Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American Civic Democracy?

Author(s): Theda Skocpol Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 537-540 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1554683 Accessed: 24/10/2008 02:26
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Will

9/11
O

and

the

War

on

Terror

Revitalize

American

Civic

Democracy?
war mobilizations. At national and local levels alike, the foundations of modem

Theda Skocpol,
HarvardUniversity

by

bserversof Americanlife have seen a silver lining in the darkclouds that billowed from the Twin Towersand the on September 11, 2001. Along with Pentagon the horror attackscame by the terrorist wrought an outpouring of solidarity and patriotism-a suddenchangeof heartfor manyAmericans who, priorto thatfatefulday, had seemedto be towardindividualism, selfdriftinginexorably and cynicaldisinterest in public absorption, As StanleyGreenberg affairs. (2001) aptlyputs more thanthe it, suddenlythe "we"mattered "me." Peoplereachedout to familymembers, and friends,while proudlydeclaring neighbors, in the American theirmembership national community. Seventy percentof Americansreportedly gave time or money to charitiesattemptingto Sector help the victims of 9/11 (Independent 2001). Anonymouscommutersuburbsin New Jersey suddenlyorganizedto provideconstant care for dozens of families who lost loved ones.' In the days and weeks after 9/11, more than four-fifthsof Americansdisplayedthe U.S. flag on homes, cars and trucks,and clothing.2And Americansdeclared renewedtrust in the federal government thing."In April
2000, only 29% said to "do the right

Americancivic life were laid as the Civil Wargenerationmaturedbetween the 1860s and the 1910s (for details and references,see U.S. inSkocpol 2003, ch. 2). Thereafter, new partnerships between governmentagencies and federatedvoluntaryassociations. From the Red Cross and the YMCA to trade unions and business and professionalgroups,
from the General Federation of Women's volvements in World Wars I and II brought

Clubs and the PTA to dozens of fraternal vigroups, voluntaryassociationscontributed tally to WorldWar mobilizations-and, in the process, gained new infusions of dues-paying members(Skocpol et al. 2002). the dramaticshifts regisUnderstandably, observersto speculatethat America'scurrent wartimecrisis may again spur civic revitalization (cf. Galston2001; Putnam2002).4 But of the conditionsthat aldeeperconsideration lowed past wars to contribute to civic engagement suggests why today's conflict might turn out differently. In the Civil Warand World WarsI and II, new attitudescoincidedwith efforts to mobilize the citizenry government for war, and preexistingmembership associations channeledpopularparticipation. But so far in this new crisis, official efforts to mobilize citizens have been sporadicand weak, while existing civic organizations providefew channelsfor group involvement. Political scientistsneed not rely on attitude surveysalone to assess possibilitiesfor civic renewalin America'snew war on terror. Historicalcomparisons bring into sharperrelief the full set of attitudinal and institutional factorsthat influencethe civic impactof war.
tered in post-9/11 surveys have encouraged

they felt such trust "always"or "most of the time,"but 64% expressedsuch faith in a poll taken shortly after 9/11.3 In important respects,popularreactionsto 9/11 and the subsequent fight againstterrorists in Afghanistan resemblewhat happened in previous U.S. wars.Despite grievousepisodesof and exclusion,U.S. wars have prorepression moted civic vitality.In a nationwhose citizens are famousfor theirproclivityto organizeand
join voluntary endeavors, outbreaks of martial conflict have sparked voluntarist upsurges that repeatedly carried over into postwar eras. The American revolutionary struggle against Great Britain was waged and won by committees of correspondence and volunteer militias-and the era during and after the revolution brought the first great explosion of voluntary group formation in the new nation (Brown 1974). The Civil War of 1861 to 1865 was fought and supported by volunteers (with the military draft responsible for at most 15% of the men who fought). In turn, the Union victory unleashed fresh rounds of civic organizing by men and women who modeled peacetime association building on

Attitudes Shift at the Outbreak of War

For long-pastwars, we do not have national surveyscomparable to the opinion polls that enable us to trackattitudinal changes toevidence nevertheless reveals day. Qualitative that outpourings of patrioticand community

sentiment accompanied the onset of conflict in April 1861, April 1917, and December 1941.

comdeclarations, Newspapers,organizational and personalmemoirs munitydemonstrations, all providerelevantevidence.When wars

break out-and especially when the nation is attacked-millions of Americans become aware of their shared national identity and are

willing to work togetheron local and national responsesto the crisis. 537

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Government Authorities May-or Call for Mass Mobilization

May Not-

If popularattitudesinvariably shift with the outbreakof authorities to orchestrate war, the willingness of government varies considerably, voluntarycitizen participation depending on the natureof the conflict and the capacitiesof government. Moder wars requiremajordomestic as well as militarycombureaucracies mitments,but government only sometimespossess the capacitiesand resourcesto act directly. When the U.S. federalgovernment suddenlyfound itself challenged by a massivesecessionistmovementin 1861, for examAbraham Lincolndesperately neededorganized ple, President volunteercontributions. At thatpoint, U.S. standingarmiesconsisted of a mere 16,000 men, mostly deployedin the West, and led by a small corps of aging professional officers,many of In the North whom "wentSouth"to fight for the Confederacy. and South alike-but especiallyin the North-the Civil War was foughtby an outpouring of militaryvolunteers assembled leaders,combinedinto state-levelunits, and by local community knit togetherto form the Union Army.To support the troops and organizerelief effortsat home, women and older men created similarvolunteer federations-the forerunner of what would laterbecome the AmericanRed Cross. were more developedby the outbreak Federalbureaucracies of WorldWarI than in the 1860s. Nevertheless,executive agencies had little capacity to reach directly into local communitiesand individualhomes, so they turnedto the national and state leaders of voluntaryfederationsfor the organizational networksthey needed to run drives to conserve foodstuffs and sell LibertyBonds, campaignsfor relief and and campaignsto maximize economic militaryrecruitment, production.Federalauthoritiesalso encouragedprofessionals and managersto come togetherin new associationsto help manage nationalprojects.Wartimemobilizationsspawned many new voluntaryassociations,and existing groups gained visibility and recuitednew memberswhen they cooperated with government. By the time the United StatesfoughtWorldWarII, government capacitieswere sufficiently did developedthat authorities not need voluntary groupsas badly as in 1917. Yet it was clear from the startthat this conflictwould be massive,lengthy,and how WorldWarI was fought,U.S. officostly. Remembering in gettingmasses of Americans cials saw advantages directly involved.Conservation and fund-raising driveswere rerunin much the same way as in 1917-19, with women'sgroups, the fraternal groups,the Red Cross, the Knightsof Columbus, of professional, business,and ethnic YMCA, and hundreds associations called upon to mobilizetheirmembersto contribute in voluntary to the war effort.Again, memberships associations surgedforwardinto the postwarera. In the post-9/11 war againstterrorism, U.S. authorities have not been so eager to engage in mass mobilization.Obviously, this is a differentkind of conflict, waged by a relativelysmall numberof highly trainedprofessionalmilitarypersonnel backedby a few newly mobilizedNationalGuardunits. An all-out war againstthe Iraqiregime may eventuallyrequirea new U.S. militarydraft,but the initial militaryefforts in Afghanistanhave not. What is more, in 2001 and early 2002, heightenedhomelandsecuritymeasuresand efforts to cope with the anthraxscare seemed to call for professionals,not citizen volunteers.The nation also faced an economic slowdown, yet reigningRepublicanideas led officials to put their faith in tax cuts and consumerspendingas remedies. Given all of this, in the monthsfollowing 9/11, federal officials such as Directorof HomelandSecurityTom Ridge stressedmanagerial coordination and professionalexpertise.

With limited U.S. militaryquotas filled, volunteerswere turned away. To be sure, PresidentGeorgeW. Bush sporadically called on Americansto volunteerin their communities.But his appealsseemed largely symbolic, not connectedto vital wartimeactivities,even as Bush administration officials visibly PresidentBush did puzzled over what to do with volunteers.5 not launchany big new civic effort, such as mandatory national service for young Americans.6 Instead,for weeks after 9/11, his most prominent appealswere commercialratherthan civic. The TravelIndustry Associationof Americaestimated that two-thirdsof Americanssaw the Presidentstarringin a television advertisement calling for people to express more "courage" by taking trips.And the presidentrepeatedly asked people to go shoppingto stimulatethe economy.If enduringimages of WorldWarsI and II featuredpostersof Uncle Sam encouraging citizens to do their duty, perhapswe need a revised version poster to capturethe main presidential message in 2001!

Civic Organizations Channel Participation

In historic wars, citizens were eager to volunteerand the federal governmentengaged in mass mobilization.Yet the nature of existing voluntaryassociationsat the time of the Civil Warand the WorldWarsalso contributed to wartimemobilizations and helped to sustaingains in civic connectedness. From the early 1800s until the 1960s, membership-based voluntaryassociationswere at the center of Americanpublic life (for furtherevidence and citations,see Skocpol 2003, chapters1-3). Leadersestablishedcivic reputations by helping to organizefellow citizens into membership groups.Clubs, lodges, and posts were as ubiquitousas churchesand schools-and most local membership groups were linked toWhen nationalcrises getherinto state and nationalfederations. struck,therefore,leadersknew how to mobilize fellow citichannelsthrough zens, and there were well-worninstitutional which people could work togetherand pool resources. After the 1960s, however,U.S. civic life was radicallyreorganized(Skocpol 1999; Skocpol 2003, chapters4-5). In the wake of the Civil Rights and feminist movements,traditional PS September2002

538

chapter-based membership federations, most of which had been racially and gender segregated, failed to attract many younger members. The war in Vietnam, ultimately unpopular and militarily unsuccessful, rendered traditional patriotic associations less appealing to many Americans. Challenged by movements and defections from below, traditional voluntary associations were also bypassed in national politics by professionally managed advocacy associations, which proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s. Professionally run citizen-advocacy groups often had no individual members at all, or else recruited monetary contributions through the mail (Berry 1977, 1999). At the state and local levels, meanwhile, nonprofit social agencies proliferated. Like advocacy groups, these are professionally managed civic organizations that raise money from donors, government agencies, or mailing-list adherents, rather than from members who attend meetings and pay regular dues. Well before the crisis of 9/11, therefore, professionally managed associations and institutions had become central to American civic life. Churches remain vital centers of membership activity in many U.S. communities, but other kinds of membership associations have dwindled or disappeared. When a national crisis happens nowadays, there are fewer well-established channels through which people can volunteer together-and fewer ways to link face-to-face activities in local communities to state and national projects. Throughout much of American history in war and peace, voluntary membership federations teamed up with local, state, and national public officials to pursue important public projects (Skocpol 2003, ch. 3). But today, partnerships between civic organizations and government are primarily a matter of collaborations among professionals. Against this background, we can better understand why, following 9/11, Americans suddenly displayed new attitudes of social solidarity and trust in government, while barely changing their patterns of civic participation. I prepared Figure 1 using data gathered by Robert D. Putnam in a nationally representative panel survey conducted months before and, again, months after 9/11. As the figure shows, net gains

SEPT.rl CHARITIES

I OTERCHARTmEs I

Sol

EL

I?*WF?

? Joe Heller, Gi reen Bay PressGazette.

Figure 1 After September 11, Changed More Than

0%-- na P 56%
10%

in civic attituc les were much greater than net gains in civic behavior. Not surprisingly, given the spectacular nature of the terrorist attack :s, the one sort of activity that exhibited a big net upward juimp after 9/11 was mass TV viewing. Wartime crises may immediately evoke attitudes of civic solidarity, but some combination of government mobilization and available organizational channels is needed to enable people to act toge:ther. If this hypothesis is true, we should see between attitudinal and behavioral change among less of a gap 1 Americans aiready engaged with membership associations prior to 9/11- -and we should see positive responses when government offfers new opportunities to participate. There is some evidence on both scores. According to a report from the Pew Research Center (2001), a large majority of Americans gion to be more important after 9/11, yet reliperceived relig rs changed very little, except among people who gious behavior were already r regularchurchgoers. Moreover, after President nodest expansions in national service programs Bush backed r and appealed 1 to Americans to join, applications to AmeriCorps and related programs shot up. Institutional shifts also help us to understand imbalances in U.S. charity following 9/11. Prior to the 1960s, 2001, American Civic Attitudes charitable giving was typically chanBehavior neled through chapter-based federations, which took advantage of wartime sensibilities to raise resources both for the immediate crisis and for long-run organizational and community needs. Federations with thousands of local BEHAI KRS CIVIC TUDES 1 rv net chapters could also move funds around er ge wt to meet a variety of needs. Yet U.S. Increa of 3.9% - ho -u 14.7% charities today are highly professional-up 18%ized operations, very dependent on \ -

I I

media-driven messages to attract

II II.r,I
t

A
4.

Data from Putnam (2002).

money from contributors who expect their money to go exactly where the advertisements promise. After 9/11, U.S. charities were inundated with contributions if they advertised plans to help the victims of the terrorist attacks. But if charities tried to bank resources for general needs, they could get into trouble-as did the American Red Cross, when a national "scandal" broke out over its attempts to devote some post-9/11 donations to other needs (Sontag 2001). Furthermore, in the

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539

thatroutinely monthsafter9/11, charities help the poor in comfor necessary remunitiesacrossthe UnitedStateswere starved Food banksand otherlocal agencieswere out of the sources.7 donorsgave to 9/11 causes. medialimelightas theirregular

An Urge to Act-but How?

The American "publicfeels urgeto act-but how?"askedan ScienceMonitornot in the Christian article appearing insightful attacksof 9/11 (McLaughlin 2001). "What long afterthe terrorist are being called uponto do-live normallivesAmericans hardlyseems heroic.UnlikeduringWorldWarII, citizensaren't for GIs or collect scrapmetalto make neededto roll bandages spurtsin My analysisof the roots of war-encouraged airplanes." since 9/11 Americans civic engagement indeed, suggeststhat, do by been asked to have than to more do be they willing may and more thanthey have been allowedto do, given government, of existingcivic organizations. the structure If they persist,post-9/11 attitudeshifts towardpatriotism, to electoral trust,and communityresponsibility may contribute

trends and changes in individual behavior, especially among young people just coming of age. There is, however, little evidence that 9/11 and its martial aftermath led to any immediate upsurge in collective voluntary activities at all comparable to the upsurges associated with historic wars. This twenty-firstcentury conflict has different requirements, and Americans today live in a very different governmental and civic universe than their forebears-a changed public world in which political authorities and nonprofit organizations rely on professional management and media messages rather than on organized popular participation. Terrorist attacks and the commitment of U.S. forces to armed combat abroad may have aroused the usual patriotic and communal feelings, but the outbreak of this war could not suddenly remake the institutional face of American civic democracy. Absent organizational innovations and new public policies, therefore, the reinvigorated sense of the American "we" that was born of the travails of 9/11 may well gradually dissipate, leaving only ripples on the managerial routines of contemporary U.S. civic life.

Notes
1. Andrew Jacobs, "Town Sheds Its Anonymity to Comfort the Bereaved,"New YorkTimes, 14 October 2001, sec. B. 2. William Risser and Sam Ward, "USA Today Snapshots: Stars and Stripes Flying High," USA Today, 19 October 1001, sec. A. 3. Dana Milbank and Richard Morin, "Poll: Americans' Trust in Government Grows," WashingtonPost, <www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A42864-2001Sep28.html> (June 28, 2002). Boston 4. See also E.J. Dionne Jr., "OurNew Spirit of Community," Globe, 26 December 2001, sec. A. 5. Alison Mitchell, "Asking for Volunteers, Government Tries to Determine What They Will Do," New YorkTimes, 10 November 2001, sec. B. 6. Albert R. Hunt, "Waitingfor the Call," WallStreetJournal, 30 March 2002, sec. A. 7. Winnie Hu, "Outpouringfor Sept. 11 Groups Means Less for Food Banks,"New YorkTimes, 21 November 2001, sec. B.

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