporation. Another thing, RPN 9, though predominantly tackles proprietary functionsthose intended for private advantage and benefit, still, it is irrefutable that RPN-9 also performs governmental roles in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general. xxx Coming now to the last assignment of error- While it may be considered in substance that the latest GIS clearly shows that petitioner was no longer a stockholder of record

of AF Broadcasting Corporation at the time of his assumption of Office in RPN 9 x x x (Petitioners Reply [to Comment]; page 317 of the Rollo), still severing ties from AF Broadcasting Corporation does not convince this Court fully well to reverse the finding of the Ombudsman that Antonio Carandang appears to be liable for Grave Misconduct (page 10 of the Assailed Decision; page 36 of the Rollo). Note that, as a former stockholder of AF Broadcasting Corporation, it is improbable that the herein petitioner was completely oblivious of the developments therein and unaware of the contracts it (AF Broadcasting Corporation) entered into. By reason of his past (Antonio Carandang) association with the officers of the AF Broadcasting Corporation, it is unbelievable that herein petitioner could simply have ignored the contract entered into between RPN-9 and AF Broadcasting Corporation and not at all felt to reap the benefits thereof. Technically, it is true that herein petitioner did not directly act on behalf of AF Broadcasting Corporation, however, We doubt that he (herein petitioner) had no financial and/or material interest in that particular transaction requiring the approval of his officea fact that could not have eluded Our attention. xxx WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the present Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision (dated January 26, 2000) of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0349 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Carandang commenced G.R. No. 148076. Violation of Section 3 (g), Republic Act No. 3019 On January 17, 2000, the Ombudsman formally charged Carandang in the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 by alleging in the following information, viz:

That sometime on September 8, 1998 or thereabouts, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, a high ranking officer (HRO) being then the General Manager of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9), then a government owned and controlled corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to On Target Media Concept, Inc. (OTMCI) through manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence and caused the government undue injury, by pre-terminating the existing block time contract between RPN 9 and OTMCI for the telecast of Isumbong Mo Kay Tulfo which assured the government an income of Sixty Four Thousand and Nine Pesos (P 64,009.00) per telecast and substituting the same with a more onerous co-production agreement without any prior study as to the profitability thereof, by which agreement RPN-9 assumed the additional obligation of taking part in the promotions, sales and proper marketing of the program, with the end result in that in a period of five (5) months RPN-9 was able to realize an income of only Seventy One Thousand One Hundred Eighty Five Pesos (P 71,185.00), and further, by waiving RPN-9s collectible from OTMCI for August 1-30, 1998 in the amount of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand and Forty Five Pesos (P 320,045.00). Carandang moved to quash the information, arguing that Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction because he was not a public official due to RPN not being a government-owned or -controlled corporation. The Sandiganbayan denied Carandangs motion to quash on October 17, 2001. After the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his motion for reconsideration, Carandang initiated G.R. No. 153161. On May 27, 2002, Carandang moved to defer his arraignment and pre-trial, citing the pendency of G.R. No. 153161. On July 29, 2002, the Court directed the parties in G.R. No. 153161 to maintain the status quo until further orders.

On November 20, 2006, G.R. No. 148076 was consolidated with G.R. No. 153161. Issue Carandang insists that he was not a public official considering that RPN was not a government-owned or controlled corporation; and that, consequently, the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over him. He prays that the administrative and criminal complaints filed against him should be dismissed. Accordingly, decisive is whether or not RPN was a government-owned or -controlled corporation. Ruling We find the petitions to be meritorious. It is not disputed that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations; and that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and employees, including presidents, directors and managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. The respective jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly defined and delineated by the law. Similarly, the law defines what are government-owned or controlled corporations. For one, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2029 (Defining Government Owned or Controlled Corporations and Identifying Their Role in National Development) states: Section 2. A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by a special law or if organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock.

Section 2 (13) of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) renders a similar definition of governmentowned or -controlled corporations: Section 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning: xxx (13) government-owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Applying this statutory criterion, the Court ruled in Leyson, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman: But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of government owned or controlled corporation contained in par. (13), Sec.2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government

directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) of its capital stock. In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, xxx. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. x x x The Court thus concludes that the CIIF are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction. Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because of the Governments total share in RPNs capital stock being only 32.4%. Parenthetically, although it is true that the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG of Benedictos shares that represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such quantification of Benedictos shareholding cannot be controlling in view of Benedictos timely filing of a motion for reconsideration whereby he clarified and insisted that the shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPNs outstanding capital stock. With the extent of Benedictos holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government held the majority of RPNs capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled corporation would be bereft of any factual and legal basis. Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) have recognized RPNs status as being neither a governmentowned nor -controlled corporation. In its Opinion/Clarification dated August 18, 1999, the PCGG communicated to San Luis as the president and general manager of RPN regarding a case involving RPN and Carandang MR. EDGAR S. SAN LUIS

President & General Manager Radio Philippines Network, Inc. Broadcast City, Capitol Hills Diliman, Quezon City Sir: This refers to your letter dated August 4, 1999, seeking PCGGs position on the following: 1. Whether RPN-9 is a GOCC x x x or a private corporation outside the scope of OGCC and COAs control given 32% Government ownership x x x. xxx It appears that under the RP-Benedicto Compromise Agreement dated November 3, 1990 validity of which has been sustained by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 96087, March 31, 1992, (Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659) Benedicto ceded all his rights, interest and/or participation, if he has any, in RPN-9, among others, to the government which rights, interest and/or participation per PCGGs understanding, include 9,494,327.50 shares of stock, i.e, about 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN-9. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), on motion of the government through PCGG, ordered the president and corporate secretary of the RPN-9 to effect the immediate cancellation and transfer of the 9,494,327.50 shares corresponding to Benedictos proprietary interest in RPN-9 to the Republic of the Philippines c/o PCGG (Sandiganbayans Resolution of February 3, 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, RP vs. Roberto Benedicto, et. al.) Benedicto, however, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution, contending that the number of RPN-9 shares ceded by him embraces only his personal holdings and those of his immediate family and nominees totaling 4,161,207.5 shares but excluding the RPN-9 shares in the name of Far East Managers and

Investors, Inc. (FEMIE), which is about 40%, as they are corporate properties/assets of FEMIE and not his personal holdings. Said motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan. xxx We agree with your x x x view that RPN-9 is not a government owned or controlled corporation within the contemplation of the Administrative Code of 1987, for admittedly, RPN-9 was organized for private needs and profits, and not for public needs and was not specifically vested with functions relating to public needs. Neither could RPN-9 be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 2029 dated February 4, 1986, which defines said terms as follows: Sec.2. Definition. A government owned- or controlled corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions which is directly chartered by special law or organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock; Provided, that a corporation organized under the general corporation law under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time, shall not be considered a governmentowned or controlled corporation before such disposition and even if the ownership or control thereof is subsequently

transferred to another government-owned or controlled corporation.

A government-owned or controlled corporation is either parent corporation, i.e., one created by special law (Sec. 3 (a), PD 2029) or a subsidiary corporation, i.e, one created pursuant to law where at least a majority of the outstanding voting capital stock of which is owned by parent government corporation and/or other governmentowned subsidiaries. (Sec. 3 (b), PD 2029). RPN-9 may not likewise be considered as an acquired asset corporation which is one organized under the general corporation law (1) under private ownership at least a majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred with a government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, or (2) as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by enunciated policy of the government is required to be disposed of to private ownership within a specified period of time (Sec 3 c, PD 2029), for the following reasons: 1. as noted above, the uncontested (not litigated) RPN-9 shares of the government is only 32.4% (not a majority) of its capital stock; 2. said 32.4% shares of stock, together with the contested/litigated 40%, were not conveyed to a government corporation or the government in satisfaction of debts incurred with government financial institution, whether by foreclosure or otherwise; 3. RPN-9 was not organized as a subsidiary corporation of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith.

It should be parenthetically noted that the 32.4% or 72.4% shares of stocks were turned over to the government by virtue of a compromise agreement between the government and Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 which is a civil action against Defendants Roberto S. Benedicto, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and others, to recover from them ill-gotten wealth (Amended Complaint, Aug. 12, 1987, Civil Case No. 0034, p. 2.) As the case between the government and Benedicto, his family and nominees was compromised, no judicial pronouncement was made as to the character or nature of the assets and properties turned over by Benedicto to the government whether they are ill-gotten wealth or not. The PCGGs Opinion/Clarification was affirmed by the OP itself on February 10, 2000: February 10, 2000 Mr. Edgar S. San Luis President and General Manager Radio Philippines Network Inc. Broadcasting City, Capitol Hills, Diliman Quezon City Dear President San Luis, xxx Relative thereto, please be informed that we affirm the PCGGs opinion that RPNI is not a government-owned and/or controlled corporation (GOCC). Section 2 (13), Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as an agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent

of at least 51% of its capital stock. As government ownership over RPNI is only 32.4% of its capital stock, pending the final judicial determination of the true and legal ownership of RPNI, the corporation is deemed private. Even earlier, a similar construction impelled the Ombudsman to dismiss a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. 3019 filed against certain RPN officials, as the Ombudsmans resolution dated December 15, 1997 indicates, a pertinent portion of which is quoted thus: This is not to mention the fact that the other respondents, the RPN officials, are outside the jurisdiction of this Office (Office of the Ombudsman); they are employed by a private corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the RPN, which is not a government owned or controlled corporation x x x Considering that the construction of a statute given by administrative agencies deserves respect, the uniform administrative constructions of the relevant aforequoted laws defining what are government-owned or -controlled corporations as applied to RPN is highly persuasive. Lastly, the conclusion that Carandang was a public official by virtue of his having been appointed as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN by President Estrada deserves no consideration. President Estradas intervention was merely to recommend Carandangs designation as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN to the PCGG, which then cast the vote in his favor vis--vis said positions. Under the circumstances, it was RPNs Board of Directors that appointed Carandang to his positions pursuant to RPNs By-Laws. In fine, Carandang was correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions in G.R. No. 148076 and G.R. No. 153161.

We reverse and set aside the decision promulgated on February 12, 2001 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 58204, and dismiss the administrative charge for grave misconduct against the petitioner. We annul and set aside the resolutions dated October 17, 2001 and March 14, 2002, as well as the order dated March 15, 2002, all issued by the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in Criminal Case No. 25802, and dismiss Criminal Case No. 25802 as against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. EN BANC [G.R. No. 102342, July 03, 1992] LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. DECISION CRUZ, J.: The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances. The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was

denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure: Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases: xxx B. Criminal Cases: 1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; 2. 3. Violations of rental law; Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied) Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows: Section 1. How Instituted - For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.) xxx Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party. She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations

appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein; b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.) Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it

is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988. That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount

thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave

oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until its too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987 MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents. GANCAYCO, J.: The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review

reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating: ORDER For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal. The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED. WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. SO ORDERED. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP08777. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining

order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason

for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the

exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court

who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, Petitioner v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ] December 13, 2005 DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates. On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004,

State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void. State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Aycos act of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record. By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct. By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the complaint to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary of Justice. And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearing. On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same as misleading and highly questionable, complainants having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date.

On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainants failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so. By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with Contempt of Court and Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court. On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. x x x (Underscoring supplied) Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.

If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses. Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State. Respondents lament about complainants failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS

(P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent is advised that the same should be lodged before the Secretary of Justice. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 179497 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee v. RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur; PENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur; Appellants and BAGINDA PALAO (at large), Alias Abdul Wahid Sultan, Accused. 01/25/12 DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this controversy. The well-known rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. Hence, [u]nless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial courts assessment must be respected. Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which affirmed with modification the July 19, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting Renandang Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and Pendatum Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder. On February 9, 1996, the following Information for murder was filed against Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao (Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.

That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, except for others whose cases are still under preliminary investigation, conspiring with and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R. Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit: Cardio respiratory arrest Hypovolemic shock Multiple gunshot wound which caused his death. Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellants pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded against them. Factual Antecedents The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief and substantiated by the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are as follows: Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain Nito were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoons auto repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City. Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his

two (2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was serving it against Batoon. The arrival of Baginda Palaos group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their work and observe what was happening. Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter after he [Batoon] [finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been working on. Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victims stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palaos gun, causing the two of them to grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind Batoons right thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also standing behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoons left arm pit with a .45 cal. [homemade] pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished [him off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident. Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile Force Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway, heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied by his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop the car. They alighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they (Mijares group) were policemen.

The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. During the exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were then captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao; but he escaped. Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was pronounced dead on arrival. Based on the necropsy examination of the victims body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio Batoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflicted at close range due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder burns. Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows: Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married, carpenter and a resident of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, he was in Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan City to see a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he went to the house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about going to a movie and returned to the Tambacan terminal in order to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid Sultan arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on board a car driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go with them because he will collect some money and afterwards they will have some enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the rear seat behind the driver. Abdul Wahid was at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to Baraas. They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and

Pendatum Ampuan alighted. Before walking away, Abdul Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with instructions to remain in the car and [keep] watch. At first he refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted the gun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the shop leaving the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard three gunshots. He moved to the rear seat where the door was open and saw policemen, who arrived and surrounded the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his hands as a sign of surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen shot him on the forearm and chest below the right nipple. He lost consciousness and regained it only at the hospital. He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as Baginda Palao. Pendatum Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan entered the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that the testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the victim is not true. He denied any part in the shooting to death of Baudelio Batoon. Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a resident of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City for Iligan City on board a passenger Armak jeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the Gaisano Superstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the store and went to the upper storey to shop. When he came out, he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they walked to the Maharlika Theater but then Bessah expressed the intention to go home to Marawi City. He accompanied Bessah to the Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan which is South of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayed overnight at his Uncle Alis house. At about 9:00 a.m., the following day, February 1, 1996, he left the house of his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking for a certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help

him collect a debt. They went to the terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to wait while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned without having found Baser and once again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. A little later, Baginda returned on board a car driven by one Aminola Basar. They went to the Tambacan terminal but again did not find Baser. Instead, they saw Renandang Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to Baraas to collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a place near a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in the car because he was going out to collect the debt. Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten minutes later, he heard shouting followed by gunfire. He stepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao [shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the police led by Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key and arrested them except Baginda Palao who escaped. They were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the sustained wounds when mauled by the children of the victim but in another breath he admitted that his injury was a gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross fire as the police shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the car when he was hit. He further admitted that Baginda Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting Baudelio Batoon. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court The RTC debunked appellants defense of denial and held them guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith and credence to the evidence of the prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and rendered a verdict of conviction, thus: WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presence of any other aggravating circumstances and hereby

sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the corresponding accessory penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs of Baudelio Batoon the sums of: P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support; P66,904.00 for and as actual damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P100,000.00 for and as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused. Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such detention shall be credited in full in favor of said accused in the service of their respective sentences. SO ORDERED. In view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court. By Resolution dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolved to accept the appeal. In view thereof, appellants were required to file their brief. Appellants thus filed their brief on November 20, 2000 while the OSG submitted the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee on May 2, 2001. Later, however, consonant with this Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. Ruling of the Court of Appeals By Decision promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. Said court ruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies pointed out by the appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative weight of said testimonies. Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuans name in the Information, the court went on to hold that such error was

only a formal defect and the proper correction of which was duly made without any objection on the part of the defense. The CA likewise held that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Judgment dated July 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P66,904.00 as actual damages. SO ORDERED. Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the CA. By Resolution dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. In their respective manifestations, the parties opted to adopt the briefs they earlier filed as their supplemental briefs. In their brief, appellants assign the following errors: That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; and The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective. The basic thrust of appellants first assignment of error is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants contend that the trial court anchored its finding and

conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp. Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent in their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable. They question the prosecution witnesses identification of Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and aver that the same only leads to the logical conclusion that said witnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue that Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to him as he was arraigned as Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum Ampuan. On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision, opines that inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters in the testimony of a prosecution eyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also contends that whatever defect the information subject of appellant Ampuans arraignment has had been cured with the latters consent during the trial. Our Ruling The appeal lacks merit. In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the credibility of witness Gepayo anchored on the following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistency in his testimony on whether he knew Ampuan before the incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident without giving any assistance to his fallen employer as well as his immediate return to work thereafter is contrary to human nature and experience; (3) while he testified that appellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects during the encounter, he failed to identify him in court; and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person but later on testified to the contrary. Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies. The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the incident is inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of Gepayos testimony. The

inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. What matters is that there is no inconsistency in Gepayos complete and vivid narration as far as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the principal assailants are concerned. The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting incident and did not render assistance to his wounded employer. To appellants, this reaction is contrary to human nature. We believe otherwise. This imputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarily diminish the plausibility of Gepayos story let alone destroy his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior. Surely, he was afraid that they might kill him because the malefactors were then armed with guns. Thus, he would not dare attempt to stop them and stake his life in the process. At any rate, it is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn. The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants cause. As the CA correctly pointed out: x x x We agree with the prosecutions observation that although he did not positively identify appellant Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however, able to point out that there was a third person who accompanied assailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victim during the incident. This is also bolstered by Insp. Mijares

testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their guns at the victim who was already lying prostrate on the ground. In any event, even without Gepayos identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of another prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to Mamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus: Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions, presented the warrant of arrest to your father, what happened thereafter? A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father. Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father? A: Abdul Wahid, Sir Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father? A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir. Q: What happened after? A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir. Q: Who [first shot] your father? A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x x his name[,] he answered that he is Renandang Mamaruncas) xxxx Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter? A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at the bench inside the Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he answered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)

Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material details are straightforward and consistent with each other. They personally saw appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable doubt the identities of both appellants, along with their coaccused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime. As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and the same person in his affidavit and yet later on testified to the contrary, this Court finds the same inconsequential and will not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent case, this Court reiterated that as between an affidavit executed outside the court and a testimony given in open court, the latter almost always prevails. It emphasized therein that: Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete. They do not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Thus, our rulings generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to be inferior to in court testimony (citation omitted). The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers who supplied the names of the suspects in Gepayos affidavit. Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived. Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial court was substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person when in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend the Information read to him. The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants failed to raise the issue of the defective Information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the

information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the Information. Objections as to matters of form or substance in the [I]nformation cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Records even show that the Information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not comment thereon, viz: FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO: Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from [Renandang] Mamaruncas and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias Pendatum Ampuan be erased as corrected. COURT: Any comment from the accused. ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG: No comment, Your Honor. Treachery correctly appreciated. From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the facts sufficiently prove that treachery was employed by appellants. The attack on Baudelio was so swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. As ruled by the trial court: In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case when the victim was completely without any weapon from the inception of the assault. At the moment when Pendatum Ampuan and Renandang Mamaruncas shot him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any position to defend himself. And when Abdul Wahid shot him while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly defenseless. Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the presence of treachery.

Conspiracy was duly proven. We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary x x x [as it] may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop of Baudelio at the same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter at his left armpit while Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio fell to the ground face down, Abdul shot him at the back. These consecutive acts undoubtedly showed appellants unanimity in design, intent and execution. They performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design in the commission of the crime. The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA considering that they are based on existing evidence and reasonable conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Though the rule is subject to exceptions, no such exceptional grounds obtain in this case. Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only muster mere denial. As ruled in various cases by the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a

bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. The Penalty Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery. Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia, attended the killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since only the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC and the CA properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934 provides: Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole. Awards of Damages The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, said award is increased to P75,000.00. Anent the award of moral damages, the CA correctly imposed the amount of P50,000.00. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. Anent the award of actual damages, the victims widow testified that the family spent a total of P66,904.00 relative to the wake and burial of the victim. However, the claim for said amount is supported merely by a list of

expenses personally prepared by the widow instead of official receipts. To be entitled to an award of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable x x x. A list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business transactions. Thus the Court deletes the lower courts award of actual damages. Nonetheless, since entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of the case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded in lieu of actual damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the trial court. Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly income of P20,000.00 and P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler truck operator, respectively. The trial court made a conservative estimate of P500.00 a day as the net income from the truck alone after making reasonable deductions from its operation. Thus, ranged against the daily minimum wage then prevailing in Region X which is P137.00 per day pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03, this case undoubtedly does not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite the lack of documentary evidence. The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven qualifying circumstance of treachery. The CA however awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P25,000.00. To conform with

prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this amount to P30,000.00. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which found appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as follows: 1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; 2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; 3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted; 4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages; 5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and 6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION [G. R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012] HECTOR TREAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. DECISION SERENO, J.: Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul

and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011. Statement of the Facts and of the Case The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows: Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter's name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred: P20,000.00- Attorney's fees, P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax, P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp, P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney's fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case. On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this

judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid. SO ORDERED. We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treas", under which he was accused in the Information. On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008. On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011. On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011. On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors: 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA; On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that P150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafahad occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence. As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she - not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latter's demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of

petitioner's. On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter's Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition. In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here. With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner's signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter. The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health. The Court's Ruling

based; and The Petition is impressed with merit. Review of Factual Findings While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows: (1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts; (7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are (10)When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures. The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was committed: Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax. As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.

he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction in this wise: It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution's evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector's allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight. Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus: That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts. Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, this Court explained: The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In Fukuzume v. People, this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court's jurisdiction. The Court ruled: More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or crossexamination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statementexecuted by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money. xxx From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part: THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B", THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIRrelated expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale

covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C", THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney's fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x

of Sale. Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses? Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND. What was the amount quoted to you? ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND. Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND? Yes, sir. And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND? TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney's fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR. And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND? Yes, sir. Did he issue a receipt? Yes, sir. If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it? Yes, sir. I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you? A Q

This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.

A Q A Q

Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next? We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.

A Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed: Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened next? We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to... and she will work for the Deed Q

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where

A Q A Q

A Q

the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner. At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioner's conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides: Rule 16.01 -- A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02 -- A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him.

to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In Cuizon v. Macalino, this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of ?130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 176819 January 26, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, and SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, Respondents.

DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 2 March 2007 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583. The Facts On 1 May 2001, Ombudsman Prosecutor II Raul V. Cristoria filed with the Sandiganbayan an information dated 5 March 2001 against respondents Robert P. Balao (Balao), Josephine C. Angsico (Angsico), Virgilio V. Dacalos (Dacalos), Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. (Lazarte, Jr.), Josephine T. Espinosa, Noel A. Lobrido, and Arceo C. Cruz for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), as amended. The information stated: The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL A. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows: That in or about the month of March, 1992, at Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, FELICISIMO LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office, Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer, respectively, of the National Housing Authority, Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their official functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use

other and with accused ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction, with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by A.C. Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit, thus accused public officials in the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. In its 22 May 2001 Order, the Sandiganbayan found the 5 March 2001 information inadequate. The Sandiganbayan stated that: This morning the Court expressed its anxiety over the inadequacy of the Information in that the participation of each of the accused did not appear clear in the resolution, much less in the Information. In view hereof, Pros. Raymundo Julio A. Olaguer will be given ten (10) days to review the records and to inform this Court as to the course of action he proposes to take in order to enlighten the Court and, if necessary, himself so that a proper Information and a proper prosecution may be had before this Court. On 4 August 2004, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Julieta Zinnia A. Niduaza (Assistant Special Prosecutor Niduaza) filed with the Sandiganbayan a memorandum dated 27 July 2004. In the memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor Niduaza recommended that the 5 March 2001 information be maintained.

In their 17 September 2004 motion, Balao, Lazarte, Jr., Angsico, and Dacalos prayed for a reinvestigation of the case. In its 27 March 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. The Sandiganbayan held that: The Court notes that the issue as to the participation of accused-movants in the acts complained of in the Information, as raised by the former First Division, appears not to have been addressed by the prosecution in the Memorandum dated July 27, 2004 of the Office of the Ombudsman, Office of the Special Prosecutor. In the said Memorandum, the prosecution found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause and recommended that the Information be maintained. xxxx The former Chairman and Members of the First Division expressed anxiety over the inadequacy of the x x x Information "in that the participation of each of the accused did not appear clear in the resolution, much less in the Information". Considering that the memorandum of the Ombudsman "recommended that the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 26583 be maintained and the prosecution of this case must proceed accordingly", without complying with the directive quoted above to clarify the participation of each of the accused, the Court finds merit in the accused-movants prayer for reinvestigation. On 1 June 2006, Assistant Special Prosecutor Niduaza filed with the Sandiganbayan a memorandum dated 30 May 2006. In the memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor Niduaza recommended that the 5 March 2001 information be maintained. In his motion dated 2 October 2006, Lazarte, Jr. prayed that the information be quashed. In their 4 October 2006 motion, Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos prayed that their motion to quash the information be admitted. In another motion, also dated 4 October 2006, Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos prayed that the information be quashed. The Sandiganbayans Ruling

In its 2 March 2007 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied Lazartes 2 October 2006 motion and granted Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos 4 October 2006 motions. The Sandiganbayan held that: The Court finds that the above Information and subsequent memoranda submitted by the prosecution in support of the said information, with respect to the accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos, fail to satisfy the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110. The Information and the supporting memoranda, still fail to state the acts or omissions of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos with sufficient particularity so as to enable them to make a carefully considered plea to the charges against them. It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered by this Court because the prosecution failed to satisfactorily comply with an earlier directive of the former Chairperson and Members of the first Division, after noting the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the participation of each of the accused. In ordering the reinvestigation, this Court noted the the prosecutions July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the apprehensions of the former Chairperson and Members of the First Division as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the information. This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecutions Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still failed to specify the participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos. The most recent findings of the prosecution still do not address the deficiency found by the Court in the information. The prosecution avers that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the rules of Court, in determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the ground of "facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense," the test must be whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law. The prosecution contends that matters aliunde should not be considered. However, in the instant case, the Court has found the information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the requirements of particularly alleging the acts or omissions of the said accused-movants, which served as

the basis of the allegation of conspiracy between the aforementioned accused-movants and the other accused, in the commission of the offense charged in the information. It appears from the prosecutions May 30, 2006 Memorandum that at the time material in this case, accused Roberto P. Balao was the General Manager of the NHA; accused Josephine C. Angsico, was the Team Head of the Visayas Management Office of the NHA; accused Virgilio V. Dacalos, was the Division Manager of the NHAs Visayas Management Office and accused Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr., was the Manager of the NHAs Regional Project Department. All four accused contend that they cannot be held accountable as they are high-ranking officials based in Metro Manila and that they relied solely on the recommendation of their subordinates in affixing their signatures. The prosecution concedes that high-ranking officials are not expected to personally examine every single detail of a transaction. But in this particular case, the general averment or conclusion of the prosecution in its memorandum that the accused allegedly had foreknowledge of the supposed anomalies and yet the accused did nothing to verify this, does not sufficiently show the basis of the charge of conspiracy insofar as accused Balao, Angsico and Dacalos are concerned. The prosecutions May 30, 2006 Memorandum does not describe how accused Balao, Angsingco [sic] and Dacalos may have known or when they became aware of the alleged anomalies, before they allegedly caused payment to the alleged errant contractor. The said Memorandum states only that they failed to enforce the contract against the alleged errant private contractor, which is not even the act imputed against them in the information. The prosecution contends that the allegation of conspiracy is sufficient, since there is no need to allege the individual acts of the conspirators because the act of one is imputable to all. The allegation of conspiracy in the information may be adequate if there is no uncertainty in the acts or omissions imputed against some of the accused and the findings of the prosecution, such as in the case at bar. To allow accused Balao, Angsico and Lazarte [sic] to be

arraigned despite the seeming inadequacy of the instant information as to their actual involvement in the offense charged, which is not addressed by the mere allegation of conspiracy, infringes on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memorandum dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, raises as issue that the "Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the information in Criminal Case No. 26583 which sufficiently charged repondents Balao, Angsico and Dacalos of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended." The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. In Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, a case involving the same information, the Court held that the 5 March 2001 information is valid. The Court held that: The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.

3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the performance of their official functions connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA. (Emphasis supplied) Sections 6 and 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court state, respectively: SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constitutiing the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. In quashing the 5 March 2001 information, the Sandiganbayan held that the information "fail to satisfy the

requirements of Section 6, Rule 110. The Information x x x still fail to state the acts or omissions of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos with sufficient particularity so as to enable them to make a carefully considered plea to the charges against them." The Court disagrees. In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the fundamental test in determining the adequacy of the averments in an information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. Matters extrinsic or evidence aliunde should not be considered. Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, states: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. In Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, the Court enumerated the essential elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. The Court held that: In a number of cases, the elements of this offense have been broken down as follows: 1. That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;

2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; 3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; 4. That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexusable negligence. Clearly, the allegations in the 5 March 2001 information, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that (1) Balao, Lazarte, Jr., Angsico, and Dacalos were the general manager, team head of the Visayas Management Office, and Visayas division manager, respectively, of the National Housing Authority; (2) they committed the prohibited acts "in or about the month of March, 1992," "while in the performance of their official functions"; (3) they caused undue injury to the Government in the amount of P232,628.35, "supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken"; (4) they gave "unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves"; and (5) they acted "with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith." WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS ASIDE the 2 March 2007 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583 and orders that (1) respondents Robert P. Balao, Josephine C. Angsico, and Virgilio V. Dacalos be reinstated as accused in Criminal Case No. 26583; (2) the hold departure order against them be reinstated; and (3) they be arrested or they post a cash bond in sufficient amount. SO ORDERED.

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