TO: Professor William Habeeb

FROM: Ben Turner

CLASS: MSFS-623: International Negotiation
SUBJECT: Re-Orienting American Negotiation Strategy with Iran

I. Introduction

The negotiations between the United States and Iran since the Islamic Revolution
in 1979 can be characterized plainly by an utter lack of official negotiation. Ever since
the American-backed Shah was deposed in Iran and replaced by the ayatollahs, Iran and
the US have talked primarily through backchannels, less-than-high-level diplomats, and
through popular media.

With the new American president, Barack Obama, has come unprecedented
movement from the American camp towards changing the tone of American relations
towards Iran. While Iran has initially reacted with extreme suspicion and skepticism,
the argument that the environment is ripe for negotiation can be made. Both nations
have many common goals, such as regional and Iraq security, economic reconciliation,
and avoidance of all-out war. Iran is gaining leverage through its nuclear program and
through increasing its regional influence, making it prudent for the United States to
negotiate with Iran sooner rather than later.

With so much to talk about, and at a good time to start negotiating, the main
problem the two countries will have is establishing a common agenda -- finding
Zartman's and Berman's "formula" for their two very different Best Alternatives To a
Non-Agreement (BATNAs) remain a looming obstacle for anything beyond pre-
negotiation (or Zartman's and Berman's "diagnosis" stage) and unfortunately such
BATNAs are well-engrained into both countries' popular mentalities.1

1
Hopmann, Terrence. "The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International
Conflicts", University of South Carolina Press, 1996, pp. 77-85. Also: Habeeb, William.
"Power and Tactics in International Negotiation", Johns Hopkins, 1988, pp. 29-33.
Page 1 of 18
 What potential actions can the US take against Iran with a new Obama
Administration? What are the levers which would most compel Iran to act favorably to
American invocations for new agreement?

II. Background

Both Iran and the US have a long history of grievances against each other. After
Iran underwent the Islamic Revolution, it overthrew the Shah who was receiving
American backing and then approved of student-led capture of the American embassy in
Tehran, famously referring to it as "a den of spies".2 Since that time, Iran has always
been deeply upset by the US meddling in its affairs whether it actually was or not.
Saddam Hussein, Iran's Iraqi neighbor, saw the Islamic Revolution as an opportunity to
strike -- one of his many miscalculations that led to many peoples' lives lost and an
eventual stalemate between Iran and Iraq. The US took Hussein's side in the war,
threatened by the Revolution in Iran, furthering distrust between the US and Iran.
Later, progressive Iranian leaders would have major trouble consolidating gains in
decreasing anti-American sentiment and opening up to the US because of this long,
sordid history.

By the time President George W. Bush had absorbed the humiliation of the 9/11
attacks and labeled Iran as part of an axis of evil, Iran's progressive movement was
completely derailed -- in fact it would become a theme that American actions would
always find harsh Iranian reactions. Bush's further incursion into Iraq, deposing
Hussein, while at the same time being unable to solve a North Korea in pursuit of
nuclear weapons, led Iran to believe that its security was in grave danger from a
neoconservative theoretical movement in the American political establishment and that
recent historical precedence (North Korea) would prove the threat of nuclear arms to be
Iran's most pragmatic strategy for national security.

Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush have used sanctions upon Iran to contain
it as it has adopted this new nuclear strategy. While this has hurt Iran economically, it
has also played into the hardliners' hands: along with the US halting any negotiations
2
PBS Frontline. "American Experience: Jimmy Carter".
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeature/sf_hostage.html
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with Iran, sanctions have helped the Iranian hawks point out to the people that Iran is
under siege from the US and must seek to protect itself through nuclear nationalism.
Robert Baer, a former CIA officer and author of the 2009 book "The Devil We Know",
about Iran's imperial ambitions, says, "Effective sanctioning of Iran is a dream. Iran’s
regime is still standing after thirty years of sanctions—still able to buy anything it wants
from China and Russia. Some of America’s closest allies, such as Turkey and Japan,
trade with Iran as if there were no sanctions at all."3

From American hawks such as John Bolton to official statements from Iran's
governing councils, everyone is in agreement that Iran wants to ensure its capacity to
build nuclear weapons, whether it actually builds one or not. At the end of President
Bush's tenure, he changed his stance on Iran somewhat so that the US would support
Europe's attempts to negotiate with Iran, but this has led to nowhere, probably because
the terms up for debate are different for the Europeans (international security) and for
the Iranians (regional security and security against Americans), and because the US
needs to be involved in negotiations as the dominant security hegemon. This establishes
the main players in this process as Iran and the US -- no one else has enough influence
or power to affect either nation in its ambitions with the other.

On the Europeans' attempts at negotiations with Iran:

"The European talks went nowhere, and six months after the U.S.
concessions, the Iranians accelerated their nuclear program by starting to enrich
uranium. On the last day of May 2006, under pressure from European allies to
open talks with Tehran, the U.S. offered to join the Europeans at the negotiating
table — but only if Iran first agreed to suspend its program of uranium
enrichment. And, hoping to press the Iranians to comply, Washington spent the
next two years trying in vain to forge a consensus in the U.N. Security Council for
meaningful sanctions. Last week, Rice announced that she had agreed to send
Burns despite Iran's firm refusal to stop enriching uranium."4

3
Baer, Robert. "The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower", Crown, 2008. Kindle
version, highlight location 4032-34.

4
Calabresi, Massimo. "U.S. and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation", Time Magazine, 21 Jul 08.
Page 3 of 18
 In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and has since stayed, occupying it with over
130,000 American troops. A resulting insurgency and Shi'ite/Sunni sectarian violence
has destabilized the entire country. This event perhaps more than any other has made
negotiation talks ripe -- for Iran, failure in Iraq means massive destabilization despite a
great Shi'ite Reawakening. Iran is also deeply unsettled having American troops both to
its west and to its east. For the US, it needs Iran's help to bring stability back to Iran's
neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq, and the US also faces a greatly worsening BATNA,
which Iran is well-aware of.

III. BATNAs and Goals

Terrence Hopmann describes the goal of negotiation as hoping "to achieve

mutually beneficial outcomes that will at least serve the basic interests of all parties
affected by a particular decision".5 The key is that both side's primary goals are
addressed within the negotiation's agenda. But for the last decade, the US and Iran have
not had mutually compatible BATNAs. The US's BATNA is that it can block Iran from
having the capacity to build nuclear weapons while using the United Nations Security
Council and Non-Proliferation Treaty as legalistic ways to slow Iran down. Iran has
already celebrated its nuclear program is unstoppable and as a pillar of its international
policy, and has stalled in discussions and European negotiations while continuing its
work on its program. Says Ray Takeyh of the Council for Foreign Relations, "It's been a
slow-motion capitulation since 2005. There's no other way of interpreting it."6

The US speaks of Iran shutting down its enrichment program as part of a pre-
condition for larger negotiations. George Friedman, founder of Stratfor (a geopolitical
strategy thinktank), remarks:

"From the Iranian point of view, the United States has made two
fundamental demands of Iran. The first is that Iran halt its military nuclear
program. The second, a much broader demand, is that Iran stop engaging in what
the United States calls terrorism. This ranges from support for Hezbollah to
support for Shiite factions in Iraq. In return, the United States is prepared to call
5
Hopmann, p. 27.
6
Calabresi, Time Magazine.
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 for a suspension of sanctions against Iran. ... For Tehran, however, the
suspension of sanctions is much too small a price to pay for major strategic
concessions. First, the sanctions don’t work very well. Sanctions only work when
most powers are prepared to comply with them. Neither the Russians nor the
Chinese are prepared to systematically comply with sanctions, so there is little
that Iran can afford that it can’t get. Iran’s problem is that it cannot afford much.
Its economy is in shambles due more to internal problems than to sanctions.
Therefore, in the Iranian point of view, the United States is asking for strategic
concessions, yet offering very little in return."7

Tehran for its part seeks international recognition of its place as at least a
regional power, but even greater than that, an emerging superpower. Iran's words to
the US through public letters from Ahmadinejad to Bush and Obama do not talk of
uranium enrichment but instead of humiliation, recognition, and imperialism. In
Ahmadinejad's own words:

"The people of many countries are angry about the attacks on their
cultural foundations and the disintegration of families. They are equally
dismayed with the fading of care and compassion. The people of the world have
no faith in international organizations, because their rights are not advocated by
these organizations. ... We increasingly see that people around the world are
flocking towards a main focal point -- that is the Almighty God. Undoubtedly
through faith in God and the teachings of the prophets, the people will conquer
their problems. My question for you is: 'Do you not want to join them?'"8

Essentially Ahmadinejad, running as a populist hardliner, is making a liberalist

claim that the US's policies, particularly in the Muslim world, bring oppression and
corruption. While Ahmadinejad certainly has little power in setting Iranian policy, his
words echo the Iranian grievancies that without a halt to US aggression against Iran,
there can be no concessions from the Iranian side.

7
Friedman, George. "Iran's View of Obama", Stratfor Global Intelligence, 23 Mar 09.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090323_obamas_new_year_greeting_and_view_iran
8
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud. "Ahmadinejad's Letter to Bush", WashingtonPost.com, 09 May 06.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR2006050900878.html
Page 5 of 18
 More recently, Obama sent a message to the Iranian Republic (a key distinction
for it recognized the regime) on the Persian holy day of Nowruz. His video was heralded
by the west as a new opening for change in tone. The response from the Ayatollah
Khatami was dismissive: "The Iranian nation is the same nation that put all options of
Bush under the table and into the history’s dustbin. ... Obama is now toeing Bush’s line
regarding Iran."9

Baer lists six interests that Iran wants to discuss with the US:

"Based on their actions and what they’ve told Western officials, they seem
to have six core interests: Internal security. Iran is 89 percent Shia and 9 percent
Sunni. The Sunnis are a small minority, but Iran still looks at them, as well as the
Kurds in Iran, as its Achilles’ heel. ... Iraq. Iran is there to stay. Nothing short of a
regime collapse in Tehran will change that. Empire aside, Iran does have a vital
interest in putting an end to the chaos in Iraq. ... Energy. Iran wants a better price
for its oil, modern technology to more efficiently lift it, and alternative energy
sources for the day it runs out of oil. This would include nuclear power plants. ...
An Iranian empire. Short of drastic action, Iran won’t cede its dominion in
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, the Gulf, and Gaza. Iran will insist on dominion in the Gulf
after the United States leaves. It will hold itself out as the protectors of the Shia as
well as the Palestinians. ... Control of Mecca. Iran wants control of Mecca. For
1300 years, the Shia have been second-class Muslims. With Iran’s newfound
military predominance, there’s no longer any reason to accept the status quo. It’s
unclear what precisely Iran’s mullahs will demand, but it will probably be co-
administering both Mecca and Medina along with Saudi Arabia. ...
Recognition/equality. At the bottom of it all, the Iranians want to be treated
fairly. Iran wants to be recognized for what it is: a stable country that has lived
within the same borders for thousands of years, the most powerful country in the
Gulf, OPEC’s second-largest producer, a regional economic power, and a major
influence in Islam."10

9
Johnson, Bridget. "Tough-talking Iran demands 'change' from Obama", TheHill.com, 02 May
09. http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/iran-talks-tough-while-demanding-change-from-
obama-2009-05-02.html
10
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 3902-3932.
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 The US is hung up on nuclear proliferation and also on Ahmadinejad's infamous
comments about Israel's existence, which seem to be primarily a distraction from the
key issues. The US is also hung up on Iran being a terrorist state, having just released a
new intelligence report saying Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism. But as
Baer put it, "Americans have missed Iran’s critical transition, its metamorphosis from a
Shia rebellion and a terrorist state to a classic military power."11 This gets into the fact
that Iran has been adding to and improving its BATNA, which will be discussed later.

So for now, the BATNAs are incompatible and the negotiation agenda does not
match. This must change in order for there to be further movement.

IV. Power

The US has largely ignored Iran diplomatically, applied economic sanctions not
universally supported by other key international players, and has rattled its saber by
moving naval vessels such as the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz into the Persian Gulf. It
has relied on European negotiations and has accepted Iranian help fighting the Taliban
in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. But the US has given little; nor should it
necessarily need to, given that the US is by far the largest and most influential military
and security power in the world, particularly in the Middle East. Regionally, the US has
a lot of sway with Iran's near neighbors, such as Saudi, Israel, Iraq, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Egypt.

Such power, defined by William Habeeb as "the way in which A uses resources in
process with B so as to bring preferred outcomes in relationship with B" 12, has been
quantified as "aggregate structural power":

Pp = (C+E+M) x (S + W)

11
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1249-50.
12
Habeeb, p. 15.
Page 7 of 18
where Pp is perceived power, C is critical mass (population size + territory), E is
economic capability, M is military capability, S is strategic purpose, and W is will to
pursue national strategy.13

The US has large amounts of all these inputs, except perhaps W when it comes to
the Middle East. However, what it is lacking most is specific to the Middle East and not
represented in this equation: regional relevance.

And this is where Iran has an advantage. Iran's issue-specific power has been
growing in the Middle East while the US has allowed actors to move against it by doing
nothing. The US holds influence but only superficially with clientelistic governments
willing to allow it. Iran has won over the south of Iraq, the Shi'ite majority, and has
infiltrated senior levels of the Iraqi government. Iran has also supported the successful
Hezbollah model in Lebanon and is actively interested in Hamas in the Palestine, to
ward off Israeli attacks. Iran is appealing to the Shi'ite groups in the Gulf countries,
winning them away from the Saudis who mistreat them. Iran, culturally and religiously,
has far more relevance in the Middle East than the US ever could have.

Iran has all but won Iraq and knows that this has not been without significant
damage to the US:

"Iran senses that with Iraq failing, it’s on an equal footing with the United
States in the Gulf. Along with that, there’s a growing confidence in Tehran today
that the United States will finally have to come around to recognizing Iran’s true
stature in the world as the only important player in the Middle East—a
superpower, even. Iran is confident that America will have to accept the
inevitable, that we’ve been wasting our time with the Gulf Arabs, and that we
have to come to terms with Iran."14

Indeed, Baer continues to say that he is disappointed with American handling of

Iran and Iraq:

13
Habeeb referencing Cline, p. 19.
14
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 499-503.
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 "But in fact, the one certainty about the Iraq War is that the United States
will see Iran’s imperial ambitions played out more clearly there than in Tehran. If
it’s in Iran’s interests to have chaos in Iraq, then chaos there will be. If Iran
intends to draw the United States into a quagmire, a quagmire is what we’ll get.
Our war with Iran will be fought in Iraq, through proxies, on the periphery of
Iran’s empire. How could we have missed this so badly?"15

Iran has been building its conventional military capability: the Strait of Hormuz,
an important bottleneck where much of the world's oil is shipped through, is rumored to
be defended now with Silkworm missiles hidden along Iran's coastline, as a threat
against any foreign attack. Baer says that "[w]hat’s particularly odd about Iran’s
advancement in conventional military tactics is that the West has largely ignored it,
choosing instead to focus almost obsessively on whether Iran is developing nuclear
weapons. It’s more evidence that we are miscalculating the nature of the Iranian
threat."16 Iran has been exporting explosively formed penetrators to Iraq, anti-tank
arms to Lebanon, and small arms everywhere.

Iran knows that the security community is reluctant to strike it, and has been
improving its defenses silently while continuing its nuclear enrichment program
publicly. It has vastly improved its BATNA, and Iraq has provided it with a huge
opportunity to swing issue-specific power to bear against the US's aggregate structural
power. As Vali Nasr, author of "The Shia Revival" put it, ""The wars of 2001 and 2003
have fundamentally changed the Middle East to Iran's advantage," he says. "The dam
that was containing Iran has been broken."17

V. Culture and Personality

William Zartman claims that culture "is every bit as relevant as breakfast, and to
much the same extent"18, as the traditions and customs of the diplomatic community
override those of each side's cultures. However, negotiations between the US and Iran
15
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 321-324.
16
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1746-1748.
17
PBS Frontline. "Showdown with Iran", 23 Oct 07.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/etc/synopsis.html
Page 9 of 18
are considerably unique: both parties do not regularly meet each other, and if they do
it's with very specific, cold instructions. There is no formal ambassadorial contact
between the two nations. The entire relationship is defined almost completely by
culture, whether it be media culture or national security culture or street culture. So,
what are the cultural backdrops within this relationship?

The United States has chosen not to engage Iran actively, making few serious
overtures at overcoming past differences. Much of this has to do with the excellent job
Iran did at vilifying itself in the western media and by establishing itself for decades to
come as the major nation of state-sponsored terror. President Bush's "axis of evil"
policy and aggressive use of hegemonic military power as advocated by the neo-
conservatives put Iran on a hit list of countries unwilling to participate in the
international experiment of democratization. Bush as a singular individual exemplified
American personality towards Iran, indicating disbelief in Iran's meddling regional
affairs, shock at its nuclear ambitions to become part of the nuclear "club", and
intransigent towards negotiation.

Iran thinks of the US as having no culture, whereas its own culture is rich in
history and predisposed by fate to allow for Persian superpower status -- it is expanding
its influence and must improve its security for potential showdowns against Turkey and
Saudi. Iran's senior leadership was forged from the Islamic Revolution, which managed
to expel US influence from Iran. The leaders use this nationalist and Shi'ite superiority
when their popularity flags or when they need support for policies. Anti-Americanism is
regular in weekly Muslim speeches.

Iranians have never forgotten that they used to control much of the Middle East,
and they see themselves as laying the building blocks for re-emerging as a world power.
Iranians do not forget the perceived injustices committed against them in the past;
thusly, it has become a point of pride for Iranians to show immediate reaction to every
American move.

18
Zartman, William. "Culture and Negotiation", United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, SAGE,
2003, p. 17.
Page 10 of 18
 Iranian leaders respond enthusiastically to American presidents' missives. US
detainment of Iranian operatives in Iraq led to an outbreak of Shi'ite militia violence
and a harsh outcry from the Iranian government. Ahmadinejad's being voted in could
have been seen as a nationalist reaction to increasingly hostile American rhetoric. Is it
possible that the Iranians are so deeply obsessed with American behavior? "You will not
find a single instance in which a country has inflicted harm on us and we have left it
without a response. So if the United States makes such a mistake, they should know that
we will definitely respond. And we don't make idle threats," Mohammad Jafari, head of
the Iranian National Security Council.

Ahmadinejad is not seen as someone who has much power within the Iranian
system or who speaks for Iran's core policy issues. Yet he is who the Americans and the
media vilify. Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader and his Council, working through an
opaque system but with fairly democratic voting procedures, steer the Iranian boat
much more wisely, and in fair estimation, in a way more conducive with American
foreign policy. Ahmadinejad is up for re-election in June of 2009. If he is voted out and
replaced with someone less of a firebrand, this may improve relations with the US since
the US and its media are so obsessed with flippant Iranian comments about Israel and
criticism of American policy.

Obama realizes Ahmadinejad's relative insignificance as an actor to try

negotiation with:

"Today, Obama rebuked the Iranian leader, saying his remarks were
harmful to Iran's standing in the world as well as to U.S.-Iranian relations. He
also said that he has found many of the Ahmadinejad's statements to be
"appalling and objectionable", but implied the possibility of improving relations
with Iran via Supreme Leader Khameni."19

Meanwhile, Barack Obama has been voted into the White House in the US and
has received global support for his measured, intellectual approach to policy-making.
While Iran (and the Middle East as a whole) has been skeptical of Obama's choices for
19
Connolly, Katie. "Obama Calls Ahmadinejad's Speech 'Harmful'", Newsweek blog, "The
Gaggle", 21 Apr 09. http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2009/04/21/obama-
calls-ahmadinejad-s-speech-harmful.aspx
Page 11 of 18
foreign policy experts (Hillary Clinton at State, an Iran containment hawk in Dennis
Ross), it must surely understand that it has an opportunity to make major inroads with
Obama that it could not with Bush. Obama for his part is eager to improve the US's
footing on its Iran policy after perceiving it as languishing under Bush. Obama is more
likely to see Iran within the context of larger issues that are not necessarily specific to
America's interests, meaning that an agreement where "all these issues are linked"
(Habeeb's high probability test of whether negotiations will succeed) is far more
imaginable. In short, Obama could have the capability to understand what Iran wants,
whereas Bush did not.

VI. Strategy and Tactics

Iran knows that the longer it waits, the more its negotiating position improves. It
is winning influence in the Middle East, coming closer to being able to build a nuclear
weapon, is creating a buffer state in Iraq, has the power to bleed the US with insurgency
in Iraq and Israel in Lebanon and the Palestine, and it is too large for international
movement to be taken against it, even by Israel. It is not clear whether the US realizes
this sorry state of affairs yet, since urgency has not been taken to change the game back
into the US's favor.

Iran also knows that the US has labeled itself as a promoter of liberal values and
human rights, and that the US feels weakened by its incursions into Iraq and
Afghanistan. Therefore Iran attempts to take a moral high road, promoting eradication
of poverty and oppression, hoping it will resonate with the European and American
populaces. Iran has been using the media actively to push the US into unsavory political
positions.

The US has remained fairly passive in its strategy and tactics, acting through the
UNSC and passing messages through European ambassadors (such as the fax the US
received from progressive Iranians promoting a "Grand Bargain", which Bush ignored).
The US military has sought to actively engage Iranian proxies in Iraq, going so far once
as to make a raid on Mohammad Jafari, a senior commander in the Iranian Quds Force
and deputy of the National Security Council in Iran, when he was rumored to have been

Page 12 of 18
in Iraq. But any actions the military has taken against Iranians has been met with
release orders and apologies from the American government, to maintain a tense
stalemate between the two countries in the proxy state of Iraq.

The US has been fairly unsuccessful in leveraging world opinion against Iran in
any meaningful way -- Iran is not likely to be cowed by international sentiment decrying
its hunger for nuclear capability. And yet the US keeps trying. A passage in an Arabic
News article puts it bluntly:

"The new package proposed to Iran says in part "Formal negotiations can
start as soon as Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities are
suspended." Since Iran has indicated that it would not accept such a position,
such package can be considered as dead on arrival in light of Iran's strong
position on this issue, even though Iranian officials did not hurry to declare so.
Also, it is not clear why such a package would have been proposed to Iran
knowing the package's fate other than to possibly give Iran the illusion that it is
benefiting from this process of negotiation, when such a process may only be
allowing the slow but certain imposition of more official sanctions on Iran
whether thru the UN Security Council or by the 5+1 member countries."20

VII. What the Americans Should Do

It is more difficult to paint a rosy picture for the Americans than it is for the
Iranians. The Iranians have been far more involved in regional affairs, despite
American occupations of two Muslim nations, because of their regional relevance and a
Shi'ite re-emergence as a result of Iraq's borders opening up.

But the US is running out of time. Not in terms of whether it can stop Iran from
getting nuclear weapons (it couldn't, at least without great cost), but in terms of the US
being able to maintain leverage to affect Iran's core interests. Containment has too
many holes and not enough allies to maintain it, and it also runs against a populace that
is, while increasingly progressive, also fervently nationalistic. Outright attack has been
shown by Iran's strategy and tactics to be untenable (and Robert Gates said as much

20
"Iran - Europe negotiation package on the nuclear issue", ArabicNews.com, 16 Jul 08.
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/080616/2008061613.html
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himself: "The United States could go to war with Iran, but the outcome is uncertain. As
President Bush’s secretary of defense, Robert Gates, said in a 2008 New York Times
interview, taking on Iran is not an option."21

First of all, what the US should do is leave Afghanistan and Iraq completely. Iran
has benefited from American provision of Iraq security -- Iran can use its militias and
connections to foment or reduce chaos when needed, while it allows Maliki to
consolidate power for the Shi'ites in the Iraqi government. The US leaving Iraq would
tear away the veil of secrecy Iran enjoys in Iraq, and it would force Iran, with a long
border with Iraq, to have to provide security for the fledgling defective democracy itself.
An alternate option Robert Baer proposes is, "Why not allow the Iranians to take direct
control of the parts of Iraq they already control through proxies? This would be more
efficient, and there would be less violence. Let the Iranians take direct responsibility for
the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Basra, which would force Iran to be more cautious and
less the spoiler."22

Baer continues:

"All of a sudden, it would be Iran deciding whether it wanted to be directly

responsible for keeping a lid on the anarchy, and whether it wanted to send in its
own troops and start killing Iraqis. A direct Iranian role in Iraq would involve
Iranians killing Sunni and even Shia, turning the conflict into a civil war.
Everything Iran achieved in Lebanon, turning the Shia and the Sunni against
Israel and the United States, would be lost. The Iranians would suddenly be the
occupiers, and as such would absorb the full political impact of running a foreign
country. They’d no longer be able to hide behind their proxies. It is unlikely Iran
would do well as pure colonial power, burdened by the inevitable blame that
comes with occupation."23

Second, as part of a larger strategy, the US should curtail its ties with Israel,
Saudi, and Egypt while maintaining that national integrity will be preserved by military

21
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 3986-3988.
22
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 4017-4019.
23
Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1477-1482.
Page 14 of 18
force (a mistake not conveyed to Saddam Hussein regarding Kuwait, leading to his
invading it). This will reduce much of the impetus for anti-Americanism and anti-
occupation within the Middle East region. The US will have to complement this with
fulfilling its energy needs through investment in green power. But this will also show
that the US is taking on a neutral, security-seeking role in the region -- no one would
doubt the US's seriousness for negotiation if it disengaged from countries seen as having
too much influence over the US. But from an American point of view it is also shoring
up American strengths and allowing it the flexibility to re-focus its security needs as
needed.

Third, the US should drop sanctions upon Iran, which do not work and further
anti-American sentiment within Iran.

After that point, the US should offer full negotiations with Iran. Iran will be
desperately seeking to figure out a new balance for its security on both its western and
eastern flanks, and will not enjoy being able to rally anti-American support on Yowm Al-
Juma'a (Friday) in the mosques. A further commitment by the US towards human
rights and internal security would defuse much of the rhetoric from Iran before it could
even respond.

The US enjoys aggregate structural power and should thus seek to change the
macro-environment towards its own ends. This trumps Iran's issue specific power. The
US will have taken initiative in the pre-negotiation or diagnostic stage of the
negotiations, putting Iran on the defensive after having perceived itself as having the
upper-hand for so long.

This also sets the stage for the formula stage of potential negotiations. The US
should openly concede Iran's capability to build a nuclear weapon (but deter it from
stockpiling them), and its right to enrich fuel for energy. The US will not need to bait
Iran with economic incentives anymore, but it will be able to place the burden of
responsibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty upon a now nuclear Iran. Meanwhile,
Iran will get the status it has always sought, and realize that what it hoped to gain wasn't
as great as what it actually got.

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 By the time the detail stage of the negotiations comes, Iran will pretty much
require economic cooperation to save its long-sagging economy, and it will need to find
regional agreements to provide security for a radically changed Middle East. If Iran
wants to be a regional power, then it will have to deal with the burden of it. Iran even
may be willing to negotiate in exchange for American partnership against Sunni
insurgents in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

VIII. Conclusion: Recognizing Ripeness

The time and macro-environment is ripe (as Richard Haas defines it24) for US-
Iran negotiations. Not only has Iraq changed the Middle East situation, but it has the
potential to change it dramatically again. At the same time, the US has elected a
measured president and Iran is having presidential elections shortly. With Iran's
impending nuclear coming-out party, the ante is increased and the US must take the
lead to prevent other regional interests from increasing their own defensive postures.
Not only all that, but also, as Habeeb says, "The actors may also recognize that changes
have occurred in the nature of their relationship. The actors may perceive that relative
power positions have changed: 'The former upper hand slips, or the former underdog
improves his position.'"25 Iran is now much stronger relatively than it was before -- this
affects the US's ability to deter or influence it.

In terms of what to look for, it is required that the US change its assumptions
about what Iran wants, while seeing Iran as part of a larger regional puzzle. For Iran, it
might need to prepare for unpredictability and movement from the Americans, since
right now it dismisses all American actions as being predictable and out of touch.

However, these are big steps to take and much of the foreign policy community's
worldview when it comes to the US and Iran is deeply rooted. At the end of the day,

24
Haas, Richard. "Conflicts Unending", Yale University Press, 1990.
25
Habeeb, p. 29.
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both sides will need to realize that "[w]ithout the will to reach an agreement, there will
be none,"26 and so part of the challenge will be convincing the citizenry within each
country that something productive, a non-zero-sum agreement, can be reached.
Otherwise, the negotiations so obvious within the framework of this paper will never
have an opportunity to take place.

Says George Friedman, Stratfor founder:

"U.S.-Iranian negotiations are always opaque because they are

ideologically difficult to justify by both sides. For Iran, the United States is the
Great Satan. For the United States, Iran is part of the Axis of Evil. It is difficult for
Iran to talk to the devil or for the United States to negotiate with evil. Therefore,
U.S.-Iranian discussions always take place in a strange way. The public rhetoric
between the countries is always poisonous. If you simply looked at what each
country says about the other, you would assume that no discussions are possible.
But if you treat the public rhetoric as simply designed to manage domestic public
opinion, and then note the shifts in policy outside of the rhetorical context, a
more complex picture emerges. Public and private talks have taken place, and
more are planned. If you go beyond the talks to actions, things become even more
interesting. ... We have discussed this before, but it is important to understand
the strategic interests of the two countries at this point to understand what is
going on. Ever since the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq has been the
buffer between the Iranians and the Arabian Peninsula. The United States
expected to create a viable pro-American government quickly after the 2003
invasion of Iraq, and therefore expected that Iraq would continue to serve as a
buffer. That did not happen for a number of reasons, and therefore the strategic
situation has evolved."27

With so many sticking points between the two countries, what it might take most
of all is two leaders willing to put their reputations on the line and to sell their plans. It
seems that Obama is willing to do this, but who will represent Iran? Will it be the

26
Zartman, William and Berman, Maureen. "The Practical Negotiator", Yale, 1982, p. 66.
27
Friedman, George. " The U.S.-Iranian Negotiations: Beyond the Rhetoric", Stratfor Global
Intelligence, 12 Feb 08.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/u_s_iranian_negotiations_beyond_rhetoric
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toothless president (who might be beneficial towards movement, depending on who
wins the June elections), or will the Supreme Council decide to take a chance?

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