Sei sulla pagina 1di 20

Strategic Management Journal

Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)


Published online 28 October 2004 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/smj.436

DOES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND


DEVELOPMENT INCREASE PATENT OUTPUT? AN
ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
JOAN PENNER-HAHN1 * and J. MYLES SHAVER2
1
School of Business Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan,
U.S.A.
2
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
U.S.A.

Internationalizing research and development is often advocated as a strategy for fostering the
development of technological capabilities. Although firms conduct international R&D to tap
into knowledge bases that reside in foreign countries, we argue that in order to benefit from
international R&D investments firms must already possess research capabilities in underlying or
complementary technologies. We examine the international R&D expansion activities, research
capabilities, and patent output of 65 Japanese pharmaceutical firms from 1980 to 1991. We find
that firms benefit from international R&D only when they possess existing research capabilities in
the underlying technologies. In addition to refining our understanding of when international R&D
enhances firm innovation, our results integrate asset-seeking and asset-based theories of foreign
direct investment. Internationalizing R&D to tap into foreign knowledge bases is consistent with
asset-seeking theories of foreign direct investment, while the contingent nature by which firms
benefit from international R&D is consistent with asset-based theories of foreign direct investment
and the notion of absorptive capacity. Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION nature, which is further utilized by international


expansion.
The internationalization of research and devel- Internationalization of R&D has become impor-
opment (R&D) is increasingly recognized as an tant in recent years in response to the perceived
important firm strategy in many industries. Firms increase in technological sophistication through-
internationalize their R&D activities to gain access out the world and to the existence of specific
to knowledge and capabilities available in other expertise in particular countries or regions. Com-
countries. Thus, internationalizing R&D is an panies reach outside of their domestic bound-
example of the type of foreign direct investment aries to acquire technologies and technological
(FDI) that several authors have termed asset- skills (e.g., Nelson, 1993). Much of the cur-
seeking (Kogut, 1991; Wesson, 1999). This is rent literature advocates internationalizing R&D
in contrast to the more traditional view of FDI in order to acquire new skills and technologies
as an asset-based activity (Buckley and Casson, (e.g., DeMeyer, 1992; Komaran and Goodman,
1976; Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1998). Here, a firm 1993). However, we know little about if, or
possesses some advantage, generally intangible in when, firms that internationalize their R&D activ-
ities enhance their technological capabilities. Our
Keywords: international R&D; patents; pharmaceutical contribution stems from the examination of this
research; absorptive capacity; foreign direct investment issue.
*Correspondence to: Joan Penner-Hahn, School of Business
Administration, Wayne State University, 5201 Cass Avenue, We argue that the establishment of international
Detroit, MI 48202-3030, U.S.A. E-mail: jdph@wayne.edu R&D activities is often not sufficient for a firm

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 8 May 2000
Final revision received 7 July 2004
122 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

to acquire desired skills and technologies. Just as we find that firms with greater existing capabilities
entering a country that has a large consumer mar- in the underlying technologies have higher future
ket is no guarantee for successful manufacturing- pharmaceutical patent output. We also find in many
based FDI, entering a market that has a unique specifications that firms with greater capabilities
knowledge base is no guarantee for successful in complementary technologies have higher future
R&D FDI. Consistent with the notions of asset- pharmaceutical patent output.
based FDI as well as that of absorptive capacity Our findings have important implications for
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), we propose that the both managers and researchers. We shed light on
acquisition of skills and technologies is contingent what conditions must hold for international R&D
on the investing firm possessing underlying tech- to facilitate firm innovation. Moreover, we show
nological capabilities that foster the acquisition of that successful asset-seeking FDI, such as inter-
skills and technology. nationalizing R&D, occurs when firms possess
There are two types of capabilities that we certain capabilities. This insight fosters an inte-
believe aid firms in successfully acquiring new gration of asset-seeking and asset-based theories
skills and technologies through international R&D. of FDI.
First, firms with strong existing research activities In the next section, we discuss previous research
in the underlying technologies will be better able that addresses the internationalization of R&D and
to absorb and put to use the skills and technolo- present our hypotheses of when international R&D
gies they are exposed to in their international R&D increases firm innovation. The third section pro-
activities. Second, firms that possess research skills vides background information on the industry con-
in technologies complementary to the skills and text of our study. In the fourth section, we describe
technologies they are exposed to in their interna- our methodology and in the fifth section we dis-
tional R&D activities will be better able to adapt cuss the findings of our study. We conclude with
the new technologies to their use. By comple- implications.
mentary technologies, we mean technologies that
are necessary for the commercial development of
another technology or science base as in the sense BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
proposed by Teece (1986).
To test our arguments, we investigate the inter- International R&D: Background
national R&D activities and pharmaceutical patent
output of firms in the Japanese pharmaceutical Internationalization of R&D has generated con-
industry for the years 1980–91. We measure firms’ siderable interest in academic and business cir-
research capabilities in the underlying technolo- cles. The primary question addressed by the exist-
gies by previous pharmaceutical patents. Because ing literature is ‘why do firms undertake interna-
most of the international R&D activities estab- tional R&D?’ Previous authors have pointed to the
lished by these firms were focused on biotech- importance of accessing skills and capabilities that
nology, we measure firms’ research capabilities reside overseas as the underlying motivation for
in complementary technologies as previous fer- internationalizing R&D (e.g., Buckley and Casson,
mentation patents. As we discuss shortly, fer- 1976; De Meyer and Mizushima, 1989; Komaran
mentation technology is complementary to many and Goodman, 1993). This type of activity has
biotechnology applications because it is the pro- been called asset-seeking FDI by some (Wes-
cess by which many biotechnology products are son, 1999) and capability-seeking by others (e.g.,
produced. Anand and Delios, 2002). This rationale for inter-
We find that international R&D increases phar- nationalizing contrasts with the asset-based ratio-
maceutical patent output. However, this is only for nales for internationalization that were proposed
firms with existing capabilities in the underlying by many FDI theorists (Caves 1971, 1982; Buck-
technologies. Firms without existing capabilities ley and Casson, 1976). In asset-based FDI, the
in the underlying technologies do not benefit from firm possesses some advantage, generally intan-
international R&D. We do not find evidence that gible in nature, that is further utilized by interna-
firms with capabilities in complementary technolo- tional expansion.
gies benefit more from international R&D com- Asset-seeking FDI has become more prevalent
pared to firms lacking these capabilities. Moreover, with the realization that the skills and capabilities
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 123

being sought by firms might be uniquely avail- when combined with international R&D, would
able in a foreign location. Although technological result in even greater innovation.
capability is diffusing and equilibrating through-
out the world, there exist pockets of expertise that
Research capabilities and patents
develop due to peculiarities of specific ‘national
innovation systems’ (Nelson, 1993). Foreign firms We expect that firms with greater research capa-
may find it necessary to establish R&D activities bilities in underlying technologies will exhibit
in these locations to tap into sources of technol- greater innovative output. As Scherer and Ross
ogy that diffuse slowly across national boundaries (1990) observed, ‘Technical innovations do not fall
(Kogut, 1991). Technological knowledge is often like manna from heaven. They require effort—the
tacit and requires frequent interaction for trans- creative labor of invention, development, testing
fer (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Thus, proximity and introduction into the stream of economic life.’
is necessary for acquiring such localized knowl- As Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986: 265) state:
edge. ‘The annual research and development expendi-
Indeed, Kuemmerle (1997) found that 45 percent tures of a firm are considered to be investments
of the foreign R&D laboratories in his sample which add to the firm’s stock of knowledge.’ Firms
were established for ‘home-base-augmenting’ pur- undertake R&D activities, in large part, to create
poses. That is, the laboratories were established innovations that will ultimately provide new prod-
for the purpose of tapping knowledge from com- ucts and therefore profits. While most innovations
petitors and institutions in other lands. Empiri- may be serendipitous, firms may have a compar-
cal evidence also documents that foreign investors ative advantage in generating inventions because
are able to tap into foreign knowledge bases and they ‘are more likely to put together the criti-
supports these arguments. For example, Almeida cal combination of a fertile mind, a challenging
(1996) shows that foreign semiconductor firms problem, and the will to solve it’ (Scherer and
tap into local knowledge in the United States. Ross, 1990).
Cantwell (1995) shows that technological leaders R&D is one of the firm-specific assets that is
are becoming increasingly geographically special- the result of a cumulative pattern of activity (Dier-
ized with respect to their technological activity. ickx and Cool, 1989). In addition, Dierickx and
Jaffe et al. (1993) find that inventors are more Cool point out the asset mass efficiencies nature of
likely to cite patents of other local inventors. Simi- R&D; that is, that increments to an existing stock
larly, firms might conduct foreign R&D in order to are facilitated by possessing high levels of that
be near the users of the technology. Foreign cus- stock. The organizational learning literature has
tomers are often the most sophisticated users of a also emphasized the experiential nature of inno-
technology and therefore important contributors to vation and that an organization’s past can influ-
future technology development. For example, Dow ence its future capabilities for renewal and change
Chemical established a furniture R&D lab in Italy (Mezias and Glynn, 1993).
because Italian furniture makers are the most inno- Economists have long explored the outcome of
vative in their demands for adhesives, finishes, and corporate R&D activities through empirical studies
other materials. (Mansfield, 1962, 1965; Terleckyj, 1980). Mans-
Although there has been a great deal of discus- field (1980) found that firms with large amounts
sion of the role of asset-seeking FDI in expand- of basic R&D had relatively high rates of pro-
ing the capabilities of firms, there have been few ductivity increase, although he finds that long-
empirical studies of the results of this type of FDI. term research rather than basic research specif-
This study attempts to rectify this situation. In ically may explain most of this growth. Subse-
order to assess the impact of international R&D quently, Griliches (1986) demonstrated that R&D
on innovation it is important to first recognize that contributed positively to productivity growth and
firm capability is also an important determinant of that basic research is an important part of pro-
firm innovation. Therefore, we turn to the existing ductivity. Pakes (1985) and Griliches (1980) have
literature to assess how capabilities, specifically results which suggest that patents are an output of
underlying and complementary technology capa- R&D rather than an input.
bilities, affect firms innovation. With this building In addition, firms that are more skilled in partic-
block we then hypothesize how such capabilities, ular research areas will be more likely to discover
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
124 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

new innovations in those same areas. In a study of International R&D and patents
the pharmaceutical industry, Henderson and Cock-
burn (1996) show that a large proportion of the Turning to the more novel hypotheses in our study,
variance in research productivity is due to firm we expect that international R&D will increase
fixed effects. Moreover, Henderson and Cockburn firm innovation. However, we expect that this
(1994) show that part of this fixed effect is related effect will only be pronounced for firms with exist-
to more fine-grained measures of research compe- ing capabilities in underlying or complementary
tence. They also find that accumulated knowledge, technologies. The following paragraphs detail this
measured by the accumulated stock of patents, argument.
accounts for 20 percent of the variance in future As we stated previously, the motivation of firms
patenting within particular programs. Accordingly, to undertake international R&D is to access knowl-
we hypothesize greater pharmaceutical research edge that is geographically bound in a foreign loca-
capabilities will result in greater pharmaceutical tion. Because there is tacitness (Polyani, 1964) and
patent output. Although, as we have discussed pre- stickiness (Szulanski, 1996) associated with the
viously, this is not a novel hypothesis, it is neces- absorption of scientific knowledge, firms cannot
sary groundwork for the subsequent hypotheses. absorb scientific knowledge from afar by read-
ing scientific papers, attending conferences and
Hypothesis 1: Firms that have greater underly- citing patents. To the extent that firms can tap
ing technological capabilities will subsequently into this knowledge and such knowledge is ben-
generate greater innovative output. eficial in fostering innovation, internationalizing
R&D should enhance firms’ innovation.
Following from the same reasoning, we expect Nevertheless, despite the potential benefits of
firms that possess complementary research capa- international R&D the difficulties of international
bilities to have greater innovation. Complementary R&D have long been recognized (Fayerweather,
capabilities are forms of know-how or technologies 1969). Such difficulties include the costs associated
that might be used in conjunction with the under- with communicating across distance and culture.
lying technologies to create new products (Teece, Moreover, complications stemming from the tac-
1986). Generally, complementary capabilities are itness and transferability of knowledge are often
downstream from the innovative technology; that exacerbated in an international context (Teece,
is, they assist in commercializing the new. Here 1976).
we are hypothesizing that there might be groups Because both potential benefits and substantial
of technologies which work together to create difficulties exist in effectively conducting interna-
new products. Firms that possess complementary tional R&D, we expect that the mere act of inter-
research capabilities will be able to use these capa- nationalizing R&D will often not be sufficient to
bilities in combination with other research skills achieve increased innovative outcomes. We believe
to create new innovations. This is similar to the that there are necessary preconditions for suc-
argument that asset stocks can be interconnected cessfully undertaking international R&D activities.
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). That is, accumulating Specifically, we expect that, in order to be suc-
increments in one area may depend on the level cessful, firms must possess (a) existing research
of another area. For example, in a study of R&D capabilities that are akin to the skills they seek in
in the petroleum industry, Helfat (1997) finds that foreign nations, or (b) research capabilities that are
greater amounts of complementary technological complementary to the skills they seek in foreign
knowledge in oil refining influences the firms’ nations.
efforts to alter their stock of knowledge in syn- Several arguments in the R&D literature ground
thetic fuels. our expectation that the possession of research
Therefore, we expect that firms with greater capabilities positively affects the effectiveness of
complementary research capabilities will exhibit international R&D. Cohen and Levinthal note that
greater innovative output. We hypothesize: by developing an absorptive capacity in a particu-
lar area ‘a firm may more readily accumulate what
Hypothesis 2: Firms that possess greater com- additional knowledge it needs . . . to exploit any
plementary research capabilities will subseque- critical external knowledge that may become avail-
ntly generate greater innovative output. able’(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 136). They argue
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 125

that firms with increased absorptive capacity will Similarly, firms that possess specific complemen-
tend to be more proactive, exploiting opportunities tary technical skills and internationalize will be
present in the environment, independent of current more effective at absorbing the knowledge that is
performance. Moreover, Cohen and Levinthal sug- available in the foreign location. The additional
gest that absorptive capacity is largely a function insight granted by the in-depth knowledge of an
of the firm’s level of prior knowledge (i.e., their important related field will allow those firms to
existing research capabilities). Namely, firms with increase their absorptive capacity and better uti-
existing research capabilities will have greater abil- lize the information created in the new location.
ity to absorb external knowledge than firms lacking Firms with relevant complementary technical skills
such capabilities. Consistent with these arguments, will be better able to overcome the difficulties of
Pisano (1990) finds that firms that have established tacitness and transferability of knowledge experi-
a capability in a particular research skill are better enced by firms internationalizing their activities.
able to absorb the information gained from external This is a more related application of the arguments
research activity in that area. outlined above for how underlying research capa-
Moreover, because greater absorptive capacity bilities and international R&D affect innovation.
enables firms to better interpret and assess knowl- We thus hypothesize:
edge from outside of the company, we expect
these abilities also to allow firms to then bet- Hypothesis 4: Firms that internationalize their
ter communicate and transfer knowledge that they R&D and possess complementary research
are able to interpret and assess within the com- capabilities will subsequently generate greater
pany. Therefore, firms with research capabilities innovative output.
are more likely able to transfer information that
they access within the company compared to com- Although grounded in the R&D literature, these
panies lacking such capabilities. hypotheses are consistent with previous research of
Additionally, increased research capabilities will international expansion success. Mitchell, Shaver,
often improve a firm’s attractiveness to research and Yeung, (1992) and Morck and Yeung (1992)
scientists or R&D partners in the host country. This find that international expansion activities in man-
is because a foreign firm with research capabilities ufacturing contexts tend to be successful when the
brings more to a venture and enhances the like- expanding firms possess existing skills or capa-
lihood that individual scientists or partners inno- bilities. Moreover, Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung
vate, compared to a firm that lacks these capabil- (1997) show that firms must possess a threshold
ities. For example, Ahuja (2000) shows that firms level of knowledge in order to learn about activi-
with greater technical capital are able to enter into ties in a foreign market.
greater numbers of linkages. The greater attractive-
ness to local research scientists and firms increases
the degree to which international R&D activities INDUSTRY CONTEXT
are able to tap into the local knowledge base.
As a result, we expect that firms with greater The Japanese pharmaceutical industry, which we
research capabilities ex ante should experience employ as the empirical setting, provides an excel-
greater benefits and mitigate some of the compli- lent context for testing hypotheses related to the
cations from international R&D compared to firms internationalization of R&D for four reasons. First,
lacking these capabilities. Therefore, we expect the pharmaceutical industry is a high-technology
that the international R&D activities of firms with industry that depends heavily on the outcome of
existing research capabilities will be more success- R&D activities. Japanese pharmaceutical firms, on
ful than those lacking such capabilities. average, spent 12 percent of sales on R&D dur-
ing the study period (JPMA, 1992). In addition,
the Japanese domestic pharmaceutical market is
Hypothesis 3: Firms that internationalize their the second largest in the world after the United
R&D and possess underlying research capabil- States.
ities will subsequently generate greater innova- Second, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry is
tive output. sufficiently populated to provide a viable sample
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
126 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

that offers the research design advantages of focus- METHOD


ing on one industry and firms from one nation. The
top four domestic firms accounted for 25 percent
Sample
of sales in the Japanese market in 1991. The
top 30 domestic firms (by sales) accounted for Our sample includes 65 participants in the Japanese
70 percent of sales in 1980 and 85 percent of sales ethical pharmaceutical industry over the period
in 1991. Moreover, the introduction of biotechnol- 1980–91. The sample includes the 30 largest
ogy resulted in a number of firms entering the Japanese pharmaceutical firms by sales and 35
industry. Because many of these entrants have entrants to the Japanese pharmaceutical industry
international R&D activities, an advantage of our over that time period. We excluded the Japanese
sample is that there exists substantial variance in subsidiaries of European and U.S. pharmaceutical
the research skills of firms that do and do not con- firms from the sample.
duct international R&D. The entrants were selected on the basis of indus-
Third, competition in the Japanese pharmaceuti- try analyses by Yano Keizai Research Institute,
cal market increased due to changes in the regula- Toyo Keizai, the Pharmaceutical Industry Forum
tory environment. Government restrictions on the (PIF) that indicated that these firms had either
entry of foreign firms were lifted in the mid-1970s. initiated pharmaceutical research or had pharma-
In addition, the government introduced price con- ceutical products for sale. The entrants included
trols for pharmaceuticals starting in the 1980s in textile, food, beverage, chemical, and steel firms.
order to decrease national expenditures on health These firms were not entrants in the sense of being
(Reich, 1990). The price controls were designed to start-ups but were established firms that diversified
encourage pharmaceutical innovation by allowing into the pharmaceutical industry. As is common in
newer drugs to receive higher prices. These two the Japanese context, the firms entered the phar-
factors started to place pressure on pharmaceutical maceutical industry by establishing pharmaceutical
firms’ profits. In turn, the need for innovative prod- subsidiaries. Most of these firms started partici-
ucts in order to obtain higher prices increased the pation in the pharmaceutical industry during the
motivation for Japanese firms to undertake R&D. 1970s, yet had not introduced products until the
Finally, there has been a change in the technol- latter part of our sample period.
ogy necessary for pharmaceutical discovery that The year 1980 is an appropriate starting point
requires a response from firms involved in the for considering the international activities of these
industry: the development of biotechnology. Sci- firms because this is the beginning of a period
entists working in Great Britain provided the intel- of real change for the Japanese pharmaceutical
lectual development of molecular biology (Nelson, industry. The development of biotechnology, the
1993). Much of the subsequent work in biotech- changes in the government’s payment policy, and
nology has been performed in the United States increased foreign competition were all affecting
(National Research Council, 1992). Both countries the Japanese pharmaceutical industry during this
continue to be leaders in the field of biotechnology. period. Moreover, we found no evidence of inter-
Thus the expertise in biotechnology has developed national R&D prior to this year.
in the United States and Western Europe. Cantwell Joan Penner-Hahn initially developed our data
(1992) documents that Japan has a revealed tech- set in her dissertation (1995). Although the data
nological disadvantage in pharmaceutical research that we employ in this study come from publicly
when compared to the United States, the United available sources, Penner-Hahn and colleagues
Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland, which he also interviewed Japanese pharmaceutical execu-
identifies as the powerhouses of pharmaceutical tives in 15 companies (the interview team consis-
research. Therefore, the geographic concentration tent of two to four members who reviewed the
of advantages in pharmaceutical and biotechnol- interview notes, reaching consensus on their con-
ogy research outside of Japan provides an obstacle tent). In the context of this study, the primary
for Japanese wishing to obtain competence in new purpose of the interviews was to verify the accu-
pharmaceutical creation. It is for this reason that racy of the publicly available data regarding phar-
many Japanese companies have looked outside of maceutical and international R&D activities. The
Japan for pharmaceutical R&D. interviews also provided an opportunity to develop
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 127

a more complete understanding of the issues con- increase the innovative output of firms, we can-
fronting the pharmaceutical firms, which aids in not rule out that underlying research capability or
formulating our tests and assessing the results. complementary research capabilities per se affect
patent output. Therefore, we must examine firms
with and without international R&D activities to
Approach effectively test our hypotheses.
To test the hypotheses, we examine how interna-
tional R&D activity affects firm-level innovative
Variable definitions
output. Before we define the variables, we high-
light the merits of our approach. Dependent variable
We focus on the firm’s overall innovative output
because the impact of international R&D activi- The dependent variable that we employ to mea-
ties is often not isolated within a particular foreign sure the construct of innovative output is the count
R&D lab or location. For example, from the inter- of U.S. drug patents granted to a firm in a given
views many of the research managers indicated year, which we label DRUG PATENT COUNT.
that they planned to send domestic R&D person- This is appropriate because our focus is pharma-
nel overseas and rotate them back into domestic ceutical firms that we expect to be innovative in
R&D labs. The goal was to diffuse the knowledge drug related areas. We identify drug patents as any
obtained abroad throughout a firm’s research activ- patent by the firm that is in the patent classes 424
ities. Similarly, several managers mentioned estab- or 514. Examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trade-
lishing dual tracks of research: one at the foreign mark Office (USPTO) assign a patent class and
facility and one at a domestic facility. Some of the subclass based on the information provided in the
firms also held formal meetings of scientific staffs patent application. Patent classes reflect the tech-
in order to share research findings. For example, nological and functional principals of an applica-
one firm alternated scientific meeting sites between tion rather than products or industries. Classes 424
its Japanese lab and its foreign lab in order to better and 514 are identified by the USPTO as ‘Drug,
acquaint the scientists with the activities occurring Bio-affecting and Body Treating Compositions.’
at each site. This patent class includes any molecules that are
In these cases, innovations and other benefits perceived to have drug applications. It is important
from international R&D are not necessarily mani- to note that every patent has multiple class assign-
fest or captured in the foreign facility but at other ments and that these two categories are not limited
research facilities throughout the company. If we to a particular formulation of drug. Patent class
were only to focus on research output that was data have been previously used to assess firms’
deemed to have occurred in a foreign facility, then technical skills. For example, Jaffe (1986) uses
our measure would miss important ways in which patent class data to characterize the technological
international R&D efforts were being managed to positions of firms. Moreover, Griliches suggests
increase innovation. This is why we focus on firm- that ‘it is possible to use a firm’s distribution of
level innovative output rather than the output of the patenting by field to infer its position in “techno-
specific foreign R&D activities.1 logical space” . . .’ (Griliches, 1990: 1702).
In addition, by measuring overall firm innova- Patent counts have been used to measure inno-
tive output, we are able to include in our com- vative output in a number of previous studies
parisons firms that have and do not have inter- (e.g., Bound et al., 1984; Henderson and Cock-
national operations. We need this variance in the burn, 1996). However, there are four issues with
sample to properly test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Should respect to our use of patent count that warrant
we restrict the sample to firms with international comment. First, the propensity to patent is not
R&D activities and find that underlying research necessarily constant across firms, especially when
capability or complementary research capabilities looking across nations. However, as Cantwell
(1989) notes, the variations between firm patenting
levels seem to reflect systematic industry-specific
1
Focusing on firm-level innovative output raises the concern and country-specific differences. Because we focus
of controlling for other firm characteristics that would affect
the dependent variable. We discuss our efforts to do so in the on Japanese pharmaceutical firms, our design holds
following section. constant industry and nationality.
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
128 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

Second, not all patented inventions result in measure revealed technological advantage across
innovations, as defined as new products. Once countries (Cantwell, 1989).
again, the design choice of the pharmaceutical We gathered patent data from the CASSIS
industry mitigates this concern. In a study of phar- Database of the Patent and Trademark Office of the
maceutical firms, Comanor and Scherer (1969) U.S. Department of Commerce. We downloaded
found a significant correlation between the num- patent information for each company in the sample
ber of patents and new products introduced. Hen- and used a FORTRAN program to extract patent
derson and Cockburn (1996) report preliminary class information.
results that indicate that Investigational New Drug
Applications are highly correlated with ‘important’ Independent variables
patents. Moreover, looking across many indus-
tries, Acs and Audretsch (1989) also found a high The variable INTERNATIONAL records whether
degree of similarity between patents and innova- or not a firm had an international R&D activity
tive activity. within a given year. It takes the value of one for
Third, not all innovations are patented. Again, firms that engaged in international R&D activity,
our choice of industry mitigates this concern. The zero otherwise.2
pharmaceutical industry provides a setting where These data were gathered from an extensive
patents offer reasonable protection of proprietary search of multiple secondary sources. We included
knowledge. In his survey of companies about the the following types of activities in our defini-
effectiveness of patents in protecting rights, Levin tion of international R&D: sponsored, collabora-
(1986) reported that only the pharmaceutical and tive, and controlled (Penner-Hahn, 1998). Spon-
chemical industries found patents to be an effec- sored research activities are those in which a firm
tive means of protecting competitive advantages funds research projects focused on the discovery
of new technology. Moreover, the pharmaceutical of a specific product or phenomenon at a for-
industry is one in which patents play an extremely eign university or R&D lab. Sponsored research
important role in protecting the intellectual capi- involves the dissemination of knowledge back to
tal of firms (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). In the sponsoring firm and, in some cases, participa-
this industry, more so than in many others, firms tion by a limited number of firm personnel in the
are likely to apply for patents when there is a foreign laboratories as researchers. Moreover, the
development that may lead to a future drug. Phar- sponsoring firm often receives rights to products
maceutical firm executives, with whom we con- developed as a result of the research. Collabora-
versed, noted that they tend to apply for patents tive research projects involve participation of a
within 2–3 months of discovery of a promising firm’s employees in the foreign research activity,
compound. either through relocation and rotation of teams of
Fourth, we use U.S. patents to measure the employees to the foreign site or through under-
technical skills of Japanese firms. Foreign firms, taking dual tracks of research at home and abroad.
with and without operations in the United States, Collaborative research projects are commonly joint
patent in the U.S. system. Japanese firms had the ventures or alliances. Controlled research activities
largest percentage of U.S. patents granted, after are those for which the firm establishes ownership
U.S. firms, in 1986 (Wineberg, 1988). Because either through the acquisition of a foreign facil-
the United States represents the largest single mar- ity or the establishment of a new facility. In these
ket in the world for pharmaceutical products, for- instances, the firm employs foreign researchers to
eign firms often seek to protect their intellec- work in these facilities and often transfers scien-
tual property rights with U.S. patents. In addi- tists from its domestic operation to the foreign
tion, the Japanese system is very slow to grant
patents, 5–7 years as opposed to 2–3 in the United 2
There might exist a time lag from the establishment interna-
States, which might provide even more incentive tional R&D activities until these activities affect firm innovative
output. Our results do not materially change if we redefine
for Japanese firms to patent their drug discov- INTERNATIONAL so that it takes the value 1 only after firms
eries in the United States (Dunphy, 1988). One have international operations for at least 1 year, 2 years, or
firm in our sample had over 450 U.S. patents 3 years. Because we cannot justify the use of one of these lag
structures over the other, we choose to present the results based
granted during the period studied. Moreover, pre- on whether a firm has international R&D activities in a given
vious research has utilized U.S. patent counts to year.

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 129

site. The INTERNATIONAL variable makes no Israel (one). As previously mentioned, Cantwell
distinction between the type of international activ- (1992) shows that the United States, Germany, and
ity undertaken, merely that at least one of three the United Kingdom have a revealed technological
existed during the particular year. Although a more advantage in pharmaceuticals.
refined measure of the intensity of the international We measure firms’ underlying research capa-
activity, such as the amount of expenditure, would bilities by the count of drug patents in the 3-
be preferable, it is simply not available. Firms are year period prior to a focal year (i.e., the sum of
generally loath to release such level of detail about the three lagged years of the dependent variable).
their activities. We label this variable DRUG PATENT STOCK.
We excluded two types of activities from our Our aim in selecting the 3-year period is to cap-
definition of international R&D. We excluded ture recent research skills. Moreover, by focus-
patent licensing because the primary reason for ing on 3 years, we lessen the chance that a ran-
such licensing is to sell a specific product in a dom, extreme event in 1 year disproportionately
foreign market, rather than to undertake R&D influences our measure of pharmaceutical research
activities with the licensor. We also excluded clin- capabilities. Nevertheless, because the choice of a
ical development facilities from our definition. 3-year period is arbitrary, we re-examined our tests
Although a few firms established clinical devel- by redefining this variable with periods as short as
opment facilities during the study period, these 1 year and as long as 5 years. Our results were
activities were directed toward market adaptation not sensitive to the length of period over which
and acceptance of existing research rather than the we measured this variable.
discovery and development of science. Therefore, An alternative way to measure such capabilities
we did not code either of these activities as inter- is to measure R&D spending or R&D intensity.
national R&D for the purposes of this study. We prefer DRUG PATENT STOCK because it is
We used interviews with 15 of the sample firms a focused measure of pharmaceutical capabilities.
to verify the accuracy of the secondary data. Due to data constraints, measures of R&D spend-
The interviews were conducted in Japan during ing or R&D intensity are available only at the firm
May and June of 1993. In most cases, the com- level, not the pharmaceutical business level.3
pany employees interviewed were members of the We measure firms’ complementary research
strategy staff or the equivalent, generally a vice- capabilities by assessing the firms’ fermentation
presidential level employee or above. Prior to the research skills. Through discussions with execu-
interviews, the firms were sent summaries of their tives in the pharmaceutical industry, we identified
foreign R&D activity based on the secondary data fermentation research skills as a complementary
collection. The interviewers verified the accuracy technological area for pharmaceutical research.4
of the activity reports and obtained information Understanding of fermentation processes obtained
on any missing activities. Only in very isolated through research would assist firms in the cre-
instances were any errors found. Moreover, such ation of biotechnology based molecules and drugs,
‘errors’ were often the companies updating their necessary in today’s competitive pharmaceutical
current international R&D strategies. Given this
confirmation of secondary sources’ accuracy, we 3
We were able to compare the correlation between DRUG
relied on the public sources for the remaining sam- PATENT STOCK and R&D for 2 years of our sample and found
ple firms. them correlated (r = 0.61).
4
Fermentation processes are fundamental to the production of
Of the 65 firms in our sample, 36 undertook many biotechnology-based drugs. As Grace (1997: 78) writes,
international R&D activities at some period dur- ‘[t]o date, microorganisms (i.e., fermentation) are still the main
ing the sampling frame. Consistent with our priors tools bioengineers use to turn out pharmaceutical products.’ Esti-
mates are that almost 50 percent of biotechnological products
and our discussions with the Japanese pharmaceu- will be produced by fermentation processes and further, that half
tical executives, international R&D appeared to of all drugs will be biotechnology based in 10–20 years (Fox,
focus on sourcing knowledge that resided within 2001). Because much of the international R&D in our sample
was focused on biotechnology, ex ante we expect fermentation
countries with revealed technological advantage to be a complementary skill that would influence firms’ success
in pharmaceutical research. Of the 36 firms, 31 in their drug research. An additional rationale for choosing fer-
had investments in the United States; the remain- mentation as the complementary skill is that many of the firms in
this industry had particular expertise in fermentation processes
ing five firms had investments in Germany (two), through the production of antibiotics, yogurt, soy sauce, and even
the United Kingdom (one), Canada (one), and beer.

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
130 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

market. Fermentation research skills were mea- In order to control for firm size, we gathered
sured by the count of firm patents in class 435 of data on firm sales. Sales data that were restricted to
the USPTO classification scheme, for the 3-year pharmaceutical sales were not available; therefore,
period prior to a focal year. We label this vari- these data capture total firm sales. The variable
able FERMENTATION PATENT STOCK. Patent SALES measures firm sales in trillions of Japanese
class 435, which is the Molecular Biology and Bio- yen, inflation adjusted to 1980. We were unable to
chemistry class, is of particular interest because it collect reliable sales data on six firms over the
includes all patents related to fermentation. How- entire panel. In addition, in four cases companies
ever, we should note that this patent class con- changed their year-end for reporting during the
tains more than just fermentation patents, which sample period. Here, we dropped the transition
might or might not be useful in drug discovery. year from the data and included the comparable
Once again, because the length of time period over years before and after the change. Finally, we
which we measure this count is arbitrary, we also were not able to collect reliable sales data for six
examined alternative period lengths. We examined other firm-year observations (pertaining to three
periods from 1 to 5 years and found no material firms). Therefore, our usable sample when we
difference in the results that we present. include the variable SALES drops by 64 firm-year
observations to 521.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the vari-
Controls
ables. We have a balanced panel of 65 firms over
Other firm characteristics and strategies influence 12 years (1980–91)—with the exception of miss-
pharmaceutical patent output such as international ing data for SALES. Because the patent stocks are
experience, culture of innovativeness, size, or orga- calculated as the cumulative 3-year lag of the drug
nization structure. To control for these effects we and fermentation patent counts, the usable sample
take advantage of the panel data design and in for the statistical analyses is a balanced panel of
many specifications include firm fixed effects or 9 years (1983–91).
random effects. The advantage of employing firm
fixed effects or random effects is that they control
for many firm characteristics and strategies that ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
affect pharmaceutical patent output, which might
or might not be observable and measurable to the The empirical models that we estimate, in general,
researcher. take the following form:
In specifications where we do not use fixed
effects, we can examine differences in patent out-
DRUG PATENT COUNT
put by firms that are entrants to the pharmaceutical
industry. To do so we create a dummy variable = f (INTERNATIONAL,
labeled ENTRANT that takes the value one if a
DRUG PATENT STOCK, FERMENTATION
firm is an entrant to the Japanese pharmaceutical
industry, zero otherwise. PATENT STOCK, CONTROLS)

Table 1. Descriptive statistics (n = 585)a

Variable Correlation
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

1. DRUG PATENT COUNTt 3.23 5.23 0.00 35.0 1


2. INTERNATIONALt 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.0 0.37 1
3. DRUG PATENT STOCK(t−1,t−3) 8.34 13.55 0.00 89.0 0.89 0.35 1
4. FERMENTATION PATENT STOCK(t−1,t−3) 2.94 5.15 0.00 30.0 0.38 0.19 0.39 1
5. ENTRANT 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.0 −0.41 −0.18 −0.42 −0.06 1
6. SALESt b (yen, trillions) 2.24 2.41 0.04 13.8 −0.11 0.10 −0.12 0.04 0.44

a
The usable base sample is a 9-year balanced panel of 65 firms.
b
The usable sample size for SALES is 521.

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 131

Because of the limited nature of the dependent Poisson and negative binomial regression mod-
variable (it is a count), we employ non-linear els.
estimators including Poisson and negative bino- We first examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 in Table 2.
mial regression models. The use of such meth- The specification in Model 1 presents the results
ods is common in studies of patent output (e.g., of the Poisson regression model and the speci-
Graves and Langowitz, 1993; Hausman, Hall, fication in Model 2 presents the results of the
and Griliches, 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, negative binomial regression model. Because we
1996). Poisson regression models are formulated have nine observations for each firm, we recognize
on the assumption that the dependent variable that observations are not independent within firms.
is drawn from a Poisson distribution, which has To account for this, we utilize the Huber–White
equal mean and variance. Should this assump- sandwich estimator for the variance and allow for
tion not hold (i.e., the data are overdispersed), the possibility that observations are not indepen-
the likelihood function from which the estimates dent within firms but independent across firms (see
are derived is misspecified. Under this condi- Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
tion, a common approach is to employ negative- The test of overdispersion in these data is
binomial regression analysis, which allows the significant, as shown in Model 2. Therefore, we
mean and variance of the Poisson process to focus our discussion on the results from the neg-
vary by introducing an individual unobserved ative binomial estimates. Nevertheless, the pattern
disturbance. In our analysis, we employ both of results is similar across the negative binominal

Table 2. Analyses of firm drug patents Dependent variable: DRUG PATENT COUNTt ; (t-values in parentheses)
[marginal effects in brackets]

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6


Poisson Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
binomial binomial binomial binomial with binomial with
with random with random random effects fixed effects
effects effects Pharm. firms only

INTERNATIONALt 0.41∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗


(2.72) (2.16) (4.16) (3.91) (3.75) (4.84)
[0.94] [0.67] [1.76] [1.70] [2.67] [0.83]
DRUG PATENT 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
STOCK(t−1,t−3) (7.86) (3.04) (3.8) (3.17) (3.97) (1.69)
[0.06] [0.10] [0.05] [0.05] [0.10] [0.01]
FERMENTATION 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.01 0.04∗∗∗
PATENT
STOCK(t−1,t−3)
(2.52) (1.08) (1.94) (1.87) (0.82) (4.86)
[0.04] [0.03] [0.10] [0.09] [−0.07] [0.07]
ENTRANT −0.84∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −1.19∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗
(3.27) (3.38) (4.96) (3.92)
[−1.90] [−1.42] [−4.64] [−4.12]
SALESt −0.13∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(1.93) (4.09)
[−0.49] [2.90]
Intercept 0.79∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(6.35) (2.02) (6.25) (6.22) (3.57)
[1.67] [0.76] [6.48] [7.12] [6.53]
χ 2 for covariates 321.46∗∗∗ 60.40∗∗∗ 99.65∗∗∗ 94.57∗∗∗ 114.14∗∗∗ 37.55∗∗∗
(d.f.) (4) (4) (4) (5) (4) (3)
χ 2 test of overdispersion 344.02∗∗∗ 128.78∗∗∗ 95.37∗∗∗ 14.54∗∗∗ 290.84∗∗∗
(col. 2) and of panel
model (other cols.)
n 585 585 585 521 231 522

∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗
p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01; one-tailed tests

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
132 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

and Poisson specifications with the exception of As previously mentioned, we wish to take advan-
the variable FERMENTATION PATENT STOCK. tage of our panel data structure and better isolate
Turning to the negative binomial results in Model the impact of our hypothesized effects from poten-
2, the positive and significant effect of DRUG tial sources of unobserved firm heterogeneity. This
PATENT STOCK indicates that firms receive more is an important consideration because the firms
drug patents if they have greater drug patents choose to conduct international R&D (e.g., Shaver,
over the previous 3 years. This is consistent with 1998). The use of panel data techniques such as
Hypothesis 1. In order to assess the magnitude of random effects or fixed effects mitigates this prob-
this effect, we examine the marginal effect of this lem in that it is one way to control for constant firm
variable on the dependent variable. Because the effects that are not included in the set of indepen-
negative binomial model is a non-linear estimator, dent variables.
the coefficient estimate is not the marginal effect. Model 3 of Table 2 presents the negative bino-
Rather, the marginal effect equals eβX b. Therefore, mial specification with firm random effects. The
the magnitude of the marginal effect is contingent test of the inclusion of the random effects is highly
on the values of the independent variables. We significant, indicating that there exist unobserved
present the marginal effect, evaluated at the mean firm effects. The statistical significance level of all
of the independent variables, in square brackets in variables increases with the addition of the random
the table. The marginal effect of DRUG PATENT effect. As a result, the variable FERMENTATION
STOCK is 0.1. This indicates that firms with 10 PATENT STOCK becomes statistically significant
drug patents in the previous three years will have as predicted by Hypothesis 2.
one more patent in the current year. There are some noticeable changes in the mag-
The coefficient estimate of FERMENTATION nitude of the marginal effects in the random
PATENT STOCK is non-significant in Model 2. effects specification.7 First, although the variable
Therefore, we do not find support for Hypothesis increases in statistical significance, the marginal
2 in this specification. As we noted previously, effect of DRUG PATENT STOCK is half of what
this variable was significant in Model 1. However, it was in the model without the random effects. In
given that the data are overdispersed, we favor the contrast, the marginal effect of INTERNATIONAL
interpretation of the negative binomial estimates. increases. In this specification, a firm that conducts
The coefficient estimate of INTERNATIONAL international R&D in a year generates 1.76 more
is positive and significant in Model 2. The marginal patents than a firm without international R&D.
effect of 0.67 suggests that firms increase their Finally, the marginal effect of ENTRANT also
patent output once they undertake international decreases to −4.64.8
R&D.5 We find evidence that many firms increase Models 4 through 6 of Table 2 further examine
their drug patenting when they conduct interna- the sensitivity of these results across various spec-
tional R&D. We did not hypothesize an effect ifications. In Model 4 we include SALES as an
for this variable in the entire sample because we independent variable. As previously discussed, the
hypothesize that the effect of INTERNATIONAL sample size drops to 521 for this specification due
is contingent on a firm’s research capabilities. to missing data. In Model 4, all of the variables
Finally, we find that ENTRANT is negative and of interest remain with similar levels of statisti-
highly significant. The size of the coefficient esti- cal significance and marginal effect. This gives
mate indicates that firms that entered the pharma- us confidence that the previously discussed results
ceutical industry have about 1.4 less patents in any were not driven by changes in firm sales. How-
given year than pharmaceutical firms.6 ever, unexpectedly, SALES takes a negative and
significant effect. The marginal effect is such that

5
Because INTERNATIONAL is a dummy variable, we calcu- 7
We evaluate the marginal effects at the mean of the independent
late its marginal effect in the following manner: eβX1 − eβX0 . variables and at the mean random effect.
Where b is the vector of coefficient estimates, eβX1 is evaluated 8
ENTRANT represents a group fixed effect because we expect
at INTERNATIONAL = 1 and at the mean of the other inde- differences in the DRUG PATENT COUNT of firms that
pendent variables; eβX0 is evaluated at INTERNATIONAL = 0 are diversifying entrants to the pharmaceutical industry. The
and at the mean of the other independent variables. random-effects model then accounts for the possibility of firm
6
In the acquisition context, which is different than the situation heterogeneity beyond this group effect. Namely, within the
that we examine, Hitt et al. (1991) show that acquisitions by groups of entrants and non-entrants there exist firm differences
diversifying acquirers have a negative effect on patent intensity. that we capture by a random effect.

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 133

a trillion yen increase in sales decreases patents 6.9 The sample size drops in the fixed-effects
by one-tenth. This effect, while statistically signif- analysis because seven companies had zero val-
icant, is not large given that the average value of ues of DRUG PATENT COUNT over the entire
SALES is 2.2 trillion yen. sample and meaningful fixed effects cannot be
Our interpretation of the negative effect is that estimated for these firms given the model speci-
the following two factors are working in tandem. fication. In addition, the effect of ENTRANT is
First, many of the entrants to the pharmaceu- subsumed within the firm fixed effect and, there-
tical business are large diversified firms, which fore, is not included in the specification. When
have most of their sales in non-pharmaceutical comparing these results to those in Model 3, all
lines of business. The positive correlation between variables of interest remain statistically significant.
SALES and ENTRANT supports this claim. Sec- In order to calculate marginal effects, we evalu-
ond, should diversifying entrants put more re- ate the marginal effects at the average fixed effect
sources and effort into pharmaceutical research of the firms that comprise the sample. There are
when their other businesses are deteriorating, then some changes in the level of the marginal effects.
sales would be negatively correlated with drug The marginal effects of INTERNATIONAL and
patents. DRUG PATENT STOCK decrease, while the effect
To further assess this interpretation, we restrict of FERMENTATION PATENT STOCK increases.
the sample to the pharmaceutical firms (i.e., we However, these are not as readily comparable to
removed firms where ENTRANT equaled 1 from those in Model 3 because we have removed firms
the sample), which reduces the sample size from from the sample that had zero patents for the entire
521 to 231. We present these results in Model panel. Thus, we removed a very selected portion
5. The effect of SALES is positive and highly of the sample in this analysis. Nevertheless, even
significant, as we would expect. This lends sup- by removing a very selected portion of the sample,
port to our interpretation of the negative effect we find that the results are very consistent between
of SALES in the entire sample. The magnitude the random and fixed-effect specifications.
of the marginal effect is that a one trillion yen To summarize the results from Table 2, we
increase in sales results in almost one-half addi- find support for Hypothesis 1. Firms with greater
tional patent, which is not a large effect. Turn- DRUG PATENT STOCK generate more patents.
ing to the other coefficient estimates, there are We find mixed support for Hypothesis 2. We find
three noteworthy differences between the results some evidence that FERMENTATION PATENT
in Model 5 and Model 4. First, the marginal effect STOCK increases patent output; however, this
of INTERNATIONAL is 2.67 for the restricted finding is sensitive to specification. This could
sample of pharmaceutical firms vs. the value of be attributable to the fact that the patent class
1.70 in the full sample. This result foreshadows of Molecular Biology and Biochemistry contains
the support we find for Hypothesis 3 in later anal- patents other than fermentation. Finally, we find
ysis. Consistent with Hypothesis 3 we expect that that across specifications firms that conduct inter-
the pharmaceutical firms that comprise the subsam- national R&D have greater patent output. We
ple have greater ability to interpret and incorporate turn to testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, which argues
international research and hence will more likely that this effect is contingent on a firms’ DRUG
benefit from such. Second, the marginal effect of PATENT STOCK and FERMENTATION PATENT
DRUG PATENT STOCK is larger (0.1 vs. 0.05). STOCK.
This might indicate that past research leads to a In order to test Hypothesis 3, we split the
greater trajectory into future patenting for phar- sample into observations where DRUG PATENT
maceutical firms vs. entrants. Third, the effect of
FERMENTATION PATENT STOCK loses signifi- 9
We estimate this specification by including individual firm
cance. This could indicate that the pharmaceutical dummy variables for each firm (e.g., Greene, 2001). We do
firms do not have extensive biotech skills or that so for two reasons. First, the commonly used negative bino-
mial estimator with fixed effects (Hausman et al., 1984) does
biotech skills are not the basis of their drug dis- not necessarily control for all stable firm effects (Allison and
covery. Waterman, 2001). Second, the estimator conditions out the firm
Our final sensitivity analysis of the specifica- effects. Because marginal effects are contingent on where a firm
lies upon the curve, conditioning out the firm effects make it
tion in Model 3 is to replace the random effect difficult to assess the marginal effect of the covariates (Greene,
with firm fixed effects, which we present in Model 2000).

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
134 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

STOCK is zero and where it is greater than zero.10 firm effects, but with adjusted variances to account
Hypothesis 3 predicts that INTERNATIONAL will for the fact that each firm has 9 years of data
have a significant positive effect in the subsam- in the panel. This parallels the specification from
ple where DRUG PATENT STOCK is greater Model 2 of Table 2. Table 3 presents these results.
than zero. Likewise, we do not expect much, if Second, we examine the negative binomial spec-
any, effect of INTERNATIONAL in the subsample ification with firm random effects. This specifi-
where DRUG PATENT STOCK is zero. We choose cation parallels the specification of Model 3 in
zero as the value of DRUG PATENT STOCK to Table 2. Table 4 presents these results. We pre-
split the sample because we believe that there are fer these specifications because they allow us to
important differences in the research capabilities include the entire sample. Nevertheless, we find
of firms that have pharmaceutical patents over a very similar results with consistent interpretations
period of time vs. those that have none. for the other specifications that we presented in
We examine this hypothesis using two of the Table 2.11 The advantage of the specification in
specifications that we previously described. First, Table 4 over Table 3 is that it employs the random
we use the negative binomial specification without effect in order to better control for unobserved firm

10 11
The sample is split by observation, not firm. This means that a Restricting the sample to the pharmaceutical firms (i.e., Model
firm (but not the same firm-year observation) can appear in both 5 of Table 2) was not possible in the forthcoming analysis due to
subsamples if the value of DRUG PATENT STOCK is zero in the very small sample size for the set of firms with zero values
some years and non-zero in others. of DRUG PATENT STOCK.

Table 3. Analyses of firm drug patents: negative binomial regression models. Dependent Variable: DRUG PATENT
COUNTt (t-values in parentheses) [marginal effects in square brackets] {variance of marginal effects in curly brackets}

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4


DRUG PATENT DRUG PATENT FERM. PATENT FERM. PATENT
STOCK = 0 STOCK >0 STOCK = 0 STOCK >0

INTERNATIONALt 0.57 0.32∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.23∗


(1.16) (2.62) (2.8) (1.36)
[0.11] [1.12] [0.65] [0.66]
{0.12} {0.44} {0.30} {0.50}
t-test that the marginal 2.35∗∗∗ 0.02
effect of
INTERNATIONAL in
odd model is ≤ even
model
DRUG PATENT 0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
STOCK(t−1,t−3) (4.21) (4.7) (3.39)
[0.13] [0.10] [0.12]
FERMENTATION PATENT −0.01 0.01 0.01
STOCK(t−1,t−3) (0.07) (1.05) (0.52)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.02]
ENTRANT −1.32∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗
(3.07) (1.95) (2.39) (2.75)
[−0.41] [−1.06] [−0.80] [−1.73]
Intercept −0.69 0.69∗∗∗ −0.31 0.72∗∗∗
(0.34) (5.33) (1.20) (3.99)
[−0.11] [2.33] [−0.25] [2.03]
χ 2 for covariates 9.84∗∗ 73.58∗∗∗ 80.00∗∗∗ 51.26∗∗∗
(d.f.) (3) (4) (3) (4)
χ 2 test of over-dispersion 4.11∗∗ 191.73∗∗∗ 51.47∗∗∗ 198.05∗∗∗
(1 d.f.)
n 178 407 240 345

∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗
p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01; one-tailed tests

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 135

heterogeneity. The advantage of the specification zero for the set of firms where DRUG PATENT
in Table 3 over Table 4 is that the marginal effects STOCK equals zero. The marginal effects are also
are more easily comparable across models. This is significantly different (1.12 vs. 0.34, p < 0.08);
because the marginal effects in Table 4 are evalu- however, the level of significance is lower than
ated at the mean random effect within each model. in the previous table. Two points are worth noting
However, the mean random effect might not be here. First, the marginal effects are calculated at the
equal across models. average random effect within each model, which
There are two factors we examine in making might not be equal. In particular, we would expect
our assessment of whether INTERNATIONAL has that companies with DRUG PATENT STOCK
a greater effect for firms with existing levels of greater than zero will have more patents in a given
patent stock. First, we examine the significance year based on the results in Table 2 and thus the
level of the coefficient estimate of INTERNA- average firm effect should be larger. Therefore, the
TIONAL in the two subsamples. Models 1 and 2 of test in Table 4 might exhibit a conservative bias.
Tables 3 and 4 present these results. We find that Second, the test of including the random effect in
INTERNATIONAL has a positive and significant the specification is non-significant in Model 1 yet
effect when DRUG PATENT STOCK is greater it is in Model 2. This indicates that the specifi-
than zero. The effect of INTERNATIONAL is not cation in Model 1 of Table 3 is preferred to the
significant when DRUG PATENT STOCK equals specification in Model 1 of Table 4. If we compare
zero. This lends support to our hypothesis. the random effect of Model 1 Table 3 to Model 2
We then examine the marginal effect of INTER- Table 4 (0.11 vs. 1.12), the difference in marginal
NATIONAL across the two subsamples and test effect is highly significant (p < 0.01). Overall, we
if the marginal effect is greater in the subsam- find very consistent support for our hypothesis that
ple where DRUG PATENT STOCK is greater firms benefit from international R&D only when
than zero. We focus on the marginal effect rather they possess skills in the underlying technologies.
than the coefficient estimate because of the non- We follow a similar procedure to test Hypothesis
linearity of the estimator. Namely, if the obser- 4. We create two subsamples—one where FER-
vations in one model lie on a different part of MENTATION PATENT STOCK is zero and one
the estimated curve, then comparing the coef- where it is greater than zero—and examine the
ficient estimates will be misleading. Turn first estimates of INTERNATIONAL across the mod-
to Table 3. The marginal effect of INTERNA- els. Models 3 and 4 of Tables 3 and 4 present
TIONAL when DRUG PATENT STOCK equals these estimates. In all models, the coefficient esti-
zero is 0.11. However, the marginal effect of mates of INTERNATIONAL are positive and sig-
INTERNATIONAL when DRUG PATENT nificantly different from zero (although marginally
STOCK is greater than zero is 1.12. Below the so in Table 3 model 4). Moreover, the difference
marginal effect, we present the variance of the in the marginal effects across models are non-
marginal effect.12 With these data, we then conduct significant. The marginal effects in Table 3 are
a t-test of the marginal effects across the two mod- 0.65 vs. 0.66 and in Table 4 are 1.01 vs. 1.82.
els. The t-test is highly significant, indicating that Because there is no difference in the marginal
the marginal effect of INTERNATIONAL for firms effect, we do not find support for Hypothesis 4.
with drug patents from the previous 3 years is To summarize the results from Tables 3 and 4,
greater than those without. This supports Hypoth- we find that international R&D increases patent
esis 3. count for firms that have drug patents in the pre-
Table 4 adds the random effect to the specifica- vious 3 years. Otherwise, there is no effect. How-
tions in Table 3. Once again the effect of INTER- ever, the positive effect of international R&D on
NATIONAL is significantly greater than zero for patent count is not contingent on firms having fer-
the set of firms where DRUG PATENT STOCK is mentation patents in the previous 3 years.
greater than zero and not significantly greater than
Further robustness checks
12 
The variance of the marginal effect is calculated as G VG, We performed a number of additional robustness
where G is the matrix of first derivatives of the marginal effect
by β (see footnote 5) and V is the variance–covariance matrix checks to further verify our interpretation of the
of the estimates of β.) results that we report. First, we examined whether
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
136 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

Table 4. Analyses of firm drug patents: negative binomial random-effects regression models Dependent variable:
DRUG PATENT COUNTt (t-values in parentheses) [marginal effects in square brackets] {variance of marginal effects
in curly brackets}

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4


DRUG PATENT DRUG PATENT FERM. PATENT FERM. PATENT
STOCK = 0 STOCK > 0 STOCK = 0 STOCK > 0

INTERNATIONALt 0.48 0.37∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗


(1.02) (3.69) (3.5) (2.38)
[0.34] [1.12] [1.01] [1.82]
{0.47} {0.30} {0.57} {0.95}
t-test that the marginal effect 1.39∗ 0.73
of INTERNATIONAL in
odd model is ≤ even model
DRUG PATENT 0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
STOCK(t−1,t−3) (4.29) (3.24) (3.97)
[0.13] [0.08] [0.10]
FERMENTATION PATENT 0.02 0.02∗ 0
STOCK(t−1,t−3) (0.25) (1.48) (0.32)
[0.01] [0.03] [0.03]
ENTRANT −1.25∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −1.42∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗
(2.54) (3.33) (4.46) (3.51)
[−0.75] [−1.10] [−1.82] [−5.63]
Intercept 0.50 1.60∗∗∗ 0.65 2.00∗∗∗
(0.56) (5.71) (1.18) (5.53)
[0.30] [2.33] [0.83] [12.67]
χ 2 covariates 6.55∗ 74.22∗∗∗ 84.53∗∗∗ 50.96∗∗∗
(d.f.) (3) (4) (3) (4)
χ 2 test of random effect 0.01 47.56∗∗∗ 2.58∗ 64.44∗∗∗
(1 d.f.)
n 178 407 240 345

∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗
p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01; one-tailed tests

the results of INTERNATIONAL in Model 1 of this sample (and outside of it) extensively patent
Tables 3 and 4 might be driven by a lack of obser- in the United States when they do not have opera-
vations where INTERNATIONAL takes the value tions there. Second, to the extent that operating in
of one. In Model 1 INTERNATIONAL takes the the United States per se increases the propensity
value of one for 19 percent of the observations. to patent in the United States, we would expect
Second, we experimented with different cut-off INTERNATIONAL to increase equally in both
points for splitting the subsamples in Tables 3 subsamples. This is not consistent with our results.
and 4, which use a cut-off of zero. In examining Nevertheless, there is a possibility that this alter-
cut-offs of one to four patents, we found results
native explanation would be most pronounced for
that were consistent with those presented in the
firms with drug patent stocks greater than zero.
table.
To assess this, we reran the analysis by examining
Finally, because most of the international expan-
sion activity of these firms is into the United only the international expansion activities of the
States, there is the possibility that INTERNA- five firms that conducted international R&D out-
TIONAL captures an increased propensity of firms side of the United States. Although the number of
to patent in the United States once they locate observations where INTERNATIONAL equals one
there and does not capture increased innovative becomes very small, we find results that are quali-
output. There are three reasons why we expect tatively similar to the ones that we present. The
that this is not driving the results. First, as we coefficient estimate of INTERNATIONAL was
previously discussed, many of the foreign firms in negative for the subsample where DRUG PATENT
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 137

STOCK equals zero and positive for the subsam- investigation. While we do not rule out the possi-
ple where DRUG PATENT STOCK was greater bility that such strategies exist, overall we do not
than zero. Although neither coefficient estimate find firms that lack technological skills employing
was significantly zero, they were significantly dif- effective strategies.
ferent from each other. Again, this suggests that, Finally, our findings highlight that conducting
as hypothesized, international benefits firms with international R&D and investing in R&D at home
greater absorptive capacity. are complements rather than substitutes. It is the
In summary, the empirical results are consis- firms that have technological capabilities that most
tent with our predictions regarding firms’ previ- greatly benefit from international R&D. This in
ous innovative activities. We find that firms with turn, can start a virtuous circle whereby this greater
greater underlying research capabilities are more knowledge base can further foster benefits from
innovative. We also find that firms with underly- increased international R&D.
ing research capabilities benefit most from interna- Overall we find that international R&D can play
tional R&D activities. Therefore, it is the combina- an important role in firms’ innovation. However,
tion of international R&D activities with existing this role should be coordinated with its underly-
skills in underlying research that increases innova- ing efforts in R&D at home. Moreover, due to the
tive output. contingent nature of when this effort is successful,
we highlight the importance of managerial strate-
gic decision making with respect to successfully
engaging in international R&D.
DISCUSSION

Our focal finding is that Japanese firms that com- CONCLUSION


menced international R&D, on average, increased
patent output. However, this effect was only signif- We find that international R&D activities increase
icant for firms that had existing capabilities in the the patent output of Japanese pharmaceutical firms.
underlying technology prior to expanding interna- However, it is firms with existing pharmaceutical
tionally. This finding is important for the following research capabilities that benefit most from inter-
reasons. national R&D. While there are many benefits that
First, in line with many recent prescriptions, it firms can obtain from international R&D activities,
provides empirical evidence that there exist bene- there also exist many complications that they incur
fits from conducting international R&D. This helps when making and managing such investments. For
augment the findings of Almeida (1996). How- this reason, only under certain conditions are net
ever, because we examine all Japanese entrants benefits from international R&D to be realized.
that expanded overseas, we are able to identify an This finding corroborates previous research show-
important contingency with respect to when inter- ing that not all firms enjoy success with their
national R&D is beneficial. Namely, only firms international expansion efforts even when there
that have skills in the underlying or underlying exist advantages to having international operations
technology benefit from international R&D. (Mitchell et al., 1992).
Second, our results suggest that tapping into for- We find that in order for firms’ patent output to
eign knowledge bases is not a panacea, especially benefit from international R&D, they must possess
for firms that are lagging in technological skill. research capabilities in addition to overseas R&D
Rather, our results suggest that such firms are the activities. This is consistent with our argument
ones that do not benefit from such activities. This is that knowledge-based skills and capabilities are
important because international R&D is an effort not simply acquired and transferred back to the
that is costly in terms of capital, scientific, and parent. Rather, firms must have existing research
managerial resources. We do not want to rule out capabilities in order to fully benefit from engaging
the possibility that technologically lagging firms in international R&D. This finding is consistent
can benefit from conducting international R&D. with the notion of absorptive capacity as described
However, our results show that this will likely by Cohen and Levinthal (1990).
require more refined or nuanced strategies. Iden- Our results have important implications for rec-
tifying such strategies is beyond the scope of this onciling theories of asset-seeking FDI (e.g., Kogut
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
138 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

and Chang, 1991) with theories of asset-based FDI REFERENCES


such as internalization (e.g., Buckley and Cas-
son, 1976; Dunning, 1977). Asset-seeking theories Acs ZJ, Audretsch D. 1989. Patents as a measure of
argue that firms make direct foreign investments innovation. Kyklos 42(2): 171–180.
Ahuja G. 2000. The duality of collaboration: inducements
in order to obtain assets that they do not currently and opportunities in the formation of interfirm
possess. Asset-based theories, on the other hand, linkages. Strategic Management Journal , Special
argue that firms possess proprietary assets that they Issue 21(3): 317–343.
choose to internalize by making direct investment Allison PD, Waterman R. 2001. Fixed-effects negative
overseas. binomial regression models. Working paper, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.
Our research suggests that while the Japanese Almeida P. 1996. Knowledge sourcing by foreign
pharmaceutical firms expanded in order to gain multinationals: patent citation analysis in the
access to skills and technology not resident in U.S. semiconductor industry. Strategic Management
Japan, those firms with pharmaceutical research Journal , Winter Special Issue 17(3): 155–165.
capabilities were best able to enhance their patent Anand J, Delios A. 2002. Absolute and relative resources
as determinants of international acquisitions. Strategic
output. Therefore, it appears that both asset-seeking Management Journal 23(2): 119–134.
and asset-based factors are important in the success Bound J, Cummins J, Griliches Z, Hall BH, Jaffe A.
of international R&D. Just as entering a country 1984. Who does R&D and who patents? In R&D
that has a large consumer market is no guarantee Patents and Productivity, Griliches Z (ed). University
for successful asset-based FDI, entering a market of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL; 21–54.
Buckley PJ, Casson MC. 1976. The Economic Theory of
that has a unique knowledge base is no guarantee the Multinational Enterprise. Macmillan: London.
of successful asset-seeking FDI. Cameron AC, Trivedi PK. 1998. Regression Analysis of
Many previous studies have shown the impor- Count Data. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
tance of R&D when assessing which firms expand U.K.
overseas (e.g., Hennart and Park, 1994) and when Cantwell J. 1989. Technological Innovation and Multi-
national Corporations. Basil Blackwell: Cambridge,
international expansion is successful (e.g., Morck MA.
and Yeung, 1991, 1992). In this paper we identify Cantwell J. 1992. The internationalisation of technologi-
when international R&D activities enhance firms’ cal activity and its implications for competitiveness. In
innovation. Continuing research into what deter- Technology Management and International Business,
mines successful international expansion, espe- Granstrand O, Hakanson L, Sjolander S (eds). Wiley:
New York; 25–95.
cially expansion activities that focus on the acqui- Cantwell J. 1995. The globalisation of technology: what
sition of knowledge within geographical locations, remains of the product cycle model? Cambridge
is warranted. Journal of Economics 19: 155–174.
Caves RE. 1971. International corporations: the indus-
trial economics of foreign investment. Economica
38(February): 1–27.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Caves RE. 1982. Multinational Enterprise and Economic
Analysis. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
We appreciate helpful comments from the anony- U.K.
mous referees, Richard Arend, Joel Baum, José Cohen WM, Levinthal DA. 1990. Absorptive capacity:
Campa, John Cantwell, Wilbur Chung, Bill Greene, a new perspective on learning and innovation.
Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1): 128–152.
Xavier Martin, Will Mitchell, Tom Pugel, Chris Comanor WS, Scherer FM. 1969. Patent statistics as a
Tucci, seminar participants at HEC, INSEAD, the measure of technical change. Journal of Political
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, the Univer- Economy 77(3): 392–398.
sity of Toronto, and at the Academy of Inter- Dierickx I, Cool K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and
national Business Annual Meetings in Vienna. sustainability of competitive advantage. Management
Science 35(12): 1504.
We also wish to thank Hiro Ishida and Anne DeMeyer A, Mizushima A. 1989. Global R&D manage-
Parmigiani for research assistance. Myles Shaver’s ment. R&D Management 19(2): 135–146.
research was supported by a grant from the Ten- DeMeyer A. 1992. Management of international R&D
neco Fund Program at the Stern School of Busi- operations. In Technology Management and Interna-
ness, New York University. Joan Penner-Hahn’s tional Business, Granstrand O, Hakanson L, Sjolan-
der S (eds). Wiley: New York.
research was supported by the Japan Technology Dunning J. 1977. Trade, location of economic activity and
Management Program at the University of Michi- MNE: a search for an eclectic approach. In The Inter-
gan. national Allocation of Economic Activity, Ohlin B,
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
Does International R&D Increase Patents? 139
Hesselborn PO, Wijkman PM (eds). Macmillan: Lon- market value. American Economic Review 76(5):
don; 395–418. 984–1001.
Dunning J. 1998. Location and the multinational JPMA (Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
enterprise: a neglected factor. Journal of International tion). Data Book 1992 . Tokyo, Japan.
Business 29(1): 45–67. Kogut B. 1991. Country capabilities and the permeability
Dunphy JF. 1988. Japan’s patent system comes under fire. of borders. Strategic Management Journal , Summer
Chemical Week 143(4): 26–28. Special Issue 12: 33–47.
Fayerweather J. 1969. International Business Manage- Kogut B, Chang SJ. 1991. Technological capabilities and
ment: A Conceptual Framework . McGraw-Hill Series Japanese foreign direct investment in the United
in International Business. McGraw-Hill: New York. States. Review of Economics & Statistics 73(3):
Fox S. 2001. Business models: contract biopharma- 401–413.
ceutical manufacturing. Chemical Market Reporter Kogut B, Zander U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm,
260(16): 20–22. combinative capabilities, and the replication of
Grace E. 1997. Biotechnology Unzipped: Promises and technology. Organization Science 3: 383–397.
Realities. Joseph Henry: Washington, DC. Komaran RV, Goodman RA 1993. Acquisition of domes-
Graves SB, Langowitz NS. 1993. Innovative productivity tic and foreign technologies by American multina-
and returns to scale in the pharmaceutical industry. tional corporations. In Academy of Management Pro-
Strategic Management Journal 14(8): 593–605. ceedings, Atlanta, GA.
Greene W. 2000. Econometric Analysis (4th edn). Kuemmerle W. 1997. Building effective R&D capabili-
Prentice-Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ. ties abroad. Harvard Business Review 75(2): 61–70.
Greene W. 2001. Fixed and random effects in nonlinear Levin RC. 1986. A new look at the patent system.
models. Working paper, Stern School of Business, American Economic Review 76(2): 200.
New York University. Mansfield E. 1962. Entry, Gibrat’s law, innovation, and
Griliches Z. 1980. R & D and the productivity slowdown. the growth of firms. American Economic Review
American Economic Review 70(2): 343–348. 52(5): 1023–1051.
Griliches Z. 1986. Productivity, R and D, and basic Mansfield E. 1965. Rates of return from industrial
research at the firm level in the 1970’s. American research and development. American Economic
Economic Review 76(1): 141–154. Review 55(1/2): 310–322.
Griliches Z. 1990. Patent statistics as economic indi- Mansfield E. 1980. Basic research and productivity
cators: a survey. Journal of Economic Literature increase in manufacturing. American Economic
28(December): 1661–1707. Review 70(5): 863–873.
Hall BH, Griliches Z, Hausman J. 1986. Patents and R Mezias SJ, Glynn MA. 1993. The three faces of corporate
and D: is there a lag? International Economic Review renewal: institution, revolution, and evolution. Strate-
27(2): 265–283. gic Management Journal 14(2): 77–161.
Hausman J, Hall BH, Griliches Z. 1984. Econometric Mitchell W, Shaver JM, Yeung B. 1992. Getting there in
models for count data with an application to a global industry: impacts on performance of changing
the patent–R&D relationship. Econometrica 52(4): international presence. Strategic Management Journal
909–938. 13(6): 419–432.
Helfat C. 1997. Know-how and asset complementarity Morck R, Yeung, B. 1991. Why investors value
and dynamic capability accumulation: the case of multinationality. Journal of Business 64(2): 165–188.
R&D. Strategic Management Journal 18(5): 339–360. Morck R, Yeung B. 1992. Internalization: an event study
Henderson R, Cockburn I. 1994. Measuring competence? test. Journal of International Economics 33: 41–56.
Exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research. National Research Council. 1992. U.S.–Japan Technol-
Strategic Management Journal , Winter Special Issue ogy Linkages in Biotechnology: Challenges for the
15: 63–84. 1990’s. National Academy of Sciences.
Henderson R, Cockburn I. 1996. Scale, scope, and Nelson RR (ed). 1993. National Innovation Systems.
spillovers: the determinants of research productivity Oxford University Press: New York.
in drug discovery. RAND Journal of Economics 27: Pakes A. 1985. On patents, R & D, and the stock market
32–59. rate of return. Journal of Political Economy 93(2):
Hennart J-F, Park Y-R. 1994. Location, governance, 390–409.
and strategic determinants of Japanese manufacturing Penner-Hahn JD. 1995. The internationalization of
investment in the United States. Strategic Management research and development: a firm level study. PhD
Journal 15(6): 419–436. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
Hitt MA, Hoskisson RE, Ireland RD, Harrison JS. 1991. Penner-Hahn JD. 1998. Firm and environmental influ-
Effects of acquisitions on R&D inputs and outputs. ences on the mode and sequence of foreign research
Academy of Management Journal 34(3): 693–706. and development activities. Strategic Management
Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M, Henderson R. 1993. Geo- Journal 19(2): 149–168.
graphic localization of knowledge spillovers as evi- Pisano GP. 1990. The R&D boundaries of the firm: an
denced by patent citations. Quarterly Journal of Eco- empirical analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly
nomics 108(3): 577. 35(1): 153–176.
Jaffe AB. 1986. Technological opportunity and spillovers Polyani M. 1964. Personal Knowledge. Harper & Row:
of R&D: evidence from firm’s patents, profits, and New York.
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)
140 J. Penner-Hahn and J. M. Shaver

Reich MR. 1990. Why the Japanese don’t export more Strategic Management Journal , Winter Special Issue
pharmaceuticals: health policy as industrial policy. 17: 27–43.
California Management Review , Winter: 124–150. Teece DJ. 1976. Technology transfer by multinational
Scherer FM, Ross D. 1990. Industrial Market Structure firms: the resource cost of transferring technological
and Economic Performance. Houghton Mifflin: know-how. Economic Journal 87: 242–261.
Boston, MA. Teece DJ. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation.
Shaver JM. 1998. Accounting for endogeneity when Research Policy 15: 285–306.
assessing strategy performance: does entry mode Terleckyj NE. 1980. What do R&D numbers tell us about
choice affect FDI survival? Management Science technological change? American Economic Review
44(4): 571–585. 70(2): 55–61.
Shaver JM, Mitchell W, Yeung B. 1997. The effect of Wesson T. 1999. A model of asset-seeking foreign direct
own-firm and other-firm experience on foreign direct investment driven by demand conditions. Canadian
investment survival in the United States, 1987–1992. Journal of Administrative Sciences 16(1): 1–10.
Strategic Management Journal 18(10): 811–824. Wineberg A. 1988. The Japanese patent system: a non-
Szulanski G. 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: imped- tariff barrier to foreign businesses? Journal of World
iments to the transfer of best practice within the firm. Trade 22(1): 11–22.

Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 121–140 (2005)

Potrebbero piacerti anche