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127240, March 27, 2000 Facts: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, he arrived at the port of Manila. Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner, he remarked to the Court: Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. Accordingly, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. However, the State, appealed to the CA annexing in its appellant's brief the pertinent documents for naturalization which contends that petitioner failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence for his naturalization which reversed the same. Hence, petitioner herein in his petition contends that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," Issue: Whether or not petitioner was correct in contending that the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief should not be considered as evidence because it was not formally offered as such? Ruling: No. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. Under Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient . The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." In the case at bar, Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. However, the Supreme Court is not persuaded. Ruling that, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996] Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue:

Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Lapu-Lapu vs CA Facts: Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100, 000 each. When the entire obligation became due, it was not paid despite demands by the bank. The Bank filed with the RTC a complaint seeking payment by Lapulapu Foundation and Elias Tan, jointly and solidarily, of the sum representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs. The Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the Bank alleging that Tan obtained the loans in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the Bank. The Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note and that the Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in Tans personal capacity and for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly, there from. For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the Bank in his personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-over) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares. Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE ENTITY AS BASIS FOR ADJUDGING JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN AND LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC Ratio: As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[17] In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.[18] While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.[19] No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

P e o p l e

v .

C a s t a n e d a

Edmundo Enriquez became the victim of a robbery-killing. He was beaten and stabbed on the different parts of his body which causedh i s s u b s e q u e n t d e a t h . H i s w a l l e t c o n t a i n i n g P60.00, his wrist watch, ring, shirt, and shoes, w e r e a l l t a k e n f r o m h i m . Te r e s i t a N o b e l l o , a deaf-mute, while walking along Taft Avenue andE . d e l o s S a n t o s A v e n u e , a l l e g e d l y s a w t h e i n c i d e n t . When she reported it to the Police, i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d t a k i n g d o w n o f s w o r n statement took place but nobody was arrested.C a s t a e d a w a s t h e n a r r e s t e d a t t h e i c e p l a n t w h e r e h e w o r k s , a d m i t t i n g t h e c r i m e a n d pointed two others Juanito and Benedicto. Healleged that it started when they were drinking w h e n t h e y s a w E n r i q u e z ( d e c e a s e d ) a t t h e nearby table and Benidicto approached him andasked for money but instead Enriquez gave hima cigarette. When Enriquez passed along a darka l l e y, t h e a c c u s e d a n d c o m p a n i o n s b e a t a n d s t a b b e d ( c a u s i n g d e a t h ) E n r i q u e z w i t h a p i p e and took the wallet containing P60, ring, watchand shirt. Teresita, as witness, said Castaneda a c t e d a s a l o o k o u t w h i l e t h e o t h e r s b e a t a n d stabbed the victim. RTC held that Juanito and C a s t a n e d a s h a l l b e p u n i s h e d w i t h D e a t h discrediting their respective alibis. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in admittingextrajudicial admission and testimony of lone evidence Teresita. Ruling: No. Trial court is correct in its decision.Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are universally recognized asadmissible evidence against him and this rule isb a s e d o n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t n o o n e w o u l d d e c l a r e a n y t h i n g a g a i n s t h i m s e l f u n l e s s s u c h declarations were true. Accordingly, it has beenheld that a confession constitutes an evidence o f a h i g h o r d e r s i n c e i t i s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e s t r o n g p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t n o p e r s o n o f n o r m a l mind would deliberately and knowingly confesst o a c r i m e u n l e s s p r o m p t e d b y t r u t h a n d h i s conscience. The trial court is not bound to believe allthat the said witness has said, but it may give w e i g h t a n d c r e d e n c e t o s u c h p o r t i o n s o f h e r testimony as it may deem worthy of belief anddisbelieve the other portions of her testimony. Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that aw i t n e s s h a s s a i d ; the y m ay ac cept som e portions of his testimony and reject o t h e r p o r t i o n s , a c c o r d i n g t o w h a t s e e m s t o t h e m , upon other facts and circumstances, to be the truth. Even when witnesses are found to have d e l i b e r a t e l y f a l s i f i e d i n s o m e p a r t i c u l a r s , t h e jury are not required to reject the whole of theiruncorroborated testimony, but may credit suchportions as they may deem worthy of belief. In t h i s r e g a r d , i t w o u l d s u f f i c e t o s t a t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t b y r e a s o n o f i t s p r o x i m a t e c o n t a c t with witnesses, is in a more competent positionto discriminate between the true and the false, a n d i n t h e c a s e a t b a r, W e f i n d n o r e a s o n t o disturb its conclusion that the said witness of the prosecution saw the incident in question.

Lilibeth Sunga Chan vs Lamberto Chua FACTS: In 1977, Lamberto Chua verbally entered into a partnership agreement with Jacinto L Sunga, father of petitioner, in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GASAPPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondentallegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn producedP100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided betweenthem.Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter,petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of

Shellite withoutrespondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal,winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibethallegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and reasons to evaderespondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially paid thesame to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partialpayment of the latter's share in the partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventoryand winding up of the properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedlyfailed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to thedamage and prejudice of respondent.Trial court directed petitioner to render an accounting, to restitute to the partnership all properties, assets, incomeand profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and advantage, to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceivedincome and profits from the partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of thepartnership and terminate its business activities pursuant to law. CA affirmed the decision Issue: Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides: SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.-- Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners. Ratio: We are not persuaded. A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary.[6] Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise.[7] The essential points that must be proven to show that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits.[8] Understandably so, in view of the absence of a written contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is whether or not the Dead Mans Statute applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondents testimony and that of his witness, Josephine. The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.[9] But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.[10] Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim[11] against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute.[12] Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.[13] Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.[14] Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.[15] Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff. We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that Josephines testimony lacks probative value because she was allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor. Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephines testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.[16] Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one. Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review.[17] This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.[18] It must be also pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that such evidence was offered. People vs Rullepa FACTS: In Nov 1995, while her mother Gloria Buenafe was about to set the table, 3 yr old daughter Cyra May said, Mama, si Kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa pepe, puwit at sa bibig ko. Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes houseboy. Cyra May said she was raped twice in Ronnies room. Gloria waited for her H to arrive that night. Sps verified from Ronnie if what Cyra May told her was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once at 4PM of Nov 17 95, 3 days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped him many times. They waited till morning to take him to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him & where he was detained thereafter. Medico-legal Officer Dr Preyra testified that Cyra May is in virgin state physically and the presence of abrasions in her female organ. She further stated that it was caused by friction w/ an object, perhaps an erect penis and doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused such injuries. Ronnie however later denied having anything to do w/ the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia. He opined that it was because Mrs Gloria Buenafe was against him for not answering her queries about her Hs whereabouts thats why she found fault against him. RTC found Rullepa guilt beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to death.

De Vera vs. Aguilar 218 SCRA 602 Facts: Basilio and his siblings mortgaged their mothers (Marcosa) land to Atty. Bernabe. Leona, adaughter, redeemed the property. Marcosa then sold it to Leona (Aguilar) and her husband. TheAguilars then registered the deed on 1956 and since then paid for its taxes. Basilio and the othersiblings demanded partition as co-owners; they also threatened the Aguilars with a suit.Likewisw, the petioners claimed the land was re-sold to Marcosa. The Aguilars declared thatthey were the owners and denied the allegations.The De Veras sued and won at the RTC. The lower court allowed the introduction of Exhibit Awhich purports to be the deed of sale converying the land to Marcosa. But the CA reversed theRTC, ruling the secondary evidence was inadmissible. Issue: De Vera claimed that the deeds existence was established by the notarys testimony. Likewise,testimonies of the National Archive and Provincial Assessor representatives established the loss.Was the CA correct in excluding Exhibit A? Held & Rationale: Yes, the loss of the deed was never established.Secondary evidence is admissible when the original is lost or destroyed. But the proponent muststill establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order for proof is: Existence;execution; loss; contents.The RTC failed to look at the facts surrounding the loss or destruction of the deeds originalcopies. All duplicates shouldve been accounted for before using copies. The notary testified thatthe deed had 4 or 5 original copies. De Vera only accounted for 3. And even then, it wasproblematic. De Vera didnt ask the Register of Deeds to reproduce the deed to court or explainwhy it cant do so. Also, the reps of the Assessor and Archives only testified; these werent enough to establish loss or destruction. Sison vs People: Cuevaz v. Muoz (G.R. No. 140520; December 18, 2000) Facts: The Hong Kong Magistrates Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muoz for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong The Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Upon application of the NBI, RTC of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention cell. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Thus, petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents must be authenticated. Held: The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must be authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest. The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to be achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the

pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable. Respondents reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription against the admission of a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by means of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine. People vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner wished to discharge Generoso Sansaet as state witness, an attorney who s e r v e d a s c o u n s e l f o r o n e P a r e d e s , p r o v i n c i a l a t t o r n e y o f A g u s a n d e l S u r a n d t h e n governor Case against Paredes was for fraudulent misrepresentation in his application of free patent over land at Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey oViolation of section 3(a) of RA 3019 Pending such case for perjury and graft, taxpayer Teofilo Gelacio prayed 3 respondentsb e i n v e s t i g a t e d ( i n c . H o n r a d o - c l e r k o f c o u r t a n d a c t i n g s t e n o g r a p h e r o f M u n i c i p a l Circuit Trial Court) oFalsified documents making it appear that since perjury case had already beendismissed, filing a graft case would constitute double jeopardy oSansaet testified that he was induced by Paredes Issue: WON Sansaets projected testimony is barred by the attorney-client privilegeHeld: NO, facts surrounding case constitute exception to the rule Ratio: privileged confidentiality does not apply to crimes which the client intends to commit inthe future t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m a d e t o h i m b y p h y s i c a l a c t s a n d / o r a c c o m p a n y i n g w o r d s o f Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which werelater filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan Sansaet was himself a co-conspirator in the falsification oPrivilege will only attach if it is for a lawful purpose or lawful endHowever, Sansaet was discharged as state witness because he has a co-conspirator to thecrime committed. LIM V CA 214 SCRA 237 SEPTEMBER 25, 1992 FACTS: Petition for review on the rule of confidentiality the patient-doctor relationship November 25, 1987 Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for annulment based onArt 36, alleging that Nelly Lim (petitioner) is suffering from schizophrenia before, during andafter marriage and until the present January 11, 989 Sim announced he will present Dr Lydia Acampado (psychiatrist) as awitness on January 25, 1989 Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witnessis privileged since Dr Acampado had examined Lim in a professional capacity and haddiagnosed her with schizophrenia. Subpoena was issued on January 12, 1989 January 24, 1989 petitioner filed urgent motion to quash subpoena and suspendproceedings. Overruled Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness and would nottestify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner as doctor. March 3, 1989 petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari and prohibition but wasdenied on September 18, 1989 on the ground that petitioner failed to establish theconfidential nature of the testimony obtained from Dr Acampado

ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying schizophrenia in casewhere petitioner is her client HELD: In order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following requisites must concur:1.Privilege claimed is in a civil case2.The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine3.Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in hisprofessional capacity4.The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity These requisites must concur with the 4 fundamental conditions necessary for invoking doctor-patient confidentiality:1.The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed2.Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of therelation between the parties3.The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulouslyfostered4.The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications mustgreater than the benefit thereby gain for correct disposal of litigation Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose anything obtained in thecourse of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. There is nothing specific orconcrete offered to show that the information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken thepetitioners reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her proceedings that hercounsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground thatit elicited an answerthat would violate the confidentiality privilege Almonte v. Vasquez (1995) Facts:This is a case wherein respondentOmbudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogadoand Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant andrecord custodian, respectively, of the EconomicIntelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) toproduce "all documents relating to PersonalServices Funds for the year 1988" and allevidence such as vouchers from enforcing hisorders.Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissionerof the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB'sBudget and Fiscal Management Division. Thesubpoena duces tecum was issued by theOmbudsman in connection with hisinvestigation of an anonymous letter allegingthat funds representing savings from unfilledpositions in the EIIB had been illegallydisbursed. The letter, purporting to have beenwritten by an employee of the EIIB and aconcerned citizen, was addressed to theSecretary of Finance, with copies furnishedseveral government offices, including theOffice of the Ombudsman.May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinentparts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed bythe Chief of Budget Division who ismanipulating funds and also the brain of the socalled "ghost agents" or the "EmergencyIntelligence Agents" (EIA); that when theagency had salary differential last Oct '88 allmoney for the whole plantilla were releasedand from that alone, Millions were saved andconverted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost allEIIB agents collects payroll from the big timesmuggler syndicate monthly and brokers everyweek for them not to be apprehended.]In his comment on the letter-complaint,petitioner Almonte denied all the allegationswritten on the anonymous letter. Petitionersmove to quash the subpoena and thesubpoena duces tecum but was denied.Disclosure of the documents inquestion is resisted with the claim of privilegeof an agency of the government on the groundthat "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative toits Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . .will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of itsoperations, movements, targets, strategies,and tactics and the whole of its being" and thiscould "destroy the EIIB." Issue:Whether petitioners can be ordered toproduce documents relating to personalservices and salary vouchers of EIIB employeeson the plea that such documents are classifiedwithout violating their equal protection of laws. Held:YES. At common law a governmentalprivilege against disclosure is recognized withrespect to state secrets bearing on military,diplomatic and similar matters and in addition,privilege to withhold the identity of personswho furnish information of violation of laws. Inthe case at bar, there is no claim that militaryor diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by theproduction of records pertaining to thepersonnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function isthe gathering and evaluation of intelligencereports and information regarding "illegalactivities affecting the national economy, suchas, but not limited to, economic sabotage,smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."Consequently, while in cases which involvestate secrets it may be sufficient to determinefrom the circumstances of the case that thereis reasonable danger that compulsion of theevidence will expose military matters withoutcompelling production, no similar excuse canbe made for a privilege resting on otherconsiderations.The Ombudsman is investigating a complaintthat several items in the EIIB were filled byfictitious persons and that the allotments forthese items in 1988 were used for illegalpurposes. The plantilla and other personnelrecords are relevant to his investigation as thedesignated protectors of the people of theConstitution.Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to theequal protection of the laws. Petitionerscomplain that "in all forum and tribunals . . .the aggrieved parties . . . can only halerespondents via their verified complaints orsworn statements with their identities fullydisclosed," while in proceedings before theOffice of the Ombudsman anonymous letterssuffice to start an investigation. In the firstplace, there can be no objection to thisprocedure because it is provided in theConstitution itself. In the second place, it isapparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," theframers of the Constitution took into accountthe well-known reticence of the people whichkeep them from complaining against officialwrongdoings. As this Court had occasion topoint out, the Office of the

Ombudsman isdifferent from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the governmentbecause those subject to its jurisdiction arepublic officials who, through official pressureand influence, can quash, delay or dismissinvestigations held against them. On the otherhand complainants are more often than notpoor and simple folk who cannot afford to hirelawyers.Finally, it is contended that the issuance of thesubpoena duces tecum would violatepetitioners' right against self-incrimination. It isenough to state that the documents requiredto be produced in this case are public recordsand those to whom the subpoena duces tecumis directed are government officials in whosepossession or custody the documents are.Moreover, if, as petitioners claim thedisbursement by the EII of funds for personalservice has already been cleared by the COA,there is no reason why they should object tothe examination of the documents byrespondent Ombudsman.