Chapter 2

Dialectic as the "Self-Fulfillment" of Logic

Dieter Wandschneider Translated by Anthony Jensen
bibliographische angaben auf den letzten beiden seiten

I. Introduction
Without a doubt, the term "dialectic" refers to one of the most controversial themes of philosophy. Whereas Plato saw in it the possibility of ultimate grounding, the very highest goal of philosophy, for Aristotle it held the rank of a mere method of dialogical investigation. And in the two thousand years of Western philosophy since then, divergences in the concept and meaning of dialectic cannot easily be disentangled. Even today not only is the relevance of dialectic debated, but also what the dialectic even is. What this ongoing controversy shows after all is that dialectic does not deal with any secondary questions. In the modern period, Kant had assigned dialectic a prominent place in the Critique o f Pure Reason; with Hegel the theme returned to the very center of philosophy. And after the rise of positivist-analytic philosophy, dialectic remains-even today-a philosophical stumbling block.' In particular, the rediscovery of Hegel at the start of the twentieth century has led to intensified occupation with the problem of dialectic. Hegel's objective-idealistic program is so closely tied to the possibility of a dialectical logic that the program itself stands or falls thereon. In this sense it is important to gain clarity about the exactitude of the dialectical form of argumentation. This, however, is possible only upon the foundation of a thmy of dialectic. Here lies one of the main concerns of the present investigation. At the same time, a question arises about the basic value of the logic employed for such an enterprise. For this must have already been demonstrated in advance; that is, the logical conditions of argumentation for a theory of dialectic are already presupposed and drawn upon. Of course, this counts for every form of argumentation and denotes no problem in "normal cases" since the logic itself is not in question. But when it comes to the question of dialectical logzc-since a theory of dialectic aims at it-logic

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The D i m i o n s o f Hegel's Dialectic

itself becomes the topic, and this requires a fundamental reflection on the logical means utilized-naturally, once again, with logical means. But can logic at the same time fulfill and ground itself? W e now see another fundamental problem of a theory of dialectic. M y own thesis is that a "SelfFulfillment" [Selbst-Einholung] of logic is in fact possible, and is indeed just the form of a dialectical logic. On the question of dialectic there have appeared a series of interesting analyses of parts of the Hegelian Logic, beyond these, some approaches to a theory of dialectic itself have been formulated. Besides older works, for example, by Jonas Cohn, Robert Heiss, Gotthart Giinther, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and others, some important contributions have appeared more recently by Klaus Hartmann, Wolfgang Wieland, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Dieter Henrich, Michael Rosen, Thomas Kesselring, and Vittorio HGsle, among othem2To their efforts we owe new insights into the structure of dialectical argumentation. On their attempts to find a convincing theory of dialectic we can rely for certain already-clarified determination^.^ Some further investigations on the fmalisability of dialectic or else on a f m a l dialectic also deserve mention, for example those of Mike Kosok, Newton C. A. da Costa, Thomas M. Seebohm, and Rainer Hegselmann. In connection with these investigations, I have also presented a sketch of a dialectical t h e ~ r ywhich ,~ aimed primarily at a reconstruction of the logic of quality at the opening of Hegel's Logic. I will revisit these considerations here, but will restrict myself as much as possible to the beginning of the dialectic of being and nothingness as a paradigm. To avoid misunderstanding, I should mention that this is not presented as a faithful interpretation of the Hegelian text, but as an attempt to develop a strict and defensible line of argumentation that would not fear departing from Hegel's own line-should it prove necessary. M y proposed reconstruction can thus be characterized as a revision of Hegelian arguments. The scope of my considerations here is defined along two lines, which seem to me of essential relevance for a theory of dialectic. On the one hand, the form of negation that-as self-refemng negation-gains a quasi-semantic expulsory force [Sprengkraft] and therewith a forwarding [weiterverweisende] character; on the other, the notion that every logical category is defective insofar as it does not encapsulate the entirety of possible meanings. The first line concerns the special role of negation. As seqreferentidnegation,5 it has, as can be shown, an antinumical characta Thomas Kesselring has tried to interpret the dialectic from this perspective, though admittedly without being able to work this out any further in a systematic sense. These approaches

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The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

nothingness are not the same. The account thus presents the form of an antimony [Antinomie],12 an insoluble contradiction: a logically most problematic structure. So goes Hegel's line of argument.13It certainly suggests that the initial category of logic, pure being, should be identical with the absolutely negative, nothingness, because of its complete indeterminacy. But the first category would thus be identified as a negative and thus-in so far as the negative is meaningful only as the negation of a given positive-it would manifestly be a mediation [ein Vmitteltes]. This is why a primarily positive sense of being is to be kept up. Yet Hegel's argument for the identification of being and nothingness is not to be dismissed so easily. Paradoxically, both seem to be accepted necessarily-i.e., the identity and difference of being and nothingness-something that would in fact amount to an antinomical structure. What has arisen meanwhile is nothing other than the "inseperatenessand inseparability" of the opposing determinations of pure being and nothingness.14 Neither has its subsistence for itself; each emerges only with the other. In this sense, according to Hegel, they require the introduction of a neu categmy which contains in itself both determinations, both as identical and as opposed. But how is this inseparability of these determinations to be understood in connection with the apparent antinomical structure? Let us make this justzjication explicit. As a start: the fact that the negative always presumes the positive means that we cannot begin with the category of nothingness, since it already assumes the category of being. "Non-being" [Nichtsein] seems to me a better designation for this case. In the following reconstruction of the dialectic of being and nothingness, I will prefer this term-non-being-since Hegel himself had no objection to it.I5 In following Hegel, we begin with pure being, without any further determination about what can be grasped in the proposition that something is the case. Here nothing determinate is stated. Instead, what is expressed is, first, only the condition of a possible determining.16Furthermore, that somethingis the case is stated alreadywith respect to the possibility of the opposite-that something is not the case. The negation, then, belongs essentially to the conditions of the possible determining. Being and non-being are understood here primarily in a predicative sense, i.e., in the sense of the copula "is" or "is-not"respectively. But naturally "to be the case" and "to not be the case" always refers to an existential sense tool7-where being admittedly may not be restricted, as it was by Kant, to physicalempirical being in a decisionistic manner.

Diakctic as the "Self-Fu~llment" o f Logic

35

I have designated the principle of the cohesion of the positive and negative Is: comphnentarythe "complementaritypznciple" [Komplementaritats~nzip] opposing concepts are not simply contradictmy, wherein the negation is completely undetermined (e.g., not-red). Moreover, "complementary"does not mean "contrary" [kontrarl in the sense of remote extremes, such as "black" and "white" which admit inter-possibilities ("gray")."Comphmntary" opposites are rather those that, as it were, "hinge on each other" without inter-possibilities, yet still-in distinction to a contradictory oppositionfulfill a delimited and well-determined "semantic-space", such as "furnished" and "unfurnished", which corresponds to what Hegel labels a "determinate negation." It lies only in the full indeterminacy of the initial determinations being and non-being that the complementary opposites here coincide with the contradictory, something no longer given in the further progress of the dialectical development of the Concept.lg In what follows, the conceptual content of a category, its meaningor intension, should be designated distinctively with angled brackets, such as <Being, and <Nan-Being. The properties [Eigenschaften] of a category are to be distinguished from the meaning. For example, the concept "red" has the meaning <red,;however, at the same time it has properties, some conceptual character perhaps, which is thus an immaterial being, etc. But as a concept it certainly does not have the p o p @ of being red. Conversely, the property of a rose's being red is not the meaningcred,. Rather, it is correspondingto wed,, or, as I wish to say briefly in the following, it is <red,corresponding. One might say in a Platonic fashion that it participates in the Idea of Redness, or in a more familiar expression, it corresponds to the concept or to the definition of <red,. With this, we return to the categories of <being,and mon-being,. As we argued, if this is to be understood as the first and most elementary condition of a possible determining, then what comes next is the question about the relationship between the two. The answer itself is obvious: <being,and mon-being, (with the abbreviations <B> and cN>respectively and "=" for an equivalency of meaning) are complementary determinations which can be represented as:

which in any case implies:

(2) cB, is not equivalent to <N,.

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The D i m i o n s o f Hegel's Dialectic

With this "is not," aproperq is now asserted of the category <being,, namely that it is not its opposing category of son-being,. Thus, <being> of itself has something of non-being in it, or in the above-introduced terminology, <being,is correspondent to mon-being, with respect to its own properties,

However, the incidental "is" now indicates that, with respect to the category <B,, something is the case (namely that <B,inheres the quality '<N,corresponding'), that <B, thus possesses a property of being [Seinseigenschaft] and therewith the very same property through which <B> itself is defined.

Because of the complementarity of <B,and <N,in the sense of (I), the following also holds: implies "is not <N>-corresponding", ( 5 ) "is <B,-corresponding" therefore also from (4)

(6) <B,is not <N>-corresponding

and therefore an opposingproposition to (3).As before with the move from (2) to (3), what results on the grounds of the again-recurring'is not' is the proposition

and so forth. The predication continuously overturns into its opposite: that, however, is the mark of an antznomical structure.20 As can be shown,2l an antinomical concept lies at the base of the antinomical structure, which in the present case possesses the form

Such a concept exactly reproduces the aboveexplicated antinomical overturning of one predicate into its opposite: the property "not <N,corresponding" for instance is correspondent to the conceptual content

Dialectic as the "Se~Fuljillment *o f Logzc

37

of the antinomical concept in (8) (shown on the right side), wherewith we have "<N>-correspondingn (shown on the left side of (8) with the expression <N,). This quality is in turn not correspondent to the antinomical concept <N> in (8), thus "not <N>-corresponding." This again is in regard to (8) "<N>-corresponding," and so forth. The substantially antinomical character of the concept in (8) emerges immediately if the opposing relationship (1) is kept in mind. Thus with (8) results
= mot-N, = mot-not- <N>corresponding> = < <N>-corresponding ,. (9) <B>

Therefore (according to ( I ) ) ,<B,is not only opposingto <N>, but has at the same time the meaning of "<N>-corresponding"-a strange, contradictory ambiguity that reflects the antinomical character of the concept (8).

111. The dialectical contradiction

The emergence of an antinomical structure in the relation of <being> and son-being> must seem quite alarming. Would an argument that contains such a contradiction be remotely convincing? For if the contradiction is permitted, then, as is well-known, any proposition can be "proven."22 But then argumentation itself would become a pointless undertaking. Fortunately, this is not the case here. Upon closer examination it will be clear that, because of its antinomical character the dialectical contradictionZ3is not a "normal" contradiction, but one that is actually only an apparent contradiction. While the reciprocally overturning predications appear to contradict each other, they actually relate to dqferent aspects of the argument: In (2) the emerging "is not" leads to the categorization through <N> and with it to the predication "is <N>-correspondingn in (3). This predication thereupon gives rise to a new predication: the now-resulting "is" and so results in the opposing predicaleads to a categorization through <B> tion "is <B>-correspondingn in (4) or else, because of the oppositional Here relationships of (1) and ( 5 ) respectively, "is not <N>corresponding." the resulting "is not7'o f itselfleads to categorization through <N> and with it again to the opposing predication "is <N>-corresponding," and so forth. Each predication leads through categorization of its inherent "is" or "is not" to a new predication, this predication to another in turn, and so on. Each predication presumes the preceding one and forms out of itself the basis of a new induced predication, etc. It arises, in other words, from a reflection

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The Dimensions o f Hegel's Dialectic

upon the respectively realized form of predication and its own subsequent categorization and is in such a way the result of a repexive transition to a new level of predication. The antinomically overturning predications are thus located on dfferentpredication hels and therefore, when rightly understood, do not contradict each other. What first appeared as a contradiction in fact turns out to be merely an apparent contradiction and thus does not affect the argument. Now it should be noted that the antinomical character of the continually reciprocal-overturning [Ineinanderumschlagens] of the predication is based substantially on implication (5), according to which "is <B>correspondingn can be converted to "is not <N>-correspondingn (naturally the justification for this rests in the opposing relationship (1); in fact, this is only clear because "is <N>-corresponding" and "is <B~corresponding" are not only distinct, but also complementary predications.). Without this possibility, the "is" in the predication "is <B>-corresponding" would only lead to a categorization through <B> and thereupon to "is <B>corresponding," and so on with this new predication, etc. This means that the argument would provide nothing new at all. Yet, this is not the last word. Because the predication "is <Bxorresponding" (which is not perpetuating per se) can be converted to "is not .N>-corresponding,"the argument can almost begin afresh with an "is not"-predication (cf. the move from (2) to (3)). The recourse to implication (5),which for its part is based on the opposing relationship ( I ) , turns the argument back to its beginning and thereby provides the circular structure of the continually reciprocal-overturning [Ineinanderumschlagens] that is characteristic of antinomical predications. To summarize: The move from "is <B>-corresponding" to "is not <N>corresponding," as was formulated in ( 5 ) ,is decisive for the essentially antinomical character of dialectical argumentation. Or, in different terms: implies "non-being"with respect to <N>. (10) "Being" with respect to <B> Hence, there is a link between "being" and "non-being," but in dqferent respects-naturally, because the two categories are complementary to each other: what the one signifies, the other does not signify, and vice versa. So it is precisely the opposition between the two that at the same time grounds their conjunction [Verbindung] (albeit in different relationships). The pair can be unified without contradiction. What was thought an ambiguity of meaning actually concerns different aspects. Rightly understood, there can be no talk of contradiction.

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Moreover, it is clear that being in the one respect and non-being in the opposite respect are inextricably l i n h d i t h e being of the key is at the same time the non-being of the keyhole, so to speak. This refers to a new sense of "being" that is "respect-dependent" [hinsichtsabhiingig]-a sense that permits differing respects and is thereby an in-itself dqferentiated being. For this new kind of being Hegel uses the category <Daseir~'~ (determinate being) which I take over here. ~Dasein,,in the sense of the argument we have so far developed, designates a being that is differentiated in itself. It is on the one hand being e o s i t e to non-being and yet on the other hand is also non-being at the same time, the latter, however, in another respect. cDasein> thus represents the synthetic unity of opposition and association of <being, and mon-being,. The antinornicaldialectical overturning is rightly understood as the expression of the inextricable connectedness between the opposition and conjunction of the two categories f a synthesis (in different respects), and in this way requires the fmation o [Synthesebildung]. According to Hegel's argument in the Science o f Logic, the synthetic unity of is initially the category <being,and man-being, (what Hegel calls <Nichts>) of <becoming,, while in the present context is immediately passed over into cDasein,. Elsewhere I have discussed this position exten~ively.'~ The main poinp of my argument concern the temporality that is bound to <becoming,. But, as a characteristic of natural reality, it still has no place here. Were <becoming,understood non-temporally, however, perhaps as a "conceptual transition," it still would not pertain to the inception of the Logc, but to the methodological reflection of the dialectic. Ultimately, it is a being that at the same time is a non-being, hence a kind of being which is more accurately categorized as ~Dasein,(while according to Hegel's definition, Dasein is a "quiet result" of the "ceaselessdisquietude" of which appeals to the concrete intuition and which thus cannot actually be called an argument). For there to be such an in-itself differentiated being that binds together being and non-being, it would have to be determinate. Indeed a thuslydetermined being [sebestimmtes Sein] is already at the same time the non-being of an otherwise-determined being [anders-bestimmten Sein]. Determinateness is here the condition of the formation of a synthesis and thus requires the introduction of a further category <determinateness, [Bestimmtsein]. This explicates the condition under which <Dasein,is the synthesis of opposition and conjunction of the conceptual pairing of <being,/<non-being,and can for that reason be designated an explicative

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

categmy [explicative Bestimmung]. I f the synthetic category <Dasein,is the fu@llment of the demand of a synthesis that emerges out of the dialectical argument, then the relevant conditions of fu@llment will be explicated through the explicative category <determinateness,.Indeed, both belong together. Along with the explicative category there appears at the same time a new dimension of meaning. Indeed, the synthetic category <Dasein,already contains something new, namely, a "new form of being [neue Seinsart]", which is still comprehensible in terms of the earlier categories <being,and mon-being,: as a being that is equally non-being in a different respect. With the explicative determination <determinateness, being-precisely as a determinate thing-will be bound expressly as a being different from other kinds of being. With it is now posited a new opposition: A "thuslydetermined being is everything that an "otherwisedetermined being is not. The explicative category <determinateness,thus immediately "dissociates" [disand <beingather> soziiert] into two new opposing categories: <being-thu~,~~ [<Sosein, und <Anderssein,]. To summarize: the synthetic category brings together the previously opposing determinations. The explicative category brings new opposing categories into play-and indeed in service of the antecedent formation of a synthesis, which requires, as seen, dqferent respects for the synthetic, contradiction-free reconcilability of the opposition and equivalence of the previously opposed categories. The dialectical argument thus moves outward from the oppositional pair .being, and mon-being,, through the and the explicative category <determinateness,, synthetic category <Dasein, to a new oppositional pair, <beingthusand <beingother,. It is important to see that in this way only the premises of the argument have "fulfilled" themselves by their explication. Since, as we have seen, the argument depends rather decisively on the fact that the category <being,is not the category man-being,, and is not so because both categories are actually determined differently and are therefore themselves already case examples of <determinateness,,<being-thus,,and <beingather,. Thus the dialectical development of categories-this must be stressed-does not depend on arbitrary incidences and contrivances, but is only the explication of what is already presupposed for the argument. The fact that new opposing categories emerge here-<beingthus, and <beingather,-renders structural correspondences visible. As can be shown,28 the relationship between these two opposing categories leads to a further antinomical structure. Out of this comes the resulting demand to form a synthesis and to introduce an explicative category as the condition

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of its fulfillment. This now leads to a new differentiation into opposing categories, and so forth. As the argument rqbeats itself in this way, it effectively runs through a dialectical cycle,which is characterized through four categories: the two opposing categories, the synthetic, and the explicative category. In place of the classical three-part schema-thesis, antithesis, synthesiswe have a four-part one.29I have more thoroughly detailed this schema elsewhere,30 so would here only mention it in passing. It is be important to note here that the argument cannot be carried out schematically in essential parts. That especially affects the retrieval of the explicative category. But it also affects what perhaps seemed to be the genuinely schematic part of the dialectical argument. In the work mentioned above,31the reconstruction of the four-cycle dialectical categorydevelopment has shown that the dialectic of the opposing categories is developed differently in every cycle. This means that, for a start, an intuitive understanding of contextual content must be reached before it can be converted into a demonstrable argument. The argument developed here may have suggested the semblance of a formalization of dialectic. But the appearance is deceiving. Of course, practically everything can be formalized after it has been understood. But to give rise to such an understanding in the first place-that is just the point in performing the dialectical conceptde~elopment.~~

W. Implicit utilization [Implizite Inanspruchnahme] of the fundamental logc

W e must now return to the logical means introduced in our argument B y that we mean the fundamental conditions for the possibility of argumentation generally, which as such have a transcendental character. In what follows, I term this complete fundamentally-transcendental logical structure as fundamental logc (as I had in earlier works33).I turn now to the second of the two main objectives of this study mentioned in the introduction. First, however, some general considerations. So that I am not misunderstood: What is characterized as "fundamental" logic is not one of many "logics" by which one understands the various systems of formal logic. These in fact concern constructs, which as such always contain conventional elements. Fundamental logic, on the other hand, inheres a transcendental character; that is, it is to be understood as a condition of the possibility of argumentation in general, and thus in the end as always forming the basis of those various "logics."

The D i m i o n s of Hegel5 Dialectic

There arises thus a basic problem with the fundamental logic: For its investigation it must be argued in advance. But the "means for argumentation" are themselves elements of this fundamental logic, which ought to have been cognized first. The very first thing to be cognized must evidently already be assumed for its own cognition-a typically recurring problem, as soon as cognition sets out to cognize the transcendental conditions of cognition itself.34 In the introduction to the Phenomenology, Hegel argued that cognition could not step out of itself in order to ground itself from the outside at the same time; this is something it does not need to do anyway, since it has, "its own criterion in itself."35 Such explanations are formulated very generally. So let us examine a concrete example. the verdict postulated by skepticism that "truth is impossible." This position is well-known as demonstrably selfcontradictory in the sense that it requires precisely what it denies-truthfor that denial itself; a contradiction that proves such position itself untenable3'j-according to the principle of noncontradiction. Now, the pfznc$le o f noncontradiction [Widmspruchs$n-znzip] itself is not explicitly grounded here as a principle of argumentation and, insofar, is not explicitly available for the argument here. Hence, it has not been explicitly taken up in the explanation either. Nevertheless, the significance of the violation of the principle of noncontradiction [Widerspruchsausschluss] is evident. Why? The contradiction cannot be permitted since it would level the difference between assertion and negation, and remove with it the possibility of demarIf both assertions-%ruth is possible" and cation and determinati~n.~~ "truth is impossiblen-are permitted in the same way, then the predicates "possible"and "impossible"would no longer be differentiated; and so on in all other cases ("red/"not-red," "good"/"not-good," etc.). In short, there would be no negation at all. But without negation, there can be no determination since all determination, per Spinoza, is d e m a r c a t i ~ nAccordingly, .~~ there could not be concepts with determinate content; that is, the possibility of meaning would be negated overall. Determination and meaning can only exist if negation exists, and this can only exist if contradiction itself remains prohibited. In other words, whoever uses sensible, meaningful concepts has always already prohibited contradiction implicitly, without having had to formulate this explicitly as a principle of argumentation. The principle of noncontradiction is exercked implicitly in all argumentation; it,is in a certain way "latently" ["untergriindig"] efficacious. With this, a question arises. If the conditions stated for the principle of noncontradiction can hold generally, is the fundamental logic efficacious

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in an entirely latent way? This question appears to be unanswerable insofar as it treats the fundamental logic in its entire, yet still unknown complexity. On the other hand, were the fundamental logic not always already efficacious as a whole in all argumentation, nothing could be argued for anyway, since that requires not only the principle of noncontradiction, butbasically-the entire fundamental logic. But can there be doubt about the possibility of argumentation, even in principle? This would admittedly concern even this doubt itself; that is, it too could not have been doubted even once - since whoever doubts must already argue, must already use sensible concepts, etc. Such a radical doubt is thus self-defeating. In the sense of this general transcendental argument, one can thoroughly see that argumentation is possible and-basically-that the entire fundamental logic is already involved and implicitly "efficacious" therein. The consequence is that it can be argued stringently without the entire logical instrumentation being explicitly available-how, for instance, it is also possible to prove through mere counting that one and one is two without having to explicitly resort to the PeaneAxioms (which are of course implicitly utilized in counting). This is a significant fact, since it means that cognition itself, although it does not explicitly dispose of the entire fundamental logic, can still draw on a latent potential that does lend soundness to its argumentation. The question we have formulated concerning the cognition of the fundamental logic itself can be answered thusly: What should only be cognized must and can already be implicitly operative for cognition. And at the same time it thereby becomes possible to extend our limited knowledge of the fundamental logic. After what has been said about limited explicit knowledge, it is to be understood that what is efficacious implicitly in such arguments becomes increasingly explicit. The cognition of the fundamental logical structures is to be understood as their explication by implicit fundamental logical means and as such is a sort of self-explication of the fundamental logic.39Just insofar, cognition has only a "discharging" [entbindende] , explicating function: to fulfill [einzuholen] and to explicate, that by which it is implicitly always already led and determined-a genuinely Hegelian perspective.

V. Dialectic as progressive self-explication of the logic

What in particular does this mean for our previous discussion of the dialectic of <being> and mon-being,? Concerning the explication of the fundamental logic, the question first arises how an entrance to it can

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T h Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

be found at all. Or, in Hegel's well-known formulation, 'With What Must the Science begin?"40 Now, a usual characteristic of the beginning is typically the lack of pesuppositions [Voraussetzungslosigkeit]. According to what has been said, however, that appears to be a misunderstanding. Since for all argumentation, the entire fundamental logic (as the transcendental condition of the possibility of argumentation) is always already pesupposed, All the more should the question of the beginning be understood as a question of a beginning relative to the explication of the fundamental logic: so, what would be supposed as the first step of explication? But first, what actually is "explication?"Apparently, it is the expression of what is implicitly the case-whereby a first thing that is already put out is explicated, namely: in the process of explication what receives expression is that something is the case, or, in short, that something is. Without the existential determination [Seinsbestimmung] "is" nothing can be explicated. This explication-that <being,(in the sense of <beingthe case,) is above all the condition of the possibility of explication-thus constitutes the beginning of the explicating. With the explication of <being> we now have a first explicit, and this means also that a determinate category is generated. <Being> indeed has the maning of indeterminate being, but is as such a perfectly determinate category. And as a determinak category, it is related to the category of its opposing determination: cnon-being,. In other words, the explicit introduction of the category <being,immediately requires the introduction of the opposing means something indeterminate, indeed; determination man-being,. <Being> but it is also, through this establishment of meaning, something determinate that is at the same time determined as opposite to its determinate opposite which it thus presupposes. With this duplicity of the explicated determinations <being,and monbeing,, a new constellation has developed, which implies the same question we saw before about the relationship between the two determinations. The emerging antinomical structure has already been worked out in detail in section 11; it would be useful to revisit its underlying argument afresh. First, it is important to note that each one is the negation of the other. This means that the category <being, t i not the category man-being. Immediately <being,itself turns out to be a case of son-being,. It still means <being> but is shot through with "non-beingnsince it is not the meaning of man-being,. <Being> has at the same time the property of non-being in itself and, insofar, is "in the mode of non-being"; I will call this "non-being-like" ["nichtseinartig"].Admittedly: to the extent that <being,is "non-being-like,"

Dialectic as the "Self-Fu$llment" of Logic

45

it again takes on the property of being and is thus "being-like" [seinsartig]. "Being-like" in turn is not "non-being-like," so that it again takes on the property of "non-being," and so forth. The category <being> alternately reflects the qualities of being and non-being. To the extent that it, as it were, oscillates simultaneously between "being-like" and "non-being-like", it actually possesses an antinomical character. As demonstrated (section 11), this oscillating in the category <being,at the p-op+-lmel has the consequence that even the categmy <being,itself has an antinomical character and that means that it is not only opposed to the is category man-being,, but is also affinitive to it. This proves that <being> inextricably bound with son-being, and vice versa. As demonstrated, too, this necessitates the introduction of a new synthetic category cDasein, and further to the explicative category <determinateness>: The Dasein of something that is determined is already at the same time a non-being, in the sense that it is-not an otherwise determined thing-a connection pointed out in Plato's Sophist.41 Parmenides' central thesis that being can never be non-being has become obsolete for Plato4?his-metaphorical-"patricide" upon P a r m e n i d e ~ . ~ ~ So while thusdeterminateness [So-Bestimmtsein] and not-thusdeterminateness [So-nicht-Bestimmtsein], i.e., otherwise-determinateness [Anders-Bestimmtsein], belongs to the sense of "determinateness", a new oppositional pair of categories is engendered therewith, one which can be termed <being-thusand <being-0th [~Sosein, und <Andersein>]. With the emergence of this new pair of opposites, the question concerning the relationship of these two categories to one another presents itself anew, with the consequence-something that cannot be more thoroughly detailed here4+-that an antinomical structure emerges anew and hence, as before, proves the necessity of a synthetic conjunction of opposing categories, and so forth. This process o f successive explication of the fundamental logical categories thus always leads to antinomically structured opposing categories, which demand a new synthetic and explicative category that for its part "dissociates" anew into antinomical opposing categories. At base, the process has-as per Hegel-the form of a dialectical conceptual development [Begriffsentwicklung]. However, an essential difference of the procedure sketched here in comparison to Hegel, is to be seen in the systematic revelation of antinomical structures. These provide, as I have detailed elsewhere,45 only a ground and justijication of the formation of a synthesis. It is significant that herewith is basically found a procedure of explication of the system of fundamental logic that at first was merely implicit. Let us consider

46

The Dimensions of Hegel S Dialectic

these developed considerations once again while keeping in mind this @ocedural-aspect. The act of explication can always explicitly fall back only on what is already quite explicitly available. As was detailed above, the argument also necessitates the usage of other, at first still implicit, elements of the fundamental logic. But in order to be provable, the procedure must abide by that what is explicitly available. Now the beginning is characterized precisely through the fact that it is not yet explicit. But then how can the procedure begin at all? The answer given here is based on the explication of the possibility of explication itself: what this explicates must in any case "be the case," or in short: it must "be," no matter how we describe it. The claimed here category <being,is thus to be understood as the first explicit category of the fundamental logic. With this first explicatory step, however, a second is already initiated: As the determined category which "being" categorizes, it is not its opposite man-being-whereby the category of non-being is also immediately engendered: the explication of "being" unavoidably entails that of "non-being." At the same time, there emerges a new constellation of explicit elements: after the two explicit categories are now at hand, the question about their relationshzp arises. As said, this leads to a complex structure that upon closer inspection bears an antinomical character. The next step is thereby indicated: The antinomical relationship between <beingand man-being, implies that both belong inseparably together and in such a way that requires the introduction of a synthetic relationship that binds the sense of <being,with that of man-being,--an effectively new sense of <being,, which is conceptualized as ~Dasein,and as its condition of fulfillment <Determinateness.That is, as a being that as the being of a thusdetennined thing is at the same time the non-being of an otherwisedetermined thing. <Being,in the sense of cDasein, and <Determinateness, therefore requires the introduction of a new oppositional pair, <beingthus,and <beingother>, that for their part make visible an antinomical structure which in turn necessitates a new synthesis and explication, and so on. In this way, the process of dialectical conceptual explication [Begriffsexplikation] provides a sequence of categories in the sense of a progressive explication of semantically fundamental ~ a t e g o r i e s . ~ ~ That this approach is not a r b i t r a y f o r otherwise it would lack explanatory value-arises from the fact that in its reflexive employment it takes up only what had become explicit in the preceding step of the procedure. Accordingly, it is essential that men through t h act of explication ibelfa new

Dialectic as the 'Self-Fu@llmentm of L o p

situation is created. A new explicit element, so to say, appears on the stage of explication and therewith a new constellation of explicit elements is realized: a new state of affairswhich for its part is notyet conceptuallygrasped and insofar still has an implicit character itself. So, every step of explication at the same time generates a new implicit case, which as such now posits the next task for explication and with it motivates a new step of explication. In other words, every step of explication itself always further induces a discrepancy between what has just become explicit and what-through the newly instantiated implicit aspect-now further demands a new step of explication. This incongruence-that directs the explication-procedure of each explicit object and of the newly produced implicit object, which is produced at the same time by the act of explication itself-is what I designate an "explication-discrepancy" [Explikations-Diskrepanz] . Under this aspect, let us observe once more the initial category <being,. First, it does have the meaning of indeterminate being. However, as the categmizatwn of this meaning it possesses the p-operty of determinacy, which brings the determinate category <being,onto the scene with its opposing determinate category mon-being,. With this opposition of <being, and mon-being,, however, a new implicit case is instantiated, namely, that the category of <being, is not mon-being,. Thus, irrespective of its meaning <being,, its emerging poperty is "non-being-like" ["nichtseinsartig"]: an explication-discrepancy that gives rise to a new step of explication and that, as was shown, leads to the synthesis of <being,and mon-being,.

VI. The perspective of finite knowing

Here it can be recognized that the diaelectical explication procedure is determined out of itself and thus-strictly speaking-all arbitrariness is erased. Every step of explication is determined by the preceding one. So, not just any implicit content becomes explicit, but precisely that implicit content which had become generated at each step of the procedure itself, through which it is concretely apprehensible and further directs the procedure through the thusly instantiated explication-~liscrepancy.~~ The dialectic therefore in no way stands under the unrealizable condition that it must have in mind already, as a guiding-principle, the jinal goal--the completed system of fundamental logic, which for Hegel is the Absolute. The self-referent reflexive employment of the procedure upon the previous step at each stage is in fact decisive, thereby capturing the specifically

48

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

emerging explicationdiscrepancyon every explication level, and sublating it by a new act of explication-which, admittedly, always induces a new explication-discrepancy. The cognitive act, therefore, constantly includes "along the way" an act of reflexive self-verification [Selbstvergewisserung] with respect to the completeness of cognition at each of its levels. But why should such a completeness be sought?Evidently, because the Absolute asserts itself underhandedly, as it were, forming the furtive motive of cognition. The logic-in the sense of Fundamental logic-is asserting itself implicitly by means of itself; in the very act of thinking we have already assumed its absolute power, willingly or unwillingly. All the cunning of cognition, in trying to seize hold of the Absolute, would be idle and in vain according to Hegel's famous formulation in the Phenomenology, "if it were not and wasn't necessarily in and for itself already with us."48 Essential for the dialectical procedure is thus the reflection upon the implicit state of agairs through which each previous step of explication had first been generated, that is, upon the logical specifications that have been carried out in the immediately previous step of explication through the procedure itself. These specifications are thus themselves to be understood as the transcendental condition of the next step of the procedure. A logical potential, so to speak, is induced with every step of the procedure that, while it is reflected thereon, provides the argument with new material content and drives the process along thereby: a methodologically regulated reJlection. It is reflected not in a private speech-act that as such could promise immediate certainty,4g but in the very logzc that is effectivelyimplicit within it. Out of this, however, no "immediate" knowledge can be had, no "immediate" evidence, so that the possibility of error cannot really be ruled out. From here some light falls on the question of the fallibility of knowledge: Not that the intentions accompanying my speech-acts, which are immediately accessible and evident to me, could count as a criterion of knowledge. Such a criterion can only be the universally accessible and objectively comprehensible logical confirmation [Ausweisung] of knowledge which as such, however, is admittedly also pone to e m . Hegel notes that Plato altered the Republic seven times; for the task of editing the Hegelian Logic, Hegel would have been happy to have had, "the free leisure to have been able to work through it seventy-seven times."50 Incidentally, the knowledge developed in the dialectical argument can be no "final" knowledge, since it is process-dependent knowledge that is in principle able to be overtah-able to be further developed, able to be made

Dialectic as the "Self-Fu~llmnt" of Logxc

more precise. But the possibility of the determinations being overtaken does not hinder the exactitude of its dialectical reconstruction. And that means also that categories that can be overtaken are not "false" categories. The "correct" meaning of a category is rather that which belongs to each respective state of the procedure. The determination belonging to a progressive state of the procedure is not the correct category, but only the more determinate one. And the argument that underlies it is in no way more exact than what we had in the case of an earlier category. It is essential that the clarification of the applied concepts must correspond to the stage of the procedure. So, for example, one can argue quite exactly with a still thoroughly indeterminate concept of truth (even with respect to the possibility of absolute truth), without needing to have dejinitiuely solved the problem of truth before handling those various theories of truth: for the disproof of the skeptical objection to know it appears sufficient that a proposition is always bound to a truth claim (section IV). Or: in the developed dialectical argument, it has been repeatedly asserted that something is correspondent to a concept. But what is a concept? There are some thoroughly different notions about that. "Concept" for Hegel has a completely different sense than it does for Wittgenstein. But that is besides the point for our purposes. In what concerns us here, where we have supposed that there is something like a "correspondence with a concept", it is implied that a norm-character [Normcharakter] accords to the concept-by definition; since only with respect to a "norm" can talk of "correspondence" be meaningful. Doubtlessly, this is no sophisticated determination of what "concept" means, but-and this is decisive-the characterization of "concept" is manifestly sufficient in view of the context of the argument addressed here ("to be correspondent to a concept"). In this context, an absolutely complete and exact definition is just not necessary. Essential to the task of reconstructing the fundamental logic, it is at last certain that in the course of reconstruction all presuppositions are "fulfilled in the end, that is, explicated and legitimized-hence also, for example, the constantly presupposed principle of noncontradiction. Only through the total reconstruction of the fundamental logic, through all logical means (as these must be already laid out "along the way" in the execution of every single argument) can these individual arguments jinally be legitimated too. Their ultzmatz justification refers to the termination [Abschluss] of the entire endeavor in whose service they stood. Hegel's thought that the proof for the correctness of the Science of Logic can only be its fully achieved system certainly strikes a central note for the

50

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

reconstruction of the Eundamental logic. Only if it concludes itself in the end in the way that all the required for reconstruction logical means are thereby reconstructed as well, only then can we say that the pursued project of reconstruction of the fundamental logic by its own means has been successfully carried out, and that means its self-fu~llment. The way to this end is the self-grounding, continual determination of the dialectical argument out of itself, which leaves behind all arbitrary incidences and presuppositions. The dialectical development of the fundamental logical structures in its systematic coherence is thus the selfreconstruction of the fundamental logic as a system in the sense of a self-suflorting whok51 This internal closedness [Geschlossenheit] is the expression of the absoluteness of thefundamental logic, i.e., the impossibility of founding it through anything other than itself, insofar as the founding itself is of an unavoidably logical nature. In the sense of the current debate over "ultimate- grounding^,"^^ this would count as the ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic: diakctic as the ultimate grounding of the fundamental logzc-a broad and still wide open field of philosophical research!

Notes
See, for example, Karl Popper "What is Dialectic?" in Conjectures and Refutations, London: Routledge, 1976, pp. 312-335. In his impressive magnum opus, Manfred Wetzel (Diakktik als Ontologit! auf der Basis selbstre$exiver Ehntniskritik. Neue Gundlegung einer Wissenschaft der Erfahmng des Bewusstseins 'und Prolegomena zu einerDialektik in systematischaAbsicht, Freiburg/Miinchen: Alber, 1986; see also Repexion und Bestimmtheit in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logzk, Hamburg: Fundament-Verlag Sasse, 1971) where he goes entirely his own way, which leads him to position the dialectic in the scope of a "self-reflexivecritique of cognition".Wetzel's concern is above all aimed at a "new foundation of a 'science of the experience of consciousness."' His analyses on the dialectic are accordingly epistemologically oriented and in this sense are above all a "Prolegomena" to a dialectical logic still to be worked out. In the present context, however, it is decidedly all about the concrete structure--even and just in regard to the process-af such a dialectical logic (see title formulations in Dialektik als Ontologie auf der Basis selbsfrejlexiverErhntniskritik). For a good overview of the present attempts, see Thomas Kesselring, Die Pmduktivitat der Antinomie. Hegels Dialektik im Lichte der gewtisch Ehntnisthemie und d e r f m l a Logik, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1984,22ff.See also the recently published investigation by Christian Krijnen, Philosophie als Systa. Prinziethee retische Untersuchungmzum Systemgedanlza bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphzlosophk,Wiirzburg: KGnigshausen & Neumann 2008, Ch. 3. Dieter Wandschneider, Grundzuge einer Themie der Diakktik. Rekonstmktion und Revision dialektischa Kategoriaentwicklung in "Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik", Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 1995.

Dialectic as th,e "Self-FuulJillmentn of Logzc

51

"

See Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Grundoperation. Eine Einleitung in die 'Wissenschaft der Logik"', in Ute Guzzoni, Bernhard Rang, and Ludwig Siep, eds, Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart. Festschnjl fur Werner Marx zurn 65. Geburtstag, Hamburg: Meiner, 1976, pp. 208-230; Dieter Henrich, "Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 213-229. Wolfgang Wieland "Bemerkungen zurn Anfang von Hegels Logik," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., Seminar: Dialektik in d e r Philosophie Hegels, Franfkfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978,pp. 194-212. Vittorio HGsle, Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivitat und das Pmblem der Intmu~ektivitat, 2 Bde., Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987, Ch. 4.1.2. In accordance with the author's wishes, both "Bestimmungen" and "Kategorien" are translated throughout as "categories." -TK Bernd Bral3el is illustrative on this point (see 'Vorziige einer Theorie der Dialektik," in Vittorio H6sle and Wolfgang Neuser, eds. Logik, Mathematik und Natuqhilosophie im objektiven Idealismus. Festschnjl fur Dieter Wandschneiderzurn 65. Geburtstag,Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 2004, pp. 91-112). As a basic clarification in this context, see also his excellent investigation Das Programm der idealen Logik, Wiirzburg: Gnigshausen & Neumann, 2005, which especially focuses on the possibility of a logical "ultimate grounding" through transcendental argumentation. lo Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V . Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 90; Hegel, G.W.F.: Werke in 20 Banden, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969-1971 (henceforward quoted as Werke, followed by volume and page number), vol. 5, p. 92. l1 Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 90; Werke, 5,93. l2 Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 92; Werke, p. 5,94. l 3 Instructive here is Ruth-Eva Schulz-Seitz. See "'Sein' in Hegels Logik: 'Einfache Beziehung auf sich,"' in Helmut Fahrenbach, ed., Wirklichkeit und RePexion. Walter Schulz zurn 60. Geburtstag, Pfullingen: Neske Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 365-383. l4 Hegel, Hegel's Science oflogic, p. 91; Werke, 6,94. l5 Hegel's Science oflogic, p. 83; W d e , 5,84. l6 John Burbidge, On Hegel's Logic. Fragments of a Commentary, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981, p. 38; Krijnen, Philosophie als System, p. 140. I7 Michael Theunissen (see Sein und Schein. Die kritische Funktion derHegelschen Logik, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1980, 385ff.) discusses the various types of copula (predicative, existential, veritative, identicative: "is", "is existing," "is true," "is identical").Yet the predicative form is always included with all of these types and in this sense is to be considered fundamental. '* Wandschneider, Grundzuge einer Theorie derDialektik, p. 55. l9 For more on this point, see Grundziige einer Theorie dm Dialektik chapters 3.2 and 4.6. For more detail, see Dieter Wandschneider, "Das Antinomienproblem und seine pragmatische Dimension," in Herbert Stachowiak, ed. Pragmatik, Bd. l V Spachphilosophie,S'achpagmatik und fwmative Pragmatik, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1993,pp. 320-352. Ibid.. section 3ff.

52

The Dimnsions of Hegel S Dialectic

*'

23

24
25

26

"
28

3'
32

33

54

35

36

If we accept as true the contradictory conjunction &-A, then from that follows the validity of A and the validity of 7A, and consequentlythe validity of the implication (*) -A + X for any proposition X. On the other hand the validity of 1A also follows from the admitted contradictory conjunction and in such a way, together with the implication (*), the arbitrary proposition X. Note that the concept of dialectical contradiction is also used in another sense. For example, see Vittorio H d e , "Begriindungsfragendes objektiven Idealismus," in Wolfgang R KGhler, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, and Peter Rohs, eds. Phihsophie und Begriindung, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987, pp. 212-267, 253f., where dialectical contradiction is perhaps understood as an "essentially performative contradiction." Cf., for example, Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, 109ff.; Werke,5, 115ff. Wandschneider, Crundzuge einer Theorie derDialektik, Ch. 3.3. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 106; Werke,5, 113. "Being-thus" ["Sosein"] is here naturally not understood as the opposite of "being-that" ["Dassein"], thus not in the sense of "essence" ["Wesen"], but quite literally as a "thus-determined" being ["so-bestimmtes" Sein]. Wandschneider, Gmndziige einer The& derDialektik, Ch. 3.5 It is interesting in this context that H6sle in his excellent investigation Hegels S y s t a , argues for a principally tetradic structure. Wandschneider, Grundziige einer Theorie daDialektik, Ch. 4.8. Ibid. At any rate, formal means are not to be rejected out of hand. They can help to form the coherence of the argument more transparently. In certain cases they can also contribute to its verification. It can thus be shown, for example, in a very formal way -something that cannot be detailed here-that the sequence of the first four dialectical cycles form a systematic unity in the sense that with it a certain argumentative completeness is reached (Dieter Wandschneider, "Letztbegriindung und Dialektik," in Raul Fornet-Betancourt, ed., Diskurs und Leidenschaft. Festschmji fur Karl-Otto Ape1 zum 75. Geburtstag,Aachen: Verlag der Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1996, pp. 317-336). For example, Wandschneida, Grundzuge einer Theorie der Dialektik. Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spzrit, trans. A. V Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 46-47'; Woke, 3, 69; similar to Plato's Theatetus, 196d-e. Hegel's Phenomenology, p. 53; Werke, 3, 76. Admittedly this holds only if the "third" is excluded. Thus even the principle of tertium non datur holds here. However, this principle appears obsolete in view of the existence of polyvalent logics in which "the third" is no longer excluded. An example is the repexion logicwith six truth-values developed by UlrichBhu; this was developed to deal with logical indeterminacy and paradoxes (cf. Ulrich Blau, "Die Logik der Unbestimmtheiten und Paradoxen," in Erkenntnis 22, 1985, pp. 369459). Generally it is being discovered that such polyvalent logics are constructs in which certain validity-possibilities are settled by convention. It is essential that even such constructs presume fundamental logical means on the meta-leuel- namely, for their introduction and functional determination. At this level, however, at least the logic operating on each highest meta-level is bivalent. Since here (and I adopt this argument from a personal conversation with Blau)

Dialectic as the 'Se~FulJillmnt" of Logic

53

37

39

*
41
42

43
44 45
46

47

there is again only the alternative "true" and "false," perhaps with respect to the question as to whether or not a third truth value accords to a proposition in the scope of a trivalent logic: since again there cannot be a third term. But the "highest" meta-level-in the founding theoretical perspective relevant here-is the transcendental logical level. In the sense of these considerations, the fact that it is plainly irreducible means that its logic is bivalent and therein the @nciple of the excluded third holds. In terms of transcendental logic, therefore, this principle is just as inviolable as the noncontradiction principle and the principle of the non-equivalence of affirmation and negation. The recourse to the principle of the excluded middle in the preceding considerations is thus legitimated transcendentally. Following Aristotle. See in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, Metaphysics, r3-6. "Determinatio negatio est" (cf. HGsle, Hegels System, p. 195). Cf. Wandschneider, Gundziige einer The& der Dialektik, Ch. 6.3, and Dieter Wandschneider, "1st das System der Fundamentallogik ohne das System der Fundamentallogik rekonstruierbar?" in Ludwig Nag1 and Rudolf Langthaler, eds., System der Philosophie? Festgabe fur Hans-Dieter Klezn, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2000, pp. 225-240. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 67; W d e , 5, 65. For example, Plato, The Sophist: A Translation with a Detailed Account of Its Theses and Argumnts, trans. James Duerlinger, New York: Peter Lang, 2005,256d ff. See also Klaus Dcsing, "Dialektikmodelle. Platons 'Sophistes' sowie Hegels und Heideggers Umdeutungen," in Dieter Wandschneider, ed., Das Problem der Dialelttik. Bonn: Bouvier, 1997, pp. 4-18. See Plato, P a m i d e s , 241d. See Wandschneider, Gundzuge einer Theorie derDialektik. Ibid., ch. 2 & 3. At this point, the question concerning the completion of such an explicaton process must remain open. On this, see the considerations of Karen Gloy, Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit. Eine Stmkturanalyse des 'und'. Systematische Untersuchungen zum Einheits- und Mannigfaltigkeitsbepyf bei Platon, Fichte, Hegel sowie in der Moderne, Berlin/New York Walter de Gruyter, 1981,166ff., 174ff.; Dieter Wandschneider, "Die Absolutheit des Logischen und das Sein der Natur. Systematische ~ b e r l e gungen zum absolut-idealistischen Ansatz Hegels," (Zatschn? f i r phibsophische Forschung, Bd. 39, 1985, pp. 331-351), 343ff.; Dieter Wandschneider, "Das Problem der EntguSerung der Idee m r Natur bei Hegel," in Hegel-Jahrbuch, Heinz Kimmerle, Wolfgang Lefevre, Rudolf W. Meyer, eds, Bochum: Germinal Verlag, 1990, pp. 25-33, section 2; Hcisle, Hegels System, 196f. Robert Brandom has shown in detail that the function of logical terms consists in making explicit what is implicitly presupposed in the practice of discourse. He himself here recognizes his Hegelian perspective (e.g., Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Wesenting, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994; see also Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Infmtialism, Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 2000). All the same, the difference with our position here is not to be overlooked: Brandom is not concerned, as we are here, with the project of a systematic

54

The Dimensions of Hegel S Dialectic

devebpmentof the implicit to be made explicit, whereby in the present context the real point is its fn-ocedure-+endent generation [verfahrensbedingte Genm'erung]. In contrast, Brandom treats the inferential potential contained implicitly in (empirical) concepts, which he understands as socially constituted. The systematic development of (fundamental-)logicis just not his issue. (See my detailed argument in Dieter Wandschneider, "'Inexpressive Vernunft'. Abschied vom 'sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus' in Robert B. Brandoms pragmatistischem Positivismus," in Brady Bowman and Klaus Vieweg, eds., Die Peie Seite der Philosophie. Skeptizismus i n Hegelschm Perspektive, Wiirzburg: Kcinigshausen & Neumann 2006, pp. 199-216). Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpzrit, p. 47; Werke, 3,69. Transcendental Pragmatism (Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, among others) sees in it the possibility of infallible knowledge. Hegel, Science of Logic, p.42; Werke, 5, 33. On the sense and possibility of a systematic philosophy today, see Christian Krijnen, Philosophie als System, esp. Ch. 6. For example, Vittorio Hcisle, Die K&e der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie. Transzendentalp-agmatik,Letztbegriindung, Ethik Miinchen: C. H. Beck, 1990; Dieter Wandschneider "Letztbegriindung und Dialektik,"; Dieter Wandschneider, "Letztbegriindung unter der Bedingung endlichen Wissens. Eine Hegelsche Perspektive," in Wolfjiirgen Cramm, Wulf Kellerwessel, David Krause, and Hans-Christoph Kupfer, eds, Diskurs und Rejlexion. Wolfgang Kuhlmann zum 65. Geburtstag, Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann 2005, pp. 353-372.

48

49

50

51

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The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

Edited by Nectarios G. Limnatis

continuum

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PublicationData The dimensions of Hegel's dialectic / edited by Nectarios G. Limnatis. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 97814411-0955-2 (HB) ISBN-10: 1-4411-0955-2 (HB) 1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831.2. Dialectic. I. Lirnnatis, Nektarios. B2949.D5D56 2010 193-dc22

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