The Context Principle and Dummett 's Argument for Anti-realism

by

KAREN GREEN
Monash University

Abr/ruct: In his earlier writings, Dummett made a distinction between deep and shallow arguments for being suspicious of bivalence. Deep arguments brought with them a commitment to anti-realism, shallow arguments did not. This distinction was motivated by a certain understanding of the significance of the context principle, according to which it is the sentence which is the primary vehicle of meaning. In later writings Dummett has despaired of making clear the distinction between deep and shallow arguments for rejecting bivalence. He has adopted the position that all deviations from bivalence involve anti-realism of some kind. In this paper I argue that this in effect removes any clear connection between Dummettian anti-realism and idealism. A suspicion of bivalence should often be interpreted as the result of an anti-realim of the error theoretic kind.

Keyword!: anti-realism, bivalence, context principle, Dummett, error theory.

1. Introduction
ANTI-REALISM IS NOT a single doctrine, but comes in a number of varieties. There are forms of idealism, which deny that the furniture of the world exists independently of our epistemic capacities, and make what exists in some sense mind-dependent. There are error theories, which are happy to recognise some classes of independently existing entities, but which claim that others, apparently presupposed in certain areas of discourse, do not in fact exist. Last, there are forms of expressivism, which claim that certain sentences which appear to be fact stating are really serving some other function (Wright 1992, pp. 1-7). Dummettian anti-realism, defined as a refusal to endorse bivalence, is generally thought to capture a variety of idealism. In this paper I will argue that while this is an accurate characterisation of the anti-realism of the early Dummett, in a later manifestation Dummettian anti-realism can be seen to have more in common with anti-realisms of an error-theoretic kind.' Dummett does not explicitly signal the fact that two apparently different forms of antiIt goes beyond the aims of this paper to give a full exegesis of Dummett's arguments for antirealist semantics. For that the reader should consult, Weiss, B. (2002) or Green, K. (2001).

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realism are captured by a refusal to endorse bivalence, but their existence raises questions for the overall interpretation of Dummetts philosophy. The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the existence of this shift of emphasis in Dummetts writing and to elucidate the way that it is mediated by his changing attitude to the context principle. The locus classicus for the statement of an error-theoretic point of view is John Mackies Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong where he denies that moral discourse is objective, while admitting that the apparent semantics of ethical assertions presupposes the existence of moral values. There he characterises an error theory as:
...a theory that although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false. It is this that makes the name moral scepticismappropriate. (Mackie 1977, P. 3 5 )

Hartry Field has also developed an error-theoretic position in relation to mathematics, and his characterisation of the position has an advantage over Mackies. For Mackies formulation can be read as asserting that all moral claims are false, and this has led to the accusation that it relegates moral discourse to bad faith (Wright 1996, p. 2).2 Field argues that mathematics does not constitute a body of truths, but this is not to say that there is something wrong with mathematics; its simply to say that mathematics isnt the sort of thing that can be appropriately evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood (Field 1980, p.viii). Or we might say for short, mathematics is neither true nor false. The fundamental idea guiding an error theory with regard to some sentence, or area of discourse, is that we are led into error about the real semantics of the sentence, or area of discourse, by a naive semantic theory which takes syntactic features such as assertoric force and predication as a reliable guide to semantics. But the error theorist will claim, with regard to some sentence or class of sentences, that although they are syntactically assertions, which involve singular terms and predicates, they are not genuinely fact stating. These sentences are in some sense neither true nor false. It is not the aim of this paper to endorse error theories in either the mathematical or the ethical case. Nor will we be able to examine the varieties of error
In fact, in the quoted passage, Mackie may only be intending to assert that all claims to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive are false, not that all moral claims are false, but his formulation is ambiguous.

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theory, a substantial task worthy of an extended treatment. The aim of the paper is merely to argue that there is a precise point in the development of Dummetts anti-realism, represented by him as merely an extension and simplification of his views, which in fact represents a substantial reorientation. This reorientation represents a shift from an idealist to an error-theoretic anti-realism and is bound up with his changed attitude to Freges context principle. Freges context principle has had an important influence on twentieth century analytic thought. However, it has undergone a number of subtle transformations in the hands of analytic philosophers. The context principle found in Dummetts early writings is not quite Freges, and the first two sections of the paper will discuss the historic transformations which led to a strong reading of the context principle, which I will call the sufficiency reading. This reading, though not clearly justified by Freges texts, played an important part in Dummetts early arguments for a connection between the refusal to assert bivalence and a version of moderate idealism. The bulk of the paper will argue that, implicitly, Dummett has been forced to give up the strong reading of the context principle, and that once the sufficiency reading of the principle is abandoned there is no reason to conclude that the failure to assert bivalence will, by itself, bring with it a commitment to idealism. Instead, refusing to accept bivalence will, at least in many cases, capture what is central to an anti-realism of an error-theoretic kind, and should be congenial to those who are thorough realists about the objects and properties of the causal realm. Dummetts acceptance of a version of the context principle justified his early adherence to the claim that it is the sentence that is the primary vehicle of meaning. This view is closely associated with, though not identical to, the linguistic priority thesis, the thesis that an account of thought must go by way of an account of language - a thesis that Dummett also accepts. This thesis is itself somewhat ambiguous, but for the sake of this paper we can ignore these complications. Following the principle that the sentence is the primary vehicle of meaning, Dummett attempted, in his early writing, to distinguish between deep and shallow reasons for being suspicious of bivalence. Deep reasons led to a refusal to assert bivalence and fell out of an account of the use that is made of sentences. Shallow reasons led to the denial of bivalence, and it was suggested that this denial was only required in order to tidy up certain logical complexities internal to sentence^.^ At this stage Dummett deemed the intuitionists reasons

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for failing to endorse bivalence to be deep, and to be the expression of an anti-realist attitude, while he claimed that Strawsons arguments for saying that some sentences are neither true nor false were shallow, and led not to anti-realism, but to a more complex form of realist logic which distinguished among undesignated truth values (Dummett 1978, pp. 1-28). In its earliest form, the deep argument for failing to endorse bivalence led to an anti-realism allied to idealism, because the idea that the sentence is the primary vehicle of meaning was supplemented with the thought that truth for sentences should be explained in terms of the use that is made of them. Together these two thoughts led to the replacement of truth by warranted assertibility. Even at this stage, Dummett wanted to distinguish his position from that of subjective idealism, but because he replaced truth with warranted assertibility, it was natural to equate the refusal to assert bivalence with a form of moderate idealism (Dummett 1978, pp. 17-1 8). Later Dummett decided that it was better, instead of replacing truth with warranted assertibility, to speak of giving a substantive account of truth in terms of warranted assertibility, but while this made his idealism even more moderate, by allowing a greater gap between truth and assertibility, the position was still idealistic; at least, it embodied a form of linguistic idealism, as I will clarify below (Dummett 1978, p. xxii). Over the years Dummetts own attempts to distinguish between deep and shallow reasons for being suspicious of bivalence ultimately dissatisfied him, and in the early 199Os, he apparently simplified his philosophy, and claimed that every rejection of bivalence involves some form of antirealism (Dummett 1991a, pp. 322-7). Strawsons denial of bivalence, as well as the intuitionists refusal to assert bivalence, now both count according to Dumrnett, as forms of anti-reali~m.~ In what follows I will
In his recent Dewey lectures Dummett argues that these complexities demonstrate differences in the ingredient senses of sentences which have the same assertoric content. He there acknowledges ingredient sense as a feature of the sense of sentences of which a theory of meaning needs to give an account, Dummett, M. (2003), pp. 16-2 I, Dummett has had a similar change of heart with regard to the denial of bivalence brought on by cases of vagueness. Having once thought that such denials are not evidence of an anti-realist attitude, he now thinks that they do involve a version of anti-realism, Dummett, M. (1996). This raises the interesting question of whether what is involved in this case is also a form of error theory. My initial thought is that it may be, but that the person who denies bivalence on account of vagueness is offering an error- theoretic account of the semantics of certain predicates, whereas the error theory discussed below involves attributing an error with regard to the semantics of some singular terms.

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argue that motivating Dummetts renunciation of the distinction between deep and shallow reasons for being suspicious of bivalence are misgivings about the doctrine that the primary unit of meaning is the sentence. This is the central insight captured by the context principle. However, it was the fact that the primary unit of meaning was deemed to be the sentence, plus, either an explanation of truth in terms of assertibility, or the replacement of truth by warranted assertibility, that underpinned the idea that to refrain from asserting bivalence was to adopt a form of idealism. Dummetts later view, according to which any kind of refusal to assert bivalence brings with it a form of anti-realism with regard to some kind of entity has therefore severed the most obvious link between Dummettian anti-realism and idealism. Once one gives up the context principle, as expressed in the idea that the sentence is the primary unit of meaning, the refusal to assert bivalence turns out, in many cases, to be something that the realist about common-sense material objects can adopt with equanimity. Indeed, I believe that Dummettian anti-realism should be adopted by those who do not want to be committed to the more bizarre denizens of the metaphysicians jungle or paradise.

2. The Context Principle in Frege, Dummett and Wright: In Freges writings the context principle is one of three fundamental principles that are laid down in the introduction to Freges Grundlagen. The first is to always separate the psychological from the logical, the third is not to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object, and the second is: never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition (Frege 188411950,p. x). There has been considerable discussion about the interpretation of the principle, partly because the distinction between sense and reference was not made in Grundlagen, and so it is open to at least two readings. One makes it a principle about sense, the other a principle about reference (Resnik 1967, 1976, 1979). In this paper I will assume that it is initially most plausible to read Frege as having had reference in mind when he formulated the context principle, at least in a confused way. I also prefer to use the word sentence rather than proposition to translate Freges word Satz, because this avoids the implication that Frege is speaking of propositions, thought of as the meanings of sentences. Frege makes it clear in his correspondence with

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Russell that he uses the word Satz for a group of visible or audible signs expressing a thought, not for the thought itself (Frege 1980, p. 149). Read thus, the context principle is the injunction, never to ask for the reference of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence. This reading is in line with the gloss on the context principle that is provided by Frege: if [it] is not observed, one is almost forced to take as the meanings [referents] of words mental pictures or acts of the individual mind, and so to offend against the first principle as well. Taking number words to refer to ideas is also the fault that he is primarily attempting to avoid in $60 where the context principle is reiterated. There he suggests that it is because we ask for the reference of a word in isolation that we are led to accept an idea as its meaning. Read thus, the context principle is a constraint on asking after the reference of a word. One should only do this in the context of a sentence, because it is when we consider the contribution that particular words are making to the truth conditions of sentences in which they occur that we can avoid the dead end of mentalistic psychologism succumbed to by those who ask after the meaning of number words in isolation. When the context principle is read as a mere constraint on asking after the reference of an expression it is at least prima facie compatible with the realism that Frege intended it to secure, though it does not deliver it.5 Following one of Freges other formulations, Dummetts early interpretation of the context principle made it sound less like a constraint on assigning reference, and more like a suj$cient condition for conferring reference. In one place Frege expresses the context principle by saying, It is enough if the sentence as a whole has a sense; it is this that confers on its parts also their content (Frege 1884/1950, p. 71e). Early on Dummett interpreted this as showing that for Frege, once we have laid down the truth conditions for mathematical sentences, we are committed to rec-

This is not the place to attempt an analysis of Freges own intentions in introducing the context principle. It is clear, however, that while he suggested that one should only ask after the reference of an expression in the context of a sentence, he did not think that a contextual definition of numerical identity was sufficient to secure a unique reference for each numerical expression. See Demopoulos, W. (1998), particularly pp.489-93, for a clear account of Freges reservations about contextual definition. Michael Beaneys discussion of the context principle also makes it a mere constraint, but in his case he suggests that Frege intends it as an epistemological constraint on asking after the meaning of number words, which he argues Frege thinks of as referring to numbers conceived of as having independent existence, Beaney, M. (1 996), p. 243.

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ognizing the singular terms in those sentences as referring to objects and so:
._. if an expression functions as a singular term in sentences for which we have provided a clear sense, ... then that expression is a term (proper name) and accordingly has a reference: ... So, then, to assert that there are, e.g., natural numbers turns out to be to assert no more than that we have correctly supplied the sentences of number theory with determi(Dummett 1978, p.212) nate truth conditions; . _ _

He continued to interpret the principle in this strong way, and to apparently endorse the context principle at least until the 1980s;
if a sense has been fixed for all possible sentences in which an expression may occur, then no additional stipulation is needed to confer a reference on that expression. (Dummett 198 I , p. 380)

However, more recently, he has voiced considerable doubts about the tenability of the context principle so interpreted (Dummett 1995). Part of the problem arises from the fact that, since Frege did not at this early stage distinguish sense from reference, the above reading is tendentious. Dummetts doubts were also inspired by Crispin Wrights 1983 discussion of Freges conception of numbers as objects (Wright 1983). In that book Wright appeared to be closely following Dummetts interpretation of the context principle and he drew from it the conclusion that:
If ... certain expressions in a branch of our language function as singular terms, and descriptive and identity contexts containing them are true by ordinary criteria, there is no room for any ulterior failure of fit between those contexts and the structure of the states of affairs which make them true. So there can be no philosophical science of ontology, no well founded attempt to see past our categories of expression and glimpse the way the world is truly furnished. (Wright 1983, p. 52)

This formulation places a rather minimal requirement on existence and encourages a profligate Platonism, since it seems to imply that talking about something in true sentences is sufficient to secure its existence. As well as expressing the claim that if an expression functions as a singular term this is sufficient for it to refer to an object, the passage also makes clear how the context principle leads to what I referred to earlier as linguistic idealism. Ontological categories are taken to be derivative from syntactic categories, such as singular term. This results in a linguistic Kantianism. This is not subjective idealism, because the rneanings of words are not ideas. But just as Kant avoided subjective idealism,

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but argued that the categories determine the limits of our thought, so the linguistic idealist avoids subjective idealism, but accepts that the logical structure of language determines the limits of our thought. Dummett has stated in a number of places that from the point of view of the context principle the possession of reference is wholly internal to the language. He has also associated it with Putnam, and the internalist strain in Freges thinking thus implying that he recognised at least a distant connection between Freges context principle and Kantian idealism (Dummett 1973, p.499; Dummett 1991b, p.211n.; Dummett 1995, pp. 10-11, 18).6 Withdrawing from his earlier apparently unqualified endorsement of the context principle, Dummett argued in Frege: Philosophy of Muthemutics that problems arise for it, because it lies behind the method that Frege adopted for determining what the numbers are, and so it resulted in contradiction and the collapse of Freges project (Dummett 1991b, pp. 2 2 3 ~ I O )But . ~ these arguments do not by themselves constitute a complete retreat from something like the view expressed by Wright, and the early Dummett. For they could be taken to hinge on a disagreement over the conditions under which a sense will have been determined for all the sentences in which a singular term occurs. Indeed, Dummett has been loath to give up the context principle, for he has always seen it as providing the basis of an account of our reference to abstract objects which avoids, on the one hand, the extreme of nominalism and psychologism or, on the other, a crude Platonism which makes a mystery of our epistemic access to truths about numbers (Dummett 1995, p. 19). Dummetts disagreement with Wright shows that when the sufficiency reading of the context principle is taken to justify the introduction of numbers by the method of contextual definition, the resultant impredicativity constitutes a prima facie objection to the strong construal of the principle. This discussion opens a space for considering a much simpler objection to the context principle. We will deal with this in 55 below. First, it will be instructive to look at the history of the context principle to see why Dummett initially fastened on a strong formulation that takes it to be a sufficient condition for reference, rather than merely accepting the principle
For a discussion of Dummett as a linguistic Kantian see Matar, A. (1997) pp.9-I0 and 4&3. If the argument of my paper is correct, Dummett has progressively moved away from an endorsement of anything like the linguistic idealism there attributed to him. The debate between Dummett and Wright continued in Dummett, M. (1995), pp. 17-1 8, and (1998) and in Wright, C. (1998a) and (1998b).

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as a constraint on asking after reference. Since some readers may feel that Freges texts provide a stronger case for the sufficiency reading than I have allowed, I should note that we shall return to this question in 97. Frege himself moves from the observation that numerals play the role of singular terms to the conclusion that numbers are objects, and this is evidence that he did not consider the context principle to be a mere constraint (Frege 188411950, 957).

3. The context principle in Wittgenstein and Quine I surmise that the transformation of the context principle from an apparent constraint on asking questions about reference into a sufficient condition for determining reference went by way of Wittgenstein. At Tractatus 3.3 Wittgenstein echoes Freges formulation, with a subtle difference. Wittgenstein says that only a sentence has a sense, and it is only in the context of a sentence that a name has Bedeutung (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 24). Thus he forged an implicit connection between the context principle and Russells theory of descriptions. It is often claimed that Russells theory shows that in the context of a sentence a definite description contributes to the meaning of the sentence, although it does not mean something, an object, when taken in isolation (Quine 1963, p, 6). In the paragraphs 3.263.263, which immediately precede his echo of Freges context principle, Wittgenstein had introduced names as primitive signs which are incapable of being defined, and whose use can only be illuminated through elucidations. A defined sign signifies by way of the signs used in the definition, and a primitive and defined sign can never signify in the same way. This is highly reminiscent of Russells distinction between logically proper names and definite descriptions. Apage later, at 3.3 18, an explicit connection between Frege and Russell is made when Wittgenstein says that like Frege and Russell he takes a sentence to be a function of the expressions that it contains (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 26). The connection that is suggested in the Tractatus, between the idea that it is only in the context of a sentence that a name has meaning and Russells theory of descriptions is taken up in various writings by Quine. Quine, following the general direction of other followers of the Vienna Circle, such as Ayer, sees Russells theory as providing a paradigm of a method for analysing away unwanted ontological commitments and mak-

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ing sense of negative existential statements (Ayer 1946, pp. 59-62). Early on, the method of descriptions provided some hope for the empiricist program of translating theoretical sentences into sense datum language, for it showed that it was only necessary that, our statements as wholes be translatable into sense-datum language, but not that they be translatable term by term (Quine 1963, p. 39). Quine goes on; the reorientation whereby the primary vehicle of meaning came to be seen no longer in the term but in the statement . .. seen in Bentham and Frege, underlies Russells concept of incomplete symbols defined in use; it is also implicit in the verification theory of meaning, since the objects of verification are statements. This connection between Frege and Russell is reiterated in Epistemology Naturalised (Quine 1969, p. 72). One needs, however, to add one more element, also to be found in Quine, and this time with antecedents in the work of the later Wittgenstein, to get the strong sufficiency interpretation of the context principle. In the Philosophical Investigations the context principle is referred to explicitly only once, at 549, but Wittgensteins discussion of ostensive definition operates on the assumption that some form of context principle is true (Wittgenstein 1967, $92840). We cannot tell from a simple act of ostension what a word refers to. It is only after we have learned what role it plays in a number of sentences that we can distinguish the name of a particular object from a common noun or a predicate. Strictly speaking, we have here also only a necessary condition for determining reference. But the insistence on use, and the way in which Wittgenstein claims that the sentence is the smallest unit that makes a move in the language game, suggest the sufficiency view. Once we have laid down the uses of the sentences of the language, and given that some expressions are being used as singular terms, that is as terms which function to pick out objects, there appears to be nothing more required in order for those words to pick out objects. Wittgensteins critique of ostension suggests that confrontation with reality, which might have been thought to underpin a difference between singular terms which genuinely refer, and others which only apparently do so, is in fact irrelevant, since it is from the logical structure of sentences that the ontological category of being an object derives. Wright makes this connection explicit in his discussion of the context principle and his strong defence of the sufficiency reading (Wright, 1983, pp.41-7). This thought is also explicit in Quine, who depicts the stimulations that

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impinge on our nerve endings as underpinning stimulus meanings that can be interpreted ontologically in various ways, relative to a language. It is only with the introduction of a language that has quantifiers and identity that reference to objects is introduced. Nothing but language determines the range of the quantifiers, for languages can differ with regard to the ontological structure they impose on reality (Quine 1969, pp. 1-1 6; Quine 1995). Thus for Quine, ontology is relative to theory. It was, I surmise, because of these intervening developments that Dummett initially accepted the sufficiency reading of the context principle. Yet from the beginning he was aware of a tension between the reading of Frege which makes reference internal to a theory, implied by the context principle, and the realism implicit in Freges use of the namehearer relation as the prototype of reference (Dummett 1973, pp. 498-9). By the time the second edition of Frege: Philosophy of Language appeared, he admitted that he had perhaps gone too far in attributing to Frege the view that our grasp of ontological distinctions depends entirely on language (Dummett 1981, p. 235). This background elucidates Dummetts former reasons for thinking that shallow arguments for giving up bivalence are realist in character. They are realist because they implicitly accept the namehearer relation as the prototype of reference. Strawsons arguments are a paradigm of such arguments. When Dummett extended the application of the term anti-realist and assimilated these arguments with the arguments that he initially deemed deep, he severed any necessary link between refusing to endorse bivalence and the linguistic idealism that resulted from an internalist perspective. One moral that one could take from this is that Dummett had more cogent grounds than he himself now recognises for maintaining the distinction between deep and shallow reasons for being suspicious of bivalence. A different moral, and the one which interests me, is that in a large class of cases the failure to endorse bivalence has little to do with idealism, but rather issues from an anti-realism that has an error-theoretic motivation.

4. Deep versus shallow arguments for failing to accept bivalence

The argument against bivalence that Dummett initially deemed to be shallow is that found in Strawsons treatment of sentences containing proper

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names that fail of reference (Strawson 1950). Like Frege, Strawson was inclined to say that sentences that contain non-denoting terms are neither true nor false. Duminett pointed out that this leads to the denial of bivalence, and the introduction of a third truth value, a position quite different to that of the intuitionists, who rejkain,from asserting bivalence, and for whom the law of excluded middle is not a theorem, but who accept that the negation of the law of excluded middle implies a contradiction. When one asserts that some sentences are neither true nor false, the introduction of a third truth value becomes necessary in order to side-step this contradiction, and in order to make negation behave in a regular fashion. Dummett argued that the introduction of a new truth value disassociates truth and falsity from the basic notions of correctness and incorrectness of an assertion, and so from the uses that we make of sentences. Dummett attempted to demonstrate the shallowness of this argument by asking what the point is of categorizing certain sentences as neither true nor false, and how our categorizing them thus would show up as requiring a different use from our simply categorizing them as false. A statement is either correct or incorrect. Here there is no place for a third option. In this regard, an assertion is different from a conditional bet. If two people make a conditional bet such as If France gets into the World Cup final it will lose there are three possible outcomes. Either one or the other wins the bet, or, in the case where France does not get into the final, the bet is off. Dummett uses examples of this kind as an illustration of what would be required in order for there to be a third option in the case of assertion (Dummett, 1978, pp. 8-10; Dummett, 1973, pp.341-2). But in the case of assertion, and in the case of conditional assertion, we need to introduce a third truth value, not because there is a definite third outcome to the assertion of a sentence, but in order to give an account of the way certain simple sentences behave in more complex sentences (Dummett 1978, pp. 12-14; Dummett 1973, p.347). To say The King of France is bald when there is no King of France is to mislead, and so is to say something incorrect. The pressure to say that it is neither true nor false, comes from the fact that The King of France is not bald is just as misleading. A third truth value needs to be introduced, but from the point of view of usage, uttering a sentence which has the third truth value is just a way of saying something incorrect. The reason why such objections to the principle of bivalence were deemed to be shallow was because the third truth value that is introduced

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is unrelated to the use that we make of sentences when they are asserted on their own. Dummett claimed, indeed, that every other feature of meaning must consist in its contribution to what is conveyed by the utterance of some complete sentence (Dummett 1973, ~ . 4 4 9 )We . ~ can see behind this an adherence to the context principle as discussed above. However, it is worth trying to say more clearly exactly why Dummett refused at this stage to take three-valued logic as being any less realist than two-valued classical logic. The thought appears to have been something like this: the strong construal of the context principle brings with it the view that reference is internal to a language. It is true that some philosophers would reject the principle thus construed, and see it as already an abandonment of realism, but Dummett did not see the issue in this light. Having accepted that the context principle implies that the sentence is the primary vehicle of meaning, the dispute between realists and idealists became a dispute over the notion of truth for sentences. Realists adopted classical logic. Dummett saw anti-realists as tying the notion of truth to the uses we make of sentences, and this led him to take the refusal to assert bivalence as the mark (from an internalist perspective) of anti-realism. Like the realists, advocates of many-valued logic severed the connection of truth with use, and thus brought in a conception of truth as unacceptable as the classical logicians. Dummetts deeper argument for the failure to assert bivalence had two distinct elements. The first, which Dummett continues to adhere to, was the claim that if we are going to give an account of meaning in terms of truth conditions we will need a notion of truth that is more substantive than that provided by the redundancy theory which says that the complete explanation of the meaning of is true is captured in the equivalence, p is true iff P . ~ The second element, which Dummett has modified, was that the substantive notion of truth that could turn the trick of providing an account of what it is to manifest a grasp of truth conditions would be one according to which the truth of a sentence was explained in terms of some kind of potential verifiability. Once we have tied substantive truth to potential verifiability there is an argument for refraining from asserting bivalence for undecidable statements. Since this account of truth makes
It is instructive to contrast this with Dummetts current view as expressed in his Dewey lectures referred to in note 3 . Dummett, M. (2003) pp. 5-25.

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truth epistemic, and so relative to our capacities to judge truth, there is every reason to think that something close to traditional idealism is implied. The objects and states of affairs that exist are just those that we can potentially recognize as existing. l o

5. A simple-minded objection to the sufficiency interpretation of the context principle

When Dummett was committed to the truth of the sufficiency reading of the context principle, he had a persuasive argument for distinguishing deep from shallow reasons for failing to endorse bivalence. But once one gives up the strong reading of the principle this argument founders. One reaction would be to conclude that Durnmett erred by his own lights when he allowed his belief in the strong construal of the context principle to waver. I will argue by contrast that there was never good reason for accepting the sufficiency reading of the context principle, which was deeply flawed from the outset, as Dummett has come to recognize. Without it we have lost Dummetts primary reason for thinking that the outright denial of bivalence and the adoption of a three valued logic is a shallow or flawed position relative to intuitionism. Of course, there may be other reasons for preferring intuitionist logic to the three valued kind, but these need not detain us here. If the denial of bivalence is nevertheless deemed to be a form of anti-realism, this should not make us conclude that it is automatically a form of idealism. Only the refusal to assert bivalence that could be justified from the deeper perspective deserved that name. Without this deeper perspective the natural way to interpret many cases where bivalence is questioned is to see them as expressions of an anti-realism of an error-theoretic kind. When Frege articulated the context principle he had not clearly distinguished sense and reference. But once that distinction is available, the principle appears to conflict with Freges later view that an expression may have a sense but no reference. We might well think, for instance,
. .~

In his Dewey lectures Dummett replaces the term verificationist with justificationist and argues, in particular, that a justificationist can adopt with regard to statements about the past a distinction between what they assert is the case (some past fact or event) and what verifies them (present evidence). As he says, this brings the justificationist position much closer to realism. Ibid. pp. 36-7.
lo

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that a sense has been fixed for all the possible sentences in which Santa Claus or Athena can occur, but that no reference is thereby fixed for these terms. Or at least, since it really isnt very clear what is meant by saying that a sense has been fixed for all (even the meaningless ones?) the possible sentences in which a term can occur, we might think that as good a sense has been fixed for the possible sentences in which these terms occur as has been fixed for the sentences in which referring terms such as Jesus Christ and Hypatia occur. Dummett when he discussed this difficulty said that here the question is no longer of a philosophical character (Dummett 1978, p. 40; Dummett 198 1, p. 383). But what did he mean? Early on Dummett expanded on what he meant, by saying that there is a difference between giving an account of the kind of reference that belongs to some class of expressions, and giving an account of the reference of one particular expression of that class. To say that singular terms refer to objects is to say that expressions that fulfill the syntactic role of singular terms are apt for referring to objects. ] I Similarly, to say that predicates refer to concepts (in Freges sense of functions from objects to truth values) is to say that predicates are apt for referring to concepts. It may nevertheless be that in natural language a term which plays one or other of these syntactic roles is not functioning normally, and hence fails of reference. Dummett suggests, therefore, that the context principle should be read as applying to classes of expressions. Once a sense is determined for all the sentences in which an expression of a class can meaningfully occur, there is no further question to be asked concerning the kind of reference which expressions of that class can have. In the case of number words, if number words behave syntactically like singular terms, and if singular terms are apt for referring to objects, then number words refer to objects, if they refer to anything. Yet this returns us to a context principle that provides only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for determining whether any particular expression has a reference. Although singular terms may be apt for referring to objects there will always be the possibility of mock singular terms. Such terms appear to refer to objects but do not do so. In at least

In order to be non-circular this formulation requires the formulation of a syntactic criterion for being a singular term. A considerable literature has developed following Dummetts initial attempts in Dummett, M. (1973) pp.54-80 to provide such a criterion. See, in particular, Wright, C. ( 1 983) #ix and Hale, B. (1 994).

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one place, this is the way in which Frege treats names such as Scylla or the name Odysseus as it occurs in the sentence, Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep (Frege 1979, p. 130). From a fairly natural point of view (though perhaps not Freges) this sentence is correct, and so on one interpretation true, but only given that one reads it as implicitly governed by a proviso such as, in the story of Odysseuss adventures. Although Odysseus is a name, it is usually assumed that it does not refer. It might be called a mock name. Once we recognize the possibility of mock names we will have to have some criterion for distinguishing such mock names (expressions which are syntactically names but fail of reference) from genuine names (expressions which in fact contribute to the truth values of the sentences in which they occur by introducing an object which is asserted to fall under some concept). Given the distinction between genuine and mock names, it is not enough to say that number words play the role of singular terms in order to conclude that they refer to objects. We need to be given a principled case for treating the whole class of numerals as genuine rather than mock names. The preceding claims may be somewhat controversial, but they provide prima facie support for thinking that, read in the strong way, the context principle is highly implausible, and that therefore Dummett is right to have expressed his doubts about it. Having undercut the distinction between the deeper and shallower arguments, in the next section I will argue that it is in fact the shallower style of argument that lies behind a wide variety of reasons for being suspicious of bivalence, and thus in many cases Dummettian anti-realism arises out of error-theoretic intuitions rather than being a form of idealism.

6. Further consequences of rejecting the deep/shallow distinction

We have seen that once Dummett gives up the distinction between deep and shallow reasons for being suspicious of bivalence he no longer has a case for finding a necessary connection between the refusal to assert bivalence and a commitment to idealism. The crux of the argument is as follows. Dummett himself recognised a tension between Freges tendency to treat the namehearer relation as the prototype of reference, and the tendency, apparently implied by the context principle, to treat reference

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as internal to a language. Once reference is made internal to language the dispute between realists and anti-realists comes to hinge on the notion of truth that is adopted for sentences. Yet, if we resolutely hold to the view that reference is internal, there is no simple route back from the notion of correctness for sentences to the idea that some singular terms fail of reference, and so are only mock singular terms. By attributing a form of anti-realism to those who take sentences containing non-referring singular terms to be neither true nor false, Dummett has reintroduced a notion of robust reference of which the namehearer relation may be taken to be a paradigm, and so has moved away from the perspective that makes reference internal to language. By his own earlier account, realism is closely associated with the view of reference that takes it to be a relation between words and independently existing things, and so there appears to be no principled reason to forge a necessary link between this kind of anti-realism, which derives from failure of reference, and idealism. What then i s the relationship between the failure to endorse bivalence, error theories and idealism? Mackie suggests a connection between the error-theoretic attitude and subjectivism. He says that a reason why one might become a subjectivist in ethics is because one assumes that there are no objective values and so will be led to look elsewhere for an account of the truth conditions of moral statements (Mackie 1977, p. 18). Similarly, in the mathematical realm, the psychologist mathematicians, against whom Frege railed, thinking that numbers could not be objectively existing objects, turned them into subjective ideas. But while the move to subjectivism or idealism is motivated by the same suspicion of the apparent semantic commitments of a discourse as is error theory, the positions should be distinguished. The subjectivist or idealist thinks that the surface syntax of some discourse is misleading. A reduction or reformulation of the subject matter is then offered in which new referents (subjective sensations or ideas) are supplied. The error theorist thinks that there is no reduction that shows that the sentences of the disputed class really concern some entities other than those misleadingly referred to. An intermediate position is possible which takes some sentences to be reducible, but in which others, for which no reformulation is forthcoming, are deemed neither true nor false. Berkeley, for instance, believes that expressions apparently referring to material substances should be understood as really referring to ideas. According to this kind of subjective idealism it is only when perceived

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that a thing exists, and hence only then that there are facts as to the way it is. On this view one would expect truths to come into existence as things come to be perceived. Berkeley only avoids this consequence of his phenomenalism by postulating that ideas are eternally perceived by God. On the unmodified phenomenalist view, the existence of an object with determinate properties, of a kind appropriate for making a sentence true, is as dependent on our perception as is the existence of a fictional fact on the invention of its author. Such subjective idealism naturally leads to the rejection of bivalence. For, just as fictional entities only have the qualities they are described as having, mental items will only have the qualities they are perceived as having. There is no fact of the matter as to whether Odysseus did or did not have a mole on his left shoulder. Nor, arguably, is it the case that either his nurse was a redhead or she was not. Equally Berkeley might accept that the unperceived tree, since it does not exist, is neither deciduous nor evergreen. When excluded middle is claimed to fail as a result of this form of argument, it is the lack of an independently given referent for the singular term which is to blame. Thus there is a strong parallel with Strawsons view that sentences containing non-denoting singular terms are neither true nor false. For, in each case it is the fact that an item does not exist which leads to the conclusion that sentences apparently referring to that item lack a truth value. In both these cases our intuitions are guided by a prior notion of existence for things of a mental or fictional kind, rather than falling out of a prior notion o f correctness for sentences. The situation with mental, fictional and mythical entities differs subtly. Mental entities exist only in minds, so an idea that is unperceived, since it exists in no mind, does not exist. This is similar to the case of non-referring singular terms. Relative to a notion of existence for material things we judge that some singular terms fail to pick out any existing thing. Fictional and mythological sentences are slightly different, for there is a notion of correctness for sentences of this kind, even though it is quite natural to say, as Frege was inclined to, that the singular terms that appear in them are only mock singular terms. The sentence Zeus was a god of the ancient Greeks is correct, whereas Zeus was a god of the pre-colonial Australians is incorrect. The sentence Odysseus tricked the Cyclops is correct, while Odysseus captured the Golden Fleece is incorrect. There are other cases in which sentences involving singular terms that fail of reference are intuitively correct. The novel I might have written would

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have been based on history is a modal example. Such sentences may only be true-in-the-fiction, true-in-mythology, or true in virtue of how things might have been (sometimes called true in virtue of the way things are in another possible world). But, if one retains the view that reference is internal to language, and maintains the sufficiency reading of the context principle, then it would seem to follow that Zeus, Hera, Odysseus and the novel I might have written exist (though perhaps we would have to say they have only fictional or possible existence). If the correctness of some of these sentences is analogous to truth, and so requires the existence (even if it is only in fictional or possible worlds) of the entities referred to in them, then why not allow that these entities exist in fictional, mythical or possible worlds? This profligate position is resisted by anti-realists who argue that we should not take the referring terms at face value, but should reformulate the sentences to reflect their real subject matter: texts, or the consistency of sentences, or whatever actually comes into play when we attempt to justify our assertion of these sentences. The profligate introduction of expanded domains of quantification in order to provide a semantics for sentences that contain singular terms that refer to no actual entities, and the introduction of quantifiers that range over non-actual existents is well known and surprisingly popular. The strategy is broadly Meinongian. Dummett now argues that when Strawson and Frege argued that sentences containing non-denoting singular terms are neither true nor false, their position involved a form of anti-realism with regard to such Meinongian non-existent objects. Meinongs realism; consists in his treating singular terms as always denoting objects even though some of these objects dont actually exist (Dummett 1991a, p. 324). But Meinongs realism appears to be very much in accord with the perspective that falls out of the context principle. If we start from a notion of truth for sentences, grounded in an intuitive conception of the correctness of an assertion, and we say that it is sufficient, in order for a term to have a reference that a sense has been laid down for the possible sentences in which it occurs, then the conclusion that some singular terms refer to fictional, mythical and merely possible entities appears unavoidable. If we refuse to accept that these terms refer to these entities because the entities are non-existent, we appear to be falling back on a prior notion of existence. This may be something like causal efficacy, or it may be something vaguer, such as being a potential object of public inter-subjective scrutiny with regard to any of its properties. The first notion is

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that which lies behind the intuitions of those who want to deny genuine existence to abstract objects. The second is more generous and might allow the attribution of existence to well defined abstract objects, without admitting the whole motley possible, fictional and even impossible crew. Falling back on a criterion of existence of this kind will involve giving up the centrality of the context principle. In his later writing Dummetts own reading of the source of the contradiction in Freges system puts pressure on the acceptability of the context principle. Dummett concludes that the context principle should not be read as justifying the assumption that objects automatically exist just in case we have laid down a sense for the sentences in which names for them occur, and it is possible to lay down a criterion of identity for them. Further, he has distinguished a thin notion of reference for number words from a robust notion according to which for numbers to exist is for them to be the objects which are semantically relevant to the determination of the truth or falsity of sentences in which their names occur (Dummett 1991b, pp. 189-99). We might think that, in the cases we have been discussing, the impetus towards denying bivalence comes from the prior thought that the non-actual objects that might be thought of as being referred to by names such as Zeus, Hera and Odysseus are irrelevant to the determination of the truth or falsity of the sentences in which these names occur. So, the syntactic role that words play in sentences is not sufficient for us to determine whether or not they are genuine referring expressions. It is only when that role can be backed up by an account of the way in which the objects the words refer to are relevant to determining the correctness or incorrectness of the sentences in which they occur that we have genuine referring. The context principle then places a constraint on questions of reference to objects, but does not provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a referent. A semantics will have to be enriched by an epistemological account of how the existence of the postulated objects is relevant to the determination of the correctness or incorrectness of sentences. This brings Dummett closer to those who have found it odd that questions of existence should be determined via questions of truth, for it allows that where causal interaction with a physical object is relevant to determining the truth or falsity of a sentence in which a name of that object occurs, we will have a paradigm for assuming the existence of that object. By contrast, when one makes an assertion about a fictional object, it is not the object, but a text or set of texts that is relevant for determining

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the correctness of ones assertion. If these arguments are persuasive one might conclude not just that Dummettian anti-realism encompasses anti-realism of both the error-theoretic and the idealist kinds, but that those features of Dummetts early thought which took him in an idealist direction were ungrounded, since they derived from a reading of Freges context principle neither justified by Freges texts nor intuitively plausible. However, before looking into the consequences of these arguments for the interpretation of Dummetts philosophy it is worth heading off the objection that the relatively simpleminded objections that have been raised againt the context principle gloss over a central caveat.

7. An objection and a reply

It might well be objected to this conclusion that the strongest evidence for attributing what I have called the sufficiency reading of the context principle to Frege, has been overlooked and that moreover when one reads Freges formulation of the context principle more carefully, it already allows a principled distinction between genuine referring expressions and mock singular terms to be drawn from within the perspective that takes reference to be internal to a language.I2 We have been following a formulation of the context principle that underplays the importance of statements of identity. But it will have been objected, by some, that the quote from Wright clearly specified that what was sufficient for reference to an object was for expressions to function as singular terms and that; descriptive and identity contexts containing them are true by ordinary criteria. Frege draws attention in 457 of the Grundlagen to the fact that we speak of the number one, where the definite article serves to class it as an object. This indicates that he does think that functioning as a singular term is sufficient for referring to an object. In $62, however, his comments suggest that this is not sufficient by itself, what must be added

~~~

Hartry Field objected to Wrights interpretation of Freges context principle, along lines similar to those developed here, in Field, H. (1984). Wright responded in Wright, C. (1990) placing constraints on the notion of ordinary criteria of truth which were intended to distinguish between truth and cases where there is a kind of correctness less than truth, pp. 79-80.
l2

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to the observation that a term takes the definite article is a demonstration that a sense has been laid down for statements of identity involving the term. He says;
We have already settled that number words are to be understood as standing for selfsubsistent objects. And that is enough to give us a class of sentences which must have a sense, namely those which express our recognition of a number as the same again. If we are to use the symbol a to signify an object we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion. (Frege 188411950,562)

This can be read as supplying a criterion for distinguishing mock from genuine proper names. A singular term will only count as a genuine singular term if we have provided truth conditions for identity statements containing it. That is to say, if we have provided a criterion of identity for the kind of object it refers to. It is just such a criterion that Quine has always insisted on if we are to admit some class of objects into our ontology. It is this which underpinned his reluctant acceptance of sets as ontologically respectable, while he continued to reject possible people, meanings, intensions and any other purported entity for which there is no clear criterion of identity. The debate over the adequacy of the neo-Fregean rehabilitation of Freges Platonism, engaged in by Dummett and Wright, hinges on whether the Fregean is in the end capable of satisfying this further constraint. Dummett argues that because Freges attempt at a solution to the Julius Ceasar problem - which amounts to the requirement that the definition of number makes it clear whether or not a particular number is identical with any object - leads to contradiction, the constraint has not been satisfied. Wright argues that the impredicativity of the Fregean method is harmless (Dummett 1998; Wright 1998a). But from the more naive perspective adopted in this paper, a rehabilitation of the sufficiency reading of the context principle, that falls back on the distinction between those entities for which we do, and those for which we do not, have a clear criterion of identity, lacks independent motivation. Superficially it appears too strong. We refer to material objects that persist through time, but it is not clear that we have provided clear truth conditions for identity statements that involve reference to persisting material objects. I can surely accept that two singular terms refer, even though there is no clear criterion for deciding whether they refer to one object that has persisted over time, or to two different objects. Secondly,

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it may be too weak. We may be able to provide a criterion of identity for non-existent kinds of object. Some of those who seriously quantify over possible objects think that they can provide criteria of identity for objects across possible worlds. And discussions of mythology often contain statements such as, The Roman Diana is the same Goddess as the Greek Artemis. There seems no reason why principles should not be laid down for determining the truth conditions of all such identity statements involving mythical entities. Even if this could be done, should it convince us that these names refer? Thirdly, one can lay down a criterion of identity for things o f a kind, without this guaranteeing that every term that purportedly refers to a thing of that kind in fact refers. So even if one can say what it is for something to be a material object, or a number, and then what counts as being the same material object, or number, doing this does not serve to distinguish those terms which actually refer from those that do not. King Arthur refers, if it does refer, to a man, and we have general, if vague, criteria of identity for men, but this does not help us with the question of whether King Arthur refers. Sentences containing this name have a sense, and there are lots of things that it is correct to say about the legendary King Arthur, but this does not secure a reference for the name. Those who think that the name does refer think that the legends have a source in real events, but that the account of those events became distorted in the retelling. For King Arthur to exist is for the origin of his legend to be able to be pinned to some historical figure who existed at a definite place and time. This brings us back to a notion of existence, at least for material objects, which does not fall out of the conditions for the correctness of the assertion of sentences. Rather, establishing that King Arthur did exist, and identifying him, will establish a new criterion for the correctness of assertions about him. It might be countered that it is just because numbers are abstract objects, rather than concrete objects, that in their case it is sufficient to have provided truth conditions for identity statements containing them in order to have shown that expressions apparently referring to them do in fact refer. Yet, in the light of the simple minded objections raised here, it seems that the profligate Platonist needs to say more to motivate the disanalogy between concrete and abstract objects. One could, for instance, introduce a new class of abstract objects called liairinesses along the following lines. First we define equihairiness:

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F is equihairy with G = there is a one:one map from the hairs on Fs head to the hairs on Gs head. We can use this to introduce reference to hairinesses: The hairiness of F = the hairiness of G = F is equihairy with G Last, H= will provide us with the identity conditions for hairinesses. H= The hairiness of F = The hairiness of G = there is a one:one map from the hairs of Fs head to the hairs on Gs head. But does this method really serve to introduce a well defined range of abstract objects? Is the hairiness of the totally bald man identical with the number zero? Or is it another kind of object altogether? Here we have another formulation of the Julius Caesar problem, and a different way of getting to the conclusion that Dummett now endorses, according to which the Platonist needs to do more than give a contextual definition of identity along these lines in order to secure the existence of abstract objects. As a result of recognising the need for a more robust conception of reference than that supplied by such contextual definitions, Dummett has come to the conclusion that failures of bivalence which result from non-denoting singular terms also involve a form of anti-realism. His conception of robust reference is more generous than the realist conception grounded in the namehearer relation, but includes it. He suggests that we have a notion of reference for singular terms that is robust enough to support a realistic interpretation of them when the reference of the term is semantically operative (Dummett 1998, p. 385). However, accepting failures of bivalence that result from singular terms which are semantically idle results from a conception of reference as a relation between our words and some objects which exist, if they do exist, independently of our words. Accepting failures of reference of this kind does not by itself commit us to any form of idealism, and so the link between Dumrnettian anti-realism and idealism is broken. Instead, in many cases we will be led to deny bivalence because expressions which are apt for referring do not stand in the reference relation to any existing object, relative to some realist or idealist criterion of existence. This is the sort of thing an error theorist will say. Thus once the strong construal of the context principle is abandoned, Dummettian anti-realism appears to be motivated by the same set of intuitions as error theory. In so far as an idealist element remains in Dummetts thinking it is now revealed to be one that emerges out of error-theoretic considerations. In the case of mathematics Dummett does not endorse total scepticism as to the truth of mathematics as

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does Field, but believes that we should follow the constructivists and save just that indefinite portion of it that is constructible (Dummett 1991b, pp. 3 12-2 1). Nevertheless, his change of heart in relation to the distinction between deep and shallow reasons for being suspicious of bivalence signals a realignment that makes his current position closer to Fields than to the linguistic idealism of Wright.

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