Article 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons

re binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband. ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines. HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows: (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 355

FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad, he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo

BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES 58 Phil 238 March 7, 1933

FACTS: The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her childrens support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.

 Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case. After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision. ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. HELD: NO. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because: The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce. Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919. Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals. SC RULING: The decision of CFI-Manila was REVERSED & Defendant is absolved from the demands made against him in this action.

CONNECTION TO PERSONS, FAMILY RELATION / CIVIL CODE: Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that Laws relating to family rights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country The last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 17 also states ...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts & their property, and those intended to promote public order & good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a foreign country. Divorce Laws of the PhilippinesThe hardships of existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they constitutional. Courts have no right to say such laws are too strict or too liberal. At the time this decision was rendered there was still absolute divorce in the Philippines on the ground of Adultery on the part of the wife, and Concubinage on the part of the husband; the divorce, however, could be granted only upon showing that the defendant had been convicted by final judgement for the adultery or concubinage as the case maybe. The new Civil Code has abolished absolute divorce, leaving only legal separation, which is equivalent to relative divorce.

Barnuevo vs Fuster 299 Phil 606

FACTS: February 7, 1875: Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were married (Catholic/canonical) in Malaga, Spain. On February 1892: Fuster went to the Philippines, settled, and acquired real and personal property. 1896: Constanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899. April 4, 1899: They made an agreement (public document): They resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases. (B. of E., P.13) Fuster acknowledged that he would send the sum of 300 pesetas monthly, payable in Madrid, Spain to support his wife starting June 1899. However, on the month of August of the same year, he stopped to make further payments.

March 11, 1909: Constanza started filing divorce proceedings against Fuster, indicating adultery committed by her husband in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom he had two children. Plaintiff prays that: she be granted a decree of divorce the court order the separation of properties between the plaintiff and defendant the conjugal society be therefore liquidated and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined, that one half thereof be adjudicated to her as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90 Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant ordered the latter to pay the former 5,010.17 That the communal property be divided between the parties with costs against the defendant And in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law Both parties appealed, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. Defendants Appeal Lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint. The court erred in its finding that he had committed adultery with a certain woman from 1899 until 1909. The court also erred in its finding that the adultery was accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife. o In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. For having decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties. Against the finding of the court that there exists conjugal property (appellant maintains that it has no foundation) the court erred in ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P5,010.17, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with respect to this sum and that the plaintiff has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after 5 years. the court erred in empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of property and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and distribution between spouses

the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his Plaintiffs Appeal petitioner prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90 (instead of P5,010.17) plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August 1909 until the date of payment with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment. Findings of the court: a. the total amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas o the sum that the plaintiff had collected in Madrid was 6,365.68 o that the remainder was 27,834.32 and was equivalent t 5,566.86 Mexican currency o Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency. b. Therefore, the sum was equivalent to P5,010 Phil currency o There was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexican pesetas it does not appear that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the partition of property decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance should be confirmed. HELD: The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance. Paraphernal property is that which the wife brigs to the marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto. But, it is a provision of article 1384 that the wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the dowry property. Article 16: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ARTICLE 16: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary provisions are valid. HELD: The order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions is hereby affirmed. The Old Civil Code is applicable because testator died in 1944. Art. 10(2) of the Old Civil Code states that Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of property and the country in which it is to be found. Testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and permanent residence. Sec. 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925: Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may by last will dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testators debts. The ex-wife has no legal claim to any portion of the estate left by the testator since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court a quo had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and the ex-wife. It does not appear that at the time of the hearing of the project of partition, Section 9905 of the Nevada Compiled Laws was introduced as evidence. The Law of Nevada can only be proved in our courts in the manner provided by our Rules: Sec 41. Proof of public or official record: An official record or any entry therein, when admissible for any purpose may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record if not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer had custody.

Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan et al 106 phil 997

FACTS: Testator was born in Nebraska, therefore a citizen of Nebraska or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention is untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his particular choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his will. The court finds that the testator was at the time of his death a citizen of the US and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the State and admits the same to probate. On April 24, 1950, CFI judge, Hon. Amparo admitted to probate the last will and testament of the testator Testator made a last will with the ff. partitions: of residuary estate to the Framers and Merchant National Bank of L.A., in trust only for the benefit of his grandson, Edward George Bohanan, which consists of P90,81.67 in cash and shares in stock of several mining companies Other half of the residuary estate to testators brother and his sister, share and share alike P6,000 grandson Edward Gilbert, and his daughter Mary Lydia P10,000 Clara Daen. P2,000 Katherine Woodward P4,000 Beulah Fox P2,000 Elizabeth Hastings Ex-wife and children questions the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them. CFI dismissed the objections filed.

Bellis vs Bellis 20 scra 358

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children

opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion. ISSUE: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply. HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter. 1. 2. The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California.

The California conflict rule found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that, If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed. Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA 7 scra 95

FACTS: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of

HUMAN RELATIONS:
Uypitching vs Quiamco 510 scra 17
FACTS: 1982: respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. The motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public. October 1981: the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, told petitioner

corporations collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by respondents men. January 26, 1991: petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks objection, took the motorcycle. February 18, 1991: petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. July 30, 1994: the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti- Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages? HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and

must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp. G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007 FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal. ISSUES: Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office. Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code. HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code). Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is

otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

Estrada vs. Escritor 492 SCRA 1. 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement. RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol [G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006]
FACTS: Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company policies stated that: New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has *a+ relative, up to *the+ rd 3 degree of relationship, already employed by the company In case of two of our employees (both single, one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. The complainants alleged that when they married co-employees, they were compelled to resign because of the company policy. Arguing that said policy is illegal, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

(2) That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In the Philippines we employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. This was illustrated in the cases of Duncan Association of Detailman vs. Gaxo Wellcome (2004) and PT&Tv. NLRC(1997). These cases instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The employees were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a coemployee. Star Paper failed to show how the marriages of the employees could be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.

ISSUE: Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative. HELD: The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. Two types of employment policies involve spouses: 1. no-spouse employment policies - policies banning only spouses from working in the same company; 2. anti-nepotism employment policies- those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same company In the US, there is what they call as bona fide occupational qualification exception, that is, unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse. And to justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and