COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL. GR No.

s 148948 & 148951, February 17, 2003 Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor Federico Poblete et al. for vote buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutors Office as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034 -99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or voteselling. The Law Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss. Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. 2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latters opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the votebuying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth. 3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99. 4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC.

4. On June 21, 1988, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioners Yorac and Africa. This was the first of several motions for inhibition filed by petitioner before respondent commission. Petitioner also prayed that the disqualification petition be referred for consideration en banc. Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for inhibition. On August 10, 1988, the COMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en banc, ruling that "no substantial reason exists why this case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that the case is set for hearing by the Second Division." 5. On October 26, 1988, petitioner Lozano himself filed a motion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac because she postponed motu proprio a hearing set on the ground that she will study the issue of jurisdiction. Said motion was denied. 6. On November 3, 1988, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2050 which provides that petitions for disqualification filed prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code but not resolved before the elections shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department which shall submit its report to the Commission en banc. Pursuant to said resolution, the Second Division on even date referred back the disqualification case against respondent Binay to the Law Department "before taking any action thereon." 7. On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed another motion praying that the disqualification case be heard and decided en banc invoking therein COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Instead of issuing a formal resolution, respondent COMELEC authorized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a member of this Court) to reply to petitioner's counsel. 8. On May 23, 1990, the Law Department submitted its investigation report 5 recommending that criminal charges be filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, as follows: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division) RECOMMENDS as follows: 1. To file the necessary information against Mayor Jejomar Binay before the proper Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, the prosecution thereof to be handled by the Special Prosecution Committee; 2. To dismiss the charge against Mayor Jejomar Binay for threats and intimidation under Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code for lack of evidence; and 3. To dismiss the charge against Conchitina Bernardo for insufficiency of evidence. 9. On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion praying that the disqualification case be, resolved jointly with the investigation report of the Law Department. 10 On July 9, 1990, petitioner filed a third motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioner Yorac for having issued a previous memorandum addressed to the chairman and members of respondent commission expressing her opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the regular courts of the offense of vote buying before he could be disqualified. The full text of said memorandum 6 reads: I submit for the Commission's consideration the matter of the procedural problems in the above case. The chronology of events, so far as this case is concerned, is as follows: 1. SPC No. 88-040 for the disqualification of Jejomar Binay, then candidate for Mayor of Makati was filed on January 11, 1988. It was assigned to the second Division. 2. On July 29, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to set the case for hearing alleging that the Commission on Audit (COA) had officially confirmed the allegations of the complainants. 3. Hearings were actually conducted on August 11, September 12, October 12 and October 19, 1988. 4. On November 3, 1988, the Commission en banc adopted Resolution No. 88-2050, which, inter alia provides that: 1. . . . In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the commission may motu

Lozano v. Yorac Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil actions for certiorari, namely: G.R. No. 94521 which seeks the review of the undated order 1 of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac denying the motion for her voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Mayor Jejomar C. Binay"; and G.R. No. 94626 which prays for a reversal of the en banc resolution 2 promulgated by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on August 7, 1990 3 dismissing the disqualification petition and criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Mayor Jejomar C. Binay in connection with the January 18, 1988 local elections, and its minute resolution of August 15, 1990 4 denying due course to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The backdrop of this case on record reveals the following antecedent facts: 1. On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections, petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of municipal funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa. 2. The disqualification case was assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC composed of Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B. Dimaampao, as members. 3. The Second Division, through its Presiding Commissioner, referred the case to the Law Department of respondent commission for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect. On February 4, 1988, Binay filed his counter-affidavit with said department.

proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election; xxx xxx xxx 3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the information for filing with the appropriate court. 5. On the same date, conformable with Resolution No. 88-2050, the Second Division referred SPC No. 88-040 to the Law Department. 6. In the course of the investigation by the Law Department, the case became entangled with procedural difficulties the resolution of which has been sought in the Second Division. My own personal thinking on the matter is that since the preliminary investigation is the determination of criminal liability, with the administrative consequence of removal imposable only as long term sanction, i.e., after final criminal conviction, the matter of procedure in the preliminary investigation is one that should be addressed to the commission en banc rather than to either of its divisions. 11. On August 2, 1990, petitioner received a notice setting the promulgation of judgment en banc for August 6, 1990. Petitioner on August 3, 1990 filed an objection to the promulgation of judgment en banc, allegedly because there was no showing that the case was referred to the commission en banc upon unanimous vote of all the members of the Second Division. 12. In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which is herein assailed, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition for disqualification and the criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Binay. During the promulgation of judgment, petitioner asked that the same be suspended until after the resolution of the legal issues raised involving constitutional and jurisdictional questions. Commissioner Yorac was likewise requested by petitioner to decide the motion for her inhibition. In her undated order subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94521, as stated in limine, Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for for inhibition, stating that: During the deliberations on this case, I seriously considered inhibiting myself from participating and voting despite the flimsy basis which was cited for it. But I became convinced, from the information that was coming in, that the motion was really part of a numbers game, being played out on the basis of information emanating from the Commission itself as to the developments in the deliberation and the voting. Reliable information also shows that approaches have been made to influence the voting. It is for this reason that I do not inhibit myself from the voting in this case consistent with my reading of the law and the evidence. 13. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 1990, on the ground that "pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling of the Commission is one of the prohibited pleadings, and therefore not allowed under the Rules. Succinctly condensed, the petition filed against respondents COMELEC and Binay raises the following issues: 1. Contrary to the requirement under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, SPC No. 88-040 was referred to the Comission en banc without the required unanimous vote of all the members of the Second Division. 2. The minute resolution of August 15, 1990 is null and void for having been issued without prior notice to the parties and without fixing a date for the promulgation thereof. 3. Respondent commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction in not finding Binay guilty of vote- buying, contrary to the evidence presented by petitioner. 7 In G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 1990 a temporary restraining order 8 ordering respondent Commissioner Yorac to cease and desist from participating in the

deliberation and resolution of the motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1990 filed in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Jejomar Binay." The order was served in the office of Commissioner Yorac on August 17, 1990 at 11:25 A.M. 9 It appears, however, that the motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent commission en banc in a resolution dated August 15, 1990, copy of which was served on petitioner on August 17, 1990 at 12:35 P.M. Consequently, the issue on the inhibition and disqualification of Commissioner Yorac has been rendered moot and academic. Granting arguendo that the petition for inhibition of Commissioner Yorac has not been mooted by the resolution en banc dismissing the main case for disqualification, petitioner's postulation that she should have inhibited herself form hearing the main case, for allegedly having prejudged the case when she advanced the opinion that respondent Binay could only be disqualified after conviction by the regional trial court, is of exiguous validity. In the first place, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1, Rule 4 thereof, prohibits a member from, among others, sitting in a case in which he has proof. There is no showing that the memorandum wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her opinion was ever made public either by publication or dissemination of the same to the public. Furthermore, the opinion of Commissioner Yorac was based on prior cases for disqualification filed with the COMELEC wherein prior conviction of the respondent was considered a condition sine qua non for the filing of the disqualification case. 10 We accordingly find no compelling reason to inhibit Commissioner Yorac from participating in the hearing and decision of the case. Similarly, we find the petition in G.R. No. 94626 devoid of merit. Petitioner first avers that under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a case pending in a division may be referred to and decided by the Commission en banc only on a unanimous vote of all the members of the division. It is contended that SPC No. 88-040 which was pending before the COMELEC's Second Division was referred to the Commission en banc without the required unanimous vote of all the division members, petitioner alleging that Commissioner Andres R. Flores voted for the referral of the petition for disqualification to the division. It is, therefore, the submission of petitioner that the resolution of the Commission en banc dated August 17, 1990 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for being unconstitutional. The argument of petitioner is not well taken. COMELEC Resolution No. 1050 issued by the commission en banc on November 3, 1988 is the applicable law in this disqualification case. It provides: xxx xxx xxx RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987: 1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained (of), the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate. In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election. 2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of the Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission. Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. 3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation

to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the information for filing with the appropriate court. 11 xxx xxx xxx Contrary to petitioner's submission that said resolution has been repealed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which took effect on November 15, 1988, there is nothing in the resolution which appears to be inconsistent with the procedural rules issued by the COMELEC. Firstly, Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the variance in opinions of the members of respondent commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of disqualification filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the manner of disposing of the same had not been uniform. Hence, the COMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of these disqualification cases. Within this purpose in mind, the Commission en banc adopted Resolution No. 2050. The transitory provision under Section 2, Rule 44 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that these rules shall govern all cases pending at the time of effectivity thereof, except to the extent that in the opinion of the commission, or the court in appropriate cases, an application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply. We believe that Resolution No. 2050 qualifies and should be considered as an exception to the generally retroactive effect of said rules. Secondly, prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 2050, petitioner had filed several motions with the Second Division asking for the referral of the disqualification case to the Commission en banc. After the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 2050, petitioner filed another motion for the referral of the case to the Commission en banc, specifically invoking Resolution No. 2050. 12 In the words of petitioner in his said motion, under the aforesaid resolution, "once the petition for disqualification is forwarded to the Law Department, the case is deemed en banc because the report is submitted En banc by the law Department." Petitioner having invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc is now estopped from questioning the same after obtaining an adverse judgment therefrom. Thirdly, Commissioner Andres R. Flores, who opined that the disqualification case should first be resolved by the Second Division, has since then clarified his position after he was reminded that Resolution No. 2050, which he had admittedly "completely forgotten" had "laid down a definite policy on the disposition of disqualification cases contemplated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 13 Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence, as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail. Anent the propriety of the issuance of the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, suffice it to say that the requirement of notice in the promulgation of resolutions and decisions of the COMELEC embodied in Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules does not apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision is not allowed under Section 1, Rule 13 thereof. Respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for disqualification and in holding that respondent Binay is not guilty of vote buying, ruled as follows: xxx xxx xxx The commission concurs with the findings of the Law Department on enumeration Nos. 2 and 3 but rejects exception to the recommendation for prosecution of respondent Binay under No. 1 therefor, it appearing that there is a clear misappreciation of the evidence submitted considering the inconsistencies in the testimonies of material witnesses for the petitioners, as well as the correct interpretation and application of the law cited as basis for the prosecution of respondent Binay. xxx xxx xxx The seventeen (17) Affidavits submitted by petitioners attached to their original petition for disqualification dated January 11, 1988, differ form the twenty (20) affidavits attached to the memorandum of petitioners filed with the Commission (Second Division) on August 22, 1988. The records of the case do not show that these seventeen (17) affidavits attached to the original petition were affirmed by the affiants during the investigation conducted by the Law Department of this Commission. Of the twenty (20) affidavits appended to the Memorandum of August 22, 1988, only five (5) of the affiants were able to affirm their testimonies before hearing officer Alioden Dalaig of the Law Department of this Commission . . .

xxx xxx xxx In his counter affidavit, respondent Jejomar C. Binay denied the allegations in the petition for disqualification and interposed the defense that: The Christmas gift-giving is an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut in the spirit of yuletide season wherein basic and essential items are distributed to the less fortunate and indigent residents of Makati out of funds appropriated for the purpose duly budgeted and subject to audit by the Commission on Audit and same were prepared sometime on October 1987 long before I filed my certificate of candidacy and ceased to be the Acting Mayor of Makati, . . . The alleged ticket bearing my name, assuming its existence, indicates nothing of significance except that of a Christmas and New Year greeting and is not suggestive of anything which may be considered or interpreted to be political in nature such as indorsing my candidacy for that matter. . . . xxx xxx xxx It is undisputed that at the time the supposed "gift-giving" transpired between the periods of December 22-30, 1987, respondent Binay was no longer Mayor of the Municipality of Makati having resigned from the position on December 2, 1987, to pursue his candidacy for re-election to the same position. The OIC Mayor of Makati on the dates complained of, December 22-30, 1987, was OIC Mayor Sergio S. Santos who stated in his affidavit dated February 4, 1988, that he was Officer-in-Charge of Makati, Metro Manila, from December 2, 1987 to February 2, 1988, and that as such he implemented on December 18, 1987 the municipal government's annual and traditional distribution of Christmas gifts. There is ample evidence to show that it was not respondent Binay who "gave" the plastic bags containing Christmas gifts to the witnesses who executed affidavits for the petitioners. The "giver" was in fact the Municipality of Makati. And this is evidenced by the following documents attached to the records of this case: 1) Certification dated January 11, 1988 issued by OIC Roberto A. Chang attached as Annex A to respondent Binay's counter affidavit dated February 5, 1988. 2) COA Report dated January 11, 1988 attached as Annex "R" to the pleading denominated as Motion to Set Hearing filed by complainant Oliver Lozano dated July 26, 1988, filed in connection with SPC No. 88-040 for disqualification against respondent Binay; The findings of the COA Report itself (dated June 21, 1988) upon which petitioners rely heavily in their disqualifications case against respondent Binay, identify the "giver" of the Christmas gifts as the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay. . . . xxx xxx xxx Respondent Binay's allegation that the gift-giving was an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati was not denied nor disputed by the petitioners who in fact made capital of the aforequoted findings of the Commission on Audit in their charge against respondent Binay for alleged misuse of public funds. Also, petitioners in their latest pleading filed with the Commission on July 2, 1990, entitled "Motion To Resolve The Disqualification Case Jointly With The Investigation Report of the Law Department" instead of rebutting respondent Binay's allegation that the Christmas gift giving is an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut, merely stated that: . . . Assuming arguendo that Mayor Estrella had practiced this gift-giving every Christmas, the fact is, that there had been no electoral campaign on-going during such distribution and/or no election was scheduled during Mayor Estrella's tenure. "This is also true in the case of Mayor Yabut." More Petitioners' documentary evidence, among which are Exhibits "A", "A-1"; "A-2"; "A-20";"B"; "B-1"; "B-2"; "B-25"; "C-1"; "C-2"; "C-27"; "D"; "E" and "F", all show indubitably that the Christmas packages which were distributed between the periods of December 22-30, 1987, were ordered, purchased and paid for by the Municipality of Makati and not by respondent Binay. There is more than prima facie proofs to show that those gift packages received by the witnesses for petitioners were intended as Christmas presents to Makati's indigents in December 1988. It would therefore appear from the evidence submitted by the petitioners themselves that the giver, if any, of the Christmas gifts which were received by the witnesses for the petitioners was in fact, the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Jejomar C. Binay.

The presence of respondent Binay, if at all true at the time the gifts were distributed by the Municipality of Makati to the recipients of the Christmas gifts, was incidental. It did not make respondent Binay as the "giver" of those Christmas gifts. Nor did the giving of such gifts by the Municipal Government of Makati influence the recipients to vote for respondent Binay considering that the affiants themselves who testified for the petitioners admitted and were aware that the gift packages came from the Municipality of Makati and not from respondent Jejomar C. Binay. The foregoing conclusion is confirmed by petitioners' witnesses in the persons of Lolita Azcarraga, Johnson Carillo, Rommel Capalungan, Renato Leonardo, Manuel Allado, Edwin Pascua, Wilberto Torres, Apolonio De Jesus, Caridad Reposar, Artemus Runtal and Jose Ermino who, in their sworn statements, uniformly described the gift package as labelled with the words "Pamaskong Handog ng Makati", a clear indication that the "giver" of the Christmas gifts was indeed the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay. There is one aspect of this case which somehow lends credence to respondent Binay's claim that the instant petition is a political harassment. It is noted by the commission that while the criminal indictment against respondent Binay is for alleged violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioners did not implead as party respondents the affiants who received the Christmas packages apparently in exchange for their votes. The law on "vote buying" [Section 261 (a) supra] also penalizes "votebuying" and "vote-selling", then the present indictment should have been pursued against both respondent Binay and against the affiants, against the former for buying votes and against the latter for selling the votes. 14 xxx xxx xxx We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as swell as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding. Finally, we have consistently held that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, and the same is true under the present one, this court cannot review the factual findings of the Commission on Elections absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitratriness in its decision, order or resolution. Thus: The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdication of this court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, "not as broad as it used to be" under the old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process." Moreover, the legislative construction of the constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruled that "this Court can not . . . review rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections," as there is "no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission created and explicitly made "independent" by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not "disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.") Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either "as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari. . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while "petitions for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law." The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier. Indeed, as early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, this Court held that the Electoral Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the language of the provision, "judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvement use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Originally lodged in the legislature, that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contests "relating to the election, returns, and qualifications "of members of the legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late justice Jose P. Laurel, "was intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature . . . " . . .

. . . A review of the respondent Commission's factual findings/conclusions made on the basis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the petitioner, "if only to guard against or prevent any possible misuse or abuse of power." To do so would mean "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment" rendered on matters within the exclusive function of the Commission, which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this Court. . . . 15 The charge against respondent Binay for alleged malversation of public funds should be threshed out and adjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, it was properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections. WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac in G.R. No. 94521 and the challenged resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94626 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. 94521 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Sison v. Comelec Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which impugns the Resolution[1] of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 22, 1998 that dismissed petitioner Joseph Peter S. Sison's earlier petition[2] in SPC No. 98-134, entitled In the Matter of the Petition to Suspend the Canvassing of Votes and/or Proclamation in Quezon City and to Declare a Failure of Elections. It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 6[3] of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of massive and orchestrated fraud and acts an alogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect. [4] In support of his allegation of massive and orchestrated fraud, petitioner cited specific instances which are summarized and set forth below: 1. The Board of Canvassers announced that election returns with no inner seal would be included in the canvass; 2. Board of Election Inspectors brought home copies of election returns meant for the City Board of Canvassers; 3. Petitioner, through counsel, raised written objections to the inclusion in the canvass of election returns which were either tampered with, altered or falsified, or otherwise not authentic; 4. According to the minutes of the City Board of Canvassers, there were precincts with missing election returns; 5. Several election returns with no data on the number of votes cast for vice mayoralty position; 6. Highly suspicious persons sneaking in some election returns and documents into the canvassing area; 7. Concerned citizen found minutes of the counting, keys, locks and metal seal in the COMELEC area for disposal as trash; 8. Board of Election Inspectors have volunteered information that they placed the copy of the election returns meant for the City Board of Canvassers in the ballot boxes deposited with the City Treasurer allegedly due to fatigue and lack of sleep; 9. Ballot boxes were never in the custody of the COMELEC and neither the parties nor their watchers were allowed to enter the restricted area where these boxes passed through on the way to the basement of the City Hall where they were supposedly kept; and 10. In the elections in Barangay New Era, there was a clear pattern of voting which would show that the election returns were manufactured and that no actual voting by duly qualified voters took place therein. While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set fourth in Section

17 of Republic Act No. 7166.[5] Hence, this petition. Alleging that COMELEC overstepped the limits of reasonable exercise of discretion in dismissing SPC No. 98-134, petitioner argues in the main that the electoral body failed to afford him basic due process, that is, the right to a hearing and presentation of evidence before ruling on his petition. He then proceeded to argue that the election returns themselves, as well as the minutes of the canvassing committee of the City Board of Canvassers were, by themselves, sufficient evidence to support the petition. Upon a meticulous study of the parties arguments together with the pertinent statutory provisions and jurisprudence, this Court is of the opinion that there is no compelling reason why we should withhold our imprimatur from the questioned resolution. At the outset, we notice that petitioner exhibits an ambivalent stand as to what exactly is the nature of the remedy he availed of at the time he initiated proceedings before the COMELEC in SPC No. 98-134. At the start, he anchors his initiatory petition under Section 6[6] of the Omnibus Election Code regarding failure of elections but he later builds his case as a pre-proclamation controversy which is covered by Sections 241-248 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7166.[7] In this respect, the rule is, what conjointly determine the nature of a pleading are the allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary objective of the party filing the same. In any case, petitioner nonetheless cannot succeed in either of the remedies he opted to pursue. Recently, in Matalam v. Commission on Elections ,[8] we have already declared that a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, founded as they are on different grounds. Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes.[9] (Underscoring supplied) We have painstakingly examined petitioners petition before the COMELEC but found nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioners claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came about. With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note that the scope of pre-proclamation controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243[10] of the Omnibus Election Code, and the enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive.[11] The reason underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and procedure is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible.[12] That is why such questions which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest.[13] However, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested, the question of whether the petition raised issues proper for a preproclamation controversy is already of no consequence since the well-entrench rule in such situation is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate remedies being a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.[14] We have carefully reviewed all recognized exceptions[15] to the foregoing rule but found nothing that could possibly apply to the instant case based on the recitations of the petition. What is more, in paragraph 3 of the COMELECs Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 (Omnibus Resolution on Pending Cases) dated June 29, 1998, it is clearly stated therein that All other pre-proclamation cases x x x shall be deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R. A. 7166.[16] (Underscoring supplied). Section 16 which is referred to in the aforecited omnibus resolution refers to the termination of pre-proclamation cases when the term of the office involved has already begun, which is precisely what obtains here. We are, of course, aware that petitioner cites the said omnibus resolution in maintaining that his petition is one of those cases which should have remained active pursuant to paragraph 4 thereof. That exception, however, operates only when what is involved is not a pre-proclamation controversy such as petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases. But as we have earlier declared, his petition, though assuming to seek a declaration of failure of elections, is actually a case of pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, not falling within the ambit of the exception. In any case, that omnibus resolution would not have been applied in the first place because that was issued posterior to the date when the herein challenge resolution was promulgated which is June 22, 1998. There was no provision that such omnibus resolution should have retroactive effect. Finally, as to petitioners claim that he was deprived of his right to due process in that he was not allowed to present his evidence before the COMELEC to support his

petition, the same must likewise fail. First, we note that his citation of Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for his right to present evidence is misplaced. The phrase after due notice refers only to a situation where the COMELEC decides and, in fact, takes steps to either partially or totally suspend or annul the proclamation of any candidate-elect. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. The statutory provision cannot be expanded to embrace any other situation not contemplated therein such as the one at bar where the COMELEC is not taking any step to suspend or annul a proclamation. Second, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to satisfy the demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166, particularly Section 18 thereof, all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of pre-proclamation controversies on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers. This is but in keeping with the policy of the law that cases of this nature should be summarily decided and the will of the electorate as reflected on the election returns be determined as speedily as possible. What exactly those records and evidence are upon which the COMELEC based its resolution and how they have been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this Courts scrutiny. But we have reason to believe, owing to the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty and the precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, that the COMELEC did arrive at its conclusion with due regard to the available evidence before it. That this is so can, in fact, be gleaned from petitioners own allegation and admission in his petition that the election returns themselves as well as the minutes of the Canvassing Committees and the City Board of Canvassers x x x are in the possession of the COMELEC.[17] He even cites paragraph (g), Section 20 of the Omnibus Election Code to validate such allegation. Hence, it is not really correct to say that the COMELEC acted without evidentiary basis at all or that petitioner was deprived of his right to due process. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Consequently, the resolution of COMELEC in SPC No. 98-134 dated June 22, 1998 is AFFIRMED. No costs. Ampatuan v. Comelec The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order[1] to nullify and set aside two (2) orders dated July 26, 2001[2] and August 28, 2001[3] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering a random technical examination of pertinent election paraphernalia and other documents in several municipalities in the province of Maguindanao to determine a failure of elections. Petitioners[4] and respondents[5] were candidates for the provincial elective positions in the province of Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner Ampatuan and respondent Candao contended for the position of governor. The slate of Ampatuan emerged as winners as per election returns. On May 23, 2001, respondents filed a petition with the Comelec for the annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections[6] in several municipalities[7] in the province of Maguindanao. They claimed that the elections were completely sham and farcical. The ballots were filled -up en masse by a few persons the night before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all.[8] On May 25, 2001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the proclamation of the winning candidates for congressman of the second district, governor, vice-governor and board members of Maguindanao.[9] On May 30, 2001, petitioners filed with the Comelec a motion to lift the suspension of proclamation.[10] On June 14, 2001, the Comelec issued an order lifting the suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates for governor, vice-governor and board members of the first and second districts.[11] Consequently, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioners winners.[12] On June 16, 2001, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition to set aside the Comelec order dated June 14, 2001, and preliminary injunction to suspend the effects of the proclamation of the petitioners.[13] Meantime, petitioners assumed their respective offices on June 30, 2001. On July 17, 2001, the Court resolved to deny respondents petition.[14] Petitioners assumption into office notwithstanding, on July 26, 2001, the Comelec ordered the consolidation of respondents petition for declaration of failure of elections with SPA Nos. 01-244, 01-332, 01-360, 01-388 and 01-390.[15] The COMELEC further ordered a random technical examination on four to seven precincts per municipality on the thumb-marks and signatures of the voters who voted and affixed in their voters registration records, and forthwith directed the production of relevant election documents in these municipalities.[16]

On August 28, 2001, the Comelec issued another order[17] directing the continuation of the hearing and disposition of the consolidated SPAs on the failure of elections and other incidents related thereto. It likewise ordered the continuation of the technical examination of election documents as authorized in the July 26, 2001 order. On September 27, 2001, the Comelec issued an order outlining the procedure to be followed in the technical examination.[18] On September 26, 2001, petitioners filed the present petition.[19] They claimed that by virtue of their proclamation pursuant to the June 14, 2001 order issued by the Comelec, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest. The former is heard summarily while the latter involves a full-blown trial. Petitioners argued that the manner by which the technical examination is to be conducted[20] would defeat the summary nature of a petition for declaration of failure of elections. On October 5, 2001, petitioners filed a motion[21] reiterating their request for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the July 26, 2001 and August 28, 2001 Comelec orders. On October 22, 2001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the implementation of the two (2) assailed orders, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: The Commission, in view of the pendency of G. R. No. 149803 xxx, requiring it to comment within ten (10) days from notice, hereby suspends implementation of its orders of July 26, 2001 and August 28, 2001 in deference to the resolution of said court.[22] However, on November 13, 2001, the Comelec issued another order lifting the suspension.[23] On November 20, 2001, we issued a temporary restraining order, to wit: xxx the Court Resolved to (a) ISSUE the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER prayed for, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent Commission on Elections to CEASE and DESIST from ordering the lifting of the suspended implementation orders dated 26 July 2001 and 28 August 2001 in SPA No. 01-323 xxx.[24] The main issue to be resolved is whether the Commission on Elections was divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide respondents petition for declaration of failure of elections after petitioners had been proclaimed. We deny the petition. Petitioners submit that by virtue of their proclamation as winners, the only remedy left for private respondents is to file an election protest, in which case, original jurisdiction lies with the regular courts. Petitioners cited several rulings that an election protest is the proper remedy for a losing candidate after the proclamation of the winning candidate.[25] However, the authorities petitioners relied upon involved pre-proclamation controversies. In Loong v. Commission on Elections,[26] we ruled that a preproclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections. These two remedies were more specifically distinguished in this wise: While, however, the Comelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. [27] The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation.[28] In the case at bar, we cannot assume that petitioners proclamation and assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections. Respondents allegation of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the May 14, 2001 election in the affected municipalities cannot be taken lightly as to warrant the dismissal of their petition by the Comelec on the simple pretext that petitioners had been proclaimed winners. We are not unmindful of the fact that a pattern of conduct observed in past elections has been the pernicious grab -the-proclamation-prolong-theprotest slogan of some candidates or parties such that even if the protestant wins, it becomes a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire or has expired. xxx We have but to reiterate the oft -cited rule that the validity

of a proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.[29] Petitioners likewise rely on the case of Typoco, Jr. v. Commission on Elections.[30] This Court held that Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a petition for declaration of failure of elections. However, we made a pronouncement that the dismissal was proper since the allegations in the petition did not justify a declaration of failure of elections. Typocos relief was for Comelec to order a recount of the votes cast, on account of the falsified election returns, which is properly the subject of an election contest.[31] Respondents petition for declaration of failure of elections, from which the present case arose, exhaustively alleged massive fraud and terrorism that, if proven, could warrant a declaration of failure of elections. Thus: 4.1. The elections in at least eight (8) other municipalities xxx were completely sham and farcical. There was a total failure of elections in these municipalities, in that in most of these municipalities, no actual voting was done by the real, legitimate voters on election day itself but voting was made only by few persons who prepared in advance, and en masse, the ballots the day or the night before election and, in many precincts, there was completely no voting because of the non-delivery of ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia; and in certain municipalities, while some semblance of voting was conducted on election day, there was widespread fraudulent counting and/or counting under very irregular circumstances and/or tampering and manufacture of election returns which completely bastardized the sovereign will of the people. These illegal and fraudulent acts of desecration of the electoral process were perpetrated to favor and benefit respondents. These acts were, by and large, committed with the aid and/or direct participation of military elements who were deployed to harass, intimidate or coerce voters and the supporters or constituents of herein petitioners, principally, of re-electionist Governor Datu Zacaria Candao. Military units and personnel visibly, openly and flagrantly violated election laws and regulations by escorting people or elements engaged in the illegal, advanced preparation of ballots and election returns and, at times, manning the polling places or precincts themselves and/or staying within the prohibited radius. Ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia were brought not to the precincts or voting centers concerned but somewhere else where massive manufacture of ballots and election documents were perpetrated.[32] The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of elections.[33] Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code further provides that: Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election of failure to elect. Elucidating on the concept of failure of election, we held that: xxx before Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In Loong vs. Commission on Elections, this Court added that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. [34] In another case, we ruled that while it may be true that election did take place, the irregularities that marred the counting of votes and the canvassing of the election returns resulted in a failure to elect. [35] In the case at bar, the Comelec is duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of respondents allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct of the May 14, 2001 election. It is well to stress that the Comelec has started conducting the technical examination on November 16, 2001. However, by an urgent motion for a temporary restraining order filed by petitioners, in virtue of which we issued a temporary restraining order on November 20, 2001, the technical examination was held in abeyance until the present. In order not to frustrate the ends of justice, we lift the temporary restraining order and allow the technical examination to proceed with deliberate dispatch. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on November 20, 2001 is DISSOLVED. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed with the hearing of the consolidated petitions and the technical examination as outlined in its September 27, 2001 order with deliberate dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 28 Sangcad S. Bao (BAO) v. COMELEC, et.al. GR 149666, December 19, 2003 F: BAO sought reelection as mayor of Bitug, Lanao del Sur, in the May 14, 1002 elections. Private respondents were candidates for mayor as well. On May 25, 2001, BAO filed before the COMELEC a Very Urgent Petition for Suspension of Counting of Votes by the Board of Election Inspectors, Canvass of Election Returns and Proclamation of Winners by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, and Declaration of Failure of Election in Butig, Lanao del Sur. Among their allegations of irregularities during the election was the occurrence of several bombings, illegal transfer of polling places, massive substitution of voters, etc. The COMELEC however, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. I: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in not declaring a failure of election? H: No; Petition DISMISSED R: The Court referred to Section 6, of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides for the instances wherein the COMELEC may declare a Failure of Elections. The Court cited its decision in Mitmug v. COMELEC, wherein it held that before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. The Court also cited its decision in Typoco v. COMELEC, wherein it held that there are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in failure to elect on account of force rnajeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In all instances there must have been a failure to elect; this is obvious in the first scenario, where the election was not held and second where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and transmission of election returns which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as winner. The Court, in applying its rulings in the abovementioned cases, rationed that in the present case, the allegations-bases of both the petition and Langcos petition-inintervention before the COMELEC are mostly grounds for an election contest, not for a declaration of failure of election. While there are allegations which may be grounds for failure of election, they are supported by mere affidavits and the narrative report of the election officer. . General allegations, without sufficient evidentiary support, do not warrant a declaration of a failure of elections. Election results are the expression of the will of the people whose welfare and interests must immediately be served by those upon whom the people have placed their trust. Peripherally but not trivially, elections need be consummated with dispatch because the losers or even those just lagging behind in the counting, more often than not, file all kinds of protests and complaints and objections that delay the election process and threaten to deny the people their representation in government. Pangandaman v. Comelec Recently, this Court emphatically stated that "[U]pholding the sovereignty of the people is what democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always better than well said." 1 Corollarily, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. 2 These standards will be the legal matrix within which this controversy will be adjudged. Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is the Omnibus Order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc dated July 14, 1998, 3 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, special elections for the municipalities, namely Butig Lumbayabague Kapatagan Sultan Dumalondong Maguing Sultan Gumander Masiu Marawi City Lumbabayabao shall be held on 18 July 1998.

Special elections shall also be held on July 25, 1998 for the municipalities of Ganassi Lumbatan Malabang Pagayawan Marantao Tubaran There shall be machine counting and consolidation of votes for all municipalities except Maguing and those precincts where ballots for manual count will be used. The Education and Information Department, the Acting PES of Lanao del Sur and the Election Officers in these municipalities are hereby directed to cause the immediate publication of this Omnibus Order in their respective municipality ( sic). Schedule for special elections in the municipalities of Madalum and Tugaya is temporarily withheld pending unresolved issues before the Commission. Let the Executive Director for Operation[s] of the Commission execute this order with dispatch. SO ORDERED. The COMELEC's challenged Omnibus Order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy thus: The instant cases were filed by petitioners praying that the Commission declare [a] failure of elections in their respective municipalities and to hold special elections thereafter. The petitions were reinforced by reports received by the Commission from its field officers and deputies. A pre-trial for all cases in Lanao del Sur involving failure of elections was set and parties, their counsels, and the election officers of concerned municipalities appeared. During the pre-trial of the above cases, it was shown and admitted by the parties that total failure of election[s] took place in the following municipalities: 1. Butig 7. Maguing 2. Kapatagan 8. Masiu 3. Lumbatan 9. Sultan Dumalondong 4. Lumba Bayabao 10. Sultan Gumander 5. Lumbayanague 11. Tubaran 6. Madalum 12. Tugaya No precinct in the above towns was able to function on election day. It was also shown and admitted by the parties that in the following municipalities, partial failure of election[s] took place as follows: 1. Ganassi 2. Malabang 3. Marantao 4. Pagayawan 5. Marawi City TOTAL FAILURE OF ELECTIONS It was found that the cause of failure of election[s] in the twelve municipalities where there was total failure of election[s] as follows: 1. BUTIG armed confrontation of opposing political groups and vehement disagreement on the clustering of precincts. + Acting election officer reported that all election paraphernalia are available except for 200 ballots for precinct 5A. 2. KAPATAGAN allegedly, Camad Benito, husband of mayoralty candidate Bailo Benito, terrorized the Acting Municipal Treasurer Okuo Macaumbas thus preventing the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia to the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs for brevity). Similarly, there were only twenty two (22) public school teachers who were available as BEIs and eighteen (18) of them were disqualified to act due to relationship to candidates within the prohibited degree. In Election Case No. 571, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur issued an order dated April 30, 1998 ordering the Election Officer of Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur to delete, erase, and cancel all Voters Registration Records with serial numbers 3676001 to 3676500 after finding that said VRRs were received only on December 15, 1998 by EA Camal Calandada from Atty. Muslemin Tahir. And yet, said VRRs appeared to be filled up, used and dated 14 December 1997. A copy of said order was received on 10 May 1998 by the Election Officer. The court having found by implication that said VRRs were irregularly/unlawfully issued, and its order having become final, this Commission in compliance with said court order hereby orders the Election Officer of Kapatagan to delete from the records said VRRs with serial nos. from 36767001 to

3676500. Pursuant to said order, the Law Department is directed to conduct a joint investigation administrative and preliminary investigation for election offenses against Camal Calandada and Muslemin Tahir to determine their criminal and administrative liability and to submit to the Commission its findings and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Order. The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in Region XII is similarly directed to initiate an investigation on the conduct of Camad Benito in contributing to the failure of election[s] in Kapatagan. + All election paraphernalia are available. 3. LUMBATAN all the members of the different Board of Inspectors are disqualified to act as such by reason of relationship either by consanguinity or affinity, within the prohibited degree. + All election paraphernalia for 39 precincts are intact and available. 4. LUMBABAYABAO candidates could not agree on the venue of the distribution of the election supplies and there was vehement disagreement on the clustering of precincts. + All election paraphernalia for fifty nine (59) precincts are available.

+ All election paraphernalia for 51 precincts are available. 11. TUBARAN non-appearance of all the members of the different BEIs due to intense rivalry among the opposing candidates. + All election supplies are intact and available. 12. TUGAYA widespread terrorism causing intimidation of the electorate to cast their vote. The order of inclusion by the Municipal Court of Tugaya, covering 4,075 voters, will be the subject of a petition to declare its nullity to be filed by the Law Department of the Commission before the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. It is the desire of the Commission to put to rest the issue on the controversy surrounding the 4,075 voters to allow honest election in this municipality. After the controversy is put to rest, then the special election shall be scheduled. PARTIAL FAILURE OF ELECTION In the following municipalities and City of Marawi, there was partial failure of election in the specified precincts due to the following reasons: 1. GANASSI members of the BEIs for nine precincts as herein below enumerated did not appear thus election supplies were not distributed on election day for the following precincts: Barangay Name Precinct No.

5. LUMBAYANAGUE there was non-completion of the composition of the BEIs in all precincts because almost all appointed members of [the] BEI are disqualified by reason of relationship either by affinity or consanguinity, within the prohibitive degree. + All election paraphernalia for the 35 precincts are available. 6. MADALUM the twenty (20) appointed teachers to act as members of the different BEIs did not arrive on election day. The issue on the existence of alleged ghost barangays/precincts is not yet resolved by the Commission considering that the alleged ghost precincts are being investigated and an ocular inspection is being made by an investigating team. The issue being factual and the findings determinative of a clean, honest and credible elections, it is the desire of the Commission that the issue on ghost precincts be resolved first before a special election in Madalum shall be scheduled. + All election paraphernalia are available. 7. MAGUING no members of the different Boards of Election Inspectors arrived in all precincts. + There is a need to print new ballots for all forty-nine (49) precincts and other election forms due to the inadvertent non inclusion of a candidate's name in the original ballots. 8. MASIU the Municipal Treasurer did not get the election paraphernalia from the Provincial Treasurer. Neither could the Municipal Treasurer be located on election day. Hence, there was nothing to distribute to the BEIs on election day. Similarly, the Acting Election Officer, EA Cayansalam Benaning, on her admission during the pre-trial hearing on June 25, 1998, arrived only at 7:00 A.M. of election day thus preventing the distribution of election paraphernalia from her office. Some parties claim in fact that she was only seen at noontime of election day while she was in the house of the incumbent mayor of Masiu. + All election paraphernalia for eighty (80) precincts are available. 9. SULTAN DUMALONDONG Municipal Treasurer did not appear on May 10 & 11, 1998 at the office of the Provincial Treasurer to receive the ballots and other election paraphernalia for distribution to the BEIs so there was no election supplies for distribution on election day. + All election paraphernalia for 16 precincts are available. 10. SULTAN GUMANDER no BEIs appeared on election day because most of them are disqualified by law to act as such; the remaining 12 who are not disqualified also did not appear; there was also disagreement on the venue of distribution of election supplies.

1. Poblacion 1A2 1A3/1A4 2. Baya 8A 3. Linuk 14A 14A1 14A2 4. Macaguiling 18A 18A1 18A2 There was also failure of election in precinct 1A1 and 17A1 due to ballot box snatching. The ballot box containing official ballots and other election paraphernalia for precinct 17A1, Brgy. Macabao whose polling place was at Ganassi Central Elementary School was snatched allegedly by the incumbent mayor of Ganassi, Maning Diangka and his armed escorts. In precinct 2A in Brgy. Bagoingud, failure of election is declared and special election shall be held considering that the ballot box, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were illegally brought to a private dwelling in said barangay and voting irregularly took place therein despite the fact that the designated polling place was Gadungan Elementary School at Gadungan. This could not take place unless the BEIs assigned in Precinct 2A cooperated in these acts. The acts complained of against Ex-Mayor Maning Diangka shall be referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur for possible prosecution. Similarly, the Election Officer of Ganassi is directed to inform the Commission of the identity of the BEIs for precinct 2A for possible prosecution. Considering the charge of Maimona Diangka in SPA 98-404 that Baguio Macapodi, candidate for Vice Mayor of the Ompia Party and his cohort Bai Sa Ganassi terrorized registered voters in Precincts 32, 32A, 32A1, and 32A2 in Barangay Taliogan, Ganassi and that they were allegedly aided by the Barangay Chairman therein, said acts shall be referred immediately to the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur for investigation. During the special election, the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ganassi are hereby directed to suspend the proclamation of Baguio Macapodi for vice mayor, if winning, until further orders from this Commission. + All election paraphemalia for the nine (9) precincts where there was non-appearance of BEIs are available. The Commission shall cause the printing of ballots and other election forms for precincts 1A1 (Poblacion), 17A1 (Brgy. Macabao), and 2A (Brgy. Bagoingud) for use in the special election since the snatched ballot box were not recovered. 2. MALABANG twenty three (23) precincts failed to function due to shooting incidents. Ballot boxes containing election paraphernalia for five precincts out of these 23 precincts were snatched and never recovered. The following are the precincts that failed to function on election day or whose ballot boxes were snatched: Barangay Name Precinct No.

1. Banday 4A2 2. Betayan 5A/5A1 3. BPS Billage 7A2/7A3 4. Bunkhouse < 8A1 5. Calumbog 11A/11A1 6. Campo Muslim < 12A2 7. Chinatown 13A 8. -do- 13A4 9. Curahab 14A 10. Diamaru 15A 11. -do- 15A1 12. Matampay < 26A 13. Pasir < 29A 14. -do- 29A1 15. -do- 29A2 16. Sumbagarogong 33A 17. -do- 33A1 18. Tacub < 34A 19. Tiongcop 36A 20. -do- 36A1/36A2 21. Tubok 37A2 22. -do- 37A5 23. -do- 37A6 < ballot box snatched + All election paraphernalia for eighteen precincts are intact and available. The Commission will cause the printing of 1,000 ballots and other election forms for five precincts (8A1, 12A2, 26A, 34A). 3. MARANTAO thirty-five (35) precincts failed to function due to terrorism in the area. Out of these 35, eight (8) precincts lost to armed groups their ballot boxes, ballots and other election paraphernalia. These eight are: Name of Barangay Precinct No. 1. Daana Ingud Proper 3A 2. -do- 3A1/3A2 3. Tuca Kialdan 7A 4. -do- 7A1 5. Banga Pantar 22A/22A-1 6. Inudaran Campong 29A 7. -do- 29A-2 8. Mapantao Goo 34A-2 Ballots are to be printed for these precincts by the Commission. Canvassing forms and other paraphernalia shall also be provided. In Precincts No. 12A, 24A and 24A-1, ballots were cast but were not yet counted due to complaints that their integrity had been violated. There being no proof that the integrity of the ballots had been violated in these precincts, the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marantao are directed to include the same in the canvass. 4. PAGAYAWAN casting of votes was aborted due to widespread terrorism. Fifteen (15) precincts failed to function. + All election paraphernalia are available. However, in precinct 5A/5A1, some commotion took place. Eleven voters out of two hundred and sixty-eight (268) have already cast their votes at the time but only one ballot was found inside the ballot box after the commotion. The Commission deems it proper that the casting of votes by the eleven voters be annulled and a special election shall be conducted therein. 5. Marawi City there was partial failure of election in sixteen precincts (16), namely Name of Barangay Precinct No. 1. Brgy. Banggolo 6A2 2. -do- 6A3 3. Brgy. Lilod Madaya 42A-4 4. Brgy. South Madaya 85A 5. Brgy. Sangkai Dansalan 83A-3 6. Brgy. Raya Madaya I 74A-6 7. Brgy. Bacolod Chico 3A 8. -do- 3A-1 9. -do- 3A-2 10. Brgy. Raya Saduc 76A 11. Brgy. Guimba 38A 12. -do- 38A-1/38A-2 13. Brgy. Lolod Saduc 73A-5 14. Brgy. Bangco 5A-5A-1 15. Brgy. Timbangalan 88A 16. -do- 88A-1/88A-2

due to non-appearance of the BEIs. All election paraphernalia are in order and available except for one ballot box intended for Precinct 5A/5A-1 in Brgy. Banco which is missing or undelivered or without ballots contained therein. The petition for declaration of failure of election in the municipality of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur will be covered by a different resolution. To avoid the risk of another failure of elections and to encourage public trust in the process and results of the special elections, the following changes shall be undertaken: a. Only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are assigned to the affected areas shall serve as members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs). The Acting Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Lanao del Sur, Atty. Suharto Ambolodto, shall ensure that said BEIs are given adequate briefing for this task; Considering that under-aged persons succeeded in registering voters, a complaint that is common in many areas in Lanao del Sur, the BEIs are given explicit authority to prevent from voting all those registered voters who are visibly under-aged and shall reflect their names and VRR numbers in the Minutes of Voting for future prosecution. For this purpose, all poll watchers are encouraged to provide themselves with camera and provide indubitable proof of under-aged voters. b. Election officers from areas outside of Lanao del Sur shall be tapped to act as Election Officers, while the regular election officers in Lanao del Sur shall perform such duties as directed by the Acting PES; c. The special election in the municipality of Madalum shall be scheduled only after the Investigating Team aforementioned has finished its investigation of alleged ghost precincts therein and the Commission has acted on their findings of facts and recommendation(s); d. The special election in the municipality of Tugaya shall be scheduled after the controversy on the four thousand and seventy-five (4,075) voters shall have been settled; e. Considering the complaints received by the Commission against certain actuations of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, the same shall be replaced with a new Provincial Board of Canvassers whose members shall be designated by the Commission; f. The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in Region XII and the Prosecution Offices in Lanao del Sur shall actively help in the filing of criminal complaint for election offenses committed during the election period. Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Omnibus Order 1.] By insisting on holding special elections on July 18 and 25, 1998 more than thirty (30) days after the failure to elect, in certain municipalities, in contravention of the clear and explicit provisions of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code; 2.] By failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President of the Philippines and Congress so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding of a special election; 3.] By ordering only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are not assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspectors, in contravention of Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the Omnibus Election Code; 4.] By insisting on machine counting despite the proven unreliability and undependability of the counting of votes with use of computer machines. In support of his cause, petitioner insists on a strict compliance with the holding of special elections not later than thirty (30) days after failure to elect pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that: Sec. 6. Failure of elections. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested

party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. Petitioner argues that the above-quoted provision is mandatory because of the word "shall". He further asserts that the prescribed time frame actually "delimits" COMELEC's authority to call for a special election and that instead, the power to call for a special election after the 30th day now resides in Congress. The provision invoked can not be construed in the manner as argued by petitioner for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. 4 Thus, a too literal interpretation of the law that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to . . . [a]dmonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth" . . . 5 Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the COMELEC's powers in conducting elections. As stated in the old but nevertheless still very much applicable case of Sumulong v. COMELEC: 6 Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions . . . . There are no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, et al., 7 that "[O]ur elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances." The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections . . . [i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. 8 Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy." 9 In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. 10 Thus, the holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or failure

to elect may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held." 11 In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partial failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were "dates reasonably close" thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes. 12 Petitioner's argument that respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President and Congress so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding of a special election, likewise fails to persuade. No less than petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure of elections in twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure in eleven (11). Yet he now insists a total failure of elections should have been declared in the entire province of Lanao del Sur. Suffice it to state that the propriety of declaring whether or not there has been a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur is a factual issue which this Court will not delve into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of fact of the COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court. 13 There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule in this case. The insistence of petitioner that the COMELEC violated Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the Omnibus Election Code when it ordered elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) who are not assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) is likewise unconvincing vis--vis the underlying reason of the public respondent to have an effective and impartial military presence "to avoid the risk of another failure of election." So too must fall the argument that machine counting being allegedly "undependable and unreliable" should not be resorted to as the reasoning of petitioner, by itself, invokes the answer. If the COMELEC saw it fit to order a machine counting of votes in the municipalities enumerated, it could only mean that the decree of R.A. No. 8436 could be implemented without the interference of the claimed "unreliability, inaccuracy and undependability" of the computer sets. The absence of any satisfactory proof to support petitioner's allegations to the contrary reduces them to mere self-serving claims. Be that as it may, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has been rendered moot by supervening events. For one, it seeks to enjoin the holding of special elections scheduled for July 18 and 25, 1998. However, petitioner himself admits that special elections were "conducted on a staggered basis" on July 4, 18 and 25, 1998. 14 For another, the petition questions the membership of the Board of Election Inspectors for being composed of elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as well as the machine counting of the votes when these events have been superseded by the recent issuance of the Certificates Of Canvass Of Votes And Proclamation Of The Winning Candidates For Provincial Offices dated August 7, 1998. 15 In face of these supervening events, the arguments proffered by the petitioner to seek the annulment of the challenged Omnibus Order rings hollow. Verily At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voter's obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms . 16 Indeed, to embark upon the costly electoral exercise insisted upon by petitioner in terms of time and taxpayer's money is an unwarranted imposition on the people of the affected areas and is an unacceptable option to the judicial conscience. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

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