Do you agree with David Kang’s contention that Western IR theory

'gets Asia wrong'?

Does Western international relations (IR) theory get Asia wrong? No, I do
think that Western IR theory ‘gets Asia wrong’. I concede to Kang’s
argument that some western IR theorists have predicted a volatile Asia
that has not eventuated, but this does not mean that as a whole, Western
IR theory is somehow irrelevant or inadequate in explaining and
understanding Asian politics.
Firstly, a working definition of what Western IR theory is and what
dictates the failure or inadequacy of that theory needs to be defined. It
has to be said there is no one coherent Western IR theory, rather many
different competing theories and ideologies are encompassed in Western
IR theory. However they all aim to ‘… gain adequate knowledge of social
reality to ground and direct policy-making.’ So IR theory is a theory that
is applied to international politics, to create a better understanding of
country to country behaviour so as to create a more favourable
environment in which the country (that applies the theory) resides. 1
Under what circumstances is a theory “proven” or deemed adequate? Well
one way is to have theories that have ‘…careful conceptual and
operational definitions of their dependent and independent variables…’2
and in turn ‘…stipulate the conditions associated with predicted
outcomes…’ ‘If these conditions are met but repeatedly fail to produce the
predicted outcomes, the theories can be rejected [deemed inadequate]. If
predicted and unpredicted outcomes occur, the theories are inadequately
specified.’ 2
So what are some Western IR theories and how do they related to Asia?
The two major Western IR theories that will be discussed are: realism
(which includes neo-liberalism) and liberalism (which includes both
constructivism and rationalism). Realists ‘…. understood politics as a
struggle for power and unilateral advantage.’ , ‘ contemporary realists
consider military capability and alliances the very foundation of security.’3
In short realists consider a country’s desire for power, in the way of
military strength and economic advantage in the political arena as the
main impetus of political policy, as this inturn would result in a secure and
stable nation. What distinguishes liberalism from realism is that liberalism
is not so much a theory based on a particular set of specific conditions or
constraints that applies to all systems but rather liberalism is a “meta-
theory”. Being a meta-theory, liberalism predicates different behaviour
and outcomes for different countries in similar situations, because
liberalism takes into account: domestic power politics, economic interests,
historical precedence, cultural, identity and institutional constrains that
are unique to each nation.4 Liberalism then forms a political theory that
will predicts the outcome of that singular political interaction of said
country in said time in history.4 Now how do these Western IR theories
relate to Asian international politics ? The answers to this question are
very complex and rely on refuting many of Kang’s statements and
contentions, so it is prudent to deal with Kang’s assumptions first.
Kang mostly focuses on realism as the Western IR theory that ‘gets Asia
wrong’; he also states ‘Many of the criticisms that I [Kang] makes…could
apply to other international relations theories such as liberalism or
constructivism.’ Kang claims that “…these [Western IR theory] do a poor
job as they are applied to Asia…’5 At the same time Kang admits that
“constructivist perspective has addressed topics including the formation of
identity, prostitution and its relationship to U.S overseas troop
deployments…’ 5 but he chooses to dismiss these ‘encouraging trends’5
because ‘… such work remains the exception rather than the norm.’ 5 and
realism’s ‘wide use in Western scholarship on Asia’. 5 So, on the one
hand, Kang admits that the constructivist perspective (a large part of
Western IR theory) does an adequate job of explaining Asian politics but
on the other he dismisses it, because of its infrequent use in policy.
Exploring the topic on a purely theoretical level, Kang should not dismiss
any part of Western IR theory as irrelevant, when it seems to directly
contradict his argument. If anything to prove definitively that Western IR
theory does get Asia wrong, Kang should be focusing on how, although
encouraging, constructivism also ‘gets Asia wrong.’ which he does not do.
Constructivist theory is a meta-theory and if the all the variable that
influence politics are taken into consideration, then it can never be wrong.

On a more practical “Realpolitik” level, one of Kang’s main argument is ‘by

realist standards, china should be provoking balancing behaviour, merely
because its overall size and projected rate of growth are so high.’ 5, which
has not happened, this inturn made the prediction of ‘…a return of arms
racing and the possibility of major conflict among Asian countries…’ 5
untrue. Kang’s argument is only true within the boundaries that he has
set. ‘Kang conveniently excludes South Asia from his Analysis…. India is
‘… expanding its naval capabilities, and moving towards closer relations
with Japan, Vietnam, Australia and the US.’8 as well as ‘…seeking closer
ties with Burma to counter growing Chinese influence there.’6 If you
exclude India’s role in Asian politics because South Asia somehow has no
influence on the rest of Asia6, then yes, no other countries are balancing
against China. However ‘this is difficult to justify in view of India’s rising
power and role in Asian security.’ if Kang is to consider Asia holistically
and still state that no other Asian country is balancing against China then
‘…Kang needs to offer alternative interpretations and explanations for
Asia’s arm modernization and alliance strengthening.’6
Kang’s perspective on balancing (realist theory) is also somewhat askew,
if “…overall size and projected rates of growth…” are the only factors that
matter in balancing then in theory, ‘…the United States should be the one
being balanced against…. Kang ignores insights from Walt’s balance of
threat theory, which shows that states balance against threats and not
simply against power. ’6 Taking India, external balancing (ie.
strengthening old alliances and forging new alliances) and Walt’s balance
of threat theory into account, it seems that the Western IR theory of
realism is not so misguided, rather the degree of conflict that realism
predicted is erroneous.
Kang also incites the Japanese situation: ‘…Japan lack aircraft carriers,
intercontinental missiles, and nuclear weapons… it also evinces almost no
significant military or diplomatic strength. ’ 5 as evidence ‘… balancing is
not occurring in Asia as realist theories would predict.’ 5 since, Japan has
neither rearmed itself nor taken a more assertive role it its own security.
In regards to the Japanese situation, I concur with Kang, realist theory
does not adequately explain Japan’s position in any depth, considering
Japan is ‘… the second largest economic power in the international
system…’ 5. But might constructivism (the other branch of Western IR
theory) have plausible explanation that encompasses the Japanese
perspective? One constructivist explanation takes into account Japanese
collective experience of the World War II era, as the Japanese people ‘…
feel victimized by their own military and the ultra-nationalist far right,
who they hold responsible for destroying Japan’s nascent prewar
democracy and who led them into a hopeless war which they should have
know Japan could not win. ‘ . After World War II the‘…Japanese feel that
they have been bullied and manipulated once in the name of nationalism
and national security and they are determined not to allow it to happen
again.’ 7 Having taken this attitude into account it seems reasonable that
there would be ‘…a strong consensus in Japan that it should minimize its
involvement in security affairs and that the armed forces as an institution
must be kept in constant check, so as to prevent it from once again
exerting a corrosive influence on Japanese democracy.’ 7 So driven by
overwhelming domestic resistance against rearming Japanese leaders
don’t see rearming as a viable option.
Kang does not refute this constructivist view on the Japanese situation,
rather he offers another explanation with Japan choosing to bandwagon
with China as the main premise. The bandwagoning explanation seems
problematic as Kang uses bilateral trade and economic ties as the main
evidence for bandwagoning, but could the trade actually be based on ‘…
rationalist, absolute gains logic’6? Further more taking modern Sino-
Japanese history into account ‘…during which Japan twice attacked
China… States like people are usually wary about placing their fates in the
hands of those whom they have wronged.’ So taking into account absolute
gains the theory, and the historical precedence, it is very unlikely that
Japan is actually bandwagoning with China. In fact Strengthen economic
ties and bilateral trade may actually be Japan’s way of soft balancing,
‘economic realities encourage some modification in behaviour that might
otherwise lead to conflict’ . It is infinitely more likely, that the Japanese
negative sentiment towards rearming rather than some complicated
bandwangoning theory is the cause for Japanese unwillingness to become
a normal power in terms of its military defences.
Kang’s arguments about the inadequacy of Western IR theory have been
tentative at best, but when have Wester IR theory actually been “right” in
regards to Asian politics? The main advantage of Western IR theory is that
is it not one rigid theory, rather that it contains several different theories
with different vantage points. In effect a combination of Western IR
theories would result in a more in depth understanding of Asian politics.
On the issue of stability and security, liberals IR theorists predict that ‘As
the world’s regions fill up with democracies [especially with more and
more Asian countries becoming democratic], they will become more
peaceful.’8 Liberals mostly uses a country’s social and political identity as
well as the continuous change in of one’s identity to predict different
outcomes for the future. Whereas realist theorists believe ‘… because of
the strength of universal, underlying forces that transcend particular
places and periods, certain patterns of behaviour occur over and over
again.’ 8 This intrinsic contradiction in Western IR theory may actually be
the paradox that gets Asia right.
If both the realist and the liberal aspects of Western IR theory into
account, where ‘…power determines identity….identity sometimes defies
power and has significant consequences [towards international policy]
even when power wins.’ So the identity of a country is influenced not only
by domestic features (which constructivist argue) but also because of its
position of power (which realists argue) comparison to neighbour
(whether it is military or other wise) then several ways to stability and
security will result, which can be seen in the modern Asia . If the two
preeminent powers Japan and the US are observed through a purely
realist angle they should be competing and balancing against each other
as ‘realism expects the two preeminent… in the region to balance against
one another.’10 If you regard the Asian regional relationships through a
purely constructivist perspective then ‘…regional economic and security
dialogues should be progressing more rapidly than regional arms races or
territorial disputes.’10 At the moment both descriptions are not accurate.
The current situation maybe more accurately explained by a combination
of power and identity, Japan and the US have similar scores on the Polity
III scale and the Freedom House scale (assessments based on the
amount of political freedoms a nation has ie. freedom of press)10. US
identification with Japan and vice versa mutes the realist prediction of
conflict between the two countries.10 If a similar argument is applied to
China, it can be seen that because of the difference of identity between
the US and China, and rivalry in military expenditure, the US is actively
balance against China10. It is only because ‘China’s military moves in the
Taiwan straits and south china seas do not challenge America military pre-
eminence directly…’10 that no cold war style military build-up has
occurred.
In conclusion, Western IR scholarship is quite relevant to modern day
Asian politics. Wester IR theory, because of its many facets can and does
explain Asian politics adequately. If Western IR theory seems somehow to
be wrong, it is only because in it’s application, not all of the variables or
conditions are specified correctly.

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