Report on Important Decisions in Recent Years

By Hon. Consuelo Ynares-Santiago Associate Justice Supreme Court of the Philippines

Fifth Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges Standards for Constitutional Review in Safeguarding Civil, Political and Socio-Economic Rights 9-11 October 2007 Seoul, Republic of Korea

CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

(G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152) J. Antonio Carpio, ponente.
The Philippine Supreme Court in this case, voided the multibillion peso reclamation contract between the Philippine Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp., a private corporation, for blatantly violating provisions of the Constitution expressly prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain. FACTS: In 1977, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created thru P.D. No. 1084 issued by the late Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos and was tasked with the reclamation and development of foreshore and submerged areas of the Manila Bay. In 1995, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands, the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) which were titled under PEAs name. The JVA also required the reclamation of additional portions surrounding these islands to complete their plan. Although the parties entered into the JVA without public bidding then President Fidel V. Ramos confirmed the same. After former Senator Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the

grandmother of all scams, a senate investigation on the matter was conducted. The investigation found out that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands making the JVA illegal. The Legal Task Force created by President Ramos

subsequently upheld the validity of the JVA contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate. In 1999, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended JVA which was subsequently approved during the subsequent term of President Joseph Estrada. Petitioner Frank Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed this instant petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order seeking to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its renegotiations with AMARI to and to enjoin it from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. ISSUES: 1.) Does the constitutional right to information include official information 2.) on

on-going

negotiations

before

final

agreement? YES.
Does the Amended JVA violate the 1987 Constitution? YES.

RULINGS:

1.)

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains a provision

on the Filipino peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces this right and these two provisions seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government as well as provide the people enough information to effectively exercise their other constitutional rights. Contrary to AMARIs contention, the right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final

contract. A consummated contract is not a requirement for the

exercise of the right to information otherwise the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated. And if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 2.) The 1987 Philippine Constitution like the 1935 and the

1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine and declares that all natural resources are owned by the State, and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. The present Philippine Charter continues the State policy banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain and

allows private corporations to hold alienable land of the public domain only through lease. A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban. The Philippine Supreme Court found the Amended JVA to have glaringly violated provisions of the 1987 Constitution and consequently declared it null and void ab initio.

AGAN JR., et al. v. PIATCO et al.

(G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612) CJ. Reynato Puno, ponente.
In this case, the Supreme Court has nullified the $650 million contracts entered into between the Philippine government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc. (PIATCO) to build and operate Terminal-3 of Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Voting 10-3-1, the high court declared the contracts contrary to public policy. FACTS: In August 1989, the Philippine Department of

Transportation and Communication (DOTC) engaged the services

of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) to determine whether it can cope with the traffic development up to 2010. Thereafter, six Filipino business leaders formed Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) and submitted an unsolicited proposal to the government for the development of the NAIA Terminal 3 under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement pursuant to the BOT Law (RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718). A consortium composed of Paircargo, PAGS and Security Bank (PAIRCARGO) submitted its comparative proposal to AEDCs bid to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). Both bidders offered to build Terminal 3 for at least $350M at no cost to the government. Under both bids, each bidder will pay the government a share in the gross revenues for the duration of the operation. AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135M as guaranteed payment for 27 years while PAIRCARGO offered to pay a total of P17.75B for the same period. PBAC accepted PAIRCARGOs proposal and gave AEDC 30 days within which to match the said bid. The project was awarded to PAIRCARGO upon AEDCs failure to match its bid. PAIRCARGO was subsequently incorporated into PIATCO. Consequently, the Concession Agreement for Terminal 3 was executed between PIATCO and the government. Amendments to the said contracts followed thereafter. The workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned

agreements, filed a petition to enjoin its enforcement before the Philippine Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1.) 2.) RULINGS: 1.) Under the BOT Law, in case of build-operate-transfer Is PIATCO a qualified bidder? NO. Is the 1997 Concession Agreement valid? NO.

arrangement, the contract shall be awarded to the bidder who, in addition to submitting the lowest bid and most favorable terms also satisfies the minimum financial, technical, organizational and

legal standards required by law.

PIATCO as the challenger to the unsolicited proposal of AEDC has to show that it possesses the requisite financial capability to undertake the project in the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost which is roughly US$350M or P9,183,650,000.00, thus PAIRCARGO has to show that it had the ability to provide the minimum equity for the project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00. As computed however, its total net worth is

P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project cost. Thus the

award of the contract by the PBAC to PAIRCARGO is null and void.

2.) The Concession Agreement is not valid considering that it contains material and substantial amendments which had the effect of converting it into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al.,

(G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004, 419 SCRA 141) J. Artemio Panganiban, ponente.

Shortly before the May 2004 national elections, the Supreme Court invalidated the P1.3-billion contract awarded by COMELEC to Korean firm-led consortium. Pointing to glaring irregularities that attended the bidding process, the Court declared that COMELEC and its officials concerned must bear full responsibility for the failed bidding and award, and held accountable for the election mess wrought by their grave abuse of discretion in the performance of their functions. FACTS: In 1997, the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 authorizing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to use an automated election system (AES) to aid in the counting and canvassing of national and local election results and also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs) and other equipments as well as to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. During the bidding process that ensued, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible out of 57 bidders. Notwithstanding the failure of both bidders in the technical evaluation conducted by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the COMELEC awarded the project to MPC.

Thereafter, petitioner Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP) along with several others wrote COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. protesting the award to MPC and seeking re-bidding. Chairman Abalos rejected the protest and declared that the award would stand up to the strictest scrutiny, prompting petitioner ITFP to seek redress before the Philippine Supreme Court via a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to void the award; to enjoin the implementation of any further Contract between COMELEC and MPC as well as to compel re-bidding for the project. ISSUE: Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it awarded the contract to MPC? YES. RULING: The Philippine Supreme Court granted the petition and nullified the COMELECs contract with MPC. The COMELEC awarded the Contract to MPC, an entity that had not participated in the bidding there being no proof that it was the real bidder. In the documents submitted to the COMELEC during the bidding process, there was no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement,

10

or business plan executed among the members of the purported Mega Pacific Consortium or MPC. It appears that the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., (MPEI) a company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements. Further, the COMELEC awarded the Contract with

inexplicable haste, without checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements accepting the computer hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had failed to pass critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections. The software was nothing but a sample or demo software, which would not be the actual one that would be used during the elections. Keeping in mind that the Contract involves the acquisition of not just the Automated Counting Machines or the hardware, but also the software that would run them, it is clear that the Contract was awarded without COMELEC having seen, much less evaluated, the final product.

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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al. v. EDUARDO ERMITA

(G.R. Nos.169777, 169659, 169660, 169667, 169834, 171246, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1) J. Carpio-Morales, ponente.
The Supreme Court in this case upheld the right of Congress to compel executive officials to appear before inquiries, so long as these hearings are done in aid of legislation. The Court, however, declared constitutional the presidents right to ban executive officials from appearing during the question hour in Congress where the sole objective is to obtain information in pursuit of its oversight function, and does not relate to specific legislation. The high court ruled that Congress has a right of information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. FACTS:

12

Under the Philippine Constitution, Congress has the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and may compel officials of the Executive Department to appear before it and provide information necessary for lawmaking. In September 2005, the Senate as a whole invited various officials of the Executive Department to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing regarding the alleged overpricing and unlawful provisions of the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. A Senate committee also issued invitations to seven high-ranking officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing in connection with the alleged wire-tapping of the Presidents phone conversation with a Commission on Elections official during the last elections. However, the invited officials reasons. Shortly thereafter, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464 which required all heads of the Executive Branch and other public officials, including officials of the AFP, to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. The President anchored this issuance on the principle of executive privilege where certain sensitive information may be validly withheld from Congress. Consequently, all the officials previously invited to appear before the Senate invoked E.O. asked for a postponement of the above scheduled hearings due to various

13

464 to decline such request on the ground that the President has not given her consent to their appearing before the Senate. Petitioner Senate of the Philippines went to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464 on the ground that it violates its constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The other petitioners, in their capacity as citizens and taxpayers, claimed that E.O. 464 violates their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. ISSUES: (1) (2) (3) Does E.O. 464 contravene Congresss power of inquiry in aid of legislation? YES. Does E.O. 464 violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern? YES. Should E.O. 464 have been first published before its implementation? YES.

RULINGS: (1) The specific provision in E.O. 464 which requires

officials of the Executive Department, including officers of the Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines, to

14

first secure the Presidents consent before appearing in the Senate or House of Representatives to give testimony or submit documents constitute an implied claim of executive privilege. Under Philippine jurisdiction executive privilege whether asserted against Congress, the courts or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. This would cover state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters as well as presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussion in closed-door Cabinet meetings. The invocation of E.O. 464 as a justification for nonappearance before the Senate impliedly means that the President has made a prior determination that the matters which the official will disclose are covered by the executive privilege. However, in the case at bar, the implied claim of executive privilege is invalid per se because it is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the ground as basis thereof. Congress is left to speculate as to what ground is being referred to by the President. A claim of privilege, being a claim for exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must be clearly asserted. The due respect for a co-equal branch of government demands that a claim of privilege clearly state the grounds therefor. Otherwise, the power of inquiry of Congress would be severely frustrated. It should be noted, however, that Congress must not require the President to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel

15

disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Philippine Supreme Court limited its exercise to the President only. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the

16

official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. (2) There are clear distinctions between the constitutional

right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. However, to the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which is presumed to be a matter of public concern. Thus, this kind of impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is just as direct a violation of the legislatures power of inquiry. (3) E.O. 464 should have first been published because it

has a direct effect on the right of people to information on matters of public concern and is, thus, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before the Philippine Supreme Court.

17

BAYAN, et al. v. ERMITA

(G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848 and 169881, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA 226) J. Adolfo Azcuna, ponente.
The Philippine Supreme Court in this case held that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies and directed the police force to exercise maximum tolerance without fail. FACTS: Batas Pambansa No. 880 or The Public Act Assembly of 1985 is the Philippine law which regulates the constitutional right of the Filipino people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Under this law, a person or group of persons is required to first secure a written permit if they intend to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. Without such a permit, the rally can be peacefully dispersed by the police. This is what is commonly known in the Philippines as the no permit, no rally rule.

18

The application for permit to rally shall state the time, place, duration and purposes of the assembly, and shall be filed with the office of the city or municipal mayor five (5) working days before the scheduled assembly. If the mayor fails to act on the application within two (2) working days, the application is deemed granted. An application may be disapproved on the ground that there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. If the application is denied, the applicant may resort to the courts. The law prescribes a policy of Maximum Tolerance in dealing with rallyists so that police dispersals should be undertaken peacefully with respect to rallies without permits. As regards rallies with permits, police dispersals should be done only when the rally has turned imminently or actually violent and unlawful; and using only reasonable means through communication/negotiation with the rally leaders, with the use of reasonable force as the means of last resort. This law also mandates a city or municipality to designate at least one suitable freedom park where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit within six (6) months from the effectivity of the aforesaid law. However, almost all cities and municipalities have failed to comply with this requirement of the law.

19

On September 21, 2005, the Executive Department issued a press release regarding unlawful mass actions or rallies without permits. It stated that the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (or more popularly known as CPR) shall now be in force in lieu of the policy of Maximum Tolerance. As such, the police shall take the necessary actions to stop rallyists from committing acts inimical to public order and peace. Petitioners consist of three groups which conducted several protest rallies against various policies of the Philippine Government on September 26, October 4, 5, and 6, 2005. They claim that the police preempted and violently dispersed their mass actions on aforesaid dates. Thus, they filed a petition before the Philippine Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of The Public

Assembly of 1985. They claim that the law violates their

constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances (as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties signed by the Philippine Government) because the law is a content-based regulation aimed at stifling political dissent and the clear and present danger standard is too broad and an unreasonable limitation on their right to peaceably assemble. In addition, they claim that the policy of CPR is void because it contravenes the policy of Maximum Tolerance under the Public

Assembly Act of 1985 and that the policy of CPR has been used by
the police to justify taking a more aggressive stance against rallyists.

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ISSUES: (4) Is the Public Assembly Act of 1985 unconstitutional? NO.

(5) Is the policy of CPR valid? NO. RULINGS: 1.) The right to peaceably assemble and petition for

redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. sacrosanct, it is not absolute. However, while such right is The right cannot be abrogated

through prior restraint except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The clear and present danger standard embodied in The Public Assembly

Act of 1985 is a well-recognized exception in Philippine

jurisprudence as well as by international treaties.

The Public

Assembly Act of 1985 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies

but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. 2.) Respondents belatedly claim that the CPR means the

same thing as the policy of Maximum Tolerance and was not intended to replace the latter. At any rate, in view of the Maximum

21

Tolerance mandated by The Public Assembly of 1985, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as Maximum Tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, Maximum Tolerance, as specifically defined under the law. The socalled CPR policy has no place in Philippine legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. agents to justify abuses. The Philippine Supreme Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under The Public Act Assembly of 1985. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities. It merely confuses the Filipino People and is used by some police

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PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et. al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, as President and Commander-In-Chief, et al.

(G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160) J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, ponente.

In this case, the Supreme Court upheld President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos power to declare a state of emergency but ruled that acts committed by government authorities under Proclamation No. 1017 were illegal. Voting 11-3, the Court said that while PP 1017 was constitutional, insofar as it constituted a call by Arroyo for the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, the warrantless arrests and search of the Daily Tribune office were in violation of the law. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the Philippines celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This proclamation was precipitated by alleged intelligence reports that the political opposition consisting of the Extreme Left (communist rebels) and the Extreme Right (military adventurists) had conspired to overthrow the Arroyo Administration through violent and unlawful means. Thus, the President, pursuant to her constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief, called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations

23

promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. To implement this proclamation, the President issued General Order No. 5 which directed the military to pursue the aforementioned objectives and, in addition, required them to suppress acts of terrorism. Thereafter, the Office of the President announced that all permits to rally originally granted by the cities or municipalities are revoked. The Presidential Chief of Staff announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented. Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters, including some of the herein petitioners, marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. In particular, petitioner Prof. Randy David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and a newspaper columnist, and his companion were arrested without a warrant but later released due to insufficiency of evidence to criminally charge them. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, police operatives, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices (a newspaper outfit) in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. The raid, according

24

to the Presidential Chief of Staff, was meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down the government. The police also warned that it would takeover any media organization that would not follow the standards set by the government during the state of national emergency. Petitioners went to the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 on the grounds that: (1) the President exceeded her commander-in-chief powers as there was no factual bases to justify the calling out of the military, (2) the issuances are a usurpation of legislative powers by the President, (3) the issuances violated petitioners rights to peaceably assemble and freedom of the press, and (4) the President cannot takeover privately-owned utilities or businesses affected with public interest during a state of emergency without authority from Congress. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. ISSUES: (6) Was the Presidents exercise of her calling out powers bereft of factual bases? NO.

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(7) (8)

Do portions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 usurp legislative powers and are thus, unconstitutional? YES. Was the implementation of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 through warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches and seizures unconstitutional? YES.

(9)

Can the President takeover privately-owned utilities and businesses affected with public interest during a state of national emergency without Congressional authority? NO.

RULINGS: (4) Under Section 18, Article VII of the Philippine

Constitution, the President may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion. However, the 1987 Constitution has granted the Supreme Court an expanded jurisdiction to determine whether such exercise of power was done with grave abuse of discretion prescinding from the sad experiences during the martial law years where the Court hid behind the political question doctrine in cases of this nature. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to prove that PP 1017 was without factual bases as the same was supported by intelligence reports submitted by the counsel for the government.

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(5)

PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President

express or implied power to issue decrees and to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President are unconstitutional because only Congress may enact laws. A decree, within the context of the martial law years, had the same force and effect as laws. As regards G.O. No. 5, the words acts of terrorism have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5 which makes a fertile ground for abuse. (6) The warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David

and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and the warrantless search of the Daily Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. These acts are declared unconstitutional without prejudice to prosecuting the individuals responsible therefor. (7) Finally, the President, in the absence of legislation,

cannot take over privately-owned utilities and business affected

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with public interest during a state of national emergency as a reasonable reading of the text of the Constitution reveal.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENT CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA

(G.R. No. 163663, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 280) J. Carpio-Morales, ponente.

THE Supreme Court in this case nullified the P390-billion solid waste management contract signed between the Metropolitan

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Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and Australian firm Jancom Environmental Corporation to operate the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site in the Rizal province which would have disposed of about 8.000 tons of Metro Manila garbage daily. The contract cannot be executed due to lack of approval from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. FACTS: Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 creating the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee (petitioner GMSWMC) to oversee and develop waste disposal sites in Rizal and Cavite under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, the Philippine government through the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) entered into a BOT contract for the creation of a waste disposal site in San Mateo, Rizal with respondent JANCOM Environmental Corporation (JANCOM), the sole complying bidder. Prior to the Presidents approval of the contract, the government ordered the landfills closure due to the clamor of the residents of Rizal. Thereafter, petitioner GMSWMC adopted a resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM citing as reasons the passage of RA 8749 otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the landfill site and costly tipping fees. JANCOM filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) to declare such resolution void and to

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enjoin the MMDA from entering into new waste management contracts with third parties. The RTC granted JANCOMs petition. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed in toto. By Decision of January 30, 2002 and Resolution of April 10, 2002, the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit

ineffective

and

unimplementable

pending

approval by the President.

JANCOM and the MMDA later purportedly modified the contract and came up with an unsigned draft Amended Agreement dated June 2002. JANCOM then filed an Omnibus Motion before Branch 68 of RTC-Pasig seeking to compel MMDA to cease from entering into any contract with third parties relative to waste management and disposal; the immediate submission of said Amended Agreement to the President; and to compel MMDA to comply with its contractual obligations. The trial court granted the same in an Order and directed the MMDA to cease from entering into any contract with third parties in violation of JANCOMs contractual rights; to submit the Amended Agreement to the President for his signature and approval and to comply with their obligations as provided in the contract. Alias writs of execution implementing said Order was subsequently issued by the RTC.

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Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the trial courts Order having found it to be proper. Petitioners then raised the matter to the Philippine Supreme Court alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in upholding the assailed Order. ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial courts Order? YES. RULING: The Supreme Courts January 30, 2002 Decision and April 10, 2002 Resolution held that although the contract between the government and JANCOM is a perfected contract, it is still

ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President providing that such approval is necessary for its effectivity.
Since the contract provides that it shall become effective only upon approval by the President, the trial court improperly issued the alias writs of execution, for in doing so, it had, in effect, ordered the enforcement of the contract despite the Supreme Courts unequivocal pronouncements. Also, the Amended Agreement was unsigned by the parties and as such was merely a

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draft document containing the proposals of JANCOM subject to the approval of the MMDA.

LAMBINO v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160) J. Antonio Carpio, ponente.
In this case, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the petition of charter change advocates seeking to revise the 1987 Constitution via a peoples initiative. By a hairline vote of 8-7, the high court ruled that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the pleas of charter change advocates for revision. FACTS: In August 2006, petitioners Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado, invoking their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution by way of peoples initiative, filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitting the following proposition:1
1

It appears, however, that this proposition differs from the one submitted to the people and which was in the abstract of the petition which states: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift

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Do you approve the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameralpresidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system and providing Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another? Several groups and individuals opposed the petition, citing

Santiago v. COMELEC (270 SCRA 106), they argued that the

COMELEC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition because of the permanent injunction of the Supreme Court in the case. They alleged that RA 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Act) is deficient and inadequate to implement a peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution and that the signature campaign was orchestrated by the government and thus, not truly reflective of the Filipino peoples will. Moreover, even if there were a law, the changes sought are not amendments but revisions which may not be effected through an initiative. The COMELEC dismissed the petition but did not rule on whether the petition was correct in substance and in form. It also refrained from ruling on the authenticity of the 6 million signatures that purportedly backed the petition. of registered voters However, it stated in its decision that the petition appeared to meet the required number

from one system to another? Petitioners later filed an Amended Petition together with a Manifestation citing corrections on the text of the proposed amendments.

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Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Supreme Court praying that the COMELECs resolution be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion and further prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering the COMELEC to entertain the Petition for Initiative and Referendum, to comply with the Constitution, and to set the date of the plebiscite pursuant to its ministerial duty as provided by law. ISSUE: Did the petition for initiative comply with the Constitutional requirements on amendments through peoples initiative? NO. RULING: The petition on initiative miserably failed to comply with the requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative. The draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal the essence of the amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

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The admissions petitioners made during the oral argument for this case established beyond any doubt that they failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets that they circulated and subsequently submitted to the COMELEC. The result is a grand deception on the supposed 6.3M signatories who are left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. In the words of the ponente of this case, J. Antonio Carpio, the Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution- that a peoples initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO

(G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452) J. Reynato Puno, ponente.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled on the validity of the Presidency assumed by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after declaring that former president Estrada resigned from the presidency after his ouster by People Power during EDSA 2.

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FACTS: On the line in the case at bar is the Office of the President of the Philippines. Petitioner Joseph Estrada was the duly elected President in the May 1998 elections where Gloria MacapagalArroyo won as Vice-President. Both were to serve a 6-year term beginning in June 1998. Although elected with an overwhelming mandate of 10M votes, Estradas term was plagued by controversy which all came to a heed on October 2000 after his long time friend and provincial Governor Luis Chavit Singson came out on television and said that the former president pocketed bribes from illegal gambling operators in the provinces. The Senate trial for Estradas impeachment which ensued in December 2000 was aborted when a majority of senator-judges voted to reject evidence linking Estrada to millions of dollars in illacquired wealth. The vote spurred a walk-out by the prosecution panel and massive anti-Estrada protests leading to eventual ouster. Estrada left Malacanang Palace at around 2:30 in the afternoon on January 20, 2001 amid the resignation of cabinet members and key military and police officials. Earlier at noon on the same day, Philippine Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo. Several cases previously filed against Estrada before the graft court were set in motion. A criminal case for plunder, graft

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and corruption was also filed against him and his co-accused. Estrada subsequently sought recourse before the Supreme Court insisting that he never resigned as president and was merely on leave making Arroyos presidency unconstitutional. And because he is still sitting president, he is immune from suit. ISSUES: 1.) Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES. 2.) Did Estrada resign as President? YES. 3.) Is conviction in the impeachment proceedings a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of Estrada? NO. Assuming that he is still President, is he immune from criminal prosecution? NO. RULINGS: 1.) The cases at bar present pose legal and not political

questions since the principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution as well as a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. 2.) The totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior

facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue shows that Estrada resigned as President. His resignation cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of

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the nation and not due to any inability. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath taking of Arroyo as President albeit with reservation about its legality. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them, this without doubt referred to past opportunity given him to serve the people as President. All these point to the inescapable conclusion that his presidency is now in the past tense. 3.) Estradas argument that he cannot be prosecuted for

the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings lacks merit. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against him has been aborted and thereafter he lost the Presidency, Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery, graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA, CHARLIE ATONG TIU HAY SI ANG, EDWARD S. SERAPIO, YOLANDA T. RICAFORTE, ALMA ALFARO, JOHN DOE aka ELEUTERIO RAMOS TAN or MR. UY, JANE DOE aka DELIA RAJAS, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES

(Criminal Case No. 26558, for: PLUNDER, September 12, 2007)

Republic Act No. 70802 penalizes public officers who amass immense wealth through a series or combination of overt or criminal acts in violation of the public trust. The reason behind the law was explained in the Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733 quoted in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan3as follows:

Plunder xxx punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed through a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy.
The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the Philippines, a former President, among others, of the offense of plunder. The resolution of this case will set significant historical and legal precedents.
2

Otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, approved on July 12, 1991. G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555.

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FACTS: In April 2001, the prosecution filed an Amended Information against the accused charging them with the crime of PLUNDER committed as follows: a.) by receiving money in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00) from illegal gambling in connivance with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling; by diverting public funds amounting to ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00) representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under RA No. 7171, in connivance with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does; by directing the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stocks of the BELLE CORPORATION in the total amount of ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,874,578,057.50); for which he received commissions in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189, 700,000.00), which became part of the deposit in the EquitablePCI BANK under the account name JOSE VELARDE;

b.)

c.)

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d.)

by unjustly enriching himself in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more or less THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) and depositing the same under his account name JOSE VELARDE at the Equitable-PCI BANK.

After the issuance of the arrest warrants against them the Estradas (FPres. Estrada and his son Jinggoy) and Serapio surrendered to the authorities and were subsequently arraigned where a plea of not guilty was entered for them. FPres. Estrada was eventually placed under house arrest in his residence in Tanay, Rizal while Jinggoy and Serapio were granted bail. Accused Charlie Atong Ang (Ang) was extradited from the United States. Having executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement with the prosecution, Ang pleaded guilty and was convicted for the lesser offense of Corruption of Public Officials. He is currently under probation. Prosecution star witness, former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit C. Singson (Chavit) testified to the systematic collection and delivery to FPres. Estrada of jueteng protection money in the amount of P5M every 15 days which was methodically recorded in two sets of ledgers covering the period November 1998-July 1999 and August 1999-August 2000. Sometime in July 1999, FPres. Estrada instructed Chavit to turn over 123M in jueteng money to Estradas accountant Yolanda T. Ricaforte (Ricaforte) to be deposited in the latters accounts. Bank officers from several

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branches of Equitable-PCI Bank subsequently testified to the existence of Ricafortes active accounts involving staggering amounts of money. In early 2000, FPres. Estrada directed Chavit to transfer 200M of jueteng money to Serapio. Bank officers of Equitable- PCI Bank later testified to the existence of the accounts of the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation in the sum of 200M which were deposited through several checks issued by Serapio. Chavit and FPres. Estrada subsequently had a falling out when the franchise of the government sanctioned numbers game called Bingo 2 Ball in Ilocos Sur was awarded to Eric Singson, Chavits political rival. Fearing that his life was in danger, Chavit gathered evidence and came out with this expose. In his defense, FPres. Estrada stated that he did not receive a single centavo from any form of illegal gambling. He even sought to legalize jueteng so that the government can earn money to help provide essential services for the poor. He stated that he met Serapio in 1999 and was impressed by the latters credentials so he appointed him as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs. FPres. Estrada claimed that he started the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation on seed money from his salary as well as with the funds raised from a golf tournament. He denied that he ordered Chavit to give jueteng money in the amount of 200M to Serapio for the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation stating that Serapio told him that an anonymous donor thru Chavit gave said amount to the foundation. FPres. Estrada maintained that Chavit is accusing him

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with these unfounded allegations out of desperation. He stated that Chavit sought his help with the Commission on Audit (COA) because he was unable to liquidate his cash advance from the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur under R.A. 7171. FPres. Estrada refused because COA is an independent constitutional body. FPres. Estrada likewise vehemently denied Chavits

allegations with respect to the diversion of the excise taxes for the province of Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No. 7171. Chavit claimed that FPres. Estrada approved his request for the release of said funds in consideration of P130M which was credited into the accounts of Alma Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan as shown by bank documents presented by the prosecution. FPres. Estrada also belied any knowledge pertaining to the purchase of Government Social Insurance System (GSIS) and Social Security System (SSS) of shares in Belle Corporation despite the testimony of its Vice-Chairman and Director Willy Ocier that FPres. Estrada brokered the sale through Jaime Dichaves in consideration of a commission in the amount of 189.7M. Ocier stated that after the purchase was concluded, the corporation issued a check in the amount of 189.7M and delivered it to Dichaves who in turn deposited the same in his account with Far East Bank and Trust Co. After some inter-bank transactions, the check finally landed in the account under the name of Jose Velarde

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which turned out to be FPres. Estradas account upon his own admission that he signed under said alias upon Dichaves behest. ISSUE: Are the above-named accused guilty of Plunder as charged? RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN: The SANDIGANBAYAN held that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the elements of Plunder as follows: a.) The principal accused, FPres. Estrada, at the time of the commission of the acts charged in the Amended Information was the President of the Republic of the Philippines; He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis Chavit Singson, who was granted immunity from suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other persons, in amassing ill-gotten wealth as follows: i. by a series of acts for receiving bi-monthly collections from jueteng, from November 1998August 2000 in the total amount of P545,291,000.00, P200M of which was deposited in the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation; and by a series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and receiving commission from the sales in the amount of P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the Jose Velarde account.

b.)

ii.

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The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt the misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur as charged and likewise failed to offer evidence on the alleged illegal sources of the numerous deposits in the Jose

Velarde account which belongs to FPres. Estrada, except for the

commission received from the sale of Belle shares and the money collected from illegal gambling. FPres. Joseph Estrada was found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of PLUNDER. Jinggoy Estrada and Edward Serapio are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty imposable is RECLUSION

PERPETUA and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and

perpetual absolute disqualification. The SANDIGANBAYAN also declared the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following: a. the total amount of P545,291,000.00 with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of P200M deposited in the name and account of the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation; the amount of P189,700,000.00, inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account; the real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as Boracay Mansion located at #100 11th St. New Manila, Quezon City.

b. c.