+IN RE SHOOP MALCOLM; November 29, 1920 FACTS - Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the

Philippines under P ar. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practi ce of Law. It was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York.- The said rule requires t hat: New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission without examina tion under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philip pine Islands. (Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5 years in any (district or circuit or highes t) court of the US or territory of it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.)- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several case s: 1.Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in t he highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia2.The applicant practiced 5 years in another country wh ose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law (ECL). ISSUE WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established HELD - The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US,under a civil gov't. est ablished by the Congress.- In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered b y the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precede nts of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law th eories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with localcus toms and institutions.- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL inits present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to analmost exclusive e xtent. - New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in th e Phils. similar to those privileges accorded b ythe rule of this court. - Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesn t establish a preced ent with respect to future applications.

TAADA VS. TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to pub lish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidenti al decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive or ders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outrig ht on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing

that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the al leged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sin e qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves pr ovides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legisl ation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of pub lication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazet te, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general a pplicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide fo r fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burden s on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of person s such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assum ption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1 991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Fili pino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong . As a result of the department order DOL E, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recrui tment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the busines s of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petit ion for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementa tion. ISSUES: whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitu tion, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not co mmit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants t

he Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities , to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restri ct and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administra tive bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society. THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. T he reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the Nati onal Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agen cies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such ru les and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippin es Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three ( 3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by l aw not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15 ) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixe d by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement acc ompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Prohibition granted.

TAYUG RURAL BANK vs CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES Submitted on May 20, 1977 for decision by this Court is this appeal from the dec ision dated January 6, 1971 rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, B ranch III in Civil Case No. 76920, the decretal portion of which states as follo ws: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff on the complaint and the defen dant is ordered to further credit the plaintiff the amounts collected as 10% pen

alty in the sum of P19,335.88 or up to July 15, 1969 and to refrain from collect ing the said 10% penalty on the remaining past due loans of plaintiff with the d efendant. With respect to defendant's counterclaim, judgment is hereby rendered against th e plaintiff and the defendant is ordered to pay the Central Bank of the Philippi nes the outstanding balance of its past overdue accounts in the sum of P444,809, 45 plus accrued interest at the rate of 1/2 of 1 % per annum with respect to the promissory notes (Annexes 1 to 1-E of defendant's Answer) and 2-1/2% per annum with respect to the promissory notes (Annexes 1-f to 1-i of the Answer). From th is amount shall be deducted the sum of P19,335.88 collected as 10% penalty. The facts of the case based on the parties' stipulation of facts (Record on Appe al p. 67), are as follows: Plaintiff-Appellee, Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., is a banking corporation in Tayug, P angasinan. During the period from December 28, 1962 to July 30, 1963, it obtaine d thirteen (13) loans from Defendant-Appellant, Central Bank of the Philippines, by way of rediscounting, at the rate of 1/2 of 1% per annum from 1962 to March 28, 1963 and thereafter at the rate of 2-1/2% per anum. The loans, amounting to P813,000.00 as of July 30, 1963, were all covered by corresponding promissory no tes prescribing the terms and conditions of the aforesaid loans (Record on Appea , pp. 15-53). As of July 15, 1969, the outstanding balance was P 444,809.45 (Rec ord on Appeal, p. 56). On December 23, 1964, Appellant, thru the Director of the Department of Loans an d Credit, issued Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing all rural banks that a n additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum would be asse ssed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965. Said Memorandum Circular w as actually enforced on all rural banks effective July 4, 1965. On June 27, 1969, Appellee Rural Bank sued Appellant in the Court of First Insta nce of Manila, Branch III, to recover the 10% penalty imposed by Appellant amoun ting to P16,874.97, as of September 27, 1968 and to restrain Appellant from cont inuing the imposition of the penalty. Appellant filed a counterclaim for the out standing balance and overdue accounts of Appellee in the total amount of P444,80 9.45 plus accrued interest and penalty at 10% per annum on the outstanding balan ce until full payment. (Record on Appeal, p. 13). Appellant justified the imposi tion of the penalty by way of affirmative and special defenses, stating that it was legally imposed under the provisions of Section 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on Septembe r 5, 1958, under authority of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended (Rec ord on Appeal, p. 8, Affirmative and Special Defenses Nos. 2 and 3). In its answer to the counterclaim, Appellee prayed for the dismissal of the coun terclaim, denying Appellant's allegations stating that if Appellee has any unpai d obligations with Appellant, it was due to the latter's fault on account of its flexible and double standard policy in the granting of rediscounting privileges to Appellee and its subsequent arbitrary and illegal imposition of the 10% pena lty (Record on Appeal, p. 57). In its Memorandum filed on November 11, 1970, App ellee also asserts that Appellant had no basis to impose the penalty interest in asmuch as the promissory notes covering the loans executed by Appellee in favor of Appellants do not provide for penalty interest rate of 10% per annum on just due loans beginning January 4, 1965 (Record on Appeal p. 96). The lower court, in its Order dated March 3, 1970, stated that "only a legal que stion has been raised in the pleadings" and upholding the stand of plaintiff Rur al Bank, decided the case in its favor. (Rollo, p. 34). Appellant appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, for

determination of questions of facts and of law. However, in its decision promulg ated April 13, 1977, the Court of Appeals, finding no controverted facts and tak ing note of the statement of the lower court in its pre-trial Order dated March 3, 1970 that only a legal question has been raised in the pleadings, (Record on Appeal, p. 61), ruled that the resolution of the appeal will solely depend on th e legal issue of whether or not the Monetary Board had authority to authorize Ap pellant Central Bank to impose a penalty rate of 10% per annum on past due loans of rural banks which had failed to pay their accounts on time and ordered the c ertification of this case to this Court for proper determination (Rollo, pp. 3435). On April 20, 1977, the entire record of the case was forwarded to this Court (Ro llo, p. 36). In the resolution of May 20, 1977, the First Division of this Court , ordered the case docketed and as already stated declared the same submitted fo r decision (Rollo, p. 38). In its Brief, Appellant assigns the following errors: I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE MONE TARY BOARD TO METE OUT PENALTIES ON PAST DUE LOANS OF RURAL BANKS ESPECIALLY SIN CE NO PENAL CLAUSE HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE PROMISSORY NOTES. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY IS A N IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR 10% COST OF COLLECTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE AS PROVIDED THEREIN. It is undisputed that no penal clause has been included in the promissory notes. For this reason, the trial court is of the view that Memorandum Circular DLC-8 issued on December 23, 1964 prescribing retroactive effect on all past due loans , impairs the obligation of contract and deprives the plaintiff of its property without due process of law. (Record on Appel, p. 40). On the other hand appellant without opposing appellee's right against impairment of contracts, contends that when the promissory notes were signed by appellee, it was chargeable with knowledge of Sections 147 and 148 of the rules and regula tions authorizing the Central Bank to impose additional reasonable penalties, wh ich became part of the agreement. (ibid). Accordingly, the issue is reduced to the sole question as to whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past overdue loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated Decemb er 23, 1964. The answer is in the negative. Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 issued by the Director of Appellant's Department o f Loans and Credit on December 23, 1964, reads as follows: Pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1813 dated December 18, 1964, and in c onsonance with Section 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks concerning the responsibility of a rural bank to remit immediately to the Central Bank payments received on papers rediscounted with the latter including the loan value of rediscounted papers as they mature, and to liquidate fully its maturing loan obligations with the Central Bank, personal checks, for purposes of repayment, shall considered only after such personal checks shall have been h onored at clearing. In addition, rural banks which shall default in their loan obligations, thus inc

urring past due accounts with the Central Bank, shall be assessed an additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum on such past due accounts with the Central Bank over and above the customary interest rate(s) at which suc h loans were originally secured from the Central Bank. (Record on Appeal, p. 135 ). The above-quoted Memorandum Circular was issued on the basis of Sections 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks of the Philippines appro ved on September 5, 1958, which provide: Section 147. Duty of Rural Bank to turn over payment received for papers dis counted or used for collateral. A Rural Bank receiving any payment on account of papers discounted or used for collateral must turn the same over to the credito r bank before the close of the banking day next following the receipt of payment , as long as the aggregate discounting on loan amount is not fully paid, unless the Rural Bank substitutes the same with another eligible paper with at least th e same or earlier maturity and the same or greater value. A Rural Bank failing to comply with the provisions of the preceding paragraph sh all ipso facto lose its right to the rediscounting or loan period, without preju dice to the Central Bank imposing additional reasonable penalties, including cur tailment or withdrawal of financial assistance. Sec. 148. Default and other violations of obligation by Rural Bank, effec t. A Rural Bank becomes in default upon the expiration of the maturity period of its note, or that of the papers discounted or used as collateral, without the n ecessity of demand. A Rural Bank incurring default, or in any other manner, violating any of the sti pulations in its note, shall suffer the consequences provided in the second para graph of the preceding section. (Record on Appeal, p. 136.) The "Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks" was published in the Official Gazette, 55 O.G., on June 13, 1959, pp. 5186-5289. It is by virtue of these same Rules that Rural Banks re-discount their loan papers with the Central Bank at 2 -1/2% interest per annum and in turn lend the money to the public at 12% interes t per annum (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum, Record on Appeal, p. 1 30). Appellant maintains that it is pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 720, as amended , that the Monetary Board has adopted the set of Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks. It reads: SEC. 3. In furtherance of this policy, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank o f the Philippines shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations governing the establishment and operatives of Rural Banks for the purpose of providing ade quate credit facilities to small farmers and merchants, or to cooperatives of su ch farmers or merchants and to supervise the operation of such banks. The specific provision under the law claimed as basis for Sections 147 and 148 o f the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks, that is, on Appellant's autho rity to extend loans to Rural Banks by way of rediscounting is Section 13 of R.A . 720, as amended, which provides: SEC. 13. In an emergency or when a financial crisis is imminent the Cent ral Bank may give a loan to any Rural Bank against assets of the Rural Bank whic h may be considered acceptable by a concurrent vote of at least, five members of the Monetary Board. In normal times, the Central Bank may re-discount against papers evidencing a lo

an granted by a Rural Bank to any of its customers which can be liquefied within a period of two hundred and seventy days: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for the purpo se of implementing a nationwide program of agricultural and industrial developme nt, Rural Banks are hereby authorized under such terms and conditions as the Cen tral Bank shall prescribe to borrow on a medium or long term basis, funds that t he Central Bank or any other government financing institutions shall borrow from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or other internationa l or foreign lending institutions for the specific purpose of financing the abov e stated agricultural and industrial program. Repayment of loans obtained by the Central Bank of the Philippines or any other government financing institution f rom said foreign lending institutions under this section shall be guaranteed by the Republic of the Philippines. As to the supervising authority of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank over R ural Banks, the same is spelled-out under Section 10 of R.A. 720, as follows: SEC. 10. The power to supervise the operation of any Rural Bank by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank as herein indicated, shall consist in placing limits t o the maximum credit allowed any individual borrower; in prescribing the interes t rate; in determining the loan period and loan procedure; in indicating the man ner in which technical assistance shall be extended to Rural Banks; in imposing a uniform accounting system and manner of keeping the accounts and records of th e Rural Banks; in undertaking regular credit examination of the Rural Banks: in instituting periodic surveys of loan and lending procedures, audits, test check of cash and other transactions of the Rural Banks; in conducting training course s for personnel of Rural Banks; and, in general in supervising the business oper ation of the Rural Banks. Nowhere in any of the above-quoted pertinent provisions of R.A. 720 nor in any o ther provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the monetary Board authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their past due accounts wi th Appellant. As correctly stated by the trial court, while the Monetary Board p ossesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of ad ministrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure supervisory in character. (R ecord on Appeal, p. 141). Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law (Valerio v . Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719; Commissioner of Civil Service v. Cruz, 15 SCRA 638; R.B. Industrial Development Company, Ltd. v. Enage, 24 SCRA 365; Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Gonzalo Sy v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 70 SCRA 570). There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agenc ies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes promulg ation of administrative rules and regulations to implement given legislation, al l that is required is that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but c onform to the standards that the law prescribes (Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183). The rule delineating the extent of the binding force to be given to administrative rules and regulations was explained by the Court in Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators (33 SCRA 588), thus: "The recognition of t he power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation o f the statute, as necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barria s (11 Phil. 327) in 1914 U.S. v. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), in 1936 People v. Santos (63 Phil. 300), in 1951 Chinese Flour Importers Ass. v. Price Stabilizat ion Board (89 Phil. 439), and in 1962 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Secu rity Commission (4 SCRA 627). The Court held in the same case that "A rule is bi nding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is follo wed and its scope is within the statute granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom

...." On the other hand, "administrative interpretation of the law is at best me rely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means." Indeed, it cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the P resident, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be fai thfully executed. No lesser administrative, executive office, or agency then can , contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional m andate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. The rule has prevailed over the years, the latest restatement of which was made by the C ourt in the case of Bautista v. Junio (L-50908, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 342). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation canno t go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of St. To mas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administrat ion, 51 SCRA 340). Except for constitutional officials who can trace their compe tence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute (Radio Commun ications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493). When promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the a dministrative agency by law, the rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil . 555; People v. Maceren, L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 462; Daza v. Republ ic, L-43276, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 267). Conversely, the rule is likewise clear. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided i n the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less o ne that is applied retroactively. The records show that DLC Form No. 11 (Folder of Exhibits, p. 16) was revised De cember 23, 1964 to include the penal clause, as follows: In the event that this note becomes past due, the undersigned shall pay a penalt y at the rate of _____ per cent ( ) per annum on such past due account over and above the interest rate at which such loan was originally secured from the Centr al Bank. Such clause was not a part of the promissory notes executed by Appellee to secur e its loans. Appellant inserted the clause in the revised DLC Form No. 11 to mak e it a part of the contractual obligation of rural banks securing loans from the Central Bank, after December 23, 1964. Thus, while there is now a basis for the imposition of the 10% penalty rate on overdue accounts of rural banks, there wa s none during the period that Appellee contracted its loans from Appellant, the last of which loan was on July 30, 1963. Surely, the rule cannot be given retroa ctive effect. Finally, on March 31, 1970, the Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 475 effecti ve April 1, 1970, revoked its Resolution No. 1813, dated December 18, 1964 impos ing the questioned 10% per annum penalty rate on past due loans of rural banks a nd amended sub-paragraph (a), Section 10 of the existing guidelines governing ru ral banks' applications for a loan or rediscount, dated May 7, 1969 (Folder of E xhibits, p. 19). As stated by the trial court, this move on the part of the Mone tary Board clearly shows an admission that it has no power to impose the 10% pen alty interest through its rules and regulations but only through the terms and c onditions of the promissory notes executed by the borrowing rural banks. Appella nt evidently hoped that the defect could be adequately accomplished by the revis

ion of DLC Form No. 11. The contention that Appellant is entitled to the 10% cost of collection in case of suit and should therefore, have been awarded the same by the court below, is well taken. It is provided in all the promissory notes signed by Appellee that i n case of suit for the collection of the amount of the note or any unpaid balanc e thereof, the Appellee Rural Bank shall pay the Central Bank of the Philippines a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the amount unpaid not in any case les s than five hundred (P500.00) pesos as attorney's fees and costs of suit and col lection. Thus, Appellee cannot be allowed to come to Court seeking redress for a n wrong done against it and then be allowed to renege on its corresponding oblig ations. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with mod ification that Appellee Rural Bank is ordered to pay a sum equivalent to 10% of the outstanding balance of its past overdue accounts, but not in any case less t han P500.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit and collection. SO ORDERED. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines, petitioner,vs. Carlos Lari osa and National Labor Relations Commission, respondents February 27, 1987Fernan, J; Facts: Carlos Lariosa, worked in Firestone Tire and Rubber Company for 11 years as a ti re builder.On July 27, 1983, on his way out the company premises, he was frisked by security Lizoand Olvez. They found 16 wool flannel swabs inside his bag tuck ed underneath his soiledclothes, all belonging to the company.He was theb dismis sed effective on August 2, 1983 through letter of Ms. Villavicani,company presid ent, based on stealing company property and loss of trust . Lariosa on theotherhand filed with the Labor and Employment a case for illegal dismissal.The Labor Arbi ter found Laniosa s dismissal justified but was reversed by the NLRC on appeal and held that Lianosa be reinstated but without backwages. Issue: Whether the act of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company was within the realm on law s onProtection to Labor Law Held: From the records, it is likewise clear that Firestone did not act arbitrarily in terminatingLinasosa s services. Based on records, an investigation of the inciden t was conducted in the presence of Lianosa, the Union President, and the Securit y Guards who witnessed the attemptedasportation.Thus, we cannot agree with the N LRC s conclusion that even if Firestone has substantial proof, it did not observe statutory requirements of due process.Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, an em ployer may terminate an employee for serious misconduct. If there is sufficient e vidence that an employee has been guilty of a breachof trust/ that his employer has ample reason to distrust him, the Labor tribunal cannot justly denyto the em ployer the authority to dismiss such employee. Wherefore, petition granted. NLRC d ecision is hereby set aside.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA vs AUGUSTO CE DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Offic e of Cagayan The essential antecedents of this case are not disputed. On February, 1957, Mari ano Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck a

nd a passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees due on sa id vehicles for 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, Gon zaga remitted to the Provincial Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.0 0, under postal money orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and 18555, purchased from and iss ued by the Post Office of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date August 31, 195 7; so does the postal cancellation mark on the face of the money orders. The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Sec tion 8 (1), Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the seco nd installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working d ay of August; that the last working day of August, 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1 957; that consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal cancellation ma rk dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law. Accordingly, sai d official sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or otherwise, threatened to confiscate the certificate of registration for the two trucks (Annexes "B" & "C").lawphil.net Gonzaga brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a stipul ation of facts, rendered judgment, the dispositive part reading POR TANTO, el Juzgado dicta decision declarando, como por la presente declara, q ue el pago hecho con los giros postales Nos. 18553, 18554 y 18555, por el recurr ente, se ha hecho dentro del plazo fijado por ley; y, por tanto, el recurrente n o ha incurrido con morosidad en cuanto a dicho pago. Se ordena al recurrido, sus agentes y representantes, que se abstengan de confis car el certificado de registro de los dos trucks del recurrente, por la alegada morosidad del citado pago. Sin costas. ASI SE ORDENA. The only issue in this appeal is whether the remittance of petitioner-appellee c overing the second installment of registration fees for 1957, made by registered mail with postal cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within the time fixed by law. The following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992 as amended Sec. 8 (I) ". . . The registration fees provided in this Act for trucks may be p ayable in two equal installments, the first to be paid on or before the last wor king day of February, and the second to be paid on or before the last working da y of August. (Emphasis supplied) Sec. 6 (b) "The date of cancellation of the postage stamps of envelopes containi ng money orders, checks, or cash shall be considered as the date of application. . . . In support of its contention that August 30, and not August 31, was the last wor king day of August, 1957, respondent-appellant invokes Republic Act No. 1880, ot herwise known as the "40-Hour Week Law", pursuant to which government offices ar e to hold office from Monday to Friday only, unless one of those expressly exemp ted therefrom. As correctly held by the court below, the fact that pursuant to Republic Act 188 0, the Motor Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had no office on Saturday, Aug. 31, 1957, is immaterial in the case. The last working day contemplated in S ec. 8(I) of Act 3992 as amended should not necessarily mean the last working day

for Motor Vehicle Office. Under Sec. 6(b) of said Act, providing for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of th e envelope containing the remittance is considered the date of application. Cons equently, where the manner of payment falls under said Section 6(b), the law, in recognizing the date of cancellation as the date of application, impliedly perm its of a remittance or payment within that last day of August that the Post Offi ce may still effect cancellation; and the remittance, in fact, bears a postal ca ncellation, dated August 31, 1957. Moreover, it is not pretended by respondent-a ppellant that the Post Office ceased or has ceased to transact business and disc harge its functions on Saturdays by reason alone of Republic Act No. 1880. Clear ly, therefore,the remittance by petitioner-appellee was within the by law, as pr ovided in Section 8 (I), in connection with Section 6 (b) of Act 3992, as amende d.lawphil.net The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public ion No. 437 (dated August 21, 1957) of the President of the have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the registration fees without penalty. On the contrary, Section ministrative Code provides holiday by Proclamat Philippines did not last day for paying 31 of the Revised Ad

Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done the ne xt succeeding business day. In Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil., 247, we ruled as follows: The complaint filed by the petitioner herein was presented in the court a quo on November 23, 1951, exactly on the eight day after the proclamation of the respo ndent as duly elected councilor for the Municipality of Orion, Bataan. It happen s, however, that November 22, 1951, the last day of the seven-day period prescri bed by Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, was declared a "Special Public Holiday For National Thanksgiving" by Proclamation No. 290, series of 1951, of t he President of the Philippines. The trial court held that the provisions of Sec tion 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court could not be applied to the case at bar because it is an election case (Rule 132, Rules of Court), and declared that the complaint was filed outside of the period provided for by law. Assuming that Se ction 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, the law applicable i s Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that "Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day." The court a q uo, therefore, committed an error in declaring that the complaint was filed out of time. The ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against respondent-appell ant. The decision appealed from is affirmed. Without costs..

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR. vs THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO FACTS: Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloo can to apply for a loan. Valencia arranged everything about the loan with the ba nk. He supplied to the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan appli cation. After the bank approved the loan for the amount of P3,000.00, Castro, ac companied by the Valencia spouses, signed a promissory note corresponding to her

loan in favor of the bank an equal ote (Exhibit "2") o affixed thereon

the bank. On the same day, the Valencia spouses obtained from amount of loan for P3,000.00. They signed another promissory n corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank and had Castr her signature as co-maker.

Both loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage on Castro's house and lot. Lat er, the sheriff of Manila sent a notice to Castro, saying that her property woul d be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation covering the two promissor y notes plus interest and attorney's fees. Upon request by Castro and the Valenc ias and with conformity of the bank, the auction sale was postponed, but was nev ertheless auctioned at a later date. Castro claimed that she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write in Engl ish. According to her, she has only finished second grade. She needed money in t he amount of P3,000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses Valenc ia, who accompanied her to the bank to secure a loan of P3,000.00. While at the bank, an employee handed to her several forms already prepared which she was ask ed to sign, with no one explaining to her the nature and contents of the documen ts. She also alleged that it was only when she received the letter from the sher iff that she learned that the mortgage contract which was an encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00 and not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to sign a s co-maker of the promissory note without her being informed. Castro filed a suit against petitioners contending that thru mistake on her part or fraud on the part of Valencias she was induced to sign as co-maker of a prom issory note and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot to secure the ques tioned note. At the time of filing her complaint, respondent Castro deposited th e amount of P3,383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her personal loan plus interest. Castro prayed for: (1)the annulment as far as she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") and mortgage (Exhibit "6") insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; and (2)for the disc harge of her personal obligation with the bank by reason of a deposit of P3,383. 00 with the court a quo upon the filing of her complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis-a-vis petitioner bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to th e amount of P3,000.00 only. HELD: Yes. RATIO: While the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her sign the promissory note and the mortgage contract, they also misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qu alifications in order to secure its consent to the loan. Thus, as a result of th e fraud upon Castro and the misrepresentation to the bank inflicted by the Valen cias both Castro and the bank committed mistake in giving their consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated their consents given. Fo r if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of the true qualifica tions of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have given their consents to the contracts. Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. We cannot declare the promissory note valid between the bank and Castro and the mortgage contract binding on Castro beyond the amount of P3,000.00, for while th e contracts may not be invalidated insofar as they affect the bank and Castro on the ground of fraud because the bank was not a participant thereto, such may ho wever be invalidated on the ground of substantial mistake mutually committed by them as a consequence of the fraud and misrepresentation inflicted by the Valenc ias. Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso, this Court declared that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit by a third person, even wi thout connivance or complicity with one of the contracting parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to the contract. The fraud particularly averred in the complaint, having been proven, is deemed s ufficient basis for the declaration of the promissory note invalid insofar as it affects Castro vis-a-vis the bank, and the mortgage contract valid only up to t he amount of P3,000.00.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO On July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on the 28th day of May, 1953. The accused thereupon presented a motion to quash the informat ion on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municip al court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Against the order of dism issal appeal is made directly to this Court under the provisions of section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as only questions of law are involv ed in the appeal. The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. . . . .

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six month s. Light offenses prescribe in two months. ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shal l commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, . . . .. The court a quo held that in accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code th e "month" mentioned in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the period of prescription commences to run from the day "on whi ch the crime is discovered by the offended party," i.e., in this case on May 28, 1953 when it was committed, the two months period provided for the prescription of the offense already expired when the information was filed, because the fili ng was on the 61st day. The Solicitor General in this appeal argues that in the same manner that Article 13 of the new Civil Code is applied to determine the le ngth of the two months period required for the prescription of the offense, its provision (of the said Article 13) contained in paragraph 3 which reads "In comp uting a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" shou

ld also be applied, so that the information should be considered as filed on the 60th day and not on the 61st day after the offense has been committed. The reso lution of the appeal involves the determination of two legal issues, first, whet her the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was committed, in acc ordance with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippi nes, and second, whether the term "month" in the Revised Penal Code should be un derstood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil calendar or calendar mon th. As to the first question, we note that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code prov ides that the period shall commence to run from the day on which the offense is committed or discovered. The title indicates that the provision merely purports to prescribe the manner of computing the period of prescription. In the computat ion of a period of time within which an act is to be done, the law in this juris diction has always directed the first day be excluded and the last included (See section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court; section 13, Rev. Adm. Code and Art. 1 3, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in the case of Surbano vs. Gloria, 51 Phi l., 415, where the question involved was whether an offense had prescribed, we h eld that from February 18 to March 15, 1927 only a period of 25 days elapsed, be cause we excluded the first day (February 18) and included the last day (March 1 5). The above method of computation was in force in this jurisdiction even befor e the advent of the American regime (Article 7, Spanish Civil Code). It is logic al to presume, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting Article 91 of the Rev ised Penal Code meant or intended to mean that in the computation of the period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and the last one to be inc luded, in accord with existing laws. We find much sense in the argument of the Solicitor General that if the Civil Co de of the Philippines is to be resorted to in the interpretation of the length o f the month, so should it be resorted to in the computation of the period of pre scription. Besides, Article 18 of the Civil Code (Article 16 of the old Civil Co de) expressly directs that any deficiency in any special law (such as the Revise d Penal Code) must be supplied by its provisions. As the Revised Penal Code is d eficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed, resort must be had to its Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of co mputing a period. We find, therefore, that the trial court committed error in no t excluding the first day in the computation of the period of prescription of th e offense. The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be consider ed as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no pro vision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of the month. Article 7 of t he old Civil Code provided that a month shall be understood as containing 30 day s; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised Administrative Cod e which provides that a month means the civil or calendar month and not the regu lar 30-day month (Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil., 334). With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be c onsidered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). This provision of the new Ci vil Code has been intended for general application in the interpretation of the laws. As the offense charged in the information in the case at bar took place on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil Code had come to effect, this new provision s hould apply, and in accordance therewith the month in Article 90 of the Revised day month. Penal Code should be understood to mean the regular 30 In our conclusion that the term "month" used in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find persuasive authority in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case dec ided by it in the year 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval o

f the Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the law spoke of months, it meant the natural month or the solar month, in the absence of express provision s to the contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil Code of Spain, which provided in its Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of the laws, and with particular respect to months, that a month shall be understood as a 30-day month, said court held that the two months period for the prescription of a lig ht offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a month being a 30-day month. ( S. de 6 de abril de 1895, 3 Viada, p. 45). Similarly, we hold that in view of th e express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code the term "month" used i n Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day m onth and not the solar or civil month. We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offe nse, and we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offens e had not yet been prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29. The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case ordered rei nstated. Without costs.

IN RE the complaint against Attorney ANACLETO FILART. These proceedings were instituted at the instance of thirty-seven residents of A singan, Pangasinan, who filed a complaint against attorney Anacleto Filart for m alpractice, alleging in substance: 1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received of them th e sum of P111 as fees for drafting a memorandum in connection with Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540; 2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting the appeal to the Supreme Court, he having practically abandoned the case. In connection with point No. 1, even admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal r eceived such a sum of complainants, which respondent denies, Filart seems to hav e had a legal right to receive compensation as an attorney, the office of deputy provincial fiscal not being specifically included in section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 1702, as an official who shall not engage in private practice. It is also to be noted that Filart did not take up the case of his own volition but was ordered by the court to defend the rights of petiti oners because the attorney they formerly retained was almost always in a state o f intoxication. In connection with point No. 2, the following facts are important: 1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal, and having engaged in the practic e of law, complainants asked Filart to prosecute the appeal of their case; 2. That Filart received from complainants sums of money, P780 according to complainants, and P160 according to respondent; 3. That the complainants were driven from their lands, and their houses wer e destroyed, by order of the court. The facts which support the allegation of fraud and negligence on the part of re spondent are: 1. The lapse of fifty-one days between the receipt of notice of denial of m

otion for a new trial (March 7, 1917) until the filing of the bill of exceptions (April 27, 1917) when the statutory period is only thirty days (Act No. 2347), sec. 26); 2. Failure to perfect a satisfactory bill of exceptions after repeated amen dments and re-amendments; 3. 4. Failure to file a bond in order to prevent execution; Assurances made by respondent that all was right.

1. This is explained by the fact that the record was not in the clerk's off ice. The date when the answers to Filart's questions from the Land Registration Office reached Filart, which were to be made a part of the bill of exceptions, d oes not appear in the record. Filart also alleges he made an oral motion to exte nd the period fixed by law for the filing of the bill of exceptions, but that mo tion appears to have been overlooked by the judge; 2. The parties are agreed that the bills of exceptions are voluminous. Resp ondent further pleads pressure of work in his law office; 3. Respondent says that he believed execution would not be valid until afte r certiorari proceedings were decided; 4. The exact nature of the assurances do not clearly appear in the record p ossibly they are no more than what an attorney fairly confident of success would make to a client. The Acting Attorney-General believes that the facts are not sufficient to suppor t the complaint, and recommends dismissal of the case. We agree to the extent th at such gross misconduct or negligence has not been shown as warrants disbarment or suspension pursuant to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "T hat part of the profession," said Lord Mansfield in Pitt vs. Yalden, ([1767], 4 Burr., 2060), "which is carried on by attorneys is liberal and reputable, as wel l as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honor and integrity ; and they ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and kn owledge. But every man is liable to error; and I should be very sorry that it sh ould be taken for granted that an attorney is answerable for every error or mist ake. . . . A counsel may mistake as well as an attorney. . . . Yet no one will s ay that a counsel who has been mistaken shall be charged. . . . Not only counsel but judges may differ, or doubt, or take time to consider. Therefore, an attorn ey ought not to be liable in case of reasonable doubt." "No attorney," said Chie f Justice Abbott, "is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be im agined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law." (Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113.) The court, having in mind the many appeals which have been dismissed because of the lack of diligence of counsel, cannot let the occurrence pass without express ing a strong disapproval of such criminal carelessness. While we would not wish to assume a harsh and uncompromising attitude towards attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them to know that by indulging in such unprofessional tactics they bec ome unworthy of the trust which the law reposes in them. The lack of due care is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client, and is indicative of a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. We bring to the notice of clien ts whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of an attorn ey in preparing or filing pleadings necessary in the proper conduct of a cause, and in taking such steps as may be required in the progress of the case, that th e client who has suffered damages as the result of his attorney's negligence or misconduct may recover therefor. In Drais vs. Hoggan ([1875], 50 Cal., 121), alt hough many other cases might be cited, it was held that "if a judgment is obtain

ed against a party upon a complaint which is radically defective, and he desires to appeal, and procures bondsmen, but his attorney neglects to do so until the time for appeal expires, the attorney is guilty of gross negligence, and is liab le for the loss sustained by the client." Without, therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of Atto rney Anacleto Filart for, sad to relate, he is only one of a class, it does beco me our solemn duty to reprimand him for carelessness and misconduct in attending to the cause of poor clients. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the resp ondent for his information with a warning that a more severe punishment will be meted out to him in case of a repetition of similar acts and omissions; and let a copy hereof be filed with his personal papers in this court. So ordered.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306. October 1 2, 1981] Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was enga ged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. fo r which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half o f the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commission er issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. d utifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 19 68. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing t he tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of asses sment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. T he company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upo n. Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334 , may be retroactively applied. Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive a pplication where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-7 1 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. T he company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corpor ations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer contro l over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptio ns are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them. PERFECTO S. FLORESCA et al vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION FACTS: Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporat ion (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of th e cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complai nt alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, neglig ently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protectio

n of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim the ir benefits pursuant to the Workmen s Compensation Act before the Workmen s Compensa tion Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex f or additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because th e petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA. ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue. HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benef its under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case b efore the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a r emedy. However, if in case they ll win in the lower court whatever award may be gr anted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasi zed that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrific es the human being. The spirit of the law insures man s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit give the life .