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Date: October 10, 2003

For: Chris Healy Facsimile! Number 296-5545

Company: 9-11 Commission Main Number:

From: Jamie Gorelick

COMMENTS: !i
Please call me when you receive this so that we can discuirSlt.

Thanks. ^'ixj^v^&r-y'*' '.': ^~..:o::i£tMM~^ "'•':

Jamie
663-6500.

it

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Questions for Deutch Testimony

1. What are the impediments or downsides with working with

what we've got? What, in your view and experience, are the
limitations of the Terrorist Threat Integration
whch on Center,
ene
wVH nb "i a eiiTM^»'» "<->'' * £-. n -i --
which is supposed to fully integrate all information,
whether gathered at home or abroad?
2 "whit we* thS i^pediments or downsides with working with
3. At our very first hearing, I examined the chairs and
ranking members of the intelligence committees on a subject
that you address, which is whether they did, or even
whether in the current construct, they could perform
effective oversight over -the intelligence community. Their
response roughly, was that they can review budgets line-
by-line, but have few effective means to look across the
intelligence community at the requirements and the ability
to meet them. You note the difficulty in getting change
such as you propose through Congress because of the shift
in budget, etc. from one oversight body (e.g., Defense,
Judiciary) to another (Intelligence) - having been
overseen by two of those three, what are the upsides of the
snitt you propose from an oversight point of view? will
programmatic review be easier or harder?
4. You were, when you were at Defense, part of efforts in
which the Secretary of Defense had to concur in the
exercise of authority by another agency -- which is what
you propose here. Isn't it the case that the.SecDef
because of his powerful position in th^ Cabinet, in-. ter,ms
of resources, stature, etc., is and wotLld ;be in a pcssi'tron
to frustrate the exerciee of budget fciithofrlfcy--which' is '-'aif "• .
the core of your proposals? ;
5. Why wait to separate out the DCI and:CIA jobs? Won't the
DIS feel that it is appealing decisions -- substantive,
resource, etc. - - t o someone who has, by virtue of "his or
her CIA hat, another loyalty? Same question with."regard,"~io~
the Defense agencies who would have tfc^CQmpfi£e,,fojE- dolla^ -
and missions with the CIA. ' -
6. One of the complaints one hears from £fce_fil& is that the
military is able to undermine ef forts-'to- q^rry aut- covert
actions by creating military support[requirements that are
so substantial that they render covert actions -not coverjt- -
or too expensive, or to costly in terms of our relations'
with other countries. Do you think tjhat this is a problem?"
How do your proposals address the pro-blent?
7. Quite apart from your organizational 'proposals, you'note a^
series of problems that need to be adldres'sed
- .,., "otherwise
- - / if

01 130
 your organizational proposals are not adopted -- that we
have multiple agencies with their own bilateral
relationships with agencies abroad; that our information
operations are without coordination; that we do not have
clear lines with regard to what is and who has
responsibility for covert actions; we lack a coordinated
approach to the development of technology, etc. Are your
organizational proposals the only way to address these
problems?

a. fit 130
Thomas H. Kcan
CHAIR FAX TRANSMISSION
Lee H. Hamilton Two (2) pages, including this coversheet
VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste TO: Commissioner Fred Fielding

Max Clcland
FROM: Chris Healey and Gordon Lederman
Fred F. Fielding National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Jamie S. Gorelick
DATE: October 10, 2003
Slade Gorton

John Lehman RE: The Commission's hearing on October 14, 2003

Timothy J. Rocmer Please find attached suggested questions for Dr. Deutch. These questions for the
James R. Thompson most part focus on the issues related to the Department of Defense.

Philip D. Zelikow
We have spoken to Commissioner Gorelick. She will mainly focus on questions
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR concerning the domestic intelligence service and oversight.

The Commission's email system is currently down. If you need to reach us, please
contact us as follows:

> On Saturday and Sunday: Chris Healey, home9/11 personal privacy

I 9/11 Personal Privacy I

On Monday: Gordon Ledermanl 9/11 personal privacy I

I 9/11 Personal Privacy ^^^^"^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

We look forward to seeing you at the October 14th hearing. Thank you.

TI:I. (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-11 commission.gov
 Suggested questions based on testimony submitted by Dr. Deutch

1. Do you believe the attacks of 9/11 are evidence of a systemic organizational problem
within the Intelligence Community?

2. Do you believe the changes within the Intelligence Community since 9/11 have been
sufficient to prevent future terrorist attacks?

3. You recommend that the DCI should have authority and responsibility for the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and part of the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) of the Department of Defense. Aren't these programs so closely
linked to the warfighting mission that they should remain under the purview of the
Secretary of Defense?

4. You propose that the DCI be given planning and budgeting authority over the JMIP
and parts of TIARA, but the Secretary of Defense should keep day-to-day
management of these programs. How would this work in practice? Doesn't having
an entity serve two masters muddle the chain of command and preclude
accountability?

5. You recommend that the DCI should give up day-to-day management over the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) but you also argue that the DCI should have
greater authority over the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the
National Security Agency (NSA). Doesn't the NRO have such an integral role in the
success of NIMA and NSA that the DCI should retain his current role over NRO?

6. An Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence was recently created within the

Department of Defense. Was the creation of this office a good idea, and what would
be this office's responsibilities if your proposal were enacted?

7. You state that there is no overall budget or multi-year program for intelligence
activities. Doesn't the DCI have authority to prepare a multi-year budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program now? What specifically prevents the DCI from
establishing program performance milestones, costs and schedules now for the NFIP?

8. How would you answer the critics who might argue that placing a domestic
intelligence service under the DCI would allow the CIA to get too close to spying on
Americans and ultimately threaten civil liberties?

9. What is the difference between your proposal and other proposals that have been
made to strengthen the DCI?
 Suggested questions based on testimony submitted by Dr. Deutch

^ X

\ 1. Do you believe the attacks of 9/11 are evidence of a systemic organizational problem
within the Intelligence Community?
jT\ 2. Do you believe the changes within the Intelligence Community since 9/11 have been
sufficient to defend against the next possible major terrorist attack?

J ££ U (l ^ou do not explicitly ooll for die uuiliuu uf dDinUui uf Naliuiidl LiidligClkV
" l CTW'); although yon advocate changing tin balance uf authority between the DCI
anH thp Sprreti^y nf Dpfengf? What is the difference between your proposal and
Proposals that have been made to aroato a DMI? stre M»tU"A H < DC DC I ?

4. An Undersecretary of Defense pr Intelligence was recently created within the

Department of Defense. What^vould be the responsibilities of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence if your proposal were enacted?

5. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is described by the Executive Branch
rCJ ) as a joint venture of the five principal departments and agencies with counterterrorism
responsibilities (i.e., CIA and the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice,
Defense and State.) What in your view are the strengths and weaknesses of a joint
venture model?

6. Under your proposal, a new Domestic Intelligence Service (DIS) would be created for
intelligence activities undertaken in the U.S. and for collection of intelligence where
U.S. persons may be involved.
\1^ If** \ How would you answer critics who might argue that a domestic intelligence

service created under the DCI would allow CIA to get too^hos^to spying on
Americans?

• Do you envision DIS being created out of the FBI's national security division?

\or • How effective would be Department of Justice oversight mechanisms if the

U ^'"*^**"^^«
niif^nf V
^ new domestic intelligence service were entirely outside the Department?
•\ f / p7
"^<£^ . ' 7. Why do you believe the positions of head of the Intelligence Community and head of
Lfj KJ£>) the CIA should not be separated under today's division of responsibilities?

8. You recommend that the DCI should have/authority or responsibility for the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and*the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) of the Department of Defense. Aren't these programs so closely
linked to the warfighting mission that they should remain under the purview of the
Secretary of Defense?
9. You recommend that the DCI should give up day-to-day management over the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) but you also argue that the DCI should have
greater authority over the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the
National Security Agency (NSA). Doesn't the NRO have such an integral role in the
success of NIMA and NSA that the DCI should retain his current role over NRO?

10. You argue that your proposal would improve the operation of four important
functions: covert action, information operations, intelligence coordination with other
countries, and science and technology capabilities. What specifically limits the DCI
from addressing these functions under current law?
' 1V DCI