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Department of Justice
NANCY E. MARTIN, ESQUIRE COLLINS & MARTIN, P.C. 55 TOWN LINE ROAD - THIRD FLOOR WETHERSFIELD, CT 06109
A041-457-839
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case. Sincerely,
Enclosure
Cite as: Ryan Damion Coulbourne, A041 457 839 (BIA Jan. 18, 2011)
A041-457-839
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision in the above-referenced case. This copy is being provided to you as a courtesy. Your attorney or representative has been served with this decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1292.5(a). If the attached decision orders that you be removed from the United States or affirms an Immigration Judge's decision ordering that you be removed, any petition for review of the attached decision must be filed with and received by the appropriate court of appeals within 30 days of the date of the decision. Sincerelv.
DOrlJUL ct1/Vt.)
Donna Carr Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Cite as: Ryan Damion Coulbourne, A041 457 839 (BIA Jan. 18, 2011)
,,
File:
Date:
JAN 18 2011
In re: RYAN DAMION COULBOURNE a.k.a. Ryan Coulbourne IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL
CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A){iii)] Convicted of aggravated felony as defined in sections 101(a)(43)(F), (G)
This case was last before the Board on April 3, 2009, when we dismissed the respondent's appeal of the Immigration Judge's December 17, 2008, decision denying his motion to terminate proceedings based upon his claim of derivative citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a). In an order dated April 20, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where this case arises, remanded the record to the Board to further consider the respondent's claim of derivative citizenship. The appeal will be dismissed. In our April 3, 2009, decision, the Board distinguished the Second Circuit's decision in
Poole v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2008), from the respondent's case and concluded that the
record sufficiently established the reason for the delay in processing the respondent's father's naturalization application such that the respondent had not met his burden in establishing derivative citizenship under former section 32 l(a) of the Act. In its remand, the Second Circuit found that, in making its decision, the Board engaged in improper fact-finding directly relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion. See Coulbourne v. Holder, 372 Fed.Appx. 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished). The Second Circuit remanded the record to consider what relief might be available to the respondent considering the delay in adjudicating the father's naturalization application, filed prior to the respondent's 18th birthday, but approved 2 months after. See id.1
In its remand, the Second Circuit asks the Board to consider, in an appropriate case, issuing
a precedential opinion addressing the concerns it raised in Poole. See id. at FN 2. We do not find this to be the proper vehicle for a precedential decision. Frther, the Second Circuit subsequently dismissed the alien's petition for review of the Board's remanded order in Poole. See
Cite as: Ryan Damion Coulbourne, A041 457 839 (BIA Jan. 18, 2011)
A041457 839
.
Our authority to grant relief nune pro tune is limited and does not extend to derivative United States citizenship claims. Therefore, because the respondent's father's application for naturalization was ultimately approved after the respondent turned 18 years old, we have no jurisdiction to find
nune pro tune that he derived United States citizenship under former section 321(a) ofthe Act. Even
if we had such authority, there is no evidence that the processing delay in this case was untoward, or that the government engaged in affirmative misconduct which would give rise to an equitable estoppel claim so as to warrant a finding that the respondent should be found to have derived United States citizenship nunc pro tune. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.
'
Cite as: Ryan Damion Coulbourne, A041 457 839 (BIA Jan. 18, 2011)