THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 139882. August 16, 2000] ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The retroactive application, of procedural rules to pending cases is well settled. Hence, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the notice of appeal, applies to the present case. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the March 8, 1999 [1] and the June 4, 1999[2] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA). The first Resolution reads as follows: "The Court considers the appeal of Leonila Cui and Oriental Assurance Corporation ABANDONED and DISMISSED for their failure to pay the required docket fees (Section 1 [c], Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.)" (emphasis in the original) The second Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts Petitioner Oriental Assurance Corporation issued Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D, insuring the stock of finished and/or unfinished products including raw materials, machinery and equipment belonging to Wear Me Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me). The policy insured against loss and/or damage by fire from March 20, 1991 to March 20, 1992. The policy was subsequently renewed for another year from March 20, 1992 to March 20, 1993 under Renewal Receipt No. 40948. A Memorandum stating that the policy was "[m]ade further subject to MORTGAGEE CLAUSE in favor of SOLIDBANK CORPORATION"' was typewritten on the face of the receipt. On April 27, 1993, petitioner issued another Fire Insurance Policy (No. F-93-40690-D) insuring the same items of Wear Me from March 20, 1993 to March 20, 1994. On July 12, 1993, a fire broke out at the factory of Wear Me, destroying a major portion of the insured properties. Wear Me submitted to petitioner and its co-insurers[3] a Notice of Loss for the value of the damaged properties. The claims were denied. As holder of trust receipts over the burned goods, Solidbank Corporation sent an undated telegram to petitioner, asking the latter to pay the proceeds of Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D. Petitioner refused to comply, because the Policy did not contain a mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank. Before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC),[4] respondent then instituted Civil Case No. 94-70505 against petitioner and Wear Me; as well as Angelita Amparo Go and Arnold A. Go, Leonila Cui, and Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. Acting favorably on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,[5] the RTC rendered a Decision,[6] the dispositive part of which reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: 1.1 Holding that the plaintiff is entitled to be paid under the loan of P1.2 Million and under the five trust receipts the sum of P4,797, 294.83, plus interests and other charges form December 29, 1992, until fully paid; 1.2 Holding defendant WEAR ME, Angelita Amparo Go and spouse, Arnold A. Go, jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff the above amounts; 1.3 Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., and Oriental Assurance Corporation, are held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff, together with defendants WEAR ME, Angelita Amparo Go and her spouse, Arnold A. Go, the above amounts but limited to the extent of the insurance coverage representing the insurance coverage assigned to Solidbank Corporation under the two (2) fire insurance policies; 1.4 Leonila Cui is held jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff, together with all the other defendants, but only with respect to the loan of P1.2 million and the accrued interest and penalties. 2. Ordering all the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff a sum equal to 10% of the amounts above payable plus the costs of the suit."[7] On August 18, 1995, respondent filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal. It was opposed by petitioner, which filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision.

Subsequently, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Execution and denying the Motion for Reconsideration. On October 23, 1995, petitioner appealed. the RTC Decision and Omnibus Order to the Court of Appeals. It should be added that before elevating the records of the case to the appellate court, the RTC granted respondent's Motion to Stay Execution Pending Appeal Based on Supersedeas Bond. As earlier mentioned, the CA denied petitioner's appeal and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court.[8] The Issue In its Memorandum, petitioner submits for the consideration of this Court this lone issue: "xxx [W]hether or not the Court of Appeals x x x committed reversible error in giving retroactive effect to Section 1 (c) of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [dismissing] petitioner's appeal for failure of the petitioner to pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees."[9] The Court's Ruling The Petition is devoid of merit. Sole Issue: Retroactive Effect of Rules of Procedure According to both parties, the sole controversy is the retroactive application of Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides: "SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. -- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxx................................xxx................................xxx (c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 [10] and section 4 of Rule 41;" Section 4 of Rule 41 in turn reads: "SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. -- Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal." Petitioner contends that these Rules cannot be given retroactive effect because such action would impair its "vested" rights under the old Rules.[11] The latter required an appellant to pay the docket fees within fifteen days from the receipt of notice from the CA clerk of court that the record on appeal has been received. The retroactive application of procedural rules to pending cases is undoubtedly well settled.[12] Petitioner even admits this in its efforts to reason out its case.[13] For this reason alone, the present Petition should be dismissed. Even assuming that it is entitled to the aforecited right, the CA's dismissal of the appeal still stands. Counsel's Negligence In Arambulo v. CA,[14] a case in which the required notice invoked by herein petitioner was sent to the wrong counsel, we held: "Both the Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Jimenez and the Appearance of Atty. Pineda are undeniably found in the original record of Civil Case No. 5301 and are explicitly referred to in the Summary Index in the record of CA-G.R. CV No. 32348. And since the withdrawal of Atty. Jimenez had taken effect upon its filing before the trial court on 12 February 1991, the notice to pay the docket and other fees sent to him by the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals on 4 March 1991 was thus void or otherwise ineffective. Receipt thereof by him did not operate as notice to the Arambulos. It is a fact on record that no notice to pay the docket fee was sent to and received by Atty. Pineda, therefore, the 15-day period to pay the required docket fee did not even commence to run." (emphasis ours) Even if we assume that petitioner is entitled to the notice mentioned in the old Rules, the appeal may be dismissed nonetheless, due to petitioner and its counsel's negligence in inquiring on the status of the appeal. Again, Arambulo is illuminating, as shown below: "Nevertheless, the appeal can be dismissed, not on the basis of the respondent Court of Appeals' error but on a different ground for which Atty. Pineda must answer. As the new counsel for petitioners, it was incumbent upon him, consistent with his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, to inquire either from the trial court or the appellate court about the status of the appeal since he had not received any notice to pay the docketing and other fees despite the lapse of several months from the time he entered his appearance. While he had every reason to expect that the office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals would faithfully comply with Sections 2(3) and 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals on the issuance of notice to the

parties to pay the docketing and other fees, his failure to receive the notice for so long a time should have alarmed him to the possibility that something must have gone awry somewhere." (Emphasis ours) Indeed, it is the duty[15] of petitioner's counsel to check the status of a pending appeal. [16] This duty is even more compelling in this case because the appeal had been pending for over three years,[17]and counsel had not received any notice to pay the required docket and other lawful fees. These circumstances should have compelled to action petitioner's counsel, whose reason for the delay was flimsy and unacceptable. Erroneous and irrelevant is the allegation that "[t]he long pendency of petitioner's appeal was due to the filing by Prudential of the petition for certiorari and the filing by the respondent of the motion to dismiss the appeal." [18] We stress that the relevant matter is the failure of petitioner to check the status of its appeal. Under the circumstances, it is bound by the negligence of its counsel.[19] In view of the foregoing conclusion, the parties' lengthy discussions of the merits of the appealed case need not be ruled upon. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic vs CA and Bobiles Republic vs CA and Bobiles GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992

FACTS: Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to Bobiles.

ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.

HELD: The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory. Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings. Hence, Petition was denied.

PEOPLE VS PATALIN 311 SCRA 186 Tuesday, January 20, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Criminal Law Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the evening of August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua. The decision for the present case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659 which restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?

Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that the framers intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. The retroactive effect may be given during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed but service has not begun; and c) when the sentence is being carried out. The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.

ORTIGAS AND CO, LTD., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 126102; DECEMBER 4, 2000DIGEST NO.1Facts: On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila. One stipulation of the contract provided that the lot will be used exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building will be constructed thereon. In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased thelot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Thus on January 18, 1995 Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint which sought to the demolition of the said structure , thus in his defense Mathay denied any knowledge of the restriction on the lot , he further contends in his special civil action to the court of appeals that ,the MCC Ordinance classified the area where the lot was located as a commercial area and said ordinance must be read as a concrete exercise of Police power. The contention however of the petitioner Ortigas, is that it is observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976,while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The trialcourt reasoned that since private respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said ordinance should be given prospective application only. And the contract of Ortigas Coand Hermosos should not be affected. Issues: Whether or not the ordinance of the MCC nullified the building restriction imposing exclusive residential use on the property inquisition. Held: In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract a reapplicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One

involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01as a legitimate police power measure.

Cui vs Arellano University TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which E metrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void. The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim.

Gatchalian v. Delim Facts: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a snapping sound was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospita l, and their bills were paid by respondents spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.

Issues: (1) Whether there was a valid waiver (2) Whether the respondent was negligent (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held: (1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy. (2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances". The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver. (3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ, ROLLY ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG and NICANOR LABUEN, vs. RIZALINO UY G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005 Facts: As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court which affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC, hearings were conducted to determine the amount of wage differentials due the eight petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and closed, stating that the judgment award as computed had been complied with to the satisfaction of petitioners. Said Manifestation was also signed by the eight petitioners. Together with the manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of petitioners, attesting to the receipt of payment from respondent and waiving all other benefits due them in connection with their complaint. On October 20, 1997, six of the eight petitioners filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are already satisfied of what they have received from respondent. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit in the local dialect, of the six petitioners attesting that they have no more collectible amount from respondent and if there is any, they are abandoning and waiving the same. Issues: 1. Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to compromise settlement; 2. Whether or not the petitioners affidavit waiving their awards in the la bor case executed without the assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid. Held: 1. There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered into after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. Petitioners voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement. Circumstances also reveal that respondent has already complied with its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement. Having already benefited from the agreement, estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it. 2. The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in to annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated.