1 LECTURE NOTES FOR PHILOSOPHY 103: LOGIC Dr. Neil A. Manson SYMBOLIC/PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC (Copi & Cohen Ch.

8) In the system of logic usually called "symbolic logic" or propositional logic, it is essential to grasp the notion of a truth-functional proposition, which is a proposition such that, if we know the truth-value of the components and the meaning of the logical operators involved, we can determine the truth-value of the whole proposition. The property of having a truth value is simply the property of being either true or false. A logical operator is a thing which connects or modifies propositions in the following way: if used correctly on a proposition or propositions, a new proposition with a different logical structure is produced. We can think of several logical operators: "It is not the case that", "or", "because", "Barack Obama believes that". When these are combined with statements in the right way, new statements--expressing new propositions--are produced. Now for some of these logical operators, knowing the truth value of the input proposition(s) enables us to determine the truth value of the newly-formed proposition. For example, with the "It is not the case that" operator, we know that the newly-formed proposition will have the opposite truth value of the input proposition. For other logical operators, however, knowing the truth value of the input proposition(s) is not sufficient for us to determine the truth value of the newly formed proposition (e.g. "Barack Obama believes that"). Logical operators of the first type are called truth-functional logical operators. The next crucial thing to grasp about this system is that it uses symbols heavily. Two sorts of things get abbreviated/symbolized in this system: logical operators and propositions. Note that there is already a big difference between propositional logic and syllogistic logic. In the latter, the things that got abbreviated were terms, which stood for classes. These terms are parts of categorical proposition. In propositional logic, we abbreviate whole propositions. For example, consider the statement "All dogs are mammals." In syllogistic logic, this would be abbreviated as "All D are M." In propositional logic, it might be abbreviated as "A, where A stands for All dogs are mammals. There are two kinds of abbreviations in this system: propositional constants and propositional variables. The former are abbreviations of particular propositions (e.g. B for My brothers pet dog Bosco ate a doggie bone"). The latter indicate blanks into which particular propositions are put. Propositional variables are used when indicating the abstract structure--the propositional schema--exhibited by a truth-functional proposition. In syllogistic logic, we might use "All S are P" to indicate the schema for "All dogs are mammals." In propositional logic, the logical structure of the proposition All dogs are mammals might be symbolized simply as "p, because All dogs are mammals is, from the point of view of symbolic logic, a simple proposition that is, a proposition not composed out of any further propositions. In general, propositional constants are restricted to capitalized letters of the alphabet, while propositional variables are restricted to lower-case letters beginning with the letter "p" and going to the end of the alphabet. Note that propositional variables and propositional schemas are neither true

2 nor false, because the variables do not express any actual propositions. If actual propositions are substituted for propositional variables in a propositional schema, it is called giving an interpretation of a schema, and the result is something which is true or false. Another tool used in this system is the truth table, which is a device for displaying all of the possible combinations of truth-values for the components of a truthfunctional proposition. We will get much more facility with truth tables as we go along, but here are two basics. First, "true" is abbreviated as T, "false" as F. Second, in the right-most column, there are alternating Ts and Fs; in the second-from-the-right column, alternating pairs of Ts and Fs; in the third, alternating quadruplets of Ts and Fs; in the fourth, alternating octuplets of Ts and Fs; and so on. This method ensures that every possible combination of Ts and Fs is covered in the truth table. If you dont follow this method, youll get a truth table that doesnt cover all of the possible combinations that is, a faulty truth table. Now that we have some notion of a truth table, we are in a position to define the truth-functional logical operators that we will be using in this system. First is the socalled dot operator, also called conjunction, which always and only expresses the truthfunctional meaning of the English word 'and'. Here's the truth table for the dot operator: p T T F F q T F T F pq T F F F

This truth table provides the complete definition of conjunction. As you can see, the only way for a conjunction to be true is if each of its conjuncts is true. Note that in English the word 'and' is often used to express much more information that is conveyed by the dot operator: For example, "Sam and Christie are married" tells you more than just that Sam is married and Christie is married; it tells you that Sam and Christie are married to one another. Again, "He got excited and spilled his beer tells you more than just that he got excited and that he spilled his beer; it tells you he spilled his beer because he got excited. Also, many other English words contain the notion of conjunction: 'but', 'although', 'yet', 'moreover', and so on (though they contain other information as well--for example, with 'although', that the two propositions are contrasted somehow). If you are translating English using propositional logic, be aware of such losses of meaning, even noting them if appropriate. The next logical operator is disjunction, which really only has one English equivalent: the word 'or'. 'Or' has one of two meanings, however: the one expressed by the English construction "Either....or....", and the one expressed by the neologism "and/or". Logicians call these the exclusive sense and the inclusive sense, respectively. The inclusive sense of 'or' is the English equivalent of disjunction. Thus we get the following truth table for disjunction:

3 p T T F F q T F T F pvq T T T F

As we can see, the only way for a disjunction to be false is if all of its disjuncts are false. Generally, logicians interpret 'or' as disjunction, unless there is good reason to think that 'or' is being used in the exclusive sense, in which case the compound proposition in question gets expressed in some other way [namely, (A or B) and (not A or not B)]. The symbol used for disjunction is a small V-wedge, in a size appropriate to distinguish it from either a lower-case or upper-case letter 'v'. The next logical operator is negation, which is symbolized by Copi using the tilde symbol, ~, thought I'll usually use instead. The result of a negation is simply a truthfunctional proposition with the opposite truth value of the proposition negated. Negation's truth table is, obviously, this: p T F p F T

Note that, for any pair of English statements A and B, it is possible that A does not look like the negation of B, but actually is. For example, "She is dead" and "She is alive" seem to involve different predicates, but in fact "She is alive" is equivalent to "It is not the case that she is dead." This illustrates a problem with how to translate a negation into everyday English. What is the best way to express the negation of "She is dead"? Whatever you come up with--"She is alive", "It is not the case that she is dead", "It is false that she is dead", "She is not dead"--you should abbreviate it the same way. The next logical operator is material implication, which is not really equivalent to any English term, although it is closely related to an "if...then..., or conditional, statement. The proposition in the "if" clause of a conditional is the antecedent, while the proposition in the "then" clause is the consequent. The symbol for material implication is , the horseshoe. Here is the truth table for : p T T F F q T F T F pq T F T T

Following our terminology for conditionals, the term preceding the horseshoe is the antecedent, while the term following the horseshoe is the consequent. As we can see, the only way for a material implication to be false is if the antecedent is true and the

4 consequent is false. Note that, of all the logical operators we've seen so far, material implication is the only one that is sensitive to the sequence of the component propositions. If A is true and B is false, then A B is false, but B A is true. Material implication captures something very important about our ordinary if.then statements. For example, if I say to you If you pay me $1,000,000, then youll get an A in this course, under what conditions would I have told you something false? Only one the situation in which you do pay me $1,000,000 but you do not get an A in this course. If you do pay me $1,000,000 and you do get an A, I told you the truth. And if you dont pay me $1,000,000 and you dont get an A, I still told you the truth (or, at least, I didnt clearly tell a lie). And if you dont pay me $1,000,000 and you do get an A, then again, I told you the truth (or, at least, I didnt clearly tell a lie); after all, I never said the only way youll get an A in this course is to pay me $1,000,000! So this basic logical feature of if.then.statements is reflected in the material conditional. Having said that, the horseshoe is not perfectly synonymous with the English ifthen. conditional. This lack of synonymy leads to the so-called paradoxes of material implication. These are, first, that any ifthen. statement with a false antecedent automatically counts as true if we interpret it as a material implication, and second, that any ifthen. statement with a true consequent automatically counts as true if we interpret it as a material implication. So, for example, any statement of the form If Ole Miss is in Virginia, then.. will be true according to material implication. So If Ole Miss is in Virginia, then the Moon is made of green cheese is true! Likewise, any statement of the form If, then Ole Miss is in Oxford, Mississippi will automatically be true. The problem arises from the fact that one statement can materially imply another even though there isn't any intrinsic relationship between them; this isn't the case with English conditionals. We can see this when we compare horseshoe to conditional in particular cases. First, consider this claim: If Mars is a planet, then Ole Miss is a university. The antecedent and consequent are both true. If we interpret this claim as a material implication, then the truth table says its true. Since Marss being a planet and Ole Misss being a university seem to have nothing to do with one another, however, were inclined to doubt the truth of If Mars is a planet, then Ole Miss is a university. Likewise, If Mars is a university, then Ole Miss is a planet is true if we interpret it as a material conditional. In ordinary speech, however, we probably wouldnt be inclined to call it true, particularly since both the antecedent and the consequent are false. Furthermore, the English conditional often implies a causal relation, which isn't part of the meaning of material implication. For example, If shell be at the party, then I wont suggests that her being at the party will cause me to stay away. But material implication doesnt carry such a connotation. So we'll translate material implications as conditionals, but we must be careful about going the other way--symbolizing conditionals as material implications. As a rule of thumb, translating from material implication into the English conditional adds meaning, while translating the English conditional as a horseshoe results in a loss of meaning. Note also that there are lots of other uses of "if" in English that might best be translated as material implications: p if q [q p]; p only if q [p q], p even if q [p]; and when p, q [p q]. Our last logical operator is material equivalence, which can be thought of as

5 mutual material implication and is symbolized as (not =). Again, there is no real English equivalent for material equivalence, but the idea is fairly clear: if the components of a material equivalence have the same truth value, then the resulting compound proposition is true; if not, it is false. So here is its truth table: p T T F F q T F T F pq T F F T

We translate material equivalences into English using the phrase "if and only if." We are free to define other logical operators. For example, why dont we talk about "truthation? Heres the truth table for truthation: p T F TRUTHATION p T T

Or how about falsation? Heres the truth table for it: p T F FALSATION p F F

The reason we dont talk about such logical operators is because there are no such operators at work in any rational language or system of thought. Sure, little kids can play word games where they pretend an operator such as falsation actually works. Little Joey: Everything Mary says is a lie. But if Mary is just the least bit clever, shell quickly see what to say in order to get Little Joey to take it back. Mary: Little Joey is handsome. Little Joey is smart. Somebody loves Little Joey. Its not true that Little Joey stinks like a pile of dog poo. Its.. Little Joey: I take it back! Mary doesnt always lie! The point is, no one could actually think using falsation. Likewise, there might be some dictatorship or cult according to which everything the Dear Leader says is true. Members of such societies or cults quickly lose their minds, because the truthation operator (attributed to the sayings of the Dear Leader) simply doesnt correspond to any rational

6 way of thinking. The logical operators we do discuss, however, actually do correspond to elements in a rational way of thinking. Indeed, by getting really clear about how these operators function, we hope to improve our minds and make ourselves better thinkers. MULTIPLE OPERATORS, TRUTH TABLES, AND TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS Often (too often) we are confronted in everyday English with complicated, convoluted statements that express a lot of information and contain more than one logical operator, and we have to have some procedures for sorting them out. If we sort them out improperly, we risk completely misunderstanding them. Consider the following example: Im going to the store and buying meat or ordering pizza. This is of the form A B v C. How are we to interpret this? Suppose A is false, but B and C are true. Then, if we interpret it as (A B) v C, we get a true statement, but if we interpret it as A (B v C), we get a false statement. As we can see, then, it is going to be very important that we disentangle such English statements and symbolize them in the right way. Here are some guidelines. First, we will use brackets to group propositional constants/variables with the appropriate logical operators (just like in math). We will use all of the clues that the English language provides when we bracket. These include punctuation marks such as commas and semicolons, as well as words such as "either." Consider the sloppy English sentence It is not true that Ashlea is an idiot or Brennan is a buffoon. The form of it is "it is not true that A or B." This could mean (A or B), or it could mean A or B. What English words or punctuation marks might help? Well, "A, or B" would clearly establish the correct interpretation, but your English teacher would frown upon it. The use of the word "either" would make things clear--"Either A or B" vs. either A or B"--but that would commit ourselves to the exclusive sense of "or. The best way to do it is to put the negation inside the proposition in question--saying, for example, "Ashlea isn't an idiot or Brennan is a buffoon." Second, we will adopt the rule that no parentheses are needed when you are negating a simple proposition. Thus, what we could symbolize as "(p) v q" we will simply symbolize as "p v q." As long as there are not brackets around the expression (p v q), we can be sure that the negation applies only to p. There are lots of idiosyncracies in English, and symbolizing such statements can be tricky. For example, "Neither A nor B" is not symbolized as A v B, but as (A v B), which, as we will later see, is equivalent to A B. Here's another idiosyncracy. Our statements often involve long lists of propositions, all conjoined or all disjoined. In order to be symbolized, these statements must be grouped, so that no more than two expressions are contained in any one bracketing. So, for example, A B C must be symbolized as either (A B) C, or A (B C), although which way is arbitrary. In each of these cases one of the operators is the main operator. As we will see when we start constructing truth tables, the main operator is just the last operator for which we write down Ts and Fs. It is the column under the main operator that provides the truth-table definition of a particular propositional schema. Now we move on to the construction of truth tables. The first thing to do is identify how many propositional variables are involved. Write them out in a row, with a little space in between. Next, make the appropriate number of rows. For every n variables, you should have 2 to the nth power rows. For example, if you had 4 variables, you should have 24 rows, or sixteen rows. These rows are filled in using the following

7 patterns for the individual variables: in the rightmost column, alternating singles of Ts and Fs; in the next column to the left, alternating pairs of Ts and F; in the next column to the left of that one, alternating quadruplets; next, alternating octuplets; and so on. Once youve set up the truth table, you write down the propositional schema on a line above your truth table. Then (and this is the tricky part that is hard to explain in writing but that youll get the hang of with practice) you build up that propositional schema from its components. A good illustration of this procedure is on Copi p. 342. Now that we have truth tables in our grasp, we can compare pairs of truthfunctional propositions and classify individual truth-functional propositions. Assuming that we've got two truth-functional propositional schemas that involve the same variables, they are logically equivalent if they produce identical final columns. If the schemas of two propositions are logically equivalent, then so are the propositions. Two schemas that are obviously logically equivalent are p and p. The fact that doubly negating any proposition results in a logically equivalent proposition is called the law of double negation. Two other important "laws" are known as De Morgan's laws, which are that i) (p v q) is logically equivalent to p q; and ii) (p q) is logically equivalent to p v q. These "laws" can be proved by constructing truth tables. We can also characterize individual truth-functional propositions. Tautologies are propositions with all Ts under the main operator. The law of the excluded middle [p v p] and the law of non-contradiction [(p p)] are famous tautologies. Contradictions are propositions with all Fs under the main operator. Any negation of a tautology is a contradiction. Tautologies and contradictions are true or false simply in virtue of their form; their content doesnt matter. Any statement that is neither a tautology nor a contradiction is a contingency--that is, a proposition with both Ts and Fs under the final column. Note that, by connecting any two logically equivalent statements via material equivalence, the result is a tautology. Note also that any material equivalence is logically equivalent to the conjunction of a conditional and its converse. This is why a material equivalence is often called a biconditional, and why material implications are translated into English as "if and only if" statements. Finally, it is worth noting that any truthfunctional schema that involves material implication, disjunction, or material equivalence is materially equivalent to some schema that involves only negation and conjunction. That is, material implication, disjunction, and material equivalence are theoretically eliminable from our system. Especially worth noting are that (p q) (p v q) and that (p q) (p q) TESTING ARGUMENT FORMS FOR VALIDITY USING TRUTH TABLES An argument is valid if and only if it is such that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. Another way of putting this is that an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for it to have true premises and a false conclusion. This clearly indicates a straightforward way of determining whether or not an argument is valid. Simply construct a truth table for the argument. If there is a row where the premises are all true but the conclusion is not, then the argument is going to be invalid. If there isnt such a row, then the argument is going to be valid. This brings us to some important, though odd, consequences. First of all, there are going to be rows in the truth table of an argument that we won't even need to

8 examine, namely ones where either i) not all of the premises are true or ii) the conclusion is true. Thus we get the following consequences out of our definition of validity: first, any argument is guaranteed to be valid if a single premise or a conjunction of premises is a contradiction. A set of premises the members of which can't all be true is said to be inconsistent. Second, any argument is guaranteed to be valid if its conclusion is a tautology. In order to see these consequences in action, we first must learn how to schematize truth-functional arguments. We can lay out a schematization of an argument in the same line-by-line fashion as we used for categorical syllogisms (although in the case of truth-functional propositional arguments, far more than three lines can be used). The basic rule is that we must use different propositional constants to represent different propositions, and we must use the same propositional constant wherever the same proposition is repeated in an argument. And, likewise, we must use the different propositional variables to represent different propositional constants, and the same propositional variables whenever the same propositional constant appears in an argument. The process of substituting actual propositions for propositional variables is called providing an interpretation of the argument schema, and the result of providing an interpretation is called a substitution instance of a propositional schema. Given our definition of validity, it follows that an argument (or argument schema) is valid if and only if there is no possible interpretation/substitution instance of it that could have true premises and a false conclusion. It is very important to note that we are not restricted to substituting simple propositions for propositional variables. We can substitute complex compound propositions for propositional variables and still have something that counts as a substitution instance of a propositional schema. For example, A R (A v R) is a substitution instance of p q (p v q). The flip side of this is that there can be many ways to schematize a complex truth-functional argument, though some schematizations exhibit the logical structure of an argument in greater detail than do others. Now the straightforward way of testing an argument for validity is to use truth tables. What we do is lay out columns for all of the propositional variables that appear in a schematization of the argument. Then we fill out a column for each premise and a column for the conclusion. We check the table to see if we can find a row where the premises are all true but the conclusion is false. If we can, then the argument is not valid. If we cannot, then the argument is valid. This seems easy enough. However when the arguments start getting complicated, the size of the truth tables grows exponentially, and it becomes practically impossible to work with truth tables. For example, consider the following argument: "Either she didn't tell me about her secret past because she thinks I'll be hurt or because she thinks it's not my business. If it's because she thinks I'll be hurt, she doesn't trust me to love her. If it's because she thinks it is none of my business, she doesn't take me seriously. If she doesn't trust me to love her, our relationship can't work. If she doesn't take me seriously, our relationship can't work. So our relationship can't work." This would be complicated to construct a truth table for, to say the least (not to mention all of the negations that need to be taken out). Here's the abbreviation of the argument: H v B

9 H T B S T W S W Therefore, W This argument is valid, but it would be a pain in the rear to check its validity by the truth table method. Youd need a 32-row table. Another problem with the truth table method is one shared by all methods of determining validity. An argument can be invalid in one system of logic but valid in another. Consider the following example. "All politicians are liars. Jones is a politician. So Jones is a liar." According to syllogistic logic, this is a valid argument, but if we were to use the methods of propositional logic, we'd have to treat each statement as a single proposition (because none of them contain any truth-functional logical operators), so we'd have three unrelated propositions and hence an invalid argument. This isn't as shocking as it might seem. After all, the different systems of logic schematize the same argument in different ways. Since there can be different schematizations for the same argument, and since whether or not an argument is judged to be valid depends on how it is schematized, it is not surprising that an argument might be valid according to one system and invalid according to another. Given this, we have to remember that an argument with a schema that is valid in one system is unconditionally valid, but an argument with a schema that is invalid in a particular system is only conditionally invalid--invalid for that particular system of logic. Also, it should be noted that for every truth-functional argument, it is possible to construct a corresponding conditional. Just conjoin all of the premises and make them the antecedent, then make the conclusion the consequent. If a truth-functional argument is valid, then its corresponding conditional is a tautology. Likewise, if any conditional is a tautology, then a valid argument can be generated by making its antecedent the premise and its consequent the conclusion. Of course, when one makes an argument one is expressing something that seems different from a conditional. In an argument, the premises are asserted to be true, whereas in a conditional, it is only asserted that if the antecedent is true, then the consequent is true.