Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

L-65894 September 24, 1987 THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN, duly represented by MAYOR RICARDO F. LIM,petitioner, vs. JOSE CARINO, VICTORIANO DACULLA, BEN GUMASING, LUCENA CRUZ, HILARIA YALON, PEPITO YAMBAO, RIC GACUTAN, ANDRES DACULLA, FELICISIMA URSAIS, PASTOR JOSOL, TEDDY ACTANG, CANDIDA MANALO, LETICIA RAMAL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES PORFIRIO V. SISON, ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN, MARCELINO R. VELOSO and DESIDERIO P. JURADO, respondents.

Sec. 19 (b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required. Whether or not the above provisions are applicable to the case at bar is the lone issue in this petition which assails the resolution of the respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983. The dispositive part of the questioned resolution reads: WHEREFORE, notwithstanding the foregoing, in the broader interest of justice and considering that under the present Interim Rules a record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal, the Court resolved to order the recall of the records of this case from the Regional Trial Court of Palawan Branch I, Puerto Princess for further proceedings before this Court. (Rollo, pp. 12-13) Following are the pertinent facts of the case as culled from the records. Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 35. The action sought authority from the court to demolish the structures built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioner's wharf. The complaint alleged, among others: that the defendants' houses were constructed more than 3 years before the filing of instant action (par. 2, Complaint),: that on August 19, 1974 the herein defendants undertook to remove their structures on space where they were then at that time and are presently standing, when it will be needed by the government (par. 3,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The second paragraph of Section 39, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that: No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof. Likewise, Sections 18 and 19(b) of the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 provide that: Sec. 18. The filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with, except in the cases referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) hereof. No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal. xxx xxx xxx

Ibid); that the space or area is needed by the plaintiff for the docking or berthing of pumpboats (motorized bancas) and fishing boats and for the loading and unloading of cargoes along the pier on both sides thereof (par. 4, Ibid); and also to ease the congested traffic along it (par. 10, Ibid); that his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had the Mayor of plaintiffmunicipality to demolish and remove all constructions along the pier after giving the defendants one month notice (par. 5, Ibid) and aside from this directive of the President, the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality is also authorized to remove the defendants' illegal constructions under LOI 19 (par. 7, Ibid); that despite said mayor's desire to comply immediately with the said presidential directive, the defendants had already been given 3 extensions thereby delaying their ejectment therefrom (par. 6, Ibid); that most of the defendants are affluent squatters (par. 9, Ibid); and that for the indigent defendants, a surveyed area has already been made ready for their relocation (par. 12, Ibid). (Decision CFI, Palawan and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV, p. 2; Reno, p. 15). On the other hand, the private respondents, in their answer, counter-alleged, among others: that their structures when made were covered by building permits with the approval of the Bureau of Public Highways (par, 2, Answer); that the area where their structures were located is a foreshore area (Par. 4, Ibid); that a meeting was convened and presided by Governor Socrates at Coron, the same having been attended by the local representatives of the Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Department (now Ministry) of Social Services and

Development, the Sangguniang Bayan and the defendants and it was agreed in this meeting that the demolition of the defendants' houses will be suspended pending action of the Office of the President (par. 15, 16, 17, Ibid); and that the Chairman of the National Housing Authority had sent a letteradvice to the mayor of the plaintiffmunicipality to suspend the demolition of the houses of the defendants (par. 18, Ibid). (Rollo, pp. 15-16) After a series of postponements, the trial court, on January 16, 1979, reset the hearing of the case for the last time for three consecutive dates, March 20, 21, and 22, 1979 with further warning to the private respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed. On March 20, 1979, despite proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner moved that private respondents' non-appearance be considered as a waiver on their part of their right to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses and their right to present evidence. The lower court issued an order granting the petitioner's motion and considered the case submitted for decision. In view of the above order, the private respondents went to the appellate court on certiorari. On June 9, 1979, the appellate court dismissed for lack of merit CA G.R. SP09389-R captioned "Jose Carino, et al., petitioners v. Mayor Ricardo Lim and Hon. Benjamin Vega, Judge CFI, Palawan, Branch IV." On May 15, 1979, after the main case had been submitted for decision as aforestated, the private respondents filed a notice to take deposition which the lower court disregarded for being "irrelevant and for other obvious reasons." On October 10, 1980, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff-municipality of Coron,

Palawan and against all the herein defendants as follows: 1. Dismissing the defendants'counterclaim for lack of merit; 2. Confirming the power of plaintiffmunicipality and authority of its incumbent mayor to demolish the defendants' structures along the rock causeway or pier of Coron; and 3. Ordering the said defendants to remove their structures in the area in question within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision and for their failure to do so, authorizing the herein plaintiff represented by its incumbent mayor to demolish the said structures at the expense of the said defendants. Costs against all the defendants. (Rollo, pp. 28-29) On appeal, the private respondents on February 2, 1982 were required "to submit the forty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together with the proof of service of fifteen (15) copies thereof upon the appellee" within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of the appellate court's Acting Clerk of Court regarding their appeal. (Rollo, p. 32) Upon motion by the private respondents, the appellate court granted an extension of sixty (60) days from April 7, 1982 within which the required printed copies of the record on appeal may be submitted. However, despite the extended period given, the private respondents were not able to comply with the appellate court's requirement. In a resolution dated July 19, 1982, the appellate court required the private respondents to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed copies of the record on appeal.

On August 31, 1982, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the private respondents' appeal docketed as CA G.R. No. 69052-R for failure to file the required record on appeal. On December 6, 1982, the Acting Clerk of Court of the appellate court, in an Entry of Judgment, certified that the above resolution dismissing the private respondents' appeal had become final and executory on September 27, 1982. Accordingly, on February 1, 1983, a writ of execution was issued to enforce the October 10, 1980 decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch IV. Before the Provincial Sheriff could proceed with the execution of the judgment, the private respondents, in a motion dated April 12, 1983 asked the appellate court that the records of the case be recalled from the court of origin. In their supplemental motion, the private respondents argued that since under the present law, printed records on appeal are no longer required, their right to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule on technicalities. In its opposition to the private respondents' motion, the Petitioner pointed out that although the newly promulgated procedural rules invoked by the private respondents may be given retroactive effect, their applicability only covers pending actions and does not extend to those which had already become final and executory. As a consequence of the private respondents' motion to recall the records of the case, a temporary restraining order dated April 29, 1983 was issued by the appellate court directing the Provincial Sheriff of Palawan to desist from executing the October 10, 1980 decision. On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued the disputed resolution. The subsequent denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration prompted the filing of this petition. The petitioner maintains that the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 to implement the

provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 29 cannot apply to the case at bar for the simple reason that to revive or recall appealed cases which had been dismissed or which had become final and executory would cause a great injustice to those in whose favor these cases had been decided. It is further contended that to allow its application would put no end to those appealed cases which are otherwise considered as closed ones. We find merit in the petitioner's contentions. We have resolved the issue as to the extent of the retroactive application of section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court in Alday v. Camilon (120 SCRA 521). We reiterated the rule that: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]) Emphasis supplied. The appellate court should have followed this timehonoured rule instead of issuing its July 29, 1983 resolution seeking to revive a case already long final as evidenced by the entry of judgment made by its Acting Clerk of Court on December 6, 1982. The records of the instant case show that despite the 60day extension period given to the private respondents within which they could file their printed record of appeal as then required, they still failed to do so. It was only after a writ of execution had been issued on February 1, 1983 that the private respondents responded to the appellate court's resolution dated July 19, 1982 requiring them to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed record on appeal. They claimed that the court's resolution must have been a result of oversight because they actually filed a record on appeal. As a general rule, our policy towards an invocation of the right to appeal has been one of liberality. (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 782 citing De Las Alas vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200). This is so because an appeal is an

essential part of our judicial system and every partylitigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities. (See Siguenza vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570). However, it is an equally established doctrine that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. (See United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Clave, 137 SCRA 346). For a proper exercise of their right to appeal, the private respondents should have complied with Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, as amended by our resolution en banc dated September 17, 1974, which partly provides that: Sec. 5. Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. It shall be the duty of the appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding section, to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal, and within sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to the court twelve (12) printed copies of the record on appeal, or twelve (12) typewritten or mimeographed (on one side of good quality paper, eleven inches in length by eight and a half inches in width commonly known as letter size written double spaced) copies of said record on appeal together with proof of service of two (2) printed, typewritten or mimeographed copies thereof upon the appellee. Thus, upon failure of the appellant to comply with the above rule, the Court of Appeals may dismiss his appeal. Said provision implicitly grants the Court of Appeals the power to do so. (See Pfleider vs. Victoriano, 98 SCRA 491). The private respondents in this case did not submit printed copies of their record on appeal. When the appellate court issued its July 19, 1982 resolution, it was to afford the private respondents a chance to explain why they failed to comply with the applicable rule. After having failed to submit the required printed copies of their record on

appeal, they cannot now rectify a clear non-compliance with the law by invoking the court's liberality insofar as the application of remedial laws is concerned. The private respondents even faulted the appellate court as having issued the July 19, 1982 resolution through oversight. They alleged that they had filed the required record on appeal when in fact what they referred to was the record on appeal from the lower court to the appellate court and not the printed record on appeal. Since the private respondents failed to submit the required printed record on appeal, the lower court's judgment in favor of the petitioner became final. and executory as an eventual result of the dismissal of the appeal. Once a judgment becomes final the prevailing party, the petitioner in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgment in his favor. For the court, it becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of said judgment. (Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56614, promulgated July 28, 1987 citing Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 49; Balintawak Construction Supply Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 124 SCRA 331; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Dayrit, 123 SCRA 203; Gonzales vs. Sayo, 122 SCRA 607). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983 is SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for enforcement of the writ of execution of the judgment. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur. Bidin, * J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau of Lands is a 26,064 square meters parcel covered by Free Patent No. 46128 issued on October 29, 1969. OCT No. P-2404 was issued on November 24, 1969. On February 24, 1970 or barely three months after he acquired the land, the respondent mortgaged the lot in question, together with another lot covered by TCT No. 3614 and some chattels to secure a commercial loan of P978,920.00 from the DBP. The lot was developed into a commercial-industrial complex with ricemill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an office and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for various materials. When the private respondent failed to pay his loan after more than seven years had passed, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977. On that date, the total obligation amounted to P1,114,913.34. DBP was the highest bidder. Certificates of sale were issued in its favor; P452,995.00 was for the two lots and P108,450.00 for the chattels. The certificate covering the disputed lot was registered with the Registry of Deeds on January 24, 1978. After the foreclosure sale, respondent Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP for P1,500.00 a month. Part of the property was also leased by DBP to the then National Grains Authority. The respondent failed to redeem the property within the one year period. On September 24, 1979 DBP sold the lot to the petitioner for P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly amortizations over a five year period. The petitioners occupied the purchased lot and introduced further improvements worth P970,000.00. On July 12, 1983, claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to repurchase, respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP countered, however, that over the years a total of P3,056,739.52 had already been incurred in the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements. On October 4, 1983, Pe filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City.

On November 27, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Development Bank of the Philippines is ordered: 1) to reconvey unto the plaintiff the parcel of land in question (Lot No. P2404) for the repurchase price of P327,995.00 plus legal interest from June 18, 1977 to June 19, 1978 only, and the expenses of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; expenses for registration and ten percent (10%) attorneys fees; 2) ordering the defendants to vacate forever the premises of said property in favor of the plaintiff upon payment of the total repurchase price; 3) ordering the defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00; 4) and to set an example to government banking and lending institutions not to take borrowers for granted by making it hard for them to repurchase by misleading them, the bank is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff by way of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00; Ordering further the defendant DBP: 5) to reimburse the co-defendants spouses Benzonan the amount they have paid or advanced the defendant DBP for the purchase of Lot O.C.T. No. P-2404; 6) ordering the defendants to pay the cost of suit. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 74-75)

G.R. No. 97973 January 27, 1992 SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 97998 January 27, 1992 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENITO SALVANI PE, respondents. Ruben E. Agpalo for Sps. Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan. Vicente R. Acsay for Benito Salvani Pe. Thomas T. Jacobo for DBP.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land foreclosed by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan. Respondent Pe is a businessman in General Santos City who owns extensive commercial and agricultural properties. He is the proprietor of the firm "Dadiangas B.P. Trading." One of the properties he acquired through free

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modifications as follows: xxx xxx xxx All the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision rendered by the court a quo with the modification that the defendant DBP shall reimburse to its co-defendant Benzonan spouses all amounts that the latter have paid for the land, minus interest, and that the Benzonan spouses shall be allowed to remove the improvement that they have made on the property under litigation, without impairing or damaging the same. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, p. 105) A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1991. The petitioners-spouses in G.R. No. 97973 raise the following "legal issues, reasons, or errors" allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that conversion and use of the land in question to industrial or commercial purposes, as a result of which it could no longer be used for cultivation, and the fact that respondent Pe has vast holdings whose motive in seeking to repurchase the property is to continue the business or for speculation or greater profits did not deprive him of the right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141, and, as a result, in ignoring or disregarding Pe's admissions and undisputed facts establishing such circumstances, contrary to what this Court held in Santana v.Marias, 94 SCRA 853 [1979], Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195 [1979]

and Simeon v. Pea,36 SCRA 610 [1970]. 2. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe still had the right to repurchase the land under Sec. 119 of CA 141, the Court of Appeals erred in not counting the 5-year period from the date of foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977 or at the very most from its registration on January 24, 1978, in accordance with the prevailing doctrinal law at the time as enunciated in Monge v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 561 [1957],Oliva v. Lamadrid, 21 SCRA 737 [1967] and Tupas v. Damasco, 132 SCRA 593 [1984], pursuant to which Pe's right to repurchase already expired. 3. The Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 101 [1988], which held that the 5-year period is counted from the date after the one-year period to redeem foreclosed homestead expired, to the foreclosure of the land in question in 1977, as its retroactive application revived Pe's lost right of repurchase and defeated petitioners' right of ownership that already accrued under the then prevailing doctrinal law. 4. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe had the right to repurchase the land in question and assuming, further, that the 5-year period is to be counted from the consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the one-year period to redeem, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the mere filing of an action for repurchase without tendering or depositing the repurchase price did not satisfy the requirements of repurchase, Pe's failure to make the

tender or deposit even up to the present being confirmatory of speculative motive behind his attempt to repurchase. 5. Assuming, finally, that respondent Pe is entitled to repurchase the property, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners are possessors in good faith, similar to a vendee a retro, entitled (a) to reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under Article 1616 of the Civil Code as held in Calagan v. CFI of Davao, 95 SCRA 498 [1980] and in Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975]; and (b) to refund of all amounts paid by them by reason of the sale of the property in their favor, including interest payments, in both instances with right of retention. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 14-16) In G.R No. 97998, DBP limited its petition to the value of the repurchase price and the nature of the contract between the parties. It framed the issues as follows: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act No. 459 as amended is not applicable in the instant case to determine the repurchase price contrary to decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court in the following cases: DBP v. Jimenez, et al. (36 SCRA 426) andDBP v. Mirang (66 SCRA 141). 2. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the law between the contracting parties are the terms and conditions embodied in the contract signed by them. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97998, p. 12) We find merit in the petitions.

The determination of the main issues raised by the petitioners calls for the proper application of Section 119 of CA 141 as amended which provides: "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance." There is no dispute over the fact that the Government awarded the land to respondent Pe so that he could earn a living by farming the land. Did respondent Pe lose his right to repurchase the subject agricultural lot under the aforequoted law considering its conversion for industrial or commercial purposes? The evidence relating to the conversion is sufficiently established and yet was not properly appreciated by the respondent court. Only three months after getting the free patent and the original certificate of title over the subject lot, it was mortgaged by respondent Pe to get a commercial loan of nearly P1 million from DBP. Pe spent the proceeds of the loan to construct permanent improvements on the lot for his rice-mill and other businesses, i.e., two warehouse buildings; administration-residential building; perimeter fence; solar and concrete drier; shed; machine shop; dirty kitchen; and machineries and equipments such as ricemill (TSN, August 13, 1984, pp. 173-174). The entire lot has been converted to serve commercial and industrial purposes. The testimony of petitioners Gauvain Benzonan on this score has not been successfully challenged, viz: Q. Out of this 2.6 hectares land area, how much of this is devoted to the solar drier construction? A. The solar drier is about one thousand (1,000) square meters . . . ah no, about six thousand (6,000) square meters.

Q. What about the area occupied by the warehouse and the ricemill complex? A. The warehouse and ricemill complex is occupying about one and a half (1 1/2) hectares. Q. What about the area occupied by the residence as well as the roadways? A. It covers about another half of a hectare again, Sir. Q. Is any part of this two point six hectares devoted to agricultural production or production of agricultural crops? A. None whatsoever because the other portion is occupied as a dumping area for our waste materials. (TSN, PP. 361-362, Sept. 3, 1985). The conversion of the lot for commercial purposes is understandable considering that the heart of General Santos City developed in that area. The respondent does not deny that, he is using the land for purely commercial and industrial purposes. His

explanation is that the land may be converted into agricultural land in the future. He applies the Krivenko v.Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461 [1947]) ruling that lands not mineral or forest are agricultural in nature and may be devoted to business purposes without losing their agricultural classification. Indeed, the records show that it was never the intention of respondent Pe to utilize the land, given to him for free by the Government, for agricultural purposes. He was not the kind of poor farmer for whom homesteads and free patents were intended by the law. As stated by the petitioners: 1. Respondent Pe acquired by free patent the land in question with an area of 2.6064 hectares, which was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-2404 on November 24, 1969. Instead of cultivating it for agricultural purposes, Pe mortgaged the land, along with another land, on February 24, 1970, or only three (3) months from issuance of OCT No. P-2404, with the DBP for P978,920.00. (par. 4, complaint, Annex "A"). Pe testified that his purpose was to construct in the land in question "bodega", an administrationresidential building, a perimeter fence, a concrete drier, and for some machineries and equipment." (TSN, p. 95, June 22, 1984). He stated that the improvements and facilities in the land included "the warehouse, the ricemill and a big warehouse housing the palay of stocks of the National Grains Authority and an administrationresidential building, a solar drier and a perimeter fence and some sheds or garage . . . a small piggery pen of several compartments, a dirty kitchen . . . a machine shop." (TSN, pp. 173-174, August 13, 1984). Pe used the property for such purposes and operated the ricemill business for a period of about nine (9) years until September, 1979

(pars. 7 and 8, complaint, Annex "A"), without paying the DBP of his mortgage indebtedness, as a result of which DBP foreclosed the properties. (Annex "F") 2. Respondent Pe testified that the land in question with its improvements has an appraised value of P1,347,860.00 in 1974, and P2,028,030.00 in 1976. (TSN, pp. 176, 177, August 13, 1984). Petitioner Gauvain Benzonan claimed it has a fair market value, as of 1985, of P5,000,000.00. (p. 8, trial court decision, Annex "F"). As against such value of the land and improvements, respondent Pe insisted that the repurchase price should only be the principal sum of P327,995.00. (par. 10, complaint, Annex "A") 3. Respondent Pe, when he testified in 1984, said he was 60 years old; he is now therefore over 66 years old. He is a "businessman and resident of Dadiangas, General Santos City" (TSN, p. 3, June 20, 1984), doing business under the style, "Dadiangas B.P. Trading" (TSN, 144, June 22, 1984). In his sworn declaration dated July 18, 1983, filed with the assessor's office pursuant to P.D. No. 1612, he listed the following real properties and their market value, all situated in General Santos City, to wit (Exh. 11-Benzonan): (a) 447 sq. m. residential P 28,720.00 (b) 11.9980 hectares of agri. lot P 23,880.00 (c) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00 (d) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P

40,000.00 (e) 6,064 sq. m. of industrial lot P303,200.00 (f) Industrial building P434,130.00 (g) Industrial machinery P 96,000.00 On June 22, 1984, when Pe testified, he said that "I own three (3) residential lots," (TSN, p. 153, June 22, 1984) and that he and his wife own in Antique Province "around twenty (20) hectares planted to coconut and sugarcane" (ibid., p. 145); he used to have 30 hectares of agricultural lands and 22 subdivision lots, which he sold to Norma Salvani and Carlos Salvani. (TSN, pp. 166-169, June 22, 1984); Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 3, 6, 6-ABenzonan). (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 17-19) In the light of the records of these cases, we rule that respondent Pe cannot repurchase the disputed property without doing violence to everything that CA No. 141 (as amended) stands for. We ruled in Simeon v. Pea, 36 SCRA 610, 617 [1970] through Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, that: xxx xxx xxx These findings of fact of the Court of Appeals that "(E)vidently, the reconveyance sought by the plaintiff (petitioner) is not in accordance with the purpose of the law, that is, "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him"" and expressly found by it to "find justification from the evidence of record. . . ."

Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' proposed repurchase of the property does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of section 119 of the Public Land Act, authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof. We reiterated this ruling in Vargas v. Court of Tax Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, 200, [1979] viz: As regards the case of Simeon v. Pea, petitioners ought to know that petitioner therein was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court found that his purpose was only speculative and for profit. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found that herein petitioners' purposes and motives are also speculative and for profit. It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. (Simeon v. Pea, 36 SCRA 617). As found by the Court of Appeals, the motive of the petitioners in repurchasing the lots in question being one for speculation and profit, the same therefore does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of said section. and in Santana et al. v. Marias, 94 SCRA 853, 861-862 [1979] to wit: In Simeon v. Pea we analyzed the various cases previously decided, and arrived at the conclusion that the plain

intent, the raison d' etre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141 ". . . is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it." In the same breath, we agreed with the trial court, in that case, that "it is in this sense that the provision of law in question becomes unqualified and unconditional. And in keeping with such reasons behind the passage of the law, its basic objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order. As it was in Simeon v. Pea, respondent Marias' intention in exercising the right of repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family fold," but "to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law's policy and spirit." The foregoing conclusions are supported by the trial court's findings of fact already cited, culled from evidence adduced. Thus respondent Marias was 71 years old and a widower at the time of the sale in 1956; that he was 78 when he testified on October 24, 1963 (or over 94 years old today if still alive); that . . . he was not living on the property when he sold the same but was residing in the poblacion attending to a hardware store, and that the property was no longer agricultural at the time of the sale, but was a residential and commercial lot in the midst of many subdivisions. The profit motivation behind the effort to repurchase was conclusively shown when the then plaintiff's counsel, in the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo, in his presence,

suggested to herein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rafael Dinglasan ". . . to just add to the original price so the case would be settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo manifested in court that an amicable settlement was possible, for which reason he asked for time "within which to settle the terms thereof'" and that "the plaintiff . . . Mr. Marias, has manifested to the Court that if the defendants would be willing to pay the sum of One Peso and Fifty Centavos (P1.50) per square meter, he would be willing to accept the offer and dismiss the case." Our decisions were disregarded by the respondent court which chose to adopt a Court of Appeals ruling in Lim, et al. v. Cruz, et al., CA-G.R. No. 67422, November 25, 1983 that the motives of the homesteader in repurchasing the land are inconsequential" and that it does not matter even "when the obvious purpose is for selfish gain or personal aggrandizement." The other major issue is when to count the five-year period for the repurchase by respondent Pe whether from the date of the foreclosure sale or from the expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property. The respondent court ruled that the period of repurchase should be counted from the expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Since the one year period to redeem expired on January 24, 1979 and he filed Case No. 280 on October 4, 1983 to enforce his right to repurchase the disputed property, the Court of Appeals held that Pe exercised his right to repurchase within the five-year period provided by Section 119 of CA 141 as amended. The respondent court cited Belisario, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 165 SCRA 101, 107 [1988] where we held: . . . In addition, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every conveyance of land acquired

under the free patent or homestead patent provisions of the Public Land Act, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within the period of five years from the date of conveyance. The five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Manuel v. PNB, et al., 101 Phil. 968) Hence, petitioners still had five (5) years from July 22, 1972 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135) within which to exercise their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act. As noted by the respondent court, the 1988 case of Belisario reversed the previous rulings of this Court enunciated in Monge, et al., v. Angeles, et al., 101 Phil. 563 [1957] and Tupas v. Damasco, et al., 132 SCRA 593 [1984] to the effect that the five year period of repurchase should be counted from the date of conveyance or foreclosure sale. The petitioners, however, urge that Belisario should only be applied prospectively or after 1988 since it established a new doctrine. We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979. At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated inMonge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law

looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ". . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof." There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will warrant a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions, however, we find no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for free agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble purposes behind the law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of improvements and the appreciating value of land must be worth more than that amount now. The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisarioruling. Considering our above findings, we find no need to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioners in their petitions. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint

for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-37914 August 29, 1932

MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. The petitioner in his own behalf. Attorney-General Jaranilla for respondent. VILLA-REAL, J.:

The penalty of one year, eight months, and twenty-one days imposed upon said petitioner by the trial court is the minimum of the medium degree of the penalty of presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees, ranging from six months and one day to four years and two months, as provided in article 534, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code as amended by Act No. 3244. The penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code, article 315, paragraph 3, for the same offense is arresto mayor in the maximum degree to prision correccional in the minimum degree, that is from four months and one day to two years and four months, of which the medium degree is from one year and one day to one year and eight months, which is more lenient and hence more favorable to the petitioner than the same degree of penalty imposed by article 534, paragraph 3, of the former Penal Code cited above. Article 22 of the Revised penal Code provides:

62, in connection with article 64, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the trial court could not legally take into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, established in article 13, paragraph 7, of the new Penal Code, because it did not exist in the old Penal Code under which the petitioner herein was prosecuted and sentenced. Article 22 of the Revised Penal code, above quoted, extends its benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to them to make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus, inasmuch as, if the penalty imposed upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code, and the latter has retroactive effect, the excess has become illegal. Now then, it appearing from the sentence that there was a voluntary confession of guilt, and that it has served as the basis of conviction, and taking into consideration that had such circumstance been classified by the old Penal Code as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court would have been bound to give it effect, could we now disregard it without failing in our duty in order to give effect to the positive provisions of the law which make all penal laws retroactive in so far as they favor the accused, who is not an habitual criminal, there being no necessity to review the proceeding? In the case before us, the voluntary confession of guilt appears in the sentence and has served as the basis of the defendant's conviction by the trial court; for which reason we must take it into account, in order to give retroactive effect to article 22, cited above of the Revised Penal Code for the benefit of the petitioner herein. As we have seen, the aforesaid petitioner was sentenced to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days ofpresidio correccional, to pay an indemnity of P647.70, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which is the minimum of the medium degree (from one year, eight months, and twenty-one days to two years, eleven months, and ten days) of the penalty of presidio correccional in the minimum and medium degrees (from six months and one day to four years and two months), prescribed by article 534, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244. The penalty provided in article 315, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code for the same crime is arresto mayor in the maximum degree

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed by prisoner Manuel Rodriguez, praying that after proper proceedings an order be issued requiring the respondent Director of Prisons to immediately set him at liberty, on the ground that he is illegally detained, inasmuch as he has already served the penalty corresponding to his offense under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The pertinent facts necessary for a solution of the question raised in the present petition are as follows: Upon arraignment for the crime of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the petitioner spontaneously pleaded guilty, whereupon the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, and there being no circumstance to modify his criminal liability, imposed upon him the minimum of the medium degree of the penalty of presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, article 534 of the old Penal Code, that is, one year, eight months, and twenty- one days of presidio correccional, to pay an indemnity of P647.70, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The first question to decide here is whether or not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code with reference to the crime of estafa, of which the petitioner was convicted, are more favorable to him than those of the old Penal Code.

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. As the provisions of the aforementioned Revised Penal Code with reference to the crime of estafa here in question are more favorable to the said petitioner, and as the latter is not habitual criminal, the more lenient penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code must be imposed upon him. The second question to decide is whether or not in habeas corpus proceedings the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt established for the first time in article 13, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code, can be taken into consideration. The mitigating circumstances, as their name indicates, serve to lessen the penalty fixed by law, and whenever they are present courts are bound to take them into consideration, according to article 77, in connection with article 80, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, and article

to prision correccional in the minimum degree, that is, four months and one day to two years and four months, which is more lenient than that provided in the old Penal Code. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in the minimum degree, that is, four months and one day to one year (article 80, paragraph 2, of the old Penal Code, and article 64 of the Revised Penal Code), and inasmuch as it is the practice of Courts of First Instance in the exercise of their discretion (article 81, paragraph 7, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2298) to fix the penalty in the minimum period, and the trial court having fixed the penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the minimum period of the medium degree, we must also fix it accordingly, that is, four months and one day of arresto mayor, which is the minimum period of the minimum degree of the penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code. The herein petitioner having already served seven months and twenty-nine days of imprisonment, as against the penalty of four months and twenty-one days, with all possible allowances, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code, he has already more than served his sentence and is entitled to be released immediately. For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and hold that when in a sentence of conviction it appears that the defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt in court before the prosecution has presented its evidence, such voluntary confession shall be taken into account in a petition for habeas corpus to give effect to article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Wherefore, the herein petitioner being illegally detained, the petition is granted and the respondent Director of Prison is hereby ordered to set him at liberty immediately, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Abad Santos, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

MALCOLM, J., dissenting: We stand squarely on the proposition that, after a court having jurisdiction of a criminal case has rendered a final judgment in that case and the convict has begun to serve his sentence in conformity with that judgment, the courts can not, in habeas corpus proceedings, enter upon a review of the decision or record to determine if a mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in order to obtain a reduction of the penalty and the liberation of the convict. Habeas corpus lies only to determine the question of the jurisdiction and lawful power of the custodian to hold the petitioner in custody, and is not available as a revisory remedy for the correction of errors either of law or fact. (29 C. J., 25; Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons [1913], 24 Phil., 121.) The Revised Penal Code provides that felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the code or acts in force at the time of their commission, while retroactive effect may only be given to the Revised Penal Code for the benefit of the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal to determine the proper penalty as found under the old Penal Code and to contrast with it the penalty corresponding to the crime under the Revised Penal Code. But if the courts are to scrutinize the decision and the record to ascertain if mitigating circumstances now found for the first time in the Revised Penal Code are to be given effect, the courts will embark upon unchartered seas and unutterable confusion will result. We believe that the court should not now revise a final judgment by inserting in that judgment a finding relating to a mitigating circumstance, thus permitting the liberation of the accused. As a consequence, our vote is for the denial of the writ. Street, Ostrand, Hull and Vickers, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.: Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended information dated October 11, 1985 charged: That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and in the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300,00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal property: one (1)

adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance for several number of days. CONTRARY TO LAW (pp, 92-93, II Record.) In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accusedappellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly: That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with firearms and other deadly

weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their companions who are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine Belesario, against their will and consent.1wphi1.nt CONTRARY TO LAW. (pp. 90-91, II Record.) Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accusedappellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record). After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing: Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:

a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered. b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them. In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. (p. 80, Rollo.) The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings: Criminal Case No. 18376 The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).

Criminal Case No. 18305 Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as former barangay-mate for a long time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The identification of accusedappellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or visage of accusedappellants. Said positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate accusedappellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 78-79, Rollo). The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo). The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief, as follows: At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his

half sister Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.). Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman)

which is beside their house. The other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988). Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's name and ask that the door be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's cousins, namely Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 1115, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990).

Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: "Money, money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990.). Then, appellants and their companions seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of lady's rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990). Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 1314, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but to obey the man's orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this

gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.). Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 1215, TSN, June 29, 1989). Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 1517, ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money. When she told him that they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the ground so he pushed her downwards.

Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out . He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988). Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living room, she was pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a doublebladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen

(13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990). Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all of them (p.19, TSN, February 15, 1990). Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm, area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and

other expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986). Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2) fingers". Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted at nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are indications that a foreign object, which could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1wphi1.nt Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid). A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid). Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of the

face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm. lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986). Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record). (pp. 300-311, Rollo.) Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as follows: Alfonso Patalin Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he described as the land lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).

In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo," said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her brother, and that she only recognized the caller's voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accusedappellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant. Alex Mijaque Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape. According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the record as "Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three days after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo. Nestor Pas

The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses' declarations as regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo). Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped. As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the plantation where he was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5). For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the policemen pointed to him and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he will file a case against you." Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latter's alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight, and accusedappellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10). Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao)

on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p. 4). We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm. Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]). A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility, particularly the ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by accusedappellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated. Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As discussed above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police

Department, as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention that she was raped. Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accusedappellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's name, he explained on crossexamination that he did not know yet the name of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned "unknown persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home. Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those mentioned inPeople vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her charge. The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in the house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic

roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]). With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]). Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-

appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accusedappellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility. Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and damning yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims' homes. He who goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and

a long gun, entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5). With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo). It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants adduced at the trial . . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that

the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . . ( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]). Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony of the victims themselves. This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accusedappellants on the death penalty. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon accusedappellants. Said provision reads as follows: Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither

shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508). Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994. Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect. Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]). True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers intended said

provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically without need for any executive action commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508). The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty. Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is insufficient. There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accusedappellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during

three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]). In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748). There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them. Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).

By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue. As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said: One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from the victims. In line with the recent ruling inPeople

vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]). Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305. WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications: (a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accusedappellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization; (c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts

all the three accused-appellant are jointly and severally liable. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynarez-Santiago, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave. Footnotes * On January 21, 1985, an Information for robbery with multiple rape was filed against Alfonso Patalin and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305. Said criminal case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 18376 based on an Information for robbery with physical injuries against the same accused and was heard by Branch 25, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City (pp. 1-2, 53-55, 11 Record). On July 1, 1985, a motion for consolidation was filed by private prosecutor Rodolfo Valera Cabado manifesting that another information was filed against Nestor Ras for robbery in band with multiple rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18835, which was founded on the same facts presented in the first two criminal cases. Eventually, the three cases were consolidated. Later, Alex Mijaque was identified and apprehended as an additional conspirator in the aforesaid Criminal Cases No. 18305 and 18835. Subsequently, a motion to admit Amended Information and to dismiss Criminal Case No. 18835 was filed by the prosecution. As a result, two cases were jointly tried by the lower court, namely, Criminal Case No. 18305 entitled "The People of the Phils. v. Alfonso Patalin, Alias "Alpoc", Nestor Ras, and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for Robbery in band with rape, and

Criminal Case No. 18376 entitled "The People of the Phils, v. Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alias "Alpoc", and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for robbery with physical injuries (pp 74-76, 86, 88-93, 11 Record).

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