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ABAKADA PARTY LIST v PURISIMA 562 SCRA 251 Facts: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which is under Section of Article XI of the Constitution (Accountability of Public Officers). Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies. In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 9335 which was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) is constitutional. Held: Petition has no merit. RA 9335 is Constitutional. Rationale: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9335, the Attrition Act of 2005 on the following basis: In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm. On the issue on Accountability of Public Officers, Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. Public Accountability-Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.

L2. Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan DOCTRINE: The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. NATURE: Review of Sandiganbayan Decision Facts: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the

Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1) WON Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes; NO. Red had not validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes on 27 September 1985. Under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the effectivity of RA No. 6733 that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all. 2) WON the tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired; If yes - WON Lenlie could no longer occupy the office despite the vacancy therein, in a holdover capacity; The tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had expired. However, Lenlie could occupy the office as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB in a holdover capacity. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is

no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position. 3) WON under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative circulars, accused Lenlie was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a holdover capacity; if not WON accused Lenlie acted in good faith and committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent; The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG Circulars confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry. 4) WON the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which they had been convicted required criminal intent and malice as essential elements. Prudence and good faith impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian. HELD: Petition is meritorious. The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted both petitioners of all the thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son and as a consequence thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally accepted indicia, for they were the very same acts alleged in the informations as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent.

L3. CUENCO v FERNAN 158 SCRA 29 Facts: Complainant Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former Member of the House of Representatives from the province of Cebu, prayed for judgment ordering the disbarment of Mr. Justice Fernan, Chairman of the Third Division of this Court. Complainant Cuenco, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceeding, makes the ff. allegations in his complaint for disbarment: 1. That Mr. Justice Fernan, appeared as counsel for the three (3) instituted heirs and despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs. 2. Influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo proceedings. 3. Has operated his Office in Cebu City as a Star-Chamber to fabricate fake and fictitious heirs of Vito Borromeo. 4. Practically abolished and crippled the legitimate functions of the Court of Appeals. 5. Collecting big sums of money in payment of his legal services rendered to his clients. 6. Had willfully, persistently, stubbornly and systematically violated his Oath of Office as a lawyer which imposes upon him the duty not to delay any man for money or malice. Issue: WON complainants charges against Mr. Justice Fernan provide a factual basis. Held: Complaint for disbarment must be dismissed for totally lack of merit and failure to provide evidences for the complaints against the respondent. Complainant Cuenco vehemently denies acting in bad faith in filing the present administrative complaint against Mr. Justice Fernan and suggests that his acts have been "misunderstood" by the Court. Complainant, however, has failed to present a shred of evidence to support the very serious charges he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan. In his untitled pleading, complainant Cuenco has not only declined to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan but has also chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly uninformed as to require no discussion. Because the Court cannot assume that complainant Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support

with anything but his own bare assertion, the Court is compelled to conclude that those accusations were made in bad faith. Rationale: Members of the SC may be removed from office only by impeachment for conviction of certain offenses. (Art. XI (2), Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court would in effect be so circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate. The Ombudsman and his deputies, majority of the members of the COMELEC and COA who are not certified public accountants, all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. L4. IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALES 160 SCRA 771 Facts: Honorable Gonzales forwarded a letter-complaint to Mr. Fernan which brought to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said Indorsement. It has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court " addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez (as Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor) referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan. The Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Should a fiscal or other prosecuting officer forthwith and dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court? The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. Ratio: There is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be

charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. L5. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 415 SCRA 44 Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5

August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate

and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

L6. GUTIERREZ v HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTTEE ON JUSTICE Doctrine: We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List Representatives. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and

betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?) Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense. The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there

should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that *a+ verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own

respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. L7. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi PaduaVarona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and thereport was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of

office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable 2. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively liable HELD: Order of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 are REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. Ombudsman's Deputies Not Impeachable The Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that The President, the Vice - President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment . Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella which reads: To grant a

complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI *2+) all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar? A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented. Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 f the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

L8. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Two separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government. Sandiganbayan ruled that the PPSB was a private corporation and its officers like Alas, did not fall under its jurisdiction. Dissatisfied the people through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed this petition. ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government- owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). HELD: Petition Granted, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction RATIO: The Philippines Postal Savings Bank PPSB is a government owned or controlled corporation organized and incorporated under the corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stocks of PPSB belongs to the government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are themselves officers of the PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Sec. 32 of the Postal Service Act of 1992. Article IX Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the present anti -graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law, in effect retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined under Art. XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution. It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors, or trustees, or managers of GOCCs with original charters whenever charges of Graft and corruption are involved. However , a question arises whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in GOCCS organized and

incorporated under the Corporation code. Article XI , Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law . This provision in effect retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined under Art XIII Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation thus: Sec. 5 . The batasang Pambansa shall create a special court known as the sandiganbayan , which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense commited by public officers and employees including those in GOCCS in relation to their office as may be determined by law. The fact that the legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents, directors, or trustees , or managers in GOCCs within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of their creation clearly reveals its intention to include such officials of GOCCS with original charters and those organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. L9. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Facts: It appears that Carandang and Clemente were in the meantime conferred with CSE Eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003.Petitioner subsequently reclassified several positions by Resolution No. 02-03 dated August 18, 2003 including Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. The Ombudsman thereupon requested the approval of the proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified positions. With respect to the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position, the Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft Investigation Officer III.Subsequently, the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of August 28, 2003, changed the status of Carandangs and Clementes appointments to permanent effective June 6, 2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he has not met the eligibility requirements.

Issue: Wether or not that there are independent offices specifically authorized by the constitution to appoint their officials ,does this imply that their appointment will not be subject to civil service law and rules?

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The appointment of Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr., as well as those of Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente, is hereby ordered made permanent effective December 18, 2002. L10. UY v SANDIGANBAYAN 312 SCRA 77 Facts: George Uy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which denied his motion to quash the six informations charging him with violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended. He argued, among others, that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner accused because his rank of Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval captains and all officers of higher rank as prescribed under sub par. (d) of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law (RA 8249). Hence, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner was vested in the regular courts. Held: Resolution of the Sandigan is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Doctrine/Rationale: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law. Republic Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to PD1606 creating the Sandiganbayan (otherwise known as the Sandiganbayan Law), provides the prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law read: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission

of the offense: (d) Philippine army and air force colonel, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. The Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners position did not fall within the rank requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts. The Supreme Court then went further to clarify that it is the prosecutor, not the ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. On Motion for Clarification by the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court categorically declared: The Officers of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor seem to suggest that they still retain the power to re-file the information and prosecute the petitioner before the regional trial court despite our finding that it is the regional trial court which has jurisdiction over the case. The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutor under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770, (An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes) which vests upon the ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan L11. CASTRO v DELORIA 577 SCRA 20 Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of public funds. The information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment. On Aug 31, 2001,Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information since it failed t to allege her salary grade --a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be

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investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. It also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman since in the cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatory resolution. Finally, it said that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the Information. Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999 until May 20, 2001 was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RT and since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case. Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari w/ CA also dismissed. Filed 65 with SC. ISSUES: 1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in light of the ruling in the First "Uy vs.Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited tocases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Castro, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process. RULING: YES to BOTH. In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and the SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases

within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted bylaw to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4)granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merelya component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutor power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA6770. In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20, 2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable

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by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue. L12. DOJ V. LIWAG FACTS: Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaintaffidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance. It required the respondents to file counter-affidavits on the charges. Respondents submitted counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed. Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of the respondents: a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong; b.) c.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;] Respondents rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents discharge of their official duties; Offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality; DOJ issued Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by respondents before the RTC of Manila. --> Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Judge Liwag issued the Order prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary investigation. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts alleged. HELD: Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP.

A panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to the respondents. Subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed. Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed. The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and deny the dismissal of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

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Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the accusations. The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV: Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . . Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and functions: (2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system ; Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275 provides: Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws. Respondents claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan. Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989: Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,

unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees. The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it. Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman. Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial,

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it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents. The second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, in aduplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman. From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge. Petition is DISMISSED. L13. TAPIADOR V. OMBUDSMAN Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in dismissing the petitioner from the government service for grave misconduct and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit by Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen, against the petitioner, Renato A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate Commissioner. Complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received from Walter Beck P10,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of P7,000.00. Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit executed by a certain Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of P10,000.00).

The petitioner denied in his counter-affidavit that he demanded nor received any amount of money from Walter Beck. Petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife, Monica Beck, came to the BID office in Manila on to follow-up his visa application. When the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a visa application, Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the petitioner with having demanded money from them. This incident prompted the petitioner to file a criminal complaint for oral defamation before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila. The petitioners allegations were corroborated by Rosanna C. Vigo, a BID employee. BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the petitioner. Criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence but Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government service. Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors: I. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. II. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION ONLY AFTER ALMOST 3 YEARS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. III. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND ACTUAL HEARING IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES, THUS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. IV. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONTRADICTING ITS OWN FINDING RELATIVE TO THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. V. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL AGAINST PETITIONER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST OFFENSE IN HIS THIRTY YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

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HELD: The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was accorded due process of law inasmuch as he was duly informed and furnished a copy of the complaint against him as evidenced by his letters addressed to the investigating officer requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare for his defense. T There was no undue delay in the conduct of the administrative proceedings since the preliminary investigation was conducted immediately after the complaint was filed and that after the criminal aspect of the case was resolved, the administrative proceeding was conducted shortly thereafter. That no preliminary conference had been conducted, primarily due to the petitioners manifestation to dispense thereof and submit the case for resolution inasmuch as he has already filed his memorandum of evidence. Ombudsman opined that the petitioner was absolved of criminal liability during the preliminary investigation. However, the Ombudsman asserts that the sworn statements of Walter Beck and his witness, Purisima Terencio, substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for grave misconduct by demanding from complainant Beck a sum of money in exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR and for that offense, peti tioner should be imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government service. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. In dismissing the petitioner from the government service the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned out, as follows: Evidence for the complainant clearly established that respondent Tapiador unlawfully received the amount of P10,000.00 from spouses Walter and Monica Becker, which act was personally witnessed by complainants witness, Purisima C. Terencio. Witness Terencio states That said spouses paid the full amount of P10,000.00 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise for the immediate release of the same. The said declaration of Terencio was aptly corroborated by complainant Walter Becker, a foreigner, who in his desire to stay permanently in the Philippines became a victim of such irregularity.

The only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness, Purisima Terencio. Review of the records showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation. Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner was not supported by any evidence. Becks affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis, Ombudsman should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance. Although Beck claimed to have paid P10,000.00, his affidavit is silent as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount. The pertinent portion of his affidavit reads, thus: (1.) That a certain Terencio informed us that I could be granted an ACR and will be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently thru Mr. Tapiador and Mr. Angeles and the fees was agreed. (2.)After completing all the requirements and the amount of P10,000.00 was given I waited but no ACR was given. (3.) My wife went to see Mr. Tapiador and was informed that he will hold my passport while I have my ACR, which I refused. (4.) We transferred our residence to Negros Occidental we arranged with Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR before we will leave and when my wife went again to pick up the ACR he was not in the office. Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same, but he did not. Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to Terencios statement that the spouses paid the full amount of P10,000.00 on to Mr. Tapiador as payment. On the assumption that there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements against the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than 30 years. On the contrary, the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until proven otherwise does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that Terencio had the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The Ombudsman should have been more prudent in according credence to the allegations of Terencio coming as they do from a supposed fixer.

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The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial evidence. Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government service are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the government service more particularly in the Bureau of Investigation and Deportation, Manila, without loss nor diminution in his salaries and benefits. L14. LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Office of the Ombudsman, Atty. Ronaldo, then Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, was alleged to have committed the following illegal acts: (1) irregularly granting Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) beyond the prescribed period; and (2) using recycled or photocopied applications for a TRV extension without the applicants fixing their signatures anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. In a joint resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes recommended for the suspension of the petitioner for 1 year for conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. The Ombudsman approved the said resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, instead, the period of suspension was reduced from 1 year to 9 months without pay. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the formers suspension reducing it from9 months to only 6 months without pay. Petitioner filed an instant petition for review with the SC. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Ombudsmans finding is merely advisory or not .

2.

Whether or not Ombudsmans resolution finding petitioner administratively liable constitutes an indirect encroachment into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters.

HELD: Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory. Also, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees. The petition was denied and the resolution of CA was affirmed. RATIO/DOCTRINE: Under Sec 13(3) of the Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public officer or employee found to be at fault, to the official concerned. On the other hand, Sec 15 of RA 6770 states that, to wit: Sec 15. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the foll owing powers, functions and duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Sec 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

The provisions of RA 6770 and Sec.13 of Art XI of the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman qualify the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation

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by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID. L15 Estarija vs Ranada Facts: Respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City. The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI. On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija. The Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension and directed him to answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No. 41,464-98, against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit, petitioner vehemently denied demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI had payables to the PPA, and although he went to the associations office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998.

On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration. Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsmans decision. Issues: 1. 2. Is there substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct? YES Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring officials unconstitutional? NO

Reasoning: 1. Estarija was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation. When Estarija went to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his doing so was indicative of his willingness to commit the crime. In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public

2.

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office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary. Intent of the framers of the Constitution- Based on the record of the Constitutional Commission, they clarified that the powers of the Ombudsman are not exclusive. They are not foreclosing the possibility that in the future, the Assembly may have to give additional powers to theOmbudsman.3. The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Petition denied. L16. Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera (2005) Petitioner: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO Respondent: ATTY. GIL A. VALERA and COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of office on August 3, 2001 and assumed his post on August 7, 2001. He is in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.

The Office of the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint filed by then Director Eduardo S. Matillano of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG). Director Matillano charged respondent Valera with criminal offenses involving violation of various provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), Executive Order No. 38, Executive Order No. 298, and R.A. No. 6713 as well as administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn complaint was respondent Valeras brother-in-law Ariel Manongdo for violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.

a. Violation of EO No. 156 & EO No. 38 A. Valera had compromised the case against the Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation while in the performance of his official functions without proper authority from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and without the approval of the President which caused undue injury to the government by having deprived the government of its right to collect the legal interest, surcharges, litigation expenses and damages and gave the Steel Asia unwarranted benefits in the total uncollected amount of P14,762,467.70 which is violative of Sections 3(e) and (g) respectively of RA 3019. b. Violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019 and RA 6713 and Section 4, RA 3019 as against Ariel Manongdo Atty. Valera while being a Bureau of Customs official directly and indirectly had financial or pecuniary interest in the CACTUS CARGOES SYSTEMS a brokerage whose line of business or transaction, in connection with which, he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity by way of causing the employment of his brotherin-law, Ariel Manongdo. c. Violation of Executive Order No. 298 (foreign travel of government personnel) The investigation also disclosed that he traveled to Hongkong with his family without proper authority from the Office of the President.

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Director Matillano also filed charges against other officials of the DPWH and Bureau of Customs. The Philippine Daily Inquirer featured a news article on them with the title More govt execs flunk lifestyle check. Prior to Matillanos sworn complaint, criminal and administrative charges were also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Atty. Adolfo Casareo against Valera for similar allegations of Matillano. November 12, 2003 Ombudsman Marcelo issued a Memorandum inhibiting himself from the criminal cases and administrative case and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor VillaIgnacio to act in his place. March 17, 2004 - petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio issued the Order placing Valera under preventive suspension for six months without pay. Villa-Ignacio found that respondent Valera entered into the compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. without being duly authorized to do so by the Commissioner of Customs and without the approval of the Secretary of Finance. Villa-Ignacio made the finding that by entering into the said compromise agreement whereby Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. shall pay the overdue taxes and duties in thirty (30) monthly installments of P1,239,862 from January 2002 to June 2004,Valera may have made concessions that may be deemed highly prejudicial to the government, i.e., waiver of the legal interest from the amount demanded, penalty charges imposed by law, litigation expenses and exemplary damages. March 17, 2004 issued order placing Valera under preventive suspension for a period of 6 months without pay Valera sought reconsideration of the said Order claiming denial of due process. Acting on Valeras motion for reconsideration,Villa -Ignacio issued the Order dated April 5, 2004 explaining that the delay in the issuance of the preventive suspension order was due to the inhibition of the Ombudsman Marcelo from the case.

April 5, 2004 - petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio denied respondent Valeras motion for reconsideration. Respondent Valera filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension issued by Villa-Ignacio and to enjoin Commissioner of Customs Bernardo from implementing the said Order. April 16, 2004 - the appellate court heard the parties on oral arguments on the prayer for injunction.

- issued TRO against the implementation of the preventive suspension order June 25, 2004 - the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension and directing Villa-Ignacio to desist from taking any further action. The CA held mainly that Villa-Ignacio is not authorized by law to sign and issue preventive suspension orders. It cited Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which vests on the Ombudsman and his Deputy the power to preventively suspend any government officer or employee under the Ombudsmans authority pending investigation subject to certain conditions and Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution was also cited as it states that the Office of the Ombudsman is composed of the Ombudsman to be known as the Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy, and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Ombudsman Marcelos Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 was declared null and void by the appellate court.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has the authority to place respondent Valera under preventive suspension in connection with the administrative case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. RULING:

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The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. DOCTRINE: The Court holds that the Special Prosecutor has no such authority. Preliminarily, it is noted that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio anchors his authority to conduct the administrative investigation on the Memorandum issued by Ombudsman Marcelo inhibiting himself therefrom and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead. Marcelo did not state in the said memorandum the reason for his inhibition. The rule on voluntary inhibition of judges finds application to the Ombudsman in the performance of his function. Like judges, the decision on whether or not to inhibit is admittedly left to the Ombudsmans sound discretion and conscience. However, Ombudsman Marcelo has no unfettered discretion to inhibit himself. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. Based on the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, the powers of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following: investigatory power; prosecutory power; public assistance functions; authority to inquire and obtain information; and function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. The Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutory power has been characterized as plenary and unqualified. Authority of the Office of the Special Prosector has been characterized as limited. The Court has consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman may delegate his investigatory function, including the power to conduct administrative investigation, to the Special Prosecutor. R.A. No. 6770 has invariably mentioned the Special Prosecutor alongside the Ombudsman and/or the Deputy Ombudsmen with respect to the manner of appointment, qualifications, term of office, grounds for removal from office, prohibitions and disqualifications and disclosure of relationship requirement. However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 (Power to preventively suspend only to the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen)

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman and his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen, as they are expressly named in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, have been granted the power to preventively suspend as the same inheres in their mandate under the Constitution: While R.A. No. 6770 accords the Special Prosecutor the same rank as that of the Deputy Ombudsmen, Section 24 thereof expressly grants only to the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen the power to place under preventive suspension government officials and employees under their authority pending an administrative investigation. This demonstrates that in the conduct of administrative investigation, the PIAB-A exercises merely recommendatory powers particularly with respect to whether to place the public official or employee subject thereof under preventive suspension. Villa-Ignacio could only recommend to the Ombudsman or, in this case because of the latters inhibition, to the designated Deputy Ombudsman to place respondent Valera under preventive suspension and that the power to place a public officer or employee under preventive suspension pending an investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsmen. The finding that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no authority to issue the March 17, 2004 preventive suspension order, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the evidence of respondent Valeras guilt is strong to

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warrant his preventive suspension need not be passed upon at this point. Anent respondent Valeras alleged non-compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping when he filed the petition for certiorari with the appellate court, suffice it to state that the appellate court correctly overlooked this procedural lapse. L17 BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents. FACTS: -Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. -In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. -Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. -Petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases and that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. It constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

-Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. -They agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. -Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. -It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. -Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. -Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. ISSUE:

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Should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. How could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? HELD: Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. -Petition is hereby GRANTED. Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. L18. Caoibes, Jr. vs Ombudsman FACTS: Jose F. Caoibes, Jr as the Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the RTC of Las Pias City, seeks to review the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner and the Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. Florentino M. Alumbres, the Presiding Judge, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman on May 23, 1997, a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for destruction of complainants eyeglasses and assault upon a person in authority. The respondent therein alleged that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Law Pias City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed; the petitioner did not answer so the respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint[2] against petitioner, this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the complaint filed earlier with the office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. HELD: The petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. RATIONALE: It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto

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itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence. L19 Lastimosa vs Vasquez February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public health nurse at Cebu, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. After an investigation, the investigating officer found no prima facie evidence and recommended its dismissal. But the Ombudsman, Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. The case eventually went to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for acts of lasciviousness. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Mojica ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.- Mojica issued an order placing Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months as approved by Ombudsman Vasquez- September 6, 1994 > Lastimosa filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders directing them to file of the action(for Attempted Rape) against the Mayor; instructing Lastimosa and Kintanar to explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against the Mayor; stating that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against the Mayor in recognition of the authority of said Office; approving of the placement of Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay; directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor to implement preventive suspension; and designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu

Petitioner claims: Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. In any event, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. Therefore the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal. ISSUES 1. WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo YES 2. WON Office of the Ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt and impose preventive suspension YES HELD 1. YES. When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his(prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989(RA6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control

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2. YES. Sec 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."- Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED. L20 Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez NATURE Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction FACTS MWSS conducted bidding for twoprojects concerning its waterdistribution system in Metro Manila. The Philippine Large DiameterPressure Pipes ManufacturersAssociation (PLDPPMA) thenquestioned the aw ard of the projects with the Office of the Ombudsman(Vasquez), charging an apparent plan on the part of the MWSS to favor certain suppliers (those offering fiber glass pipes over those offerings teel pipes) through the technical specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. The Ombudsman then issued theassailed order, directing the MWSSto: set aside the recommendation of an MWSS committee to award thecontact to a contractor offeringfiberglass pipes, and award thesubject contract to a complying and responsive bidder- the officials of MWSS filed theinstant petition with the SC,contending that the ombudsmanacted beyond the competence of his office when he assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, when the same is clearly among the excepted cases enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. Also, that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion byarbitrarily and capriciously interfering with the exercise of sound discretion of the MWSS.

ISSUE 1.WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the PLDPPMA and correspondingly issue the challenged orders. HELD 1. NO Ratio On the basis of all the provisions regarding the Office of the Ombudsman, SolicitorGeneral insists that the authority of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in the bidding conducted by the MWSS- The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erringpublic officials, and through theexertion of official pressure andinfluence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasance committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office toinvestigate all criminal complaintsagainst public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Actmakes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmanencompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committedby any officer or employee asmentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office. - the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement. This case concerns the investigatory power and Public Assistance Duties of the Ombudsman- the Ombudsman, in resolving thecomplaint, considered 3 issues: (1)WON the technical specificationsprescribed by MWSS in the projects have been so designed as to really favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/Bidders; (2) WON the MWSS has thetechnical knowledge and expertisewith fiberglass pipes; and (3) WONthe contractors and localmanufacturers of fiberglass pipeshave the experience and qualification to undertake the projects. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate

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any act or omission which "xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion bayan agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfullyvested. It seems that theOmbudsman, in issuing thechallenged orders, has not onlydirectly assumed jurisdiction over,but likewise preempted the exerciseof discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, therecommendation of the MWSSCommittee to award the contractappears to be yet pendingconsideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees. We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law. Disposition Petition is granted. Order annulled and set aside. L21 Acop vs Office of the Ombudsman Facts: On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the notorious robbery gang, "Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the National Capital Regional Command (NCRC), Traffic Management Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC). On May 22, 1995, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC) made an expose', stating that there was no shootout. De los Reyes stated that the eleven (11) suspected members of the "Kuratong Baleleng" gang were victims of summary execution. The following day, he executed a sworn statement to this effect. . . . On May 24, 1995, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the separate sworn statements of Myrna Abalora, Nenita G. Alap-ap and Imelda Pancho Montero are relatives of the slain suspected gang members, accusing the PACC, NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder.

In a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion filed with this Court on 28 July 1995, the petitioners in G.R. No. 120422 challenged the take-over, asserting: First, that it violated Section 3, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 issued by the Ombudsman. The petitioners emphasized that the enumeration in the said Section does not include the Ombudsman himself nor the Acting Ombudsman among those authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. Second, that in so doing, Villa effectively denied the petitioners the different appellate levels within the Office of the Ombudsman. And third, that Villa's take-over and order in question prejudged the very issues pending before the Supreme Court and was, therefore, contemptuous. Hence, the petitioners in G.R. No. 120422 joined cause with the prayer of the petitioners in G.R. No. 120428 The common issues within which the parties agreed to limit their arguments: 1. Whether it is the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special Prosecutor which has jurisdiction over the complaint in question 2. Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Military Manuel Casaclang committed grave abuse of discretion when he set the case for preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to submit their counteraffidavits before any preliminary evaluation of the complaint as required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman. Held: 1. As to the first issue, the petitioners in G.R. No. 120422 concede that in the light of this Court's decision in Zaldivar, 4 it is the Ombudsman, and not the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the complaint filed against them. The petitioners plead, however, for this Court re-examine the conclusion reached in Zaldivar, i.e., that under the 1987 Constitution, the Tanodbayan no longer has the authority to conduct preliminary investigations except upon order of the Ombudsman. Said conclusion, the petitioners assert, "is based on a wrong premise." The petitioners hardly persuade us on this matter. While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. Paragraph 6, Section 12 of the original draft of the proposed

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Article on Accountability of Public Officers, which the Committee recommended for incorporation in the Constitution, reads: Sec. 12. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (6) To exercise such powers and perform such functions or duties as may be provided by Law. As finally approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law. Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveals otherwise. 2. We do not share the petitioners' view that respondent Casaclang set the case for preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits without the conduct of a preliminary evaluation of the complaint as required by the Rules, of the Office of the Ombudsman. In the case before us, no evidence to that effect was adduced. On the contrary, as shown by the summary of antecedent facts earlier quoted, the Panel of

Investigators submitted its evaluation report on 8 June 1995, and it was only on 14 June 1995 that respondent Casaclang issued the questioned order. Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), on the process and nature of the evaluation required, reads as follows: Sec. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; (b) referred to respondent for comment; (c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forward to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; (e) referred for administrative adjudication; or (f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. It cannot be denied that the evaluation required is merely preliminary in nature and scope, not a detailed inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of such evaluation involves the exercise of discretion which has not been shown to be abused in the instant case. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, these two petitions and the motion to cite Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa in contempt of court are DENIED for want of merit. This decision is immediately executory. L22 Khan Jr. vs Office of the Ombudsman Facts: In February 1989, private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA 3019. In their complaint, private respondents accused petitioners of using their

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positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were shareholders. Issue: Whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019[1] (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Held: We find merit in petitioners arguments and hold that public respondents do not have the authority to prosecute them for violation of RA 3019. The 1987 Constitution states the powers and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. Specifically, Article XI, Section 13(2) provides: Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. The phrase with original charter means chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners. PAL has since reverted to private ownership and we find it pointless to scrutinize the implications of a legal issue that technically no longer exists. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

L.23 GARCIA-RUEDA V. PASCASIO Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

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Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. L.24 FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989] Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos, being one of his enemies. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the

annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by direct grant by law (CA 63) which was not invoked by the petitioner.

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>>> Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. L.25. MERCADO VS. MANZANO FACTS Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. ISSUE: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. HELD Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry

aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegia nce to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. L.26 Caasi v. CA Facts: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service which would mean that he is a permanent resident of the United States, and not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, despite his green card, he has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Commissioner Badoys dissent: A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the

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Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. Issues: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States Article XI, Sec. 18, 1987 Constitution: Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. Omnibus Election Code: SEC. 68. Disqualifications Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) 2.WON Miguel waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green cardholder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.

Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code). Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. L.27. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto FACTS On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. The Committee was directed to perform the following functions: 1. Inventory all behest loans 2. Identify the borrowers who were granted friendly waivers, as well as the government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers. 3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date hereof. President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non -performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-behest loans. Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability. In its 14th REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans.

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In his instructions handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned Report, President Ramos directed COMMITTEE Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter alia, proceed with administrative and judicial actions against the twenty -one firms (out of 21) in this batch with positive findings ASAP. On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaintagainst the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, which read: Corrupt Practices of Public Officers In the resolution dated 14 May 1996 and approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968 on the ground of prescription. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the OMBUDSMAN in the Order of 19 May 1997, the COMMITTEE filed this case. The COMMITTEE argues that the right of the Republic of the Philippines to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution. Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and his cronies accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides, even assuming ex gratia that the right to file criminal charges against the respondents is prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the date of their commission. ISSUE Whether public respondent ombudsman Destiero committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offenses with which the other respondents were charged in OMB-0-96-0968 HELD We agree with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. What is now Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution was originally Section 13 of the proposed Article on Accountability of Public Officers in Committee Report No. 17 submitted to the Constitutional Commission by its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

The assertion by the OMBUDSMAN that the phrase if the same be not known in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean lack of knowledge but that the crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretat ion that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application. In the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968 without even requiring the respondents to submit their counteraffidavits and solely on the basis of the dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or the dates of the commission of the alleged offense was committed. Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should commence from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-960968. It should have first received the evidence from the complainant and the respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the date of discovery of the offense. L. 28. ARGANA vs REPUBLIC FACTS Respondent Republic filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition for Forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of the late Maximino A. Argana. On October 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the conduct of an inquiry. In 1990, the case was reactivated in the Sandiganbayan. On August 7, 1997, petitioners offer of compromise was accepted by the PCGG in its Resolution No. 97-180-A. In a letter dated October 7, 1997, PCGG informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the signing of the Compromise Agreement and requested the OSG to file the appropriate motion for approval thereof with the Sandiganbayan. On May 27, 1998, then President Ramos approved the Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent. On June 4, 1998, the OSG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement. Petitioners expressed their conformity to the motion on June 15, 1998. After conducting hearings on the motion, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1998 approving the Compromise Agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with the terms thereof.[12]

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However, on October 5, 1998, respondent, through the OSG and the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by Compromise (Motion to Rescind). Respondent prayed for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement or reformation thereof after a renegotiation with petitioners. Respondent contended that the partition of the properties in the Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous to the government and that there was fraud and insidious misrepresentation by petitioners in the distribution and partition of properties, to the damage and prejudice of the government. On April 11, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution gran ting respondents motion to rescind and setting aside the Decision dated July 31, 1998. With respect to the issue of fraud, it held that there was extrinsic fraud in the execution of the Compromise Agreement. Petitioners insist that the Motion to Rescind which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is fatally defective for (i) lack of authority of respondents lawyers to file the same; (ii) having been filed out of time; (iii) non-submission of an Affidavit of Merit; and (iv) nonsubmission of a Certification against Forum-Shopping. ISSUE 1) Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy; 2) Whether the OSG and the PCGG lawyers have authority to file the Motion to Rescind on behalf of respondent; 3) Whether the Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for relief, complied with the requirements of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; 4) Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Rescind and in setting aside its Decision dated July 31, 1998; and 5) Whether the members of the Sandiganbayans Third Division should have inhibited themselves from resolving petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. HELD . There is no requirement under the law that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines. More importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. The Court has previously held that as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month reglementary periods within which to file

a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the court. This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan in admitting the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed. Anent the propriety of the Sandiganbayans nullification of the Compromise Agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the Court holds that no error nor grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan for ruling that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was tainted with fraud on the part of petitioners and in connivance with some PCGG officials. A circumspect review of the record of the case reveals that fraud, indeed, was perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement, the assessed or market values of the properties offered for settlement having been concealed from the reviewing authorities such as the PCGG En banc It is evident from the foregoing that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is grounded on facts and on the law. The Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusions drawn by the Sandiganbayan on the basis of its findings, especially considering that the three justices comprising the Sandiganbayans Third Division conducted a thorough examination of the documents submitted by the parties to this case, heard the testimonies of the parties witnesses and observed their deportment during the hearing on the Motion to Rescind. Moreover, it is an established rule that the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its agents. Respondent cannot be bound by a manifestly unjust compromise agreement reviewed on its behalf and entered into by its representatives from the PCGG who apparently were not looking after respondents best interests Petition is DISMISSED L.29 URBANO V CHAVEZ Facts: Sometime in 1988, the petitioners Urbano and Acapulco, instituted a criminal case against Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Local Government as well as Sectoral Representatives Pacifico Conol and Jason Ocampos, Jr. of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tangub City, for alleged violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint against them was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.

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The Office of the Solicitor General, through Solicitor General Francisco Chavez entered his appearance as counsel for the saidrespondents as far as the preliminary investigation of the case is concerned. The said petitioners seek to enjoin the Solicitor General and his associates from acting as counsel for the said respondents in the course of the preliminary investigation. The said petitioners submit that in the event that the corresponding information is filed against the said respondents with the Sandiganbayan and a judgment of conviction is rendered by the said court, the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General on behalf of the said respondents during the preliminary investigation will be in conflict with its role as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines. ISSUE: Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action against him or in a civil action for damages against him? The Court rules that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This applies to all officials in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government. For this reason, the doctrine announced in Anti- Graft League of the Philippines, Inc v Hon. Ortega and Solicitor General v. Garrido and all the deciding cases affirming the same; in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, SHOULD BE DEEMED ABANDONED. Presidential Decree No. 478: Sec. 1. Functions and Organization. 1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. . . (Emphasis supplied) Section 1661 of the Revised Administrative Code: "As principal law officer of the Government, the Solicitor General shall have the authority to act for and represent the Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers and agents in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer." Under the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. and Garrido, the Office of the Solicitor General is authorized to enter its

appearance as counsel for any public official, against whom a criminal charge had been instituted, during the preliminary investigation stage thereof. Nevertheless, in the same case, this Court held that once information is filed against the public official, the Office of the Solicitor General can no longer represent the said official in the litigation. But, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. The Office of the Solicitor General, as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, is expected to take a stand against the accused. More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical considerations, where the Office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the preliminary investigation stage of the criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. As to why the public official concerned may no longer be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, the ostensible reason is this: the said Office may no longer represent him considering that its position as counsel for the accused will be in direct conflict with its responsibilities as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. L.30 GLORIA V CA Facts: Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report to work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with: (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990. Issue: WON there is a right to back salaries of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they did not report for work but who were eventually ordered reinstated because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike, although reprimanded for being absent without leave

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L.31. QUIMBO VS. GERVACIO Held: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (Section 47, par. 4, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292). Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. However, no compensation was due for the period of preventive suspension pending investigation. The Civil Service Act of 1959(R.A. No. 2260) providing for compensation in such a case once the respondent was exonerated was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. But although it is held that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, they are entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension pending investigation x x x is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/ suspension by the DECS until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding 5 years. FACTS Quimbo, the Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for HARASSMENT ANDOPPRESSION by Padoan, a general foreman who was detailed to the Motor Pool Division, Provincial Engineering by then Prov. Gov. Quimbo was placed under preventive suspension w/o pay to commence upon receipt of the order and until such time that it is lifted but in no case beyond 6months. He began serving it on March 18, 1998 but it was lifted April 27, 1998after presenting 2 witnesses on direct examination. ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension should becredited for his penalty HELD: NO. Preventive suspension is not a penalty. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered partof the actual penalty SEC. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. NATURE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: merely apreventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation -purpose: prevent accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper w/ records w/c may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.; not to be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. L. 32. GONZALES vs CHAVES FACTS According to petitioner Gonzales, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three (33) cases before this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in the National Labor Relations Commission and another case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one hundred

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forty-four (144) cases. In December 1990, the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation." As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom are trial lawyers. Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance was made without any reason, it implied that it was "within the absolute discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG in court. ISSUE Whether or not the Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines. HELD Abandonment of a case is however does not mean that the solicitor general may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons for the discretion given him is not unlimited. He is obligated to perform his functions, withdrawal of appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is tantamount to withdrawing on no grounds at all and to dereliction of duty. He should not decline to appear in court to represent a government agency without just and valid reason. Although the PCGG is empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it, such express grant of power does not imply that it may abdicate such power and turn over the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide to employ. Petition GRANTED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED to immediately re-enter his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion to withdraw appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the services of the lawyers it had employed. L.33 ARIAS V SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for

the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as "residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase. Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic onJune 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature on the voucher, there is no evidence linking him to the transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment. Petitioner Data's participation as the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District is that he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. Issue: Is Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, guilty of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig,Rizal?

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Held: Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: "SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corruptpractices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: "(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." All heads of offices have a right to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinate and on the good faith of those who prepared the documents, and are not liable for the falsification.

Avenue to Monumento. On board the LRT, her handbag was slashed, among the items taken from her was the government-issued cellular phone. Petitioner was ordered to pay the purchase value of the cell phone (P3,988) and that of its case (P250), a total of P4,238. The auditors action was sustained by the director of the National Government Audit Office II (NGAO II). The matter was then elevated to the Commission on Audit. On appeal, the COA found no sufficient justification to grant the request for relief from accountability. ISSUE Whether petitioner was negligent in the care of the government-issued cellular phone Whether she should be held accountable for its loss. HELD Petition is GRANTED. Riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a negligent act; more so under the circumstances in this case, in which petitioners mode of transit was influenced by time and money considerations. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent man and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed, and the importance of the act which he is to perform. The Rules provide that property for official use and purpose shall be utilized with the diligence of a good father of a family. Extra-ordinary measures are not called for in taking care of a cellular phone while in transit. Placing it in a bag away from covetous eyes and holding on to that bag, as done by petitioner, is ordinarily sufficient care of a cellular phone while travelling on board the LRT.

If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners, Arias and date beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequacy of the evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain conviction. L.34. CRUZ vs. GANGAN FACTS Petitioner Cruz went to the Regional Office of TESDA in Taguig, Metro Manila for consultation with the regional director. After the meeting, petitioner went back to her official station in Caloocan City, by boarding the LRT from Sen. Gil Puyat

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Within thirty days of the loss, petitioner applied for relief from accountability. We hold that such application be deemed as the notification of the loss of the subject cellular phone. She has also done her part in proving that the loss was due to theft or robbery L.35 REYES V COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of Interior and Local Government were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took twentyseven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to be heard. A temporary restraining order was issued by the court on February 7, 1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner's counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the decision. On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of

mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong. Issue: WON the reelection of the petitioner rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic Held: Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office 12 during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. The subsequent finding that a candidate is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the lections so as to invalidate the votes casts for him.
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